THE
CHOWKHAMBA SANSKRIT STUDIES
VOL. I.

ABHINAVAGUPTA

BY

K. C. Pandey

THE
CHOWKHAMBA SANSKRIT STUDIES
Vol. I

ABHINAVAGUPTA

AN
HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY

BY

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M. A., PH. D., D. LITT., M. O. L., SHASTRI,
LUCKNOW

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
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AS A TOKEN OF GRATITUDE FOR THE INSPIRATION

No 1

अभिनवगुप्तः



ABHINAVAGUPTA

FOREWORD

The work now being placed before the public—Abhinavagupta : An Historical and Philosophical Study by Dr. Kanti Chandra Pandey—is an important contribution to scholarship. It provides an account of well-known, but little-studied, philosophical system, known under the several names of 'Śiva' 'Trika' 'Pratyabhijñā' and others. The basic Sūtras expounding the system are by Śiva himself, followed by Paraśurāma Gauḍapāda and others: but like Śaṅkarācārya in the realm of Vedānta whose basis lay in the Upaniṣads, the person who made the system intelligible was the great Abhinava Gupta who hails, like so many writers of the period, from Kashmir. He is a voluminous writer on several subjects – on Dramaturgy, on Rhetoric, on the Philosophy of Poetry and on Philosophy. But whatever he wrote, not only on Philosophy but also on poetry and Poetics—in all there runs the under-current of spirituality culminating in that 'Brahmāsvāda' the idea of which he has made so popular.

I have only to add, in the words of my esteemed friend, Mahāmahopādhyāya Pandit Gopinath Kaviraj that in the succeeding volumes the author will "concentrate his energy on the constructive side of his work - viz. its exposition and interpretation, more than on the refutation of rival doctrines". It is not that there is no constructive aspect in the present volume : there is plenty of it : but it is so embeded in the mass of polemics in which our writers always revel, that

an ordinary student will find it difficult to utilize it for his purpose.

It is encouraging to find a young scholar appearing on the horizon of Sanskrit philosophical Scholarship with such innate and acquired aptitude as one finds evinced in the following pages ; especially the "historical sense" of which there is ample evidence in the first part of the work.

I hope the volume will find readers. I assure them they will be more than repaid.

GEORGE TOWN
ALLAHABAD
18-4-1936.

Ganganath Jha

INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION

The opportunity to bring out the Second Edition has been utilized for adding an offset picture of Abhinavagupta and four new Chapters, besides giving a more complete account of his life, works and historical background of his thought.

The authenticity of the picture in paint lies in its being a faithful representation of the pen-picture, drawn by his pupil, Madhurāja Yogin, who was present at the celebration of the 'recognition' of Abhinavagupta as the spiritual head of all the Śaiva sects by the contemporary great spiritualists, both male and female.

The picture has a religio-philosophical significance; because it presents him as a typical follower of the Kula system. Two 'Dūtīs', each with a jar of Śiva-Rasa, a kind of intoxicant, in the right hand and a lotus-flower and a citron-fruit in the left, are waiting upon him and dance, song and music are going on in front of him; but his mind, being in touch with the Reality, is experiencing the spiritual bliss, and the expression of his eyes stands as a witness to it. For, the characteristic feature of the Kaulism is that it denies antagonism between sensuous joy and spiritual bliss (Ānanda); recognises the former to be a means to the latter; and emphatically asserts that it is meant for the few, who are highly proficient in the Rāja–Yoga as distinct from the Haṭha–Yoga, who have such a control over the mind that they can withdraw it from the stimulating object even at a time when it is being enjoyed most and concentrate it on the tip of Suṣumṇā.

It has an æsthetic significance. Abhinavagupta is a well recognised authority on Śaivaism in general and on poetics, dramaturgy, music, æsthetics and the three monistic systems

of the Śaiva philosophy, dealt with in the present edition, in particular, on account of the 48 works which his powerful pen produced. The picture presents him as a practical musician, playing upon Nāda-Vīṇā, a stringed instrument, capable of producing the original musical sound, called Nāda, and experiencing the transcendental bliss (Ānanda). It shows that his assertion that the sensuous aspect of a work of fine art leads an æsthete, who possesses the necessary subjective conditions, to the highest level of perfect bliss through the imaginative, emotive and Kathartic levels, is based upon his personal experience.

It has an historical importance ; because it presents an important event in the history of Sanskrit Literature in so far as it presents Abhinavagupta explaining the sections on music in the Nāṭya Śāstra of Bharata to his pupils, Kṣemarāja etc., who are attentively listening to him and are taking down the words of the master: and also because it reflects a very important religio-philosophical movement in the 10th century A.D.

The pictorial art can present just one moment of life of its object of presentation which the pictorial genius conceives to be the most important visual aspect, inasmuch as it reflects the inner being in a way that suggests the state of consciousness, self or Ātman. Accordingly the central fact, presented in the picture, is the expression of the eyes, which suggests the rest of the self in itself, the experience of the Self of Itself (Svātma-parāmarśa).

Two of the smaller works of Abhinavagupta (i) the Paryanta Pañcāśikā and (ii) the Ghaṭakarpara Kulaka Vivṛti have been given a small Chapter each, because there is a misunderstanding about them in the minds of some scholars.

The two monistic systems, the Krama and the Kula, which developed side by side with the Pratyabhijñā, are known to

few. The Kashmir Śaiva thought, therefore, has been identified with the Pratyabhijñā only. Accordingly the philosophical works of Abhinavagupta are attempted to be interpreted in the light of this known system. Hence arose the misunderstanding about the system of philosophy, presented in the Paryanta Pañcāśikā. The third Chapter in the historical part of this work attempts to remove it.

There are very few poetic productions in the vast Sanskrit Literature, which present so many problems as does the Ghaṭakarpara Kulaka. A separate small chapter, therefore, has been devoted to it to solve them in the light, thrown on them by Abhinavagupta's commentary, the Vivṛti, on it. It shows that the poem "Ghaṭakarpara" does not simply reverse the "motif of the Meghadūta by making a love-lorn lady, in the rainy season, send a message to her lover" : that the word "Kulaka", which is an essential part of the title of the poem, according to Abhinavagupta, does not mean a set of five or more verses with only one finite verb, as it is ordinarily understood to mean : on the contrary, it means a type of musical poetic composition (Gīta-Kāvya) – consisting of a group of songs, which presents one theme and, therefore, the members of which are well connected with one another,– meant for presentation on the stage in a manner different from that of a drama inasmuch as in it singing, acting and dance follow one another : that such poems were not only being composed but also were being staged at the time of Abhinavagupta : that it belongs to the highest type of poetry inasmuch as it is highly suggestive, as has been pointed out by Abhinavagupta in his commentary : that the repetition of different groups of letters (Yamaka) in it is not a sign of laboured composition, nor is its condemnation by our contemporaries as a low type of poetry justifiable, in the light of Abhinavagupta's critical estimate of it, which seems to have anticipated such an adverse criticism : that, according to Abhinavagupta, who follows the Kashmirian tradition about it, it is from the pen of Kālidāsa

and that the status of Kālidāsa as the topmost poet is not adversely affected by this poem; for, the use of Yamakas in it gives such a musical value to it as enhances its emotional and æsthetic value. The Kashmirian tradition about Kālidāsa's authorship of the Ghaṭakarpara Kulaka seems to be supported by the fact that in the Mālavikāgnimitra, the musical poetic composition of Śarmiṣṭhā is a poem of this type.

The sixth Chapter in the philosophical part presents the Krama system in a proper historical perspective and gives an account of the literature on and of the exponents of it. It is a monistic system. Like the dualistic-cum-monistic Śaiva system, propounded by Lakulīśa and known as Lakulīśa Pāśupata, it has a pentadic tendency: it thinks in terms of groups of five concepts or postulates. Accordingly the basic pentad, which represents the five forms in which the Absolute manifests itself, consists of the five, Vyomavāmeśvarī etc.; and the aspects of speech, which are recognised to be three by Bhartṛhari in his Vākyapadīyam, four by Somānanda in his Śiva Dṛṣṭi, are admitted to be five, adding Sūkṣmā to the generally recognised four, Parā, Paśyantī, Madhyamā and Vaikharī. It is a Śākta system, not only in its ritualistic aspect, in which it enjoins the use of wine, woman and meat, but also in its philosophical aspect inasmuch as it recognises the Ultimate Metaphysical Principle to be Kālī and advocates the following of the Śāktopāya for the realisation of the Reality. It asserts that the ethical value of an action is entirely determined by the motive. Hence the use of the prohibited, such as wine etc., in the ritual does not mean moral turpitude, because the motive in it is not the satisfaction of the senses, but the realisation of the Real.

The last Chapter deals with the Kula system. It traces the history of the system from the 5th century A. D., when it was propagated by Macchanda alias Mīna, to the 18th century A. D. when Bhāskara Rāya wrote his commentary

on the Nityāṣoḍaśikārṇava in Kāśī (Vārāṇasī). It gives an account of the vast literature on it in an historical order, though most of it is known from Abhinava's references only.

The Kaulism is a difficult system of philosophy. It has been recognised as such by Abhinavagupta himself. Its chief contribution is the conception of "Anuttara", a word, which has been interpreted in twenty-two different ways to bring out the full philosophical significance of it. It synthesizes the Śaivaism and the Śāktism and holds the Ultimate Reality to be the unity of Anuttara and Anuttarā, in which the plurality is as absent as in the first letter of the Devanāgarī alphabetical system "a" (अ) in such instances as "Sīmanta" in which the following "a" at the beginning of "Anta" becomes one with the preceding, at the end of the word "Sīma", according to Pāṇini's aphorism "Atoguṇe".

It is, therefore, a monistic system. It was very much influenced in its development by the philosophy of language, propounded by the philosophers of language like Nandikeśvara, Pāṇini, Patañjali, Bhartṛhari, Vṛṣabha, Puṇyarāja, Helārāja etc. It gives the philosophy of the letters of the Devanāgarī alphabetical system, in a way which has close similarity with that of the letters of the fourteen aphorisms in the beginning of Pāṇini's system, given earlier by Nandikeśvara. It spread, not only all over India, including the South, but over China also and influenced the Buddhism. Its Tantric aspect got so firmly rooted in China that sages from India went there to learn the Kaulika practices.

In conclusion I very sincerely thank the University Grants Commission for the timely help to enable me to complete this work and to "prepare and publish" others according to the plan ; the authorities of the Lucknow University for giving me the necessary facilities for continuing teaching and research; learned scholars in many Universities such as Dr. N. N. Choudhury, Delhi, Professor P. Pradhan, Cuttack, Dr. Ashutosh

Bhattacharya, Calcutta, Professor C. K. Pandey, Patna, Dr. R.S. Tripathi, Aligarh, Professor Viramani Prasad Upadhyaya, Gorakhpur, for enlightening me on some points referred to them; the Management and the workers of the Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Varanasi, for their enthusiasm in bringing out this work; scholars in general for their deep interest, which has been responsible for the demand for the second edition; and Mr. Aditya Prakash Misra M. A. and Mrs. Lila Pandey B. A. for their devoted and selfless assistance.

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3 - 2 - 63.

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INTRODUCTION

TO THE FIRST EDITION.

The following pages present a short but comprehensive study of Abhinavaguptapāda, the Kashmir Śaiva Philosopher and Literary Critic. His name is familiar and his fame is still alive. His writings are voluminous and his philosophical and poetical theories hold their ground even to-day. To most Sanskrit Scholars, however, he is known only from references in the generally studied books on poetics, such as the Sāhitya Darpaṇa and the Kāvya Prakāśa. Very few know that he was more a philosopher than a literary critic, and that his contribution to Śaiva philosophy is much greater both in volume and importance than that which he made to poetics.

For about two hundred years so little has he been studied that the oral tradition about the interpretation of his works may be considered to be practically dead. The modern scholars, both in the east and the west, have not so far made any attempt to revive the study of Abhinava. His most important philosophical work, the Bṛhatī Vimarśinī, has not yet been published. The Tantrāloka and the Abhinava Bhāratī have appeared only in parts. The difficulties, therefore, that a person, attempting such a work as the one in hand, has to face, are considerable.

When I started the work, I could not even dream of the difficulties which arose in the course of its progress. I had hopes that the Kashmir Government would help me in my undertaking by allowing me access to their two libraries, one in Raghunātha Temple of Jammu and the other in the Research Department in Srinagar, where the extant MSS. of Abhinava's works are kept. But I am sorry to say that only severe disappointment was in store for me at the hands

of the authorities concerned. In spite of my repeated earnest entreaties, they could not see their way to allowing me even a glance at the MSS. For some time I thought that the completion of the work was impossible. But soon a suggestion came from my brother that I might look for the required MSS. in private houses. I began my search immediately and with the kind help of my sympathisers at that time of utter disappointment and great dejection I was fortunate enough, in the end, in securing all the MSS., excepting one, which I required for my immediate purposes. What difficulties I experienced in persuading the owners to part with them or at least to allow me to copy them and what heavy prices I had to pay for some of them, this is not the place to state.

My original plan was to include in the present work a chapter on Abhinava's theory of Rasa. But after a careful study of the published portion of his contribution to the Alaṅkāra literature, I discovered that, without the help of the unpublished portion of the Abhinava Bhāratī, to which there are good many forward references in the part dealing with Rasa, my exposition of the theory would hardly add anything to what has already been written by some of the most eminent scholars. But when I got the necessary material and studied it, I found that the subject required more space than could be given in the present volume. I have, therefore, decided to deal exhaustively with Abhinava's æsthetic theory in a separate volume.

I have used the following MSS. in the preparation of the present work :—

1. Anuttarāṣṭikā.
2. Anuttara Tattva Vimarśinī Vṛtti.
3. Anubhava Nivedana.
4. Bṛhatī Vimarśinī or Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vivṛti Vimarśinī.
5. Bhagavadgītārtha Saṅgraha.

6. Bhāskarī (a commentary on Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī).
7. Bhairava Stotra.
8. Bhairava Stotra Ṭīkā.
9. Bimbapratibimba Vāda.
10. Dehastha Devatācakra Stotra.
11. Ghaṭa Karpara Kulaka Vivṛti.
12. Krama Stotra.
13. Mahopadeśa Viṁśatika.
14. Paramārtha Carcā.
15. Paramārtha Dvādaśikā.
16. Śivadṛṣṭi of Somānanda. (now published)
17. Tantrāloka. (It has partly been published)
18. Tantroccaya.
19. A commentary on Parātriṁśikā by Rājānaka Lakṣmīrāma.

The book is divided into two parts, historical and philosophical. The former includes a chapter on the life of Abhinava. Its essential purpose is to show what light a careful study of Abhinava's works throws on two important branches of Sanskrit literature, namely, Śaiva Philosophy and Poetics. Abhinava's works are full of quotations from and references to the earlier writings, very often coupled with the names of the authors. They also record traditions concerning the preceptorial lines and the origin and development of these two branches of Sanskrit learning. A careful sifting of these quotations and traditions throws a considerable light on the history of the Śaiva and the Ālaṅkārika literature. Abhinava's works have not yet been used fully to elucidate the history of the above two branches. In the present volume they are being utilised for that purpose for the first time. This is the connecting thread of the material, brought together in the first part, which at first sight might appear rather heterogeneous. The second part deals with the monistic Śaiva philosophy

which is technically called "Trika" and which, in modern philosophic terminology, I have called *Realistic Idealism.*

I may state here very clearly that I am writing the second part as a pure Sanskritist. My work, therefore, is only to interpret the so far unhandled texts and to present the highly abstruse system, with the greatest possible amount of fidelity to the original. I may say in the words of the great commentator Mallinātha "I write nothing which is not based upon the authority of the original texts" (nāmūlaṁ likhyate kiñcit). It is to convince my learned critics of this fact and to make their task of fair criticism easy that I have burdened, as the reader will often feel, my work with extensive quotations ; and have given not only further references in the foot-notes but also full textual authority in Appendix A. The reader will not, therefore, find in these pages what typifies those of a close student of the western philosophy.

In presenting this part I have endeavoured, as far as possible, to avoid the use of technical terms and to state the views of Abhinava in such language as would be intelligible to the average reader. It is, however, not an easy task for a writer on philosophy, particularly when he attempts to present the views of an unknown system for the first time, as in my case, to escape the charge of obscurity, not because of any leaning towards the unintelligible, but because of the inherent difficulty of the subject-matter. When a person is reading a book on a familiar system he is helped by his memory in understanding the particular sense in which a certain expression is used by the writer. But such is not the case when one is reading a work on a new or unfamiliar system, particularly if it is presented in a language different from that in which it was originally written. In such a case, the ideas being foreign to the language in which the presentation is attempted, the writer has to depend upon approximations. In the reader's mind,

however, these approximations are associated with a number of different meanings in which they are ordinarily used. But he finds that none of the accepted meanings quite fits in the context and, therefore, naturally blames the writer for lack of clearness in exposition.

In order, however, to help my readers in easily understanding the system, I have put the original Sanskrit word within brackets when a certain English word is used in a technical sense for the first time and have explained it immediately in a sentence or phrase. I know that in spite of all this at places the idea will not be very clear. Such lack of clarity is due partly to the abstruseness of the subject and partly to the fact that many of the important works of Abhinava, such as the Pūrva Pañcikā and the Śivadṛṣṭyālocana, which would probably elucidate these obscure points, have not yet been discovered.

For the information of the reader I must add here the following few important notes :—

I. The Roman Figures, coming after the abbreviations, I. P. V. and T. A., unless otherwise indicated, stand for the number of volume. The number, coming immediately after the Roman figures, as in the above two cases, or after an abbreviation, as in most cases, indicates the number of the page.

II. In appendix A, I have given, in some cases, a few necessary textual authorities in addition to those indicated by the foot-notes and have not hesitated to repeat the same authority when necessary.

III. The lack of the right types has compelled me, at places, to violate the established practice of using S with a vertical stroke at the top to represent the palatal sibilant of Devanāgarī and to use the stroke immediately after S as S′.

Here I feel in duty bound to acknowledge my indebtedness to the editors of the Kashmir Series, to Mr. J. C. Chaterji, the author of "Kashmir Śaivaism", and to Dr. Būhler, the discoverer of the Pratyabhijñā literature in Kashmir, but for whose labours probably I would not have taken up Abhinava for a special study.

Among the Professors of this University, I have to specially thank Dr. N. N. Sen Gupta, under whose able guidance I am writing "Indian Æsthetic Theory", for his carefully going through the philosophical portion of this work and for giving many valuable suggestions.

The chief difficulty in preparing this work lay in understanding the original texts, often without even so much as a commentary as in the cases of the Parātriṁśikā Vivaraṇa and the Mālinī Vijaya Vārtika. It was made exceptionally difficult by the incorrect texts both in MSS. and print. A great deal of time had to be spent in determining in some cases the beginning and the end of a sentence. It is not for me to say how far I have correctly understood the original texts; it is for my learned readers to decide. But let me state here that if I have achieved any success in my undertaking it is to a considerable extent due to the help that I was fortunate to get from the eminent Sanskritists in Kashmir and Benares. I must, therefore, acknowledge my debt of gratitude to Pandit Harabhaṭṭa Śāstrī, to Pandit Śivabhaṭṭa Śāstrī and to Pandit Meheśvara Rājdān of Kashmir and to Mahāmahopādhyāya Pandit Gopīnātha Kavirāja, to Pandit Dāmodara Lāla Gosvāmī and to his learned pupil Mahāmahopādhyāya Pandit Devīprasāda Śukla of Benares for taking special pains in removing the textual difficulties. My deepest thanks, however, are due to Professor K. A. Subramania Iyer, under whom I had the honour to work in this university, for his unwearied help, kind sympathy and steady encouragement. But for

the assistance of his profound scholarship and exceptional capacity in interpreting the difficult Sanskrit texts the completion of this work would have been well nigh impossible for me.

I cannot close the introduction without apologising to the reader for a few obvious but unwelcome printing mistakes, particularly of the diacritical marks to represent the Devanāgarī palatal sibilant, which may have remained in spite of the utmost care that I took to remove them in the course of reading the proofs.

Lucknow University.
July, 1935.

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THE KULA SYSTEM

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.

A. Bh.	Abhinava Bhāratī. (Baroda)
Abhi.	Abhinavagupta.
Ah.	Āhnika.
A.K.	Ādhāra Kārikā. (Vani Vilasa Press, Devasalpuri)
A. Ko.	Amara Kośa. (Nirnaya Sagar, Bombay, 1929)
A. S.	Amaraugha Śāsana. (Kashmir Sanskrit Series)
B. B	Bāla Bodhinī. (Nirnaya Sagar)
Bh.	Bhāskarī. (Sarasvatibhavana, Banaras)
Bh. G.	Bhagavad Gītā.
Bh. G. S.	Bhagavad Gītārtha Saṅgraha. (Edited by Lakshman Raina, Kashmir)
Bh. K.	Bhoga Kārikā. (Vani Vilasa Press, Devasalpuri)
Bh. P.	Bhāva Prakāśa. (Vani Vilasa Press)
Bh. S.	Bhairava Stava. (Appendix C)
Bh. Su.	Bharata Sūtra. (Nirnaya Sagar)
Bh. V.	Bhāskara Vilāsa Kāvya. (Included in Lalitānāma Sahasra. Nirnaya Sagar, Bombay, 1935)
B. P. V.	Bimba Pratibimba Vāda. MS.
B. Su.	Brahma Sūtra. (Nirnaya Sagar, Bombay, 1904)
B. V.	Bṛhatī Vimarśinī. (Another name of the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vivṛti Vimarśinī)
C. C.	Catalogus Catalogorum.
Ch. K.	Chandaḥ Kaustubha by Bhāskara Rāya.
D. C.	Daśāvatāra Carita. (Nirnaya Sagar, Bombay, 1891)
Dh. L.	Dhvanyāloka Locana. (Nirnaya Sagar. 1928)

Dh. L. (B)	Dhvanyāloka Locana, with commentary, Bālapriyā. (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Banaras 1940)
Dh. S.	Dhyāna-Ślokāḥ by Madhurāja Yogin, MS.
D. M. S.	Dakṣiṇā Mūrti Stotra. (Nirnaya Sagar, 1902)
D. R. (G)	Daśarūpaka. (Gujarati printing Press, Bombay)
D. S.	Devī Śataka by Ānanda Vardhana. (Nirnaya Sagar, Bombay, 1803)
E. H. I.	Early History of India by V. A. Smith. (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1924)
Gh.	Ghaṭa Karpara Kāvya. (Nirnaya Sagar)
Gh. Abh.	Ghaṭa Karpara Kulaka, with commentary by Abhinava. (Kashmir Sanskrit Series)
Gh. K. (Di) (MS.)	Ghaṭakarpara, with commentary by Divākara.
Gh. K. (Go) (MS.)	Ghaṭakarpara, with commentary by Govinda.
Gh. K. (Ka.) (MS.)	Ghaṭakarpara, with commentary by Kamalākara Bhaṭṭa.
Gh. K. (Ra.) (MS.)	Ghaṭakarpara, with commentary by Ramāpati.
Gh. K. (Śan) (MS.)	Ghaṭakarpara, with commentary by Śaṅkara.
Gh. K. (Ta.) (MS.)	Ghaṭakarpara, with commentary by Tārācandra.
Gh. V.	Ghaṭakarpara Kulaka Vivṛti. (Kashmir Sanskrit Series 1945)
Gu. Pa.	Gurunātha Parāmarśa by Madhurāja Yogin, MS.
H. C. L.	History of Classical literature : Keith. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1928.

H. S. L.	History of Sanskrit literature by S. N. Dasgupta and S. K. De. (Calcutta University Press, 1947.)
H. S. P.	History of Sanskrit Poetics by S. K. De.
H. Y. P.	Haṭha Yoga Pradīpikā. (Theosophical publishing house, Adyar, Madras, 1949)
I. Ph.	Indian Philosophy by Radhakrishnan.
I. P. V.	Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī. (Kashmir Sanskrit Series, 1918)
I. P. V. V.	Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vivṛti Vimarśinī. (Kashmir Sanskrit Series 1938)
J. A.	Jyotirvidābharaṇa.
J. Ar.	Jñānārṇava. (Anandashrama, Poona 1912)
K. A.	Kāvyālaṅkāra by Bhāmaha. (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series 1928)
K. Ad.	Kāvyādarśa by Daṇḍin.
K. An.	Kāvyānuśāsana by Hema Candra. (Nirnaya Sagar, Bombay)
K. Ar.	Kulārṇava. (Jivananda Vidya Sagar, Calcutta, 1937)
K. K. V.	Kāvya Kautuka Vivaraṇa by Abhinava gupta
K. M.	Kāvya Mīmāṁsā. (Baroda 1934)
K. Ś.	Kashmir Śaivaism. (Kashmir Sanskrit Series 1914)
K. S	Krama Stotra. (Appendix C)
K. Sa.	Kāvyālaṅkāra Sārasaṅgraha. (Nirnaya Sagar, Bombay, 1915)
K. Su.	Kāvyālaṅkāra Sūtra vṛtti by Vāmana. (Jivananda Vidya Sagar, Calcutta, 1922)
M. A.	Mālavikāgnimitra, with commentary by Revatikant, Calcutta.
M. Bh. M.	Mahā Bhārata Mañjarī. (Nirnaya Sagar, Bombay, 1903)
M. Bh. (Pra.)	Mahābhāṣya (Pradīpa). (Nirnaya Sagar, Bombay, 1917)

M. Bh. (Ud.)	Mahābhāṣya (Udyota). (Nirnaya Sagar, Bombay, 1917)
M. K.	Mokṣa Kārikā. (Vani Vilasa Press, Devasalpuri, 1925)
M. M.	Mahārtha Mañjarī. (Trivandrum 1919)
M. P.	Mahānaya Prakāśa. (Trivandrum Sanskrit Series)
M. P. (K.)	Mahānaya Prakāśa in Kashmiri language. (Kashmir Sanskrit Series)
Mṛ. T.	Mṛgendra Tantra. (Devakottai 1928)
Mṛ. V.	Mṛgendra Vṛtti (Devakottai 1928)
M. V. V.	Mālinī Vijaya vārtika. (Kashmir Sanskrit Series 1921)
N. K.	Nāda Kārikā. (Vani Vilasa Press 1925)
N. M.	Nepāla Māhātmya. Edited by Murlidhara Jha, Banaras, 1901
N. S.	Nāṭya Śāstra. (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, 1929)
N. Sa.	Nītisāra. (Jivananda Vidya Sagar, Calcutta)
N. S. A.	Nityā Ṣoḍaśikārṇava. (Anandasharma, Poona, 1908)
N. T.	Netra Tantra. (Kashmir Sanskrit Series)
Pā.	Pāṇini.
P. H.	Pratyabhijñā Hṛdaya. (Kashmir Sanskrit Series)
P. L. M.	Parama Laghu Mañjūṣā, with commentary by Pandit Sabhapati, Banaras, 1929).
P. P.	Paryanta Pañcāśikā. Edited by Dr. V. Raghavan, Madras, 1951)
P. R.	Pātañjala Rahasya. (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, 1935)
P. S.	Paramārtha Sāra. (Kashmir Sanskrit Series)
P. T.	Parā Triṁśikā. (Kashmir Sanskrit Series)

P. T. V.	Parā Triṁśikā Vivaraṇa. (Kashmir Sanskrit Series)
R. P.	Rahasya Pañcadaśikā. MS.
R. T.	Rāja Taraṅgiṇī. (Stein's edition)
R. Tr.	Ratna Traya. (Vani Vilasa Press, Devasalpuri, 1925)
R. Y.	Rudra Yāmala Tantra. (Jivananda Vidya Sagar, Calcutta, 1937)
Ś.	Śloka.
Śā. Saṁ.	Śārṅgadhara Saṁhitā.
Sau. Bh.	Saubhāgya Bhāskara. (Nirnaya Sagar, Bombay, 1935)
Ś. Bh.	Śāṅkara Bhāṣya on the Vedānta Sūtra. (Nirnaya Sagar)
Ś. C.	Śabdārtha Cintāmaṇi. (Udayapur)
S. C.	Stava Cintāmaṇi. (Kashmir Sanskrit Series)
Ś. D.	Śaṅkara Digvijaya.
S. D.	Sāhitya Darpaṇa. (Jivananda Vidya Sagar, Calcutta, 1916)
Ś. Dr.	Śiva Dṛṣṭi. (Kashmir Sanskrit Series)
S. D. S.	Sarva Darśana Saṅgraha. (Abhyankar : Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, 1951)
S. K.	Spanda Kārikā. (Kashmir Sanskrit Series)
S. Kau.	Siddhānta Kaumudī. (Nirnaya Sagar, Bombay, 1908)
S. N.	Spanda Nirṇaya. (Kashmir Sanskrit Series)
S. P.	Sāmba Pañcāśikā. (Nirnaya Sagar, 1910)
Ś. Pa.	Śāstra Parāmarśa by Madhurāja Yogin. MS.

S. Pa.	Svātma Parāmarśa by Madhurāja Yogin, MS.
S. P. Bh.	Śāṅkhya Pravacana Bhāṣya.
S. R.	Saṅgīta Ratnākara. (Anandashrama, Poona, 1942)
S. S. Vā.	Śiva Sūtra Vārtika. (Kashmir Sanskrit Series)
S. S. Vi.	Śiva Sūtra Vimarśinī. (Kashmir Sanskrit Series)
S. T.	Svacchanda Tantra. (Kashmir Sanskrit Series)
Ta. San. T. D.	Tarka Saṅgraha Tattva Dīpikā, edited by M. R. Bodas. (Bombay Sanskrit Series, 1930)
T. A.	Tantrāloka. (Kashmir Sanskrit Series)
T. C.	Tanjore Catalogue.
T. P.	Tattva Prakāśikā. (Vani Vilasa Press, Devasalpuri, 1923)
T. R.	Tantra Rāja.
T. S.	Tantra Sāra. (Kashmir Sanskrit Series)
T. San.	Tattva Saṅgraha. (Vani Vilasa Press, Devasalpuri, 1923)
T. T. N.	Tattva Traya Nirṇaya. (Vani Vilasa Press, Devasalpuri, 1923)
T. U.	Tavalkāropaniṣad.
T. V.	Traditional Verse.
T. V. Dh.	Tantra Vaṭa Dhānikā. (Kashmir Sanskrit Series).
V.	Varient or Verse.
V. M.	Vāmakeśvarī Mata. (Kashmir Sanskrit Series)
V. P.	Vākya Padīya, with the commentaries of Puṇyarāja and Helārāj. (Banaras Sanskrit Series)

V. P. (Comm. Ban.)	Vākya Padīya. (Brahmakāṇḍa, with commentary by Surya Narayan Shastri. Kashi Sanskrit Series Banaras)
V. S.	Vedānta Sūtra.
V. S. S. Bh.	Vedānta Sūtra Śāṅkara Bhāṣya. (Nirnaya Sagar)
V. T.	Vāmakeśvara Tantra. (Included in Nityāṣoḍaśikārṇava.)
Y. D.	Yoga Darśana. (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, 1934)
Y. S.	Yoga Sūtra.

PART I.

HISTORICAL.

CHAPTER I.

LIFE OF ABHINAVAGUPTA.

PRELIMINARY.

Abhinava, it appears, knew the importance of biographical information about a writer in understanding his works. He has, therefore, not remained silent about himself, like Kālidāsa, about whose date scholars differ by centuries, or like Bhāsa, whose very authorship of his own dramas is now a matter of keen controversy. He has given a sketch, though very brief, of his person, descent and the then social conditions in the concluding portions of his two works, the Tantrāloka and the Parātriṁśikā Vivaraṇa. This sketch, when coupled with the information gathered from the stray references to his life in the vast literature that he, his pupils, his commentators and the followers of his theories have produced, gives us a more or less connected and a little detailed, though still incomplete, account of his life. It can be fairly completed but only with the help of an oral tradition which is current down to this day in a few learned Brāhmaṇa families as well as in a few muslim homes in Kashmir. But an oral tradition, though old and persistent, is after all an oral tradition, and as such cannot have the same value in the eyes of a historian as the evidence of inscriptions or literary works. However, in the case of Abhinava, it is possible for us to know exactly the forces and influences which produced such a mind, even if we confine ourselves to well-authenticated facts. For the purpose of understanding his writings we need no more.

TWO ABHINAVAGUPTAS.

The Abhinavagupta, studied in the following pages, is a different person from his namesake who was a Śākta contemporary of Śaṅkarācārya. The only source of information about the other Abhinavagupta is the Śaṅkara Digvijaya of Mādhava, which is noticed under a slightly different name "Sūkṣma Śaṅkara Vijayas" in Dr. Aufrecht's catalogue. It gives the following account of him :—

He[1] belonged to Kāmarūpa (Assam). He was a Śākta and wrote a Śāktabhāṣya, probably a commentary on the Vedānta Sūtra of Bādarāyaṇa, from the Śākta point of view. He was a great opponent of the monistic theory of Śaṅkara. He engaged Śaṅkara in a controversial discussion (Śāstrārtha) when the latter reached Assam in the course of his Digvijaya. In that he was defeated and so, according to the then prevalent practice, became a disciple of the victor. Like our Kashmirian Abhinavagupta, his Śākta namesake also is referred to as an Ācārya[2].

Our object in giving the above account is to point out that if Mādhava's testimony in reference to the Śākta Abhinavagupta is to be considered reliable, he should not be confused with the Śaiva Abhinavagupta of Kashmir. Their distance from each other is about two centuries. The former, if he was Śaṅkara's contemporary, must have lived in the last quarter of the 8th and the first half of the 9th century A. D.: for, according to the generally accepted opinion, Śaṅkara lived from 788 to 820 A. D.; and the latter, on the evidence of the dates of composition of the Krama and the Bhairava Stotras and the Bṛhatī Vimarśinī, given by the author himself, belonged to the second half of the 10th and the first quarter of the 11th century A. D. In view of these facts we fail to

1. Ś. D., Ch. XV, Ś. 158. 2. Ś. D. Comm., Ch. XV, Ś. 158.

understand why Dr. Aufrecht has included the Śāktabhāṣya in the list of Kashmirian Abhinavagupta's works in his Catalogus Catalogorum. This work, according to his own statement :—"Śāktabhāṣya, quoted by Mādhava. Oxf 258b" (C. C., P. 25) is no other than the one, the authorship of which is attributed to the Śākta Abhinavagupta by Mādhava, as we have stated above. For, on page 258 of Catalogi Condicum Manuscriptum containing an extract from the Śaṅkara Digvijaya which is referred to by our learned Doctor in the above quotation from Catalogus Catalogorum P. 25, the same passage is given as that on which our own account of the Śākta Abhinavagupta is based. It runs as follows :—

Tadanantarameṣa Kāmarūpān
Adhigatyābhinavopaśabdaguptam
Ajayat kila śāktabhāṣyakāraṁ
Sa ca bhagno manasedamāluloce
Oxf 258b

We now leave it to our readers to form their own conclusion on this point.

HIS ANCESTRY.

The earliest ancestor of Abhinava, so far known to us, was Atrigupta. He lived in Antarvedi,[1] the region between the Ganges and the Yamunā, in the reign of king Yaśovarman of Kannauj (Circa 730–740 A. D.[2*]). He attained a very great fame for erudition in all the branches of learning in general and in the Śaiva Śāstras in particular. King Lalitāditya of Kashmir (Circa 725-761) was so much impressed with his scholarship and so eager did he become to take him (Atrigupta) to his capital that soon after the conquest of King

1. P. T. V., 280. *2. E. H. I., 386.

Yaśovarman he approached and requested Atrigupta to accompany him to Kashmir. And so earnest was the request that Atrigupta could not but accede to it[1].

Thus the family, which after about two centuries, was to produce the Śaiva Abhinavagupta, migrated from Kānyakubja to Kashmir. There[2] a spacious house was soon built by the king's order on a plot opposite the temple of Śitāṁśumaulin on the bank of river Vitastā (Jhelum) for the immigrant family to settle permanently, and a big jāgīr was granted for its proper maintenance. After Atrigupta, we know nothing of the family for about hundred and fifty years. Abhinava has evidently left a gap between his earliest known ancestor, who migrated to Kashmir very shortly after king Lalitāditya's victory over Yaśovarman of Kannauj about 740 A. D., and his grand father Varāhagupta, whom we cannot place earlier than the beginning of the 10th century A. D. The language of the text, on which our conclusion is based, leaves very little doubt on this point. To show the distance of time between Atrigupta and Varāhagupta the word "anvaya" (family)[3] is used. In marked contrast with this, we find the word "ātmaja" used, to indicate the immediate descent of Cukhulaka, the father of Abhinava, from Varāhagupta. From the very brief description of the latter, it is evident that the successive generations had maintained the scholastic traditions of the learned family and that he (Varāhagupta) also was a great scholar and devout worshipper of Śiva.

HIS PARENTS.

His father, Narasiṁhagupta, alias Cukhulaka, was of great intellectual calibre, had equal proficiency in all the Śāstras

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1. T. A., XII, 404-5.

2. T. A., XII, 411.

3. Ibid.

and was a great devotee of Śiva. The name of his mother was Vimalakalā[1]. She was a very pious and religious lady. They were a happy couple and attended to household duties not because of any worldly attachment to them but simply because they were enjoined by the scripture. The family atmosphere was thus thoroughly religious and scholarly.

In view of the facts stated above and supported by the authority of Abhinavagupta himself, quoted in full in Appendix (A), the statement of Pandit Madhusudan Kaul of the Kashmir Research Department in his introduction to the I. P. V., Vol. II, P. 7 about the name of Abhinava's father requires correction. His statement runs as follows :—

"He received instruction in the Pratyabhijñā Śāstra from his father Lakṣmaṇagupta, son of Narasiṁhagupta and pupil to Utpala."

Lakṣmaṇagupta, though undoubtedly a teacher of Abhinava in Pratyabhijñā, was certainly not his father ; nor was there a relation of father and son between Narasiṁhagupta and Lakṣmaṇagupta. The father of the latter, according to the following statement of Abhinava, was Utpalācārya :—

"Traiyambakaprasarasāgaravīcisomā-
nandātmajotpalajalakṣmaṇaguptanāthaḥ."

T. A., XII., 414

ABHINAVA AS A YOGINĪBHŪ.

In and about the 10th and the 11th centuries the atmosphere in Kashmir was thoroughly surcharged with the spirit of religion. The people then believed in the efficacy of religious observances. All that was great and good was believed to be attainable by some kind of religious performance or other. For each worldly gain there was prescribed a separate elaborate ceremony. A

1. T. A. Comm., I. 14.

king wishing to enlarge his kingdom, a student anxious to widen his knowledge, a father aspiring for a worthy son and a merchant desirous of prosperity in his business, each had to perform some special rite to bring about the speedy realisation of his desire. When failure came in spite of these observances, it was attributed to some flaw in the performance of the prescribed rite. Abhinava's literary greatness also, therefore, was naturally attributed, not so much to his own exceptional natural intelligence and great assiduity as to a certain religious frame of mind in which his parents had united for his birth[1]. It is enjoined in the Śaiva scripture that the parents, desirous of a son, who in Śaiva terminology is called Yoginībhū, should rise above all worldly ideas at the time of meeting and that the mother should identify herself with Śakti and the father with Śiva. And it is believed that only a Yoginībhū can properly understand and intelligibly propound the Śaiva monism. According to Jayaratha, the popular idea of Abhinava's being Yognībhū was based upon Abhinava's own authority. For, he, as Jayaratha interprets, refers to this fact in the very first verse of the Tantrāloka.

PROBABLE TIME OF HIS BIRTH.

The era, used in the works of Kashmir writers from the earliest time, is known as Saptarṣi. It began 25 years after the commencement of Kali era, as we learn from Abhinava's own statement in the concluding verse of the Bṛhatī Vimarśinī :—

"Iti navatitamesmin vatsarentye yugāṁśe
Tithiśaśijaladhisthe mārgaśīrṣāvasāne
Jagati vihitabodhām Īśvarapratyabhijñāṁ
Vyavṛṇuta paripūrṇām preritaḥ Śambhupādaiḥ".

It states that he finished the Bṛhatī Vimarśinī in the 90th year when 4115 years of Kali had elapsed. This year (1959)

1. T. A. Comm., 1, 14-5.

it is the 5060th year of the Kali and the 5035th year of the Saptarṣi era, as any almanac will show. If we deduct 25 out of the figures, which stand for the Kali era at present, they will show the Saptarṣi year. This shows that the word "navatitame" in the above quotation stands for 4090th of the Saptarṣi era just as 59th, used to-day, would naturally mean 1959th A. D.

There are two more works of Abhinava in which the dates of composition are given. One is the Bhairava Stava (AppendixC) which was written on the 10th day of the darker half of Pauṣa[1] in the year 68. And the other is the Krama Stotra (Appendix C) which was composed in praise of Śiva on the 9th day of the darker half of Mārgaśīrṣa[2] in the year 66.

The years of composition of these Stotras refer to the Saptarṣi era. The dates, therefore, of the earliest and the latest known works of Abhinava clearly show that the period of his literary activity extended over a quarter of a century from 4066 to 4090 of the Saptarṣi era i. e. 990-1—1014-15 A. D.

There is no reason to believe that the Krama Stotra, though the earliest of the known dated works of Abhinava, was his first work. More on this point will be found in the chapter dealing with his works. It seems, therefore, that he began his literary career five years earlier i. e. in 985 A. D. And taking into consideration the extensive study that he made of various branches of learning, not privately but at the houses of so many teachers, and the maturity of style and judgment, found in his earliest work, it will be unreasonable to suppose that he began writing when he was only in his teens or early twenties. It will, therefore, not be wrong to say that he was born between 950 and 960 A. D.

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1. Bh. S., V. 10. 2. K. S., V. 30.

HIS CHILDHOOD AND EDUCATION.

As a child he was sent to a neighbouring Pāṭhaśālā, located in a second story. Even there he showed signs of his future greatness and deeply impressed his teachers with his exceptional intellectual power and fluency in speech. His name is ample testimony to that. It is said that the name Abhinavaguptapāda by which our great writer is known, is not that which was given him by his parents but that which he received from his teachers in early school days for no other reason than that he was an intellectual giant and as such was an object of terror, like a serpent, to his young school fellows. This is what, according to Vāmanācārya, the author of the Bālabodhinī, a commentary on the Kāvyaprakāśa, Mammaṭa means to convey by referring to our Abhinava as "Abhinavaguptapāda[1]" in his work. To this very fact Abhinava himself most probably refers in the following line :—

"Abhinavaguptasya kṛtiḥ seyaṁ yasyoditā gurubhirākhyā".

T. A., I, 50.

ABHINAVAGUPTA, AN INCARNATION OF ŚEṢA.

In South India there is a tradition, current among those who even now dance in strict accordance with the rules, given by Bharata in his Nāṭya Śāstra, that Abhinavaguptapāda was an incarnation of Śeṣa. This tradition seems to be another and later interpretation of the name "Abhinavaguptapāda". It was most probably suggested by the great reputation that he enjoyed, like Patañjali alias Śeṣa, for his thorough mastery of all the intricacies of grammar and his extraordinary skill and originality in dealing with the difficult grammatical problems. To his great proficiency in grammar he himself refers in the Tantrāloka as follows :—

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1. B. B., 95.

"Pitrā sa śabdagahane kṛtasampraveśaḥ."

T. A., XII, 413.

In this quotation the words "gahane" and "sam" are of special significance. This tradition found general acceptance among later generations, because it was imagined to have the support of his teachers also who gave him the epithet, Abhinavaguptapāda, which can, without the least fear of contradiction, be interpreted as "new Śeṣa."

HIS TEACHERS.

Great was his love of learning and endless and incessant was his endeavour for its acquisition. 'Knowledge for its own sake' was his motto. This he preached both by personal example and precept, as found in the T. A., VIII, 205-6. He held that even though one may be lucky enough to get a teacher who has attained perfection himself and can easily show the way to it to his disciple also, yet that is not sufficient reason for not approaching other teachers for the knowledge of other Āgamas and other paths. This he has given as the only reason for his waiting upon teachers of other religions such as Buddhism and Jainism.[1]

He approached the best teachers of his time in different subjects for the traditional and the most authoritative information. Such was his humility and devotion[2] to them that they, out of sheer love for him, told him all the secrets of learning in their possession, and so well did he learn and retain all that he was taught and so well did he impress his teachers with his extensive study that all of them unanimously declared him to be an all-round Ācārya.

So insatiable was his thirst for learning that he found all its fountain heads in Kashmir insufficient to quench it. He,

1. T. A., VIII, 206. 2. T. A., XII, 415.

therefore, went outside the beautiful land of Kaśyapa in quest of a bigger fountain head. How many places outside the valley of Kashmir he visited and how many learned teachers he waited upon, there is no evidence just at present in hand to show. There is, however, no doubt that he went to Jālandhara[1] and learnt Kaulika[2] literature and practices from Śambhunātha. In fact it was through Śambhunātha's teaching that he got peace and attained self-realisation.[3]

The following is the list of his teachers with the subject or subjects, which they taught, shown against each name :—

1.	Narasiṁhagupta[4] (his father)	Grammar.
2.	Vāmanātha[5]	Dvaita Tantras.
3.	Bhūtirāja[6]	Brahmavidyā.
4.	Bhūtirājatanaya[7]	Dualistic-cum-monistic-Śaivaism.
5.	Lakṣmaṇagupta[8]	Krama and Trika Darśanas.
6.	Indurāja[9]	Dhvani.
7.	Bhaṭṭa Tota[10]	Dramaturgy.

Others in whose cases subjects are not specified :—

8. Śrīcandra.[11]
9. Bhakti Vilāsa.
10. Yogānanda.
11. Candravara.
12. Abhinanda.
13. Śivabhakti.
14. Vicitranātha.
15. Dharma.
16. Śiva.
17. Vāmana.
18. Udbhaṭa.
19. Bhūtīśa.
20. Bhāskara.

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1. T. A., Comm., I, 236.
2. T. A., Comm., I, 31.
3. T. A., I, 51.
4. T. A., XII, 413
5. T. A., XII, 413.
6. T. A., Comm. III, 194.
7. T. A., XII, 414.
8. T. A., Comm., III, 194.
9. Dh. L., 1.
10. A. Bh., Vol. I, 1.
11. T. A., XII, 415.

The necessary information about Bhūtirāja, Bhūtirāja-tanaya, Lakṣmaṇagupta, Indurāja and Bhaṭṭa Tauta, that is found in the available works of Abhinavagupta, will be given in Chapter five, 'Historical background of his thought'.

HIS FAMILY AND ITS ATMOSPHERE.

Besides his father and mother, his family consisted of an uncle, Vāmanagupta, a younger brother, Manoratha, and five cousins, Kṣema, Utpala, Abhinava, Cakraka and Padmagupta. His uncle's name is included in the list of his teachers. In the Abhinava Bhāratī[1] Abhinava quotes his uncle who, therefore, seems to have written on poetics. His brother[2] was deeply learned in all Śāstras and was the first to be favoured by Abhinava by being accepted as his disciple. And if the name, Kṣema, be supposed to stand for Kṣemarāja, the author of the Spanda Nirṇaya and other works on Śaivaism, and the others, classed with him, be also supposed to have had more or less similar qualities, then his cousins also seem to have been very highly educated. Whatever may have been their education there is no doubt that they prized devotion to[3] Śiva above all things and considered all their wealth to be no better than a straw. Thus the whole family atmosphere was surcharged with the spirit of renunciation, zeal for advanced study and above all devotion to Śiva. There was left nothing to be desired in the atmosphere, in which he passed his childhood, for the development of a healthy brain and of a spirit necessary for the great work that he had before him.

SOME EVENTS IN THE FAMILY AND THEIR EFFECT ON HIS YOUNG MIND.

His mother was extremely dear to him. It was she alone who made home sweet for him. But unfortunately, or, as

1. A. Bh., Vol. I, 297. 2. T. A., XII, 415

3. T. A., XII, 417.

Abhinava took it, fortunately, she was snatched away by the cruel hands of death when he was a mere child.[1] Home, therefore, lost most of its charm for him, but not all, because his father was still there. To him he was tied with a double cord of filial and pupilary love. But soon after the death of his mother, his father also, though still young, renounced the world and took to a life of asceticism.[2] These events seem to have taken place when he was studying literature (Sāhitya). They turned his mind from all wordly attachments to devotion to Śiva, so much so that he made up his mind never to marry[3]. That was the turning point in his life. That was the end of his literary study and life at home. Thenceforward, in order to feed his suddenly kindled flame of devotion with the oil of the Āgamic lore, he spent his time in the houses of his Āgamic teachers. His Tantrāloka is a living testimony of the great zeal with which he pursued the study of the Āgamas and of the unparalleled proficiency which he acquired in them.

HIS ASCETIC PERIOD.

The period of preparation was now over. The natural gifts and the favourable circumstances had immensely helped him in thoroughly equipping himself for the memorable work that he was destined to accomplish. The long and healthy scholastic and religious tradition of his family, unbroken for over two hundred years, the noble and scholarly life of his father and the perfectly religious life of his mother, the harmony and the healthy atmosphere of his family, his high education, his practical training in various kinds of yogic practices, his never-broken vow of perfect celibacy and the consequent indefatigable energy, his drinking at so many fountain heads of learning both in and outside Kashmir, his untiring efforts

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1. T. A., XII, 413.
2. T. A., XII, 412.
3. T. A., XII, 414.

and their fruition in scholastic attainments and above all his great sacrifice of all the comforts of worldly life, all combined, gave him such an intellectual and spiritual power and made his pen so powerful that even to-day he is recognised as the highest authority on the monistic Śaivaism in respect of both its rituals and its philosophy, as well as on the poetical theories of Rasa and Dhvani.

Thus equipped he began his life's work at a sufficiently mature age. What he has contributed to the philosophical literature of India, though at present ordinary people know him only as a writer on poetics, is not a production of a mere imaginative mind in an easy chair in a beautiful and a little secluded place, as so many persons think, but a record of personal experience,[1] gained through continuous yogic experiments, carried on for years. If we carefully read even the few available works, out of so many that his extraordinarily powerful pen produced, we can trace out the successive stages in his spiritual attainment. Successively he worked on the three systems which are known in the Śaiva philosophical literature as the Krama, the Trika (of which Pratyabhijñā is only a branch) and the Kula.

When from the study of literature his mind suddenly turned to devotion to Śiva, it was Lakṣmaṇagupta who first gave him intellectual satisfaction by feeding him with intellectual food in the form of an exposition of the Pratyabhijñā[2]. He taught Abhinava Krama Darśana also. This fact Jayaratha has established after a long controversial discussion in his commentary on the Tantrāloka.[3] There is circumstantial evidence enough to believe that he was taught Krama system first. In any case the earliest date of the Krama Stotra, to which reference has

1. T. A., IV., 202. 2 M. V.V., 2.

3. T. A. Comm., III, 194.

already been made, is a clear proof of his having first tried his spiritual experiments in accordance with the Kramic instructions. The attempt was not quite a failure : for, in the Kramakeli, which is probably Abhinava's first known work on the Krama system, he attributes his then spiritual greatness to his following the Kramic teachings.[1] But it did not yield the expected result. He then tried the Trika system, but to what result, there is not enough evidence just at present in hand to show. There is, however, no doubt about this that the result of that also did not perfectly satisfy him : for, it is from the Kula system alone that he affirms to have got perfect satisfaction and peace.[2] Because of this it is that we find in his works a more glowing tribute paid to Śambhunātha, his Kaulic teacher, than to any one else.[3] That before writing the Tantrāloka he had realised his identity with the Parama Śiva and that it was due to following Śambhunātha's teaching, he himself says in his introduction to the Tantrāloka :—

"Bodhānyapāśaviṣanuttadupāsanottha—
Bodhojvalobhinavagupta idaṁ karoti."

T. A., I, 16.

The concluding line of the Paramārthasāra and Yogarāja's commentary on it give a very clear idea of the spiritual greatness attained by Abhinava, before he began writing, at least, his more important works. The passage runs as follows :—

"Abhinavaguptena mayā śivacaraṇasmaraṇadīptena".

P. S., 198.

"Śivasya paraśreyaḥsvabhāvasya svātmasthasya cidānandaikamūrteḥ yāni caraṇāni cidraśmayaḥ teṣāṁ smaraṇaṁ śabdādiviṣayagrahaṇakāle nibhālanam pratikṣaṇaṁ svānubhavā-

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1. T. A. Comm., III, 191-2. 2. T. A. Comm., I, 31.
3. T. A., I, 16.

pramoṣaḥ tena dīptaḥ parāhantācamatkārabhāsvaraḥ.........iti upadeṣṭuḥ samāviṣṭamaheśvara svabhāvonena uktaḥ syāt."

This seems to be the foundation of the traditional belief amongst Kashmirian Pandits that Abhinavagupta was Bhairava incarnate.

HIS MIRACULOUS POWERS.

Human nature is always the same everywhere. We should, therefore, not be surprised at the suspicious eye with which the present generation looks at all claims to individual spiritual greatness, particularly because there are so many impostors abroad now. In the time of Abhinavagupta also people did not very easily believe in any such claim. It was, therefore, not without any reason, as the literary tradition says, that they looked upon Abhinava as Bhairava incarnate. Just as the enlightened people of the present time would not admit any body's claim to realisation of identity with the Almighty unless he should show himself to be almighty, so did not the contemporaries of Abhinava. Following the authority of the Śrīpūrva Śāstra he has himself given the five infallible signs of such a man[1] which can briefly be stated as follows :—

1. Unswerving devotion to Rudra.
2. Power of incantation (mantra sidhi).
3. Control over all the elements.
4. Capacity to accomplish the desired end.
5. Sudden dawning of the knowledge of all the Śāstras.

And we learn from Jayaratha, who also bases his statement on the authority of his teacher whose verse he quotes[2], that Abhinava's contemporaries found all the above signs unmistakably present in him. This was the secret of his great influence

1. T. A. Comm., VIII, 136. 2. T. A. Comm., VIII, 137.

with his contemporaries and of the unparalleled success as a writer in the field of both the Śaiva philosophy and the poetics.

The fact, that he wrote under divine inspiration, seems to be referred to by Abhinavagupta himself, when in the Tantrāloka he says that calling back to his mind the various Śāstras, of which he had heard from his teachers, he composed the Tantrāloka.[1] It implies that he had no library at his disposal to refer to the books from which he quotes so extensively. The authorities referred to are so many and are so accurately quoted that the reader is compelled to think that so vast and accurate references without the help of any book are beyond human power and could be possible with divine power only.

CENTRES OF HIS ACTIVITY.

We have had occasion to speak about the site of his ancestral home. In one of the MSS. of the T. A., belonging to Pandit Maheśvara Rājdān of Kashmir, a different reading of the passage, descriptive of the site where a house was built for Atrigupta, is found. It reads "Vaitasta mūrdhani" instead of "Vaitasta rodhasi" as in the MS. in the possession of the writer of these pages, which agrees with the printed edition. The conclusion was easy and so once the exact spot of Abhinava's ancestral home was thought to have been discovered. The writer visited the place and found that there is a small village just above the source of Vitastā (Vaitasta mūrdhani) which even to this day is called Guṭṭar Guṇḍa or Guṭṭal Guṇḍa. Guṇḍa is a common Kashmiri word for village and Guṭṭar or Guṭṭal can easily be supposed to be a corruption of Gupta with local affix "r" or "l". But after a little more careful study of the text it was found that this interpretation does not suit the context.

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1. T. A., XII, 425.

For, the word "tasmin" in the beginning of the verse[1] stands for "Pravarapura," described in the preceding lines, the site of which has been identified within modern Srinagar. The source of Vitastā is at a distance of over thirty miles from there. It cannot, therefore, reasonably be supposed to have been within Pravarapura. The reading "Vaitasta rodhasi" (on the bank of Vitastā), therefore, seems to be correct. There is, however, a way in which the other reading also can be explained, that is, by taking "Vaitasta mūrdhani" with "parikalpitabhūmi-sampat" and not with "nivāsam". The passage then will mean that the king, having granted a jāgīr to him above the source of Vitastā, got a house constructed for him in that part of Pravarapura, which, because of its being situated opposite the temple of Sitāṁśumaulin, was, in point of sanctity, better than any other. This appears to be quite probable. The evidence in hand, however, is too insufficient for any definite statement on the question.

There being no evidence to the contrary, it is natural to suppose that he passed his childhood in his ancestral home. There is, however, a definite statement regarding the place of composition of the Vārtika on the first verse of the Mālinī Vijaya Tantra[2]. It was composed in Pravarapura East. It seems, Pravarapura also was divided into different parts and was called Pravarapura East and so on, just as the different parts of Simla at the present time are known as Simla East and Simla West. Was this the same place as his ancestral home ? Nothing can be said definitely, but the probability is that it was. In any case, from the reason that prompted Mandra to request Abhinava to shift to the former's city[3] to write out a systematic guide to various paths to final emancipation, as found

1. T. A., XII, 411. 2. M. V. V., 135,

3. T. A., XII, 419.

in the Trika literature, it is evident that it was not a fit place for undertaking such a great work as the writing of the Tantrāloka. Therefore, when the request was made and the necessity for a change was explained the latter agreed. The Tantrāloka was thus written, not in the ancestral home of the author but in that of his loving disciple.

HIS RECOGNITION AS THE SPIRITUAL HEAD OF ALL THE ŚAIVA SECTS.

By the time he came to be of middle age, his reputation as an exponent of the Śaivāgamas was so well established on account of his having written commentaries on so many of them and having given a systematic exposition of the Tāntrika philosophy and rituals in his big work, the Tantrāloka ; and his spiritual power was so much in evidence that he was recognised to be the spiritual head of all the Śaiva sects, such as Siddhānta, Vāma, Bhairava, Yāmala, Kula, Trika, Ekavīra etc.

For this purpose there was a great congregation of great spiritualists, both male and female, in Kashmir. At this time he was comparatively young so much so that to the elderly spiritualists, who had gathered together, he looked to be merely a child. They had deep love for him. His authoritative exposition of the Śaivāgamas had convinced them that he was an incarnation of Śrīkaṇṭha.[1] Hence, they affectionately recognised him to be the spiritual head of all the Śaiva sects.

PEN-PICTURE OF ABHINAVAGUPTA.

Madhurāja Yogin, a pupil of Abhinavagupta, has given a pen-picture of the teacher in the Dhyānaślokāḥ[2] consisting of four verses. This pen-picture is so complete in details that an artist, working under our direction, has been able to reflect it

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1. Gu. Pa., 23 2. Dh. S., 1-4.

in paints, as given in the beginning of this work. It may be translated into English as follows :—

May glorious god Dakṣiṇāmūrti in the form of Abhinava, who is an incarnation of Śrīkaṇṭha and has come to Kashmir out of deep compassion, protect us. His eyes are rolling with spiritual bliss. The centre of his forehead is clearly marked with three lines, made with ashes. His ears look beautiful with Rudrākṣa. His luxuriant hair is tied with a garland of flowers. His beard is long. His body is rosy. His neck, black because of its being besmeared with paste[1] of camphor, musk, sandal, saffron etc., looks splendid. His long sacred thread (Yajñopavīta) is left loose. He is dressed in silk-cloth, white like the rays of the moon, and is sitting in the Yogic posture, called Vīra,[2] on a soft cushion over a throne of gold with a canopy, decked with strings of pearls, in an open hall,—full of crystals, beautified with paintings, smelling extremely sweet on account of garlands of flowers, incense and lamps, perfumed with sandal etc., constantly resonant with vocal and instrumental music and dance and crowded with female ascetics and saints of recognised spiritual power,—in the centre of a garden of grapes. He is attended by all his pupils, such as Kṣemarāja, who are sitting, with their minds concentrated, at his feet and are writing down all that he says, and by two female messengers (Dūtīs), who are standing at the sides, each with a jar, full of water,[3] distilled from the grain kept socked in water for three nights, and a box, full of betels, in the right hand and a fruit of citron and a lotus in the left. His right hand, wearing the rosary of Rudrākṣa, is resting on the thigh and his fingures are in the position indicative of the grasp of the Ultimate Reality. And he is playing upon the Vīṇā, which

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1. A. K., Ch. II, V., 133 2. S. C., Vol. IV, 412.

3. S. C., 568. and T. A., Ah. XXIX. Vs. 11—13.

is capable of producing original musical sound (Nāda),[1] with the tip of nail of his lotus-like left hand.

HIS AGE REFLECTED IN THE PEN-PICTURE.

Madhurāja Yogin in his Gurunātha Parāmarśa, a set of verses in praise of his teacher and spiritual preceptor, Abhinavagupta, says that once there was a great congregation of religious leaders, spiritual preceptors, (Deśika)[2] and female ascetics (Yoginī) possessed of spiritual powers, due to the practice of Yoga. Therein he was recognised to be the topmost spiritual preceptor of all the Śaiva sects known up to that date,[3] such as Sidhānta, Vāma, Bhairava, Yāmala, Kaula, Trika and Ekavīra.[4]

The pen-picture seems to present one of the scenes, connected with the great congregation of the spiritualists, because it refers to their assemblage (Yoginīsiddhasaṅghairākīrṇe). At that time Abhinavagupta was comparatively young. He looked to be merely a child to the old spiritualists, who had gathered together, as is suggested by the word "Upalālitaḥ".

The pen-picture itself presents him as having his hair tied with a garland, i. e. having his luxuriant hair held in befitting position by means of a garland, as wearing the sacred thread and as playing upon Nāda-Vīṇā. The picture, therefore, is of the time before he became an ascetic. The two references in the pen-picture itself definitely settle the problem of his age, in which he is presented in the picture : (i) the presentation of his playing upon Nāda-Vīṇā and (ii) explanations of the musical sounds produced therefrom, which were being written down by his great pupils, such as Kṣemarāja. For, we know that it is his great commentary on the Nāṭya Śāstra of Bharata,

1. S. C., 1372
2. S. C., 1244.
3. Gu. Pa., (MS.) 7.
4. Gu. Pa., (MS.) 21.

called the Abhinava Bhāratī, in which he discusses the matters connected with music. This commentary belongs to the second period, the Ālaṅkārika period, of his literary activity; the period, which preceded the philosophical and followed the Tāntrika, in which his reputation as a great exponent of the Śaivāgamas had been well established. It was the mid-period of his literary activity and, therefore, it seems to be indisputable that he was of middle age at that time.

ABHINAVAGUPTA AS A JĪVANMUKTA.

By the time he started to write his Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vivṛti Vimarśinī he had attained the state of jīvanmukta. -He himself says in the beginning of the above work that the present body is the last of his earthly existence.[1] This fact becomes very clear from his utterances in different Stotras wherein he refers to himself as such, for instance, in the Paramārtha Dvādaśikā, verse 10 and the Anubhavanivedana, verse 3 :—

"Śāktaṁ dhāma mamānubhavataḥ kinnāma na bhrājate."

THE LAST SCENE OF HIS EARTHLY EXISTENCE.

Unlike what has been written so far, we have no other authority than that of a tradition for what we are going to write in the following few lines. We have not so far been able to trace any written authority on which this may have been originally based. The tradition, which, as we pointed out before, is current not only in old Pandit families but also in some of the old Muslim houses in the locality, says that on one day Abhinavagupta, after finishing his work, as he thought, along with twelve hundred disciples walked into the Bhairava cave and was never seen again. The cave is there even now.

1. I. P. V. V., Vol. I, 1

It is about five miles from Magam, a place midway between Srinagar and Gulmurg. A village in its neighbourhood and a brook running down below the hill, wherein the cave is, both are known by the name of Bhīruvā and so is the cave itself. The writer visited the locality and went into the cave also. Its mouth is at a sufficiently great height from the foot of the mountain and from below looks like a crevice in a rock. It goes deep down into the earth. Its opening is very narrow so that a man cannot get into it very easily. At the sight of a small opening and a dark deep pit immediately, one hesitates and fears to go in. One cannot walk but has to crawl into it and that too at places with great difficulty. It has several ways leading to places where one can sit undisturbed and meditate. One of these places is big enough conveniently to accommodate forty to fifty persons; it is round in shape and at a great height there is a chink towards the sky, but it does not allow the rays of the sun to penetrate so far into the cave as to be perceived by the persons within. Far into the cave a hole was pointed out, through which none but a child can find a passage, and it was said that Abhinavagupta went that way. It was also stated by the guide that the hole was said to have been much bigger in earlier times, but was slowly and imperceptibly getting smaller with the passing years. Outside this opening on the rock-walls there seems to be inscribed something with a very sharp instrument, but it is not possible to say at present as to what it is. It is quite probable that the upper layer of the rock may have got so cracked as to look like inscribed figures.

Down the hill was accidently seen a religious minded and long bearded Mohammedan, bent double with age, slowly walking reclining on his slender stick. He was approached and questioned if he knew or had heard any thing about the cave. The only information, that he could give, was

"Hama ne hamārā dādā se sunā, Abnācārī bārā sau sāgirdoṁ ke sātha isa ke andara gayā bas phir pīchū nahīṁ lauṭā." (I heard from my grand father that Abnācārī went into it along with twelve hundred disciples but did never return.) On being further questioned if he knew anything more, he said with great simplicity that that was all, he had heard, and that to add a word to it, his love of truth and religion did not permit him. This was said in such a tone and with such an expression of sincerity and truthfulness on the wrinkled face that the writer felt convinced that whatever may be the exaggeration in the number of followers, the fact that Abhinava went into the cave with some followers and was never seen again was perfectly true, for the simple reason that to retire from the din of the world to some inaccessible place to take Samādhi seems to be the natural termination of the earthly life of a person like Abhinavagupta.

A BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF HIS LIFE.

He was born in a noble and learned Śaiva Brāhmaṇa family in Kashmir. His father was a religious minded person of scholastic attainments and mother a pious orthodox lady. He highly respected the former[1] and deeply loved the latter. He faithfully served his teachers and they lovingly revealed to him the secrets of learning in their possession. He was persevevant, industrious and exceptionally intelligent and so his study was extensive and his command over various subjects was great. He tried innumerable experiments personally to ascertain the truth of what he had read or heard about spiritual matters, and unchallengeable is, therefore, the correctness and precision of his conclusions. Great was his spiritual power and his contemporaries had occasions to see its greatness in deeds. Clear was his head, powerful his memory[2] marvellous his intellectual

1. M. V. V., I.

2. T, A., XII, 425.

capacity, wonderful his command over the language, shrewd his eye to see the real nature of a thing from different angles of vision and beautiful and convincing the way of putting his ideas ; and every page of his available books is an unmistakable proof of it. He was devoutly served by his disciples and he has gratefully acknowledged and rewarded their services by mentioning them in some of his important works. Thus noble was his birth, loving and gentle his temper, honest and rigorous his life, strong and admirable his character, brilliant and highly useful his career, memorable and lasting his contribution to both poetics and philosophy, and glorious was the last scene of his earthly existence when like Tennyson's legendary king Arthur, he parted from his followers never to be seen again.

CHAPTER II.

HIS WORKS.

LIST OF HIS KNOWN WORKS.

1. Bodha Pañcadaśikā.
2. Mālinī Vijaya Vārtika.
3. Parātriṁśikā Vivṛti.
4. Tantrāloka.
5. Tantrasāra.
6. Tantravaṭadhānikā.
7. Dhvanyāloka Locana.
8. Abhinava Bhāratī.
9. Bhagavadgītārtha Saṅgraha.
10. Paramārtha Sāra.
11. Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vivṛti Vimarśinī.
12. Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī.
13. Paryanta Pañcāśikā.
14. Ghaṭakarparakulaka Vivṛti.
15. Krama Stotra.
16. Dehastha Devatā Cakra Stotra.
17. Bhairva Stotra.
18. Paramārtha Dvādaśikā.
19. Paramārtha Carcā.
20. Mahopadeśa Viṁśatika.
21. Anuttarāṣṭikā.
22. Anubhavanivedana.
23. Rahasya Pañcadaśikā.
24. Tantroccaya.
25. Purūravo Vicāra.
26. Kramakeli.

27. Śivadṛṣṭyālocana.
28. Pūrva Pañcikā.
29. Padārthapraveśa Nirṇaya Ṭīkā.
30. Prakīrṇaka Vivaraṇa.
31. Prakaraṇa Vivaraṇa.
32. Kāvyakautuka Vivaraṇa.
33. Kathāmukha Tilaka.
34. Laghvī Prakriyā.
35. Bhedavādavidāraṇa.
36. Devīstotra Vivaraṇa.
37. Tattvādhva Prakāśikā.
38. Śivaśaktyavinābhāva Stotra.
39. Bimbapratibimba Vāda (Dr. Bühler's Kashmir Catalogue MS. No. 469).
40. Paramārtha Saṅgraha (Do. 459).
41. Anuttara Śataka.
42. Prakaraṇa Stotra.
43. Nāṭyālocana.

(41–43) Introduction to the P. T. V., P. 15. It does not state any authority to substantiate the statement.

44. Anuttaratattvavimarśinī Vṛtti (T. C. MS. No. 8219).

There is enough evidence to show that he wrote many other works besides the above. From the known references to them we get the idea of their titles and contents as follows :—

1. His commentaries on other Śaivāgamas than the Śrīpūrva Śāstra on the lines of the Pūrva Pañcikā. That he wrote such commentaries is evident from the following accidental remark in P. T. V., 147 :—
"Pūrvaprabhṛtipañcikāsu."
2. His commentaries on other Stotras than those mentioned above. To them he refers in T. S., 31.
3. His Stotras from which he often quotes in the available works with an introductory remark "mayaiva stotre" or something similar to it. Most of these quotations are

not traceable in the above mentioned available Stotras. The inference, therefore, is natural that he wrote some more Stotras than those we have so far been able to discover.

4. His commentary on the Yogavāśiṣṭha. We have no other source of information about it than a tradition current among Kashmirian Pandits.

The Catalogus Catalogorum includes in its list of seventeen works of Abhinava the following three :—

1.	Paramārthasāra Saṅgraha.	Report XXX.
2.	Paramārthasāra Ṭīkā.	Oudh IX 22.
3.	Spanda.	Oudh XVI 124.

The first, in our opinion, is not a different work from that which has already been published by the Kashmir Research Department under the title of "Paramārthasāra". It is the same as Paramārthasāra Oxf. 238 (C. C., 25). In fact the published text contains both the titles. Abhinava's colophon refers to it as "Paramārthasāra" only, but his commentator, Yogarāja, adds the word "Saṅgraha" to the title in the colophon of his commentary. The two colophons run as follows :—

"Iti śrīmahāmāheśvarācāryābhinavaguptaviracitaḥ Paramārthasāraḥ."

"Sampūrṇeyam Paramārthasārasaṅgrahavivṛtiḥ kṛtistatrabhavatparamamāheśvara Śrī Rājānaka Yogarājasya."

The Oudh Catalogue does not give any extracts from the MSS. It is, therefore, not possible for us to pronounce any opinion on the other two works which are included in Dr. Aufrecht's Catalogue on the authority of the former (Oudh Catalogue), though personally we are inclined to think that the

Paramārthasāra Ṭīkā is the same work as the Paramārthasāra-saṅgrahavivṛti.

EXPLANATION OF THE ARRANGEMENT.

In the above list the first fourteen are the published works. They are arranged in their chronological order on which we shall soon write. From the 15th to the 24th are the MSS. in the possession of the present writer. Out of these, 15th to 23rd are given as appendix C to the present thesis. From the 25th to the 38th are found referred to in the various available works in print or MSS. On the 39th we shall write towards the end of this chapter. The rest are known to us only from different catalogues and reports of searches for Sanskrit MSS.

CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER.

There is no difficulty in arranging in a chronological order those works which bear dates of their composition. Such works have already been pointed out in the preceding chapter. The difficulty lies in fixing the chronology of the rest. Our arrangement is based, not on the mostly imaginary ground of maturity of style and ideas, but on the solid ground of references to earlier works in the later ones. Only in two cases, where in spite of all patient research such a firm ground has not been found, recourse has been had to other testimonies, which are certainly more reliable than those of style etc., for fixing their order.

One of these two cases refers to the question of the priority or the posteriority of the Mālinī Vijaya Vārtika and the Parātriṁśikā Vivaraṇa to each other. Both of them are referred to in the Tantrāloka as follows :—

> " Mayaitat srotasāṁ rūpam anuttarapadād dhruvāt
> Ārabhya vistareṇoktam mālinīślokavārtike."
>
> T. A., XII, 401.

" Anuttaraprakriyāyāṁ vaitatyena pradarśitam
Etat tasmāt tataḥ paśyed vistarārthī vivecakaḥ."

T. A., VI, 249.

On this Jayaratha comments as follows :—

"Anuttaraprakriyāyāmiti parātrīśikāvivāraṇādāvityarthaḥ"

Thus though they are earlier than the Tantrāloka yet no reference is found to one in the other so that the question of priority may be decided. Here, however, the M. V. V. has been placed before the Parātriṁśikā Vivaraṇa :

Firstly, because the former was written at a period when of the family of Karṇa and Mandra, who were cousins, he knew nobody excepting the cousins themselves. In the P. T. V., however, he devotes three verses to describe their ancestry and refers in familiar terms to Vatsalikā, of whom he speaks so much later on in the Tantrāloka. The concluding passages of the Tantrāloka further inform us that with the lapse of time his familiarity with Karṇa-Mandra family grew so much that he agreed to put up with that family to write the encyclopaedic work on the Tantras.

Secondly because it is mostly controversial in its contents and the controversial Tāntrika literature from the pen of Abhinava, as we shall soon show, belongs to the earlier part of his Tāntrika period.

And thirdly because it is a detailed explanation of some passages of the Mālinī Vijaya Tantra, also called Pūrva Śāstra.

("Vākyārthaṁ kathaye kiñcin Mālinyāṁ yat kvacit kvacit."

M. V. V., 2.)

And we know on the authority of the P. T. V. that he wrote a regular commentary on the Pūrva Śāstra, called Pūrva Pañcikā, before the former work :—

("Nirṇītañca etat mayaiva Śrīpūrvapañcikāyām."

P. T. V., 57.)

We also know from the following quotations from the Tantrasāra and the Bhāskarī, a commentary on the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī, edited by us, that works on the same subject, whether they are further expansions or brief resumes of the same, were written one after another :—

"Vitatas Tantrāloko vigāhituṁ naiva śakyate sarvaiḥ
Ṛjuvacanaviracitam idam Tantrasāraṁ tataḥ śṛṇuta."

T. S., 2.

"Tatra ca sarvajanahitārtham Bṛhatpratyabhijñākhyā bahuvistarā ṭīkā kṛtā, tadvicāraṇe ca janam aśaktaṁ jñātvā tenaiva Pratyabhijñākārikāsūtreṣu saṅgrahamayī Vimarśinītiprasiddhā ṭīkā kṛtā." (Bhāskarī).

The M. V. V. also, therefore, has to be supposed to have come either immediately before or after his commentary on the Pūrva Śāstra, in any case before the Parātriṁśikāvivaraṇa.

The other case of a work of doubtful chronological position is that of the Paramārtha Sāra. It consists of only 105 verses and contains only one literary reference and that also is to the Kārikās of Śeṣa, of which it is an adaptation. This, however, has been placed between the Bhagavadgītārtha Saṅgraha and the Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī, because it is a philosophical work. We know of only four philosophical works of Abhinava. Of these, the chronological position of three is certain on the evidence of Abhinava himself. The Bhagavadgītārthasaṅgraha is the first and the Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī is the last. The Pratyabhijñā Vivṛti Vimarśinī or Bṛhatī Vimarśinī immediately preceded the latter. There is, therefore, no other position which we can assign to the Paramārthasāra than the one, given above.

THE TEXTUAL AUTHORITY.

The two doubtful cases having thus been settled, we now give for each work a textual authority in support of the chronological position that we have assigned to it.

1. Bodha Pañcadaśikā.

"Prabodhapañcadaśikāmadhye tādṛṅ mayā sphuṭamuktam".
M. V. V., 36.

2. Mālinī Vijaya Vārtika.

Reasons have already been given.

3. Parātriṁśikā Vivaraṇa.

Reasons have already been stated.

4. Tantrāloka.

"Anuttaraprakriyāyām vaitatyena pradarśitam
Etat tasmāt tataḥ paśyed vistarārthī vivecakaḥ"
T. A., VI, 249.

5. Tantra Sāra.

"Vitatastantrāloko vigāhituṁ naiva śakyate sarvaiḥ
Ṛjuvacanaviracitam idaṁ tu Tantrasāraṁ tataḥ
śṛṇuta." T. S., 2.

6. Tantra Vaṭa Dhānikā.

Because it is a still briefer resume of the Tantrāloka than even the Tantra Sāra.

7. Dhvanyāloka Locana.

"Taduttīrṇatve tu sarvam parameśvarādvayam brahmetyasmacchāstrānusāreṇa viditaṁ Tantrāloka-granthaṁ vicāraya."

Dh. L., 19.

8. Abhinava Bhāratī.

"Tacca madīyādeva tadvivaraṇāt Sahṛdayāloka Locanād avadhāraṇīyam." A. Bh., I, 334.

It is a well known fact that Sahṛdayāloka Locana is another name of the Dhvanyāloka Locana.

9. Bhagavadgītārtha Saṅgraha.

"Vipañcitaṁ caitat asmadgurubhiḥ asmābhiścānyatra vitanyate itīha nātinirbandhaḥ kṛtaḥ." A. Bh., I, 337.

3

A footnote on the word "anyatra" in the above quotation clears what it stands for by stating "Bhagavadgītāvyākhyāyām".

10. Paramārtha Sāra.
The question has already been discussed.

11. Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī.
Because it came immediately after the Bṛhatī Vimarśinī, which is his last known dated work on philosophy, on which he wrote last of all.

M. M. MUKUNDARĀMA ŚĀSTRĪ ON THE CHRONOLOGY OF ABHINAVA'S WORKS.

In view of the facts stated above, it is surprising to find that M. M. Mukundarāma Śāstrī in his two introductions to the Tantrasāra, the one in English (P. IX) and the other in Sanskrit (P. 5-6) has placed the Parātrīśikā Vivaraṇa, the Tantrāloka and the Tantra Sāra chronologically after the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī saying :—

"As, in his great work Tantrāloka, he often quotes from Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī, which, he himself says, was written by him in the year 4115 of the Kali age corresponding to 1014 A. D., it follows that the former was composed after the year 1014. Now the date of composition of Tantra Sāra, which is an epitome of Tantrāloka must necessarily be some time later than 1014 A. D."

In his introduction in Sanskrit he makes an additional statement assigning to the Parātriṁśikā Vivaraṇa an earlier chronological position than that of even the Tantrāloka :—

"Tadanu parātriṁśikāgranthavivaraṇam"

It is to be noted here that the learned Śāstrī has not given the passages which he considers to have been quoted in the Tantrāloka from the I. P. V. We have already quoted the authority

of the Bhāskarī on the basis of which we have assigned to the Bṛhatī Vimarśinī an earlier position in the chronological order than that of the Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī. We have also given a quotation in justification of the P. T. V.'s chronological position before the Tantrāloka. Here is another passage which has been found in the I. P. V. actually referring to the Tantrāloka and the Tantra Sāra. This, in our opinion, is the most conclusive proof of the latter's having been written before the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī :—

> "Etacca vistarataḥ tatpradhāneṣu Tantrālokasārādiṣu mayā nirṇītam itīhānupayogānna vitānitam."
>
> I. P. V., II, 214.

It seems that our Śāstrī mistook the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Kārikā for the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī. The Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Kārikā is the original text of Utpalācārya and the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī is the smaller of the two commentaries on the above by Abhinavagupta. Undoubtedly, there are quotations in the Tantrāloka from the former (Vide Appendix B). But in view of the above quoted statement of Abhinava himself about the earlier chronological position of the Tantrāloka it would indeed be very surprising if any quotation from the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī could be traced in the Tantrāloka.

There are many points which need discussion in connection with the Paryanta Pañcāśikā and the Ghaṭakarparakulaka Vivṛti. We shall, therefore, deal with each of them in a separate chapter subsequently.

WORKS KNOWN FROM REFERENCES.

1. Purūravovicāra.

The Purūravovicāra is so far known from a reference to and quotation from it in his commentary on Kālidāsa's Ghaṭakarpara Kulaka. As the title of the work suggests, it

was concerned with the literary criticism of the character of Purūravas, the hero of Kālidāsa's drama, Vikramorvaśīyam. In it he defended Kālidāsa against the adverse criticism of his drama. Herein he justified poetic freedom as is clear from the following quotation :—

Yaduktam mayaiva Purūravovicāre

Na vai doṣā doṣā na ca khalu guṇā eva ca guṇāḥ
Nibaddhuḥ svātantryaṁ sapadi guṇadoṣān vibhajate.
Iyaṁ sā vaidagdhī prakṛtimadhurā tasya sukaveḥ
Yadatrotpādādapyatisubhagabhāvaḥ pariṇataḥ.

(Gh. V., 21.)

2. Kramakeli.

It was a commentary on the Krama Stotra. It has to be noted here that this Krama Stotra was different from Abhinava's composition of the same name, given in appendix (C) to this thesis. It was a work on the Krama system of philosophy. It is very often quoted by Maheśvarānanda in his commentary, Parimalā, on the Mahārtha Mañjarī. It is referred to by Abhinava in his Vivaraṇa on the Parātriṁśikā :—

"Vyākhyātaṁ caitat mayā taṭṭīkāyāṁ Kramakelau vistarataḥ."

P. T. V., 236.

3. Śivadṛṣṭyālocana.

Śivadṛṣṭi is a well known work on the Trika system, written by Somānanda, the great grand teacher of Abhinava. The Pratyabhijñā system is based on it. From its name and reference the Ālocana of Abhinava seems to have been a critical study of the original work :—

"Yathoktam mayaiva Śivadṛṣṭyālocane
'Preṣopi sa bhaved yasya śaktatā nāma vidyate"

P. T. V., 116.

4. Pūrva Pañcikā.

This was a commentary on the Pūrva Śāstra, also called Mālinī Vijaya, which, according to the following statement, is the most authoritative book on the Trika system of the Śaiva philosophy :—

"Daśāṣṭādaśavasvaṣṭabhinnaṁ yacchāsanaṁ vibhoḥ
Tatsāraṁ Trikaśāstraṁ nu tatsāram Mālinīmatam."
T. A., I, 35.

From its name, Pañcikā, which means a detailed exposition, and from the frequent references to it in most of Abhinava's writings it seems to have been a very big work. An idea of its size can be formed from the available part of the Mālinī Vijaya Vārtika which is an exposition of only the first verse of the Mālinī Vijaya Tantra, as he himself says in its concluding line:-

"Pravarapuranāmadheye pure pūrve Kāśmīrikobhinavaguptaḥ

Mālinyādimavākye vārtikam etad racayati sma."

What must have been the size of the detailed exposition of the whole of the above Tantra, it is not difficult to imagine. This work, however, seems to be irrecoverably lost. Its loss to Śaiva philosophical literature is irrepairable.

Other Pañcikās.

On the lines of the work, just mentioned, he wrote expositions on other Tantras also, as is clear from his reference to them in :—

"Nirṇītaṁ caitan mayaiva Śrī Pūrva prabhṛti
Pañcikāsu." P. T. V., 147.

Here the use of the word "prabhṛti" can have no other meaning than the above.

5. Padārtha Praveśa Nirṇaya Ṭīkā.

Nothing more about this can be said than that, from its name and the nature of the context in which the following reference to it occurs, it appears to have been a work of psycho-philosophical interest :—

"Anusandhāyāḥ smṛtibhede tasyāśca anubhavopajīvitve anubhavābhāvāt ; vitatya ca vicāritaṁ mayaitat Padārtha Praveśa Nirṇaya Ṭīkāyām."

P. T. V., 162.

6. Prakīrṇaka Vivaraṇa.

From the context, in which reference to it, as given below, occurs, this seems to have been a grammatico-philosophical work :—

"Itthaṁ jaḍena sambandhe na mukhyaṇyartha-saṅgatiḥ
Āstām anyatra vitatam etad vistarato mayā."

T. A. VII, 33.

Commenting upon the word "anyatra" Jayaratha says:—

"Anyatreti Prakīrṇaka Vivaraṇādau."

Here the use of the word "ādi" indicates that he wrote many other works of the same kind.

7. Prakaraṇa Vivaraṇa.

It was a commentary on the Prakaraṇa Stotra and is referred to in the T. S., 31.

8. Kāvyakautuka Vivaraṇa.

It was a commentary on Bhaṭṭa Tota's work on poetics, the Kāvyakautuka. It was perhaps the first work on poetics that Ābhinava wrote. For, chronologically it comes before the Dhvanyāloka Locana as the following reference shows :—

"Sa cāyam asmadupādhyāya Bhaṭṭa Tautena Kāvya Kautuke asmābhiśca tadvivaraṇe bahutarakṛta-nirṇayaḥ pūrvapakṣasiddhāntaḥ ityalambahunā."

Dh. L., 178.

9. Kathāmukha Tilakam.

It is referred to as his own composition in the Bṛhatī Vimarśinī. Madhurāja Yogin in his Gurunātha Parāmarśa refers to it and calls it Kathāmukha Mahātilaka. It was concerned with the presentation of sixteen categories of the Nyāya system. It was written with the object of checking the opponents, who entered into discussion with him, from straying away from the point under discussion and talking what was not relevant to it, and defeating them[1].

Abhinavagupta himself refers to it in his Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vivṛti Vimarśinī[2]. From the context it appears that therein he attempted to show how his opponents, the Bauddha etc., in the presentation of their views had gone against the recognised canons of logic.

10. Laghvī Prakriyā.

It was a devotional Stotra as the following quotations therefrom in the Bhagavadgītārtha Saṅgraha and the nature of the context clearly show :—

"Yathā ca mayaiva Laghvyām prakriyāyāmuktam":—
"Na bhogyaṁ vyatiriktaṁ hi bhoktus tvatto vibhāvyate
Eṣa eva hi bhogo yattādātmyam bhoktṛbhogayoḥ."

Bh. G. S., ch. IV, Ś. 28.

and

"Ūnādhikam avijñātam..
Kṣantavyaṁ kṛpayā śambho yatastvaṁ karuṇākaraḥ
Anena stotrayogena tavātmānaṁ nivedaye."

Bh. G. S., ch. XII, Ś. 11.

1. Gu. Pa., 9.

2. I. P. V. V., Vol. I. 20.

11. Bhedavāda Vidāraṇa.

It is referred to in the Bhagavadgītārtha Saṅgraha, Abhinava Bhāratī Vol. II, 224 and the Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī. It was a controversial work chiefly meant to demolish the dualistic theory, as is apparent from the following quotation :—

"Kṛtapratānaścāyam prakṛtyarthaṇyarthaviveko mayaiva Bhedavāda Vidāraṇe iti tata evānveṣyaḥ."

I. P. V., II, 158.

12. Devī Stotra Vivaraṇa.

This was a commentary from the monistic point of view on Ānandavardhana's Devī Stotra. The Stotra has been published in the Kāvyamālā series. Our statement is based upon the following lines in the Bh. G. S.:—

"Sarvabhūteṣu ātmānaṁ grāhakatayā anupraviśantam bhāvayet, ātmani ca grāhyatājñānadvāreṇa sarvāṇi bhūtāni ekīkuryāt ; ataśca samadarśan-atvaṁ saṁjāyate yogaśceti saṁkṣepārthaḥ ; vistarastu Bhedavāda Vidāraṇādi prakaraṇe Devīstotra Vivaraṇe ca mayaiva nirṇītaḥ."

Bh. G. S., ch. VI, Ś. 30.

Here from the use of the word "ādi" after "Bhedavāda Vidāraṇa", it appears that he wrote very many books to controvert the dualistic theory.

13. Tattvādhva Prakāśikā.

In this the author discussed the nature and the number of Tattvas, accepted by the Trika. It is referred to by Jayaratha in his commentary on the Tantrāloka as follows :—

"Granthakṛtā ca Tattvādhvaprakāśanādau tatra tatra tanmatāvalambanam eva kṛtam."

T. A., Ah. XI, P. 19.

14. Śivaśaktyavinābhāva Stotra.

In this Stotra, as the title indicates, Abhinava praises Śiva and Śakti as inseparable from each other. He quotes two verses from this in his commentary on the 19th verse of the 15th chapter of the Bhagavadgītā.

DIVISION OF HIS WORKS INTO THREE PERIODS.

There are three clearly marked periods of his literary activity. His works, therefore, have to be classified accordingly.

I. TĀNTRIKA PERIOD.

From the dates of his two dated Stotras, Krama and Bhairava, and from the chronological order of his works based on references and other indications it is clear that first of all he tried the power of his pen mainly in commenting on the then existing Tantras from the point of view of monistic Śaivaism. That the Krama was the first of the Tāntrika systems on which he worked, the earliest date of the Kramastotra clearly proves. His known contributions to it are his above Stotra and the Kramakeli. The next Tāntrika system that drew his attention was the Trika. To this his chief contributions are his Pūrva and other Pañcikās. That it was the transitional period between his experimenting in and writing on the Krama, and his ultimately taking to Kaulism, is conclusively proved by the following statement of Jayaratha :—

"Tantropāsannagurvabhimukhīkaraṇānantaraṁ viśrāntisthānatayā kulaprakriyāgurumapi utkarṣayati."
T. A., Comm., 1, 31.

His known contributions to the Kaulika literature are the Bhairavastava and the Parātriṁśikā Vivaraṇa. To the last part of this very first period of literary activity belong also his encyclopaedic work, the Tantrāloka, which deals with all the allied schools of Kashmir Śaivaism, and its three summaries, the

Tantra Sāra, the Tantroccaya and the Tantravaṭa Dhānikā, each briefer than the preceding.

II. ĀLAṄKĀRIKA PERIOD.

In the concluding portion of the last chapter of the Tantrāloka we find that his taste is changing. We see him inclining more towards the angle of vision of an admiring poet than towards that of a dry spiritualist. His vivid description of colour, taste and pleasant after-effects of wine, the record of his observation of charming complexion, beautiful facial cut and sportive movements of the city ladies, his interest in the beauty of the fauna and the flaura of Kashmir, his description of the river Vitastā and repeated reference to the power of Cupid, are all unmistakable signs of a changed taste. The Ālaṅkārika period, therefore, followed. That this was the middle period we know on the unmistakable authority of the Dh. L. which contains a clear reference to the T. A. (vide Dh. L., 19). There are four known works of this period, of which the K. K. V. was the first (vide Dh. L., 178) and the A. Bh. was the last to come from his pen.

III. PHILOSOPHICAL PERIOD.

Again, at the time of writing the A. Bh., philosophical ideas are seen getting supremacy, so much so that his exposition of Rasa, which has held its ground to this day, is purely philosophical. Not only this, while commenting on Bharata's Nāṭya Sūtra he had already begun writing side by side a purely philosophical work, namely, his commentary on the Bhagavadgītā, as we know from a reference in A. Bh. (vide A. Bh., I, 337). Thus last of all did come the philosophical period. To this belong his monumental works, the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī and the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vivṛti Vimarśinī. The latter is also known as Bṛhatī Vimarśinī or Aṣṭādaśa Sahasrī. Because of these two works it is that he

is acknowledged to be the chief exponent of the Pratyabhijñā philosophy, as the concluding portion of Mādhavācārya's summary of the Pratyabhijñā Darśana in the Sarvadarśana Saṅgraha shows :—

"Abhinavaguptādibhirācāryaiḥ vihitapratānopyayamarthaḥ."

The Pratyabhijñā Vivṛti Vimarśinī is the penultimate of his known works. There is only one work, namely, the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī, which, on the authority of the Bhāskarī, we know for certain as posterior to it. How many more works he wrote thereafter, or whether he wrote any at all, we have at present no authority to say.

A GENERAL IDEA OF HIS AVAILABLE WORKS.

1. Bodha Pañcadaśikā.

It is a propagandistic pamphlet, consisting of 16 verses. It is called Bodha Pañcadaśikā, because in fifteen (Pañcadaśa) verses the basic principles of the monistic Śaivaism are summarized in it. The sixteenth verse simply explains the object of such a composition. It speaks of the Śaiva conception of Śiva and Śakti, their relation and consequent emanation of the universe ; of the cause and the nature of the bondage and the way to freedom from it, and of their (bondage and freedom) being in reality non-different from the highest Lord. It was written, as the following quotation shows, with the expressed object of enabling the less intelligent pupils of his, easily to grasp the fundamental principles of the system propounded by him :—

"Sukumāramatīn śiṣyān prabodhayitum añjasā
Imebhinavaguptena ślokāḥ pañcadaśoditāḥ."

B. P., Ś. 16.

The eighth verse of this pamphlet is quoted in the M. V. V., with the introductory remark :—

"Prabodhapañcadaśikāmadhye tādṛṅ mayā sphuṭam."
M. V. V., 36.

2. Mālinī Vijaya Vārtika.

It was an exposition of some of the very difficult verses of the Mālinī Vijaya Tantra which is also called Śrīpūrva Śāstra. It was written at the earnest entreaty of his loving pupils, Karṇa and Mandra[1]. On the former we have already spoken a little and shall speak more when dealing with the Tantrāloka. It is unfortunate that so far we have been able to get the Vārtika on the first verse only which was composed in the eastern part of Pravarapura[2]. That he wrote his Vārtika on more than one verse and that the published edition, consisting of only two chapters, is only a part of a very big work that he wrote, is clear from his repeated reference to the 18th chapter wherein he promises to deal exhaustively with the various points under discussion[3]. Though it is only the second in the chronological list of his published works yet it was not the second of his compositions. Before taking up this work he had written many others as references to them to be frequently met with in this work clearly prove[4]. The available portion contains a very scathing criticism of various important theories of the Nyāya.

3. Parātriṁśikā Vivaraṇa.

The Text.

Amongst the eight numerically equal groups[5] of the sixty-four non-dualistic Tantras, Rudra[6] Yāmala Tantra is the seventh in the second i. e. Yāmala group. The verses constituting the text of the Parātriṁśikā form the concluding part

1. M. V. V., 2.
2. M. V. V., 135.
3. M. V. V., 58, 104.
4. M. V. V., 33.
5. T. A., I, 42.
6. T. A., I, 42.

of the same. They give a summary of the whole Tantra. This statement finds its support in the last verse of the text itself :—

"Evam mantraphalāvāptirityetad Rudrayāmalam."

P. T. V., 277.

The Vivaraṇa is Abhinava's commentary on it.

OTHER COMMENTATORS.

The Parātriṁśikā seems to have been quite popular during the century that intervened between Somānanda and Abhinava. This supposition alone can explain the existence of so many commentaries on it. Abhinava refers with reverence to only three of these, written by Somānanda, Bhavabhūti and Kalyāṇa separately[1]. About the rest he had so bad an opinion that he considered it disgraceful even to criticise them[2]. In Kashmir the present writer found another commentary, which is both simpler and briefer. It was written by Rājānaka Lakṣmīrāma. The MS. was copied by Rājānaka Nīlakaṇṭha in the Saptarṣi year 4962. It is in the possession of his son Mahisar of Srinagar.

In Kashmir one more commentary was found in 1946. It was written by Rājānaka Lāsaka. The MS. is in the possession of Shri Kanth Kaul of Srinagar (Kashmir). It is fairly correct and in good condition. The commentator is a successor of Abhinavagupta. He refers to and quotes from the Tantrāloka as follows :—

Tantrālokeṣvapi :—

"Tapaḥ prabhṛtayo ye ca niyamāstattadāsanam
Prāṇāyāmaśca tatsarvam etadvāhyavijrambhitam"

and so on. He states that the commentary, written by Abhinavagupta, was difficult. Therefore, he wrote another commentary, the Triṁśikā Vivṛti.

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1. T. A., VIII, 96. 2. P. T. V., 93.

Dṛṣṭvā durghaṭanāṁ śāstre guptapādair vinirmite
Rājānaka Lāsakenaiṣā triṁśikāvivṛtiḥ kṛtā.

He clearly points out the object of the Rudra Yāmala Tantra, particularly of the portion on which he comments. According to him, two paths to final emancipation, (i) of knowledge (2) of action, were known. The former was followed by the Śaivas, the Vedāntins and the Sāṅkhyas and the latter by the followers of Pātañjala Yoga, the Haṭha Yogins and the Mīmāṁsakas. The third path, which is distinct from and easier than the above two and which is pointed out by the Parātriṁśikā, is called "Anuttara". This means is called Kaulika, because it brings about the identity of the insentient body etc. with the Universal Consciousness (Kaulikaḥ-jaḍasya dehādeścidekarūpatāsampādakaḥ agnirivāyasapiṇḍasyāgnitopa-pādakaḥ) just as the fire brings about the identity of an iron-ball with itself. It consists in the practice of Rājayoga, the contemplation on "Aham".

THE TITLE.

The title is very misleading. On seeing it, the reader naturally thinks that the word "Triṁśikā" is indicative of the number of verses constituting the original text, but it is not so,[1] because the text actually consists of more verses than thirty. The real title of the book is Parātrīśikā.[2] It means "Parā, the mistress of the three i. e. the three powers of will, knowledge and action." In fact Parā is an abbreviation of Parāsaṁvid, which is higher than these powers and is still identical with them. The book is so called because it deals with such a "Parā". No doubt, it was also called Parā Triṁśikā, but for no other reason than that of similarity of sound. The word "triṁśikā" does not imply number thirty. Another name of this book is Trika Śūtra, because it gives in brief outline the

1. P. T. V., 17. 2. P. T. V., 16-7.

basic principles (Prameyas) of the Trika system.[1] The text with Abhinava's Vivaraṇa is also called Anuttara Prakriyā.[2]

There are frequent references in this book to a Tantra Sāra. But it has to be noted here that this Tantra Sāra is an Āgama and not the summary of Abhinava's great work, the Tantrāloka. We made a very thorough search for the quotations from the Tantrasāra, found in the Parātriṁśikā Vivaraṇa, in Abhinava's Tantrasāra, but could not trace any. We have, therefore, come to the natural conclusion that the Tantrasāra, quoted in the Parātriṁśikā Vivaraṇa, is different from the work of the same name which is merely one of Abhinava's own summaries of his great work, the Tantrāloka. The chronological position, therefore, that we have assigned to the Parā Triṁśikā Vivaraṇa, needs no change.

ŚAIVA CONCEPTION OF PARĀ, PAŚYANTĪ, MADHYAMĀ AND VAIKHARĪ.

According to the Ābhāsavādin, the whole universe is a mere manifestation of the Universal Self or Parama Śiva, as the images of an imagination, the scenes of a dream or the creations of a person who has attained certain yogic powers (yoginirmāṇa) are those of the limited selves. Our experience tells us that the things of imagination, dream and yogic creation have no existence independently of or separately from the self which is responsible for their manifestation. Believing, therefore, the macrocosm to be the same in its nature and constitution as the microcosm, the Ābhāsavādin holds that the whole universe rises from, has its being within, is maintained by and again merges in the same Universal Consciousness or Self. He also holds that it is in its essence the same as that from which it rises, just as the waves of the ocean are essentially the same as the ocean itself.

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1. T. A., Ah. XII, P. 101. 2. T. A., VI, 249.

This Self, the ultimate reality, he conceives as "prakāśa vimarśamaya". The universe also he broadly divides into substance and speech (vācya and vācaka) ; speech, not as a mere physical phenomenon but as that of which the words are mere symbols. In fact the word " vāk " (speech) is used for the immaterial part of the universe, because the grossest form of Vimarśa is distinguished from its other forms by its association with the physical sound which is its symbol and has a different physical substratum as opposed to the purely intellectual substratum of the idea. The substance is the grossest manifestation of the Prakāśa aspect of the Universal Consciousness and the speech is that of the Vimarśa. Thus, Parā is a distinctive name of the ultimate reality by which it is referred to when its Vimarśa aspect is intended to be emphasized. The Parā is called speech (śabdana), not in its gross form in which we hear it, but in the most subtle one, like self-consciousness within. In this form it is independent of all conventions, rather, it is their very life in the condition of Māyā[1]. It is the background of the individual self-consciousness, which has no other reality than the identification of self with a body, an identification which finds expression in gross speech as "I am John". Thus substance and speech are one in their most subtle original form, though in the stage of Māyā both seem to have separate existence. This state of perfect unity of consciousness and its entitative contents (prakāśavimarśaikya) is called the *Parā* state.

"Citiḥ pratyavamarśātmā parā vāk svarasoditā."

I. P. V., I. 203.

All that we hear and can possibly hear exists in the Parā state of speech exactly in the manner in which all that we determinately perceive exists in the state of indeterminate

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1. I. P. V., 205.

knowledge. But before it can find manifestation in gross speech, technically called Vaikharī, it passes through two intermediate stages, known as Paśyantī and Madhyamā. To give a clear idea of what these technical terms stand for, it is necessary to deal with them separately, avoiding, as far as possible, the use of philosophical jargon.

I PARĀ.

The Parā is pure consciousness. It is free from all limitations of time and place, and name and form. It can be called self-consciousness (Aham), not as associated with body, mind, or vital airs, but as identical with the Universal Self. It has to be noted here that the use of the word "self-consciousness" for the Parā state of speech is from the point of view of the limited perceiver, who in the Vaikharī stage recognizes the latter's origin from the former. The reason is that the Parā state is the state of absolute unity without even so much as the faintest rise of diversity. For, the first rise of diversity takes place only in the first stage in the manifestation of gross speech from Parā, called Paśyantī. It is the ultimate source of all power that is found in words, used in ordinary life. It is a state of perfect unity of all kinds of powers. It is ever present in all the limited perceivers as identical with their self-consciousness, not as associated with body etc., but as something above them all. It is present even in the state of deep sleep when there is no consciousness of the earthly existence.

II PAŚYANTĪ.

Taking Parā as the primordial state of speech, we can speak of Paśyantī as the first stage in the manifestation of gross speech. In it there is but an extremely faint rise of gross speech as distinct from pure consciousness, so much so that the distinction cannot at all be said to have arisen. This rise of distinction is regulated by the desire which is its cause :

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just as in the case of remembrance, though its object is associated with a variety of ideas yet in the memory there arises only that idea for the revival of which there has been an immediate cause. As for instance, though a gold jar is associated with innumerable ideas yet there is no rise of all of them or any of them promiscuously at the time of remembrance. We know it from our own experience that when it is remembered at the time of prosperity the only ideas, which rise about it, are those which are associated with it as an article of decoration and luxury. But do not absolutely different ideas arise when the same is remembered at the time of adverse circumstances? Is not then the idea of its salability prominently associated with it? And what is it that controls the rise of these ideas? Is it not the desire of the remembering individual? The same, therefore, is the determining factor in the rise to distinction of certain forms of speech to the exclusion of the rest in the stage of Paśyantī, though there is no denying the fact that all of them are equally present within Parā exactly as all the ideas, which can rise in remembrance, are within ourselves.

III MADHYAMĀ.

It is that stage which immediately precedes the articulate speech. In this although the distinction between idea and speech, preceding the utterance, is clear, yet, there is no difference in the substratum of the two exactly as in the case of a black jar in which, although we have the idea of jar as separate from that of its blackness, yet, the substratum of jar is non-different from that of the quality of blackness. This we can all feel when we are delivering a very thoughtful speech in which every idea and the words expressive of it are very carefully chosen before utterance. Although in such a case there is a very clear consciousness of the distinction between the two, yet, experience tells us, there is no difference of substratum.

IV VAIKHARĪ.

It is that form of speech which we use in our daily transactions[1]. In it the idea and the articulate symbol, which represents it, have separate substrata.

The distinction of each one of the four forms of speech from the rest of them will become clear if we were to compare them with the four conditions of a seed, which sends out its sprout. The Parā is like that condition of a seed, in which all the future forms of the sprout, according to the Sāṅkhya conception, exist in the state of absolute unity. The Paśyantī is just like that condition in which there is just the rise of that state which is responsible for the first perceptible development. It is just like self-preparation on the part of a person before he makes any perceptible movement to stir or jump. The third i. e. Madhyamā is like the enlargement of seed in which though there is a perceptible change from the original condition yet the two (seed and sprout) cannot be pointed out as distinct from each other in point of substratum. The last i. e. Vaikharī is comparable to that condition in which the sprout has appeared as distinct from the seed and both are directly perceptible as distinct from each other in all respects not excluding that of the substratum.

The reader will, now, understand that Parā, with the explanation of which the Parā Trīśikā is concerned is nothing but the Parā Saṁvid or Anuttara ; and that the adjunct "Trīśikā", which forms a component part of the compound which stands as the title of the book, is meant to distinguish this Parā from the first of the four forms of speech involved in the individual utterance in the condition of Māyā. This explains why the work was called Anuttara Sūtra also.

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1. P. T. V., 4-5.

THE SUBSTANCE.

The text is in the form of a dialogue between Bhairava and Bhairavī. The latter questions what is that thing, called Anuttara, from the mere knowledge of which equilibrium of Khecarī i. e. liberation from all kinds of pains and sorrows (mokṣa) can be got[1]? The idea is similar to that of the Vedānta which also says "One who knows Brahman himself becomes Brahman." (Brahmavid Brahmaiva bhavati). What Bhairava says in reply on the essential nature of the Saṁvid and the way to know it, we shall have occassion to speak of in the philosophical part of this work.

BIOGRAPHICAL IMPORTANCE.

This book, next to the Tantrāloka, is of very great biographical importance. In the concluding portion of this work he describes, for the first time, his as well as his favourite pupil Mandra's descent and gives some account of both the families and their atmosphere. All these points have already been dealt with at some length in the preceding chapter.

4. TANTRĀLOKA.

This is the most voluminous of all the works of Abhinava, discovered so far. It deals exhaustively with all the matters connected with the non-dualistic sixty-four Āgamas. It touches upon both the ritualistic and the philosophical matters alike. Although it is primarily concerned with the systematic presentation of the teachings of the Kula[2] and the Tantra systems only yet occasionally it gives authoritative information on others also[3] such as the Krama etc. It is the most authoritative book on the said subjects, because the statements made in it

1. P. T. V., 3.
2. T. A., I, 24.
3. T. A., Comm., I, 29.

are not simply matters of opinion, but are based[1] on the authority of the Śaivāgama, as traditionally interpreted, and, what is more, on the personal experience of the author himself. It consists of thirty-seven[2] chapters. All of them have now been published. They, together with the valuable commentary of Jayaratha, cover twelve volumes. Of these the first five, the ninth and the thirteenth chapters are of very great philosophical importance. The first gives in brief all that is to be dealt with later in detail. The following four deal successively with the four ways to the final emancipation, namely, (i) Anupāya, (ii) Śāmbhava, (iii) Śākta. and (iv) Āṇava. The ninth is interesting because it deals with the thirty six Tattvas of the Śaiva philosophy and the interest of the thirteenth lies in its giving us an idea of the Śaiva theory of Karma.

THE MOST IMPORTANT POINTS DISCUSSED IN THE TANTRĀLOKA.

1. The cause of bondage.
2. The way to freedom.
3. What is knowledge as distinct from ignorance.
4. What is Mokṣa according to the Trika.
5. Conceptions of Mokṣa of other schools.
6. What is the ultimate reality of the objective world.
7. The process of manifestation of the universe.
8. The ways to realisation of the ultimate reality.
9. The points of difference between one way and another.
10. Bimbapratibimba Vāda.
11. Comparison of the Tattvas from Puruṣa to Pṛthvī with those of the Śāṅkhya.
12. The worlds in the universe as conceived by the Śaivas.
13. Śaiva rituals.
14. Autobiographical touches.

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1. T. A., I, 149. 2. T. A., I, 288.

On most of these points we shall be speaking in the second part.

THE TITLE.

It is called Tantrāloka because it enlightens its reader on the path, pointed out by the Tantras.

"Ālokam āsādya yadīyaṁ eṣa
Lokaḥ sukhaṁ sañcaritā kriyāsu." T. A., Ah. XXXVII, 426.

THE PLACE OF AND THE OCCASION FOR ITS COMPOSITION.

It was written at the house of Mandra[1]. And it was at the combined request of his younger brother, Manoratha[2], his dear pupil, Mandra, his loving cousins, and some other devotees of Śiva, such as Rāmagupta, that he undertook to write this work. As a matter of fact the idea of writing such a work was already in his mind. This combined request simply gave an additional impetus and so the work was taken up[3] immediately.

ITS AUTHORITY.

Although it is full of quotations in support of the various points, discussed therein, from ever so many Tantras, yet, according to Abhinava's own statement, it is primarily based upon the authority of the Mālinī[4] Vijaya Tantra. This Tantra is the most important of all the three, Siddhā, Nāmaka and Mālinī, which primarily contain the principles and teachings of the system, called the Trika, and represents the essence of all the ninty-two Āgamas belonging to the three schools of Śaivaism, namely, Advaita, Dvaitādvaita and Dvaita.

1. T. A., Ah. XXXVII, 425.
2. T. A. Ah. XXXVII, 418.
3. T. A., Ah. XXXVII, 419.
4. T. A., I, 35,

5. TANTRASĀRA.

6. TANTRA VAṬA DHĀNIKĀ.

These two, as their names imply, are the summaries of the Tantrāloka. The last is a briefer summary than the first. It is like a seed of the huge tree of the Tantrāloka.

AUTHORSHIP OF THE TANTRA VAṬA DHĀNIKĀ.

Jayaratha quotes two verses from the Tantra Vaṭa Dhānikā in his commentary on the Tantrāloka Ah. II, Ś. 2, without mentioning the name of the author. This was thought by M.M. Mukundarāma Śāstrī to be sufficient reason to attribute this work to another Abhinava of the same name. He says in a foot note to his edition of the work under discussion:—

" 'Upāyairna Śivo bhāti' ityādi padyadvayaṁ (Tantrāloka 2 Ah. 2 padyaṭīkāyām) yaduktam itīyatā granthakṛnnāmānuddiśya yat pramāṇarūpeṇopanyastam atonumīyate etadgranthakṛd Abhinavaguptaḥ prasiddha Abhinavaguptācāryād vibhinno Rājānaka Jayarathācāryāt paurvakālikaśca sambhavatīti."

T. V. Dh., P., 5.

Even if there had been no other reason to the contrary, we would have considered the reason stated by the learned editor to be too insufficient for such a conclusion. But there is the sound evidence of Jayaratha himself, who, in his commentary on the Tantrāloka itself, clearly attributes the Tantra Vaṭa Dhānikā to our Abhinavagupta, saying "Yaduktam anenaivānyatra" and quotes verses thirty-six and thirty-seven giving the name also of this work in T. A., Comm., Ah. 13, P. 81. The supposition of difference in point of authorship of this work is, therefore, baseless.

7. DHVANYĀLOKALOCANA.

It is the well known commentary of our author on Ānandavardhana's Dhvanyāloka. On the commonness of the auth-

orship of the Kārikā and the Vṛtti ; on the history of the theory of Dhvani, on its opponents and on other commentators on the Dhvanyāloka than our author, we shall speak at proper places in the following chapters. Here, therefore, we need not go into any detailed treatment of the work.

8. ABHINAVA BHĀRATĪ.

This is a commentary of Abhinavagupta on the Nāṭya Śāstra of Bharata. In this he mostly follows the interpretation of the text, as orally given by his teacher in this branch, Bhaṭṭa Tota.[1] On many important points, however, he differs from him (Bhaṭṭa Tota) as he does from Somānanda, whose commentary he follows and expands in the Parā Triṁśikā Vivaraṇa. These differences he clearly states, as for instance, in regard to there being a possibility of the enjoyment of Rasa from the perusal of a poem (A. Bh., vol. I,292-3). His object in this commentary was not simply to prove that his predecessors' interpretations of Bharata's text were wrong but rather to modify them.[2]

THE PLAN.

According to his own statement, his plan in this work was to comment in detail, giving a full and clear explanation of all the intricacies to be met with in the important passages, to give the meanings of the difficult words in the case of the unimportant ones, to reconcile all the apparent contradictions in the text, to explain repetitions, to discuss at length the disputed points, to clear up doubts and to put together the opinions of the authoritative persons on the most salient[3] points. These are some of the distinctive features of the commentary. Space here does not permit us to illustrate all the points stated above. Two places in the commentary may, however, be pointed

1. A. Bh., Vol. I. 1. 2. A. Bh., Vol. I, 2. 3. A. Bh., Vol. I, 1-2.

out as illustrative of most of them. One is that in which he deals with Bharata's definition of Rasa in the 6th chapter, and the other is the third chapter in which he contents himself with mostly giving the meanings of a few words here and there.

THE QUESTION OF THE JOINT AUTHORSHIP OF THE TEXT.

The question of the joint authorship of the Nāṭya Śāstra of Bharata is very old. On this scholars have differed right from the pre-Abhinava time. According to some, those portion in which sage Bharata is addressed in the second person, as for instance in Bh. Su., ch. I, Ś. 2-6, were from the pen of some of his pupils and the rest from that of Bharata himself.[1] But Abhinava considers the use of the second person alone to be too insufficient for such a conclusion and thinks that Bharata himself wrote those portions also, representing himself to be an interrogator. He substantiates his statement by giving the instances of the use of dialogic form in the works of accepted single authorship. We reserve our opinion on this matter till the 5th chapter.

THE INTERPRETATION OF BHARATA'S MYTH ABOUT THE ORIGIN OF THE STAGE.

Abhinava puts a very intelligent interpretation on the mythical account, given by Bharata, of the origin of the stage in the first chapter. According to him, when Bharata speaks of his having been instructed by Brahmā to direct the dramatic performance because of his being a sage with hundred sons, of his having been given umbrella, crown and throne etc. by different gods, of the appointment of certain divine beings to guard over certain parts of the theatre or certain actors and of the creation of fairies, he simply means to tell us the requirements of the stage and the way to manage it.

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1. A. Bh., Vol. I, 8.

To state it briefly, the stage-director should be a self-sacrificing, hardy,[1] industrious and influential[2] person of great intellectual[3] power ; he should be capable of understanding[4] the idea of the poet at a glance ; he should have a large number of men of receptive mind[5] and retentive memory, of quick judgement[6] and easy delivery ; these men should be capable of identifying[7] themselves with the characters which they represent, so that not only their tone and facial expression may change with the changing scenes, but the colour[8] also, which is ordinarily not possible unless there be corresponding feeling[9] in the heart. Their height, complexion, facial cut, colour of the hair and eyes and general constitution of the body should be fit for the varying needs of the stage, as the hundred names of Bharata's sons, enumerated in the text, imply[10] ; and above all they should be free from all shyness[11] before the audience.

Women are indispensable for the stage. For, whatever be the nature of training, the characteristic differences in point of delicacy of body and sweetness of tongue, which are the gifts of nature alone, and the sudden or gradual change of colour and look which are caused by certain feelings natural to women alone under certain circumstances, cannot possibly be displayed by men ; and the absence of these seriously interferes with the enjoyment of Rasa. Like men, women also, as the names of the created fairies imply, should be of different kinds to suit the occasion.

There is also required a sympathetic, appreciative and liberal public to supply, like gods in the myth, the various scenic

1. A. Bh., Vol. I, 17.
2. A. Bh., Vol. I, 17.
3. A. Bh., Vol. I, 16.
4. A. Bh., Vol. I, 21.
5-6, A. Bh., Vol. I, 16.
7. A. Ah., Vol. I, 27.
8. A. Bh., Vol. I, 28.
9. A. Bh., Vol. I, 22.
10. A. Bh., Vol. I, 19.
11. A. Bh., Vol. I, 16.

necessities to give the look of naturalness to all the scenes of the drama.

As regards the management, the general manager should be a person who in disposition, talk and look is exceptionally sweet like[1] the moon. But strong and strict should be the stage-manager[2]. The other executives also should be of such nature and power as characterise[3] the gods, mentioned in the myth.

In this brief statement of a general idea of his works, we need not state what he has said in regard to those portions of Bharata's Nāṭya Śāstra which concern themselves with the details of construction of the stage and the arrangement of seating accommodation for the audience according to the class, rank and importance of each individual[4], with the narration of the orthodox religious rites to be performed before using a new stage, with the description of one hundred and eight postures (karaṇa) and thirty-two gestures (aṅgahāra) of dance and finally with the instructions as to how to stage the prologue. We, therefore, pass them over.

TWO RECENSIONS OF THE NĀṬYA ŚĀSTRA.

It may be pointed out here that not only Abhinavagupta himself refers to the text of Bharata as consisting of 36 chapters[5] at the beginning of his commentary but also refers to the 36 categories of the Pratyabhijñā system as propounded by Utpalācārya. And at the beginning of each successive chapter he praises the deity in terms of one of the thirty six categories beginning with the Earth (Bhūmi) in the first chapter. In the Kashmirian recension of the Nāṭya Śāstra there were 36 chapters only as is clear not only from the reference to them by

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1. A. Bh., Vol. I, 31.
2. A. Bh., Vol. I, 31.
3. A. Bh., Vol. I, 31,
4. A. Bh., Vol.I, 32,
5. A. Bh., Vol. I, 1.

Abhinavagupta himself but also from the views of those who differed from him on some points. For, they also asserted that the Nāṭya Śāstra consists of thirty six chapters only[1]. An additional support to this view is lent by Madhurāja Yogin, a pupil of Abhinavagupta, who, while referring to Abhinava's commentary on the Nāṭya Śāstra, talks of thirty six chapters only[2].

Therefore, it seems that the splitting of the contents of the thirty sixth chapter into two and putting a verse in praise of the Anuttara, the thirty seventh category, was the work of a later writer, who followed that recension of the Nāṭya Śāstra in which the subject-matter was divided into thirty seven chapters. And it is a fact that there are two recensions of the work of Bharata, one having thirty six chapters and the other thirty seven.

9. BHAGAVADGĪTĀRTHA SAṄGRAHA.

The Bhagavadgītārtha Saṅgraha, as its name implies, is not a commentary in the strict sense of the word. It is simply a summary of the subject-matter of the Bhagavadgītā. At some places, however, it has the look of a commentary inasmuch as it gives the meanings of certain words. In it Abhinava gives the traditional interpretation from the Śaiva point of view, as learnt from his teacher, Bhaṭṭendurāja, but not without using his[3] judgment. It was written at the repeated request of a certain pious Brāhmaṇa, Loṭak,[4] who, it appears, was Abhinava's relative[5]. It fills a gap left by other commentators inasmuch as it gives the hidden true import of the Bhagavadgītā[6]. Its proper understanding presupposes a tolerably good knowledge of the undisputed parts of the text as well as that of

1. A. Bh., Vol. I, 8,
2. Gu.. Pa., 10,
3. Bh. G. S. Introd. Ś. 6.
4. Bh. G. S. concl. Ś. 2.
5. Bh. G. S. concl. Ś. 3.
6. Bh. G. S. Introd. Ś. 5.

the basic principles of the Trika philosophy. A person, who is qualified in both these respects, will certainly find it very informing, particularly on those passages about which doubt is not removed by the commentaries of his predecessors. The following verses illustrate the point :—

II, 12, 69; III, 11; IV, 18, 24; V, 14; VI, 5-7.

The text on which Abhinava comments, differs at many places from the one published by the Nirnaya Sagar Press, which, along with other commentaries, includes Abhinava's Bhagavadgītārtha Saṅgraha also. In the printed text, for instance, we find that the well known verse :

"yadā yadā hi dharmasya"

etc. reads in the concluding portion as

"tadātmānaṁ sṛjāmyaham".

But Abhinava's text reads as

"tadātmāṁśaṁ sṛjāmyaham".

The variation, though apparently slight, implies a greatly different meaning as the following extract from the commentary shows :—

"Śrī Bhagavān kila pūrṇaṣāḍguṇyatvāt śarīrasamparkamātrarahitopi sthitikāritvāt kāruṇikatayā ātmāṁśaṁ sṛjati ;

Ātmā pūrṇaṣāḍguṇyaḥ, aṁśaḥ upakārakatvena apradhānabhūto yatra tat ātmāṁśam, śarīram, gṛhṇāti ityarthaḥ."

Bh. G. S., Ch. IV, 7.

Numbers of a few more verses with this kind of difference are given below :—

1st Chapter :	1, 6, 18, 28, 33.
2nd Chapter :	1, 5, 10, 11, 12, 13, 21, 30, 32, 43, 47, 48, 58, 60, 63.
3rd Chapter :	23, 26, 35.

Further, it has very many verses in addition to those found in the published text. Take for instance verses forty to forty-five in the third chapter.

"Eṣa Sūkṣmaḥ paraḥ śatrur dehinām indriyaiḥ saha
Sukhatantra ivāsīno mohayan pārtha tiṣṭhati
Kāmakrodhamayo ghoraḥ stambhaharṣasamudbhavaḥ
Ahaṅkārobhimānātmā dustaraḥ pāpakarmabhiḥ
Harṣam asya nivartyaiṣa śokam asya dadāti ca
Bhayañcāsya karotyeṣa mohayaṁstu muhur muhuḥ
Sa eṣa kaluṣaḥ kṣudrachidraprekṣī Dhanañjaya
Rajaḥpravṛtto mohātmā mānuṣāṇām upadravaḥ."

On this Abhinava comments as follows :—

"Eṣa tāvat sūkṣma utpattisamaye alakṣya indriyeṣu" etc.

IMPORTANCE OF THE BHAGAVADGĪTĀ IN THE EYES OF THE ŚAIVAS.

Several teachers of Śaivaism from the time of Vasugupta down to that of Abhinava commented upon the Bhagavadgītā. In the writings of our author there are very many quotations from it and often they are coupled with reference to Kṛṣṇa as Guru[1]. It is, therefore, necessary to state here how Kṛṣṇa is connected with the Trika Śaivaism, and consequently what position the Gītā does occupy in the Śaiva literature.

Here we may state by the way that in this and similar other cases our object in these pages is simply to explain why orthodox Śaivas had a certain view about this or similar other matters. Whether they were right or wrong in these respects is altogether a different matter with which we are not concerned immediately.

Although the Śaivāgama in its available form had its origin between the third and the fourth centuries A. D., as we shall

1. T, A, I, 162,

show in the 5th chapter, yet the orthodox Śaivas regarded it as of very high antiquity, indeed of eternal existence like the Vedas. This view we find recorded by Abhinava in the 35th Āhnika of the Tantrāloka in which he traces the origin of the Śaivāgama from Bhairava and represents Rāmacandra also to have studied it partly. In the Harivaṁśa Purāṇa we are told that Kṛṣṇa was taught the sixty-four monistic Śaivāgamas by sage Durvāsas, the revealer of all of them in Kali age. Similarly in the Mahābhārata, Mokṣa Parva, it is stated that he got instruction in the Dvaita and the Dvaitādvaita Śaivāgamas, twenty-eight in number, from Upamanyu. It seems that it was because of the above statements that Kṛṣṇa was thought by the Śaivas to have been himself a follower of the Trika. Perhaps for this very reason the Bhagavadgītā is classed with the Āgamas.

10. PARAMĀRTHA SĀRA.

THE TITLE.

This work is called Paramārtha Sāra, because it briefly states the most essential principles of the Trika philosophy.

"Āryāśatena tad idaṁ saṁkṣiptaṁ
śāstrasāram atigūḍham."

P. S., 198.

THE SOURCE

According to Abhinava's own statement, it is an adaptation of the Ādhāra Kārikās of Śeṣa Muni who is also referred to as Ādhāra Bhagavān or Ananta Nātha. These Kārikās were known as "Paramārtha Sāra" also. They gave in brief the most essential principles of the Sāṅkhya philosophy and taught that the final emancipation could be attained by discriminating between Prakṛti and Puruṣa. The original with a few omissions, additions and alterations was adapted to serve as a medium of teaching the most essential principles of the Trika. The adap-

tation consists of one hundred and five verses, though Abhinava's own statement as regards the number of its verses is :—
"In hundred Āryā verses I have summarised the essential principles of the Trika system which are so difficult to understand." P. S., 198.

This, however, does not mean that Abhinava wrote only hundred verses and that the rest were subsequently added to them by some other hands. The fact is that the number refers to the verses, concerned with the statement of the principles, and not to all which constitute the existing text. Therefore, if we leave aside the first three verses, in the first of which he offers prayer and in the following two states the source and nature of his composition, and also the concluding two, we find the verses dealing with the subject-matter to be only one hundred. This seems to have been his way of giving the number of verses in a particular work, as is testified by his Bodhapañcadaśikā. Although this work actually consists of sixteen verses yet it is called Pañcadaśikā (consisting of 15 verses) because only in the first fifteen verses the Bodha is dealt with. The last is simply a concluding verse similar to the last two in the work under discussion.

COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE SOURCE AND THE ADAPTATION.

There is a difference of opinion among scholars as regards the text which was the source of Abhinava's adaptation. Dr. Barnett, who was perhaps the first Contemporary scholar to study the philosophical works of Abhinavagupta, remarks in J. R. A. S. (1910) P. 708 :—

"Our Paramārtha Sāra must be distinguished from another little work of the same name, of which an edition was published in 1907 at Madras, with a Telugu paraphrase by Pattisapu Venkateshvaradu. The latter consists of seventy-nine Āryā

verses; a considerable number of these are borrowed directly from our Paramārtha Sāra and with them have been incorporated others, the whole work being painted over with Vaiṣṇava colours. Needless to say, it is valueless for the criticism of our book."

Supposing the text of the Paramārtha Sāra, referred to by the learned Doctor, to be the same as that of the one published in the Śabda Kalpadruma, Mr. J. C. Chatterji holds, on the contrary, that the very work, referred to by Dr. Barnett in the above paragraph, was adapted by Abhinava to suit his needs. He further adds in the same connection :—

"A comparison of the two texts would prove, to my mind, interesting and I propose to make it on another occasion."

K. Ś., P. 12.

After a careful study of the available material on the subject, we are inclined to support the latter view. We also, like Mr. Chatterji, have not had access to the Madras edition of the Paramārtha Sāra, with a Telugu paraphrase. Our information about the supposed adapted Paramārtha Sāra is based on two editions. One of these forms a part of the Śabda Kalpadruma and the other has been published in the Trivendrum Sanskrit Series. Like Mr. Chatterji, we also feel little doubt that the text presented by these two editions is the same as that of the edition referred to by Dr. Barnett, because it fully answers the description of the Madras publication. This also consists of seventy nine Āryā verses. It may be noted here that the concluding line of the text appearing in the Śabda Kalpadruma states the number of verses to be 85. The Trivendrum publication does have 85 verses. But the additional six verses have got nothing to do with the subject-matter. They constitute a sort of introduction and were, therefore, perhaps, dropped by the scribes of the MSS. on which the two editions, the

one included in the Śabda Kalpadruma and the other published at Madras, referred to by Dr. Barnett, are based. A considerable number of verses in the common text of the two publications is the same as that found in Abhinava's Paramārtha Sāra, and the whole of the original work is painted over with Vaiṣṇava colours. Consult, for instance, the verses 25 and 59 of the Śabda Kalpadruma.

This work was held to be very sacred, so much so that Abhinava in his Bh. G. S. quotes from it as from a Śruti the following verse :—

"Tīrthe śvapacagṛhe vā naṣṭasmṛtirapi parityajan deham
Jñānasamakālamuktaḥ kaivalyaṁ yāti hataśokaḥ."

Bh. G. S., Ch. VIII, 7.

It may be pointed out here that this verse is found without the least difference in Abhinava's Paramārtha Sāra also. But it cannot be supposed to be a quotation from that; firstly, because, as we have already said, the Bh. G. S. comes before the Paramārtha Sāra in the chronological order of his works ; secondly, because it is given as a quotation from Śruti, as the context given below shows :—

"Evaṁ hi sati jñāninopi yāvaccharīrabhāvidhātudoṣa—
vikalitacittavṛtter jaḍatāprāptasya tāmasasyeva gatiḥ
syāt na cābhyupagamotra yuktaḥ pramāṇabhūtaśruti-
virodhāt asti hi "tīrthe śvapaca" etc. ;

Bh. G. S., Ch. VIII, 7.

thirdly, because, had the quotation been from his own work he would have stated so, as it is his clearly marked practice in this and other works ; and fourthly and lastly, because of Mr. Chatterji's reason in support of the earlier date of the adapted text than that of our author, namely, that a verse from it is quoted in the Spanda Pradīpikā by Utpala Vaiṣṇava, who was an older contemporary of Abhinava, if not his

predecessor, as we shall show in the next chapter (K. Ś., P. 13). Thus the supposition of the earlier existence of the work, accessible to us, does not seem to be unreasonable. We, therefore, are of opinion that the Paramārtha Sāra of Abhinava is an adaptation of the work, published in the Śabdakalpadruma and in the Trivendrum Series.

We attempt below to compare briefly the language of the two to strengthen our opinion further :—

"Nānāvidhavarṇānāṁ varṇān dhatte yathāmalaḥ sphaṭikaḥ,
Tadvadupādher guṇabhāvitasya bhāvaṁ vibhur dhatte."

A. K.. Ś. 7.

and

"Nānāvidhavarṇānām rūpān dhatte yathāmalaḥ sphaṭikaḥ
Suramānuṣapaśupādaparūpatvaṁ tadvadīśopi."

P. S., Ś. 6.

Here the difference of principle will be apparent to any one familiar with the ideas of the two systems. According to the Sāṅkhya, limitation is the result of the nearness of its cause to what is limited and the two have separate independent existence. But, according to the Trika, it is simply a result of the free will of the one who is all-powerful and independently of whom nothing has or can have an existence. However, because of the commonness of the idea that this limitation is only apparent and that the pure being is in reality as little affected by these varying conditions as a crystal is by the various things which cast their reflections on it, Abhinava has retained in his adaptation so much of the language of the original that any one having the two verses before him can confidently say that one is an adaptation of the other.

But when there is no such difference of principles, we find the very language of the original without the alteration of even a letter, as in the following instance :—

"Puṇyāya tīrthasevā nirayāya śvapacasadananidhanagatiḥ
Puṇyāpuṇyakalaṅkasparśābhāve tu kiṁ tena."

These lines constitute the 74th verse of the original and the 84th of the adaptation.

Further, we find certain portions of the original altogether omitted, because they deal with matters in which the two systems fundamentally differ, as for instance, that part in which the original deals with the effect of the mere presence of Puruṣa in bringing about all activity in the insentient senses :—

"Yadvadacetanam api sannikaṭasthe bhrāmake bhramati loham
Tadvat karaṇasamūhaś ceṣṭati cidadhiṣṭhite dehe."

A. K., Ś. 3.

We also find in the adaptation certain verses which cannot at all be traced in the original. These are mainly those which deal with the ideas peculiar to the Trika Śaivaism, as for instance, those which describe the eleven Tattvas in which this system believes in addition to those which it has in common, at least in point of names, with the Sāṅkhya system :—

"Śivaśaktisadāśivatām īśvaravidyāmayīṁ ca tattvadaśām
Śaktīnām pañcānāṁ vibhaktabhāvena bhāsayati."

P. S., Ś. 14.

For a detailed comparative study we give below the numbers of the verses in the adaptation showing against them those of the verses in the Ādhāra Kārikās, as found in the Śabda Kalpadruma, of which the former are adaptations.

P. S.	A. K.	P. S.	A. K.
7	8	60	65
8	9	61	64
9	10	69	68
26	18	70	69
27	19	71	70

28	20	81	71
30	21	82	72
32	22	83	73
36	27	84	74
37	28	100	76
51	49	101	77
52	50	102	78
53	54		

11. ĪŚVARA PRATYABHIJÑĀ VIVṚTI VIMARŚINĪ.

It is a published commentary of Abhinava on Utpalācārya's commentary called "Vivṛti" on his own Pratyabhijñā Sūtras, as Abhinava himself states in one of the introductory verses to this book :—

"Śrīmal Lakṣmaṇagupta darśitapathaḥ
Śrīpratyabhijñāvidhau
Ṭīkārthapravimarśinīṁ racayate vṛttim praśiṣyo guroḥ."

This is the penultimate of the available works of Abhinava. It clears up most of the points which are not very clear in the Laghvī Vimarśinī. But the readers will be pained to know that Utpalācārya's Ṭīkā, on which it is a commentary, has not so far been found in full in spite of vigorous searches made by so many enthusiasts. It was supposed, unfortunately, to be irrecoverably lost.

It is, however, a matter of very great satisfaction that the present writer, in the course of search for it in Kashmir, discovered a fragment of it. It contains all the three works of Utpalācārya (i) the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Kārikā (ii) the Vṛtti and (iii) the Vivṛti. It begins with the 6th Kārikā of the Jñānādhikāra Āhnika 3, which runs as follows :—

Evamanyonya bhinnānāmaparaspara vartinām
Jñānānāmanusandhānajanmā naśyejjanasthitiḥ

It continues up to the 3rd Kārikā of the Āhnika 5, which runs as follows :—

Bhinne prakāśe cābhinne śaṅkaro viṣayasya yat.
Prakāśātmā prakāśyortho nāprakāśaśca siddhyati.

But it abruptly ends with

Iha bodhastāvadabhinnaḥ prakāśamātrameva hyasya paramā.

If we compare it with the references to it in the now published commentary, the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vivṛti Vimarśinī of Abhinavagupta, there remains not even a shadow of a doubt about its genuineness. For, Abhinavagupta, while commenting on the Vivṛti quotes beginnings of the sentences or words on which he comments. And these are found in the MS. just in the same order.

In the later portion there are many gaps ; but the earlier is without them. We are trying to edit it and hope that if "He wills" it will be published in due course.

12. ĪŚVARA PRATYABHIJÑĀ VIMARŚINĪ.

This is Abhinava's commentary, called Vimarśinī, on Utpalācārya's Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Sūtras. This is called Laghvī Vimarśinī also, because of its being a comparatively less detailed commentary than the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vivṛti Vimarśinī. According to the old method of calculation, in which a group of thirty-two syllables was counted as one Śloka, the former work consists of four thousand and the latter of eighteen thousand Ślokas and, therefore, they are also known as Catussahasrī and Aṣṭādaśasahasrī respectively. The contents of this work will be dealt with in the second part.

The nine smaller works of Abhinava, which we are giving in Appendix (C) to this thesis, can be divided into two classes: (I) propagandistic booklets or leaflets on the Trika Śaivaism and (II) Stotras. To the former belong :

13. Anuttarāṣṭikā,
14. Paramārtha Dvādaśikā,
15. Paramārtha Carcā and
16. Mahopadeśa Viṁśatika.

And to the latter class belong :

17. Krama Stotra,
18. Bhairava Stava,
19. Dehastha Devatā Cakra Stotra,
20. Anubhava Nivedana and
21. Rahasya Pañcadaśikā.

All the four pamphlets are concerned with the explanation of the phenomenon of the universe as non-different from the highest reality, which is spoken of as "Anuttara" in the first, "Paramārtha" in the second and the third and "Prapañcottīrṇa" and "Viśvamūrti" in the last of the first group. They state that the realisation of the highest reality, as they represent it, is the only way to salvation.

The first line of the second verse of the Anuttarāṣṭikā :—

"Saṁsārosti na tattvatas tanubhṛtām bandhasya vārtaiva kā"

is quoted by Jayaratha in his commentary on the Tantrāloka, III, 99. Although in this work we find some of the similes very commonly used by the Vedāntins to explain the unreality of the universe, for instance :—

"Mithyāmohakṛdeṣa rajjubhujagacchāyāpiśācabhramaḥ,"

yet it would be a mistake to think that the Trika conception of the universe is the same as that of the Vedānta. For, the former is Ābhāsavāda and the latter is Vivartavāda. For fuller information on this refer to the 2nd chapter in the 2nd part.

The Paramārtha Dvādaśikā was known as Advaya Dvādaśikā also, because the second verse :—

"Yadyatattvaparihārapūrvakaṁ tattvam eṣi
tadatattvam eva hi"

is quoted by Ramyadevācārya in his commentary on Cakrapāṇinātha's Bhāvopahāra, Ś. 45, with the introductory remark "Advayadvādaśikāyāmapi."

As regards the Stotras, about the first two, viz., the Krama and the Bhairava, we have already spoken in discussing the date of Abhinavagupta. Here it may be added in connection with the latter that in old Pandit families of Kashmir there is still current a tradition which says that Abhinava, while entering the Bhairava cave for his last Samādhi, was reciting this Stotra.

In the Dehastha Devatā Cakra Stotra Abhinava shows that the attendant deities of Śiva, mentioned in the Purāṇas, are found associated with him even when he is in the body as a limited self (Śiva eva gṛhītapaśubhāvaḥ). Though in the latter case their names and forms are different yet their functions are the same. For instance, in the Purāṇas he is said to have got two door-keepers, Gaṇeśa and Baṭuka. They accompany him even when he assumes limitations as an individual (Paśupramātā) to guard two of the nine doors of the body. Of course, in this case, they are called Prāṇa and Apāna. Jayaratha echoes this very idea when in his commentary on the Tantrāloka, I, 6, he says the following with regard to Gaṇeśa and Baṭuka :—

"Asya hi prāṇavyāptirasti ityevaṁ nirdiśanti guravaḥ"

and

"Vastuto hi apānavyāptirasyāsti ityevaṁ nirdeśaḥ," respectively.

Regarding the Anubhava Nivedana it may be stated here that we attribute it to Abhinava on the authority of a tradition only. We have so far not been able to find any internal or external literary evidence to support it. The colophon says

nothing about its authorship. We are, therefore, not quite sure that the tradition is well founded. We have, however, included it in the list of Abhinava's works, because we found it in an old collection of Abhinava's Stotras in the possession of Harabhatt Shastri of Kashmir.

It may be added here that the first two verses of this work are found in the Haṭhayoga Pradīpikā by Svātmārāma Svāmin as verses 37 and 41 respectively, without clearly saying that they are quotations from elsewhere. He refers to Matsyendra and Gorakṣa, as the authorities on Haṭha Yoga[1] and the commentator Brahmānanda asserts that Jālandhara Nātha, Bhartṛhari and Gopīcandra are implied by the word "Ādi" in the text. This lends support to the view that Bhartṛhari, the author of the Vākya Padīyam, was an authority on Yoga also as is stated in the colophon at the end of the Vākya Padīyam :—

"Iti mahāvaiyākaraṇa–mahākavi–mahāyogi–mahārājāvantīś vara Śrī Bhartṛhari viracitaṁ Vākyapadīyam."

He refers to Gorakṣa as one who had attained union with the Ultimate in the life time through the practice of Haṭha yoga. That Gorakṣa was the author of some works is clear from the following quotation in the Haṭh Yoga Pradīpikā :—

Tathāhi Gorakṣa-vacanam :—
Varjayeddurjanaprāntam vahnistrīpathasevanam
Prātaḥ snānopavāsādi kāyakleśavidhiṁ tathā

The fact that he was the chief exponent of the Nādopāsanā is also asserted by Svātmārāma Svāmin.[2] That one of his works was the Gorakṣa Śataka is clear from two references to it by Brahmānanda, the commentator on the Haṭha Yoga Pradīpikā, in the course of his commentary on Ch. III, 113. and Ch. IV, 27.

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1. H. Y. P., 7. 2. H. Y. P., 201.

This Gorakṣa seems to be a very early authority and, therefore, different from Gorakṣa alias Maheśvarānanda, the author of the Mahārtha Mañjarī and other works. For, while the former is recognised to be the exponent of Haṭha Yoga, Maheśvarānanda was the exponent of Mantra Yoga as we shall show in dealing with him in a subsequent chapter.

It has to be definitely noted here that Svātmārāma Svāmin very often quotes from other works without stating the source or even saying that it is a quotation. For instance, he quotes from the Yogavāśiṣṭha :

"Saṅkalpamātrakalanaiva jagat samagram" H. Y. P., IV, 58.

It is the commentator, Brahmānanda, who points out that it is a quotation as follows :—

Vasiṣṭhavākyam pramāṇayati.

The occurrence of the two verses of the Anubhava Nivedana in the Haṭhayoga Pradīpikā, therefore, does not conclusively prove that Svātmārāma Svāmin is their author.

RAHASYA PAÑCA DAŚIKĀ.

The last line of this work says that these Fifteen verses were written by Abhinavagupta and the title also refers to number Fifteen. The work, therefore, should consist of Fifteen verses only. But the manuscript before us contains thirty seven verses. This makes one doubt the authorship of it. Though in some of his other works also the number of verses actually found is more than there should be, according to his own statement : for instance, the Paramārthasāra contains 105 verses, though his statement at the conclusion of the work is "In hundred Āryā verses I have summarised the essential principles of the Trika system" : and the Bodha Pañcadaśikā consists of sixteen verses, though according to the title there should be

fifteen only : yet the additional verses, found in these works, admit of explanation as we have shown in dealing with them. But in the present work the number of additional verses is so large, being more than twice the number that there should be according to the author's own statement, that one is compelled to think that either it is not a genuine work of Abhinavagupta or that so many verses have been interpolated in it that it is difficult to distinguish the original verses from the interpolated.

It is primarily concerned with the presentation of Parā in inseparable union with Śiva or Parama Śiva[1] under the influence of the religious mythical conception of Śiva and Pārvatī. It speaks of Parā as both Lakṣmī[2] and Sarasvatī,[3] representing her in the characteristic features of the two deities as conceived in the Purāṇas. It refers to her powers as known in the Vedas.[4] It mixes up the philosophical conception of Parā with the mythical conception of Pārvatī, Lakṣmī, Sarasvatī etc. Very often it repeats the same idea and the same word. No reference to this work has been traced so far.

22. TANTROCCAYA.

This is another summary of the great work, Tantrāloka, smaller than the Tantrasāra but bigger than the Tantravaṭadhā-nikā. Although both the introductory and the concluding verses speak of its being a work of Abhinava, yet the language, the style and the method of treatment of the subject-matter, give rise to grave doubt about its being from the pen of Abhinava.

23. BIMBAPRATIBIMBA VĀDA.

This work is noticed in two catalogues (1) Dr. Bühler's Kashmir catalogue and (2) Dr. Bhandarkar's Report of the

1. R. P., 4.
2. Ibid. 7.
3. Ibid. 22.
4. Ibid, 18.

collection of Sanskrit MSS. in 1875-76. A careful study of a copy of the MS. of the work in question, kindly supplied by the curator of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, tells us that this work, though noticed as a separate work of Abhinava, is in reality only a part of the 3rd Āhnika of the Tantrāloka in which he refutes the Bimbapratibimba theory of the Naiyāyikas and establishes that of the Śaivas. A comparison of the verses 1 to 23 of the third Āhnika and the commentary thereon with the MS. No. 469 of 1875-76 in the B. O. R. I. will convince anybody. In fact the colophon very clearly states that the Bimbapratibimba Vāda is only an extract from the Tantrāloka.[1]

24. ANUTTARA TATTVA VIMARŚINĪ VṚTTI.

Prof. P. P. S. Shastri's descriptive catalogue of the MSS. in the Tanjore Palace Library informs us that there are two MSS. of this work in the said Library; but unfortunately both of them are incomplete. The extracts given by the learned Professor leave no doubt about Abhinava's authorship of the work.[2] It may be pointed out here that there is no foundation for Prof. P. P. S. Shastri's guess :—

"The work under notice is perhaps his (Abhinava's) commentary on Utpalācārya's Īśvarapratyabhijñā, a metrical summary of Śaivaism."

A careful comparison of the extracts from the MS. on pages 6360-61 with the Parātriṁśikā Vivaraṇa of Abhinavagupta, published by the Research Department of Kashmir, leaves no doubt about its being another and smaller commentary of Abhinava on the Parātriṁśikā, an extract from the Rudrayāmala Tantra. Compare, for instance, the following :—

"Iha khalu svātmadevataiva pramathyamānāvasthāyām ātmānaṁ parāmarśenānavaratam pṛcchatītyata ucyate :—

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1. B. P. V. (MS.). 2. T. C., P. 6361.

Śrīdevyuvāca"
Kim pṛcchatītyata āha :—
"Anuttaram" iti
"Anuttaraṁ svātmadeva
Sadyaḥ kā.........ra siddhidam
Yena vijñānamātreṇa
Khecarīsamatāṁ vrajet"

T. C., 6360—I

and

"Śrīdevyuvāca"
"Anuttaraṁ kathaṁ deva
Sadyaḥ kaulika siddhidam
Yena vijñātamātreṇa
Khecarīsamatāṁ vrajet."

P. T. V., 3.

The few small differences between the two texts can be explained as due to either scribal mistakes or local variations in reading.

A set of his works dealing with the Anuttara, Abhinava used to refer to as "Anuttaraprakriyā". This fact we learn from Jayaratha's following comment on the above word :—

"Anuttaraprakriyāyāmiti parātriṁśikā-vivaraṇādāvityarthaḥ."

T. A., Comm., VI, 249.

The two works under discussion are apparently of the said set. It was a common practice among the Kashmir-writers of the 10th and the 11th centuries to write more than one commentary on the same work. Utpalācārya, the grand teacher of Abhinava, for instance, has written two commentaries on his own Īśvara-pratyabhijñākārikā, namely, the Vṛtti and the Vivṛti, the first being the smaller of the two.

CHAPTER III

PARYANTA PAÑCĀŚIKĀ

A learned edition of Abhinavagupta's Paryanta Pañcāśikā was published by Dr. V. Raghavan in 1951 in a booklet of about 30 pages. The editor gives quotations from many texts, suggesting the meanings of different technical philosophical expressions used in it. The main problem that needs solution is : Which of the three systems, Krama, Kula and Pratyabhijñā, on which Abhinavagupta wrote, is epitomised here ? They have much in common, but they are distinct from one another. They use the same technical expressions very often, but with different meanings. The meanings of the words and the text can be settled only when we can solve the main problem, stated above. We shall take up this problem in due course.

THE AUTHORSHIP OF THE WORK.

There can be no dispute about the authorship of the work. The fact that the Paryanta Pañcāśikā was written by Abhinavagupta is established on the following grounds :—

(i) Colophon at the end of the book says that it is from the pen of Abhinavaguptanātha.[1]

(ii) In the colophon, referred to above, the author refers to himself as Abhinavaguptanātha and not as Abhinavaguptapāda or simply as Abhinavagupta. This cannot be sufficient ground for doubting the work to be from the pen of the same author as wrote the Tantrāloka, the Parātriṁśikā Vivaraṇa etc. For, Madhurāja Yogin in his Gurunātha Parāmarśa uses "Abhinavaguptanātha" as the name of the author of the Abhinavabhāratī, the commentary on the Nāṭyaśāstra of Bharata[2]

1. P. P., 22.

2. Gu. Pa., 4.

and refers to the Paryanta Pañcāśikā as the work of the same author.[1]

Gorakṣa alias Maheśvarānanda, the author of the Mahārtha Mañjarī also refers to Abhinavagupta as Abhinavaguptanātha, though he includes the word "Pāda" in it.[2] He was a great admirer and follower of Abhinavagupta. He quotes from the Paryanta Pañcāśikā at many places in the course of his commentary "Parimalā" PP. 12, 44–5, 49, 70, 72–3. in different contexts.

IDEA OF EACH VERSE OF THE PARYANTA PAÑCĀŚIKĀ WITH NECESSARY ELABORATION.

(1) I contemplate on the unspeakable speech (Parā) which is the heart,[3] the most essential aspect, of the Ultimate and which holds within the first, the last and all other powers[4] which come between them and, therefore, is perfectly free.[5]

BHAIRAVA.

(2) Bhairava is the God and all other gods have as little separate being from Him as jar has from clay. He is "Being" such as does not exclude even not-being.[6]

(3) He is consciousness such as comprehends within even not-consciousness. The philosophy that centers round Him is such as gives place to the opposite systems within itself.

(4) The Bhairava state is the state in which all the six types of manifestation, (Kalā,[7] Tattva, Bhuvana, Varṇa, Pada and Mantra, from the ritualistic point of view) have their

1. Gu. Pa., 8. 2. M. M., 202.
3. Bh., Vol. 1, 250-5. 4. Bh., Vol. I, 267. 5. Bh., Vol. I, 35.
6. Bh., Vol. I, 258-9. 7. S. T., II, (Comm.) 50.

being in the state of identity.[1] At the culminating point it is such as, according to all the Tantras, does not admit of definition. It is the ultimate goal to be realised.

(5) The Vimarśa Śakti, which is essentially nothing but the self-consciousness and in which the powers of will, knowledge and action are merged, is the heart, the most essential aspect, of the Bairava, the God of gods, and has no being separately from Him, is inseparably united with Him.

(6) He manifests himself in all forms from the Anāśrita Śiva[2] to the earth by the sheer force of his will, because the Vimarśa is the most essential aspect of Him.

CREATION.

(7) Creation of the Lord is of two types : (i) signifying sound (Vācaka) and (ii) signified meaning (Vācya). Each is of three types (i) transcendental (Para) (ii) subtle (Sūkṣma) and (iii) gross (Sthūla). Thus the creation is of six types.[3] It is nothing but limited manifestation of the Bhairava.

(8) He manifests the variegated limited manifestations (Ābhāsas) as different and separate from one another. They give rise to distinct ideas, which, when put together by the mind, are responsible for the idea of succession in two forms (i) temporal and (ii) spatial.[4]

EXPERIENCE.

(9) The world of limited manifestations admits of being experienced in two ways, pure (Śuddha) and impure (Aśuddha). Pure experience is that in which the externalised objects are

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1. T. A., Ah. XI, 45. 2. S. T., Vol. VI. 4-7. and 22.
3. S. T., Vol. II, 50-1. 4. Bh., Vol. II, 14-16.

apprehended as merged in the Self, the "I", with which they are essentially identical.

(10) The impure experience is that in which the external objects, though identical with the Self, are not realised as such. In between these two experiences there are innumerable forms of experience, more or less different from one another.

(11) In the manifestation of the limited individual subjects in relation to the befitting objects, very often both the subjects and the objects are manifested as universal, as in the case of æsthetic experience from drama and poetry,[1] but mostly both of them are manifested as individual as in the case of the ordinary experience at the empirical level.

CREATION.

(12) That creation (the pure creation) is recognised to be Lord's own creation, the distinctive characteristic of which is indeterminacy. Herein the "I" and the "This" are not experienced as separate from each other. The Lord himself is the creator of this.[2] (It is distinct from the impure creation, of which Ananta is the creator).

(13) The power of consciousness, which is the very soul of the powers of knowledge and action, for manifesting the diversity, manifests itself as Kalā and Vidyā and becomes the cause of the experience of diversity in manifestations.

(14-15) The group of the means of right knowledge and the intellect or Buddhi are but different manifestations of the activity of the power of consciousness (Cicchakti)[3].

INDIVIDUAL SUBJECT.

The same, when active to know and reacting to the external

1. Bh., Vol. I, 239. 2. T. A., VI, 55.
3. Bh., Vol. I. 312 and T. A. III, 126,

objects and, therefore, performing different perceptual and physical actions, each completely cut off from the rest, manifests itself as the powers of senses of perception and of organs of action, is spoken of as the limited subject or Paśu. Thus the Lord Bhairava assumes limited form out of his own free will.

(16) And His power, operative within the fixed limit, follows him. As He assumes limited form, He has the states of limited subjects[1], due to identification with body, vital air, intellect and void, in place of the states of Vidyeśa, Sadāśiva and Śiva, as at the transcendental level.

(17) Different types of imaginative pictures are such creations of the individual subject as are exclusively the objects of his own experience. They are due to the fact that he has the residual traces of the experiences of the objects, which are the creations[2] or manifestations of the Śiva, the Bhairava.

(18) It is the Universal Subject, the Śiva or Bhairava Himself, who assumes the form of the individual such as has been presented above, when out of his free will he manifests himself in diversity. But even while so doing He remains unaffected[3] as essentially of the nature of indeterminate consciousness.

(From verse 19 to 28 this work is in the form of dialogue between the teacher and the taught.)

Teacher says :—

(19) O child ! realise yourself what has been said above. For, Universal Consciousness is a unity and the universe is recognised to be essentially identical with that consciousness. Nothing apart from it has being.

The pupil enquires :—

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1. Bh., Vol. I, 312, 2. Bh., Vol. I, 298.
3. T. A. III, 124,

THE MEANS TO THE REALISATION.

(20) What is that one way to realise this reality, different from which is not possible.

The teacher replies :—

(21) That one way is called Ananyopāya or Ātmopāya. Withdrawing the mind from everything and realising the meaning of "Aham" one realises one's true self which is characterised by immediacy.

(22) Having entered into that consciousness, whose unitary character remains in tact in spite of assuming the innumerable forms, one should not let the determinate ideas arise in the mind.

(23) One should enter into the great lake in the form of Vyomeśvarī (Cit), which is perfect because the four rivers in the forms of Khecarī, Dikcarī, Gocarī and Bhūcarī spring from it[1] and merge his limited self into it : i. e. one should rise above the empirical world, senses, ego-feeling and intellect, and identify oneself with pure universal consciousness.

(24) One should realise oneself as Śiva, performing the five acts of creation, maintenance, destruction, obscuration and grace.

(25) Or one should realise, as taught by the teacher, that one's own self is the performer of the five functions (i) Kṣepa[2], external manifestation of the objects (ii) jñāna, apprehending the objects so manifested as non-different from the Saṁvid (iii) Prasaṅkhyāna, grasping the manifested subjects and objects as distinct from one another as "this is this, this is not this" (iv) Gati, realising that the objective world of Ābhāsas is related to the Saṁvid much as the reflection is to the reflecting surface, (v) Nāda, shining of the universal

1. M. M., 89. 2. T. A., III, 203–4.

consciousness, Saṁvid, in its true light, as a result of elimination of all the manifested.

(Here he follows the Krama system which is recognised to be very closely related to the Kula.[1])

(26-8) Thinking determinately that I am the Bhairava, the whole universe is my form, the entire universe is my manifestation and is related to me as the flames are to fire or rays to the sun; that I myself appear as the subject, the object, the means of knowledge and the knowledge itself ; that I, as pure consciousness, have the four states, Khecarī, Dikcarī, Gocarī and Bhūcarī[2]; that I am responsible for both bondage and freedom, according as I grasp the objective world as different from or identical with myself ; one attains absolute freedom on account of the unshakable belief.

(Here he seems to follow the Kula system)

THE BHAIRAVA.

(29) You are omnipotent and, therefore, independently you manifest every thing from or withdraw within yourself, without being subjected to the temporal succession.

(30) The Absolute, the Bhairava, the Anuttara, and his power of Creation, the Visarga, constitute the couple ; the one of which (the Bhairava) rests[3] in his own unchanging eternal nature and, therefore, is called Viśrama and the other is His first stir, and, therefore, is called Udaya. They mutually unite. (This constitutes the highest triad or Para Trika). All powers are in[4] the union of Śiva and Śakti.

(31) These powers are Ānanda, Icchā, Īśana, Unmeṣa and Ūnatā. The difference between Icchā and Īśana is recognised

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1. T. A. III, 157. 2. P. T. V, 39.

3. P. T. V., 55-6. 4. S. K. (Comm.) 134. and Bh., Vol. I. 35,

to be this that while in the case of the former the object is indistinct in the latter it is distinct.

(32) The union of Anuttara and Ānanda with Icchā and Unmeśa, (which is represented in the Devanāgarī alphabetical system by E and O; and the union of each of the latter two again with A and Ā, which is responsible for the rise of Ai and Au) [The distinction of e, ai, o, ou from one another is that in them in succession the power of action is obscure, clear, clearer and clearest[1]] and Bindu, (which is represented in the Indian alphabetical system as Aṁ[2] and stands for freedom in the act of knowing) which is the very life of the objects of knowledge : all these powers, represented by letters from 'A' to Aṁ, to put it figuratively, constitute the perfect body of the Bhairava.

(33-5) The objects, which shine in Icchā and Īśana, standing separately in gross form, appear as five gross elements, earth etc. : in subtle form they appear as five subtle elements (Tanmātras) : in the form of means, they appear as two sets of five i. e. as five senses of perception and five organs of action: in giving rise to individual knowing subject in relation to the external objectivity , they appear as Manas, Buddhi and Ahaṅkāra : in the state of non-distinction of all the above, they appear as Pradhāna or Prakṛti and Puruṣa, to whom bondage and freedom refer.

(36-7) The power of will has two forms (according as it is related to indistinct or distinct object). They are ever united. The object to which it (will) is related is of two types; possessed of velocity or steadiness.[3] Thus the power of will is of three forms. They are represented by I. Ṛ. Ḷ. Each one of the three forms, becoming united with A, which stands for

1. T. A. (Comm.) II 106. 2. T. A., II. 116.

3. T. A. II, 153 and 162.

Anuttara, gives rise to a separate power. They are represented by Y, R and L. Similarly U, united with A, gives rise to V. These four powers are internal. They are in each limited subject. They belong to the sphere of the Māyā. They are responsible for the distinction of the limited subject from the all-pervading Universal Consciousness on the one hand and from the insentient earth etc. on the other. They hold him up between the two, like Triśaṅku between earth and heaven. They stand for the four categories, Rāga, Vidyā, Kalā and Māyā.

(38) From the three forms of the power of will (represented by I. Ṛ. and Ḷ) arise other three powers; Śuddha Vidyā, Īśvara and Śadāśiva, represented by the three sibilants Ś, Ṣ and S. Then the power of creation (Visargaśakti) becomes thoroughly manifest because of the manifestation of the manifestable. This form of the creative power is represented by H.

(39) After this creation there is symbolic union of the powers, represented by consonants. This is represented by Kṣ. There is no creative activity that is not included in the Visarga, described above.

(40) All this rests again and again within the all-transcending Bhairava through the powers of Being, Will etc. and again arises from Him.

(41) The Parā is consciousness, which is nothing but self-consciousness, holding within the endless objects of consciousness. It is one continuous stream, which does not admit of division into past and future. It is the original consciousness. It is the highest Mantra.[1] It grasps the universe as identical with itself. Its omnipotence and omniscience have no reference to anything that is different from it.

(42) It is spoken of as Kālakarṣiṇī[2], because it is responsi-

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1. P. T. V., 4. 2. T. A., III (Comm) 157-8.

ble for the manifestation of time[1], both internal and external, which has three flows, three paths and three states.[2]

(43-4) Paśyantī is the power of consciousness that is characterised by unity-cum-duality, because it is related to the indivisible objectivity that is separately manifested within. It is the state of Vāk which has its being in the state of Īśvara.

Madhyamā is characterised by succession. It is gross. It has its being in the internal sense. In it thought and speech are still not separated from each other. It is not connected with the activity of the vital air[3].

(45) In the former two states also (i. e. in Parā and Paśyantī, when we look at them as present in the individual subject) the individual subject[4] remains limited, because the residual traces of individuality are still present. And even in the Paśyantī the succession is there in a subtle form (because the power to manifest succession is undeniable.[5])

(46) Having entered into the two states, Paśyantī and Parā, which are characterised by indeterminacy, one after the other, the blessed one realises the full magnitude of his self, with feeling of wonder.

(47) The Vaikharī is essentially the activity of the individual subject inasmuch as it involves the striking of the vocal organs and places of articulation (by the wind). The forms of Vaikharī are the objects of the sense of hearing.

(48) The activities of the Vaikharī are means of mutual communication of ideas by the layman as well as the learned, which is very difficult because of the subtleness of distinction of ideas from one another.

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1. S. T., III, 168.
2. Idid. 256-7.
3. S. Dr. 44. F. N.
4. V. P. (Comm. Ban) 118.
5. Ibid. 117.

(49) The deities presiding over the eight groups of letters[1]—(i) Avarga, (ii) Kavarga, (iii) Cavarga, (iv) Ṭavarga, (v) Tavarga, (vi) Pavarga, (vii) Yavarga, and (viii) Śavarga—Māheśvarī etc. (Mahālakṣmī, Brāhmī, Māheśvarī, Kaumārī, Vaiṣṇavī, Vārāhī, Aindrī, Cāmuṇḍā) do not bind or delimit even in the wakeful state that person who knows the all-pervasiveness of Vāk as presented above.

(50) Obstinate insistence on a particular means is not right. For, the state of the Bhairava is the objective to be realised and that is nothing but one's own consciousness. And all means lead to it. One should enter into that.

(51) I identify myself with or bow to that All-transcending Light (Anuttaraṁ Mahaḥ) which is the secret of all sacred formulas and symbolic presentations of different aspects of the Reality by putting the hands in different shapes (Mantra-mudrā) and holds within the innumerable words and objects, signified by them, including the first and the last and all those which come between them.

(52) I identify myself with or bow to those teachers who, in heart are one with the Supreme and have realised the Ultimate Consciousness or Reality through mental concentration, which does not break (Nirvyutthāna samādhi).

THE SYSTEM PROPOUNDED IN THE PARYANTA PAÑCĀŚIKĀ.

The idea of each verse of the Paryanta Pañcāśikā, given above, will enable any person casting a glance at it to understand that the system, propounded in it, is not the Pratyabhijñā system as presented by Utpalācārya in his Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Kārikā. For, while Utpalācārya admits thirty six categories only, Śiva being the highest, in the Paryanta Pañcāśikā the thirty seventh category, the Bhairava, also referred to as Anu-

1. S. T., I, 29 and S. N., 68.

ttara elsewhere, is admitted ; and Śiva, who is referred to as Anāśrita Śiva[1], is spoken of as a form of Bhairava.

This point that the author of the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Kārikā did not admit the thirty seventh category is made very clear by Bhāskara in his Bhāskarī, the published commentary on the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī of Abhinavagupta, in the course of his comment on the second benedictory verse at the beginning of the Āgamādhikāra[2]. That Abhinavagupta admits the thirty seventh category and refers to it in the very first benedictory verse at the beginning of his commentary on the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Kārikā should not confuse us. For, therein he is referring to the conception of the Ultimate Reality as conceived by the Kula system, which he followed. This point also is clarified by Bhāskara.[3]

The system, propounded in the Paryanta Pañcāśikā, therefore, is not the Pratyabhijñā system of Utpalācārya but mainly the Kula system as taught by Śambhunātha, Abhinava's teacher in that branch of Kashmir Śaivaism.

This view is supported by the following facts :—

(i) Utpalācārya's system is concerned with such Tattvas, categories, only as are subsumed under the second of the three types of manifestation, Kalā, Tattva and Bhuvana, all of which come under the signified meaning (Vācya). This point is emphasised by Bhāskara in his commentary as follows :—

Pratyabhijñādirūpeṣu prakriyāśāstreṣu Tattvasvarūpakathanamātramevestam. (Bh. Vol. II, 212.)

But in the Paryanta Pañcāśikā six types of manifestation, subsumed under two heads, the signifying sound (Vācaka) and the signified meaning, (Vācya), which are the basis of the six paths (Ṣaḍadhva), are dealt with.[4]

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1. P. P., 6.
2. Bh., Vol. II, 211-12.
3. Bh., Vol. I, 3-5.
4. P. P. 7.

(ii) The Paryanta Pañcāśikā deals with the manifestation of the expressive sounds, the letters of the Devanāgarī alphabetical system from A to Kṣ[1], which is the characteristic feature of the Kula system, as is clear from the third Āhnika of the Tantrāloka and the Parātriṁśikā Vivṛti, wherein he deals with the Kula system.

(iii) In the Paryanta Pañcāśikā there is reference to the eight goddesses, presiding over the eight groups of letters in the Devanāgarī alphabetical system, a thing which has no place in the Pratyabhijñā system.

(iv) The Paryanta Pañcāśikā deals with a way or means to the realisation of the Ultimate, which it calls Ananyopāya or Ātmopāya. But this means is not to be identified with the Anupāya, which is the only means propounded by Utpalācārya. For, in this context in the Paryanta Pañcāśikā, Abhinavagupta talks of the realisation of the meaning of "Aham"[2] which is the characteristic feature of the Śāmbhavopāya[3], of withdrawing the mind from everything, of entering into the great lake, the Vyomeśvarī (Parā), and merging oneself therein, of Khecarī, Dikcarī, Gocarī and Bhūcarī, all of which can have no place in the Anupāya. Similar is the case with Kālakarṣiṇī.[4]

The fact is that the Parā as manifesting itself in different manifestations is called by different names, Vyomavāmeśvarī, Vyomeśvarī, (which are synonimous as we shall show in the sequal) Kālasaṅkarṣiṇī[5], Kālakarṣiṇi[6] Mātṛsadbhāva, Vāmeśvarī,[7] Kālī[8], Kālikā etc.[9] These references occur in the context of other means than the Anupāya. It is, therefore, wrong to

1. P. P., 30-39.
2. P. P., 21.
3. T. A., II, 295-8.
4. P. P., 42.
5. T. A., III, 157.
6. T. A., II, 223.
7. T. A., III, 256-7.
8. T. A., III, 205
9. T. A., II, 235.

identify Ananyopāya or Ātmopāya with Anupāya, the only means propounded by Utpalācārya.

A very important point to remember in an attempt to interpret "Ātmopāya" in the Paryanta Pañcāśikā, is that in a quotation from a very authoritative text on the Kula system, given by jayaratha (T. A., Comm. XXIX, 4.). Kula is spoken of as "Ātmasvarūpa" (Kulamātmasvarūpantu). "Ātmopāya", therefore, can be interpreted as "Kulopāya" in harmony with other references to the Kula system in the text.

THE MEANS PRESENTED IN THE PARYANTA PAÑCĀŚIKĀ.

Abhinavagupta directly mentions Ananyopāya only which is synonimous with Ātmopāya. But that is because of the question "What is that one way to realise the Reality, different from which is not possible" (P. P. 20). The fact is that he begins with the presentation of the Śāmbhavopāya as is clear from his instruction to realise the meaning of "Aham" which is the main thing to be done by the pursuer of the Śāmbhavopāya.[1] The Śambhavopāya, according to him, is the highest means.[2] This is the means that he followed[3]. He did not recognise Anupāya to be a separate means. According to him, it is the highest stage of the Śāmbhavopāya, which he calls Paropāya, Paramopāya or Sākṣādupāya.[4] From all this it seems to be clear that by Ananyopāya in the Paryanta Pañcāśikā he means Śāmbhavopāya, which he calls Ātmopāya, because in it external means are unnecessary.

But he does not confine himself to the Śāmbhavopāya. He preaches Śāktopāya also, as is clear from reference to Vyomeśvarī, wherein the disciple is advised to merge his self. For, Vyomeśvarī, Kālakarṣiṇī etc. are discussed in the context of

1. P. T. V., 218-9.
2. T. A., II, 259.
3. T. A., I, 31.
4. T A.., I, 181-2.

Śāktopāya and the use of the word "or" (Vā) in verse 25 signifies that Abhinavagupta points out an alternative means.

In fact he advises the disciple not to be obstinate in the pursuit of any particular means,[1] and, therefore, seems to say that a means is to be adopted according to the fitness of the pursuer to follow it.

THIRTY SEVENTH CATEGORY IN THE PRATYABHIJÑĀ SYSTEM.

Although Utpalācārya did not accept the thirty seventh category in his Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Kārikā as has been pointed out above, yet Abhinavagupta seems to have emphasised the importance of the admission of the thirty-seventh category even in the context of the Pratyabhijñā system as is clear from the first verse of prayer in the beginning of his commentary, the Vimarśinī, "Tadadvaitaṁ vande Paramaśiva Śaktyātma nikhilam." That here he accepted the 37th category is clearly stated by Bhāskara as follows :—

Tattvaṣaṭtriṁśakabhittibhūtaṁ Saptatriṁśa Paraśivarūpam.
Bh., Vol. I, 4.

And in his Tantra Baṭadhānikā he went on to accept even the thirty-eighth category[2].

This led to the acceptance of the thirty seventh category by his pupils, like Kṣemarāja, in dealing with the Pratyabhijñā system. For, according to Maheśvarānanda's interpretation, Kṣemarāja in his aphorism :

"Citiḥ svatantrā viśvasiddhi hetuḥ"

in his Pratyabhijñā Hṛdaya accepts the thirty seventh category. In his Mahārthamañjarī Maheśvarānanda remarks as follows:— "Yathoktaṁ Śrī Pratyabhijñā Hṛdaye "Citiḥ svatantrā viśvasiddhihetuḥ" Soyaṁ svātmasātkṛtāśeṣaṣaṭtriṁśattattvakalāpo mahān

1. P. P., 50. 2. T. B. Dh., Ah. III, V., 16-7.

Paramaśivabhaṭṭārakāhvayaḥ pramātā saptatriṁśatayā svīkriyate" M. M., 70.

This remark is interesting : because it occurs in a context in which he quotes from Abhinavagupta's Paryanta Pañcāśikā verse 6 "Citsvābhāvyāt" which we have discussed above, and seems to suggest that in the context of the Pratyabhijñā system also Abhinavagupta accepted the thirty seventh category. What is pointed out here is that Utpalācārya did not accept it and that Abhinavagupta adds it under the influence of the Kula system.

It may be noted here that to the cursory reader of the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Kārikā it would seem that Utpalācārya himself admitted Paraśiva, Parama śiva or Maheśvara to be distinct from Śiva, the first category. But closer study will reveal that Utpalācārya himself recognises identity of Śiva and Maheśvara in the following :—

"Sa eva vimṛśattvena niyatena Maheśvaraḥ" (Bh., Vol. I, 421.)
And Bhāskara's remark :

"Tattvataḥ Śiva Paramaśivayoraikyameva" (Bh., Vol. II, 212.)
will dispell all doubt about Utpalācārya's position in regard to the thirty seventh category.

CHAPTER IV

GHAṬAKARPARA KULAKA VIVṚTI

The Ghaṭakarpara Kulaka is a short but very interesting poem of twenty verses. And Vivṛti is Abhinavagupta's learned commentary on it.

There are very few poetic productions in Sanskrit which present so many problems as does the Ghaṭa Karpara. Its title, authorship, number of verses, their arrangement, wording, and the character or characters, who are supposed to speak them, the type of poetry to which is belongs, the use of Yamaka in it and many other problems connected with it need solution.

Besides the Ghaṭakarpara Kulaka Vivṛti of Abhinavagupta it has about a dozen other commentaries such as those of Vidyānātha, Vindhyeśvarī Prasāda, Govardhana, Kuśala Kavi, Divākara, Govinda Jyotirvid, Kamalākara Bhaṭṭa, Ramāpati Miśra, Tārācandra, Śaṅkara and Rāmacarita Śarmā. Of these only the last six besides that of Abhinavagupta, have been accessible to us. They will be dealt with in the proper contexts. It has been translated into German by G. M. Dursch, into French by Chézy, into English by J. B. Chaudhury and into Hindi by Pandit Rāmacarita Śarmā.

Its Yamaka impressed the later poets so much so that each Pāda of it was taken up for Samasyāpūrti by Madana in 1680 V. S. (1623 A. D.) in his famous work, the Kṛṣṇalīlā-Kāvya, which presents Kṛṣṇa's separation from the Gopis. It appears that the recension of the Ghaṭakarpara, that was used by Madana, consisted of twenty one verses. For, his work consists of 84 verses. They admit of division into twenty one groups in so far as a complete verse of the Ghaṭakarpara is reproduced

in it in a group of four, the four Pādas of a verse in the Ghaṭakarpara figuring as the first, second, third and fourth Pādas respectively in the successive verses of the group. In his recension "Nicitaṁ kham" appeared as the first verse.

It is engaging the attention of contemporary scholars in the West as well as in the East and commentaries on it are still being written. However, it has not received the amount of serious attention of scholars that it deserves. It has been approached from the critical point of view of the West, the use of Yamaka in it has been condemned and accordingly it has been asserted that it is a poem of not much poetic merit. Abhinavagupta's commentary on it has not been studied and, therefore, his solutions of the problems, stated above, have not been presented. Let us, therefore, see what light the "Ghaṭakarpara Kulaka Vivṛti" of Abhinavagupta throws on them.

THE TITLES OF THE POEM.

The poem is known by four titles : (i) Ghaṭakarpara Kulaka (ii) Ghaṭakarpara Kalāpakāvya (iii) Ghaṭakarpara (iv) Ghaṭakarparakāvya. The first is used by (1) Abhinavagupta in the colophon to his commentary. The second is referred to by (2) Divākara in the introductory verse[1] to his commentary. The third is used by (3) Govinda Jyotirvid, who finished his commentary on the eighth day of the darker half of the month of Śrāvaṇa in the Śāka year 1510 (1588 A. D.)[2]. He does not include even the word 'Kāvya' in the title. According to him, title is only "Ghaṭakarpara" and this word does not stand for the name of the poet. For, he says that it is a work of a poet whose name is not mentioned in the poem.

(4) Kamalākara Bhaṭṭa also, who belongs to the 16th century A. D. inasmuch as he quotes the definition of the high-

1. Gh. K. (Comm.) Di (MS.) 2. Gh. K. (Comm.) Go. (MS.)

est type of heroine (Uttamā Nāyikā) from Bhānudatta or Bhānukara Miśra, who was patronised by Sher Shah who defeated Humayun in 1540 A. D., knew the poem only as "Ghaṭakarpara" without the additional word 'Kāvya'. According to him, Ghaṭakarpara is not the name of poet, but the title only of the work[1], given to it because herein the poet vows to carry water in a pot-shred to one who can defeat him in the use of appropriate Yamakas. He recognises Kālidāsa[2] to be the author of the work.

(5) Ramāpati Miśra also, who seems to belong to about the 16th century A. D., because he refers to many commentaries written before him[3], knew the title of poem to be "Ghaṭakarpara" only as stated in one of the introductory verses and the colophon.

(6) Tārācandra has produced an edition of old commentary of an unnamed author. And he also in a concluding verse recognises the title of the poem to be "Ghaṭakarpara" only[4].

(7) Śaṅkara, whose date is uncertain, is the only writer who mentions "Ghaṭakarparakāvya" to be the title of the poem and recognises it to be a work of Kālidāsa[5].

Among these commentators Divākara is the only one that mentions a title, which includes the word 'Kāvya', and accordingly dissolves the compound so as to show that Ghaṭakarpara was the author of the poem. Śaṅkara knew the title of the poem to be Ghaṭakarpara Kāvya but he does not recognise Ghaṭakarpara to be the author. According to him, poem was written by Kālidāsa. The rest of the commentators, who did not have the word 'Kāvya' as the concluding part of the title,

1. Gh. K. (Comm. MS.) 2. Gh. K. (Comm. MS.)
3. Gh. K. (Comm.) Ra. (MS.) 4. Gh. K. (Comm.) Ta. (MS.)
5. Gh. K. (Comm) Śan. [MS.]

either mention Kālidāsa as its author : they are (1) Abhinavagupta (2) Kamalākara Bhaṭṭa : or state that it is the work of an author of unknown name, e. g. Govinda Jyotirvid, or are silent about the authorship, e. g. Ramāpati and Tārācandra.

Of all the commentators, mentioned above, Abhinavagupta is the earliest. The problem, therefore, arises: Why was the title, mentioned in Abhinavagupta's commentary, discarded ? There seem to be two reasons for it. (i) The Kashmirian recension was different from that commonly known in the rest of India. The two recensions differed not only in regard to the number of verses, but also in the arrangement of them. Thus, we find that the number of verses varied from twenty to twenty-four and the first five verses from "Nicitaṁ khamupetya" to "Kṣipram prasādayati" in the non-Kashmirian recension appear as verses 15th to 19th in the Kashmirian. It appears that the title of the poem in non-Kashmirian recension was mostly "Ghaṭa karpara" only. (ii) Abhinava's commentary, even if known, was not taken seriously in regard to the title, because the additional word "Kulaka" in it appeared to be a mistake to the superficial readers. For, the word "Kulaka" popularly means a group or collection of five or more verses, forming one sentence. But because the verses in the poem under discussion do not form one sentence, the word "Kulaka" was taken to be a mistake and was not taken seriously. What it means, according to Abhinavagupta, we shall state in the proper context.

For similar reasons the title 'Ghaṭakarpara kalāpakāvyam', mentioned by Divākara, was rejected. For, if "Kalāpa" be taken in the sense of collection, it is redundant : if taken to be used for Kalāpaka, a poetic composition of four verses forming one sentence, it is inappropriate or erroneous : for, the poem consists of more than four verses and each verse is complete in itself. Accordingly by some, such as Śaṅkara, the title of

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the poem was accepted to be Ghaṭakarpara-Kāvya, without attaching any special importance to it and without realising the future misinterpretation of it by dissolving it as a genitive determinative compound and attributing the poem to a poet Ghaṭakarpara by name. For, according to the Indian tradition, recorded in works on poetics like the Sāhitya Darpaṇa, the title of a poem is to be the name of the poet, of its hero or any other important character or is to refer to the most important event in it.[1] This addition of the word "Kāvya" seems to have been responsible for the inclusion of poet Ghaṭakarpara among the nine gems wrongly supposed to belong to the court of Vikramāditya.

EVIDENCE ON THE EXISTENCE OF POET GHAṬAKARPARA.

(1) The generally known evidence in support of the existence of poet Ghaṭakarpara is the following ill authenticated verse, which includes Ghaṭakarpara among the nine gems in the court of king Vikramāditya :—

"Dhanvantari-Kṣapaṇakā-marasiṁha-Śaṅku-Vetālabhaṭṭa-Ghaṭakarpara-Kālidāsāḥ

Khyāto Varāhamihiro nṛpateḥ sabhāyāṁ ratnāni vai Vararucirnava vikramasya"

(2) The Nītisāra, which has been published in the Kāvya Saṅgraha, compiled by Jīvānanda Vidyāsāgara, is definitely recognised to be the work of Ghaṭakarpara. It consists of 21 moralizing stanzas and is not a poetic work, as the very title shows. It contains many well known verses such as :—

Apamānam puraskṛtya mānaṁ kṛtvā tu pṛṣṭhataḥ
Svakāryam uddhareddhīmān kāryabhraṁśo hi mūrkhatā.

It definitely proves that this poet was later than Kālidāsa, because it quotes Kālidāsa's famous line :—

1. S. D., 533.

"Eko hi doṣo guṇasannipāte nimajjatīndoḥ kiraṇeṣvivāṅkaḥ" and asserts that it is not a universal truth, because poverty is a blemish, a weak point (Doṣa), which destroys the multitude of excellent qualities. From this verse it appears that Ghaṭakarpara had a very low opinion of Kālidāsa as a poet, because he speaks of Kālidāsa as a barber among poets (kavināpita),[1] of course through Śleṣa. Such a statement seems to lend some support to the view that Ghaṭakarpara was a younger contemporary of Kālidāsa.

(3) Among the many commentators on the Ghaṭakarpara the following attribute the work to poet Ghaṭakarpara :—

(1) Divākara in an introductory statement to his commentary says "The poem, which is technically of the Saṁghāta-type (in which a poet presents his theme in just one chapter) is full of Yamakas and was written by poet Ghaṭakarpara.[2] He belongs to a period later than the 12th century A. D., because he quotes from Bhoja's Śṛṅgāra Prakāśa the definition of Proṣitā and seems to have been influenced by Śāradātanaya in holding that the poem is of the Saṅghāta-type. For, Śāradātanaya defines Saṅghāta as follows :—

Yatra ślokakṛto yuktisamudāyo rasāśrayaḥ
Ekapraghaṭṭake soyaṁ saṅghāta iti kathyate

This statement seems to be based on another reading of the introductory verse, which probably had the word "Saṅghāta" instead of "Kalāpa."

He seems to have recognised that it is meant for presentation in dance. For, Śāradātanaya includes saṅghātakāvya in his list of 20 types of poem, meant for presentation in dance.[3] But he seems to be a fairly late writer.

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1. N. Sa., V. 17. 2. Gh. (Comm.) Di. MS. 3. Bh. P.

(2) Ramāpati Miśra, a comparatively late writer, probably belonging to the 18th century, may be said to recognise it to be from the pen of Ghaṭakarpara. By his time many commentaries on it had been written and were being written.[1] His statement "Ghaṭakarparākhyakavitā" admits of two interpretations (i) poem called Ghaṭakarpara and (ii) poem by one whose name was Ghaṭakarpara, according as we split the compound as co-ordinative or genitive determinative compound. Some of the contemporary commentators also, such as Paṇḍita Rāmacarita, have attributed the poem to poet Ghaṭakarpara.

INCONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE ON THE EXISTENCE OF POET GHAṬAKARPARA.

We have referred to (i) the verse in the Jyotirvidābharaṇa that includes Ghaṭakarpara among the nine gems in the court of Vikramāditya : (ii) the Nitisāra, a collection of moralizing stanzas, which is recognised to be a work of Ghaṭakarpara : (iii) recognition of the Ghaṭakarpara as the product of a poet of that name by some commentators. But none of these conclusively proves the existence of poet Ghaṭakarpara. The reasons may be stated as follows :—

(i) The Jyotirvidābharaṇa belongs to as late a period as the 16th century A. D. and the verse that is under reference is ill authenticated. Herein there is utter lack of historical sense in so far as it lumps together the authors of well recognised dates such as Vararuci, who is admitted to have flourished before the third century B. C., because Patañjali in his Mahābhāṣya (4, 3, 101.) ascribes a Mahākāvya to him, and Vārāhamihira, whose date is accepted to be the 6th century **A. D.**

Further, Hemacandra (close of the 11th and beginning of the 12th century A. D.) in his Kāvyānuśāsana records the

1. Gh. (Comm.) Ra. MS.

view that Ghaṭakarpara was the name given to Bhāsa in order to ridicule him for his vow to carry water in a potsherd.[1] It may be pointed out here that Hemacandra seems to suggest that the poem "Ghaṭakarpara" is a work of Bhāsa. Therefore, it cannot be said definitely that the word Ghaṭakarpara in the verse refers to a poet of that name. For, it may be said to be referring to Bhāsa under the nickname.

(ii) The Nītisāra, even if we accept it to be a work of Ghaṭakarpara, does not establish him to be a poet. For, it is a collection of twenty one moralizing stanzas some of which are found in other works, as has already been stated.

(iii) We cannot definitely state the date of Divākara, who alone, among the older commentators, the manuscripts of whose commentaries on the poem "Ghaṭakarpara" are accessible to us, attributes the poem to poet Ghaṭakarpara. But he seems to be a fairly late writer as he represents the poem under discussion to be a Saṅghāta-Kāvya, and may have been influenced by ill-founded tradition, recorded in the Jyotirvidābharaṇa. Thus, the evidence on the existence of poet Ghaṭakarpara is very scanty, particularly in view of the following facts :—

(i) Abhinavagupta refers to a tradition, which recognised Kālidāsa[2] to be the author of the poem "Ghaṭakarpara", and attempts to justify the tradition by showing it to be the highest type of poetry in so far as it is highly suggestive and by pointing out how the use of Yamaka constitutes a point of excellence in it.

(ii) With the exception of Divākara, all the older commentators, the Manuscripts of whose commentaries have been accessible to us and who mention the name of the author of the poem, state the name of Kālidāsa e. g. Kamalākara Bhaṭṭa

1. K. An. 2. Gh., (Comm.) Abh. 20.

and Śaṅkara. The two contemporary commentators have apparently been misled by the ill-founded tradition recorded in the Jyotirvidābharaṇa.

(iii) There are only two works, which have been attributed to poet Ghaṭakarpara, (i) the poem entitled Ghaṭakarpara and (ii) the Nītisāra. As the fame of Ghaṭakarpara as a poet primarily rests on the poem of that name, as the poem is admitted to be the work of Kālidāsa by the overwhelming majority of commentators and as the Nītisāra is not a poem at all, the available evidence is not at all satisfactory to admit the existence of a poet Ghaṭakarpara by name, who could be put on a par with Kālidāsa.

THE MEGHADŪTA AND THE GHAṬAKARPARA KULAKA.

The poem "Ghaṭakarpara" does not simply reverse 'the motif of the Meghadūta by making a love lorn woman, in rainy season, send a message to her lover.[1]' No doubt it presents 'a situation reverse of that of the Meghadūta,[2]' but that is true of the four verses only from the second to the fifth, according to Abhinava's recension, in which the love-lorn lady addresses the cloud. But the point to be noted is that all the verses are not put in her mouth, nor are all of them addressed to cloud. The first verse "Chādite dinakarasya Bhāvane" is from the poet exactly as the first five verses of the Meghadūta are. And the following four verses, from the second to the fifth are addressed by the love-lorn lady to the cloud and contain the message to be conveyed to her lover exactly as the rest of the verses are in the Meghadūta. Only so far the poem Ghaṭakarpara may be said to reverse the motif of the Meghadūta. The sixth "Meghaśabdamuditāḥ" and the seventh "Kiṁkṛpāpi" are addressed to the lover by a

*1. H. C. L., 120. *2. H. S. L., 200.

messenger and a friend—messenger respectively. The eighth and the ninth verses are again addressed by the bewailing lady but to her friend. The verses from the tenth "Susugandhitayā" to the fourteenth "Kusumairupaśobhitām sitaiḥ" are the expressions of the intensified emotion of sorrow of the love-lorn lady, when she is taken to the garden of the house by her friend. They refer to different trees and creepers of the garden and present the waves of ideas aroused by them. The verses from the fifteenth "Nicitam khamupetya nīradaiḥ" to the nineteenth "Kṣipraṁ prasādayati" are addressed to the lady by the imagined female counter-messenger, to explain the reasons why her lover has not returned and to inspire hope of his return so that she may patiently pass the intervening time.

It may be noted here that these five verses appear as one to five in the non-Kashmirian recension, the commentaries on which have been accessible to us.

The twentieth verse, Abhinavagupta holds to be a later interpolation. He states the following reasons in support of his view :—

(i) It has to be noted in this connection that the reading of the last part of this verse, current among his predecessors and contemporaries was "Priyasakhi Śvasamā nayanti" and not "Priyasakhīśca samānayanti" as printed in the Nirnayasagar edition. And it was interpreted by his predecessors as 'O my dear friend ! (rainy) season is fruitful to those only who enjoy union with the dearest in the cloudy days when the clouds with rainbow thunder; otherwise they pass the rainy season like witches.' Accordingly the first reason that he advances for its rejection as a verse from the pen of Kālidāsa is that its content does not harmonise with the preceding, which is meant for consoling the love-lorn lady with the hope of arrival of her dear. For, the present verse is a condemnation of the life that the lady is living.

(ii) In it there is the unjustifiable defect of repetition of meaning (Arthapaunaruktya) in so far as the two words "Dina" and "Durdina" are used here.

(iii) This defect cannot be remidied by interpreting Yādineṣu" as "In which the sun (is seen) setting" by taking it to be a compound word and splitting it as "Yān—astaṁ gacchan inaḥ—Sūryaḥ eṣu." For, in that case there will be left no word to convey the sense of "who" which the word "Tāsām" (of those) requires. If we accept the word "Tāsām" as suggestive of the whole idea, present in the mind of the poet, independently of the word "Yāḥ" (who), the following portion of the verse will become useless. Further, in the last part of the verse the word "Anyathā" (otherwise) will have to be supposed to be implied. Such a supposition, however justifiable in non-poetic literature, is not at all justifiable in poetry in so far as it completely destroys poetic beauty.

(iv) "Meghāgamaṁ Śvasamā nayanti" (pass the rainy season like witches) is the most unfit to be the concluding line of such a beautiful poem. It is unthinkable that Kālidāsa completed his poem with a line so full of the defect of unfitness (Anaucitya). For, if he had done so, he would have given rise to the æsthetic experience of disgust (Bībhatsa) rather than that of love (Śṛṅgāra). He rejects some ingenious but difficult explanations, put forward to show that there is no defect of unfitness of meaning; because they do not convey the idea of richness of meaning. He maintains that change in reading that may be suggested is useless.

The concluding verse "Bhāvānurakta" is from the poet himself.

Thus it is clear that though in the beginning of the poem the motif of the Meghadūta is reversed, yet it is substantially of a different type in so far as there are at least three situations

or scenes, the house, the garden and the place where the lover was met by the lady's friend-messenger. And towards the close of the poem a fresh character is introduced to interpret differently the advent of the rainy season and the movement of the swans etc., the staying away of the lover at the appearance of which had been taken by the lady as a sign of his indifference to her, to prevent her from proceeding to him and to console her.

It may be added here that in addition to the twenty-one verses commented upon by Abhinava, there is a benedictory verse in the beginning. The M.S. in our possession gives number one to this verse and two to the following which is recognised to be the first verse of the Ghaṭa Karpara and with the commentary on which Abhinava's Vivṛti begins. The question, therefore, naturally arises : "Is it a part of the poem ?" For the following reasons our opinion on this point is that it is a benedictory verse of Abhinava at the commencement of the commentary and not the first verse of the poem. Its wrong place and the wrong number of the first introductory verse of the poem are due to scribal mistakes :—

(i) Had it been a part of the poem Abhinava would not have left it uncommented.

(ii) While Kālidāsa often, particularly in minor poems, does not offer benediction, Meghadūta for instance, we have not so far discovered any work of Abhinava without a benedictory verse in the beginning.

(iii) This verse is not found in the Nirnaya Sagar edition. It runs as follows :—

Apūrvaḥ koyante varada śirāsaḥ śekharavidhir
Nanu jñātaṁ pluṣṭasmaradhanuridaṁ mūrdhani dhṛtam
Yadālokālloke viṣamaviśikhaḥ sphūrjatitarām
Iti prokte devyā galitaniyamaḥ śambhuravatāt.

EXPLANATION OF "KULAKA."

The colophon at the end of Abhinavagupta's commentary on the poem Ghaṭakarpara runs as follows :—

"Samāpteyam Ghaṭakarpara Kulaka Vivṛtiḥ kṛtirmahāmāheśvara Rājānaka Śrīmadabhinavaguptapādānām."

That the author of this commentary is Abhinavagupta is beyond even a shadow of a doubt. For, the concluding verses clearly state that it was written by Abhinavagupta, a pupil of Indurāja[1]. Two points become clear from these statements : (i) he recognised the work to be a poem (Kāvya) and (ii) admitted its distinctive feature to be "Kulaka." The question, therefore, arises, what is the meaning of the word "Kulaka" particularly because it does not form a part of the title of the work, according to any other commentator and because the word cannot be admitted to have been used in the ordinary meaning of the word as a group or collection of five or more verses, which form one sentence. For, the twenty verses, of which the poem consists, according to Abhinavagupta, are not spoken by one person, but by as many as five, and every verse contains a predicate and, therefore, presents a complete sentence.

It is impossible to admit that a scholar of Abhinavagupta's eminence has erred in the retention of the word "Kulaka" as a part of the title of the work or that he did not see the inappropriateness of this word if taken in the ordinary meaning. Let us, therefore, attempt to find out its intended meaning.

I KULAKA AS A POETIC VISION OF A HOUSE.

The word "Kulaka", which forms a part of the title, according to the recension, on which Abhinava has commented,

1. Gh., (Comm. Abh.) V. 21.

does not only mean a poetic composition of five or more verses which constitute one sentence, but also an imitation, a reflective presentation, a poetic vision, of a house. It is formed by affixing "Kan" in the sense of "imitative presentation" according to Pāṇini's aphorism "Ive pratikṛtau" (5-3-96) to "Kula" meaning a house.

This word, therefore, appearing at the end of the compound, which stands for the title of the poem, may be understood to mean an imitative poetic presentation of a house, an imaginative depiction of domestic life. For, the poem is such a presentation.

II KULAKA AS A POEM FOR PRESENTATION ON STAGE.

Kālidāsa knew of literary products other than dramas, which were meant for presentation on the stage, but were not in strict accordance with the rules of dramatic composition, laid down in the Nāṭyaśāstra. For instance, in his Mālavikāgnimitram he talks of a literary product of Śarmiṣṭhā, in the acting of which Mālavikā was instructed by the dramatic instructor (Nāṭyācārya) Gaṇadāsa. The presentation of this work on the stage was of a peculiar type in so far as in it acting was not simultaneous with recitation, but the two were done separately in succession : the song was first sung and acting followed. This is evident from the text of the Mālavikāgnimitra itself. The two stage-directions in this context are : (i) After giving the combination of notes by way of introduction to the melody, she sings a song consisting of four parts. (ii) Then she present the Rasa in acting. From the brief description of the literary product in question, given by Gaṇadāsa, it appears that it consisted of songs only, each of which was to be sung separately at first and then its meaning, Rasa, was to be presented in acting (Abhinaya) by the character.

It is interesting to find that in this context Kālidāsa uses Bharata's technique of music as given in Ch. XXXI, where he (Bharata) discusses Gītas (Songs) and states how they should be presented on the stage. For instance, Kālidāsa describes the song, intented to be presented on the stage, as characterised by mid-harmony (Layamadhyā) and four parts (Catuṣpadā). For, Bharata recognises Laya to be of three types, fast, slow and middle (Druta, Vilambita and Madhya[1]) and talks of sixteen Kalās (time fractions) in all songs and their division into four parts, each part consisting of four Kalās[2]. This seems to explain what Kālidāsa meant by Catuṣpadā. Bharata recognises Gīta to be of seven types, Mandraka, Aparāntaka etc[3]. and says that Mandraka may have three or four songs (Vastu[4]). This gives an idea of the meaning of "Caturthavastunaḥ" in the Mālavikāgnimitram. Thus it is evident that Kālidāsa knew of musical poetic compositions, very distinct from any type of drama, and that the type of composition which he attributes to Śarmiṣṭhā and a part of which Mālavikā presents on the stage is a type of Gīta-Kāvya discussed by Bharata in his Nāṭya Śāstra.

What has been stated above lends some support to our view that Kālidāsa was the author of the Chaṭakarpara Kulaka. For, Kulaka is a type of musical poetic composition which is characterised by the fact that all the songs in it present one continuous theme. All the seven types of musical composition, Mandraka etc. are subsumed under it. It is meant for presentation on the stage. We shall deal with it in detail in a subsequent section.

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1. N. S., XXXI, 343.
2. N. S., XXXI, 365-6.
3. N. S., XXXI, 364.
4. Ibid., 364.

TYPES OF KĀVYA, MEANT FOR PRESENTATION IN DANCE ON THE STAGE.

From Abhinavagupta's commentary on the Nāṭya Śāstra Ch. IV, which deals with different types of dance, it is clear that by the time of Abhinavagupta a large number of Kāvyas, which were meant for presentation in dance on the stage, had been written and that there was a keen controversy about their classification. For, they could not be easily defined in terms of the recognised types of either drama or poetry.

This type of poetic composition was classed separately as Nṛtta Kāvya and had many subdivisions such as (i) Ḍombikā, (ii) Bhāṇaka, (iii) Prasthāna, (iv) Bhāṇikā, (v) Ṣidgaka, (vi) Preraṇa, (vii) Rāmākrīḍa, (viii) Rāsaka, (ix) Hallīśaka.

It may be pointed out here that the conceptions of some of these as presented by Viśvanātha in his Sāhitya Darpaṇa, Chapter VI, for instance (i) Prasthāna, (ii) Rāsaka, (iii) Śilpaka and (iv) Bhāṇikā are different from those given by Abhinavagupta. He speaks of them as dependent types of Rūpaka. But Abhinavagupta, following the earlier authorities, speaks of them as different types of poetic composition which were meant for presentation in dance[1] (Ete prabandhāḥ nṛttātmakāḥ A. Bh. Vol. I, 183). Ḍombikā, for instance, consists of sweet songs, expressive of secret love, addressed to a king with a view to winning his heart. It is characterised by tenderness in both music and dance. It is very much like what is presented by Mālavikā in the Second act of the Mālavikāgnimitra, referred to above. (ii) Bhāṇikā consists of the description of the exploits of Viṣṇu etc. in various incarnations such as Nṛsiṁhāvatāra and Varāhāvatāra and is meant for presentation in dance. It is characterised by harshness. (iii) Ṣidgaka consists in the mixed

1. A. Bh. Vol. I, 183.

presentation of tenderness and harshness, the later occupying a subordinate position to the former, but occupying more time than it does in "Prasthāna". (iv) Prasthāna differs from Ṣidgaka only in so far as the element of harshness in it is less than in Ṣidgaka.

In the presentation of the musical poetical composition of any one of the said types the dancer has to enter into the meaning of the composition, has to visualise the idea fully, has to put the mind in the necessary frame and has to present the composition in musical expressions and the language of dance, the movements of different parts of the body and expressions of the eyes.[1]

DISTINCTION OF "GĪTA-KĀVYA" FROM DRAMA AND ITS CLASSIFICATION.

According to Bharata, as interpreted by Abhinava, the three (i) vocal music (ii) instrumental music and (iii) dance can occupy subordinate position to one another. But stage-presentations, in which the three are combined, are not to be identified with drama (Nāṭya) : because while in these presentations dance, song or instrumental music is predominant, reducing the others to subordinate position, in Nāṭya all the three are subordinated to the æsthetic configuration, the Rasa.[2]

The classification of the musical poetic compositions in Sanskrit was based upon the predominance of one or the other of the three; or upon the subordination of all the three to the purpose of the performer; or upon the predominance of the sound value or the meaning value of the composition.

Thus, that musical poetic composition is called (i) Ḍombikā in the stage-presentation of which dance, song and instrumental music are meant to help the dancer in communicating

1. A Bh., Vol. I, 182. 2. A. Bh., Vol. I, 168.

her inner feeling to the principal figure in the audience, the king. The musical poetic composition of Śarmiṣṭhā, included in the Mālavikāgnimitra of Kālidāsa, seems to have some affinity with the composition of this type : because the main purpose of Mālavikā here is the communication of her secret love to the king (Agnimitra). And she fully realises it as is clear from the statements of the fool and the king :—

Fool : Sir, By means of the song, consisting of four parts, expressive of so many states of mind, she has presented her self objectively.

King : So do I think.

(ii) In "Prasthāna" sound-value of the composition predominates. (iii) In "Śilpaka" it is the meaning-value that domineers. (iv) In Bhāṇaka, the instrumental music occupies predominant position. (v) In "Cillīmārga" that follows the presentation of Ḍombikā, dance predominates. (vi) In "Cārīmārga" though dance predominates, yet occasionally in the course of the performance either vocal or instrumental music comes to the principal position and often among the various musical instruments one of them predominates.[1]

NṚTTA (DANCE) AND NĀṬYA (DRAMA) DISTINGUISHED.

It is necessary to distinguish dance from drama, because the means of presentation of dance, acting of four types and music of two types, are the same as those of drama. Those who hold the two to be identical argue as follows :—

In dance also there is the presentation of the meanings of words and sentences of musical poetic composition in and through the movements of the different parts of body, no less than there is the presentation of the mental states. These two are

1. A. Bh., Vol. I, 168–9.

recognised to be the characteristic features of drama. The two, therefore, are identical. The presentation of dance by single individual and addressing a character that is not present on the stage, cannot be asserted to be distinguishing features of dance. For, there is a type of drama, called Bhāṇa, which is presented by a single character, who talks to another who is not present on the stage. Nor can the distinction of dance from drama be urged on the ground that dance does not visually present the poetic vision as does drama. For, the judgements of the spectator "Khaṇḍitā (jealous) is dancing" "Kalahāntaritā (separated by quarrel) is dancing" show that in dance also there is visual presentation of the poetic vision.

There can be no objection to calling dance, in which there is acting of four types for the presentation of idea of the musical poetic composition, a Rūpaka, because it visually presents the vision of the poet. But is there no difference in acting in dance from that in drama ? And cannot on that basis difference between them be asserted, particularly because what is acted out in dance is poetry and not prose ? The reply is as follows :—

Slight difference cannot be denied. But such a difference is there between one type of drama and another also. And the word "Nāṭyayita" has been used for the stage-presentation of "Dhruvā" which is poetic. The two bases, pointed out by the exponent of the distinction, therefore, cannot be looked upon as sound for the admission of distinction.

If the distinction were attempted to be proved on the ground that the musical poetic compositions (Rāgakāvyas) like Ḍombikā, Prasthāna, Śilpaka, Bhāṇikā etc. are not covered by the definition of ten types of drama, given by Bharata : we would ask, "Are Toṭaka, Rāsaka etc. covered by it ? If it be said that they are included in Nāṭya by Kohala etc. we would point out that the musical poetic compositions, under reference, are

equally included. The conclusion, therefore, is that there is no distinction between the two. On these and similar other grounds the earlier interpreters of the Nāṭya Śāstra like Kīrtidharācārya[1] asserted the identity of Nṛtta and Nāṭya.

Abhinavagupta and his teachers stoutly maintained the distinction between Nṛtta and Nāṭya. Accordingly Abhinavagupta divides the products of poetic genious primarily into two : (I) that which is meant for recital and, therefore, for ear only (Śravya) (II) that which is meant for presentation on stage and, therefore, is primarily for eye (Rūpaka). This corresponds to the ordinarily accepted division of literary productions into poetry and drama. Then he subdivides Rūpaka into (i) that which is primarily meant for presentation of æsthetic configuration on the stage and in which dance and song are subservient to Rasa (Nāṭya) (ii) that which is primarily meant for singing and in the stage-presentation of which acting and dance occupy subordinate position (Rāgakāvya)[2] (iii) that in the stage–presentation of which dance occupies the principal position and acting and song are reduced to subordinate position (Nṛttakāvya[3]). Just as Nāṭya is subdivided into ten types, Nāṭaka, Prakaraṇa etc., an account of which is given in the Second edition of the Comparative Æsthetics Vol. I, Indian Æsthetics Ch. VIII, so Nṛtta and Gīta Kāvyas are divided into many types such as Ḍombikā, Prasthāna, Śilpaka, Bhāṇaka etc[4].

It may be interesting to note that in Kashmir up to the time of Abhinavagupta Nṛtta and Gīta Kāvyas, not only were being written but also were being presented on the stage

1. A. Bh., Vol. I, 208.
2. A. Bh., Vol. I, 168 and 174.
3. Ibid., 170.
4. A. Bh., Vol. I, 168.

by such poets as Rāṇaka etc.[1] and Bharata's technique of dance was followed[2] in all parts, including the concluding.

On the basis of the above classification of the poetic literature, Abhinavagupta maintains Nāṭya to be distinct from Nṛtta and refutes the arguments, advanced earlier in support of identity of the two, as follows :—

Apart from the main point of distinction of Nāṭya that it presents an æsthetic configuration (Rasa) while Nṛtta presents a state of mind only, the distinction of the two may be asserted on the following additional bases :—

(I) Nāṭya presents the characters of the poet's imagination perceptually in all respects so as to make the spectators think that the characters of the piece are before him. Hence in the case of the presentation of Nāṭya on the stage the personality of the actor is entirely concealed by means of befitting make-up, dress and language : but in the case of Nṛtta the personality of the dancer is not so concealed.[3]

(II) In Nṛtta–Kāvya there is no statement made from behind the scene (Ākāśa–bhāṣita) as in the case of Bhāṇa, such as the Pādatāḍitaka.[4]

(III) The use of the words "separated by quarrel is dancing" etc. in the expression of judgement on a dance–presentation is in the secondary sense in so far as the dance presents the meaning of the song in appropriate movements, which constitute the language of dance. The words cannot be said to be used in the primary sense, because the personality of the dancer is not concealed by befitting make-up and dress.[5]

(IV) In the stage-presentation of Nṛtta there is no such acting as directly presents the meaning of song objectively.

1. A. Bh., Vol. I, 190.
2. Ibid., 195.
3. A. Bh., Vol. I, 178.
4. A. Bh., Vol. I, 178.
5. Ibid., 178.

If it were so, in the case of presentation of fainting, there would be the necessity of the dancer's lying down in bed in the condition of the fainted as in the case of the stage-presentation of Nāṭya.[1]

(V) There is the difference between the purposes of Nṛtta and Nāṭya. The latter aims at instructing the spectators in regard to the ways and means of realising any one or more of the four recognised objectives of human life and arousing æsthetic experience in them. But the purpose of Nṛtta, according to Bharata, is to please a god or a king. The spectators in general may be pleased but that is not the primary aim of Nṛtta.[2]

STAGE-PRESENTATION OF GĪTA-KĀVYA AT THE TIME OF ABHINAVAGUPTA.

Abhinavagupta, as a matter of principle, writes on those subjects only of which he has personal experience. This is true not only in the sphere of philosophy but also in that of art. Thus, in the case of dramatic presentation he writes on the basis of presentation of drama by great actors (Mahānaṭa) who were his contemporaries and to whom he refers in the Abhinava Bhāratī. Similarly what he writes in connection with the presentation of Gīta-Kāvya on the stage is based on what he had actually seen.

The following references in the Abhinava Bhāratī support this view:—

(i) The "Chandaka", the supplementary concluding song, which was added to the presentation of the Gīta-Kāvya at will,[3] was very well known in all the details of musical technique and dance[4] among his contemporaries.

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1. A. Bh., Vol. I, 179. 2. Ibid., 179.

3. A. Bh., Vol. I, 194 and 196. 4. Ibid., 195.

(ii) He refers to Kashmirian poets of the Gīta-Kāvyas, such as Śrī Rāṇaka, who introduced four dancers in succession in their presentations of the Gīta-Kāvyas and made them exit after the presentation of "Piṇḍībandha", the assumption of a dance pose, which resembles some god in form.[1]

(iii) He says that the Gīta-Kāvyas are seen presented in accordance with the technique of music and histrionic art.

Therefore, it is clear that the tradition of presenting the Gīta-Kāvyas on the stage in accordance with Bharata's technique of music, dance and acting was alive during the time of Abhinavagupta and, therefore, the word "Kulaka", which forms a part of the title of Kālidāsa's poem under discussion "Ghaṭakarpara-Kulaka" according to his commentary, has the technical meaning that is associated with it in Bharata's Nāṭya Śāstra, wherein it is recognised to be a distinct type of the Gīta-Kāvya as we shall show. Therefore, its criticism by our contemporaries, who have no idea of what Kulaka is, have looked upon it as a poem of the type of the Meghadūta, only with motif reversed, have asserted that it is not of much literary value and is of a low type, because of the frequent use of alliteration (Yamaka), is based upon the ignorance of its essential nature and, therefore, has to be ignored.

THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE GĪTA-KĀVYAS AND PLACE OF KULAKA AMONG THEM.

Study of Bharata's Nāṭya Śāstra is very important for tracing out the history of Indian music and the evolution of classical music from the Sāmavedic. Bharata gives seven types of song, which, according to him, evolved from the Sāmaveda. They are (i) Mandraka (ii) Aparāntaka (iii)

1. A. Bh., Vol. I, 190.

Prakarī (iv) Ullopyaka (v) Rovindaka (vi) Āveṇaka (vii) Uttara.

These seven types are divided under two heads : (i) Vastunibaddha : the first three come under this head : (ii) Aṅgakṛta : the last four come under this.[1]

Vastu and Aṅga are highly technical musical terms. And even at the time of Abhinavagupta there was difference of opinion on the meaning of "Vastu" as is clear from the following quotations from the Abhinava Bhāratī. To understand the relevency of these quotations it is necessary to remember that for Vastu, very often, the term "Vastuka" is used.

(i) Vastukāni ṣaṇmātrādīni.

(ii) Anye tu vastukaśabdena pāṇikālāsya-gānādīnāṁ saṅgrahamāhuḥ.

It is very difficult to come to any definite conclusion on points like these. For, the portions of both the Nāṭya Śāstra and the Abhinava Bhāratī, both in print and MSS., where these points are discussed, are hopelessly corrupt. Under these circumstances any view that is expressed on points like those under discussion is naturally open to correction by future intensive and extensive research on the subject.

WHAT IS VASTU ?

Vastu is discussed in Chapters IV, XXXI and XXXII of the Nāṭya Śāstra and the Abhinava Bhāratī. Taking into consideration what is said on the subject of "Vastu" in the context of Dhruvā in Ch. XXXII where Vastu and Pada are spoken of as synonymous, we may say that Vastu means a metrical composition in which there is fixed number of syllables, definite number and order of long and short vowels,

1. A. Bh., Vol. I, 195.

and regular pause. It serves as the basis of systematic presentation of musical notes (Svara) and time-beat (Tāla)

Gāndharvaṁ yanmayāprokatm
Svaratālasamudbhavam
Padaṁ tasya bhaved vastu
Svaratālānubhāvakam. N. Ś. Ch, XXXII, 25

Commenting on the last line, Abhinavagupta says the following :—

Tasya gāne aprādhānyaṁ tathā ca gāndharve. Tatra hi svaratālau pradhānam. Tau cānādhārau na Śakyau prayoktum ityādhāratayā tadupayogi. Tadāha "Svaratālānubhāvakam" iti.

Niyatākṣarasambaddham
Chandoyatisamanvitam
Nibaddhantu padaṁ jñeyam
Nānā chandaḥ samudbhavam. Ibid., 29.

And Abhinavagupta comments upon it as follows :—

Niyatākṣarasambaddham–Niyatāni prakṛtirasādyaucityāya guṇālaṅkārasaṁghaṭṭādīni yānyakṣarāṇi tairyuktam, chandasā akṣaraparimāṇena yatyā virāmeṇa yuktam.

This view is supported by what Abhinava says in the context of song (Gīta) in his commentary on Ch, IV, 300-1. Here the question is : "How Gīta–Kāvya or Nṛtta–Kāvya is to be presented on the stage ?" or "In what order song, acting and dance are to come in the stage-presentation of a Gīta-Kāvya ?" And the answer is that out of a number of musical compositions that is intended to be presented, the first should be produced in the ascending order of musical notes and the second in the descending order in accompaniment with stringed and wind instruments. This is to be done behind the curtain. Then the dancer should enter the stage stepping according to

the beat of drum and present the subject of musical composition in dance.[1]

Thus it seems to be clear that Vastu,[2] according to Abhinavagupta, is a metrical composition that is meant for presentation in music, dance and acting.

WHAT IS AṄGA ?

The musical compositions are of two types: (i) Those which are in strict accordance with metrical laws. (ii) Those which are in accordance with the technique of music. The word "Aṅga" seems to stand for the various aspects of the technique of music, such as Vidārī, a group of words of a song at the beginning or anywhere else, which is separated from the rest for rendering it in a definite set of notes (Tatra ye sthūlā ārambhakā bhāgāste vidārītvena vakṣyante. A. Bh., Ch. XXXI, 269) (Vidārī cāvāntarapadasamūhavicchedarūpā A. Bh., Ch. XXIX, 19).

All types of song have three common parts[3] (Aṅga) and many distinctive parts. They are stated in the Nāṭya Śāstra in Ch. XXXI, from 367 to 414.

The one important point that has to be noted in this connection is that every type of song has both Vastu and Aṅga. The division of songs into (i) Vastunibaddha and (ii) Aṅgakṛta is based upon the predominance of Vastu in the first three types and that of Aṅgas (parts) in the remaining four.[4]

KULAKA DEFINED.

A group of songs, belonging to any one of the seven types, mentioned above, which presents one poetic theme and, there-

1. A. Bh., Vol. I, 195.
2. Ibid., 258.
3. N. S., Ch. XXXI, 268. ff.
4. A. Bh., Ch. XXXI, 275.

fore, the members of which are well connected with one another is called "Kulaka". But that group, every song of which presents a separate theme, is called "Chedyaka".

Each of the two, (i) Kulaka and (ii) Chedyaka, has three subdivisions (i) Niryukta (ii) Padaniryukta (iii) Aniryukta. These subdivisions are presented in terms of the following technical terms : Śākhā, Pratiśākhā, Upohana and Pratyupohana. One important thing to be remembered in this connection is that Upohana is synonymous with Mukha.[1] And so Pratyupohana seems to be the same as Pratimukha. These two subdivisions of the part of song are made for fitting it in with dance.[2]

THE CONTEXT OF UPOHANA.

Upohana is discussed in the context of Vardhamānaka, which is nothing but a combination of the Āsārita songs[3] of four types. In a Vardhamānaka there are four parts (Khaṇḍikā) (i) Viśālā (ii) Sammatā (iii) Sumukhī (iv) Sunandā. The first has nine time-fractions (Kalā), the second eight, the third sixteen and the fourth thirty two. Now Upohana of Visālā consists of five time-fractions. Upohana rests primarily on permanent musical note (Sthāyisvarasamāśrayam) : the musical notes spring from it and song begins with it.[4] Upohana, when sung, gives an idea of dance that is to follow. The number of vowels in the Upohana of each part differs. Thus Upohana of Viśālā consists of sixteen vowels : two long and fourteen short. Hence Upohana is that part of a song, with which song begins and which is separated from the rest to fit it for dance. Pratyupohana, being identical with Pratimukha, is the succeeding part.[5]

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1. N. S., Ch. XXXI, 194.
2. A. Bh., Ch. XXXI, 158.
3. N. S., Ch. XXXI, 225.
4. N. S., Ch XXXI, 231-41.
5. A. Bh., Ch. XXXI. 241-2

ŚĀKHĀ AND PRATIŚĀKHĀ.

Śākhā and Pratiśākhā are discussed by Bharata in the context of seven types of song, Mandraka etc., mentioned above. The two terms stand for the two parts into which a song of any one of the above types is divided for rendering it in terms of different aspects of musical technique such as Śamyā, Tāla, Sannipāta etc.[1] The first part is called Śākhā and the last is termed Pratiśākhā. Thus if a song consists of Twenty four time-fractions (Kalā) the Śākhā will consist of twelve Kalās and so the Pratiśākhā also will have the same number.[2]

Thus Niryukta type of Kulaka or Chedyaka is that which has Upohana and Pratyupohana and Śākhā and Pratiśākhā and, therefore, is fit for presentation in terms of music, dance and acting. It is so called because it admits of presentation in three arts, music, dance and acting.

Aniryukta type of Kulaka or Chedyaka is that which admits of division into Śākhā and Pratiśākhā but not in those of Upohana and Pratyupohana and Aṅgas. Padaniryukta is that which has Śākhā, Pratiśākhā and Aṅgas but not Upohana and Pratyupohana.[3]

Thus it is clear that some Kulakas were meant for presentation in dance, befitting music and acting. Others were such as could not be presented in dance. This view is supported by the method of presentation of the Gīta-Kāvya, given by Bharata.

THE METHOD OF PRESENTATION OF GĪTA-KĀVYA.

The method of presentation of Gīta-Kāvya and Nṛtta-Kāvya is stated by Bharata in Chapter IV of his Nāṭya Śāstra.

1. N. S., Ch. XXXI, 347-49. 2. A. Bh., (MS.) Ch. XXXI. 341.
3. A. Bh., Ch. XXXI, 416.

The Gīta–Kāvya was presented on the stage. The players on the musical instruments were seated, not in front of the stage but on the back of it, behind the curtain. The singer, who presented the song in dance and acting, also stood behind the curtain. Her personality was not concealed by dress and make-up as in the case of regular drama.

The performance began with singing of the parts of the song which constituted the beginning and that which followed it. They were sung in accompaniment with stringed and wind instruments, without the drum of any kind, in such a manner that they gave an idea of the dance, which was going to be presented on the stage. This was done behind the curtain.

Then the dancer entered the stage, stepping in accordance with the beat of drum, the playing upon which was started at the conclusion of the singing of the parts of the song referred to above.

Thereafter the song was sung in accordance with the technique of music.

It was subsequently so acted out that it gave a clear idea of the meaning.

And last of all it was rendered in terms of the language of dance, the movements of different parts of the body, hands, feet, eyes, eye-brows etc.[1]

Very often there was dance even in the middle of acting. This depended upon the mode of singing and the type of song. Bharata talks of Gītis, Māgadhī etc. The characteristic of Māgadhī is the repetition of the parts of the song. Therefore, when a part of song was repeated, only the first rendering of the part of song was acted. The subsequent renderings were presented in terms of dance-movements only.[2]

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1. A. Bh., Vol. I, 195. 2. A. Bh., Vol. I, 197.

In such a case dance was very often presented according to the various renderings of song in instrumental music.[1]

THE OCCASIONS FOR DANCE IN THE STAGE-PRESENTATION OF GĪTA-KĀVYA.

Gīta-Kāvya, as distinct from Nāṭya, that used to be presented on the stage, was of two types (i) Gīta-Kāvya (ii) Nṛtta-Kāvya. This distinction is based upon the fact that some Kāvyas were such as could be presented in music, dance and acting, while others could not be split into parts such as would make them fit in with dance. Both of them were called Gīta-Kāvyas. But there were also songs which consisted of meaningless syllables and, therefore, were fit for dance only. They were called Nṛtta-Kāvyas. They were also called Nirgīta or Bahirgīta. Bharata in Chapter V, 31-45 has given an account of the occasion which was responsible for the rise of this type of Kāvya. But very often the distinction between the Nṛtta Kāvya and the Gīta-Kāvya is based upon the predominance of either of the two elements, dance or song, in the stage-presentation.

Bharata has definitely stated the subjects which admit of presentation in dance as well as those which do not. These statements refer to gentle dance (Sukumāra).

In general the dialogue between two persons of opposite sexes in love with each other, which springs from mutual desire for union and from which the spectator gets the æsthetic experience of Śṛṅgāra Rasa, is a fit subject for presentation in dance.[2] The occasions at which dance is to be presented are (i) the closure of musical rendering of a song or any definite part thereof or that of a Varṇa (Sthāyī etc.) (ii) rise to prosperity (Abhyudaya) (iii) happy event connected

1. A. Bh., Vol. I, 197. 2. A. Bh., Vol. I. 199,

with the lives of the two in love (iv) when the two enjoy pleasant season.

But dance is not to be introduced when a young lady is presented in separation on account of jealousy, quarrel, or lover's being away; or when she is displeased because of the non-arrival of the lover at the appointed time; or when she feels eager for union with one, who is in distant land, on account of the presence of a particular season.

However, dance may be introduced even in the presentation of a woman in separation when she feels happy on account of the rise of hope of union, aroused by a word from a messenger and so on.[1]

Kālidāsa follows Bharata's instruction regarding the omission of dance in the stage-presentation of the Gīta–Kāvya, attributed to Śarmiṣṭhā in Act II of the Mālavikāgnimitra. Mālavikā is in separation from the object of her love, king Agnimitra, is yearning for union with him and, therefore, in the stage-presentation of the song that expresses her inner feeling, Kālidāsa has omitted dance. In the Ghaṭakarpara Kulaka, however, he has conceived such a theme as would admit of introduction of dance towards the close of presentation where hope of reunion with the object of love is inspired in the lovelorn lady, though in the presentation of the rest of the composition dance cannot be introduced, because it is mostly expression of the feeling of separation by the love-lorn lady.

The poem under discussion is thus a wonderful piece of art and no other genius than Kālidāsa can be credited with the authorship of it, particularly because we have the evidence of his composition of this type in the Mālavikāgnimitra. The Kashmir tradition about the authorship of the Ghaṭakarpara Kulaka seems to be well founded and the attribution of its

1. A. Bh., Vol. I, 201-2.

authorship to poet Ghaṭakarpara, whose only other work is the Nītisāra, which is mostly a collection of moralizing stanzas of others, seems to be ill founded.

LITERARY CRITICISM OF THE POEM.

The Ghaṭakarpara Kulaka is a Kāvya. But it is of a very distinct type from the known Kāvyas such as the Kumāra Sambhava, the Raghu Vaṁśa, the Kirātārjunīya, the Śiśupāla Vadha, the Naiṣadha etc. For, in all these the poet presents the situation in which a fresh character is introduced, introduces him, states the circumstances in which he speaks and says "so and so spoke as follows". For instance, the following lines are found in the Naiṣadha, before the swan speaks to Nala :—

"Avādi tenātha sa mānasaukasā
Janādhināthaḥ karapañjarasprśā" (I, 129)

The following verses :—

"Jagādavadanacchadmapadmaparyantapātinaḥ.
Nayan madhulihaḥ śvaityamudagradaśanāṁśubhiḥ".
in the Śiśupāla Vadha, (II, 21.)

"Vihitāmpriyayā manaḥpriyāmatha niścitya giraṁ garīyasīm.
Upapattimadūrjitāśrayaṁ nṛpamūce vacanaṁ vṛkodaraḥ"
in the Kirātārjunīyam, (II, 1.)

"Tamāryagṛhyaṁ nigṛhītadhenurmanuṣyavācā manuvaṁśaketum.
Vismāyayan vismitamātmavṛttau siṁhorusattvaṁ nijagādasiṁhaḥ."
in the Raghuvaṁśa, (II, 33.)

"Vacasyavasite tasmin sasarja giramātmabhūḥ,
Garjitānantarāṁ vṛṣṭiṁ saubhāgyena jigāya sā".
in the Kumāra Sambhava, (II, 53.) illustrate the same point.

But in this poem the poet is perfectly silent after the introductory remark till the conclusion of the work, at which he amusingly boasts of his all-surpassing perfection in the use of Yamakas. The characters speak without any introductory remark from the poet and it is left to the reader to guess the character that speaks. The scene changes without any indication of such a change being given by the poet. Even a fresh character comes without being introduced. This has led many to think that the whole poem is from the mouth of the love-lorn lady and has been responsible for the change in the order of verses in the poem so as somehow, though unsuccessfully, to make them fit in her mouth.

It belongs to the highest type of poetry inasmuch as it is highly suggestive, as is pointed out by Abhinavagupta in the course of his commentary on verses 2, 5, 7, 10, 11, 12, 19, where words "Dhvanyate" "Dhvanati" and "Vyajyate" occur. It is full of very spontaneous use of the figures of speech, both verbal and ideational e. g. Pratīyamānotprekṣā in verse 5, Kāku, which is recognised to be a Śabdālaṅkāra by Rudraṭa,[1] in 11, 12, 13, Śleśa in verses, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 13, 14, 17, 18, parts of which have been interpreted to have two or even three meanings.

Some of the words have been very carefully chosen. Each of them signifies something that inhances the emotive value of the composition e. g. "Badhū" in verse 3, which signifies a woman, with whom marriage has been solemnised according to the injunction of the Śāstra. The implication of the use of this word is that she is not the object of love.

Even the case termination has an emotive significance. For instance, the use of genitive case in "Te" in verse 2. We know that, according to the Sanskrit grammar, genitive case

1. K. M.. 31.

is not a Kāraka. The statement "Priyā te yācate" means that you are not a Kāraka in respect of her request. For, Kāraka in relation to "Yācate" can be one who accedes to the request. But you never did so. Similarly in verse 3, the genitive case in "Te" (Sādya te durdhareṇa madanena) signifies the general and not the agential relation. For, the latter relation is prohibited by the rule of Pāṇini (Nalokāvyayaniṣṭhākhalartha tṛnām. 2-3-69.) when the word in the genitive case is connected with another that has the prefix 'Dur' meaning "difficult" and has the affix "Khal" according to the rule of Pāṇini (Īṣadduḥsuṣu kṛcchrākṛcchrārtheṣu khal. 3-3-126.). As the word 'Te' in the present context is connected with the word "Durdhara" which is formed according to the rule, stated above, the genitive case in which it is used cannot signify agential relation. Accordingly it means : though in past you saved her from the torments of the cupid, yet today, being away from her, you are helpless to do so.

In verse 12 also the genitive case in "Te", because of its being connected with "duṣprasahasya" (Praṇipatāmi ca duṣprasahasya te) stands for general relation and, therefore, suggests that that, which is signified by it, is not the most desired (Īpsitatamatvābhāvaḥ sambandha ṣaṣṭhyā vyajyate). For, it is the accusative case or the genitive used to signify it (Karmaṇi ṣaṣṭhī) that indicates that the object of action is the most desired (Karturīpsitatamaṁ karma 1–4–49).

Let us now discuss the merit of the repetition of a group of syllables (Yamaka). For, it is looked upon as the sign of a laboured composition : its use has been prohibited by Ānanda Vardhana in the presentation of love, particularly in separation, because it diverts the mind from the main object, the presentation of the æsthetic configuration, in so far as it involves search for the words of the same sound value : its use in the Ghaṭakarpara has been responsible for its non-

admission by the contemporary critics as a work of Kālidāsa, has made them oblivious of its great merits and has been responsible for their criticism "It........aims chiefly at displaying the skill in the verbal trick of repeated syllable, known as Yamaka...........but shows little poetic talent."[1]

It seems that Abhinavagupta anticipated such a criticism. For, he attempts to justify the use of Yamaka and represents it as a point of all-surpassing excellence of the poem. He holds that the poem is from the pen of Kālidāsa; that the status of Kālidāsa as the topmost poet (Dhurandhara) is not at all adversely affected by this poem; that here also he shoulders his poetic responsibility to the end as well as elsewhere.[2] He asserts that the use of Yamakas in the poem gives such a musical value to the poem as inhances its emotional and æsthetic value. It is a point of all-surpassing excellence in so far as it is not a product of conscious effort but that of unconscious spontaneity. He points out that such a repetition of a group of syllables is not against the view of the exponent of the Dhvani school of Indian poetics, Ānanda Vardhana. For, he is against the continuous use of Yamakas in so far as it involves conscious effort to search for words of the same sound value.[3] He is not against the use of any figure of speech, verbal or ideational, that comes spontaneously. He says "Aprathagyatnanirvartyaḥ". What he means is that the poet ought to avoid everything that is likely to divert his mind from the main task, the delineation of the æsthetic configuration.[4]

Abhinavagupta is an exponent of "Free Will" or "Svātantrya" not only in the context of metaphysics but also in that of poetics. He recognises the free will as the ultimate princi-

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*1. H. C. L., 120. 2. Gh., V. 19.
3. Dh. L., 87. 4. Dh. L., 85.

ple of poetic production. He discards the distinction between Vyutpatti and Pratibhā, acquired lore and genius, as admitted by Rājaśekhara and others.[1] He holds that poetic genius is more effective in the poetic production than any acquired lore and that in fact the so called Vyutpatti is nothing else than the power of poetic production, genius, Pratibhā or Kaviśakti.[2] He asserts the importance of poetic freedom in his Purūravovicāra, to which he refers in the concluding part of his commentary on the Ghaṭakarpara and from which he quotes the following :—

Na vai doṣā doṣā na ca khalu guṇā eva ca guṇāḥ
Nibaddhuḥ svātantryaṁ sapadi guṇadoṣānvibhajate
Iyaṁ sā vaidagdhī prakṛtimadhurā tasya sukaveḥ
Yadatrotpādādapyatisubhagabhāvaḥ pariṇataḥ.

Herein he says that it is not that defects (Doṣa) are necessarily always defects : nor are qualities under all conditions qualities only. It is the "freedom" (Svātantrya) of the poet that differentiates immediately between defects and qualities. It is because of the naturally sweet poetic genius of that good poet (Kālidāsa) that in his poetry extreme poetic beauty results from the transgression of the principles of poetic production.

Abhinavagupta, who is the topmost of Indian æstheticians, who has been followed by all important writers on æsthetics, and, therefore, whose view on matters of literary criticism ought to command respect among the contemporaries, is emphatically of the opinion that the use of Yamakas in the Ghaṭakarpara Kulaka is not to be looked upon as a fault or mere verbal trick, but as something from which extreme poetic beauty springs, something which the great poetic genius of Kālidāsa alone could

1. K. M., 16.
2. Gh., V. 20.

utilise to such an advantage, to inhance the æsthetic value of his work.

If we cast a glance at the Yamakas without any prejudice, created by the contemporary criticism under the influence of the western principles of literary criticism, we find that recurrence of the same group of syllables is natural and simple. It does not make the understanding of the poem difficult at all. Take for instance Toyadā and Gato yadā (V. 7) Mucyatām and Kimucyatām (V. 8.) Samprati and Mānasam prati (V. 9.) Komalam and Cātako (a) malam or any other and find out if the repetition of the groups of syllables causes any difficulty in understanding the meaning.

Importance of repetition of a group of syllables for inhancing the musical value of a poetic composition, that is intended to be rendered in the technique of music, was fully realised by Bharata as is very clear from the following illustration :—

Sthityutpattipralayanimittam
Sūkṣmākṣamacintyaṁ candrārdhadharaṁ
Trikalārdhadharam netrārdhadharam
Muñcārdhadharam kāntārdhadharam.

N. S. Ch. XXXI, 207.

Kālidāsa in the use of Yamaka follows this ancient practice, freeing it from the defect of the repetition of the same group of syllables without any difference in the meaning.

If we get the verses sung properly by a person of melodious voice in the necessary frame of mind, we will find that the musical value, due to the recurrence of the group of syllables at the end of the Pāda, makes the poem emotively more effective. The use of Yamakas, therefore, in this poem should not lead us to condemn it, nor should it, for that reason, make us think that it is not a work of the great poet, Kālidāsa.

Kālidāsa is recognised to be a poet of nature. He loves nature and presents it beautifully. The realistic presentation of nature is the characteristic feature of all his recognised dramas and poems. In this poem, however, he is primarily concerned, not with the objective presentation of nature, though that also is there in abundance, but with the presentation of the subjective effect of the external nature on a mind that is affected by the emotion of love in separation. There is a beautiful description of the rainy season with rays of the sun enveloped in the dark clouds, fall of the rain from the sky on soft green gross, swans flying in a row, Cātaka begging water from the clouds, peacocks, delighted, because of the rumbling clouds, forests full of Kuṭaja trees in bloom, dirty waters of the rivers, unsurpassed fragrance of the forest of Ketaka trees, blossoming of Kuṭaja and Kadamba trees and jasmine-creeper and so on. But all this is viewed through the eyes of the love-lorn lady and only such emotive value of the things, referred to above, as it had to her, is presented. Thus the clouds plough her heart, notes of peacock strike grief in her heart, forest of blossomed Kuṭajas makes her anxious, the sight of Nīpa burns her heart and Kuṭaja seems to laugh at her.

Thus, the poem is extremely beautiful, is free from all defects and presents such a beautiful synthesis of Citra-Kāvya and Dhvani-Kāvya as remains unrivalled and, therefore, fully justifies the boast of its author, Kālidāsa.

CHAPTER V

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF HIS THOUGHT

In the second chapter we have divided the literary activity of Abhinava into three periods and have placed the Tāntrika period first of all. In this chapter we propose to trace the historical background of his Tantric, philosophic and ālaṅkārika thoughts. We may state at the very outset that our subject being "A Study of Abhinavagupta", we do not mean to follow the traditional method of tracing the origin of the three subjects, on which he worked, to some ideas found in the Vedas and their development through the later literature till they got the respective names by which they are now known. We shall strictly confine ourselves to stating what idea of their history we get from the writings of Abhinava himself and of his immediate predecessors, to whom he often refers, to enable the reader to picture to himself the stages in the development of these ideas at which Abhinava took them up and the modifications which he introduced into them. We may further add that certain statements in the following pages will appear more mythical than historical, particularly in the part, dealing with the history of the Tantric literature. But they have been given a place here, partly to let the reader know the orthodox belief in its high antiquity and partly for a grain of historical truth that we find therein.

I HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF HIS TANTRIC IDEAS.

The belief among the orthodox Śaivas even to-day is that the Śaivāgamas are of eternal existence like the Vedas. To this belief Abhinava has given a philosophical explanation in the Mālinī Vijaya Vārtika which can be briefly put as follows :—

"Creation, or, to be more exact, manifestation, is, according to the Trika, of two kinds. One relates to speech and the other to substance (vācyavācakātmaka). Speech also is represented to be of two kinds, divine and human. The Śaivāgamas are the divine speech and as such are the grossest manifestation of the supreme Vimarśa, as different from the individual Vimarśa which is the cause of the ordinary human speech. Speech, as we have already shown in the course of our treatment of the Parātriṁśikā Vivaraṇa, has an eternal existence in a state of identity with the Parā. The Āgamas are but divine speech, and as such they also have similar eternal existence. According to the Trika, therefore, there can be nothing like an origin of the Śaivāgamas. There is only appearance or reappearance of them at the divine will."

These Āgamas originally consisted of nine crores of verses. Bhairava alone knew them all. This Āgamic lore, however, considerably lost in bulk as it was handed down by one divine being to the next after him. Literary tradition definitely says that the number of known verses decreased by one crore in the case of each of the remaining eight divine beings according to the order of their succession, shown below :—

1. Bhairava.
2. Bhairavī Devī.
3. Svacchanda.
4. Lākula.
5. Aṇurāṭ.
6. Gahaneśa.
7. Abjaja.
8. Śakra.
9. Guru.

The last mentioned, namely, Guru, taught the known portion of the Āgamas in parts to the following eight, according to their individual receptive power :—

1. Dakṣa etc.
2. Saṁvarta etc.
3. Vāmana etc.
4. Bhārgava.
5. Bali.
6. Siṁha.
7. Vinatābhū.
8. Vāsukināga.

Out of the part of the Āgamas in heaven (in the possession of Śakra ?) Rāvaṇa took one-half, which was partly handed down from generation to generation in the following order :—

1. Bibhīṣaṇa.
2. Rāma.
3. Lakṣmaṇa.
4. Siddhas.
5. Dānavas.
6. Guhyakas.
7. Yogins.

This, in brief, is the orthodox history of the Śaivāgamas from the time of Satyayuga to our age (Kaliyuga) as given by Abhinava in the 36th Āhnika of the Tantrāloka. It is based on the authority of the Siddhā Tantra and the tradition that he heard from his teachers.[1]

But when the iron age (Kaliyuga) was sufficiently advanced, the sages, who were in the possession of the Śaiva Tantric traditions, retired to places inaccessible to ordinary mortals. The Śaiva Tantric tradition, therefore, disappeared from the ordi-

1. T. A., Ah. XXXVI, 381-8.

nary society and spiritual darkness prevailed. Once Śrīkaṇṭha, (this is one of the names of Śiva) while roaming over the mountain Kailāsa, was touched with pity for the suffering humanity, which was then immersed in spiritual darkness, caused by the disappearance of the Śaivāgamas. He, therefore, instructed the sage, Durvāsas, to revive the Śaivāgamic teaching. The sage accordingly divided all the Śaivāgamas into three classes according as they taught monism, dualism or monism-cum-dualism, imparted their knowledge to his three mind-born sons, Tryambaka, Amardaka and Śrīnātha respectively, and charged each one of them separately with the mission of spreading the knowledge of the respective Āgamas. Thus there came into existence three Śaiva Tantric Schools, each known by the name of the first earthly propagator. It may be noted here that there is one more Āgamic school which is known as 'half-Tryambaka' (Ardhatryambaka) because it was founded by a descendant of Tryambaka on the side of his daughter.

We have not made any considerable attempt up to this time to search for the preceptorial lines of the Dvaita and the Dvaitādvaita Tantras. Whatever information, however, we have been able to collect from the available sources on the teachers of these two schools and their contributions to the Śaiva literature, to which there are repeated references in Abhinava's works, we have given in the Third Volume of the Bhāskarī and shall briefly put in the middle of this very chapter. As regards the successive teachers of the Advaita Tantras, we find a tolerably good account in the closing chapter of the Śivadṛṣṭi of Somānanda, the great grand teacher of Abhinava. In that he represents himself to be the 19th descendant of Tryambaka, the founder of the Advaita Tantric School. Of the first fourteen ancestors after Tryambaka he did not know much. His account of the fifteenth is a little definite. According to this, his name was Saṅgamāditya ; he married a

Brāhmaṇa girl, came to Kashmir in the course of his roaming and settled down there. The names of the three descendants between Saṅgamāditya and Somānanda are given below in the order of their succession :—

1. Varṣāditya.
2. Aruṇāditya.
3. Ānanda.[1]

In the foregoing account of the origin of the system in the hoary past, its long propagation, gradual decay, temporary disappearance and reappearance at the time from which the history now is traceable, there is nothing extraordinary. This seems to have been the traditional method of describing the high antiquity of a system. Leaving other books of lesser importance aside, if we take up such an important book as the Bhagavadgītā we find that there too Kṛṣṇa similarly speaks of the antiquity of the Karmayoga in the following lines in the beginning of the 4th Chapter :—

"Imaṁ vivasvate yogam proktavān aham avyayam
Vivasvān manave prāha manurikṣvākavebravīt
Evam paramparāprāptam idaṁ rājarṣayo viduḥ
Sa kāleneha mahatā yogo naṣṭaḥ Parantapa
Sa evāyam mayā tedya yogaḥ proktaḥ purātanaḥ."

Bh. G., Ch. IV, Ś. 1-2.

All this, however, is not without any historical importance. Here also the shrewd eye of a researcher can find a few grains of historical truth. And what our not very much trained eyes have been able to find in the above account we state as follows :—

Somānanda speaks of himself as the 19th descendant of Tryambaka. He was a great grand teacher of Abhinava whose date of birth we have fixed at about the middle of

1. S. Dr., Ch. VII, 220-1.

the 10th century A. D. It is, therefore, very probable that he was a contemporary of Bhaṭṭa Kallaṭa, who, as we know from the Rājataraṅgiṇī, lived in the reign of king Avantivarman of Kashmir (855-883 A. D.). In fact Bhaṭṭa Kallaṭa also was a great grand teacher of Abhinava from the side of Bhaṭṭendurāja, who was Abhinava's teacher in the Bhagavadgītā. For, Bhaṭṭendurāja was a pupil of Mukula, son of Bhaṭṭa Kallaṭa. This statement is based on the combined authority of Bhaṭṭendurāja's commentary on the Kāvyālaṅkāra Sāra and Mukula's Abhidhāvṛtti Mātṛkā in which the following lines occur :—

"Śrutvā saujanyasindhor dvijavara Mukulāt"

and

"Bhaṭṭa Kallaṭa putreṇa Mukulena nirūpitā
Sūri prabodhanāyeyam Abhidhāvṛtti Mātṛkā"

If, therefore, Somānanda belonged to the later half of the 9th century A. D., it would not be wrong to say that the monistic, the dualistic and the dualistic-cum-monistic schools of Śaivaism arose in the last quarter of the 4th century A. D. For, if we follow the traditional method of allowing 25 years for each generation we will have to admit that a period of four hundred and fifty years intervened between Tryambaka, the founder of the monistic school of Śaivaism and Somānanda, the founder of the Pratyabhijñā school ; because the latter was the 19th descendant of the former.

Thus, if different philosophical schools of Śaivaism arose towards the end of the 4th century A. D. it naturally follows that before that time there was no such distinction. This conclusion finds support in Abhinava's account of early Śaivaism, because in that no difference of any kind is stated or indicated to have existed. Perhaps before that time Śaivaism was simply a form of worship of the particular deity after

which the faith was called and the introduction of the philosophical element came much later as a result of the influence of Buddhism.

The traditional method of allowing 25 years only for each generation, however, seems to be too mechanical in the case of the history of the Śaiva philosophy. For, there is definite inscriptional evidence to show that the Lakuliśa Pāśupata system arose in the first half of the 2nd Century A. D. (Vide the Bhāskarī Vol. III, pp. XXVIII-XXX.). The bifurcation of different schools of Śaivaism can, therefore, be edmitted to have taken place much earliar than the traditional method would permit us to assert.

It is not possible for us to state the time of composition of the different Tantras, because very few of them are so far available. How can any correct conclusion be possible unless all of them or at least a respectable number of them be carefully read? As regards their division into the three Śaiva schools, there seems to have existed a difference of opinion a little before the time of Abhinava; for, there is the evidence of Kṣemarāja that the Svacchanda Tantra, on which he has commented from the point of view of Śaiva monism, was before his time explained in accordance with the principles of dualism.

("Nāmnaiva bhedadṛṣṭir viddutā yenāsvatantratātattvā
Śrīmat Svatantra Tantram bhedavyākhyāṁ na tat sahate.")

Abhinavagupta, however, has made a clear cut division of these in his Tantrāloka as follows :—

"Daśāṣṭādaśavasvaṣṭabhinnaṁ yacchāsanaṁ vibhoḥ."

T. A., I, 35.

And Jayaratha in his commentory on the above verse has given the list of the Tantras as follows :—

DVAITA TANTRAS.

1. Kāmaja.
2. Yogaja.
3. Cintya.
4. Maukuṭa.
5. Aṁśumat.
6. Dīpta.
7. Kāraṇa.
8. Ajita.
9. Sūkṣma.
10. Sahasra.

This division, according to his own statement, is based on the authority of the Śrī Śrīkaṇṭhī.

(Etacca Śrī Śrīkaṇṭyām abhidhānapūrvakaṁ vistarata uktam. T. A., comm., I, 39.)

This authority was probably a recent one, and, therefore, was perhaps disputed. This supposition alone can justify the existence of a dualistic interpretation of the Svacchanda Tantra.

In the introduction to the Mṛgendra Tantra occurs the following quotation, giving the names of the ten Śiva Tantras. This authority is different from that quoted by Jayaratha :—

"Kāmikaṁ Yogajaṁ vātha tathā Cintyaśca Kāraṇam
Ajitaṁ Dīpta Sūkṣmau ca Sahasraśca tathāṁśumān
Suprabhedastathā hyete śaivāḥ samparikīrtitāḥ."

Introd., Mr. T., P. 2.

It may be noted here that the MS., with the help of which the present edition of the Tantrāloka was brought out, was, perhaps, mutilated in that part which states the names of the dualistic Tantras and, therefore, there is left a gap after giving six names. We have, however, completed the list with the help of Dr. Farquhar's Outline of Religious Literature in India P. 193, in which he gives all the ten names. It may

be pointed out in this connection that this list instead of Maukuṭa and Kāmaja, gives Suprabha and Kāmika. At present we have not got sufficient material at our disposal to explain this difference.

DVAITĀDVAITA TANTRAS.

1. Vijaya.
2. Niśvāsa.
3. Madgīta.
4. Pārameśvara.
5. Mukhabimba.
6. Siddha.
7. Santāna.
8. Nārasiṁhaka.
9. Candrāṁśu.
10. Vīrabhadra.
11. Āgneya.
12. Svayambhuva.
13 Visara.
14. Raurava.
15. Vimala.
16. Kiraṇa.
17. Lalita.
18. Saurabheya.

It is interesting to note here that Abhinava in his Tantrāloka has given quotations from some of these Tantras also in support of certain views propounded therein. For the list of these and the contexts in which references to them occur consult appendix (B)

ADVAITA TANTRAS.

The Advaita Tantras consist of eight groups, each comprising eight Tantras and having a separate name as shown below :—

(I) BHAIRAVA TANTRAS.

1. Svacchanda
2. Bhairava
3. Caṇḍa
4. Krodha
5. Unmatta Bhairava
6. Asitāṅga
7. Mahocchuṣma
8. Kapālīśa

(II) YĀMALA TANTRAS.

9. Brahmayāmala
10. Viṣṇuyāmala
11. Svacchanda (Yāmala)
12. Ruru
13. ....?
14. Ātharvaṇa
15. Rudra
16. Vetāla

(III) MATA.

17. Rakta
18. Lampaṭa
19. Lakṣmīmata
20. Mata
21. Cālikā
22. Piṅgala
23. Utphullaka
24. Viśvādya

(IV) MAṄGALA.

25. Picu Bhairavī
26. Tantra Bhairavī
27. Tata

28. Brāhmī Kalā
29. Vijayā
30. Candrā
31. Maṅgalā
32. Sarvamaṅgalā

(V) CAKRĀṢṬAKA.

33. Mantracakra
34. Varṇacakra
35- Śakticakra
36. Kalācakra
37. Binducakra
38. Nādacakra
39. Guhyacakra
40. Khacakra

(VI) BAHURŪPA.

41. Andhaka
42. Rurubheda
43. Aja
44. Mūla
45. Varṇabhaṇṭha
46. Viḍaṅga
47. Mātṛrodana
48. Jvālin

(VII) VĀGĪŚA

49. Bhairavī
50. Citrikā
51. Haṁsā
52. Kadambikā
53. Hṛllekhā
54. Candralekhā
55. Vidyullekhā
56. Vidyumat

(VIII) ŚIKHĀṢṬAKA.

57. Bhairavī Śikhā
58. Vīṇā
59. Vīṇāmaṇi
60. Sammoha
61. Ḍāmara
62. Atharvaka
63. Kabandha
64. Śiraścheda

This list of sixty-four monistic Tantras is based on the authority of the Śrīkaṇṭhī, a Śaiva work, quoted by Jayaratha in his commentary on the Tantrāloka, I, 42—3. We may add here that the above list of 64 Tantras is different from the one given in the Śabdārtha Cintāmaṇi under "Tantra" on page 1048. The latter is based on the authority of the Siddhi Sārasvata and has certain names of Tantras in common with the former, e. g. Svatantra, Rudra Yāmala etc. and mentions the names of certain others which are quoted by Abhinava in the Tantrāloka, though not included in Jayaratha's list.

THE FOURTH ŚAIVA TANTRIC SCHOOL.

The fourth school of Śaivaism owed its existence to a descendant of Tryambaka on his daughter's side and, therefore, was called Ardha-Tryambaka. The evidence which we have been able to collect so far leads us to think that it is the same system as that which is referred to in the Tantrāloka as Kula-Prakriyā. For, according to the statement of Jayaratha in the introduction to T. A., Ah. I, Ś. 7, Abhinava deals with the teachings of both the Tantra and the Kula in his Tantrāloka. Abhinava also pays his homage to his teachers in both the schools, as the following quotation shows :—

"Evañca tantraprakriyopāsannagurvabhimukhīkaraṇānantaraṁ viśrāntisthānatayā kulaprakriyāgurum api utkarṣayati." T. A., Comm., I, 31.

If we read the following verse with the introduction to it, given above, it becomes evident that Śambhunātha was his teacher in the Kula system :—

"Jayatāt jagaduddhṛtikṣamosau
Bhagavatyā saha Śambhunātha ekaḥ.

T. A., I, 31.

Now in the concluding portion of the Tantrāloka, Ah. 37, the author, while enumerating his teachers in different branches, refers to this very Śambhunātha, not only as his teacher in the fourth school

("Turyākhyasantatimahodadhipūrṇacandraḥ
Śrī Somataḥ sakalavit kila Śambhunāthaḥ.")

T. A., Ah. 37, Ś. 61.

but also as a pupil of Soma, which is an abbreviated form of Somadeva, who was Śambhunātha's teacher in Kulamārga, as the following statement of Jayaratha in his commentary on the Tantrāloka, I, 213, coupled with a quotation makes clear :—

"Śrī Sumatināthasya Somadevaḥ Śiṣyaḥ tasya Śrī Śambhunāthaḥ yad vakṣyati 'Śrī Somataḥ sakalavit kila Śambhunāthaḥ"

yattu

"Kaścid dakṣiṇabhūmipīṭhavasatiḥ śrīmān vibhur Bhairavaḥ
Pañcasrotasi sātimārgavibhave śāstre vidhātā ca yaḥ
Lokebhūt Sumatis tataḥ samudabhūt tasyaiva śiṣyāgraṇīḥ
Śrīmāñchambhuriti prasiddhim agamaj-Jālandharāt pīṭhataḥ"
ityanyatroktaṁ tat paramagurvabhiprāyeṇa yojyam.

We, therefore, hold that the words "kulamārga," and "ardhatryambakamaṭhikā" stand for the same school of Śaivaism.

THE TRACEABLE HISTORY OF THE FOURTH SCHOOL.

We learn from the following quotation in T. A., Comm. that it had its origin in Kāmarūpa (Assam) and that its founder was the great sage, Mīna alias Macchanda Vibhu :—

"Bhairavyā Bhairavāt prāptaṁ yogaṁ vyāpya tataḥ priye
Tatsakāśāttu siddhena Mīnākhyena varānane
Kāmarūpe mahāpīṭhe Macchandena mahātmanā."

T. A., Comm.. I., 24.

The commentator has cleared the point that Macchanda was the founder of the fourth school by describing him as "Turya-nātha" in the introduction to that Śloka of the 1st Āhnika of the Tantrāloka in which the author offers his salutation to him (Macchanda Vibhu). Here the word "turya" stands for "Turyākhyasantati" referred to in a quotation given above.

We know nothing at this stage of the names or number of the successive teachers of this school till we come to Sumati, the great grand teacher of Abhinava in this branch. He belonged to Southern Pīṭha (Dakṣiṇabhūmipīṭhavasatiḥ). The names of the teachers who came after him are given below in the order of their succession :—

1. Somadeva.
2. Śambhunātha.
3. Abhinavagupta.

More on this subject will be found in the chapter dealing with the Kula system.

II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF HIS PHILOSOPHIC IDEAS.

The rise of the monistic Śaiva philosophy in Kashmir.

In the preceding few pages we have tried to trace the history of the monistic Tantras, on which the monistic Śaiva philosophy is based, from the earliest time down to that of

Somānanda (Circa 850 A. D.). It was about this time that the monistic Śaiva philosophy arose in Kashmir.

THE CAUSES OF ITS RISE.

The rise of a system presupposes the existence of the *material* out of which it is to be built, of the *capable men* who can give it the required shape and of the *immediate public necessity* which it has to satisfy. A century or so before the time of the actual rise of this system, men, material and need for any such thing as the monistic Śaiva philosophy were all lacking in Kashmir. For, we have shown above how monistic Tantras, on which this system is based, had their origin outside the valley of Kashmir; how the traditional Tantric lore was brought to Kashmir only about the middle of the 8th century by the fourth ancestor of Somānanda and how Atrigupta, the renowned Śaiva philosopher of Kannauj and the earliest known ancestor of Abhinava, the greatest authority on the Pratyabhijñā, was brought to Kashmir by king Lalitāditya sometime after 740 A. D. And we know from the following quotation :—

> "Sūtraṁ vṛttir vivṛtir Laghvī Bṛhatītyubhe Vimarśinyau
> Prakaraṇavivaraṇapañcakam iti śāstram
> Pratyabhijñāyāḥ."

given by Mādhava in his Sarvadarśana Saṅgraha that the Pratyabhijñā literature is a mere exposition of the principles laid down by Somānanda in his Śivadṛṣṭi, which was called by him "Prakaraṇa" and that the authoritative books on this are the following :—

1.	Pratyabhijñā Sūtra.			Utpala.
2.	,,	,,	Vṛtti.	
3.	,,	,,	Vivṛti.	
4.	,,	,,	Vimarśinī	Abhinava.
5.	,,	,,	Vivrti Vimarśinī.	

We know also that all these three writers belonged to the two learned immigrant families, namely, of Somānanda and of Abhinava, referred to above.

It may be pointed out here that the verse "Sūtraṁ Vṛttir" occurs in the Śāstra Parāmarśa of Madhurāja Yogin as verse four. Mādhava (15th century A. D.) in his Sarvadarśana Saṅgraha quotes it with very slight variation at the end. While the concluding word, according to Madhurāja, was "Pratyabhijñākhyam", the quotation in the Sarvadarśana Saṅgraha concludes as "Pratyabhijñāyāḥ". From this it is clear that Madhurāja's works were known in places far distant from Kashmir.

Thus a century before the rise of the monistic system, Kashmir was lacking in both men and meterial for building up its own school of philosophy. As for the public necessity, there is evidence to show that there was none. In support of this statement we would content ourselves here with simply quoting Dr. Stein's remark which endorses our view that the general public were quite satisfied with the then existing religious conditions and did not require any philosophical system to satisfy their spiritual needs :—

"The contrast, which this (Kalhaṇa's) partiality for Buddhist cult and traditions presents to avowed Śaivaism of Kalhaṇa, is more apparent than real. For centuries before Kalhaṇa's time Buddhism and the orthodox creeds had existed peacefully side by side in Kashmir. As far as the laity was concerned they had to a great extent amalgamated. His own narrative from the point where it reaches historical ground gives ample proof of this. Of almost all royal and private individuals, who are credited with the foundation of Buddhist Stūpas and Vihāras, it is recorded that they, or at least members of their family, with equal zeal endowed also shrines of Śiva or Viṣṇu."

R. T., Introd., P. 9.

ANCIENT FAITH OF KASHMIR.

One question will naturally arise here in the reader's mind, viz., if Tantric Śaivaism is a thing of later introduction in Kashmir, what was its religion before that? Before attempting to answer this question we may state here that for our answer we have primarily to depend upon what little historical truth we find in Kalhaṇa's mostly legendary account of the earlier kings of Kashmir. After this introductory remark we may at once say that it was a polytheistic religion, as described in the Nīlamata Purāṇa and that Śiva, as associated with his spouse, was its most popular god. Because, when a religious point arises after the coronation of Yaśovatī, the 3rd of Gonanda line of Kashmir, Kṛṣṇa quotes the authority of the Nīlamata Purāṇa in support of his view (R. T., ch. I, 71-72.). Similarly, when the religion of the land is represented to have suffered at the hands of the Bauddhas with Nāgārjuna as their head, the reference is to nothing else than the ritualistic performances prescribed in the Nīla Purāṇa :—

> "Kriyāṁ Nīlapurāṇoktām ācchindan āgamadviṣaḥ."
>
> R. T., ch. I, 178.

Further, when Candra, a descendant of Kaśyapa, propitiated Nīla, the lord of the (Kashmir) Nāgas, who being angry at the suspension of the customary oblation because of Buddhistic influence, had sent down the destructive snowfall, the religion that was revealed to him anew was no other than that of the Nīla Purāṇa (R. T., ch. I, 183.).

Whatever opinion we may hold about Kalhaṇa's account of the kings and their administration in the earlier part of his chronicle, in view of the fact that Tantric Śaivaism was of as late introduction into Kashmir as the 8th century A. D. and that when Buddhism entered Kashmir at the time of Aśoka

there was already a religion there, the prominent feature of which was the worship of Ardhanārī Naṭeśvara, it will not be unreasonable to suppose that Kalhaṇa at least in his statement in regard to the ancient faith or religion of the land is generally not wrong.

SOIL FOR THE GROWTH OF TANTRIC ŚAIVAISM.

It has been pointed out in the preceding two paragraphs that the old religion of the land of Kaśyapa was polytheistic with a special inclination towards ritualistic Śaivaism. It was purely a traditional faith and had no literature of its own at the time of the advent of Buddhism in Kashmir in the reign of Aśoka (273–232 B. C.). But so wise was then the way in which Buddhism was spread, so non-interfering was the religious policy and so judicious was the royal patronage of different religions that Brāhmaṇas did not very much feel the advent of the new religion. Antagonism of Brāhmaṇas, however, was aroused when in consequence of Kaniṣka's gift (125-60 A. D.) of Kashmir to Buddhistic Church*, Nāgārjuna came to power and began to use his power of both learning and position to spread Buddhism. The fact that this was the time when the struggle between Buddhism and Śaivaism began seems to find support in the tradition, recorded by Varadarāja in the following introductory verse to his Vārtika on Vasugupta's Śiva Sūtra :—

"Nāgabodhyādibhiḥ siddhair nāstikānām puraḥsaraiḥ
Ākrānte jīvalokesmin ātmeśvaranirāsakaiḥ."

Ś. S. V., I.

Here we take "Nāgabodhi" to stand for "Nāgārjuna Bodhisattva" on the basis of the following authority :—

"Nāgārjunena sudhiyā bodhisattvena pālitāḥ."

R. T., I, 175.

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* R. T., Ch. I, 177-8.

The immediate effect of this was that the teachings of the local religion, which were till then simply a matter of floating traditions, were systematised for the first time by a pious Brāhmaṇa ascetic, Candradeva. This in our opinion is the one historical truth in Kalhaṇa's story of the destructive snow-fall, sent by Nīla, enraged at the abeyance of religious rights prescribed in the Nīla Purāṇa in consequence of Nāgārjuna's propaganda (R. T., I, 177–184). The story is, otherwise, as pointed out by Dr. Stein, (R. T., Introd. P. 77) "but the réchauffé of an ancient legend told in the Nīlamata Purāṇa, which relates the deliverance of Kashmir from the plague of the Piśācas through the rites revealed by Nīla Nāga."

What important events took place in the following six hundred years in the history of the local faith of Kashmir, we do not know anything about. The only thing that we can say is that the local religion, being polytheistic, accepted Buddha also as one of its gods. Therefore, whatever conflict of views may have existed among the priests of both Buddhism and Śaivaism regarding religious matters, common people, as has already been stated, followed a mixed faith. That both influenced each other was a matter of course. Thus there developed a religion which was neither purely Buddhistic nor purely Śaivaite, but was a harmonious mixture of the meditative and philosophical aspect of the one and the ritualistic aspect of the other; but as such it had no scriptural authority to support it. Thus, there was already the soil congenial for the growth of Tantric Śaivaism which gives ritual and philosophy more or less the same place as was probably given them by the then popular faith, so that when it came with all the scriptural support at its back, it was accepted by the common people of Kashmir as their ancestral faith. Even today Tantric Śaivaism is the faith of Kashmir Hindus, though now it is considerably mixed with Vedic rituals.

INFLUENCE OF ŚAṄKARĀCĀRYA.

For over nine centuries the local faith had been influenced by Buddhism. For about the same period the people of Kashmir had professed a mixed faith and had heard enough of the idealistic philosophy and perhaps thought also over it. Their minds, therefore, were sufficiently trained to receive and to retain philosophical ideas. For about a century they had seen the Tantric Śaiva rituals practised by the two great Śaiva families which had migrated into Kashmir and had heard their philosophical ideas. Perhaps many families, not finding any fundamental difference between this and the religion that they and their predecessors had professed for centuries, had accepted it. The decline of Buddhism had come. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (about 750 A. D.) had shaken its roots. Such was the opportune time when Śaṅkarācārya visited Kashmir some time in the second decade of the 9th century after giving his final blow to Buddhism in the rest of India (Śaṅkara Digvijaya, ch. XVI, 54–80). Let us state here very clearly that our statement about Śaṅkarācārya's visit to Kashmir has no other authority than that of the Śaṅkara Digvijaya, referred to above. Let us, however, add that it does not appear to be altogether baseless: firstly, because it is supported by a local tradition which is still current in Kashmir, and secondly, because the influence of Śaṅkara's Tantric philosophy on the Trika is so great that the supposition of a personal touch of its founder-writers with Śaṅkara seems to be necessary to explain it at such an early time. If we compare the philosophical ideas of Śaṅkara, as contained in his Dakṣiṇā Mūrti Stotra and explained by his pupil Sureśvarācārya in his commentary on the above Stotra, we find that Śaṅkara's conception of the ultimate reality is the same as that of the Pratyabhijñā. In fact he uses all the important technical expressions in the same sense in which they are used in the Pratyabhijñā. Compare for instance :—

(I) "Bījasyāntarivāṅkuro jagadidam prāṅnirvikalpam punar
Māyākalpitadeśakālakalanāvaicitryacitrīkṛtam
Māyāvīva vijṛmbhayatyapi mahāyogīva yaḥ svecchayā
Tasmai śrī gurumūrtaye nama idaṁ śrī Dakṣiṇāmūrtaye."

D. M. S., Ś. 2.

and

"Cidātmaiva hi devontaḥsthitam icchāvaśād bahiḥ
Yogīva nirupādānam arthajātam prakāśayet."

I. P. V., I, 182.

(II) "Jñānakriye jagatkḷptau dṛśyete cetanāśraye."

D. M. S., Comm. (2), Ś. 13.

and

"Jñānaṁ kriyā ca bhūtānāṁ jīvatāṁ jīvanam matam."

I. P. V., I, 39.

(III) "Tasmāt sattā sphurattā ca sarvatrāpyanuvartate."

D. M. S., Comm. (2), Ś. 13.

and

"Sā sphurattā mahāsattā deśakālāviśeṣiṇī."

I. P. V., I, 207.

(IV) "Jñātṛtvam api kartṛtvaṁ svātantryaṁ tasya kevalam."

D. M. S., Comm. (2), Ś. 50.

and

"Kartari jñātari svātmanyādisiddhe maheśvare."

I. P. V., I, 29.

We, therefore, feel that, whatever be the amount of fiction with which Mādhava may have coloured Śaṅkara's visit to Kashmir, it is not without a grain of truth inasmuch as the said visit was a fact. Further, we are of opinion that Śaṅkara believed in the monistic Tantras, as the epithet "sarvatantrasvatantra" in his virudāvalī indicates; that the Tantras, the authority of which he accepted, were sixty-four in number, as his reference to them in his own Saundarya Laharī in the following line :—

"Catuḥṣaṣṭhyā tantraiḥ sakalam abhisandhāya bhuvanam" clearly shows; that he had a special inclination towards the Tantric practices of Kashmir, as his establishing Śrīcakra in some of his Maṭhas testifies; and that in his exposition of the Vedānta he was greatly influenced by the philosophical parts of the aforesaid Tantras, as we shall point out at different places in the philosophical portion of this thesis.

The visit of such a great person, particularly after uprooting Buddhism in the course of his Digvijaya, (if this be taken to be an historical fact) was of no little importance to the philosophical system that was soon to come into existence. This visit purged the local faith of its Buddhistic element, strengthened the position of the new Tantric creed, which was brought by the two immigrant families and had already begun to be accepted by the populace, and aroused their curiosity to know more about the new creed.

THE RISE OF KASHMIR ŚAIVAISM.

Thus men and material being already there in the two immigrant families and those that followed them, as for instance, that to which Vasugupta, the author of the Śiva Sūtra, belonged, and the need for a systematic presentation of the new faith in both its philosophical and ritualistic aspects having been created by the visit of Śaṅkarācārya, the Kashmir Śaivaism made its appearance without much delay.

Our object in these pages, we may state here, is not to trace the history of the divine Śaiva literature so much as to give an idea of the human literature that had been written before Abhinava on the subject of Kashmir Śaivaism so as to show clearly what our great writer contributed to it. In this chapter, therefore, we shall deal with the writings of his predecessors only. We shall speak on his successors in the

next chapter and shall show how far he influenced their ideas.

THE SPANDA BRANCH.

(1) VASUGUPTA AND HIS ŚIVA SŪTRA.

On the authority of the Rājataraṅgiṇī (ch. V, 66) we know that Bhaṭṭa Kallaṭa, the pupil of Vasugupta, was a contemporary of Avantivarman, King of Kashmir (855–883 A. D.). There he is referred to as "siddha". It is, therefore, evident that at that time he was an old man of established reputation. Vasugupta, the teacher of Kallaṭa, therefore, it is natural to suppose, belonged to the preceding scholastic generation extending from about 825 to 850 A. D. We shall, therefore, not be wrong if we say that Vasugupta gave a systematic form to the philosophical ideas of the monistic Tantras in his Śiva Sūtras in the next decade after Śaṅkarācārya's visit to Kashmir towards the end of the second decade of the 9th century A. D.

Kṣemarāja, in his introduction to the Śiva Sūtra Vimarśinī, records a tradition which says that Vasugupta was not the writer but simply the publisher of the Sūtras which he had found inscribed on a boulder to which he had gone, as instructed by Śiva in a dream, and which turned bottom upward at the mere touch of his hand. Whatever we may think of this tradition, it was believed in by his immediate successors, who refer to the Śiva Sūtras as of divine authorship. They are divided into three chapters dealing in succession with the three ways to final emancipation, pointed out by the monistic Tantras.

OTHER WORKS OF VASUGUPTA.

2. Spanda Kārikā.

There is a difference of opinion about the authorship of the

Spanda Kārikā. Utpala Vaiṣṇava on the strength of the 53rd Verse :—

"Vasuguptād avāpyedaṁ guros tattvārthadarśinaḥ
Rahasyaṁ ślokayāmāsa samyak śrī Bhaṭṭa Kallaṭaḥ."

attributes its authorship to Kallaṭa. But it has to be noted in this connection that this verse is not found in the recension of Kṣemarāja, who attributes the Kārikā to Vasugupta himself, probably on the authority of the following verse, found in his recension :—

"Labdhvāpyalabhyam etaj jñānadhanaṁ hṛdguhāntaḥ-kṛtanihiteḥ
Vasuguptavacchivāya hi bhavati sadā sarvalokasya."
S. N., 16.

About this quotation also it has to be pointed out that as the former is not found in the recension of Kṣemarāja so the latter is not traceable in that of Utpala Vaiṣṇava. We, however, follow Kṣemarāja, because he is supported by Maheśvarānanda who quotes this verse, as found in Kṣemarāja's recension, in his commentary on the very first verse of his own Mahārtha Mañjarī.

The Spanda Kārikā is simply an amplification of the fundamental principles of Śaivaism, as aphoristically given in the Śiva Sūtra. It was called Spanda Sūtra also. Kṣemarāja in one of his introductory verses to the Spanda Nirṇaya refers to it as such :—

"Samyak sūtrasamanvayam parigatiṁ tattve parasmin parām..............
Śrī Spanda śāstrasya." S. N., I,

This work has to be distinguished from "Spanda Sūtra" nos. 518-19 of Dr. Bühler's report ; for, there the name stands for "Śiva Sūtra" (consult his extracts from MSS.).

3. SPANDĀMṚTA.

It is mentioned as a separate work of Vasugupta by Mr. J. C. Chatterji in his Kashmir Śaivaism P. 37. He does not state any authority on this point. But our opinion is that it is the same as the Spanda Kārikā. In fact the word "Spandāmṛta" does not stand for the title of a work. It is simply a metaphorical expression used for the fundamental principles of the Spanda system, as is clear from the use of this very word by Kṣemarāja in one of the introductory verses to his Spanda Nirṇaya :—

"Spandāmṛte carvite tu Spandasandohato manāk"

We know that the Spanda Sandoha is Kṣemarāja's commentary on the first verse of the Spanda Kārikā. Another place where this word has been found is the concluding verse of Kallaṭa's Spanda Sarvasva :—

"Dṛbdham mahādevagirau maheśasvapnopadiṣṭācchiva-sūtrasindhoḥ
Spandāmṛtaṁ yad Vasuguptapādaiḥ Śrī Kallaṭas tat prakaṭīcakāra."

Here also the word, if at all it stands for the title of a work, cannot refer to any other than the Spanda Kārikā itself on which the Spanda Sarvasva is a commentary.

This verse seems to solve the riddle of the authorship of the Spanda Kārikā. Here Kallaṭa himself represents Vasugupta to be the writer of the Spanda Kārikā ; mark the words "Spandāmṛtaṁ dṛbdham" ("Dṛbhī granthe" Pāṇini's Dhātupāṭha) and clearly states his work in connection with the Kārikās to be simply that of a publisher :—

"Śrī Kallaṭas tat prakaṭīcakāra"

Perhaps this is a posthumous work of Vasugupta. If this explanation be taken to be correct there will remain no difficulty in harmoniously interpreting the two verses given above

in this connection. For, "Rahasyaṁ ślokayāmāsa samyak", occurring in the Spanda Pradīpikā, can, without stretching the language, be interpreted as "well published the sacred doctrine."

4. VĀSAVĪ ṬĪKĀ ON THE BHAGAVADGĪTĀ.

No complete MS. of this work has so far been discovered.

5. SIDDHĀNTA CANDRIKĀ.

Noticed in Bühler's catalogue as MS. No. 501.

(II) KALLAṬA (855 A. D.)

What little we know about his person we have already stated while discussing the date of Vasugupta. Here, therefore, we confine ourselves to giving an account of his works only.

1. SPANDA SARVASVA.

It is a commentary on the Spanda Kārikā.

2. TATTVĀRTHA CINTĀMAṆI.

This was a commentary on the last quarter of Vasugupta's Śiva Sūtra, as we learn from the 5th introductory verse of Bhāskarācārya to his Vārtika on the same Śiva Sūtra :—

"Vyākarot trikam ete (ke) bhyaḥ *Spandasūtraiḥ svakaistathā*

Tattvārthacintāmaṇyākhyaṭīkayā khaṇḍam antimam".

3. SPANDA SŪTRA.

From the portion italicized in the above quotation it appears that he wrote his own Spanda Sūtras also.

4. MADHUVĀHINĪ.

We have not been able to trace any reference to it ourselves; we are mentioning it here on the authority of Mr. J. C. Chatterji's Kashmir Śaivaism P. 37.

(III) RĀMA KAṆṬHA.

In the colophon to his commentary on the Spanda Kārikā he speaks of himself as Utpaladeva's pupil :—

"Kṛtiḥ śrīmad-Utpaladevapādapadmopajīvinaḥ Śrīmad Rājānaka Rāmakaṇṭhasya."

We know that Utpala was Abhinava's grand teacher and, therefore, belonged to the first half of the 10th century A. D. We shall, therefore, not be very wrong if we say that he (Rāma Kaṇṭha) lived in the second and the third quarters of the 10th century A. D.

His Works.

1. SPANDA VIVARAṆA SĀRAMĀTRA.

This is the name of his commentary, mentioned above, as is apparent from the colophon :—

"Iti Spanda Vivaraṇa Sāramātraṁ samāptam."

Two more works of this author are noted in the K. Ś. with an interrogation mark against each.

2. Commentary on the Mataṅga Tantra ?
3. Commentary on the Bhagavadgītā from the Śaiva point of view ?

(IV) BHĀSKARĀCĀRYA.

Four generations intervened between Kallaṭa and Bhāskarācārya. The latter belonged to the fifth generation from the former. The following are the names of his predecessors in the order of their succession[1] :—

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1. Ś. S. V., Introd.

1. Pradyumna Bhaṭṭa.
2. Prajñārjuna.
3. Mahādeva Bhaṭṭa.
4. Śrīkaṇṭha Bhaṭṭa.

Abhinavagupta quotes in his Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī from the Vivekāñjana of Divākaravatsa with the following remark :—

"Yadāha Bhaṭṭa Divākaravatso Vivekāñjane"
I. P. V., I, 10.

If we take the word "Divākaravatsa" to mean "son of Divākara" as we have reason to do in view of his referring to himself as "Daivākariḥ" in the Ś. S. V. referred to above, there does not remain much difficulty in fixing his date. Abhinavagupta's Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī is the last of his available works and came after his Bṛhatī Vimarśinī which was completed in 1015, A. D. as we have already shown in the chronological order of his works. And Bhaṭṭa Kallaṭa, we know, was king Avanti Varman's contemporary (855 A. D.). Allowing, therefore, a period of about a century for the intervening four generations, it will not be wrong, in our opinion, to say that he was an older contemporary of Abhinava, if not a predecessor.

HIS WORKS.

1. ŚIVA SŪTRA VĀRTIKA (published)
2. VIVEKĀÑJANA (known from reference)
3. KAKṢYĀ STOTRA.

The last mentioned work is attributed to Bhaṭṭa Divākaravatsa by Yogarāja in his commentary on Abhinava's Paramārtha Sāra P. 103, as the following quotation shows :—

"Yathāha Bhaṭṭa Divākaravatsaḥ
'Jāte dehapratyayadvīpabhaṅge
Prāptaikadhye nirmale bodhasindhau

Avyāvartya tvindriyagrāmam antar
Viśvātmā tvaṁ nitya ekovabhāsi'

iti Kakṣyā Stotre."

THE PRATYABHIJÑĀ BRANCH.

It may be pointed out at the very outset that the "Pratyabhijñā" also, like the Spanda, is based on the monistic Śaiva Tantras and that in point of the philosophical conception of the universe and its cause, and of the nature of the individual self and that of the highest reality there is no difference between the two. The only point where the two differ is the means of realising the Highest Reality. The Spanda showed the three well known paths to the said realisation, namely, Śāmbhava, Śākta and Āṇava, as is clear from the three chapters of the Śiva Sūtra, called after the above three means. But the Pratyabhijñā, according to the statement of the author of the Pratyabhijñā Sūtra or Kārikā, showed an easier path to it which was not known before and which was, for the first time, pointed out by Somānanda in his Śivadṛṣṭi.[1]

(I) SOMĀNANDA.

We have already pointed out that two teachers of Abhinava, namely, Lakṣmaṇagupta and Bhaṭṭendurāja, belong to two different preceptorial lines. The distance of both, Somānanda and Kallaṭa, from Abhinava is only two intervening generations as the following table shows :—

1	Somānanda[2]	1.	Kallaṭa
2.	Utpaladeva	2.	Mukula
3.	Lakṣmaṇagupta	3.	Bhaṭṭendurāja
4.	Abhinavagupta	4.	Abhinavagupta.

1. I. P. V., II, 271.
2. T. A., XII, 414.

We can, therefore, safely say that Somānanda was Kallaṭa's contemporary, perhaps older, and belonged to the close of the first and the beginning of the second half of the 9th century A. D.

HIS WORKS.

In the next generation after the so called discovery of the Śiva Sūtras by Vasugupta and a sort of running commentary thereon in the form of the Spanda Kārikāṣ by the same, but perhaps before a commentary on the latter by Kallaṭa, Somānanda wrote his Śivadṛṣṭi.

1. ŚIVADṚṢṬI.

While the works on the Spanda branch, just mentioned, are mere dogmatic statements of the Śaiva doctrines, the Śivadṛṣṭi is an attempt to present the Śaiva idealistic monism or monistic idealism in a systematic philosophical form coupled with the necessary reasoning. It consists of about 700 verses in seven chapters. Somānanda also, like Vasugupta, claims to have been inspired by Śiva in a dream, but not simply to go to a boulder to find inscribed what was to be propagated, but to systematise the philosophical contents of the monistic Tantras.[1] He clearly states that what he has given in the Śivadṛṣṭi, is not simply a creation of his own mind, but is based on the Śāstra "Śivo dātā śivo bhoktā."[2] We have not so far been able to trace this quotation in any one of the Āgamas to which we have had access. But the verse given below, of which the above quotation constitutes a part, is very well known and is daily recited in the Pandit families of Kashmir :—

"Śivo dātā śivo bhoktā śivaḥ sarvam idaṁ jagat
Śivo yajati yajñaśca yaḥ śivaḥ soham eva hi."

---

1. Ś. Dr., 219. 2. Ś. Dr., 219.

We may, however, state that Abhinavagupta, while dealing with the Anupāyamārga, in the second Āhnika of his Tantrāloka, declares that he follows the authority of the Ūrmimahāśāstra. He further adds that this subject has been dwelt upon by earlier teachers beginning with Somānanda.[1] The above-mentioned Tantra, therefore, was perhaps the authority which Somānanda followed. The quotation also may be from the same.

2. VIVṚTI.

This is supposed to have been Somānanda's commentary on his own Śivadṛṣṭi. Dr. Stein, however, is of opinion that no such work was written by him (Introd. XLII, Jammu Cat.)

3. PARĀTRIṀŚIKĀ VIVṚTI.

This, as the name implies, was his commentary on the Parātriṁśikā. Abhinava, according to his own statement[2], follows it in his own commentary on the same (Parātriṁśikā). In fact his object was to discuss the points which were left doubtful by Somānanda.

(II) UTPALADEVA.

He was both son and pupil of Somānanda.
("Somānandātmajotpalaja–Lakṣmaṇaguptanāthaḥ."
T. A., Ah. 37, P. 414.)

He, therefore, seems to have lived towards the end of the 9th and the first half of the 10th century A. D.

HIS WORKS.

1. ĪŚVARA PRATYABHIJÑĀ KĀRIKĀ.

This was the first work on the Pratyabhijñā system as such.

1. T. A., Ah. II. P. 39.

2. P. T. V., 282.

In fact the system owes the name Pratyabhijñā to this book. Its importance, however, is due to two commentaries of Abhinava, the Vimarśinī and the Vivṛti Vimarśinī.

2. ĪŚVARA PRATYABHIJÑĀ VṚTTI.

It is a brief commentary mostly concerned with clarifying the ideas given in the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Kārikā.

3. ĪŚVARA PRATYABHIJÑĀ ṬĪKĀ.

Unfortunately it seems to be irrecoverably lost. It was a detailed commentary on his Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Kārikā. According to the old way of counting thirty-two syllables of a prose book as one verse, it consisted of six thousand verses. It is to this that Abhinava refers as Ṭīkā in one of his introductory verses to the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī.[1] It is one of the five books of accepted authority on the Pratyabhijñā philosophy, referred to by Mādhava in his summary of the Pratyabhijñā system in his Sarva Darśana Saṅgraha.[2] It was on this that Abhinava wrote his famous commentary, Bṛhatī Vimarśinī. A fragment of it has recently been discovered.

4. STOTRĀVALĪ.

It has a commentary of Kṣemarāja. It is referred to by Madhurāja Yogin in his Śāstra Parāmarśa. He asserts that though there are thousands of Stotras yet none can stand comparison with the Stotrāvalī. It purifies the soul of man as soon as it enters into his ears and leads him to the obode of Śrīkaṇṭha.[3]

5. AJAḌA PRAMĀTṚ SIDDHI.

6. ĪŚVARA SIDDHI.

7. ,, ,, VṚTTI.

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1. I. P. V., I, 3.
2. S. D. S., P. 191
3. S. Pa., Ś. 7–8.

8. SAMBANDHA SIDDHI.

9. " " VṚTTI.

10. VṚTTI ON SOMĀNANDA'S ŚIVADṚṢṬI.

It was written at the request of his own son Vibhramākara and a Brahmacārī Padmānanda by name. That it was Utpaladeva's work is made clear both by an introductory verse and colophon given as an extract from the MS. No. 4178 in Jammu Cat.[1] On this point there is the additional evidence of the Bhāskarī, which not only attributes a commentary on the Śivadṛṣṭi to Utpala but also places it before the Iśvara Pratyabhijñā Kārikā in the chronological order, as the following extract shows :—

> "Śrīmān Utpaladevaḥ svagurunirmitaṁ
> Śivadṛṣṭyākhyam mahāśāstraṁ vyākhyāya
> tatpratibimbakalpaṁ kārikāmayam Īśvara
> Pratyabhijñākhyam mahāśāstram praṇīya."

But the Bhāskarī does not seem to be right in stating that the Vṛtti on the Śiva Dṛṣṭi was written before the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Kārikā; because Utpalācārya himself refers to the Īśvara Pratyabhinjñā Ṭīkā in the Vṛtti as follows :—

> "Etacca sarvam Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Ṭīkāyām nipuṇamālocitam."
> (Ś. Dṛ. (Comm.) 14.)

All these works are very frequently quoted by Abhinava in his works (for illustrations vide Appendix (B).

11. PARAMEŚA STOTRĀVALĪ.

It is noticed by Dr. Bühler in his Kashmir Report MS. No. 458.

(III) LAKṢMAṆAGUPTA.

On the authority of Abhinava, quoted earlier, he was both son and pupil of Utpaladeva. We have already shown

1. Jammu Cat., MS. 4178.

that he was our great writer's teacher in both the Darśanas, the Pratyabhijñā and the Krama. The period of his literary activity must have extended over the close of the second and practically the whole of the third quarter of the 10th century A. D. It is indeed very strange that no work of his has so far been discovered; nor any quotation from or reference to his works even in the writings of Abhinava has so far been found. The only passage where there seems to be a reference to his writing is to be met with in one of the concluding verses of Abhinava's Bṛhatī Vimarśinī[1] or Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vivṛti Vimarśinī. In this he is spoken of as "Śrīśāstrakṛt". We have got no information about the nature of the contents of this book.

THE KRAMA SYSTEM.

Abhinavagupta inherited the tradition of the Krama system not only from Lakṣmaṇagupta, as has been stated just above, but also from Bhūtirāja; and probably from the latter's son, Helārāja, who, being the son of a recognised authority on the Krama system, may himself have been its exponent.

(I) BHŪTIRĀJA.

Bhūtirāja seems to have been a very important Śaiva teacher, at whose feet Abhinavagupta sat to learn not only the dualistic Śaivāgamas but also the Brahma-Vidyā and the Krama Darśana.[2] He is referred to in the Tantrāloka, Ah. I, 28; Ah. IV, 193; Ah. VIII, 265; Ah. XXX, 196; the Tantrasāra, 30; the Mālinīvijaya Vārtika, 1; and the Mahārtha Mañjarī, 127. Abhinavagupta respected him more than even his own father, Cukhulaka.[3] He was looked upon as an incarnation of Śiva.

1. I. P. V. V. Vol., III, 406.
2. T. A. III, 194.
3. M. V. V., 1.

He definitely wrote on the Krama system as is clear from a quotation in Abhinavagupta's Tantrasāra, P. 30.

Śrī-Bhūtirāja-Guravaḥ :—

"Kṣepājjñānācca Kālī kalanavaśatayātha".

This view finds further support from another quotation in similar context in the Mahārtha Mañjarī, P. 127 :—

Bhaṭṭa Śrī Bhūtirājenāpyuktam :—

"Sarva kroḍīkāreṇa sthitatvād devyeva mantraḥ"

In connection with the Bhuvanādhvā also he is distinctly referred[1] to. There was a great controversy among the contemporaries of Jayaratha regarding the subjects the knowledge of which was imparted by Bhūtirāja to Abhinavagupta. But it is agreed that he taught three subjects, because Abhinavagupta himself refers to them. The controversial point is thoroughly discussed by Jayaratha in the course of his commentary on the first half of the verse 173 in Ah. IV of the Tantrāloka. The Brahma-Vidyā, taught by him, was the one that could enable a man in death-bed to attain the unaffected state (Nirañjana) immediately. It consisted of the three sacred syllables Om, Hrīm, Aum[2].

(II) BHŪTIRĀJATANAYA.

It appears that Abhinavagupta sat at the feet of not only Bhūtirāja but at those of his son also, to whom he distinctly refers as one of his teachers. He is recognised to be as important in the line of Śrīnātha as is the sun among the heavenly bodies.[3]

In his commentary on Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīyam, Helārāja regularly refers to himself in the colophon to each section as the son of Bhūtirāja :

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1. T. A., Ah. VIII, 265. 2. T. A., XII, 196

3. T. A., XII, 414.

"Bhūtirājatanaya Helārājakṛte..."

If we accept Bhūtirājatanaya, the teacher of Abhinavagupta, to be identical with the commentator on the Vākyapadīyam, for the reason that Abhinava shows so deep knowledge of the Vākyapadīyam, we can definitely say that he lived in the 10th century A. D. in Kashmir.

More on this subject will be found in the chapter, dealing with the Krama system.

DUALIST ŚAIVA SCHOOL.

Here it will not be out of place to speak a little on the literary activity of the Śaiva dualists, particularly because Abhinava himself frequently refers to them. These writers we divide into two periods, viz., pre-Abhinavagupta and post-Abhinavagupta. And because we are mentioning them only by the way to show the relation of other Śaiva schools with the one under discussion, we shall, therefore, finish with the writers of both the periods right here, without postponing the treatment of the post-Abhinava dualists till we come to the next chapter as in the case of the monists.

AMALGAMATION OF THE DVAITA AND THE DVAITĀDVAITA SCHOOLS.

It appears that while the monistic Śaiva School was doing its work, as described above, the dualistic school was not idle. The probability is that the latter began its work earlier. For, Kṣemarāja, as has already been pointed out, speaks of even the admittedly monistic Tantras, as for instance, the Svacchanda, having been interpreted in the dualistic light: and Abhinavagupta also quotes some dualist writers giving their names.

Our work at present is confined to the monistic school. We have not made enough search for the material to build up the complete history of the dualistic school. The available infor-

mation on this topic is given in the Bhāskarī, Vol. III. It is, therefore, not possible for us to say when and how this school came to Kashmir, who were its earliest writers and what were the circumstances responsible for its rise. We can, however, definitely state that long before Abhinava's time the two Śaiva Schools, namely, the Dvaita and the Dvaitādvaita, had amalgamated and as such had one common name "Siddhānta". Pauṣkara Saṁhitā, for instance, calls the group of twenty-eight Āgamas, consisting of ten Dvaita and eighteen Dvaitādvaita Āgamas, as stated before, by the name of "Siddhānta".[1] Abhinava also uses this very word to refer to the teachings of these twenty-eight Āgamas as a whole,[2] and his commentators refer to the writers of this school as the followers of the Siddhānta[3] (Saiddhāntikas).

THE POSITION OF THIS SCHOOL IN ABHINAVA'S TIME.

In the time of Abhinava the position of this school was already well established. It had produced great writers like Sadyojyoti, Bṛhaspati and Śaṅkaranandana. The leaders of this school had written learned commentaries on the Tantras, not only of the admittedly dualistic school but also on those which were known to belong to the monistic school such as the Svacchanda. They had also written such popular works as the Bhoga Kārikā and the Śiva Tanu Śāstra, which presented the fundamental principles of the school in a very simple and appealing language. In the eyes of Abhinava, however, this school was to be shunned; because it was dominated by ritualism, the observance of which meant much trouble but little religious merit in return; because it could not show the right way to final emancipation and because its principles were not at all in harmony with common experience[4]. It was

1. Mr. T., Introd. 2.
2. T. A., XII, 400.
3. T. A., Comm., VI, 221.
4. T. A., XII, 400-1.

to demolish the theories of this school that he wrote such works as the Bhedavāda Vidāraṇa. In the Tantrāloka, in which he has dealt with almost all the points connected with his monistic school, he has drawn attention to the points of difference between the Siddhānta school and the Trika and has tried his best to refute the theories of the former. This is not the place to illustrate these differences. We, therefore, content ourselves with quoting the following verse of Jayaratha in support of our view :—

"Śaṅkaranandana-Sadyojyoti-Devabala-Kaṇabhugādimatam
Pratyākhyāsyan navamaṁ vyācakhyāvāhnikaṁ Jayarathaḥ."

T. A., Comm., VI, 250.

LAKULĪŚA PĀŚUPATA.

The Siddhānta school, referred to in the preceding paragraph, is not to be confused with another Tāntrika Śaiva school, known as Lakulīśa Pāśupata. The latter follows only the eighteen Tantras of the Dvaitādvaita school, and not the twenty-eight Tantras, as interpreted in the light of the dualistic teaching. According to Abhinava, while the Siddhānta school is simply to be shunned, the Pāśupata school occupies a position next only to his own monistic school as a sure guide on the way to final emancipation. The superiority of the latter lies only in the fact that it is a sure means to the realisation of the worldly desires also.[1]

The available information about the historical position, literature and philosophical principles of this Dvaitādvaita system is given in the Bhāskarī. Vol. III, pp. XXVI–XXXI and CXI–CXLVII.

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1. T. A., XII, 396–7.

DUALIST WRITERS AND THEIR WORKS.

(I) SADYOJYOTI ŚIVA.

He was a dualist Śaiva and was spoken of as Siddhaguru. He was also called Kheṭapāla[1]. As regards his time, we can authoritatively say only this much that he was Abhinava's predecessor. About the place of his birth we have no evidence at present to say any thing at all. His teacher was Ugrajyoti[2].

HIS WORKS.

1. BHOGA KĀRIKĀ.

It deals with Bhoga in accordance with the teaching of the Raurava Tantra. There is a quotation from this in T. A., Comm., VI, 132.

2. MOKṢA KĀRIKĀ.
3. PARAMOKṢA NIRĀSA KĀRIKĀ.
4. TATTVA TRAYA NIRṆAYA.
5. RAURAVA TANTRA VṚTTI.

He considered this Vṛtti to be so important a work of his that he refers to himself as "Vṛttikṛt" (the writer of the Vṛtti).[3] To us it is known only from references to it by his commentator, Aghora Śivācārya.[4]

6. TATTVA SAṄGRAHA.

(II) BṚHASPATI.

He appears to have been accepted to be as great an authority as Sadyojyoti himself, not only from the frequent references to him in the writings of Abhinava (consult Appendix B.) but also from the fact that he is quoted as an authority by the post-Abhinava dualist Śaiva writers such as

1. T. A., Comm., VI, 211.
2. M. K., 63.
3. T. T. N., Comm., 2.
4. T. San., Comm., 52.

Aghora Śivācārya and Bhaṭṭa Rāma Kaṇṭha. The latter in the introduction to his commentary on Sadyojyoti's Mokṣa Kārikā, couples the name of Bṛhaspati with that of Sadyojyoti as follows :—

"Yābhyām prakāśitaṁ vartma siddhānte siddhabhāvataḥ
Gurūṇām api tau vandyau Sadyojyoti-Bṛhaspatī."

1. ŚIVA TANU ŚĀSTRA.

This is the only known work of this writer. The only source of our information about it, is Abhinava's reference to it in the following quotation :—

"Iti nirvacanaiḥ Śivatanuśāstre gurubhiḥ smṛto devaḥ."
T. A., I, 146.

Jayaratha, commenting on this, says :—
"Gurubhiḥ iti Bṛhaspatipādaiḥ."

(III) ŚAṄKARANANDANA.

He also was one of the dualist Śaiva writers whose views Jayaratha controverts, as he himself says in the concluding line of his commentary on the Tantrāloka Āhnika IX. Abhinava also refers to him in his Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī, I, 181.

1. PRAJÑĀLAṄKĀRA.

This is the only known work of Śaṅkaranandana. Our source of information about it, is Abhinava's reference to it in I. P. V., I, 181. From the nature of the context in which the reference occurs, it seems to have been written with the object of exploding the atomic theory of the Naiyāyikas.

(IV) VIDYĀPATI.

Two works of his

1. ANUBHAVA STOTRA T. S., 31.
2. MĀNA STOTRA T. A., Ah. XIV, 9.

are known from Abhinava's references to them, as shown above. He is quoted in Bhaṭṭa Rāma Kaṇṭha's commentary on the Mokṣa Kārikā, P. 21. The evidence in hand is not conclusive to show whether he was a dualist or not. But it is very probable that he was. We have, therefore, given him a place here.

(V) DEVABALA.

Him we know as a dualist writer only from a reference to him made by Jayaratha in T. A., Comm., VI, 250.

ŚAIVA DUALISTS OF THE POST-ABHINAVA PERIOD.

For reasons already stated we briefly deal with the Śaiva dualists of even the post-Abhinava period right here.

(I) KING BHOJADEVA.

Mr. Smith in his Early History of India speaks of two Bhojas (i) Mihira, son of Rāmabhadra, usually known by his title Bhoja (840—90 A. D.) and (ii) Bhojadeva of Dhārā (1018-60 A. D.). Of these only the latter is known to have been a patron of learning and a great writer. He is quoted by Mādhava in the Sarva Darśana Saṅgraha, in his summary of the Śaiva Darśana, and by Vidyāraṇya Yatīndra (Mādhava himself so called when he became a Sanyāsin ?) in his commentary on the Sūta Saṁhitā. He is referred to by Aghora Śivācārya (1158 A. D.) in his Paddhati[1] and is represented to have been a pupil of Uttuṅga Śivācārya or his brother. He is, therefore, probably identical with Bhojadeva of Dhārā. His known Śaivaite work is

1. Tattva Prakāśikā.

1. T. P., Introd., 4.

(II) RĀMA KAṆṬHA.

HIS IDENTITY.

The author, with whom we are dealing here, was different from his namesake, the son of Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇa Kaṇṭha and the author of the Nāda Kārikā. The former was the grand teacher of Nārāyaṇa Kaṇṭha, the father of the latter. This is evident from an introductory verse in the Mṛgendra Vṛtti of Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇa Kaṇṭha which gives the names of the successive teachers as follows :—

1. Rāma Kaṇṭha.
2. Vidyā Kaṇṭha.
3. Nārāyaṇa Kaṇṭha.[1]

HIS DATE.

Aghora Śivācārya, the author of the Dīpikā on the mṛgendra Vṛtti of Nārāyaṇa Kaṇṭha, according to his own statement in his Paddhati, quoted by Śrīkṛṣṇa Śāstrī in his introduction to Aṣṭa Prakaraṇa, finished his Paddhati in the Śāka year 1080 i. e. 1158 A. D. For, according to the orthodox view the Śāka era began 78 years after the commencement of the Christian era. He speaks of Rāmakaṇṭha as one of his teachers.[2] We have already shown that Rāma Kaṇṭha, the author of the Nāda Kārikā on which Aghora Śiva commented, was a different person from the grand teacher of Nārāyaṇa Kaṇṭha of the same name and that the author of the Nāda Kārikā was the son of Nārāyaṇa Kaṇṭha. In the list below the names of the teachers are given in their order of succession with the probable time of their literary activities :—

1.	Rāma Kaṇṭha I	1025-1050
2.	Vidyā Kaṇṭha.	1050-75.
3.	Nārāyaṇa Kaṇṭha.	1075-1100.

1. Mr. T., 456.
2. N. K., 24.

4. Rāma Kaṇṭha II 1100-30.
5. Aghora Śiva. 1130-58.

HIS WORK.

1. SADVṚTTI.

This is the only work of Rāmakaṇṭha I that we know and the source of its knowledge is only a reference to it in the concluding line of the Ratna Traya by his pupil, Śrīkaṇṭha.[1]

(III) ŚRĪKAṆṬHA.

He speaks of himself as a pupil of Rāma Kaṇṭha I in one of the concluding verses of his Ratna Traya.[2] His literary activity, therefore, probably fell between 1050 and 1075 A. D. The only work of this author that we know of is

1. Ratna Traya.

(IV) NĀRĀYAṆA KAṆṬHA.

HIS IDENTITY.

Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇa Kaṇṭha is a different person from Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇa, the author of the Stava Cintāmaṇi, whom Abhinava quotes in the Parātriṁśikā Vivaraṇa, page 69. The former, according to his own statement in the concluding line of his commentary on the Mṛgendra Tantra, was the grandson of Śaṅkara and the son of Vidyākaṇṭha, but the latter, according to the statement of Kṣemarāja in his commentary on Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇa's Stava Cintāmaṇi, was the grandson of Parameśvara and the son of Aparājita[3]. He was the grand teacher of Aghora Śiva. His works, therefore, must have been written in the last quarter of the 11th century A. D.

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1. R. Tr., 107. 2. R. Tr., 107.
3. S. C., Comm., 10.

HIS WORKS.

1. MṚGENDRA VṚTTI.

It is a commentary on the Mṛgendra Tantra.

2. ŚARANNIŚĀ[1]

or

BṚHAṬṬĪKĀ.

This we know only from a reference to it by Aghora Śiva in the introduction to his commentary on the Tattva Saṅgraha of Sadyojyoti.

(V) RĀMA KAṆṬHA (II)

He was the teacher of Aghora Śiva and the son of Nārāyaṇa Kaṇṭha. We can, therefore, safely say that he wrote in the first quarter of the 12th century A. D.

HIS WORKS.

In the colophons of all his works he speaks of himself as the son of Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇa Kaṇṭha. There is, therefore, no room for any difference of opinion on his authorship of the following works, because the question as to whether a particular work was written by one Rāma Kaṇṭha or the other, cannot arise :—

1. NĀDA KĀRIKĀ.
2. VṚTTI ON PARAMOKṢA NIRĀSA KĀRIKĀ.
3. VṚTTI ON MOKṢA KĀRIKĀ.

Works known from references only :—

4. MANTRA VĀRTIKA ṬĪKĀ.

M. K., P. 4.

5. ĀGAMA VIVEKA.

P. M. N. K., P. 49.

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1. T. San., 1.

In the concluding verse of the Nāda Kārikā there is a statement that Rāma Kaṇṭha II belonged to Kashmir. It is, therefore, probable that all the other writers also of the post-Abhinava period of whom we have spoken above, excepting, of course, Bhojadeva, belonged to the same place. The fact that "Kaṇṭha" is a common family name in Kashmir even to day lends additional support to this probability.

(VI) AGHORA ŚIVA (1130-58 A. D.)

We have discussed his date above. He was an inhabitant of Kuṇḍina Kula in Cola.[1] His teacher was Sarvātma Śiva. In the colophon to his commentary on the Tattva Prakāśikā he represents himself to be teacher of two lacs of pupils.

HIS WORKS.

He commented on the following works :—

1. TATTVA PRAKĀŚIKĀ.
2. TATTVA SAṄGRAHA.
3. TATTVA TRAYA NIRṆAYA.
4. RATNA TRAYA.
5. BHOGA KĀRIKĀ.
6. NĀDA KĀRIKĀ.
7. MṚGENDRA VṚTTI.

He wrote the following independent works, but we know them only from his own reference to them in the concluding lines of his commentary on the Ratna Traya in which he calls himself a Kavīśvara[2] :—

8. ĀŚCARYA SĀRA.
9. PĀKHAṆḌĀPAJAPA.
10. BHAKTA PRAKĀŚA.
11. ABHYUDAYA NĀṬAKA.

1. T. T. N., 22.

2. R. Tr. 108.

IDENTITY OF THE SIDDHĀNTA SCHOOL
WITH
THE ŚAIVA DARŚANA OF MĀDHAVA.

Leaving aside the similarity of the philosophical conceptions with which we shall, space permitting, deal in the second part, if we were to compare the authorities of the Siddhānta School, about whom we have spoken in the last few pages, with those quoted by Mādhava in the summary of the Śaiva Darśana in his Sarva Darśana Saṅgraha, we shall have very little doubt left in our minds about the identity of the Siddhānta School with the Śaiva School of Mādhava's S. D. S. The former follows the mixed authority of twenty-eight Tantras, ten of the Śaiva group and eighteen of the Rudra group. The latter also does the same. It quotes as authorities the Mṛgendra Tantra of the first and the Saurabheya and the Kiraṇa Tantras of the second group. We may point out here that the Mṛgendra is a part of the Kāmika Tantra. As regards human authorities, with the exception of only two (i) Bahudaivatya and (ii) Soma Śambhu, which have not so far been accessible to us, all are out of those which have been discussed above. The following are the names of the authors and books quoted as authorities by Mādhava, which are common to the Siddhānta School, described above :—

1. TATTVA SAṄGRAHA.
2. TATTVA PRAKĀŚA OR TATTVA PRAKĀŚIKĀ.
3. BHOJARĀJA.
4. SIDDHA GURU.
5. BṚHASPATI.
6. RĀMA KAṆṬHA.

To show the identity of the two was one of the reasons for our dealing here with the writers of the Siddhānta School of the post-Abhinava period. It is interesting to note that

Mādhava himself uses the word "Siddhānta" when he speaks of the followers of this school as distinguished from those of the other Śaivāgamic Schools.[1]

III. *Historical background of his dramaturgic ideas.*

THE WRITERS ON DRAMATURGY KNOWN TO ABHINAVA AND THEIR HISTORICAL POSITION.

Bharata is admitted by all to be the first known writer on Sanskrit Dramaturgy whose work is available in full. For information on Sadāśiva Bharata etc. please refer to the Indian Æsthetics, Second Edition pp. 4–6. On his Sūtras Abhinava has commented. We can, therefore, give a clear idea of Abhinava's contribution to Sanskrit dramaturgy only if we trace its history from the time of the writer of the original to that of the commentator. But the limited space at our disposal in the present thesis does not permit us to undertake it. We shall, therefore, content ourselves with showing what light a careful study of Abhinava's works throws on some of the important problems.

INTERPOLATION IN BHARATA'S NĀṬYA ŚĀSTRA.

The question of Bharata's Nāṭya Śāstra being a work of many hands is very old. In fact, as we have already pointed out, even before the time of Abhinava, there were some who considered at least those portions, in which Bharata is spoken of as a third person, to have been form the pen of some of his pupils. How in Abhinava's opinion such a view was wrong we have already shown. In recent times two places in the published text of the Nāṭya Śāstra have been pointed out as indicative of its later rehandling and recasting. One is the colophon at the end in the Kāvyamālā edition :—

1. S. D. S., 174.

"Samāptaścāyaṁ (granthaḥ) Nandi–Bharatasaṅgītapustakam"

and the other is a sort of prediction, contained in the last chapter, that the rest of the topics will be treated in detail by Kohala. In addition to this a work on music called "Nandi Bharata" noticed by Rice in his Mysore and Coorg Catalogue and a chapter referred to as "Nandi Bharatokta saṅkara hastādhyāya" from a "work on the art of dancing accompanied by the different kinds of movements of the hand etc." noticed in the Madras Catalogue are mentioned; and it is stated "these works, probably late compilations, refer to Nandi or Nandikeśvara, whom tradition acknowledges as an ancient authority on music and histrionic art." It is further added "This designation of the later part of Bharata's text, a part of which deals, among other things, with music, probably implies that it was compiled and recast at some later period in accordance with the views of Nandikeśvara." Similarly the prediction about the continuation of Bharata's work, referred to above, has been supposed to indicate "that the rewriting of the portion in question was done some time after Kohala as well as Nandikeśvara had spoken on the subject." (H. S. P., P. 24-5.)

It is apparent from what has been stated above that the theory of the later interpolation is based upon the supposition of the later chronological position of Nandi and Kohala, due to the ignorance of the relation of these two accepted authorities to Bharata. Therefore, unless we are able to fix the exact chronological position of these two persons we cannot either accept or reject the theory. Let us, therefore, see what light the text of the Nāṭya Śāstra itself and the commentary of Abhinava thereon throw on this point.

Bharata is very frank in stating that all the information that he gives on gesticulation was got from Taṇḍu :—

"Tato ye Taṇḍunā proktās tvaṅgahārā mahātmanā.
Nānākaraṇasaṁyuktān vyākhyāsyāmi sarecakān."
N. S., Ch. IV, 18-9.

On this there is a very important comment of Abhinavagupta, which explains the identity of Taṇḍu. According to this, Taṇḍu is another name of Nandi as Muni is that of Bharata :—

"Taṇḍu-muniśabdau Nandi-Bharatayoḥ aparanāmanī."
A. Bh., Vol. I,90.

Thus it is clear that Nandi was Bharata's contemporary, perhaps older, or a predecessor, but not his distant successor. If we accept the identity of Nandi with Bharata's teacher or collaborator, Taṇḍu, there remains no difficulty in explaining the colophon at the end of the last chapter of the Bharata Sūtra in the Kāvyamālā edition, "Nandibharata". It may mean Bharata instructed by Nandi.

(Nandyupadiṣṭo Bharataḥ—Nandi-Bharataḥ;
"Śākapārthivādīnāṁ siddhaye uttarapadalopasyopasaṅkhyānam.")

Similarly the colophon of the MS. No. 13009 noticed in the Madras Catalogue, referred to above, can also be easily explained.

KOHALA.

That he is an ancient authority on dramaturgy, nobody doubts. That he wrote some works on that subject is made abundantly clear by Abhinava (consult A. Bh.,Vol.I, PP. 25, 48, 173, 182, 266, 272). Many other later writers also frequently refer to him and quote from his works. That he had established his reputation as an authority on dramaturgy so as to be referred to by Bharata himself is also made clear by Abhinava in the A. Bh. For, according to his statement on

page 266, the 10th verse of the 6th chapter of the Nāṭya Śāstra contains the opinion of Kohala and not that of Bharata on the question of the number of the essential constituents of Nāṭya, because the Nāṭya Śāstra states the views of Kohala also on some important points. Further, at some places, according to Abhinava's interpretation, Bharata rejects the view of Kohala, as for instance, in regard to the nature of Suṣira, as the following comment on Bharata's verse "Suṣiro vaṁśa eva ca" clearly shows :—

"Evakāraḥ Kohalādivyudāsāya"

How can the acceptance of some views of Kohala and rejection of others by Bharata be possible but for their contemporaneity ?

The question is only about his exact position in relation to Bharata, and on this also Abhinava, though indirectly and incidentally, has spoken in terms not easily to be mistaken. Bharata, while speaking on Nāndī in Ch. I., Ś. 56, uses the word "vicitrā" and Abhinava, commenting on this word, says :—

"Ata eva vicitretyuktam..
Ityeṣāpi bhāratīyatvena prasiddhā Kohalapradarśitā
nāndyupapannā bhavati." A. Bh., Vol. I, 25.

Here the word "Bhāratīya" is of very great importance in giving us a clue to the relation, we are trying to find out. This word means "propounded by the son of Bharata". It cannot mean "of Bharata" because according to Pāṇini's rule "Vṛddhācchaḥ" (Pā. 4-2-14.) the affix "Cha" which changes into "īya", cannot be added to a word with a short initial syllable.

"Vṛddhiryasyācāmādis tad vṛddham."

Therefore, the initial has to be prolonged before this affix can rightly be added. But how can it be done unless at first the

affix "Aṇ" expressive of the sense of "offspring" (apatya) ("Tasyāpatyam". Pā. 4-1-92.) be affixed to the word "Bharata"? "Bhāratīya" therefore, literally means "of the son of Bharata." The meaning of the word having been settled the next question that naturally arises is : "Who was this son of Bharata?". To this also Abhinava gives a reply in the same line by saying "Kohalapradarśitā". Thus it is evident that Kohala was Bharata's son, at least this is Abhinava's view. It may be interesting to note in this connection that Kohala is included in the list of the hundred sons of Bharata, enumerated in Bh. Sū., Ch. I, Ś. 26–39.

It may be pointed out here that the word "Bhāratīya", on the interpretation of which our conclusion on the exact relation of Kohala to Bharata is based, occurs also in the colophon of each chapter of the Nāṭya Śāstra :

"Iti Bhāratīye Nāṭya Śāstre"

But there the word has a quite different meaning from that in which it is used in the passage under discussion. For, if we take it to mean the same there as here, against all traditions and authorities we will have to accept Kohala to be the author of the Nāṭya Śāstra. The question, therefore, naturally arises : in what sense is the word used in the colophons ?

The following three interpretations suggest themselves to us, but, we confess, none satisfactorily explains the long "ā" in the initial syllable :—

(I) "Handed down by Bharata." This meaning we get by affixing "cha" to the word "Bharata" ("Tena proktam" 4–3–101) after affixing "aṇ" in svārtha ("Prajñādibhyaśca" 5–4–38).

(II) "Concerning the pupils of Bharata, that is the actors in general." The word yields this sense if we take it to have

been formed from the word "Bharata" according to Pāṇini's Sūtra "Adhikṛtya kṛte granthe" (4-3-87) after affixing "aṇ" in the sense of pupil according to "Kaṇvādibhyo gotre". (4-2-111).

(III) "Beneficial to the actors." To get this meaning we have to form "Bhārata" as in the preceding case, and then affix "cha" in the sense of "beneficial" according to "Tasmai hitam" (5-1-5). This interpretation seems to have the support of Abhinava as the following quotation shows :—

> "Naṭajanasvakapravṛttiviśeṣopadeśaparam, ata eva tadgatasiddhasadupāyopadeśanaparam idaṁ śāstram iti naṭasya tāvannānena kiñcidupadiśyate taṁ pratyupakārād ṛte" A. Bh., Vol. I, 4.

The extracts discussed above can very easily be interpreted by the exponents of the later interpolation theory as supporting their own position. But this is possible only on the presumption of the later date of Kohala, which has yet to be proved to be based upon sound literary evidence. We have, at least, the support of such a great authority as Abhinavagupta for the view maintained here.

Now, taking Abhinava's testimony in this matter to be correct, let us see how this explains the prediction referred to above. It is evident that Bharata wrote his Nāṭya Śāstra when he was very old, because he is spoken of as a Muni. Therefore, it will not be wrong to suppose that at the time when the sage was writing the above work, his son, or younger contemporary, Kohala, was already of sufficiently advanced age and held certain views on some dramaturgic points, which, though different from those of Bharata, were not to be ignored. The latter, therefore, at some places purposely uses expressions, as Abhinava interprets, to indicate the acceptability of Kohala's views, as in the instance discussed above. Taking all these facts into consideration it seems very probable that by the

time the present Bharata Sūtra reached its completion the sage had grown too old and feeble to continue writing on the remaining points of dramaturgy which were of equal importance with those already treated. By this time Kohala also had established his reputation as an authority on dramaturgy and had become quite able to continue the work. Bharata, therefore, entrusted the future work on the subject to his worthy son or contemporary and closed his work with the so-called prediction, on which the present controversy is partly based[1]. Thus the two grounds, on which the conclusion of later interpolation and recasting is based, do not appear to be sound. The third is simply a tradition that the original work of Bharata was in the Sūtra form. It is, therefore, unnecessary to discuss it here.

BHARATA'S DATE.

Both his style and the method of dealing with the subject are apparently Purāṇic, and we know that Purāṇas assumed their final form, roughly speaking, in the fourth century A. D. But, as in the case of Purāṇas so in that of Bharata, whose date we can at present find out only with the help of the style and the language, the upper limit cannot be precisely fixed. The lower limit, however, is not so uncertain. For, we have positive proof of the existence of his Nāṭya Śāstra in the present form in the 6th century A. D., because there is a Vārtika on it of King Harṣa of Kannauj (606–47 A. D.) which is quoted by Abhinava in his commentary on Bharata's Nāṭya Śāstra with the remark "iti Harṣa Vārtikam" (consult A. Bh., Vol. I,PP. 67, 172, 174, 207, 211, 212). Bharata's Nāṭya Śāstra must have, therefore, existed and become of accepted authority long before King Harṣa's time to prompt him to write a Vārtika on it. It may be noted that in the case of Bharata's text, on which Harṣa

1. Bh. Su. ch. 37, ś. 18.

wrote his Vārtika, Abhinava does not point out any difference in reading as he does in the case of that (text of Bharata) on which others have commented, as for instance, on page 226 of A. Bh., Vol. I. The intervening period between Bharata and Harṣa, therefore, does not seem to have been very long. Nor was it very short, because the necessity for a sort of commentary, Vārtika, had arisen. It will, therefore, not be wrong to suppose that Bharata lived sometime between the 4th and the 5th century A. D. There is, however, no denying the fact that oral traditions about dramaturgy, which are embodied by Bharata, were current from much earlier time than the 4th century or that there were works on dramaturgy, such as the Ādi Bharata etc., already in existence when Bharata wrote the present Nāṭya Śāstra.

BHARATA'S COMMENTATORS AND WRITERS ON SUBJECTS ALLIED TO DRAMATURGY REFERRED TO BY ABHINAVA.

(I) TUMBURU.

Tumburu was an authority on dance-movement. He is quoted and referred to by Abhinava. He seems to be earlier than Bharata; for, according to Abhinava, Bharata agrees with Tumburu in holding that Recakas are aspects of Karaṇas and Aṅgahāras.[1]

(II) DATTILĀCĀRYA.

From the nature of the context in which he is referred to as well as from a quotation in A. Bh., Vol. I, P. 205, he appears to have been an old authority on Tāla, because he is spoken of as 'Ācārya' by Abhinava as also because his name is mentioned in the list of hundred sons of Bharata. (We do not attach more than due importance to the latter argument.)

1. A. Bh., Vol. I. 165.

He was a contemporary of Bharata, as has been shown in the second edition of the Indian Æsthetics P. 538.

(III) RĀHULA.

There are two quotations attributed to him in the A. Bh., Vol. I, PP. 115, 172. They show that he wrote on dramaturgy in general. For, the first concerns dancing and the second the way in which a female character should address her loving husband or friend. He acknowledges the authority of Bharata even in one of these quotations[1].

He was an eminent teacher of Buddhism. He admitted many more graces (Alaṅkāra) of women than mentioned by Bharata. Abhinava asserts that these additional graces are not in consonance with the view of Bharata.[2]

(IV) RAGHUNĀTHA.

Raghunātha is an authority on music. He is referred to in connection with the four types of song, to be introduced in the presentation of the preliminaries of a drama, such as Māgadhī etc. He is said to have defined them in terms of musical technique[3], Tāla etc. Other authorities on music are discussed in the second edition of the Indian Æsthetics in Ch. XI 'Art of Music'.

(V) ADHVAHĀRA.

Adhvahāra was an author of a work on dramaturgy. For, a quotation from his work is given in the course of discussion on the language that Śakāra uses. According to him, Śakāra is a low type of person, placed in high position. The language that befits him is not any type of Prākṛta, but an Apabhraṁśa

1. A. Bh., Vol. I, 172. 2. A. Bh., Vol. III, 164.

3. A. Bh., Vol. I, 255.

which abounds in the use of palatal sibilant 'Ś'. Abhinavagupta agrees with this view and quotes two verses of his own, but points out that a great poet Bhīma, in his drama 'Pratijñā Cāṇakya' has frequently referred to King Vindhyaketu as Śakāra[1].

(VI) JAYADEVA (PRE-ABHINAVA).

Jayadeva, referred to by Abhinava[2] in chapter 14th, dealing with metre, is an authority on metre. A line from his work Chapter I is quoted in the Abhinava Bhāratī, in which he summarily presents the idea of Bharata's verses 83rd and the following. It may be pointed out here that the reading of the verse 83 as quoted in the commentary is slightly different from that of the printed text. But the former seems to be a scribal mistake. For, 'Sarveṣāṁ vṛttānām' instead of 'Sarveṣāṁ chandasām" is metrically defective reading.

This Jayadeva is very different from his namesake, the author of the Gītagovinda, who was one of the five jewels, which adorned the court of King Lakṣmaṇagupta of Bengal (1175–1200 A. D.). The only thing that can be said at present about Jayadeva, under reference, is that he was a predecessor of Abhinavagupta and, therefore, belonged to a period earlier than the second half of the 10th century A. D.

(VII) BHAṬṬA ŚAṄKARA (PRE–ABHINAVA).

Bhaṭṭa Śaṅkara seems to have been an authority on metre and acting. Commenting on Bharata's conception of the parts of the classical metrical composition, Abhinavagupta interprets Bharata to mean that in every fourth part the subsidiary sense should be complete and the concluding word should not be such as partly belongs to one Pāda and partly to another; and instructs the actors to pause and recite so as

1. A. Bh., Vol. II, 161. 2. A. Bh., Vol. II, 244.

to give a clear idea of the break, both in meaning and metre. This view he says is in consonance with that of Bhaṭṭa Śaṅkara[1] and quotes from his work the following :—

"Kvacidupāntyo vā"

He was a very great devotee of Śiva and wrote a work on music extending over many chapters, in one of which he dealt with the basic types of Dhruvā. The reference runs as follows :—

Yathā Śrī Śaṅkara bhaktiśālinā Bhaṭṭa Śaṅkareṇa Arthasamavṛtta prakaraṇe pradarśitam. A. Bh., (MS.) Ch. XXXI, V. 327-8

(VIII) BHAṬṬA YANTRA.

He seems to have written a commentary on the Bharata Sūtra, because a quotation is given apparently from his commentary to state his opinion on the meaning of the word "evam" which constitutes a part of Bharata's verse 331, ch, IV, as Abhinava clearly states :—

"Etacca svamatānusāreṇa "evam" śabdārthamāhuḥ."

A. Bh., Vol. I,208.

(IX) KĪRTIDHARĀCĀRYA.

He is spoken of as vyākhyātā along with the known commentators of Bharata and his opinion also is quoted on the meaning of the same word "evam" as pointed out above. He also, therefore, seems to have commented upon the Bharata Sūtra.

It may be pointed out here that Dr. De, in his history of Sanskrit poetics, represents this Kīrtidharācārya to have been Abhinava's successor, probably because in the quotation that

1. A. Bh., Vol. II, 245.

he gives in the foot-note on page 27, H. S. P., Kīrtidhara is mentioned after Abhinava. But, in view of the fact that he is quoted by Abhinava himself, as shown above, Dr. De's opinion, we think, requires revision.

(X) NĀNYADEVA.

He was the writer of a commentary on the Bharata Sūtra, called Bharata Bhāṣya. He is quoted by Abhinava in A. Bh., Vol. I, 255.

HIS TIME.

Nānyadeva is a familiar name to indologists. Four eminent scholars have written on him. Professor Sylvain Lévi was the first to deal with the question of Nānya's date in Le Népāl, Vol. II. According to him, Nānyadeva's accession fell in 1097 A. D. This date, according to Dr. R. C. Majumdar, because it is "confirmed by a memorial verse preserved in Vidyāpati's Puruṣaparīkṣā and corroborated by a MS. written in 1097 in the reign of king Nānyadeva" (I. H. Q,, Vol. VII, P. 680) may be regarded as finally settled. According to Mr. Jayaswal, however, the year of accession was 1093 A. D. and that of death 1133 A. D.

All these scholars, for some reason or the other, allow Nānyadeva a reign of about fifty years. This Nānyadeva, who is supposed to have lived from sometime in the later half of the 11th century to 1133 or 1147 A. D., we would have altogether ignored, but for the article of Mr. Ramakrishna Kavi in the Quarterly Journal of the Andhra Historical Research Society, October, 1926, P. 55-63, in which he gives an account of Nānya's commentary on Bharata's Nāṭya Śāstra (chs. XXVII to XXXIV, dealing with music).

The available portion of the commentary gives the following details about the identity of the author :—

1. Mahāsāmantādhipati-dharmāvaloka-Śrīmān Nānyapati.
2. Mithileśvara.
3. Karṇāṭakulabhūṣaṇa.
4. Dharmādhārabhūpati.
5. Rājanārāyaṇa.
6. Nṛpamalla.
7. Mohanamurāri.
8. Pratyagravāṇīpati.
9. Extinguisher of the fame of the king of Mālava.
10. Conqueror of the heroes of Sauvīra.
11. Breaker of the powers of Vaṅga and Gauḍa.

Dr. Majumdar has tried to explain some of the above attributes as referring to Nānyadeva of the 11th and the 12th centuries A. D. According to him naturally, therefore, the commentator of the Nāṭya Śāstra is identical with the king of Mithilā who reigned from 1097 to 1147. A. D.

Our careful study of Abhinava presents the following difficulty in accepting the said identification :—

Abhinavagupta, in his commentary on Bharata's Nāṭya Śāstra, refers to Nānyadeva and quotes from his Bharatabhāṣya, a commentary on the Nāṭya Śāstra, as follows :—

"Uktaṁ Nānyadevena sva-Bharatabhāṣye :—

> 'Atra varṇaśabdena gītirabhidhīyate nākṣaraviśeṣaḥ, nāpi ṣaḍjādisaptasvarāḥ padagrāme tvaniyamādeva svecchayā prayujyante, ṣaḍjādisvarāntānām apyaviśeṣeṇa vāvarohādidharmāṇam pratyeva samupalambhate. Ato varṇa eva gītirityavasthitam, sopi caturdhā māgadhyādiḥ." A. Bh., Vol. I, 255.

But, on the evidence of the dates of composition of three of his important works, (vide ch. I) given by himself, Abhinava is known to have lived from about the middle of the 10th

century A. D. to about the close of the first quarter of the 11th century. Further, on the solid ground of the references to the earlier works in the later, his writings are separately assigned to the following three periods :—

1. Tāntrika.
2. Ālaṅkārika.
3. Philosophical.

The date of completion of the biggest philosophical work of Abhinava, so far known, namely, the Pratyabhijñā Vivṛti Vimarśinī, is definitely known to be 1014-15 A. D. The time of writing of the Abhinava Bhāratī, therefore, can safely be stated to be the beginning of the 11th century A. D. Nānya-deva, therefore, in order to explain his being quoted by Abhinava in the beginning of the 11th century A. D., has to be supposed to be an older contemporary, if not a predecessor, of Abhinava. In any case, it has got to be admitted that Nānyadeva finished his commentary on Bharata's Nāṭya Śāstra before the close of the 10th century A. D. He has therefore, to be supposed to have been thirty to forty years of age at that time. For, it would not be reasonable to suppose that he finished such a work in his teens or early twenties. Under the circumstances, in our opinion, it would not be wrong to say that he was born early in the later half of the 10th century A. D.

Now, Nānyadeva, king of Mithilā, is represented to have ascended the throne in 1097 A. D. and to have ruled for about fifty years. If we accept the conclusions of the scholars, who have specialized in the history of Nānya's time, the following questions will naturally arise :—

1. Did Nānyadeva come to the throne when he was about one hundred and thirty years of age ?

2. Did he live for about two hundred years and continue

ruling till the very end of his life ? For, such a supposition alone can explain his reign from 1097 to 1147 A. D.

3. If not, how then can the identity of the commentator Nānyadeva, quoted by Abhinava in the beginning of the 11th century, with a king of Mithilā of the same name but belonging to the 12th century A. D. be accepted ?

The only alternative that seems to be plausible, is to admit that king Nānyadeva, who, according to Dr. Majumdar, played an important part in north Indian politics in the first half of the 12th century A. D., was king of Mithilā and commented on Bharata's Nāṭya Śāstra, is different from Nānyadeva, who is quoted by Abhinava and, therefore, must belong to a period earlier than the close of the 10th century A. D.

THE COMMENTATORS WHOSE DATE CAN BE FIXED.

(XI) BHAṬṬA MĀTṚGUPTA (5TH CENTURY A D.).

Bhaṭṭa Mātṛgupta is associated with Bhartṛmeṇṭha and Kālidāsa, as is clear from the references cited by Prof. F. W. Thomas in his introduction to the Kavīndra-Vacana Samuccaya (PP. 105–6).

He is said to have been Pravarasena's predecessor on the throne of Kashmir. If we identify him with our author his date would come to be the 5th century A. D. For, Pravarasena is admitted to have ruled in that century by some but in the 6th century by Prof. Stein in his Translation of the Rāja Taraṅgiṇī. He is said to have patronised Meṇṭha, whose Hayagrīva Vadha won for him the royal favour.

He is quoted by Kṣemendra in his Auchitya Vicāra Carcā (Ch. 22). He commented on the Nāṭya Śāstra as is clear from the following facts :—

Rāhula Bhaṭṭa referring to Bharata's text on Ārambha and Vindu supports the view of Mātṛgupta on it. Sundara Miśra

in his Nāṭya Pradīpa, composed in 1613 A. D., speaks of Mātṛgupta as the writer of a Vyākhyāna on the Nāṭya Śāstra.

He is referred to by Śārṅgadeva in the introductory verses to his Saṅgīta Ratnākara as one of the authorities on which his work is based.[1]

Abhinavagupta, commenting on the Nāṭya Śāstra Ch. XXIX, V. 92., which deals with one of the ways of producing musical sound from a stringed instrument, quotes the view of Mātṛgupta as follows :—

Yathoktaṁ Bhaṭṭa Mātṛguptena
"Puṣpañca janayatyeko bhūyonusparśanānvitaḥ".

(XII) ŚRĪ HARṢA, THE AUTHOR OF THE HARṢA VĀRTIKA.

Harṣa, very often referred to as Śrī Harṣa, king of Kānyakubja (606–647 A. D.), in whose court lived Bhaṭṭa Bāṇa, is a well known landmark in the history of Sanskrit literature. His dramas, Nāgānanda, Priyadarśikā and Ratnāvalī, are recognised master-pieces and are frequently referred to by Abhinavagupta. His Harṣa Vārtika seems to be one of the earliest commentaries on the Nāṭyaśāstra. His deep knowledge of music and adherence to the technique of Bharata are reflected in his drama, the Nāgānanda, in such verses as "Vyaktirvyañjanadhātunā", as pointed out by Abhinava[2]. He recognised the distinction between Nāṭya and Nṛtta[3], though, following the text of Bharata, prima facie he admitted the identity of the two[4] in his Vārtika. He dissolved the compound Pūrvaraṅga as Pūrvaścāsau raṅgaḥ and admitted the 'preliminaries' (Pūrvaraṅga) to mean "Tauryatrika", a combination of dance, song and music. Abhinavagupta differs from him, dissolves the compound as Pūrvaḥ raṅge and holds that Pūrvaraṅga consists in the

1. S. R., Vol. I, (An) 6.
2. A. Bh., (MS.) Ch. 29., V. 101.
3. A. Bh., Vol. I, 207.
4. A. Bh., Vol. I, 172 and 174.

employment of dance, song and music separately or together.[1] He, it appears, altered the text of Bharata "Nepathyabhūmau mitrastu" as "Mitrantu" and interpreted it to imply that in the tiring room attendant should be eunuch so that the female characters may not feel shy. But Abhinavagupta points out that it is a thoughtless alteration and interpretation; asserts that the word 'Mitra' is used in the masculine gender when it stands for the sun and that in the present context it is used in this sense and implies that care should be taken for proper ventilation in the tiring room; and suggests that its additional implication is that the gems, used in decorating the actors and actresses, should be bright like the sun.[2]

Thus, it becomes abundantly clear that Harṣa wrote his Vārtika on the Nāṭya Śāstra, which was available to Abhinavagupta, and that on many points Abhinavagupta differed from Harṣa.

Abhinavagupta gives a very important quotation from Śrī Harṣa's work, probably from his Harṣa Vārtika, because it occurs in the context of the introductory scene (Prastāvanā). Here Abhinavagupta, propounding the view that Prastāvanā is of two types (i) an aspect of the preliminaries (Pūrvaraṅgāṅgabhūtā) (ii) otherwise. In the former case the poet remains indifferent to it, that is, he writes nothing about it. In the latter case, he writes what is to be spoken. And in support of his view he quotes Śrī Harṣa, who, he holds, admitted the two types of Prastāvanā, as follows :—

"Yadāha Śrī Harṣaḥ--Ata eva Hā (Bhā ?·) so nāma (Kaviḥ) kasmiṁścinnāṭake.

Divaṁ yātaścittajvareṇa kalirita evābhivartate. Aśakyamasya puratovasthātum. ityādi" (A. Bh., Vol. I. 251-2.)

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1. A. Bh., Vol. I,

2. Ibid.,211. 31.

This passage is important, not only because it incorporates a view of Harṣa but also because it seems to refer to Bhāsa and to contain a quotation from one of his dramas. It may, however, be pointed out that here the text of the Abhinava Bhāratī is corrupt. The MS. has 'Hāsa'. 'Bhāsa' is the reading suggested by the editor, who surprisingly enough states the name of the drama, from which the quotation is given, to be 'Nala Vikrama', which is referred to by Śāradātanaya in his Bhāva Prakāśa, but which is not one of the thirteen dramas, attributed to Bhāsa.

(XIII) UDBHAṬA.

The followers of Udbhaṭa (Audbhaṭas) are represented to hold that the 11th verse of the sixth chapter of the Bharata Sūtra states that, according to Kohala, Nāṭya Saṅgraha consists of eleven parts. Does this mean that he also wrote a commentary on the Bharata Sūtra? In any case, it is apparent that he interpreted Bharata's text in a way which considerably differed from other interpretations of the same and that these differences, though they may have been simply matters of oral tradition, were so many and had been accepted by so many that those who followed his interpretation were called Audbhaṭas.

HIS DATE.

There is no controversy about his date. He is taken to be identical with Bhaṭṭa Udbhaṭa, whom Kalhaṇa in his Rājataraṅgiṇī, Ch. IV, 495, represents as the Sabhāpati of King Jayāpīḍa of Kashmir (779-813 A. D.). He is very well known for his works on Alaṅkāra e. g. Kāvyālaṅkārasārasaṅgraha.

(XIV) BHAṬṬA LOLLAṬA.

That he commented upon the Bharata Sūtra is clear not so much from his opinion on Rasa, quoted by Abhinava, as from the quotation which points out the difference of his interpre-

tation of the word "evam" in Bh. Sū. Ch. IV, Ś. 331, from those of Bhaṭṭa Yantra and Kīrtidharācārya.

HIS DATE.

From the manner in which reference has been made to his theory of Rasa by Abhinava in his A. Bh., Vol. I, p. 274, there remains little doubt about the fact that he was Śrīśaṅkuka's older contemporary. Not only is his exposition of Rasa given first of all but his view also is represented to be in common with that of the ancients (Cirantanas), such as Daṇḍin. Further, Śrīśaṅkuka is represented to be his first opponent; and the word 'etanna', with which the statement of the opponent's view begins, shows that the latter was Lollaṭa's contemporary. We know that the word "etat" in Sanskrit stands for what is present before; in fact this is the only difference in idea conveyed by this word as distinguished from "tat". The time of Śaṅkuka is accepted to be the middle of the 9th century A. D., because he is taken to be identical with the poet. Śaṅkuka, who, according to Kalhaṇa's statement, (R. T., Ch. IV, 705) was King Ajitāpīḍa's contemporary (circa 850) and had written a poem, called Bhuvanābhyudaya. The view that Lollaṭa was a contemporary of Śrīśaṅkuka is supported by the following fact :—

Kṣemarāja, who was a pupil of Abhinava, refers in his Spanda Nirṇaya to Lollaṭa's commentary, called Vivṛti, on Bhaṭṭa Kallaṭa's Spanda Kārikā in the following words :—

"Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭenāpi 'tadādyanta' iti evameva vyākhyāyi sva Vivṛtau" S. N., 34.

Bhaṭṭa Kallaṭa, as has already been stated, is referred to as a Siddha and, therefore, must have been a very old man in the time of King Avanti Varman (856 A. D.). He, therefore, must have written his Spanda Kārikā or rather given publicity to Vasugupta's posthumous work so called, as we have explained

before, some time in the middle of the second quarter of the 9th century ; and Lollaṭa, his younger contemporary, commented upon the same towards the end of the same quarter of that century. It is probable that Lollaṭa also like Kallaṭa was Vasugupta's pupil. The fact that Lollaṭa wrote some philosophical works also is further supported by Abhinava's referring to him as a writer of a philosophical work in the Mālinī Vijaya Vārtika Ch. I, Ś. 777-8.

"Evamīśvarasāpekṣānumānaikapramāṇatā
Nirṇitā Lollaṭākhyena guruṇā lokasammatā".

Thus it is evident that Bhaṭṭa Kallaṭa, Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa and Śrīśaṅkuka were contemporaries and that the first was the oldest and the last the youngest of them. It will, therefore, not be wrong to say that Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa lived in the second and the third quarters of the 9th century A. D.

(XV) ŚRĪŚAṄKUKA.

From frequent references to and criticism of Śrīśaṅkuka's interpretation of the Bharata Sūtra by Abhinava in his commentary (Vol. I, pp. 67, 75, 104) as also from the fact that he points out differences between his original of the Bharata Sūtra and that of Śrīśaṅkuka, (A. Bh.. Vol. I, 216, 217) it is apparent that the latter also commented upon the Bharata Sūtra. That he belonged to Kashmir and was a contemporary of king Ajitāpīḍa (850) we have already stated in the foregoing pages.

(XVI) BHAṬṬA GOPĀLA (9th CENTURY A. D.)

Bhaṭṭa Gopāla seems to be not a very distant predecessor of Abhinavagupta. He is recognised to be an authority on music particularly on rhythm (Tāla). His name is coupled with that of Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa[1] and a work, called Tāla Dīpikā,

1. A. Bh., Vol. II, 134.

is mentioned, wherein the employment of rhythm in the musical composition, technically called Dhruvā as admitted by earlier authorities, is said to have been criticised at length. As Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa is a recognised author of a commentary on the Nāṭya Śāstra in which he may have expressed his views on matters connected with music, the Tāla Dīpikā seems to be a work of Bhaṭṭa Gopāla. And because his name is mentioned after that of Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa, he may have been Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa's successor.

He is referred to at two places in the course of commentary (i) on chapter XII verse 13 where the way, in which an actor should move into the stage from behind the curtain, in accordance with the time unit, rhythm and tempo of music that is going on behind the scene, is pointed out (ii) on chapter XXXI verse 510 where Bhaṭṭa Gopāla is said to have differed from others in the interpretation of the compound 'Yathāmārgakalopeta'.[1] Therefore, he also seems to have commented on Bharata's Nāṭya Śāstra, though he may have done so on some parts only of it.

(XVII) GHAṆṬAKA (9th CENTURY A. D.)

Ghaṇṭaka seems to have been an authority on dramaturgy. May be that he also commented on the Nāṭya Śāstra or on the chapter, dealing with different types of drama, where the reference occurs, or may have written an independent work on dramaturgy. If we admit that Abhinavagupta mentions successive authorities in historical order, then Ghaṇṭaka may be said to have come after Śrīśaṅkuka. For, his view is mentioned after those of Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa and Śrīśaṅkuka. The view that Ghaṇṭaka was immediate predecessor of Abhinavagupta seems to find support in the fact that his conception of sixteen types of Nāṭikā is an improvement on that of Śrīśaṅ-

1. A. Bh., (MS) Ch. 31, V. 510.

kuka who admitted it to be of eight types only after criticising the view of Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa who held it to be of six types.[1]

(XVIII) BHAṬṬA NĀYAKA.

Did he comment on Bharata's Nāṭya Śāstra ? Dr. De answers this question in the following words in his History of Sanskrit Pœtics :—

"No doubt, Abhinava in his own commentary on Bharata, as well as numerous other later writers taking their cue from Abhinava, criticise at some length Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's theory of Rasa, along with those of Lollaṭa and Śaṅkuka, and with special reference to Bharata's particular Sūtra on the subject : yet Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka is nowhere mentioned directly as a commentator on the same text."

The following few lines contain our opinion on the subject with the available data on which it is based :—

Abhinava in his commentary on the very first verse of Bharata, while discussing the meaning of the last part of the same "Brahmaṇā yadudāhṛtam" quotes the following passage from the Sahṛdaya Darpaṇa :—

"(Bhaṭṭa Nāyakastu) Brahmaṇā paramātmanā yadudāhṛtam avidyāviracitaṁ nissārabhedagrahe yadudāharaṇīkṛtam tannāṭyaṁ tad vakṣyāmi : yathā hi kalpanāmātrasāraṁ tata evānavasthitaikarūpaṁ kṣaṇena kalpanāśata.............. lokottaraparamapuruṣārthasūcanena śāntarasopakṣepoyam bhaviṣyati :—"svaṁ svaṁ nimittam ādāya śāntādutpadyate rasaḥ" iti tadanena pāramārthikam prayojanam uktam (iti vyākhyāṁ sahṛdayadarpaṇe paryagrahīt)".

The portions within brackets, at the beginning and in the end, are Abhinava's own remarks. This makes the following three points clear :—

1. A. Bh., Vol. II, 436.

(1) Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka wrote a work called Sahṛdaya Darpaṇa.

(2) That work dealt with the text of Bharata's Nāṭya Sāstra.

(3) At many places it interpreted the Bharata Sūtra in a way which differed from that of the other commentators.

EXPLANATION OF THE REMARK OF MAHIMA BHAṬṬA'S COMMENTATOR.

Here one question may very pertinently be asked. If Sahṛdaya Darpaṇa is Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's commentary on the Bharata Sūtra what about the remark of "Mahima Bhaṭṭa's commentator", who in the words of Dr. De "tells us that this Hṛdaya Darpaṇa, like the Vyakti Viveka, was composed with the special object of demolishing the Dhvani theory, formulated by Ānanda Vardhana"? The answer is simple and we propose to give it by putting another question "Is there any difference between "Hṛdaya" and "Sahṛdaya"? If the reply be "Yes" we would request the reader to see if there is not the same difference between the titles of the works referred to by Abhinava and Mahima Bhaṭṭa's commentator in their respective commentaries. One is Hṛdaya Darpaṇa and the other is Sahṛdaya Darpaṇa. The former is concerned with the demolition of the Dhvani theory of Ānanda Vardhana and the latter with the interpretation of Bharata's text. This conclusion is based upon the wording of the text, quoted above in full, and the quotation :—

"Darpaṇaḥ......................Hṛdayadarpaṇākhyo dhvani dhvaṁsa granthaḥ."

given by Dr. De in his H. S. P., in a foot-note on page 40.

HIS DATE.

From what has been stated above it is clear that he lived

some time after Ānanda Vardhana, a contemporary of King Avanti Varman, 856–883, (R. T., Ch. V, 34,) and a little before Abhinava (Second half of the 10th and the beginning of the 11th century A. D.). Therefore, probably it will not be wrong to identify him with Nāyaka whom Kalhaṇa represents as King Śaṅkara Varman's contemporary, 883-902 A. D., (R. T., Ch. V, Ś. 159.).

EXPONENTS AND OPPONENTS OF THE THEORY OF DHVANI.

The men of letters, of whom we have to speak here, can, according to Ānanda Vardhana, the first known exponent of the theory of Dhvani, be divided into three classes : (I) the supporters of the theory ; (II) its opponents ; and (III) those who considered it to be identical with Lakṣaṇā.[1] Among those of the first class are included also those, who believed that there was something like Dhvani, though they could not properly define it. Before the writer of the Dhvani Kārikā, there was no book presenting the views of either the exponents or the opponents.[2] This, however, does not mean that the earlier thinkers of Sanskrit poetics had no idea of Dhvani. The fact, on the contrary, is that the theory was well formulated and had its opponents too, long before the time of the Kārikā, but all that was simply a matter of oral tradition handed down from generation to generation.[3] The thinkers of the third school, in marked contrast with the above two, more or less, recorded their views in the books, which we still possess. To this class belong such early writers on poetics as Bhaṭṭa Udbhaṭa and Vāmana.[4] The view of the school of opponents also had begun to be systematised before Ānanda Vardhana

1. Dh. L., 3.
2. Dh. L., 3.
3. Dh. L., 3.
4. Dh. L., 10.

wrote his work, as is apparent from a quotation attributed to a poet, Manoratha, who, according to Abhinava, was Ānanda Vardhana's contemporary.[1] But it appears from Abhinava's wording that only stray verses were written by one writer here and another there, and that there was no book presenting the opponents' views systematically: for, he seems to have purposely used the word "Śloka". It was only after Ānanda Vardhana's learned exposition of Dhvani in his Dhvanyāloka, that there appeared two books of the opponents' school, one from the pen of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, whom Abhinava so much criticises, and the other from that of Mahima Bhaṭṭa, who was probably Abhinava's successor or younger contemporary.

WHO WAS THE AUTHOR OF THE DHVANI KĀRIKĀ ?

But before we begin speaking on these writers in their chronological order, let us take up the much disputed question of the authorship of the Dhvani Kārikā, and see what light a careful study of Abhinava's Locana throws on it. There is no doubt, as was first pointed out by Dr. Bühler, that Abhinava uses the two words "Kārikākāra" and "Vṛttikāra" with a distinction. There is also no doubt that Abhinava means two different works by "Vṛttigrantha" and "Kārikā". But let us state here that he does not oppose them, if by the word "oppose" the idea meant to be conveyed is that one contradicts the view of the other. But we have complete agreement if it is meant to denote that the contents of the works, referred to by the words "Kārikā" and "Vṛtti" which form component parts of "Kārikākāra" and "Vṛttikāra", differ in certain respects, i. e. certain points are dealt with in greater detail in the latter than in the former and certain others are given exhaustive treatment in the latter, which, though very closely connected with the subject-matter of the former, have not very clearly

1. Dh. L., 8.

been touched upon in it. That there is nothing like contradiction between the two is made clear by those very three instances which are stated in the History of Sanskrit Poetics (P. 107-8) and on two of which the learned author himself speaks a little later in the following words :—

"In one place, for instance (P. 123) Abhinavagupta clearly points out that the classification of Dhvani according to Vastu, Alaṅkāra, and Rasādi is not expressedly taught in any Kārikā; while at another place in Ch. IV Abhinavagupta states that the question as to the source of the endless variety of Artha in poetry is mentioned by the Vṛttikāra but not touched upon by the Kārikākāra."

But we do not agree with Dr. Jacobi and Dr. De who, "relying on Abhinavagupta's testimony put forward the suggestion that Dhvanikāra, the supposed author of the Kārikā, was a different and older writer, who should be distinguished from Ānanda Vardhana, the author of the Vṛtti.' The arguments of the scholars who hold that the Kārikā and the Vṛtti are of different authorship may be briefly stated as follows :—

1. There is difference in respect of the points dealt with in the Kārikā and the Vṛtti.
2. The ideas of the Kārikā are expanded, revised and modified in the Vṛtti.
3. A sufficiently long time must elapse before the need for a commentary is felt.
4. Abhinavagupta uses the two words "Kārikākāra" and "Vṛttikāra" and means two distinct authors thereby.

We have already stated in the preceding paragraph that whatever be the number of the points dealt with in the Vṛtti, in addition to those expressedly stated in the Kārikā, none of

the former contradicts any one of the latter; and here we might add that though there is considerable expansion, revision and modification of the views of the Kārikā in the Vṛtti, yet all that is of the nature of an addition to clear the ideas of the former: for, that is the one purpose that the commentary is intended to serve.

Having thus disposed of the first two points, stated above, we take up the third. It is not always that a commentary is written only after the lapse of sufficiently long time. It may have been so, long before or after the time of Ānanda Vardhana, but was not certainly so in or about his time, as the history of Sanskrit Literature, particularly of that part of India to which Ānanda Vardhana himself belonged, shows. We know on the accepted authority of Kalhaṇa on this particular point that Ānanda Vardhana was King Avanti Varman's contemporary (856–883 A. D.) and that Kallaṭa also lived at the same time. We also know that Vasugupta, the author of the Śiva Sūtra, was a teacher of Kallaṭa and that the latter wrote a commentary on the Spanda Kārikā, called "Spanda Sarvasva". Although there is difference of opinion as regards the authorship of the Spanda Kārikā which in itself is a sort of running commentary on the Śiva Sūtra, yet, whethere the authorship of the Spanda Kārikā be attributed to Vasugupta or to Kallaṭa, our position is not affected. What we intend to show here is that in or about the 9th century A. D. in Kashmir there are instances of the same person, writing both the text and the commentary. So that if we take Vasugupta to be the author of the Spanda Kārikā, then, it is his own commentary on his own Śiva Sūtra; but if Kallaṭa be accepted to be the author, then, he also has written a commentary on it, called Spanda Sarvasva, as pointed out above. This is not a solitary instance; about the same time Somānanda also is said to have written a commentary upon his

own Śivadṛṣṭi, though we have not so far been able to discover it; and, in the next generation Utpalācārya wrote the Vṛtti and the Vivṛti on his own Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Kārikā to which Abhinava makes a reference in one of the introductory verses in his Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī.[1] Thus the third argument also does not appear to be very sound.

As regards the fourth argument that Abhinava uses two words, Kārikākāra and Vṛttikāra, and means to imply distinction, we may point out that this also does not necessarily mean difference in point of the authorship of the works so referred to. Our study of Abhinava's works tells us that it is his practice to refer to the same person as the writer of one work or another, if he has written more than one work, according as he refers to him in one capacity or another. Leaving aside other instances, if we take up that of Utpalācārya himself, we find that he is referred to both as Vṛttikāra and Ṭīkākāra in one passage. On reading it a person, not knowing the truth, is likely to fall into the error of thinking that there are two different writers, referred to by these two words. The passage in question occurs in Abhinava's commentary, called Vimarśinī, on the first verse of Utpalācārya's Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Kārikā or Sūtra. It runs as follows :—

> "Iyati vyākhyāne vṛttikṛtā bharo na kṛtaḥ tātparyavyākhyānāt yaduktam :—
>
> 'Saṁvṛtasautranirdeśavivṛtimātravyāpārāyām' iti :
>
> Ṭīkākāreṇāpi vṛttimātraṁ vyākhyātum udyatena nedaṁ spṛṣṭam." I. P. V., I, 22-3.

We have stated above that Utpalācārya himself was the writer of both the Vṛtti and the Ṭīkā and have also given a quotation in support of our statement.

1. I. P. V., I, 3.

Here it may be asked "Is there any justification to suppose that the use of the two words "Kārikākāra" and "Vṛttikāra" by Abhinava in his Locana is of the same kind as that of Vṛttikāra and Ṭīkākāra in the Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī ?" To answer this question we state the following few facts, gathered from the three works, the Kārikā, the Vṛtti and the Locana :—

I. As a rule, Sanskrit writers do not begin their work without first writing at least one verse in praise of the deity to which they are devoted or using some such expression in the beginning as is interpreted to be what is technically called Maṅgalācaraṇa. If, therefore, the Dhvani Kārikā and the Vṛtti had been written by two different writers there would have been two separate benedictory verses, at least one at the beginning of each. But there is only one such verse in the present case and this seems to form the beginning of the Dhvani Kārikā. What are we to infer from this ?

II. When we read the Vṛtti we find at the conclusion of the introductions to some Kārikās here and there the word "ucyate" and we feel that if we could know the subject of the passive form we shall have some light thrown on the question of authorship. Abhinava, as if knowing the mind of the future generations, has cleared this point. Commenting on "iyat punarucyate eva" which comes as a sort of introduction to the 28th verse of the Second Chapter of the Dhvani Kārikā, he says "asmābhiriti vākyaśeṣaḥ". Does not this mean that Abhinava considered the writer of the introductory words, given above, to be the same as that of the verse that comes after ?

III. There is another statement in the Locana at the beginning of the second chapter wherein also Abhinava similarly states the understood subject of a passive form of verb.

(Vṛtti) "Dhvanir dviprakāraḥ prakāśitaḥ."

(Locana) "Prakāśita iti, mayā vṛttikāreṇa sateti bhāvaḥ." Does not the use of the word "satā" imply that the writer of the Vṛtti is the writer of the Kārikā also ?

IV. At another place he seems to be clearly representing Vṛttikāra as the author of the Kārikā. Commenting upon the word 'tathā ca' Abhinava says :—

> "Prakrāntaprakāradvayopasaṁhāraṁ tṛtīyaprakāra sūcanaṁ ca ekenaiva yatnena karomītyāśayena sādhāraṇam avataraṇapadam prakṣipati vṛttikṛt".
>
> Dh. L., 104.

Here the words "ekenaiva yatnena" apparently refer to the following verse. They constitute a part of the sentence, the finite verb of which is "karomi". This sentence is attributed to the Vṛttikṛt. He has, therefore, to be naturally supposed to be the subject of "Karomi". Does not this show that Abhinava considered the same person to be the author of both the Vṛtti and the Kārikā ? The limited space does not permit us similarly to dwell upon some more instances of this kind. We, therefore, simply give below the numbers of the pages where similar passages are to be found :—

82, 83, 85, 105, 223, 246.

V. And last of all let us add the evidence of Abhinava's colophon to support our opinion on the identity of the authorship of the Kārikā and the Vṛtti. There can be no difference of opinion in respect of Ānanda Vardhana's authorship of the Dhvanyāloka, because the colophons to different chapters make it clear beyond doubt. Abhinava's professed object in his Locana is to comment upon the Dhvanyāloka. Let us, therefore, try to find out what he means when he uses the above title in the colophon to each chapter of his commentary. Does he thereby refer to the Vṛtti alone or to the Kārikā also ? For, if the case be the latter it would mean that the title

"Dhvanyāloka" stands for both. And if so, how can then there arise the question of difference in the authorship of the Kārikā and the Vṛtti ? It is an indisputable fact that Abhinava means both the Kārikā and the Vṛtti when he uses the above title in his colophons, because he comments on both. Take, for instance, the third and the sixth verses of the first chapter. The Locana on them runs as follows:—

"Tatreti dvyaṁśatve satyapītyarthaḥ, prasiddha iti vanitāvadanodyānendūdayādivallaukika evetyarthaḥ, upamādibhiḥ prakāraiḥ sa vyākṛto bahūdheti saṅgatiḥ."
Dh. L., 14.

and

"Sarasvatīti vāgrūpā bhagavatītyarthaḥ." Dh. L., 29.

Taking, therefore, all the above stated facts into consideration, we feel that the theory of different authorship of the Kārikā and the Vṛtti is untenable.

PRECURSORS OF DHVANI.

From what has been stated before it is clear that there was no book systematically presenting the ideas of either the exponents or the opponents of the theory of Dhvani before Ānanda Vardhana.

(I) UDBHAṬA.

Among those, who included Dhvani in Lakṣaṇā, according to Abhinava's own statement, Bhaṭṭa Udbhaṭa was the first just indirectly to touch upon Dhvani without even using this word in his exposition of Bhāmaha's verse,

"Śabdaś chandobhidhānārthaḥ."

in his commentary on the latter's Kāvyālaṅkāra. About him we have already spoken before.

It may be added here that this Udbhaṭa has to be distinguished from one of the teachers of Abhinavagupta who had the

same name. For, the latter came more than a century after the former, who is recognised to be identical with the Sabhāpati of king Jayāpīḍa (779–813 A. D.) as has already been stated.

(II) VĀMANA.

In connection with Dhvani, Vāmana is placed in the same category as Udbhaṭa. From the manner in which Abhinava refers to him it appears that Vāmana was Udbhaṭa's successor. For, he mentions the former after the latter in giving the names of the writers who include Dhvani in Lakṣanā. This alone cannot be taken to be conclusive evidence. We can, therefore, reasonably take him, as Dr. De points out, and as the tradition also says, to be identical with King Jayāpīḍa's minister of the same name (779-813 A. D.).

OTHER VĀMANAS.

It may be pointed out here that Abhinava refers to three other Vāmanas, (i) Vāmanagupta (ii) Vāmanadattācārya (iii) Vāmana. In fixing the date of the first of these there is no difficulty ; for, Abhinava, in his Abhinava Bhāratī, page 297, where the reference occurs, calls him his own uncle, (asmat pitṛvya). He, therefore, without much fear of contradiction, may be said to belong to the second and the third quarters of the 10th century A. D. There is only one verse attributed to him there. It is, therefore, not clear as to whethere he did or did not write any work.

About the second we cannot, at this stage, say anything definitely, excepting that he wrote a philosophical work, the Saṁvit Prakāśa, to which Abhinava refers in the Tantrāloka, Ah. V, Ś. 155, as his commentator explains :—

"Gurubhirbhāṣitaṁ tasmād upāyeṣu vicitratā"

T. A., Ah. V, Ś. 155.

"Gurubhiḥ" Vāmanadattācāryeṇa, "bhāṣitam" iti Saṁvitprakāśe." T. A., Comm.

This work is quoted by Maheśvarānanda in his commentary, Parimalā, on the Mahārtha Mañjarī, PP. 21, 23, 26. From the nature of the quotation, found in the Spanda Nirṇaya of Kṣemarāja, p. 48, attributed to Bhaṭṭa Śrī Vāmana, it appears that he is the same person as Vāmanadattācārya of Abhinava's quotation, because the quotation is about the Saṁvid.

About the third nothing more is known than that he was a teacher of Abhinavagupta. Vāmanagupta and Vāmanadattācārya are definitely distinct from each other as is indicated by the words "gupta" and "datta" coming after "Vāmana" in the two cases. But there is no evidence, available at present, either to distinguish Abhinava's teacher "Vāmana" from or to identify him with either of the two. And the suggestion that Vāmanadattācārya may be identical with Vāmana, the minister of king Jayāpīḍa, does not seem to be very sound, because of the occurrence of the word "Ācārya" at the end of the name of the author of the Saṁvitprakāśa.

The founder of the Theory of Dhvani.

ĀNANDA VARDHANA.

He was the first person to give a systematic exposition to the theory of Dhvani in his Dhvanyāloka, which is also called Kāvyāloka or Sahṛdayāloka, and finally to establish it. About his date we have already spoken. His own contribution, as compared to that of his predecessors in connection with Dhvani, was that he established it as the principal meaning (aṅgī) in marked contrast with its conception as a subordinate figure or mere ornament (alaṅkāra).

HIS OTHER WORKS.

Like Lollaṭa and other writers in or about his time, he also wrote on both poetics and philosophy

1. TATTVĀLOKA.

He, the author of the Kāvyāloka or Dhvanyāloka, is spoken of as the writer of another work, called Tattvāloka, by Maheśvarānanda in his commentary, Parimalā, on his own Mahārtha Mañjarī, P. 149 :

"yaduktaṁ Tattvālokakṛtā Kāvyāloke."

From its title it appears to have been a philosophical work.

2. VIVṚTI ON THE VINIŚCAYA ṬĪKĀ DHARMOTTAMĀ.

In this work, as he himself says in his Vṛtti on the Dhvanyāloka Kārikā, he criticised various Bauddha theories :

"Yattu anirdeśyatvaṁ sarvasvalakṣaṇaviṣayaṁ Bauddhānām prasiddhaṁ tat tanmataparīkṣāyāṁ granthāntare nirūpayiṣyāmaḥ." Dh. L., 233.

Abhinava, commenting upon the word "granthāntare", says :—

"Viniścayaṭīkāyāṁ Dharmottamāyāṁ yā vivṛtiramunā granthakṛtā kṛtā tatraiva tadvyākhyātam."

3. DEVĪ ŚATAKA.

It is a philosophical Stotra in praise of Devī. There is a commentary on it by Kaiyaṭa. This Kaiyaṭa was a different person from his namesake, the author of a commentary on Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya and the son of Jaiyaṭa. He, according to his own statement at the conclusion of his commentary, was the son of Candrāditya and finished the work in question in 978 A. D.[1]

4. VIṢAMAVĀṆA LĪLĀ.

From a quotation in the Vṛtti on the Dhvani Kārikā, P. 62, it appears to have been a poetical work of his in Prākṛta.

1. D. S., Comm.

5. ARJUNA CARITA.

From the nature of the context in which reference to this work occurs in the Dhvanyāloka, p. 176, it appears to have been a drama.

COMMENTATORS ON THE DHVANYĀLOKA BEFORE ABHINAVA.

There was a regular commentary on the Dhvanyāloka, written by one of Abhinava's ancestors whose name we have not been able to trace[1]. It was called Candrikā.[2] It was probably written towards the close of the 9th or the beginning of the 10th century A. D. : for, the writer does not seem to have been seen by Abhinava, who refers to him as living in the distant past ("Pūrvavaṁśyaiḥ").

Abhinava refers to other opinions also on the interpretation of Ānanda Vardhana's text on PP. 22, 36, 44, 50, 123, 131, 206, 208, 213, 215. But it is not clear as to whether thereby he means some regular commentaries or simply the opinions of the traditional oral exponents.

OPPONENT OF DHVANI.

BHAṬṬA NĀYAKA.

We have already spoken about him; but his mention again here is necessary, because he is the chief opponent of Dhvani, whom Abhinava so frequently criticises in his Locana. He wrote:

1. Hṛdaya Darpaṇa

with the avowed object of demolishing Ānanda Vardhana's theory of Dhvani.

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1. Dh. L., 185. 2. Dh. L., 233.

ABHINAVA'S TEACHER IN DHVANI:
BHAṬṬA INDURĀJA.

Abhinava refers to him as his teacher in the introduction to his Locana. The high opinion, that he had about his teacher's great literary attainments, finds expression in Dh. L., P. 100, wherein he says :—

"Vidvatkavisahṛdayacakravartino Bhaṭṭendurājasya."

Although there are so many quotations attributed to him, yet, unfortunately, they are not coupled with the names of the works wherefrom they were taken. There is, therefore, a difference of opinion among the scholars about his being identical with Srī Indurāja, who commented on Udbhaṭa's Kāvyālaṅkāra Sāra Saṅgraha. Taking into consideration the fact that Bhaṭṭa and Śrī are generally found indiscriminately prefixed to the ordinary name and also that the chronological position of the supposed two Indurājas is the same, we are inclined to think them to be identical. The opinion that in the present case Bhaṭṭa or Śrī, as found in different places prefixed to Indurāja's name, is simply an honorific prefix is supported by Abhinava's referring to him without either of these prefixes in the concluding verses of his commentary on the Ghaṭakarparakulaka as follows :—

Kavīndorindurājasya te saccittavikāśakāḥ
Bodhāṁśavo vigāhantām bhūrbhuvaḥsvastrayīmapi.

Gh. V.

In the concluding line of the aforesaid commentary Srī Indurāja refers to Mukula as his teacher. And Mukula represents Kallaṭa to be his father in his Abhidhā Vṛtti Mātṛkā. We have already shown above that Somānanda was Kallaṭa's contemporary. There is, therefore, only one generation between Abhinava's teacher in Dhvani, Indurāja, and Kallaṭa on the one hand and his teacher in philosophy, Lakṣmaṇagupta,

and Somānanda on the other. Thus the chronological position of Srī Indurāja coupled with the fact that we do not know of any other person of so great literary attainments belonging to that period and that Abhinava was not a person either not to have approached such a person for education in that particular branch of learning or to have extolled an insignificant person in the manner in which he has praised Indurāja, very strongly support the supposition, already hinted at, that Abhinava's teacher was the same as the commentator on the Kāvyālaṅkāra Sāra Saṅgraha.

It may be pointed out here that Bhaṭṭendurāja, though he does not refer to himself as "Bhūtirājatanaya", was the son of Bhūtirāja, as is clear from the geneology of Indurāja, given in the concluding lines of Abhinava's commentary on the Bhagavadgītā, as follows[1] :—

1. Kātyāyana (a distant ancestor ?)
2. Sauśuka
3. Bhūtirāja
4. Bhaṭṭendurāja.

But Helārāja regularly refers to himself, in the colophon to each section of his commentary on Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīyam, as "Bhūtirājatanaya". The two, therefore, have to be distinguished from each other : one was a philosopher and the other was a literary critic. One is referred to in the T. A., Ah. XXXVII, Ś. 60 as a descendant of Śrīnātha, the earliest propounder of the monistic-cum-dualistic Śaivāgamas; and the other as that of Kātyāyana as pointed out above.

THE BACKGROUND OF HIS POETIC THOUGHT.

In the history of Sanskrit literature we do not come across another writer with such an extensive intellectual back-

1. Bh. G. S., 186.

ground as Abhinavagupta. Though we have not yet discovered all his works to appreciate it fully, yet the available works in themselves are sufficient to give us an idea of the vast literature on various subjects that he had thoroughly read so as to criticise the views contained therein or to quote an authority from it. In fact, we know of many otherwise unknown authors and books from references to them in his works. If we confine ourselves even to his two commentaries, one on the Dhvanyāloka and the other on the Nāṭya Śāstra, we find that in the field of poetry, including drama, there is hardly any writer, worth the name, who is not referred to in some context or the other. And if we arrange them in an historical order, we can throw some interesting light on the history of the poetical literature in Sanskrit up to the time of Abhinavagupta. In the following pages we shall deal with the authors and their works referred to in these two works in an historical order and shall refer to the context so as to show the line of literary criticism followed by Abhinavagupta.

Though we have not so far been able to trace most of the quotations, given without reference to authors or works, in the available books and, therefore, are not in a position to give an exhaustive account of his poetic background, yet it seems very unlikely that he did not know even the important Kashmirian authors such as (i) Bhartṛ Menṭha (5th century A. D.), the author of a Mahākāvya, Hayagrīva Vadha, who was patronised by king Mātṛgupta of Kashmir, was a poet of great repute, and has been referred to by Śiva śvāmin, equated with Bhāravi, Subandhu, Bāṇa etc. by Maṅkhaka (12th century A D.) : (ii) Bhūmaka, (6th century A. D.) the author of the Rāvaṇārjunīya in 27 Cantos : (iii) Sarvajña Mitra, who wrote the Āryā Tārā Sṛgdharā Stotra in the 1st half of the 8th century A. D. : (iv) Dāmodaragupta, who was, according to Kalhaṇa, a minister of king Jayāpīḍa of Kashmir (779–813

A. D.) and wrote the Kuṭṭinīmata, a poem bordring on satire : (v) Ratnākara, who flourished under Cippaṭa Jayāpīda (832 A. D.) and Avanti Varman (855 A. D.) in Kashmir and wrote the Hara Vijaya, wherein he makes use of the concepts of the Kashmir Śaivaism, and the Vakrokti Pañcāśikā : (vi) Śiva-svāmin, a contemporary of King Avanti Varman, (855–88) who poetises the Buddhist legend of Kapphiṇa in his Kapphi-ṇābhyudaya : (vii) Bhallaṭa, the author of the Bhallaṭa Śataka, who flourished in the reign of king Śaṅkara Varman (888–902) : or the non-Kashmirians such as (i) Kumāradāsa, the author of the Jānakī Haraṇa (517–26 A. D.) : (ii) Bhaṭṭi, who wrote Bhaṭṭi kāvya (6th century A. D.) (iii) Padmagupta or Pari-mala, (1005 A. D.) the author of the Navasāhasāṅka Carita, composed as compliment to his patron, the Pāramāra Sindhu-rāja of Dhārā.

Here we shall confine ourselves to dealing with those poets only who are either not well known or those in regard to whom Abhinavagupta says something that is important from our point of view. To Kālidāsa we have already given a separate Chapter, dealing with his Ghaṭakarpara Kulaka, but pass over Bhāravi, Māgha, Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇa etc. for want of space, though they are frequently referred to.

PĀṆINI (4th Century B. C.).

Pāṇini, according to the following quotation in Jalhaṇa's Sūktimuktāvalī, attributed to Rājaśekhara, first wrote the grammar and then the Jāmbavatījaya :—

"Svasti Pāṇinaye tasmai yasya rudraprasādataḥ
Ādau vyākaraṇaṁ kāvyam anu jambavatījayaḥ"

Rāya mukuṭa in his commentary on the Amarakośa, com-posed in 1431 A. D., cites the following from the Jāmbavatī-jaya :—

"Payaḥ-pṛṣantibhiḥ spṛṣṭā vānti vātāḥ śanaiḥ śanaiḥ"
1-2-3-6.

And Nemi Sādhu in his commentary on Rudraṭa's Kāvyālaṅkāra cites from Pāṇini's Pātāla Vijaya :—

(i) "Sandhyā vadhūṁ gṛhya kareṇa"
(ii) "Gaterdharātre parimandamandam
Garjanti yat prāvṛṣi kālameghāḥ
Apaśyatī vatsamivendubimbam
Taccharvarī gauriva huṁkaroti"

as illustrations to support the view that great poets often violate the rules of Grammar. He calls it Mahākāvya. Saduktikarṇāmṛta (5-26-5) records the tradition which recognised Pāṇīni (Dākṣīputra) as one among the great poets such as Kālidāsa (Raghukāra). Anthologies attribute 17 verses besides the above to Pāṇini e. g.

(i) Kavīndravacana Samuccaya (1000 A. D.)
"Tanvaṅgīnāṁ stanau dṛṣṭvā"
(ii) Subhāṣitāvalī of Vallabhadeva (10th century) quotes:
"Upoḍharāgeṇa vilola tārakam"

This verse is given as an illustration of Samāsokti by Ānanda Vardhana, without any reference to the author. And Abhinavagupta comments on it. It has been discussed in the Indian Æsthetics 2nd edition (299-301).

KĀTYĀYANA (3rd Century B. C.).

Kātyāyana seems to have written a work connected with dramaturgy or poetics. He is quoted by Abhinavagupta to show which particular metres should be employed in the presentation of physical features of different characters. The lines run as follows :—

Vīrasya bhujadaṇḍānāṁ varṇane sṛgdharā bhavet
Nāyikāvarṇane kāryaṁ vasantatilakādikam

Śārdūlalīlā prācyeṣu mandākrāntā ca dakṣiṇe

A. Bh. Vol. II. 246.

Abhinavagupta quotes[1] a verse from the Ubhayābhisārikā also, which is a Bhāṇa, published in the Caturbhāṇī and is attributed to Vararuci. It runs as follows :—

"Śantiṁ yāti śanairmahauṣadhibalādāśīviṣāṇāṁ viṣam
Śakyo mocayitum madotkaṭakaṭādātmā gajendrādvane
Grāhasyāpi mukhānmahārṇavajale mokṣaḥ kadācidbhavet
Veśastrīvaḍavāmukhānalagato naivotthito dṛśyate"

It is quoted as an illustration of Lakṣaṇa, called Nidarśana, which consists in words, spoken in support of a well known fact so that people may not ignore it.

In the Indian tradition, reflected in grammatical works, Kātyāyana, the author of the Vārtikas on the Sūtras of Pāṇini, is recognised to be identical with Vararuci. For instance, Jñānendra Sarasvatī, the author of the Tattva Bodhinī, a commentary on the Siddhānta Kaumudī of Bhaṭṭojī Dīkṣita, commenting on the very first verse interprets "Muni trayam" as "Pāṇini-kātyāyana-Patañjalīnāṁ trayam". But a verse in the beginning of the Dhātupāṭha, naming "Munitraya", substitutes Vararuci for Kātyāyana:

"Vākyakāraṁ Vararucim Bhāṣyakāram Patañjalim
Pāṇiniṁ sūtrakāraṁ ca praṇatosmi munitrayam"

Therefore, if we take the two to be identical we find quite a large number of works on different subjects attributed to Vararuci, which may be regarded as those of Kātyāyana. But it is certain that Vararuci-Kātyāyana wrote on subjects other than grammar. For, Patañjali refers to Vāraruca-Kāvya (M. Bh. IV, 3, 101); and Rājaśekhara mentions the name of Vararuci's Kāvya as Kaṇṭhābharaṇa, in his Sūktimuktāvalī.

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1. A. Bh., Vol. II, 354.

But no definite statement is possible on the question whether all the works, attributed to Vararuci, are by the Vārtikakāra, Vararuci-Kātyāyana, or by his namesake, one or many, far removed from him in time. The other works attributed to Vararuci are as follows :—

1. Vasumatī, a tale (kathā) quoted by Bhoja in the Śṛṅgāra Prakāśa.
2. Prākṛta Prakāśa.
3. Rākṣasa–Kāvya.
4. Vararuci Vākya-Kāvya.[1]

Besides these many works on grammar, medicine, Rājanīti etc., are attributed to him.

BHĀSA.

In an historical study of Abhinavagupta, we have naturally to confine ourselves to what light a study of Abhinavagupta's works throws on Bhāsa. We shall, therefore, not attempt to determine Bhāsa's date, the only point in regard to which, that is free from controversy, is that he was a predecessor of Kālidāsa, by whom he is referred to in the introductory scene to the Mālavikāgnimitra; and if we admit that the reference to Agnimitra's reign in the concluding verse of the above drama is a reference to the king in whose reign the poet lived, he may be said to belong the second century B. C., because Agnimitra ascended the throne in the middle of that century. The scholars, however, differ by centuries in regard to the date of Kālidāsa from the 2nd century B. C. to the 4th century A. D. in the reign of Candragupta II, surnamed Vikramāditya. Nor shall we discuss the question whether all the thirteen plays, first published by T. Gaṇapati Shastri, are from Bhāsa's pen or only some of them.

*1. H. C. L., 730.

(i) Abhinavagupta refers to Bhāsa in the Abhinava Bhāratī in the context of Raudra Rasa, and asserting that the injustice and breach of moral principles primarily arouse anger (Krodha), the basic mental state of Raudra-Rasa, and that every body wills to suck even the blood of the unjust and immoral, illustrates the point by quoting from Bhāsa, recognising him to be a great poet, a verse, in which Rāma says in anger, "On getting Rāvaṇa, I shall not be fully satisfied even after cutting his body to as small pieces as the sesame-seed."

There are two dramas of Bhāsa in the available collection of thirteen, the themes of which have been borrowed from the Rāmāyaṇa (i) Pratimā and (ii) Abhiśeka. It may have occurred in the latter, but it is not traceable there. It may have been eliminated by early Kerala actors, in their abridgement. In any case one thing is certain that this is a quotation from Bhāsa's work.[1]

(ii) Svapna-vāsavadattā is referred to, not only in the Abhinava Bhāratī but also in the Dhvanyāloka Locana without mentioning the name of the author. In the former Abhinava asserts that the common relationship of case (Sāmānādhikaraṇya) of the two words, different in genders, (i) Svapnavāsavadattā and (ii) Nāṭakam, indicates that the presentation of this drama on the stage does not arouse the consciousness of its being a representation but that of the immediately or directly present.[2] Here Abhinavagupta recognises that this drama is thoroughly fit for stage and can arouse the æsthetic experience, if presented well.

In the Locana, however, he seems to be criticising the Svapnavāsavadattā adversely for the use of figure of speech in disregard of Rasa in the following verse[3] :—

1. A. Bh., Vol. I, 320. 2. A. Bh., Vol. I, 87.

3. Dh. L., 152

"Sañjitapakṣmakapāṭaṁ nayanadvāraṁ svarūpataḍiteva
Udghāṭya sā praviṣṭā hṛdayagṛhaṁ me nṛpatanūjā"

The Kerala actors, from whose descendants the collection of dramas, attributed to Bhāsa, was acquired, seem to have known Abhinavagupta's view on this verse and, therefore, eliminated it in their abridgement. Hence it is not found in the published text of the drama.

(iii) The Avimāraka, one of the dramas attributed to Bhāsa, is quoted by Abhinavagupta, without mentioning the author, twice in the Abhinava Bhāratī to illustrate the two out of thirty six Lakṣaṇas (i) Upadiṣṭa (ii) Leśa.

(i) Upadiṣṭa is an instructive utterance, based on the sacred scriptures, such as pleases the learned e. g. the following from the lips of the king in the Avimāraka, first act :—

"Dharmaḥ prāgeva cintyaḥ sacivamatigatiḥ prekṣitavyā svabuddhyā
Pracchādyau rāgaroṣau mṛduparuṣaguṇau kālayogena kāryau
Jñeyaṁ lokānuvṛttam paracaranayanair maṇḍalam prekṣitavyaṁ
Rakṣyo yatnādihātmā raṇaśirasi punaḥ sopi nāvekṣitayaḥ."

(ii) Leśa consists in questions put and answers cleverly made by those who are skilled in the use of appropriate language in a manner that serves the desired purpose.

Nurse : What is being pondered over ?

Avimāraka : Madam ! Śāstra is being pondered over[1] etc.

Abhinavagupta seems to refer to the existence of a tradition, similar to that followed in the thirteen dramas, attributed to Bhāsa, of beginning the drama with the stage-direction "Nāndyante Sūtradhāraḥ." He says that this tradition was followed

1. A. Bh., Vol. II, 362.

by the ancient dramatists.[1] It was based upon a slightly different reading of Bharata's text "Tadantenukṛtirbaddhā" as "Kṛtā tadantenukṛtiḥ" current in the distant past. It was interpreted as "after the Nāndī began the imitative dramatic presentation." This shows that the thirteen dramas of the disputed authorship are in any case products of the ancients, far removed from Abhinavagupta.

ŚŪDRAKA.

Śūdraka is the recognised author of the three dramas, Mṛcchakaṭika, Vatsarāja Carita and Padma Prābhṛtaka. But in regard to the Mṛcchakaṭika, it has been asserted by some scholars that it is based upon Cārudatta, which is included in the list of dramas, attributed to Bhāsa, but which is really 'the fragmentary original of the first four acts of the Mṛcchakaṭika of Śūdraka,' or 'which has preserved a great deal of the original upon which Śūdraka's drama is based.'

A careful study of the Abhinava Bhāratī throws an interesting light on this point. Though Abhinavagupta does nto refer to Śūdraka by name, yet he refers to two dramas, (i) the Vatsarāja Carita, which is recognised to be from Śūdraka's pen and (ii) the Daridra Cārudatta, and quotes from the latter as follows :—

"Śuṇāmi mallagandhaṁ, andhaālaśacchidādo uṇa ṇāsiādo hiduttaṁ (subbattam ?) elāmi."

This passage occurs in the published edition of the Mṛcchakaṭika with slight difference as follows :—

"Śuṇāmi mallagandhaṁ, anddhaālapūlidāe uṇa ṇāśiāe śubbattaṁ uṇa ṇa pekkhāmi bhūśaṇaśaddaṁ."

Abhinavagupta quotes the above as an illustration of expression of a state of mind in one of the twelve types of

1. A. Bh., Vol. I, 26.

vocal histrionic representations, technically called "Pralāpa," an expression of foolishness in utterance of words such as have no connection with one another.[1]

Both the printed texts seem to be corrupt. They seem to represent different recensions. Ṇāsiādo in Abhinava's text is changed into ṇaśiāe in the printed Mṛcchakaṭika. The latter has repitition of "Uṇa" and so on. But the identity of the two is very clear. The interesting fact about it is that the Abhinava Bhāratī after the quotation states the name of the drama as "Mṛccha" and the figure 1 follows it. If it is not an editorial insertion; it makes it very clear that "Daridra Cārudatta" is another name of "Mṛcchakaṭika." Though the editor suggests in the foot-note that "Daridra Cārudatta" is the name of the first act of the Mṛcchakaṭika, yet it may be pointed out that in the printed edition, the introductory scene mentions the name of the drama to be Mṛcchakaṭika and the colophon at the end of the first act states "Alaṅkāravinyāsa" and not "Daridra Cārudatta" as its name.

In the light of these facts, is seems that the view expressed by some scholars that the two are different from each other and that the Daridra Cārudatta is a fragmentary original, which was later on developed into a big drama by some other writer, needs reconsideration.

The Vatsarāja Carita also is quoted many times by Abhinavagupta in the course of his commentary on the Nāṭya Śāstra on chapter XVI to illustrate different Lakṣaṇas such as (i) Padoccaya, which consists in giving the idea of one and the same thing by means of a series of standards of comparison e. g.

"Khaḍgo rakṣāndhakāre raviratitimire kāryabhāreṣu dhuryaḥ."

V. C., Act VI.

1. A. Bh., Vol. III, 175.

(ii) Garhaṇa, which consists in presenting faults as merits or vice-versa e. g. the following statement of Viṣṇutrāta :—

"Nṛpāḥ prabhutvāt pratiṣedha vāmā........" V. C, Act II and so on.

Śūdraka gives some information about himself in the introductory scene to his Mṛcchakaṭika. Thus we learn that he was a great Brāhmaṇa king, who was a great Śaiva, was proficient in the Ṛgveda, the Sāmaveda, mathematics and two arts (i) Vaiśikī, the art concerning courtesans and (ii) Hastividyā, the art concerning elephants : that he performed the horse-sacrifice, put his son on the throne and died, literally entered into fire, at the age of Hundred years and ten days.

The statement about the date of death arouses grave doubts about Śūdraka's real authorship of the play as we find it in print. For, the introduction to it cannot be supposed to have been written by him just on the day of his death, when, as a religious minded king, it was natural for him to think of matters spiritual rather than to think of giving finishing touches to the introduction. This fact seems to be responsible for many theories about the authorship and the date of Mṛcchakaṭika from the second century B. C. to the sixth century A. D. But the circumstantial evidence makes us think that Śūdraka is prior to Kālidāsa. For, to Somila and Rāmila, the former of whom is referred to by Kālidāsa in the introductory scene (Prastāvanā) of his drama, Mālavikāgnimitra[1], he is already a legendary character, as we know from the title of the work, Śūdrakakathā, which he wrote in collaboration with Rāmila and which is referred to by Rājaśekhara, Jalhaṇa, Śārṅgadhara and Bhoja, though we have not been able to discover it so far. The verse in praise of the authors of the Śūdrakakathā, cited by Jalhaṇa, runs as follows :—

1. M. A., 5.

"Tau Śūdrakakathākārau vandyau Rāmila-Saumilau
yayordvayoḥ kāvyamāsīd ardhanārīśvaropamau."

But legend must have a basis. Such a basis Śūdraka seems to have been. So much about the upper limit. He is quoted by Vāmana (iii, 2, 4) in the 8th century A. D. The lower limit, therefore, may be regarded to be the 6th century A. D.

GUṆĀḌHYA.

The Nepāla Māhātmya gives a mythical account of the origin of the Bṛhatkathā, written in Paiśācī by Guṇāḍhya. It says that the stories, written by him, were originally told by Mahādeva to Pārvatī in secret. But Guṇāḍhya, who before his birth was an attendant of Śiva, named Bhṛṅgī, assumed the form of a black bee and entered the room, where the stories were being narrated, through a chink in the door, heard them and narrated them to his wife. Once when Pārvatī was narrating one of the stories to her friends, saying that no body heard it before, Bhṛṅgī's wife, Vijayā, displayed her knowledge of it and painfully surprised Pārvatī. Mahādeva, being informed of it and coming to know through the spiritual power that Bhṛṅgī had overheard him, called him and cursed him that he would go down to the earth and be born as a Brāhmaṇa ; but, having been propitiated, said "After having composed Nine lacs of Gāthās and installed a Śiva Liṅga, you will come back."

Accordingly Bhṛṅgī was born in Mathurā as the son of a Brāhmaṇa, Viṣṇudatta by name. He was given the name "Guṇāḍhya" by his father. He became very proficient in many branches of learning, went to Ujjayinī where king Madana was reigning, was introduced to the king by the chief court-Pandit, Sarva Varman, and lived there for long.

Once when the king wanted to learn grammar in the shortest possible time, Guṇāḍhya said that it could not be taught in less than twelve years; but Sarva Varman undertook to make the

king proficient in grammar in two years. Thereupon Guṇāḍhya vowed that if that could be done he would leave every thing, would not speak Sanskrit for the rest of his life and would retire to the forest. Sarva Varman succeeded in his undertaking and Guṇāḍhya retired to the forest and there, on the advice of a sage, wrote the Bṛhatkathā on leaves and after completing it went to Nepāla, installed a Śiva Liṅga, and returned to Kailāśa.[1]

Coming to history from mythology we find that the Bṛhatkathā is one of the earliest story-books, which has supplied material for a vast poetic and dramatic literature. Its importance can be guessed from the fact that it was known in distant land like Combodia, where, according to Professor M. S. Levi, a verse from it is found ingraved in an inscription, belonging to the last quarter of the 9th Century A. D.

According to Abhinavagupta's interpretation, it was known to Bharata; because in his Nāṭya Śāstra there is implicit reference to it in the course of the definition of Prakaraṇa. Bharata defines Prakaraṇa in two ways : (i) that in which the subject-matter and the hero are the creations of the dramatist's imagination (ii) that in which the dramatist borrows his theme from either the literature that is not from the lips of sages (Anārṣa) or the works of older dramatists, but considerably modifies and improves upon it from the æsthetic point of view by introducing in it such excellences as are absent in the original. Commenting on "Anārṣam" in Bharata's text, Abhinavagupta says :—

> Anārṣamiti purāṇādivyatirikta Bṛhatkathā-
> dyupanibaddhaṁ Mūladeva caritādi........
> Vastubhutaiḥ Bṛhatkathādau kāvyāntare vā
> prasiddhairguṇairyuktam prakaroti taditi

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1. N. M. Ch. XXVII–XXIX.

tasmāddhetoretadapi prakaraṇam, tena Bṛhatkathādiprasiddhasya Mūladevāderadhikāvāpaṁ kaviśaktiryadā vidhatte tadā prakaraṇam.

Two points seem to be clear from the above statement (i) that the second type of Prakaraṇa, in which the plot of the drama was borrowed from the Bṛhatkathā etc., originated after the books like the Bṛhatkathā had been written (ii) that the story of Mūladeva was an undeniable part of the book.

Further, in the course of the discussion on the aspect of gentle dance, technically called Pracchedaka, which consists in the presentation of delight of a lady at the sight of reflection of the object of her love, Abhinavagupta asserts that such a delight is very often presented as the cause, that removes the lady's anger in amorous sports and brings about the reconciliation with the object of love and cites, according to the editorial suggestion, a verse from the Bṛhatkathā (Kashmirian recension) which is in praise of Śiva and refers to his reflections falling on the nails of the feet of Pārvatī.[1]

If we accept this, we find support to what is said in the Nepāla Māhātmya in regard to the faith of the author, namely, that he was a Śaiva. Additional support to this is found in the remark of Jagaddhara, a commentator on the Vāsavadattā, who seems to be referring to what is said in the Nepāla Māhātmya, in his following statement :—

"Tena kila bhagavato bhavānīpater mukhakamalādupaśrutya Bṛhatkathā nibaddheti vārtā."

Bṛhatkathā was a very popular book both in Nepāla and Kashmir, as is clear from its summaries, one by Kṣemendra, (1030 A. D.) called Bṛhatkathāmañjarī and the other by

1. A. Bh., Vol. III, 70.

Somadeva (1063) called Kathāsarit Sāgara, both belonging to Kashmir : and the Bṛhatkathā Śloka Saṁgraha of Buddhasvāmin, which is assigned to the 8th or the 9th century A. D. Its importance was recognised by Bāṇa and Subandhu, who refer to it. The lower limit of its date, therefore, can definitely be said to be the 5th century A. D. The upper limit is a matter of keen controversy.

CANDRAKA (2nd CENTURY A. D.).

Candraka, according to Kalhaṇa (ii, 6) lived under king Tuñjana of Kashmir and composed many dramas. A few fragments from them are found in Śrīvara's Subhāṣitāvalī. He is a very early dramatist of Kashmir, because he was a contemporary of a very early king of Kashmir. He may be said to have flourished in the 2nd century A. D.

He is referred to by Abhinavagupta in the context of Saindhavaka, an aspect of gentle dance (Lāsya). Pointing out that the language of a drama has to be in strict accordance with the æsthetic configuration presented in it, Abhinavagupta cites the instances of dramas, which are written in one language only, and refers to the dramas, written by Candraka, as those in which no other language than Sanskrit is used, because they present Vīra or Raudra Rasa.[1]

PRAVARASENA (5th CENTURY A. D.).

Pravarasena was king of Kashmir. His well known work is the Setubandha. It is referred to in the Dhvanyāloka to illustrate the point that the use of Alaṅkāras, though seemingly difficult, is justifiable, if they come to poet without any special effort such as diverts his mind from the presentation of the æsthetic configuration. Thus, in the Setubandha, abundant

1. A. Bh., Vol. III, 72.

use of figures of speech is not a fault in the presentation of Sītā, as overpowered by grief at the sight of the head of Rāma, which was a creation of magic.[1]

AMARU OR AMARUKA.

Nothing can definitely be said about the date and place of birth of the great erotic poet Amaru or Amaruka. The lower limit of his date is fixed by reference to him by Ānanda Vardhana in his Dhvanyāloka, to which we shall refer in the next para. But the general opinion is that he belonged to the Śataka period, a great literary figure of which was Bhartṛhari, the popularly recognised author of the three Śatakas, Śṛṅgāra, Nītī and Vairāgya as also of the Vākya Padīyam, a work on the philosophy of grammar, who, according to the Buddhist pilgrim Yi-tsing, died about 651 A. D. That the author of the Vākyapadīyam is identical with that of the three Śatakas seems to be supported by the colophon at the end of the Vākyapadīyam, which runs as follows :—

"Iti mahāvaiyākaraṇa mahākavi mahāyogi mahārājāvantīśvara Śrī Bhartṛhari viracitaṁ Vākyapadīyam."

Amaru may, therefore, be said to belong to the 6th or 7th century.

Amaru is well known for his power of miniature picturasque presentation in a solitary stanza. His Śataka is a series of miniature poems. Each stanza of it is a separate unit and presents a perfect little picture, a single idea, a single phase of emotion of love, with the necessary mimetic changes in a befitting situation. That he excells in the presentation of such Śṛṅgāra as floods the heart of the æsthete with the æsthetic emotion of love, is admitted by no less a literary critic than Ānanda Vardhana.[2] The fact that his presentation abounds in

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1. Dh. L. 87. 2. Dh. L. 142.

the wealth of situation etc. is pointed out by Abhinavagupta, who, commenting on Ānanda Vardhana quotes from Amaru's work the following in support of his view :—

Kathamapi kṛtapratyāsattau priye skhalitottare
Virahakṛśayā kṛtvā vyājavikalpitamaśrutam
Asahanasakhīśrotra-prāptipramāda-sasambhramam
Vivalitadṛśā śūnye gehe samucchvasitaṁ tataḥ.

Amaru is such an important writer of erotic verses that often one and the same verse is cited to illustrate different æsthetic theories in different contexts in different works. Thus, we find the following verse occurring in two works of Abhinavagupta, the Locana and the Abhinava Bhāratī :—

Ekasmiñchayane parāṅmukhatayā vītottaraṁ tāmyato
Ranyonyaṁ hṛdayasthitepyanunaye saṁrakṣatorgauravaṁ
Dampatyoḥ śanakairapāṅga-valanān miśrībhavaccakṣuṣor
Bhagno mānakaliḥ sahāsarabhasavyāsakta kaṇṭhagraham.

In the former it is cited in the context of Bhāvaśānti Dhvani to illustrate that the consciousness of a sudden termination of a mood, involved in a basic mental state, is the source of æsthetic experience.[1] In the Abhinava Bhāratī it is given to show that Sambhoga and Vipralambha are not two distinct types of Śṛṅgāra, but two states, which are pervaded by the emotion of love, which being experienced by æsthete is called Śṛṅgāra. Abhinavagupta is of the view that the term Sambhoga śṛṅgāra, when used in reference to what presents the union of the lovers, is to be understood to be in the secondary sense. For, the minds of lovers in the state of union are not free from the idea of possibility of separation.[2]

Further, it is quoted as an example to prove that there is essential internal relation of the word to the state of mind that

1. Dh. L. 24. 2. A. Bh., Vol. I. 304.

arises in the æsthete and to refute the opposite view that it is unessential and external.

(Cittavṛttim prati śabdānām bahiraṅgatvam. A. Bh. Vol. II, 221.)

Abhinavagupta asserts that this verse is recognised to be beautiful by the æsthete like the reflection of the full moon in the surging ocean and is admitted, like the full moon, to be capable of bringing about the upsurge of the æsthetic emotion in the ocean of the heart of the æsthete. But if the opponent's view be accepted its appeal will be inexplicable, because it contains the word Hāsa.[1]

Furthermore, Abhinavagupta cites Amaru's verse "Lagnā nāṁśukapallave" to illustrate the Lakṣaṇa, called Niṣedha[2].

SUBANDHU (6th CENTURY A. D.).

The title of Subandhu's drama, according to the Abhinava Bhāratī, wherein it is referred to and quoted, is not "Vāsavadattā" only but "Vāsavadattā Nāṭyadhārā." Abhinavagupta mentions the name of the author with the title "Mahākavi" (great poet) which indicates that Subandhu was held in high esteem for his poetic genius.

The reference occurs in the context of one of the six types of the histrionic representation through the body (Śārīrābhinaya), technically called "Nāṭyāyita." On this point Abhinavagupta criticises the view of Śrīśaṅkuka and states his own as follows :—

Very often it happens that in a long dream, one sees another person dreaming. At such a time one, who sees another dreaming, is awake from his own point of view, but in reality he is dreaming if his state be compared with that of one who is

1. A. Bh., Vol. II, 222–3. 2. Ibid 311–2.

fully and actually awake. Such a state in Sanskrit language, is referred to as "Svapnāyita." Similarly in a long dramatic presentation when one of the characters of the piece acts as the spectator of the action of some other actor, his acting is called "Nāṭyāyita" e. g. in the Vāsavadattā Nāṭyadhārā of Subandhu, Vindusāra is presented as the spectator of Udayana's action and the latter also is depicted as the spectator of Vāsavadattā's action. The histrionic representation through body (Śārīrābhinaya) of both Vindusāra and Udayana is an illustration of "Nāṭyāyita."[1]

Subandhu is referred to by Bāṇa, Vāmana and Vākpatirāja, the first of whom, being a contemporary of Harṣa of Kānyakubja, belonged to the 7th Century. Bāṇa's reference to Vāsavadattā in the preface to the Harṣa Carita is of doubtful nature, because there is no reference to the name of the author. Reference by the other two who are admitted to belong to the 8th Century is free from doubt. Subandhu may, therefore, be said to belong to the 6th or 7th Century A. D.

His famous work is a prose Romance, Vāsavadattā. He takes pride in his skill in the use of Śleṣa in every letter of his composition (Pratyakṣaraśleṣamayaprapañca vijñānavaidagdhyanidhiṁ prabandham).

MATAṄGA DIVĀKARA (620 A. D.).

Mataṅga Divākara, according to Rājaśekhara, quoted in the Sūktimuktāvalī (IV-70), was a contemporary of Bāṇa and Mayūra in the court of king Harṣa. There is at least one work of Mataṅga, which we know from reference by Abhinavagupta. It was probably a poem in praise of King Harṣa, in which occurs a stanza, quoted in the Subhāṣitāvalī (No 2546), which has been censured by Abhinava,

1. A. Bh., Vol. III, 172.

because it represents the sea-girdled earth successively as grand-mother, mother, spouse and daughter-in-law of Harṣa. It runs as follows :—

Āsīnnātha pitāmahī tava mahī jātā tatonantaram
Mātā samprati sāmburāśirasanā jāyā kulodbhūtaye
Pūrṇe varṣaśate bhaviṣyati punaḥ saivānavadyā snuṣā
Yuktaṁ nāma samagranītividuṣāṁ kiṁbhūpatīnāṁ kule.

It comes in the context of pointing out the distinction between the suggestive and the ornamented poetry. Very often it happens that the suggestion is mixed up with a figure of speech in a poetic composition. The question in such a case arises : "Is it to be classified as suggestive or ornamented poetry ?" Ānanda Vardhana, therefore, lays down the principle of classification as follows :—

That poem, in which the suggested element is the helper of the directly presented figure of speech and, therefore, occupies a subordinate position, is to be classed as ornamented poetry.

Some earlier authority cited the above quotation as an illustration of the figure "Vyājastuti", wherein the suggested element occupies a subordinate position to the directly presented figure of speech. Referring to it Abhinavagupta says that such a presentation of 'Vyājastuti' (which to some extent resembles what we call "Irony" in English, insofar as in it praise is implied by apparent censure or vice–versa) is condemned in the circle of the lovers of poetry inasmuch as it gives rise to the idea that smacks of extreme vulgarity.[1]

MAYŪRA (7th CENTURY A. D.).

Mayūra, according to the Jain legends, is associated with Bāṇa Bhaṭṭa, as a literary rival in the court of king Harṣa of

1. Dh. L., 44–5.

Kānyakubja. This is supported by Bāṇa's own mention of Mayūraka as a friend of his youth in the Harṣa Carita (p. 42) and by Padmagupta (about 1005) who mentions Mayūra along with Bāṇa in the court of Harṣa in his Navasāhasāṅka Carita (ii, 18). He is said to be related to Bāṇa and to have described the intimate personal beauty of Bāṇa's wife in an indiscreet poem 'Mayūrāṣṭaka', to have been cursed with leprosy by her and to have recovered from it through the grace of the sun god, in whose praise he composed the Sūrya Śataka.

Abhinavagupta in his Locana comments upon two quotations given by Ānanda Vardhana in the Dhvanyāloka from Mayūra's Sūrya Śataka :

(1) No kalpāpāyavāyoḥ............(p. 92).

It comes in the context of the effective ways of the use of the figures of speech in the presentation of Śṛṅgāra. One of the suggestions made here is that a poet should not persist in the presentation of a figure of speech, though he may have for the time being desired to present it primarily, and that he should give it up at a suitable time. And the illustration, that is given, is the one in which Arthaśleṣālaṅkāra is given up for Vyatireka for the effective presentation of Śṛṅgāra. But a literary critic asserts that in the illustration "Raktastvaṁ navapallavaiḥ" there are no two Alaṅkāras but only one, called Śleṣavyatireka. In reply, Ānanda Vardhana points out that the sphere of the said Alaṅkāra is that in which the consciousness of Vyatireka arises from the expression, used for Śleṣa. For, if in the instances like these the separable union of two figures of speech be admitted, there will be left no verse which may be cited as an illustration of inseparable union of two Alaṅkāras (Saṁsṛṣṭi). It cannot be said that the above is not an instance of Saṁsṛṣṭi in so far as the simile here comes in through pun (Śleṣa) and, therefore, the latter is the helper of the Vyati-

reka. For, Saṁsṛṣṭi is marked by the absence of such relation between the two Alaṅkāras. The reason is as follows :—

The question is : Does Vyatireka exist only where the simile (Upamā) is directly stated in words or even where it is suggested ? The first alternative is refuted by pointing out that Vyatireka is found even where Upamā is not directly stated as in the following verse of Mayūra :

"No kalpāpāyavāyoḥ"

(2) Dattānandaḥ prajānām (p. 99–100) is cited as an illustration of the Śabdaśaktyudbhava-Dhvani, which has been discussed in the Indian Æsthetics, 2nd Edition, pp. 312–4.

MAHENDRA VIKRAMA VARMAN (620 A. D.).

In the context of the definition of a Lakṣaṇa, called Viparyaya, which consists in the expression of a view about the directly perceived or an injuction, quite contrary to the prevalent, on account of doubt about the either,[1] Abhinavagupta gives a quotation from the Matta Vilāsa, a Prahasana from the pen of Mahendra Vikrama, a king of Pallava dynasty and son of Siṁha Varman, as an illustration. It runs as follows :—

Mattavilāse Śākyabhikṣuḥ
Paramakāruṇiena...........
Avassaṁ edehi duṭṭhabuddhatthavirehi ṇirucchāehi ahmāṇaṁ taruṇajaṇāṇaṁ maccharеṇa piḍaaputhaesu itthiāsurāpāṇavihāṇāṇi paḍāmuṭṭhāṇi iti takkemi.

Mahendra Vikram Varman is of definitely known date. For, what is stated in the introduction to the play in regard to the author is corroborated by inscriptions which mention the Matta Vilāsa as a work of Mahendra Varman as also all

1. A. Bh., Vol. II, 358.

the titles, stated in the play, such as Guṇādhāra etc. He ruled in Kāñcī about 620 A. D.

YAŚOVARMAN (731 A. D.).

Abhinavagupta in his Dhvanyāloka Locana distinctly referes to Yaśovarman as the author of the Rāmābhyudaya. This reference occurs in the course of his commentary on the Dhvanyāloka where Ānanda Vardhana quotes the Rāmābhyudaya in support of his view that dramatist or poet should not wantonly change the original historical theme: but if it becomes necessary for the presentation of a particular æsthetic configuration, he has to do it with extreme care[1]. At another place[2] he quotes a verse from the said drama to illustrate Alakṣyakramavyaṅgya Dhvani in a sentence.

In the Abhinava Bhāratī also there are three references to it to illustrate (i) gesture of hands, technically called Kapota, in which two hands are shown meeting on one of their sides[3] : (ii) that the main theme is that which presents the hero directly pursuing an objective, which the dramatist skilfully attempts to present as the main; e. g. bringing Sītā back in the Rāmābhyudaya[4] (iii) that the second, out of the four types of episode-indication (Patākāsthānaka), consists in conveying the idea of the main future event in poetic language, including exaggerated statement (Atiśayokti) e. g. the message of Sugrīva to Sītā in the third act of the Rāmābhyudaya.[5]

Yaśovarman is a historical person. He succeeded Harṣa, as king of Kānyakubja, (Kanauj) in about 731 A. D. and was defeated by Lalitāditya of Kashmir in 740. He was patron of Bhavabhūti, the author of the Uttara Rāmacarita etc. and of Vākpatirāja, the author of the Gauḍa-Vāha, a Prākṛta Kāvya.[6] He is quoted in the Nāṭya Darpaṇa, Bhāvaprakāśa etc. also.

1. Dh. L. 148. 2. Ibid., 133. 3. A. Bh., Vol. II, 56.
4. A. Bh., Vol. III, 5. 5. Ibid., 20. 6. R. T., IV, 144.

BHAVABHŪTI.

Bhavabhūti's position in the history of Sanskrit literature is certain. He, according to Kalhaṇa in his Rāja Taraṅgiṇī, was patronised by Yaśovarman, king of Kānyakubja, who succeeded Harṣa in 731 A. D., as has been stated in the preceding paragraph. He is eulogised by Vākpatirāja, the author of the Gauḍavāha and, therefore, belonged to the close of the 7th and the first half of the 8th century.

Bhavabhūti is referred to by Abhinavagupta in his Tantrāloka[1] as a commentator on the Parātriṁśikā along with Somānanda and Kalyāṇa. We know that at the time of Yaśovarman there were famous Śaiva scholars in Kānyakubja. For, as we have pointed out earlier, Abhinavagupta's ancestor, Atrigupta, was brought from Kānyakubja to Kashmir by king Lalitāditya after his victory over Yaśovarman. We also know that Bhavabhūti was a Śaiva, as is clear not only from his name but also from the prayer in the beginning of his Mālatīmādhava as also from his choice of the occasion to stage his dramas, namely the festival in honour of Mahākāla (Śiva) at Ujjayinī. He seems to be referring to the particular conception of Parā Vāk as inseparably united with Śiva, as presented in the Parātriṁśikā, in the second half of the first benedictory verse in the Uttara Rāmacarita. The historical position together with his Śaiva tendencies are, it seems, enough justification to identify the dramatist Bhavabhūti with the commentator on the Parātriṁśikā.

All the three famous dramas of Bhavabhūti, Uttara Rāmacarita, Mālatī Mādhava and Vīra Carita are frequently referred to by Abhinavagupta. The details about the ancestry, parentage, religious tendencies, family atmosphere, place of birth etc. of the dramatist are found in these dramas.

1. T. A., Ah. XIII. 96–7.

MĀYŪRARĀJA (8th CENTURY A. D.).

Māyūrarāja is a different poet from Mayūra, about whom we have written earlier. He, according to Rājaśekhara's verse, quoted in Jalhaṇa's Sūktimuktāvalī (IV–82) was a Kalacuri poet. Being known to Rājaśekhara he may be said to belong to the 8th century A. D.

Abhinavagupta refers to the Udātta Rāghava, which is recognised to be from the pen of Māyūrarāja, in the context of the Sandhyaṅgas. Apart from the sixty-four Sandhyaṅgas, Bharata mentions Twenty one Sandhyantaras. And there are two views about them. One is that they come in between Sandhyaṅgas, according to the purpose. The other is that they are the basis of subdivisions of the Sandhyaṅgas, Upakṣepa etc.[1] Thus, Upakṣepa has many subdivisions. And illustrating the subdivision of Upakṣepa in which recapitulation of the causes is the characteristic feature, Abhinavagupta refers to the Udātta Rāghava[2] of Māyūrarāja.

ANAṄGAHARṢA MĀTṚRĀJA (8th CENTURY A. D.).

Anaṅga Harṣa Mātṛrāja was son of king Narendra. He belonged to a period earlier than the 9th century A. D., because he is quoted by Ānanda Vardhana, Abhinavagupta and Kuntaka. His famous drama is the Tāpasa Vatsarāja. Its theme is similer to that of the Svapna Vāsavadattā. It presents Udayana as an ascetic in consequence of separation from Vāsavadattā on account of her alleged death, his marriage with Padmāvatī and final reunion with Vāsavadattā at Prayāga, when both, king Udayana and Vāsavadattā, tired of life, are about to commit suicide. A manuscript of this work is found in Burlin. It has been referred to as No. 2166 by Professor Weber. It was edited by Yadugiri Yatirāja, Bengalore, in 1928.

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1. A. Bh., Vol. III, 63. 2. A. Bh., Vol. III, 64.

It has been referred to by Abhinavagupta to illustrate (i) that Śṛṅgāra often leads to the rise of Karuṇa, though Karuṇa does not necessarily follow Śṛṅgāra[1] : (ii) that grief in Udayana is not due to mere relationship with Vāsavadattā, but to her being object of intense love[2] : (iii) that a transient emotion is primarily relished in the context of Śṛṅgāra, for instance, eagerness (autsukya) is relished in love in separation or union "premāsamāptotsavam" (T. V. R, 1–17); but no transient emotion can be experienced in the context of disgust (Jugupsā), because it is opposed to all attachments, from which the emotions arise (Rāgapratipakṣatvāt).

It is also referred to to illustrate (1) the observance of Bharata's technique in respect of two types of introductory scene, technically called Praveśaka, out of the five types of it, recognised by Bharata : (i) Vyākhyā Praveśaka, the introductory scene in which the secret purpose of an action is revealed, as in the beginning of the 4th act of the Tāpasavatsarāja wherein the secret purpose of keeping Vāsavadattā in the palace of Padmāvatī is revealed : (ii) Kārya Praveśaka, wherein the means to the end, the time, place and persons etc., at and by whom they are to be employed, the ways and means of averting possible calamity etc. are talked of as in "Māmijjaiasavāsaehi... (T, V. R.[3] Act IV) : (2) the third Sandhi, technically called Vimarśa or Avamarśa wherein the hero reflects over the situation because of temptation[4] (3) the 41st Sandhyaṅga, called Drava, which consists in the presentation of going against the respected[5] (4) main plot (Ādhikārika Itivṛtta).[6] (5) Recollection of purpose (Vindu)[7] (6) Patākā.[8]

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1. A. Bh., Vol. I, 297.
2. Ibid., 298.
3. A. Bh., Vol. II, 424–5.
4. A. Bh., Vol. III, 27.
5. Ibid., 53.
6. A. Bh., Vol. III, 4.
7. Ibid., 14.
8. Ibid., 17.

It is also brought in to illustrate that the sweetness of behaviour is one of the causes of love[1] and that the meeting of princely lovers even in the day time in the harem[2] is permissible, according to Bharata.

BHEJJALA (9th CENTURY A. D.).

The only thing that can be said about the date of Bhejjala is that he belonged to a period before the 10th century, because he is referred to by Abhinavagupta. The only drama of this dramatist that we know of is the Rādhāvipralambha. It was a dependent type of drama, recognised by Kohala[3], called Rāsaka. Abhinavagupta, however, gives it slightly different name, calling it Rāsakāṅka, which seems to signify that the characteristic of Utsṛṣṭikāṅka, one of the main types of drama, was predominant in it. For, the chief feature of the Utsṛṣṭikāṅka is to present grief of women and Bhejjala's drama as the very title indicates, does so. And, according to the definition of Rāsaka in the Sāhitya Darpaṇa, it combines in itself the characteristics of both Bīthī and Aṅka or Utsṛṣṭikāṅka. If we follow Viśvanātha we may also say that it consisted of one act only. It was mainly composed in the language of Sindhu and presented the aspect of gentle dance, technically called Saindhavaka.[4] In it three junctures (Sandhi) were united together merging Parikara and Parinyāsa into Upakṣepa.[5] Bhejjala accepts the view that what is presented behind the scene (Antaryavanikāṅga) is not simply meant for entertainment, but has important dramatic purpose.[6] The following verse is quoted by Abhinavagupta from it at two places, A. Bh., Vol I, 42, and 216 :—

1. A. Bh., Vol. III, 197.
2. Ibid., 206.
3. A. Bh., Vol. II, 407.
4. A. Bh., Vol. III, 72.
5. Ibid., 63.
6. A. Bh., Vol. I, 216.

Meghāśaṅkiśikhaṇḍitāṇḍavavidhāvācāryakaṁ kalpayan etc. This drama is quoted in the Nāṭya Darpaṇa by Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra, pupils of Jain Ācārya Hemacandra. They belonged to the time of Kumārapāla and Ajayapāla (C. 1143–75 A. D.).

BHĪMA (9th CENTURY A. D.).

Bhīma, according to Abhinavagupta, was a great poet. His only work, that we know, is the Pratijñā Cāṇakya as referred to by Abhinavagupta in the context of presentation of the idea that Śakāra need not necessarily be a man of low birth. For, Bhīma has presented king Vindhyaketu as Śakāra.[1]

The question is whether this Bhīma is identical with Bhīmaṭa, whose (i) Manoramā Vatsarāja is cited in the Nāṭyadarpaṇa, and (ii) Svapna Daśānana is referred to by Bhoja and Rājaśekhara, the latter representing him as king of Kaliñjara and author of five plays. At this stage nothing more can be said than that besides a little similarity in names there is no evidence to identify the two. He may have been a very distant predecessor of Abhinava : for, his son Vasunāga also is referred to in the Abhinava Bhāratī. He may have belonged to the 9th century.

VASUNĀGA.

There seems to be a reference to Bhīma's son, Vasunāga, who was the author of a drama, Pratimāniruddha, depicting the carrying away of Uṣā by Aniruddha. It is referred to by Abhinava to illustrate (i) that very often two parts of a juncture (Sandhyaṅgas) are compressed into one as in the Pratimāniruddha by Vasunāga, the son of Bhīma, where Parinyāsa comes immediately after Upakṣepa, because Parikara is compressed into the former[2] (ii) that very often the stage-manager

1. A. Bh., Vol. II, 161.

2. A. Bh., Vol. III, 63.

makes use of Bīthyaṅgas in the introductory scene[1] (iii) that in some dramas a character of the piece enters into the stage repeating the last words of the stage-manager.[2]

BRAHMAYAŚAḤSVĀMIN (9th CENTURY A. D.).

From Abhinavagupta's discussion on "Mandakulastrī-caritam" N. S., Ch. XVIII, V. 50, as a part of the definition of Prakaraṇa, it appears that there were two interpretations of the line quoted above : (i) in which there is very little action of the lady of high class, (ii) wherein the married woman (the heroine) also is not very high born. The former interpretation was common. The latter was given by the teachers of Abhinavagupta and was followed by the author of the Prakaraṇa, Puṣpadūṣitaka, which dealt with the love-story of a merchant, Samudra Datta, and Nandayantī in six acts. It appears that this drama was adversely criticised by the followers of the former interpretation. But Abhinavagupta defends the author of the drama on the basis of his teachers' interpretation and says that by their adverse criticism the critics have not injured the reputation of Brahmayaśaḥsvāmin but their own.[3]

From this it seems to be clear that Abhinavagupta knew the name of the author to be Brahmayaśaḥsvāmin and that the latter was not very far removed from the former in time. He may have been a successor of Abhinava's teachers or a contemporary. He may, therefore, be said to belong to the 9th or 10th century A. D. Very probably he was a Kashmirian.

RĀJAŚEKHARA.

Rājaśekhara's date can be fixed on the basis of his own remarks in the prologues to his dramas, wherein he asserts that he was the teacher of king Mahendrapāla of Kānyakubja

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1. A. Bh., Vol. III, 92. 2. Ibid., 94. 3. A. Bh., Vol. II, 432.

(903 A. D.) and was patronised by his son Mahīpāla (917 A. D.) as also on that of his references to and quotations from Ānanda Vardhana, who was contemporary of king Avanti Varman of Kashmir (857–884). He is, therefore, admitted to have lived in 880–920 A. D.

He seems to have been criticised by Abhinavagupta in his commentary on the last verse of the Ghaṭakarpara Kulaka of Kālidāsa[1] for maintaining the distinction between Kavi Śakti and Vyutpatti.[2] This point, as it appears from Abhinava's reference, was elaborated by him in his Purūravovicāra.

In the Abhinava Bhāratī not only Rājaśekhara is referred to but also three of his dramas are mentioned and quoted as follows :—

(i) In the context of the theatrical convention (Nāṭyadharmī), technically called "Ativākyakriyopeta" i. e. the introduction of the befitting and interesting modifications in the dramatised historical events, the Bāla Rāmāyaṇa of Rājaśekhara is referred to as an illustration. For, herein the author modifies the historical plot in so far as he represents the exile of Rāma, consented to, not by Daśaratha himself, but by a Rākṣasa in his garb.[3] (ii) In the course of the commentary on the Nāṭyaśastra chapter xxxi, while discussing Saindhava, one of the ten aspects of Lāsya, Abhinavagupta points out that dependent forms of 'dance-drama' such as Ḍombikā, Prasthānaka etc. have been evolved by poets from the Saindhava. The manuscript here is very corrupt. The meaning, however, is clear. It runs as follows :—

Saindhavamiti rūpametadupajīvadbhiḥ (jivatā deva ?) loke prekṣaṇīyāni (nyaṅgāni) ḍombikā (dināṭaka ?) prasthānādīni kavibhirnibaddhāni (A. Bh., Ch. XXXI, V, 513).

1. Gh., V. 21. 2. K. M., 11. 3. A. Bh., Vol. II, 215.

And commenting on the Saindhavaka in Chapter XIX, he points out that in the presentation of Śṛṅgāra Rasa, Prākṛta is the most effective. Hence Rājaśekhara composed his Saṭṭaka, the Karpūra Mañjarī, in that language.[1] (iii) Dealing with the gesture of hands, technically called Patākā, and pointing out that it is to be employed in the presentation of the glory of a king in order to cause dejection in the hearts of the enemies, Abhinavagupta refers to a passage in the Viddhaśāla Bhañjikā[2] in the acting of which it is necessary.

TOTA OR BHAṬṬA TAUTA (10th CENTURY A. D.), ABHINAVA'S TEACHER IN DRAMATURGY.

Bhaṭṭa Tota or Tauta was Abhinava's teacher in dramaturgy. What is said in the Abhinava Bhāratī is a summary of lectures on the exposition of Bharata's Nāṭya Śāstra, given by Bhaṭṭa Tauta.[3] Abhinavagupta refers to him and quotes from his works, very often giving the name of the work, but equally often without stating the name of the particular work. It is, therefore, not certain whether Bhaṭṭa Tauta wrote any other work besides the Kāvya Kautuka, to which there are explicit references and on which Abhinavagupta wrote his commentary, called Vivaraṇa, which also is known so far from his own references only.

Bhaṭṭa Tauta is quoted and referred to by Abhinavagupta in the Locana and the Abhinava Bhāratī. In the Locana he refers to and quotes him in support of the view that the experiences of the hero, the poet and the æsthete are identical[4] and that the Śānta Rasa is the highest of all Rasas, because it is concerned with the highest objective of human pursuit and leads to final emancipation.[5] In the latter case there is reference

1. A. Bh., Vol. III, 72.
2. A. Bh., Vol. II, 29.
3. A. Bh., Vol. I, 1.
4. Dh. L., 29.
5. Ibid., 178.

to the Kāvya Kautuka without any quotation, but in the former case no work is referred to, only quotation is given.

In the Abhinava Bhāratī Bhaṭṭa Tauta is referred to and quoted in support of the view that music should follow the presentation of the dance-movements, involved in Cārī, but should not accompany[1]; that æsthetic experience is possible not only from the presentation of a drama but also from the perusal or hearing of a poem, but only when what is poetically presented is so visualised as to border on direct perception[2] (here Kāvya Kautuka is mentioned).

Another context is that of Śṛṅgāra. The question that is raised is : How can the transient emotions of Karuṇa find place in the presentation of Śṛṅgāra, the basic emotion of which is Rati ? And the reply, in accordance with the Kāma Sūtra, is that it is because Śṛṅgāra is recognised to have ten states, including death. Hence there is place for anxiety (Cintā) etc. in the presentation of Śṛṅgāra. But the distinction of Śṛṅgāra from Karuṇa lies in this that in the former the basic emotion of love underlies all the transient emotions, which are common to Karuṇa also; but in the Karuṇa, the underlying basic emotion is grief due to the irrecoverable loss of the object of love. For instance, in the Ratnāvalī, Udayana's befitting love for Sāgarikā,—that arises in consequence of his seeing the picture in the befitting situation, presented by the bed of lotus-leaves, as also the mimetic changes, the fall of tears etc., presented in the part of the picture, representing Sāgarikā, which clearly indicate her love for the king and justify the rise of love for Sāgarikā in him,—underlies all the transient emotions, which are common to Karuṇa. But when love is not to be presented in the context of separation, then its rise may be presented independently of awareness of the

1. A. Bh., Vol. I, 187. 2. Ibid. 291-2.

existence of love in the object of love on the part of the lover : for instance, Rāvaṇa's love for Sītā. In support of this view Bhaṭṭa Tauta is quoted without reference to the work as follows :—

"Svātantryeṇa pravṛttau tu sarvaprāṇiṣu sambhavaḥ."[1]

Such a love is not real love, but only an appearance of it (Ratyābhāsa).

In the Sandhyadhyāya of the Abhinava Bhāratī Ch. XIX in the context of the gentle dance, which is recognised to have ten aspects, Abhinavagupta refutes the view of those who accept the eleventh aspect of gentle dance (Lāsya), call it Bhāvika and attribute a verse to Bharata, which defines it. He points out that such a view is inconsistent with the statements of Bharata in Ch. XIX, V. 120 and Ch. XXXI, wherein he declares it to have ten aspects only[2] (Daśāṅgaṁ lāsyam). He emphasises the importance of gentle dance (Lāsya) which is distinct from drama, is to be presented by a single performer,[3] lends such a charm to drama as is not to be found at the empirical level and, therefore, is to be introduced in abundance in the presentation of the æsthetic configuration, of which it is a very essential aspect, and quotes six verses from the 22nd Chapter of a work of Bhaṭṭa Tauta, the name of which he does not mention.

In the context of discussion of young lady's graces (Alaṅkāra) Abhinavagupta takes up a very interesting point in so far as it refers to the Sāttvika Bhāvas, dealt with in the Nāṭya Śāstra, the Abhinava Bhāratī on which is not fully available. In Chapter VII he attempted to answer a question : "How can an actor, who is not in grief, act that emotion ?" by asserting that he can do so by mental concentration at the idea of grief :

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1. A. Bh., Vol. I, 310. 2. A. Bh., Vol. III, 77. 3. Ibid., 66.

(Sattvaṁ cittaikāgryam tajjanitaṁ ca kṛtakaṁ vāṣpādiprāptyavasthātmakam. A. Bh. Vol. I, 347).

and thus explained that certain emotions are called Sāttvika, because they are due to mental concentration and find invoIuntary expression in physical changes such as fall of tears etc.

In Chapter XXII elaborating this point, he attempts to draw a distinction between the Sattva which is the origin of the Sāttvika Bhāvas, which find expression in the involuntary physical changes such as perspiration, horripilation etc., and that Sattva, which expresses itself in the woman's graces (Alaṅkāra): for, both are admitted to be due to Sattva. Bharata himself distinguishes between the two by calling one 'not-manifest' (Avyaktarūpaṁ sattvam A. Bh., Vol. III, 150) and the other 'physical' (Dehātmakam bhavet sattvam, Ibid., 155). Abhinavagupta explains the distinction as follows :—

An emotive tendency of the mind or heart, coming to the conscious level and affecting the vital air (Prāṇa) affects the physical organism and, therefore, finds expression in physical changes. It is called 'not-manifest' when it does not very clearly descend to the level of clear consciousness and affect vital air. Such a Sattva is the subject-matter of that part of the 7th chapter, which deals with Sāttvika Bhāvas.[1]

The Sattva, which is called 'physical,' and is referred to in the context of woman's graces, is the peculiar property of the body and manifests itself in the physical beauty[2] and graces at the time of youth. In this case no mental effort is needed to concentrate on an emotion as in the case of the Sāttvika Bhāva. Some of the graces presuppose simply the residual traces of the experiences of the past birth.[3] They are movements of eyes, eyebrows and neck, made by a girl, such as arouse the idea in the æsthete that she would be

1. A. Bh., Vol. III, 152. 2. Ibid., 155. 3. Ibid., 154.

a great heroine. These physical movements are called Bhāva when they attain greater excellence.

When she attains youth but still is not conscious of it and makes graceful movements so much so that both æsthete and non-æsthete can clearly recognise the expression of love in them, they are called "Hāva."[1] These very movements, at the time when she becomes conscious of her youth but yet has no definite object, are called Helā.[2] They are expressions of love that has no objective reference, and are due simply to the residual traces of it, coming more and more to the fore-ground.

In this context Abhinavagupta asserts that these graceful movements are found not only in high born girls but also in those of low birth and indicate their superiority to others of the same class.[3]

It may be noted here that the conception of Sattva in the context of Śāttvikābhinaya is very different, as discussed elsewhere. In the same chapter he discusses the physical changes, movements and behaviour of both men and women when the emotion of love arises at the sight of, hearing of and even on seeing the picture of befitting object. They arise only in the absence of the pleasure of union, not only before the first union but also in the separation after union. In support of this view he quotes Bhaṭṭa Tota.[4]

There are many places at which Bhaṭṭa Tauta seems to be referred to simply as Upādhyāya and it is very interesting to find that often Abhinavagupta differs from what Bhaṭṭa Tauta said in his Kāvya Kautuka and criticises him adversely.[5]

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1. A. Bh., Vol. III, 156.
2. Ibid., 157.
3. A. Bh., Vol. III, 153.
4. Idid., 199.
5. A. Bh., Vol. III, 168.

WAS VIKAṬA NITAMBĀ AN AUTHORESS ?

Many of our contemporaries, basing their opinion on the word Vikaṭa Nitambā, occurring in the Anthologies, have asserted that she was a poetess. But a study of the Abhinava Bhāratī makes it very doubtful that the word "Vikaṭa Nitambā" stands for the name of an authoress. For, Abhinavagupta definitely states that Vikaṭa Nitambā is a character in the comic play (Prahasana) called Vikaṭa Nitambā Prahasana, and quotes from it the following :—

"Anyāsu tāvadupamardasahāsu bhṛṅga
Lolaṁ vinodaya manaḥ sumano latāsu
Mugdhānanām arajasām kalikām akāle
Bālāṁ kadarthayasi kiṁ navamallikāyāḥ."

It is an illustration of the Lakṣaṇa, called Manoratha, which consists in expressing one's secret desire under the pretext of referring to some one alse's condition.[1]

Nothing more can be said about the date of this Prahasana, excepting that it is prior to the 10th century A. D., because it is referred to by Abhinavagupta. The name of its author is not traceable.

ĪŚVARA DATTA.

Īśvaradatta, the recognised author of the Dhūrtaviṭa Saṁvāda, a Bhāṇa, published in the Caturbhāṇī, is thrice quoted in the Abhinava Bhāratī. All the quotations are from the Bhāṇa, which is referred to as Dhūrtaviṭa only. They are found in the published edition and are given as illustrations of the Lakṣaṇas, called (i) Upadiṣta, (ii) Garhaṇa, (iii) Arthāpatti. They are as follows :—

(i) Śūnye vāsam...........

1. A. Bh., Vol. II, 362.

(ii) Praṇaṣṭā na vyaktiḥ.........

(iii) Ādaṣṭasphuritādhare...........

The only thing that can be said with certainty about his date is that he is prior to Abhinavagupta.

SARVASENA.

Servasena is referred to in the Dhvanyāloka and the Locana, as the author of a poem, Harivijaya, in the course of presentation of the ways and means of making a poem æsthetically suggestive. One of the ways is the elimination of such parts of the original plot as are not in full harmony with the æsthetic configuration, that the poet intends to present, and introduction of such as heighten its æsthetic value. To illustrate this point Harivijaya is referred to as the one in which carrying away of the Pārijāta is introduced to please the darling.[1] He may be said to belong to the 8th or the first half of the 9th century A. D., because he is referred to by Ānanda Vardhana in the second half of the 9th century.

ABHINANDA (10th CENTURY A. D.), A TEACHER OF ABHINAVA.

Abhinavagupta refers to Abhinanda as one of his teachers in the long list of them in the concluding chapter of his Tantrāloka. That he is identical with the author of the Kādambarī Kathāśāra, seems to be beyond doubt, because quotations from the above work appear not only in Abhinavagupta's works but also in those of Bhoja and Kṣemendra. He was the son of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, the author of the Nyāya Mañjarī. Abhinanda, therefore, can safely be said to belong to the 10th Century A. D. The fact that he refers to Rājaśekhara whose date is admitted to be 880–920 A. D. and that he belonged to Kashmir, because he refers to one of his ancestors, Śaktisvāmin,

1. Dh. L., 148.

who was a minister of Muktāpīḍa, King of Kashmir (699–735), support the identification of the author of the Kādambarī Kathāśāra with Abhinavagupta's teacher, Abhinanda.

This Abhinanda is to be distinguished from his namesake, the author of the Rāma Carita, from which also a quotation occurs in the Abhinava Bhāratī Vol. II, 361. For, Satānanda was the name of the latter's father. Only one thing can be stated with certainty about the latter's date, namely, that he was earlier than Abhinavagupta.

It may be added here that the Rāma Carita, referred to by Abhinavagupta, is to be distinguished from another poetic work, bearing the same title, composed by Sandhyākara Nandin, son of Prajāpati Nandin, who completed his poem in the reign of Madanapāla at the close of the 11th century A. D.

ŚYĀMALAKA (10th CENTURY A. D.).

Śyāmalaka belonged to Kashmir and his Bhāṇa (a type of drama) entitled "Pādatāḍitaka" is referred to by Abhinavagupta.[1] He was a great poet and teacher of Mahima Bhaṭṭa, who belonged to the 11th century A. D., because he came after Abhinavagupta, whom he criticises, and before Ruyyaka, who comments on his Vyakti Viveka. Śyāmalaka may, therefore, have been an older contemporary of Abhinavagupta and may, therefore, be said to belong to the close of the 10th and the beginning of the 11th century A. D.

It may, however, be pointed out that the above statement is based on the presupposition that Śyāmalaka, referred to by Mahima Bhaṭṭa as his teacher, is identical with Śyāmilaka, whose drama 'Pāda Tāḍitaka' has been published in the Caturbhāṇī, edited by Rāma Kṛṣṇa Kavi in 1922. The view that the two are identical finds support in the following quotation

1. A. Bh., Vol. I, 178.

by Abhinavagupta,[1] in which Madanasenā is described and, therefore, serves as an illustration of the Lakṣaṇa, called Dṛṣṭa, which consists in the linguistic presentation of the external form of an object in due temporal and spatial relations, whether it be directly perceptible or not :—

"Utkṣiptālaka"

It is interesting to note that this verse is found as verse No. 115 in the printed edition.

Works of unknown authors referred to by Abhinavagupta :—

1. Abhisārikā vañcitakam
2. Māyā Puṣpaka
3. Pāṇḍavānanda
4. Nṛttapāra or Nṛttavāra
5. Kṛtyā Rāvaṇa
6. Mārīca Vadha
7. Rāghava Vijaya
8. Pratibhā Cāṇakya
9. Gadāyuddha.

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1. A. Bh., Vol. II, 356.

CHAPTER VI

HIS IMPORTANCE AND INFLUENCE

In the preceding chapter we have tried to trace the historical background of Abhinava's Tāntrika, poetic and philosophic thoughts to give a clear idea of the material on which he worked and of the advance that his thoughts present on those of his predecessors. In this chapter we propose to deal with some of the important writers, who succeeded him, to show his importance in the eyes of the later generations and to indicate how far he influenced the ideas of the future writers and how his work was carried on by his immediate successors. We, therefore, for the sake of convenience, divide the writers on whom we have to speak here into two classes :—

1. His commentators or pupils.
2. Other writers who were directly influenced by him.

(I) KṢEMARĀJA.

Among his commentators first of all comes Kṣemarāja in the chronological order, which, as before, we propose to follow in this chapter also. In the colophons of all his works he represents himself to be a pupil of Abhinavaguptapādācārya. And Madhurāja yogin in his 'Dhyānaślokāḥ' seems to represent him as the greatest of the pupils of Abhinavagupta by referring to him alone by name among those who wrote down the exposition of the theory of music, orally given by the teacher.

"Kṣemarājaprabhṛtibhirakhilaiḥ sevitaḥ śiṣyavargaiḥ."

There is, therefore, no difficulty in fixing his time. Abhinava's last available dated work was completed in 1014–15 A. D.

We can, therefore, easily assign Kṣemarāja's literary activities to the close of the first and practically the whole of the second quarter of the eleventh century A. D. We have not so far been able to find any passage in Kṣemarāja's works which could give us an idea of his parentage. But Abhinava in the 37th chapter of his Tantrāloka, includes "Kṣema" in the list of the names of his pupils. In another list, which gives the names of his cousins, this very name is mentioned as that of the first of them. They also were his pupils.[1] The indications of a very close contact of himself with Abhinava that Kṣemarāja gives by using some such expressions as "Pādapadmopajīvin" in every work of his, and the important place that he occupies among Abhinava's pupil-writers seem to support the probability that Kṣema of the Tantrāloka stands for Kṣemarāja, the author of the Pratyabhijñā Hṛdaya and other philosophical works. In fact, in the Pratyabhijñā Hṛdaya he refers to himself as Kṣema :

"Kṣemeṇoddhriyate sāraḥ saṁsāra viṣa śāntaye."

P. H., 1.

If this probability be accepted we would suggest the name of Kṣemarāja's father also. In the last chapter we have spoken about one Vāmanagupta, whom Abhinava represents as his uncle.[2] As he is the only uncle of Abhinava, of whom we know, will it be wrong to say that he was Kṣemarāja's father ?

HIS WORKS.

Kṣemarāja also, like his great teacher, Abhinavagupta, has written on all the three subjects i. e. Tantra, poetics and Śaiva philosophy. His work on poetics, viz., the commentary, called Udyota, on Abhinava's Locana has not so far been accessible

1. T. A., XII, 417.
2. A. Bh., Vol. I, 297.

to us. It is, therefore, not possible at this stage to assign any chronological position to it. However, on the strength of what we have read we can say that he also worked on the lines of his great teacher. He also, like Abhinava, first of all, used the power of his pen in commenting upon the monistic Śaiva Tantras, then perhaps upon his teacher's work on poetics, the Locana, and last of all on the philosophical works, like the Spanda Kārikā. Thus he carried on the work of his teacher. The students of the Śaiva philosophy owe a special debt of gratitude to Kṣemarāja for a systematic presentation of the views of Abhinava on the Spanda branch, on which the latter,[1] not liking to be classed with the common herd of commentators, did not write.

1. SVACCHANDODYOTA.

It is his commentary on the Svacchanda Tantra. This seems to be the first in the chronology of his available works. It is referred to in his commentaries on Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇa's Stava Cintāmaṇi, P. 226, on the Śiva Sūtra, P. 12, and on the Netra Tantra, P. 226.

2. NETRODYOTA.

Netrodyota is a commentary on the Netra Tantra.

3. VIJÑĀNA BHAIRAVODYOTA.

4. DHVANYĀLOKA LOCANODYOTA.

5. SPANDA SANDOHA.

Spanda Sandoha is, as has already been pointed out, Kṣemarāja's commentary on the first verse of the Spanda Kārikā in which he deals with practically the whole of the Spanda system. In the chronological order of his works this comes before his Spanda Nirṇaya[2] in which he refers to it at more than one place.[3]

1. S. N., 77. 2. S. N., 1. 3. S. N., 7.

6. SPANDA NIRṆAYA.

It is a commentary on the whole of the Spanda Kārikā. It may be pointed out here that Dr. Bühler in his Kashmir Catalogue has thrown some doubt on the point of the authorship of the last two works by showing them as the works of Kṣemendra (consult P. XXXIII, MSS. 511 and 517) though he says on page 79 :—

"Kṣemendra, the author of Spanda Nirṇaya, No. 511, and of Spanda Sandoha 517 appears to be identical with Kṣemarāja, the pupil of Abhinava."

We do not know the learned Doctor's reasons for assigning these works to Kṣemendra, perhaps he found this name in the colophons of the works in question. But our careful study shows that they are the works of Kṣemarāja and that if in the colophons of some MSS. the name of Kṣemendra is found, it must have been simply due to the mistake of the scribes. In the Pratyabhijñā Hṛdaya and in the Śiva Sūtra Vimarśinī, which are accepted by all to be of Kṣemarāja's authorship, these two works are referred to by him as his own, as the following quotations therefrom show :—

"Tathā mayā vitatya Spanda Sandohe nirṇītam." P. H., P. 24.

"Yathā caitat tathā asmadīyāt Spanda Nirṇayād avaboddhavyam." S. S. Vi., P. 14.

"Etat Spanda Nirṇaye nirākāṅkṣam mayaiva nirṇītam." S. S. Vi., P. 129.

7. PRATYABHIJÑĀ HṚDAYA.

8. COMMENTARY ON THE ABOVE.

9. ŚIVA SŪTRA VIMARŚINĪ.

10. VIVṚTI ON THE STAVA CINTĀMAṆI.

11. UTPALA STOTRĀVALĪ ṬĪKĀ.

12. PARĀ PRAVEŚIKĀ.

13, ṬĪKĀ ON SĀMBA PAÑCĀŚIKĀ.

14. A COMMENTARY ON THE KRAMA SŪTRA.

Of this we know from the following reference only, in Maheśvarānanda's commentary on his own Mahārtha Mañjarī, P. 166 :—

"Yaduktaṁ Śrī Kramasūtreṣu.................

Yathā ca vyākhyātaṁ Śrīmat Kṣemarājena."

15. A STOTRA.

This is known from the following reference only, in his own commentary on the Stava Cintāmaṇi, P. 64 :—

"Taduktam mayāpi svastotre."

16. BHAIRAVĀNUKARAṆA STOTRA.

It is mentioned as one of his works in the introduction to the Sāmba Pañcāśikā Ṭīkā.

17. PARAMĀRTHA SAṄGRAHA VIVṚTI.

It is noticed in Dr. Bühler's Kashmir Catalogue (MS. No. 459). The text is attributed to Abhinavagupta.

18. VṚTTI ON PARAMEŚA STOTRĀVALĪ OF UTPALA.
(Bühler's Kashmir Catalogue MS. 458.)

(II) MADHURĀJA YOGIN AND HIS WORKS.

Madhurāja Yogin was a very devoted disciple of Abhinavagupta. We have not so far discovered any work of his, which may be said to be a commentary on a work of Abhinavagupta. He has given an autobiographical sketch of himself in his poem, the Svātmaparāmarśa, a MS. of which, together with those of the Gurunāthaparāmarśa, the Śāstra Parāmarśa and the Dhyānaślokāḥ, was discovered in Kashmir. The copies of these MSS. are in the possession of Mahāmahopādhyāya Gopīnātha Kavirāja and Mahāmahopādhyāya Narayana Shastri Khriste, Varanasi. The Gurunātha Parāmarśa, consisting of Fifty verses, with a brief introduction and elucidatory foot-notes has been published by Dr. V.Raghavan

in the Bulletin of the Government Oriental Manuscript Library, Madras, Vol. II, No. 1.

Madhurāja Yogin does not mention his name even in the colophon of his Svātmaparāmarśa. But in the body of the poem he refers to himself as Mādhura,[1] Madhurāja Kavi[2] and Madhurāja Yogin.[3]

It seems that, according to the established practice, which is followed even now, he was given this name when he became an ascetic. His former name was Bhaṭṭa Kṛṣṇa and to this also he refers.[4]

In three other poems he does not refer to himself by name. But in them also he refers to himself in the first person. Thus, in the Śāstra-parāmarśa he says "Hṛdayamastu mama pratibhāmayam" (3) "Bhavatu mama vibhūtyai" (7) and "Svairaṁ carāmo vayam" (9). In the Gurunāthaparāmarśa also similarly he says "Ālokaṁ diśatu dṛśāmalaukikaṁ naḥ" (4) "Asmākamāranālamiva" (11) "Niyamena mokṣalakṣmīrnaḥ" (16) "Asmākamātmaviduṣām" (18) "Mama tvayi niveśitam" (34) and so on. These references to self, together with similar titles, including the common word "Parāmarśa" seem to leave little doubt about the common authorship of these small poems.

As regards the Dhyānaślokāḥ, it may be said that though there occurs reference to self in it "Śrīmān naḥ pātu" (4) as in other poems, discussed above, yet there is no similarity in title. But the internal evidence, consisting of commonness of the ideas e. g. referring to Abhinavagupta as an incarnation of Śrīkaṇṭheśa, together with the common tone of devotion to him and existence of this poem in the same codex seem to suggest that Madhurāja Yogin is the author of the work.

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1. S. Pa., 6.
2. Ibid., 14.
3. Ibid., 9.
4. S. Pa., 13.

HIS AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH AND DATE.

In Kashmir there was the practice of referring to Kali or Saptarṣi era or both as is clear from Abhinavagupta's references in his works, referred to in the 1st Chapter. Madhurāja states that in the year 4167 "Siddhaviśākhakṛpāmṛtavarṣe" (7) he was Eighty years of age. If we take "siddha" to stand for seven, according to seven means of attaining Siddhi (Upāyāstatra kartavyāḥ sapta śaṅkarabhāṣitāḥ) ; "Viśākha" for six, because Svāmikārtika has six faces; "Kṛpā" for one and "Amṛta" for four, because of its being recognised to be of four forms :

Amṛtaṁ guṇavatī bhāryā amṛtaṁ putrapaṇḍitaḥ
Amṛtaṁ śiśire vahnir amṛtaṁ śiśubhāṣitam

we get the figures, mentioned above. And if we take the reference to Kali era, the year of his birth will come to be 4087 of Kali. This means that in the year 4115 of Kali era, (1014–15 A. D.) when the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vivṛti Vimarśinī of Abhinavagupta was completed, Madhurāja was 28 years of age. Thus, it is clear that he had seen with his own eyes the great congregation of spiritualists, in which Abhinavagupta was recognised to be the spiritual head of all the Śaiva sects, to which he refers in the Gurunātha parāmarśa (7) and had witnessed the scene which he presents in his Dhyānaślokāḥ. Being of impressionable age at that time, he was very deeply impressed by Abhinavagupta's intellectual and spiritual greatness and his impressions are beautifully recorded in his small poem.

His autobiographical sketch is concerned with the last seven years or so of his life when he had embraced asceticism. It begins with the statement that he became a Śaiva ascetic (Śivayogin) on Sunday, when the Viśākhā Nakṣatra had reached the thirteenth day of the brighter half of the month of Jyeṣṭha. He was capable of demolishing the theories of the

opponents and establishing his own. His memory was keen so much so that he clearly remembered even at the age of 74 what he had been taught by his father in his childhood. At the age of 78 he was still preaching monistic Śaivaism. He realised his oneness with Śiva at the age of Eighty. Even at such an advanced age he was composing poems and expounding intricate problems of his system. He had only four things, a staff in hand, a begging bowl of shell of tortoise, a water-pot and a patched garment. His body was besmeared with ashes. Occasionally, however, when he travelled over very hot regions, he wore shoes and carried an umbrella of mat, supported by three spokes. He was dressed in a loin-cloth and carried a manuscript, ashes and a piece of cloth, which he used to throw over the back and knees at the time of abstract meditation. He visited Mathurā, Mālava, Baṅga, Lāṭa, Gauḍa and other distant places. He lived on grass, gram or broken rice,[1] according to the need of time. He was indifferent to praise and blame.

He was a very well read man. He had read works on dualistic Śaivaism, covering two lacs of Granthas and one lac of Granthas on the Śaiva monism. Even at the age of Eighty he was a voracious reader. He had inherited the learned tradition of his family. Accordingly he was well versed in the Yajurveda and its branches, in Mantra and Tantra, and in the Paramādvaita philosophy.[2] He was skilled in many arts.[3] He wrote Thousands of original verses and many works in prose, which won the hearts of persons with æsthetic susceptibility. He liked Vīramata. He wrote the Svātmaparāmarśa at the time when he was living in the outskirt of Pāṇḍya Capital (Madura ?)[4]

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1. S. Pa., (MS.) 24-7.
2. Ibid., 31-33.
3. S. Pa., (MS.) 23.
4 Ibid., 41-2.

(III) YOGARĀJA.

The commentator who came next after Kṣemarāja was Yogarāja. According to his own statement in the concluding lines of his commentary, Vivṛti, on the Paramārtha Sāra of Abhinavagupta, he was a pupil of Kṣemarāja[1] who was in possession of the tradition. We shall, therefore, not be wrong if we say that he belonged to the second half of the eleventh century A. D. At the time when he wrote the said commentary he had already renounced the world and was living as an ascetic at Vitastāpurī in Kashmir. This commentary, according to its author, is from the point of view of pure monism.

(IV) SUBHAṬA DATTA.

He is the first known commentator of Abhinava's Tantrāloka. The only source of information about him is Jayaratha's Viveka[2]. According to this, he was the preceptor of Rājarāja, whom we cannot definitely identify with any King of Kashmir. There is, however, no difficulty in approximately fixing his time. Jayaratha says that his initiation (into Śaivaism ?) was performed by Subhaṭa. The former's time of literary activity, as we shall just show, was the close of the 12th and the beginning of the 13th century A. D. We can, therefore, safely say that Subhaṭa lived in the later half of the 12th century. His father's name was Tribhuvana[3] Datta and that of his grand-father, Viśvadatta. It is probably to this commentary that Jayaratha refers in his commentary on the Tantrāloka, Ah. I. PP. 15–16, where he says that he refrains from criticising different interpretations put upon the first verse by others, because his object is only to take out whatever substance is to be found in their writings and not to criticise them.[4] This commentary was called

1. P. S., Comm., 199.
2. T. A., Comm., XII, 433.
3. Ibid.
4. T. A., Comm.. Ah. I, 15-6.

VIVṚTI.

No trace of it has so far been found.

(V) JAYARATHA.

He was the author of the Viveka, the famous commentary on the Tantrāloka. He was a younger contemporary of a certain Kashmirian King, Rājarāja, who was probably the same as Jaya Siṁha (Circa 1200 A. D.). It was because of the encouragement received from this King that he studied the Tantrāloka.[1] His initiation was performed, as stated above, by Subhaṭa Datta.[2] His teacher in Śaivaism was Kalyāṇa[3] and so was Śaṅkhadhara in other branches of learning.[4] He had a younger brother named Jayadratha.[5] Śṛṅgāraratha was the name of his father who was a minister to King Rājarāja.[6] He was a Jīvanmukta.

HIS DATE.

He has given the genealogy of his family since the time of Pūrṇamanoratha who was a minister to King Yaśaskara[7] of Kashmir (930 A. D.). Eight generations are shown to intervene between the first ancestor of this list, Pūrṇamanoratha, and our commentator, Jayaratha. Of these the fifth ancestor also, viz. Utpalaratha,[8] who was a minister to King Ananta of Kashmir (1028-1063 A. D.), is of known date. Thus if we allow, according to the ordinary practice of scholars, about a quarter of a century for each generation, Jayaratha's time comes to be about the close of the 12th and the beginning of the 13th century A. D. The names of his direct ancestors are given below in the order of their succession :—

1. Pūrṇamanoratha (930 A. D.).
2. Utpalaratha I.

1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. T. A., Comm., XII, 428–34.

7, 8. T. A., Comm., XII, 430.

3. Prakāśaratha.
4. Sūryaratha.
5. Utpalaratha II. (circa 1028-63)
6. Samaratha.
7. Guṇaratha.
8. Guṅgaratha.
9. Śṛṅgāraratha.
10. Jayaratha.

Like Abhinavagupta and others, he also wrote both on Śaivaism and poetics. At present we know of only the following three works of his :—

1. TANTRĀLOKA VIVEKA.
2. ALAṄKĀRA VIMARŚINĪ.

It is a commentary on Ruyyaka's Alaṅkāra Sarvasva.

3. ALAṄKĀRODĀHARAṆA.

(VI) ŚOBHĀKARAGUPTA.

He commented upon Abhinava's famous Bhairava Stotra, giving it a Vaiṣṇavaite interpretation. The manner in which he splits the words and the uncommon meaning that he attributes to them make it clear that the interpretation is forced and was not intended by the writer of the original. A copy of the MS. of this commentary is in the possession of the present writer. The commentator interprets the last verse in such a way as to make it indicate the date of his commentary. According to this interpretation, it was written on the day of Śivarātri i. e. the 13th day of the dark half of the lunar month of Phālguṇa, in the fifty-third year of Kali.[1] He has not stated the century : it is, therefore, not possible to fix his time. He does not appear to be a very old writer.

1. Bh. S., Comm., (MS.)

(VII) BHĀSKARA KAṆṬHA.

He is the writer of the commentary on Abhinava's Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī, called Bhāskarī. It is a very learned commentary and gives the traditional interpretation of Abhinava's text. Although it presupposes sufficient previous study of the Śaiva literature of Kashmir on the part of the reader in order that he may be able to understand it and needs elaboration, yet, in view of the fact that the tradition about the Pratyabhijñā literature is well-nigh dead, a proper understanding of Abhinava's Vimarśinī is extremely difficult without its help. This difficulty the writer of these pages himself felt for a very long time when he had to struggle with the text before the discovery of the commentary. Many points would have remained doubtful and many more would have been misunderstood but for the help that could be got from this at the last stage. A copy of it is in the possession of the present writer. It has been edited and published along with translation, in English, of Abhinava's Vimarśinī, and an outline of History of Śaiva Philosophy in three volumes. The author of the Bhāskarī tried, in his own way, to make it as simple as possible so much so that he felt the necessity of explaining the purpose of the particular method of exposition that he had adopted, by stating in his introduction "Svasutādibodhanārtham."

He was of the Dhaumyāyana Gotra.[1] The names of his grand-father and father were Vaiḍūrya Kaṇṭha and Avatāra Kaṇṭha respectively. He married and had a son, Jagannātha. His teacher's name was Kaula[2] Narottama.

HIS DATE.

He does not say anything about the time of his life or that of the composition of his works. On enquiry, however, from

1. Bh., Vol. I, 2. 2. Bh., Vol. I, 3.

his living descendants, it has been found that he was six generations removed from the present. We can, therefore, safely say that he belonged to the later half of the 18th century A. D.

HIS WORKS.

Besides his commentary on the Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī which he called "Bhāskarī" after his own name, he wrote the following works :—

1. Sanskrit Translation of LALLĀ VĀK.

It is interesting to note in this connection that the Lallā Vāk is a Śaivaite work in the old Kashmiri, written by a woman in about the 14th century A. D.

2. Commentary on YOGA VĀŚIṢṬHA.

It consisted of one lac and ten thousand verses, according to his own statement in his introduction to the Bhāskarī. But only a few fragments of it are now left with his present descendants. This presents a Śaivaite interpretation of the text.

3. HARṢEŚVARA STAVA.

It was written by him, as the tradition says, on the occasion of his visit to the temple of Harṣeśvara in Kashmir.

The names of his successors are given below in the order of their succesion :—

1. (Bhāskara Kaṇṭha).
2. Jagannātha.
3. Maṇi Kaṇṭha.
4. Somānanda.
5. Gaṇa Kaṇṭha.
6. Mahānanda.
7. Viśveśvara.

(VIII) A COMMENTATOR, WHOSE NAME IS NOT TRACEABLE.

Besides the Bhāskarī, there is another commentary on the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī by an author, who is so unostentatious that he does not mention his name either in the introduction or in the colophons. The commentary is very learned and illuminative. It has been utilised for filling up the gaps in the Bhāskarī, as has been stated in the introduction to the second Volume. A MS. of it was found in the collection of MSS. in the possession of Manaveda Arjuna Raja, Pudaa Koovilyam, Calicut. It was copied for the Government Manuscript Library, Madras, in 1923–24. A copy of it is in the possession of the writer of these pages. It is proposed to include it in the Second Edition of the Bhāskarī, which is necessary now.

The writers directly influenced by Abhinava.

(I) KṢEMENDRA.

Is he identical with Kṣemarāja ? The only reason for identifying the one with the other is probably a scribal mistake which gives the name of Kṣemendra instead of that of Kṣemarāja in the colophons of the Spanda Sandoha and the Spanda Nirṇaya. These works have now been published and their colophons have the name of the latter (Kṣemarāja) and not that of the former. The colophon of the Spanda Nirṇaya, for instance, reads as follows :—

"Kṛtiḥ Śrī Pratyabhijñākāra praśiṣya Mahāmāheśvarācārya Śrīmad Abhinavaguptanāthadattopadeśasya Śrī Kṣemarājasyeti Śivam."

A careful study of the works of Abhinava and those of Kṣemarāja gives a sufficiently clear idea of the personality of Kṣemarāja as separate from that of his younger contemporary, Kṣemendra. We have represented the Tantrāloka to be a

production of the first period of Abhinava's literary activity to which the Krama Stotra belongs. It must have, therefore, been written in about 990 A. D. At that time Kṣemarāja, the first-mentioned cousin of Abhinava, was sufficiently educated to understand the intricacies of the monistic Tantras so as to be prompted to join others in requesting Abhinava to write the Tantrāloka :—

"Anye pitṛvyatanayāḥ Śivaśaktiśubhrāḥ
Kṣemotpalābhinava–Cakraka–Padmaguptāḥ.

... ...

Anyopi kaścana janaḥ śivaśaktipāta–
Sampreraṇāparavaśaḥ svakaśaktisārthaḥ
Abhyarthanāvimukhabhāvamaśikṣitena
Tenāpyanugrahapadaṁ kṛta eṣa vargaḥ

... ...

Ācāryam abhyarthayate sma gāḍham
Sampūrṇa tantrādhigamāya samyak

T. A., XII, 417-8.

He is the only pupil of Abhinava, whose name is mentioned by Madhurāja Yogin in his Dhyānaślokāḥ, out of those who wrote down the theory of music, orally given by the teacher. And the circumstantial evidence is clear enough to show that he began his literary activity either during the last years of his teacher's social life or immediately after the latter's entering into the cave sometime after the year 1015. The period of his literary activity, therefore, falls between 1015 and 1040. But if we identify the two we shall have to allow a period of half a century for the literary activity of one person, because the last dated work of Kṣemendra, Daśāvatāra Carita, was finished, as he states,[1] in 1066 A. D.

1. D. C., Conclusion.

Kṣemendra, not only bears a different name but has another name also "Vyāsadāsa" which he almost invariably gives along with the former, but which is never to be found coupled with Kṣemarāja's name. His connection also with Abhinava cannot at all be said to have been so close as that of Kṣemarāja : for, he refers to Abhinava, so far as we know, only once i. e. in the Mahābhārata Mañjarī, wherein he speaks of having heard Abhinava's lectures on poetics :—

"Ācāryaśekharamaṇer vidyāvivṛtikāriṇaḥ
Śrutvābhinavaguptākhyāt sāhityam bodhavāridheḥ."

We know that even today there is a marked difference between Śiṣya and Śrotā. The difference may be said to be similar to that which exists in the present-day colleges between a registered and a casual student. Further, Kṣemarāja probably used to live in Bijbihāra (Vijayeśvara) which he mentions as the place of composition of his commentary on the Stava Cintāmaṇi :—

"Tenārthipraṇayād dinaistricaturair yāṁ Kṣemarājo vyadhāt
Kṣetre Śrī Vijayeśvarasya vimale saiṣā śivārādhanī."

But Kṣemendra states Tripureśaśaila as his place of residence in one of the concluding lines in his Mahābhārata Mañjarī :—

"Prakhyātātiśayasya tasya tanayaḥ Kṣemendra-nāmābhavat
Tena Śrī Tripureśa-śailaśikhare viśrāntisantoṣiṇā."

In the opinion of Dr. Bühler, referred to by Dr. De in H. S. P., P. 141, the only thing that can finally settle the question, under discussion, is the discovery of the name of Kṣemarāja's father. We may, therefore, add here what little information we have been able to collect on this point. We have already shown how Kṣemarāja is identical with Kṣema, mentioned in

the Tantrāloka, as one of the cousins (pitṛvyatanaya) of Abhinava: for, he refers to himself by the abbreviated form, found in the Tantrāloka, in his own Pratyabhijñā Hṛdaya. We know the name of one uncle (pitṛvya) of Abhinava, referred to in A. Bh., P. 297. We cannot, however, definitely say that he was the father of Kṣemarāja. For, there can be pointed out a possibility of Abhinava's having had more than one uncle, and, therefore, of the name of Kṣemarāja's father having been different from that of Abhinava's uncle who is referred to in A. Bh. But there cannot be any such possibility about Kṣemarāja's grand-father, who also had a different name from that of Kṣemendra's grand-father. We have stated in the 1st chapter that the name of Abhinava's grand-father was Varāhagupta. Therefore, if Kṣemarāja was Abhinava's cousin, as we have shown before that he was, it naturally follows that Varāhagupta was the grand-father of Kṣemarāja also. But Kṣemendra's grand-father, according to the Mahābhārata Mañjarī, was Nimnāśaya:—

> "Kaśmīreṣu babhūva sindhuradhikaḥ sindhośca nimnāśayaḥ
> Prāptastasya guṇaprakarṣayaśasaḥ putraḥ Prakāśendratām
> ....
> Prakhyātātiśayasya tasya tanayaḥ Kṣemendra-nāmābhavat."
> M. B. M.

After stating the above arguments we leave it to the reader to pronounce the final verdict.

HIS DATE.

There cannot be two opinions about the time of his literary activity, because two of his works are dated. The year of completion of the Samaya Mātṛkā is stated to be 1050 A. D. in the reign of King Ananta of Kashmir and that of the Daśāvatāra Carita 1066 A. D. when King Kalaśa was occupying the throne of Kashmir.

HIS WORKS.

1. NṚPĀVALĪ (R. T., I, 13).
2. MAHĀBHĀRATA MAÑJARĪ.
3. RĀMĀYAṆA KATHĀ SĀRA.
4. CĀRUCARYĀ. (Kashmir Cat. MS. No. 347).
5. NĪTĪ KALPA TARU. Do. 351.
6. DAŚĀVATĀRA CARITA.
7. SAMAYA MĀTṚKĀ.
8. SUVṚTTA TILAKA.
9. BṚHATKATHĀ MAÑJARĪ (J. Cat. MS. No. 81).
10. AUCITY VICĀRA CARCĀ.

(For complete list consult H. S. P., P. 142).

ABHINAVA'S INFLUENCE IN POETICS.

We are not writing a history of Sanskrit poetics. Our object is only to explain the importance of the author who is studied in these pages. It is, therefore, unnecessary to deal with the later writers on poetics separately. Suffice it to say that with perhaps the only exception of Mahima Bhaṭṭa, who was probably Abhinava's younger contemporary and who, in his Vyakti Viveka, tried to explode the theory of Dhvani, all the writers on poetics, who came after Abhinava, for instance Mammaṭa in his Kāvyaprakāśa, Hema Candra in his Kāvyānuśāsana, Viśvanātha in his Sāhitya Darpaṇa, Śāradā Tanaya in his Bhāva Prakāśa, Appayya Dīkṣita in his Kuvalayānanda etc., Pandit Jagannātha in his Rasagaṅgādhara and Mahāmahopādhyāya Govinda in his Kāvya Pradīpa, refer to or follow Abhinava's theory of Rasa and Dhvani and most of them extensively quote him, and that the Saṅgīta Ratnākara and the Śṛṅgāra Ratnākara are more or less simply versifications of parts of Abhinava's commentary on Bharata's Nāṭya Śāstra.

HIS INFLUENCE IN PRATYABHIJÑĀ PHILOSOPHY AND TANTRIC RITUALISM.

The Pratyabhijñā philosophy could be said to be practically dead, some 30 years back. For, even in Kashmir there could be found only three or four Pandits who, to some extent, were still in possession of the old tradition ; but they too, for want of both, encouragement and enthusiastic and hard-working students, could, with difficulty, remember what was handed down to them. When the writer of these pages approached them for information on some of Abhinava's texts in 1929, one of them very frankly said that he was approached for the first time in his life for such information. The case with Śaiva rituals, however, is different. Such of them as are connected with the house-holder's life are still performed in many Brāhmaṇa families : and in regard to them Abhinava's Tantrāloka is supposed to be (shall we say ?) the final court of appeal. In earlier times, however, the Pratyabhijñā philosophy had its powerful exponents and staunch followers not only in Kashmir but also in as far distant places as Cola country ; and all of them acknowledged Abhinavagupta to be the chief authority on it. Mādhava, for instance, who was so closely connected with his contemporary King of Vijayanagara, in his Sarva Darśana Saṅgraha, acknowledges Abhinava to be the chief exponent of and authority on the Pratyabhijñā.

We cannot close the chapter without substantiating our statement in the preceding paragraph, by speaking a little on two writers on the monistic Śaiva philosophy to show Abhinava's influence in places far distant from Kashmir and on the continuity of the literary productions on his lines for several centuries.

(I) GORAKṢA ALIAS MAHEŚVARĀNANDA.

Gorakṣa, son of Mādhava, belonged to Cola.[1] He was a pupil of Mahāprakāśa[2] and was an avowed follower of Abhinava, whom he so frequently quotes, and whose method of writing he follows.[3] He attributes his proficiency in poetics to his careful study of the Dhvanyāloka and the Locana and his knowledge of the Self to his following the path of Pratyabhijñā.[4] His teacher and grand-teacher also belonged to the same country and wrote on philosophical subjects on which Abhinava himself had written. Abhinava was interested in and made important contributions to the Krama system, such as the Kramakeli, as we pointed out in the second chapter. Maheśvarānanda's Parama Guru was also similarly interested in and contributed to the aforesaid system at least two known works, the Krama Vāsanā and the Ṛjuvimarśinī, of which we know from references to them in the Mahārtha Mañjarī, pages 115 and 178 respectively. His teacher also, like Abhinava, was interested in the Pratyabhijñā and wrote the Ānanda Tāṇḍava Vilāsa Stotra in which the Pratyabhijñā conception of the universe is embodied, as is clear both from the quotation and the context :—

"Yadabhipretya Śrī Pratyabhijñāyām uktam :—
Viśvarūpoham idam ityakhaṇḍānanda bṛṁhitaḥ' iti".
"Yaccoktam asmadgurubhiḥ Ānanda Tāṇḍava Vilāsa
Stotre :—

Vayaṁ tvimām viśvatayāvabhānam
Bahirmukhasyāsya tavonmukhasya
Svasaṁhitaṁ viśvavilāpanodyat
Svatantratānandamayīm manāmaḥ."

M. M., 166.

1. M. M., 202.
2. M. M., 1.
3. M. M., 202.
4. M. M., 202.

Maheśvarānanda was ritually initiated into Śaivaism. He was recipient of grace of the preceptor, possessed of the spiritual power. He was free from all impurities.[1] He had inherited the tradition of the Auttarāmnāyas, the various Śaiva philosophical schools of Kashmir. He had mastered the Krama,[2] Kula and Pratyabhijñā systems. He had realised the Self.[3]

According to him, Mahārtha or Mahānaya Darśana is not very much different from the Trika Darśana :

> "Anena Śrī Mahārtha Trika-darśanayoḥ anyonyaṁ nātyantaṁ bhedapratheti vyākhyātam."
>
> M. M., 99.

Mahārtha Mañjarī with his own commentary, Parimalā, is the only work of his that is available so far. About other works, we know from references only in the above-mentioned commentary. The following is the list of his known works :—

1.	MAHĀRTHA MAÑJARĪ.		
2.	PARIMALĀ.		
3.	SAṀVIDULLĀSA (Referred to in M. M., P. 78).		
4.	PĀDUKODAYA.	Do.	118.
5.	MAHĀRTHODAYA.	Do.	132.
6.	SŪKTA.	Do.	59.
7.	PARĀ STOTRA.	Do.	77.
8.	KUṆḌALĀBHARAṆA.	Do.	73.
9.	MUKUNDA KELI.	Do.	73.
10.	KOMALA VALLĪ.	Do.	73.
11.	NAKHA PRATĀPA.	Do.	73.

It may be pointed out here that like Abhinava he also gives the gist of the subject-matter in the introduction to his available commentary.

1. M. M., 6. 2. Ibid., 2. 3. Ibid., 6.

HIS DATE

Gorakṣa, the author of the Mahārtha Mañjarī and a commentary on it,[1] was given the name "Maheśvarānanda" by his teachers on account of his spiritual attainments.[2] He extensively quotes, not only from Abhinavagupta's works but also from the Pratyabhijñā Hṛdaya of Kṣemarāja on pages 12, 24, 70, 110, 126, and 137. He may, therefore, be said to belong to the 12th century A. D.

In Sanskrit literature we come across more than one Gorakṣa, e. g. (i) an early exponent of the Haṭhayoga system, (ii) one of the many Siddhas who are admitted to be still moving about in the Brahmāṇḍa[3] (iii) teacher[4] of Svātmārāma Svāmin, the author of the Haṭha Yoga Pradīpikā, who seems to quote two verses from Abhinavagupta's Anubhava Nivedana : "Antarlakṣya" (187) and "Ardhodghāṭita" (189) and one from Gorakṣa "Varjayeddurjana prāntam"[5] (iv) the author of the Amaraugha Śāsana, which deals with Yoga as a way to final emancipation and contains a quotation from Smṛti.[6]:—

"Śabdabrahmaṇi niṣṇātaḥ parambrahmādhigacchati" without stating that it is a quotation. But Gorakṣa, the author of the Mahārtha Mañjarī, is apparently different from all these.

ORIGIN AND HISTORY OF HIS THOUGHT.

Gorakṣa gives the origin and history of the thought that he propounds in the Mahārtha Mañjarī. Leaving aside the Mythical origin of it from Śiva and revelation of it to Icchā Śakti that sprang from him, we may say that the earliest teacher of the system and, therefore, its founder was Śivānanda. It

1. M. M., 2. 2. Ibid., 1. 3. H. Y. P., 8-10.
4. Ibid., 7. 5. Ibid., 41. 6. A. S., 13.

seems that Śivānanda belonged to Kashmir, because the system is admitted to have sprung up in Kashmir.[1] We shall speak on him in the context of the Krama system. Its tradition was maintained by successive teachers, whose names ended with the word "Nātha", till the time of Mahāprakāśa, the teacher of Maheśvarānanda.

In the earlier period of his life Maheśvarānanda used to perform ritual, for which many material things were necessary. Wine was one of such essentials[2] and so was a Dūtī.

THE OCCASION FOR WRITING THE MAHĀRTHA MAÑJARĪ.

Once when, after the performance of the ritual, Maheśvarānanda was experiencing spiritual bliss with his sideglance fixed on the breasts of Dūtī, there appeared before him a woman in hermit's garb, wearing a Kanthā, with a Triśūla (Trident) in one hand and a human skull in the other. Mahesvarānanda offered her a seat, worshipped her and asked Dūtī to present to her some money, according to the means. Thereupon the Siddhā said in anger as if it were "I have nothing to do with all this" in Mahārāṣṭrī language and symbolising number seven with her hand, added "Give this Mudrā and reap its fruits". As she said this she touched his forehead with the skull and disappeared.

Early next morning Maheśvarānanda approached his teacher and narrated to him what had happened at night. The teacher interpreted the symbolic presentation of number seven with her hand to mean that she wants the ritual, that needs so many material things, to be discarded and desires the religious formula (Mantra) to be employed as a means to the realisation of the spiritual bliss. This path you should propound in the Mahārāṣṭrī language in Seventy verses. Accordingly

1. M. M., 193. 2. M. M., 197.

Maheśvarānanda composed his Mahārtha Mañjarī in Seventy verses in Mahārāṣṭrī and a commentary on it in Sanskrit.

THE AIM OF THE BOOK.

The aim of the book is to present the means to final emancipation which he calls Vimarśopāya. It asserts that Vimarśopāya is another name of Pratyabhijñopāya.[1] Accordingly it suggests the introspective analysis of the ordinary experience of an object as a means to the realisation of the identity of the individual self and the Universal. The analytical process, which is to be followed is as follows :—

Every perception presupposes a sense of perception, and is possible only when we concentrate the attention on what is before, and, therefore, presupposes the mind, the Manas. These means of perception, because they are means, presuppose an agent, who employs them, and consequently gets affected by the external object in so far as the reflection of the object falls on it. This agent, the subject, is essentially self-luminious, self-conscious and free from limitations of time and space. Therefore, the way to self-realisation is to realise through introspection the essential nature of the subject at the time of the perception of an object of the world.[2] The objective world, he holds, is not the cause of bondage but a means to freedom, if correctly used.[3]

But a careful study of the book shows that he does not confine himself to the presentation of the Pratyabhijñā system only. No doubt he begins with it and discusses it at length. But he finds that the Ultimate, as presented by it, does not appeal to the heart and, therefore, feels the necessity of some means which may be helpful in grasping it to the satisfac-

1. M. M., 7. 2. M. M., 13. 3. Ibid., 14.

tion of the heart.[1] Such a means he finds to be no other than the one pointed out by the Krama system, that is the Śāktopāya. Hence he deals with the Krama system. But the Śāktopāya, as he discovered from his personal spiritual experience, culminates in the Śāmbhava, which is the means, pointed out by the Kula system. Therefore, he deals with such aspects of the Kula system as are important from his point of view. He admits that the Śāmbhavopāya ends in the Nirupāya.[2] Thus we find that the Mahārtha Mañjarī deals with all the three monistic Śaiva systems of Kashmir and attempts to synthesise them. A brief account of them according to Maheśvarānanda, may be given as follows :—

PRATYABHIJÑĀ DOCTRINES ACCEPTED BY MAHEŚVARĀNANDA.

He accepts (i) that the self cannot be known through any means of knowledge, (ii) that the objects are essentially of the nature of 'light of consciousness' (Prakāśa) (15), (iii) that the Self, though clearly manifest, remains unmanifest exactly like the sun in mid-day, because of the rays (29), (iv) that Vimarśa is the essential nature of Prakāśa (30), (v) that there are three impurities, (vi) that Vimarśa means freedom to be, (vii) that being is identical with consciousness (Sattaiva Cittvam) (35), (viii) that the causal relation is ultimately nothing but the relation between the creator and the created (Kāryakāraṇabhāvoyaṁ kartṛkarmabhāva paramārthaḥ) (37), (ix) that the entire universe is the manifestation of free will or Vimarśa (Svātantryavāda), (x) that Śiva is transcendental (Viśvottīrṇa Parama-svacchanda) (39), (xi) that there are thirty six categories from Śiva to earth (67), (xii) that being (Sattā) is nothing but 'shining' (Prakāśamānatā) and (xiii) that Abhāva also is essentially Prakāśa (80–2).

1. M. M., 83. 2. M. M., 168.

CHAPTER VI.

DOES MAHEŚVARĀNANDA DEAL WITH THE KRAMA SYSTEM ?

Maheśvarānanda admits that the Vimarśopāya or Pratyabhijñopāya is the direct means to the realisation of the Ultimate,[1] but asserts at the same time, as has already been pointed out, that it does not appeal to the heart. He, therefore, feels the necessity of some means, the following of which can put the individual in such a state as may enable him to look upon the world so as to recognise himself to be the highest Lord (Maheśvara). And the means that he suggests is the worship of the Parama Śiva, the highest subject (Mahā Pramātṛ) surrounded by the goddesses, the powers of senses of perception.[2] The inner mental worship, according to him, consists in the identification of the individual with the universal self, the recognition of the individual as Maheśvara, and in mental grasp of the entire objectivity and viewing it as non-different from Him.[3] He recognises the importance of the idol-worship as preparatory to the mental worship.[4]

He points out that the object of mental worship, need not necessarily be one. The Śaiva traditions differ on this point. The number of deities to be worshipped varies from one to one thousand, according as the one Reality is attempted to be grasped in the original form or in its manifestations.[5] In this context he talks of the worship of Gaṇapati, Vaṭuka etc.[6] and seems to refer to the group of deities, of which Abhinavagupta talks in his Dehastha Devatācakra Stotra, as is clear from the reference to the first two deities in that Stotra, but does not deal with them in detail, because of fear of increasing the size of the book as also because of their being too secret to mention (Atirahasya). He mentions the five currents of manifestation (Sphuraṇadhārāḥ) Vyomavāmeśvarī,

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1. M. M., 7. 2. Ibid., 83. 3. M. M., 85.
4. Ibid., 86. 5. M. M., 85. 6. Ibid., 88.

Khecarī, Dikcarī, Gocarī and Bhūcarī,[1] which are referred to by Abhinavagupta in his Paryanta Pañcāśikā (verse 23). In the Tantrāloka also Abhinavagupta refers to Vāmeśvarī,[2] a name which is synonimous with Vyomeśvarī and Vyomavāmeśvarī, as is clear from Abhinavagupta's own statement that this Parā Saṁvid manifests itself in four forms, the subject, the means, the object, and knowledge.[3] In the presentation of the currents (Vāha) from the Parā Saṁvid or Vāmeśvarī the means are split up into two (i) internal (Dikcarī) and (ii) external (Gocarī). Maheśvarānanda himself refers to Vyomavāmeśvarī as Vāmeśvarī.[4]

He deals not only with the Pañcavāha, which he calls Cakra[5] (Circle) but many others such as Mūrti, Prakāśa, Ānanda, Vṛnda etc. The evidence in support of the view that in his presentation of the Cakras he follows the Krama system may be put as follows :—

In connection with the discussion of Cakras he refers to and quotes from the works like the Krama Sadbhāva, Krama Vāsanā, Krama Keli etc., and refers to the twelve goddesses Sṛṣṭikālī etc. which are referred to by Abhinavagupta in the course of the partial presentation of the Krama system in his Tantrāloka, III, 159–207. Therefore, it may be admitted that he deals with the Cakras in accordance with the Krama system.

The additional reasons for admitting that in the presentation of Cakras he follows the Krama system may be stated as follows :—

(1) One of the Cakras, discussed by him, is the Vṛnda Cakra. And he asserts that this Cakra is the most important of all the Cakras in the detailed presentation of the Mahārtha Krama (Śrīman Mahārthakramaprapañcaḥ sarvopi Vṛnda

1. Ibid., 89. 2. T. A., Ah., IV. 206.
3. Ibid., 127. 4. M. M., 25. 5. M. M., 88.

Cakre viśrāmyati 194). But Mahārtha is another name of the Krama system. For, Jayaratha in the course of his commentary on that portion of the Tantrāloka which, by the way, deals with the Krama system, as has been stated above, gives a quotation which refers to the Krama system as Mahānaya :[1] and the Mahānaya Prakāśa,—which Maheśvarānanda so frequently quotes in the context of the presentation of the Cakras, the characteristic feature of the Krama system,—seems to use the word Mahārtha as synonymous with Mahānaya. Maheśvarānanda picks up this word and uses it as a part of the title of his work and calls the system that he presents "Mahārtha-krama" or Mahārtha Darśana.[2] The following quotation makes the point clear :—

Mahārtha kramasya sarvasrototiśāyī kopi slāghyatvotkarṣo dhvanyate yaduktam Mahānaya Prakāśe :—

Evam vidham yadadhigantumihātmatattvam
Mithyā vikalpavibhavoddalanaṁ ca samyak.
Yuktim Mahānayamayīm na vihāya śakyam
Sarvottamottamatamo hi tato mahārthaḥ. M. M., 179.

(2) Maheśvarānanda refers to Śivānanda as the earliest exponent of the system that he propounds. And Śivānanda is spoken of as the first earthly propagator of Krama system. If we take the two to be identical, and we shall show a little later that they are ; the system that Maheśvarānanda presents is the Krama system.

(3) He very frequently talks of Auttaratattva[3] or Auttarāmnāya.[4] This can be interpreted in two ways. (i) We know that the Śaivāgamas have procceded from the five mouths of Śiva. Auttarāmnāya may, therefore, mean the teachings proceeding from the Northern mouth, in other words "the

1. T. A., III, 195.
2. M. M., 96.
3. Ibid., 196.
4. Ibid.. 6.

Vāmamārga", because the Northern face is to the left. (ii) We also know that among the Pīṭhas one is Uttara-pīṭha, also called Auḍyāṇapīṭha, which is admitted to be Kashmir. It may, therefore, mean the system that originated in Kashmir. And the Krama system with its characteristic conception of Cakras is admitted to be such. The first interpretation agrees with references to the Dūtī-Yajana[1] and the use of wine, woman and meat as essentials of worship, enjoined by the system,[2] ánd suggests that the Krama was a form of Vāmamārga. And the second interpretation is in consonance with the statement that this system arose in Kashmir[3] and with recognision of Śivānanda,[4] referred to by Jayaratha also in the context of the Krama system, as the earliest propagator of the system on the earth.

Thus Maheśvarānanda, according to his own statements and the implications thereof, is primarily concerned with the presentation of Auttara, Atimārga, Mahārtha, Mahānaya, or Krama system which originated in Kashmir.

HIS APPROACH TO KAULISM.

In the Mahārtha Mañjarī in the later portion there are so many references to Kaulism that it becomes abundantly clear that Kaulism has a definite place in Maheśvarānanda's scheme.

(1) In giving an account of the origin and propagation of the system he says that it is based on Kaulika tradition (Āyātiratha tantrasya kathyate Kaulikoditā M. M. 195).

(2) He represents the Kramakeli,–a work from the pen of Abhinavagupta, in the form of a commentary on the Krama Stotra, which, according to the quotations from it, given by Jayaratha, in the presentation of the Twelve Kālīs, admitted

1. M. M., 87.
2. Ibid., 182.
3. Ibid., 193.
4. Ibid., 197.

by the Krama system, is recognisedly a work on the Krama system–to be Kulāgama.[1]

(3) He refers to his own spiritual experience as Yāmalī siddhi, an experience in which there is unity of the subject and the object, harmonious synthesis of Prakāśa and Vimarśa or Śiva and Śakti, and asserts that it is the same as that which is referred to as Rudra Yāmala in the Parātriṁśikā, a recognised work on the Kula system.[2]

(4) He holds that the liberation in life (Jīvanmukti) is attained if this unity of the Prakāśa and the Vimarśa be grasped even for a moment,[3] and asserts that it is possible through the grace of the 'teacher'. Here also he refers to the Parātriṁśikā and quotes the following from Abhinava's commentary on it :—

"Abhyāsena vināpi jīvanmuktatā Parā Kaulikī siddhiḥ".

Similarly there are other references to Kaulism such as Kaulikī Mahāvidyā and Kaulika Siddhānta (177) Kulācārya (175) Kaulakrama (188) Kaulikaiśvaryānubhūti (192) Kaulikī tṛpti etc.

(5) Finally he refers to his experience as well as to that of his teacher as liberated in life (jīvanmukta). In this context he asserts that the experience of jīvanmukta is characterised by the identity of the experiencer and the experienced, refers to and quotes[4] from Abhinavagupta's Bodha Pañcadaśikā and asserts that such an experience is attainable only by following the monistic system that holds the Anuttarasaṁvid to be the Ultimate Reality (Śrīmadanuttarasaṁvidadvaita siddhāntasādhyā M. M., 134.). And we know on the authority of the Parātriṁśikā that "Anuttara" is the peculiar conception of the Ultimate Reality according to the Kula sys-

1. M. M., 191.
2. M. M., 170–1
3. M. M., 173.
4. Ibid., 134.

tem. For, the book begins with the inquiry about the essential nature of the Anuttara, the knowledge of which immediately leads to the liberation, technically called Bhairavīsāmya :

(Anuttaraṁ kathandeva sadyaḥ kaulika siddhidam
Yena vijñātamātreṇa Bhairavīsamatāṁ vrajet).

THE RELATION BETWEEN THE KRAMA AND THE KULA SYSTEMS.

Maheśvarānanda in his Mahārtha Mañjarī follows Abhinavagupta and admits that in all the Tantras, whether proceeding from the northern, southern or any other mouth of Śiva, whether Vāma (left) or Dakṣiṇa (right), have in them, as their essential aspect, the teachings which are essentially those of the Kula system. The Kaulism is, therefore, present in all of them as the smell in flower, oil in the sesame seed, life in a living organism or nector in water.

Puṣpe gandhastile tailaṁ dehe jīvo jalemṛtam
Yathā tathaiva śāstrāṇāṁ kulamantaḥ pratiṣṭhitam

M. M., 177.

Accordingly he synthesises the Krama and the Kula systems and holds that Śākta Upāya, with which the Krama system is concerned, ends in the Śāmbhava and, therefore, the final experience, that Krama system leads to, is identical with that which Kaulism promises.[1] In fact, at one place he asserts that every means culminates in the Śāmbhava.[2] He admits that the adherence to the teachings of the Krama means following the Śāktopāya, but it ultimately leads to the Śāmbhava, and that this view has the support of the Vijñāna Bhairava and Kṣemarāja, who has commented on it.[3]

1. M. M., 152. 2. Ibid., 168. 3. Ibid., 152.

SYNTHETICAL APPROACH OF MAHEŚVARĀNANDA.

Maheśvarānanda approaches the three Monistic Śaiva systems of Kashmir, Krama, Kula and Pratyabhijñā, from the synthetical point of view. He begins with the presentation of the Pratyabhijñā Philosophy, dealing with the thirty seven categories. He comes to the Krama system as a means to the realisation of the Absolute as pointed out by the Pratybhijñā and thus advocates the following of the Śākta Upāya. And finally he deals with the Kaula conception of the liberation, attainable through the Śāmbhava path, because Śāktopāya culminates in the Śāmbhava and the Kula is the essence of all Śaiva Tantras including those on which the Krama system is based.

But basically he is the follower of the Krama system and primarily attempts to present the same as ordered by the Siddha-Yoginī, who appeared before him at the time when he was contemplating after the performance of the worship. For, he bows to her in the concluding verse of his work, identifies her with the Kālasaṅkarṣiṇī, the highest category of the Krama system, and explains the symbolic meaning of "Kanthā-Śūla-Kapāla-mātravibhavām" in terms of the Krama system as one who manifests the entire objective variety by means of three powers, Icchā, Jñāna and Kriyā through the limited individual subject. Here Kanthā symbolises the whole of objective world with its countless varieties ; Triśūla stands for the three powers and the human skull for the individual subject.[1] We shall deal with the two systems, the Krama and the Kula, separately in the two successive chapters towards the close of this book.

(II) VARADA RĀJA ALIAS KṚṢṆADĀSA.

Varada Rāja, according to his own statement, was born in

1. M. M., 192.

a family that followed Śaivaism and was the youngest son of Madhurāja.[1] And we have stated earlier that Madhurāja Yogin was one of the pupils of Abhinavagupta, who was 28 years of age in 1014–15 A. D. when the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vivṛti Vimarśinī was completed. It can, therefore, be definitely stated that Varada Rāja lived in Kashmir towards the close of the 11th and the beginning of the 12th century A. D.

The only work of this writer that we have known is

ŚIVA SŪTRA VĀRTIKA.

It is a Vārtika on the famous Śiva Śūtra of Vasugupta. There is nothing original in it. It is a mere versification of Kṣemarāja's commentary, the Vimarśinī. The author also very frankly says that he follows Kṣemarāja's commentary on the Śiva Sūtra[2] and incorporates much of what was found in an earlier Vārtika.

1. S. S. V., 48. 2. S. S. V., 1-2.

PART II.

PHILOSOPHICAL.

CHAPTER I.

PRELIMINARY.

Abhinava wrote on a number of subjects and was recognized to be a reliable authority on each one of them. He worked on poetics, only during the short period of transition from the Tāntrika to the Philosophical period. The number of his works on poetics is, therefore, much smaller than that of his philosophical treatises. The value, however, attributed to the former, has overweighed that which scholars in general have attached to the latter. Hence he is better known as an able exponent of the theories of Rasa and Dhvani than as the greatest authority on the three monistic Śaiva systems, the Krama, the Kula and the Pratyabhijñā.

The reason is not far to seek. The systems of philosophy, he has attempted to formulate and to elaborate, are non-Vedic; not because their doctrines are fundamentally opposed to those of the Vedic systems, but because they do not recognize the Veda as the final authority. They were, therefore, ignored by the Brāhmaṇa community, which alone has kept alive the literary traditions connected with various schools of Indian thought as a matter of religious duty.

These non-Vedic trends of thought, however, were very popular among the Brāhmaṇas of Kashmir who had the opportunity of knowing them better than those elsewhere. They had a succession of learned writers and the basic Āgamas. The available information about the human and divine literature on the Pratyabhijñā and Spanda branches of the Kashmir Śaiva thought has been given in the first part. Similar infor-

mation about the Krama and the Kula systems will be given in chapters dealing with them separately.

But, for more than a century, they were neglected even in the land of their birth.

Some fifty years back the literary tradition of these systems seemed to be completely dead in Kashmir too, where they primarily existed.

The local Pandit families, however, continued to hold a very high opinion of them, because of the vast treasure of MSS. of the literature on them in their possession, and to regard the monistic Śaiva philosophy of Kashmir to be better than any other system of thought in India.

During the last Fifty years, however, the scholarly interest in the monistic Kashmir Śaiva philosophy has been growing, because it has been realised that it has contributed to the growth of such important branches of Indian thought as the philosophy of grammar or language and æsthetics.

Our attempt, therefore, in the following pages is to present these systems of Śaiva philosophy as clearly as it is possible with the help of the material available at present. Fidelity to the original text is our guiding principle. Our attempt is not to present the systems in terms of modern philosophy, but simply to give an exposition to Abhinava's ideas about some of the persistent philosophical problems and to explain, so far as possible, how he came to form them. Let us, therefore, not be misunderstood if some of the arguments, stated in these pages, do not appeal to the modern minds and some of the views, set forth here, are not in consonance with the doctrines of the modern science.

ABHINAVA'S CONTRIBUTION.

Indian philosophers, however original their works, have never claimed originality for themselves ; their attempt has

always been to show that whatever they say is based upon an ancient authority. This holds good in the case of both the Vedic and the non-Vedic systems. Śaṅkara declares in unmistakable terms that the only test of correctness of a view is its harmony with the teachings of the Veda and that the argument has value and is to be relied upon only in so far as it supports the principles laid down in the Veda.[1] Similarly, Somānanda, the author of the Śivadṛṣṭi and so the real founder of the Pratyabhijñā School, emphatically states that his Śivadṛṣṭi is not a pure creation of his mind but is based upon Śāstra, though his pupil, Utapalācārya, holds that it shows a new path to final emancipation.[2] A study of Abhinava's works shows that he also, in this respect, followed the tradition of his learned predecessors.

If we take into consideration, for instance, three of his most important works, on which his reputation chiefly rests, we find that two of them, (i) the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī and (ii) the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vivṛti Vimarśinī, are simply commentaries on Utpalācārya's Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Kārikā[3] and Ṭīkā respectively,[4] and the third, the Tantrāloka, professedly follows the authority of the Mālinī Vijaya Tantra.[5] It is, therefore, not possible for us to attribute the authorship of any particular theory to Abhinava as we can do to Kant or Hegel. This, however, does not mean that he did not contribute anything to the "Realistic Idealism" of Kashmir. The fact, on the contrary, is that the philosophical system of Kashmir, with Abhinava's contribution to it, left out of consideration, loses most of its importance. His contribution to the "Realistic Idealism" is of the same nature as that of the great Śaṅkara to the monistic Idealism of the Vedānta.

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1. S. Bh., 8.
2. I. P. V., II, 271.
3. I. P. V., I. 3.
4. I. P. V. V., Vol. III, 406.
5. T. A., I, 35.

The aim of philosophy all over the world at all times has been to explain the what, the why and the wherefrom of the phenomena of knowledge. The chief distinctive feature of Indian philosophy in general and of the monistic Śaiva thought of Kashmir in particular is that it deals not only with the experiences of wakeful, dream and deep sleep states but also with those of the transcendental (Turīya) and the pure (Turīyātīta) states : i. e. it tries to explain not only those experiences which are due to the working of the mind, the intellect and the sense-organs collectively or severally, but also those in which they are perfectly at rest and in which, therefore, consciousness is free from all kinds of affection.

To Indian philosophers the two states, the transcendental and the pure, are not mere myths. They are realisable truths. In fact, the aim of the higher systems of Indian philosophy is to point out an easy way to the realisation of these states. The importance of a philosophical work to the Indian mind, therefore, is commensurate with the degree to which the author is believed to have personally realised them through spiritual experiments. For, he alone can be a sure guide, who is familiar with the path. Abhinava's philosophical works are considered to be very important, because people have reason to believe that the statements on supersensuous matters, contained therein, are based upon the author's personal experience, gained through spiritual experiments, which he carried on for years, as we have attempted to show in his biography. To personal experience he gives the first, to reason the second and to ancient authority only the third place as the basis of his views on supersensuous matters,[1] the revelations of the Turīya and the Turīyātīta states. In fact the charm that this system had for his contemporaries and successors, the popularity that it

1. T. A., I, 149.

enjoyed and the high esteem in which it is held even now by the Kashmir Pandits was and is due mostly to the labours of Abhinava both as a scholar and as a spiritualist (Yogin).

A very careful study of the vast literature on the monistic Śaiva thought of Kashmir in print and MSS. for twenty five years after the publication of the first edition of this work in 1935, has yielded the material for systematic presentation of two more well developed systems of monistic philosophy of Kashmir (i) the Krama and (ii) the Kula, besides the Pratyabhijñā. But the material on the former two, discovered so far, is barely sufficient for treating them summarily. Therefore, we begin with the Pratyabhijñā system, on which enough material is accessible for fairly detailed presentation.

THE PRATYABHIJÑĀ SYSTEM.

The system, presented systematically for the first time by Somānanda in his Śiva Dṛṣṭi, reflected in the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Kārikā and the Vṛtti thereon and elaborated in the Vivṛti on them by Utpalācārya, and elucidated by Abhinavagupta in his two commentaries (i) Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī and (ii) Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vivṛti Vimarśinī, is called 'Pratyabhijñā' because it points out 'Pratyabhijñā' (recognition) to be the means to the realisation of the Ultimate Reality. We shall soon discuss the concept of "recognition" (Pratyabhijñā).

The writers on this system, who flourished before Abhinava, wrote only minor treatises, dealing with certain aspects or branches of the system. The books, for instance, which include the word "Spanda" in their titles, deal with what is referred to as "Caitanya" or "Vimarśa" (consciousness) in the Śiva[1] Sūtra and the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Kārikā respectively,[2] and point out three ways to the realisation of the Ultimate Reality,

1. I. P. V., I, 200. 2. I. P. V., I, 208-9.

the Śāmbhava, the Śākta and the Āṇava. They are mere dogmatic statements of the fundamental principles of the Spanda branch of the Pratyabhijñā. They do not enter into an exposition of the reasonings which can be adduced in their support ; nor do they cite any accepted scriptural authority on which they are based. They are, therefore, so brief that all of them taken together would cover hardly more than fifty pages of a printed book. Similarly, those books, which are named after Pratyabhijñā, attempt to establish the existence of an all-including universal Self and point out the fourth way to freedom from worldly troubles, through Pratyabhijñā or recognition. Although they are argumentative and expository and consequently twenty times more voluminous than the former, yet, being concerned with only a branch, they could not bring out the full importance of the monistic Śaiva system of Kashmir as a whole. Moreover, the literature on both the branches, referred to above, is equally silent on the rituals of the system. It was Abhinava, who, for the first time, took up the system as a whole[1] for a rational and exhaustive treatment in his great work, the Tantrāloka; gave the philosophical conceptions of the different branches a proper place in the whole; showed the comparative merit of all the four means of Mokṣa, Anupāya, Śāmbhava, Śākta and Āṇava; exhaustively dealt with the monistic Śaiva rituals; supported the philosophical and psychological theories of the system with strong and convincing arguments as well as with extensive quotations from the Āgamas of accepted authority and elucidated the existing texts with learned commentaries, like the Śivadṛṣṭyālocana and the two Vimarśinīs.

EXPLANATIONS OF THE NAMES OF THE SYSTEM.

It is a misnomer to call the entire monistic Śaiva thought of Kashmir "Pratyabhijñā" or "Spanda" as much as it would

1. T. A., I, 50.

be to call India "Calcutta" or "Bombay." They are parts and very important parts, but severally they do not present the whole. For, the monistic Śaiva thought of Kashmir, according to the material available at present, comprehends three distinct monistic systems, the Kram, the Kula and the Pratyabhijñā.

They have much in common ; but fundamentally they are distinct from one another. Each has a different history, a distinct line of teachers, a different set of books in which it is propounded and a different conception of the Ultimate Reality, as will be made clear in the course of presentation of the Krama and the Kula systems.

Very often the Pratyabhijñā system is referred to as "Trika" as we shall show in discussing the various meanings of the word "Trika" in dealing with the Kula system.

But it may be pointed out here that Abhinava uses the word "Trika" for the entire Śaiva thought, as presented by him in his Tantrāloka. In such a case 'Trika' refers to both the authority on which the system is based and the subject-matter which forms the distinctive feature of this monistic system as a whole. It is called Trika for the following reasons :—

(I) In all, there are ninety-two Āgamas recognised by this system. Of these the triad, (Trika) consisting of the Siddhā, the Nāmaka and the Mālinī, is the most important. The system is called Trika because its chief authority is this triad (Trika).[1]

(II) According to this system, there are three triads, the higher, the lower and the combined (Para, Apara and Parāpara). The first consists of Śiva, Śakti and their union; the second of Śiva, Śakti and Nara; and the third of three goddesses

1. T. A., 1, 35.

Parā, Aparā and Parāparā. It is called Trika because it deals with all the three triads.[1]

(III) It is called so for another reason also, namely, that it explains all the three aspects of knowledge, viz. absolute oneness (abheda), predominent oneness (bhedābheda), and duality (bheda) in the light of its monistic theory (abhedavāda).

Further, the word "Trika" is used for the Kula system also which is also called Ṣaḍardha Śāstra,[2] (literally, the school of half of the six) for the following reason :—

The Kula system holds that the Devanāgarī or the Sāradā alphabetic system represents the process of manifestation of ideas (Parāmarśodayakrama). The first six vowels, a ā i ī u ū, for instance, represent the order of succession in which the powers of Anuttara, Ānanda, Icchā, Īśana, Unmeṣa and Ūrmi or Ūnatā arose from the Highest Reality. Of the above, those, represented by long vowels, are due either to the association of those, represented by short ones, with their respective objects, as in the cases of Īśana and Ūrmi, or to the union of two, as in that of Ānanda.[3] The former, therefore, are dependent upon the latter and hence are not considered to be of equal importance with them.[4] Thus Kula system is called Ṣaḍardha Śāstra, because it counts as 'principal' only three of the six powers shown above, namely, Anuttara, Icchā, and Unmeṣṣa, which are also referred to as Cit, Icchā and Jñāna.[5]

The Pratyabhijñā system, including the Spanda branch, was called "Kashmir Śaivaism" by Mr. J. C. Chatterji as is clear not only from the title of his book but also from the account of the literature of the system that he presents. It was given the name of Kashmir Śaivaism, because almost all the writers

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1. T. A., I, 7–21. 2. T. A., I, 3. 3. T. A., II, 81–6.
4. T. A., II, 186. 5. T. A., II, 233.

of the available literature on the Pratyabhijñā school of Śaivaism belonged to Kashmir. It has, however, to be noted in this connection that in Kashmir there was not one system only of the monistic Śaiva thought, but as many as three, Pratyabhijñā being only one of them. There is definite evidence to show that the Krama system originated in Kashmir much earlier than the Pratyabhijñā and that the Kula system also attained its full development in the hands of the Kashmir thinkers like Somānanda and Abhinava. Therefore, it is not right to think that the Pratyabhijñā philosophy is the whole of Kashmir Śaivaism.

FOR WHOM IS THE SYSTEM MEANT ?

Unlike the Vedic systems, this school of thought knows no caste restriction.[1] It is meant for all in whom desire for knowledge and liberation has arisen. A distinction, however, is drawn between following the teachings of the system in life and getting its fruit on the one hand and studying the system and understanding its philosophical intricacies on the other. Any one with a firm determination can follow the teachings : no literary qualification of any kind was, therefore, considered necessary for following it by its early authorities. The case with study, however, is different. It requires a trained and well-informed mind. This system criticises almost all the important schools of thought which came before it. Its proper understanding, therefore, presupposes, according to the learned tradition, contained in the following verse, the knowledge of the six Vedic systems of philosophy and of the Veda with its six branches of learning as an antecedent condition :—

"Ṣaṭśāstravid yo vedasya ṣaḍaṅgajñaśca vedavit
sa eva śrīpratyabhijñādhyayanedhikṛtro bhavet."

1. I. P. V., II, 276.

It requires also a previous study of all the Āgamas, a knowledge of the arguments of other dualistic and monistic systems and a command over grammar :—

"Yodhītī nikhilāgameṣu padavid yo yogaśāstraśramī
Yo vākyārthasamanvaye kṛtaratiḥ śrīpratyabhijñāmṛte
Yastarkāntaraviśrutaśrutatayā dvaitādvayajñānavit
Sosmin syādabhikāravān kalakalaprāyaḥ pareṣāṁ ravaḥ."

THE AIM.

The aim of this system, like that of the Vedānta, is to help the individual in self-realisation : and the means also, by which this end is to be achieved, is the same as that of the Vedānta, viz., removing the veil of ignorance.[1] But they differ in their conception of self-realisation, because their ideas of the apparent, (ābhāsa) the universe, are different. While the Vedānta holds that the universe (jagat) is unreal, the Realistic Idealism maintains it to be real, because it is a manifestation of the Ultimate. Therefore, while, according to the former, all that we know disappears at the time of self-realisation exactly as, in the case of an illusion, the snake vanishes when the rope is perceived as a fact : according to the latter, the objective universe stands even when the Self is realised, but is known in its true perspective or in all its aspects or bearings. This kind of realisation is spoken of as 'Recognition' (Pratyabhijñā).

Thus, for the Vedānta, the realisation of the Self is coincidental with the negation of facts of experience in the same way as the perception of the rope as a fact is with that of the snake in the well known illusion. For the Pratyabhijñā on the other hand, self-realisation brings with it an understanding of the world of experience in its true relations and perspective.

1. I. P. V., I, 35.

There is no negation of the Universe but a new interpretation and appreciation. For this system, therefore, self-realisation is nothing but self-recognition (Pratyabhijñā).

WHAT IS RECOGNITION ?

Recognition is an act by which we endeavour to recall and reunite the former states of consciousness and is a kind of reasoning by which we ascend from a present consciousness to a former one. It differs from remembrance but slightly. Remembrance is a knowledge which is born of mental impression (saṁskāra) alone. But in recognition, though the mental impression is an important factor yet it is not the only factor as in the case of remembrance; it is necessarily always coupled with the direct perception of the object which serves as an operating cause. Suppose, for instance, that a certain person was, on one occasion, very much impressed by the sight of a king, riding an elephant: and suppose also that some time later he sees the elephant alone. Naturally at such a time, because of the law of association, his former impression of the king will be revived and there would arise a picture of the king before his mind's eye. Remembrance is thus nothing but a purely mental perception of a former object of sense-perception. But recognition is not a purely mental perception due to the revival of a past impression. In it the object recollected is actually present before the eyes and the novelty of perception consists in identifying the object, now perceived, with the one, seen before. When a person, for instance, on seeing Devadatta, recollects the previous perception of him and identifies the mental image with the one present before his eyes in the judgment :—"It is the same Devadatta as I saw on that occasion." the actual perception of the object is as much a cause of knowledge as the impression, left on the mind by the former perception of the same. Recognition, thus, requires

not only previous perception of the object but also its presence at the time when it takes place.

The previous knowledge of the object, which is an essential condition of recognition, is, in some cases, as of one collocation of the object and its attributes, while in others they (the object and its attributes) are known separately. Thus, while in the former case, there is only one mental image of the object with all its qualities, in the latter, side by side with one, caused by the direct ocular perception, there is another also, which is a vague creation of mind and as such is hardly anything more than a mere embodiment of the heard qualities. To illustrate the latter case, which seems to be rather a complicated one, let us suppose that a lady, on hearing the excellent qualities of a certain gallant, fell in love with him even before she had an occasion to see him; and suppose also that that person chanced to pass incognito before her many a time so as to be noticed well enough and to leave the impression of his person on her mind. In such a case, the mind naturally draws a picture of the object of love, which is hardly anything more than a mere embodiment of the previously heard excellences which were responsible for the rise of the passion of love. This image, of course, will be distinct from that, left by the real object of love who passed incognito so many times before her.

It will thus be clear that recognition in this case is not so simple an act as in that in which the object and its attributes are known as one collocation, as in the illustration of Devadatta, given above. In the present case recognition is not at all possible unless the veil be removed and the real qualities of the person be revealed so as to make the identification of the imaginary object of love with the person present before her possible. Thus, in the former case the failure to recognise is simply due to forgetfulness on the part of the

perceiver. For instance, it is often seen that a big man, like a king, fails to recognise an ordinary person, who was properly introduced to him on a former occasion and who, even now, in all respects, is the same as he then was. To enable the king to recognise the person before him does not require any thing more than reminding him of the past occasion. But in the latter case the failure to recognise is due, not to forgetfulness; for, then the passion of love would disappear, but partly to the veil and partly to the existence of a vague mental image, which, as has been said before, is hardly any thing more than a mere embodiment of the previously heard qualities, as distinct from the image of the known object who is really their possessor. Thus in this case recognition requires not only the removal of the veil but also the identification of both the mental images with the unveiled object.

To illustrate this point let us suppose that a person, while in India, hears of the excellences of a certain lord. He goes to England and there often sees that lord, without knowing him as such, walking like an ordinary man in a garden. He then, on one occasion, goes to the House of Lords, sees that person among the members and recognises him to be the same person as he had so often met in the garden. And let us also suppose that this lord is the same as he had heard about in India and that the former shows many of the qualities of the person, he was so anxious to see. Now, the question, that we have to ask ourselves, is, whether, under these circumstances, the lord will be recognised as such and if not, why not ? The answer is simple. He has failed to recognise the lord as the one about whom he had heard, because the latter has not yet been pointed out as such by any responsible person.

There are other minor distinctions between one kind of recognition and another, but we are not immediately concerned with them. We have drawn the above distinction to show

what part the present system of philosophy has got to play in self-recognition.

As in the case of the recognition of the lord so in that of the Self, there are two distinct images in the mind of the recogniser (pratyabhijñātṛ). In the former case one is caused by the reports, heard in India, and the other by the sight of the lord in a garden in England. In the latter case also similarly, one, that is, of one's own limited self is due to intuitive knowledge that every body has of himself[1] and the other is created by the descriptions of the Maheśvara or the universal Self that one reads in the sacred books such as the Purāṇas and the Āgamas.[2] When one studies philosophy, there arises the third image, which is different from both the previous mental images. This third image one identifies with one's own self much as the gentleman of the above illustration identifies the person, whom he frequently saw in the garden, with the lord in the House of Lords. The other image, in both the cases, however, i. e. the image caused by reports heard in India in the one and that created by the description given in the sacred books in the other, will still remain unidentified. Thus, just as the identification of this image in the illustration, as we have just pointed out, depends upon a word from a responsible quarter, so, that of the universal Self as revealed by the study of Āgama depends upon spiritual instruction. The intellectual knowledge, got through the study of philosophy, is called Bauddhajñāna and the spiritual knowledge, that comes from preceptorial instruction (Dīkṣā), is called Pauruṣajñāna. Of these the former is more important, because it is this that qualifies a person for the latter.[3]

To make the point a little clearer let us add here that the limited self also is a manifestation. It is characterised, not only by obscuration of its perfect Will Power (Svātantrya-

1. I. P. V., I, 20. 2. I. P. V., I, 21. 3. T. A., I, 83.

śakti) but also by ignorance thereof. That is, the innate limitation of the individual self is twofold. Not only is its perfect power of will hidden from it, but it is also ignorant of the fact that that power really belongs to it, though obscured, for the time being, by Māyā, the principle of obscuration.[1] In order that there may take place the perfect self-recognition, there is the necessity of the removal of both, of the veil which hides the perfect power of will and of the ignorance which is responsible for the imaginary distinction between the individual and the supreme Self and which stands in the way of recognition even when the veil is removed. The work of philosophy is simply to remove the veil and to expose what it hides, and thus to make self-recognition possible, as does the appearance of the lord of the above illustration in his lordly form and place. But this alone does not make the recognition an accomplished fact. Therefore, just as in the case of the illustration of the lord a word from a responsible quarter is needed, so in the present case there is the necessity of Dīkṣā to remove the imaginary distiction and to bring about the identification of the individual with the universal Self.

Here it may be asked : if the individual self is really identical with the Supreme, how can recognition or non-recognition of this fact affect its causal efficiency ? Does the recognition of a seed as such or the absence thereof affect its causal efficiency to develop into a sprout ? The reply is that the causal efficiency (artha-kriyā-kāritva) is of two kinds :—

(i) External, which does not affect the mind in any way; for example, the development of a seed into a plant.

(ii) Internal, which does affect the mind ; for instance, the causal efficiency to give delight.

The former does not presuppose recognition, but the latter does. To illustrate this point we give below Professor Cowell's

1. T. A., I, 55.

translation of Utpala's passage in the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Kārikā, quoted in the Sarva Darśana Saṅgraha :—

"A certain damsel, hearing of the many good qualities of a particular gallant, fell in love with him even before she had seen him, and agitated by her passion and unable to suffer the pain of not seeing, wrote to him a love letter descriptive of her condition. He at once came to her, but when she saw him, she did not recognise in him the qualities, she had heard about, he appeared much the same as any other person, and she found no gratification in his society. So soon, however, as she recognised those qualities, as her companion now pointed them out, she was fully gratified."

Similarly though the individual self is identical with the Supreme, yet we cannot get the happiness of this identity unless we are conscious of it.

WHAT IS DĪKṢĀ ?

Dīkṣā does not mean, as ignorant people think, simply getting a certain religious formula (mantra) whispered into one's ear by a certain religious man. It is rather an act whereby spiritual knowledge is imparted and the bondage of innate ignorance is removed.[1]

One more point is worthy of note in this connection, viz., that, according to this system, Dīkṣā, the spiritual instruction which makes self-recognition an accomplished fact, is not indispensable for mokṣa. It is a matter of common experience that even when recognition is due to the removal of the veil and consequent exposure of the hidden qualities and identification of both the mental images with the object present before, it does not always require a word from an authoritative person, as for instance, when the object of recognition reveals some

1. T. A., I, 80.

such unmistakable sign[1] as makes identification of the imaginary vague image with the object present before possible. Śaiva writers had observed this and, therefore, gave the name of Prātibhajñāna to that faculty which enables a person to attain self-recognition without the help of Dīkṣā.[2]

ŚAKTIPĀTA.

That divine will, which leads a person on to the path of spiritual knowledge, is called Śaktipāta. It may be spoken of as divine grace. It is independent of human action[3] and is the only cause of self-recognition.[4] On this point there is complete agreement between this system and the Vedānta. The latter also says that the Self cannot be realised by means of intellectual power or through the study of the Vedas or even through spiritual instruction. It can be realised by him alone whom He favours and to whom He reveals himself :—

"Nāyamātmā pravacanena labhyo
Na medhayā na bahunā śrutena
Yamevaiṣa vṛṇute tena labhyo
Yasmai vivṛṇute tanuṁ svām."

THE CAUSE AND THE NATURE OF BONDAGE.

It is a common belief of all the schools of Indian philosophy that ignorance is the cause of bondage and that knowledge is the only means to liberation. The opinions, however, greatly differ in regard to the exact nature of both. Abhinava has tried to explain and harmonise this difference in his comprehensive study of the system. How he has done so, we shall show as we proceed. Let us first state his, or more correctly, the Śaiva, view of these.

1. I. P. V., II, 275.
2. T. A., VIII, 107.
3. T. A., VIII, 173.
4. T. A., VIII, 163.

When in the Śaiva literature "ignorance" is spoken of as the cause of bondage,[1] it does not mean a total absence of knowledge. For, such a state is to be found only in insentient objects,[2] such as bricks and stones, which, because of the absence of life and feeling, cannot at all be represented to be in bondage. It means simply imperfect knowledge, such as is found in ordinary mortals. It may further be pointed out that in such a context it stands, not for the intellectual (bauddha) but for the innate (pauruṣa) ignorance which is technically called āṇavamala[3] (innate impurity). As such it is represented to be the cause of another impurity, called kārmamala (impurity of Karma). (For details on this the reader is requested to refer to the 5th chapter.) The latter also, in its turn, is said to be the cause of still another, namely, impurity of transmigratory existence[4] (Māyīya mala). The self is covered with these three impurities [of innate ignorance, of Karma and of transmigratory existence (Āṇava, Kārma and Māyīya malas)] exactly in the manner in which[5] an ovule (kaṇa) is with nucellus (kambuka), integument (kiṁśāruka) and husk (tuṣa). These covers are responsible for the transmigration of the individual self as nucellus, integument and husk are for the development of ovule.

Although these impurities are said to be related with one another by causal relation, yet no idea of succession in their coming into being is intended to be implied. For instance, when the innate ignorance, is spoken of as the cause of the impurity of Karma, and the latter of transmigratory existence it does not mean that one follows the existence of the other. It simply means that without one the other cannot exist, i. e., the existence of each of the preceding in the above list is an indispensable condition for that of the following.

1. T. S., 5. 2. T. A., I, 58. 3. T. A., I, 56.
4. T. A., I, 54. 5. P. S., 55, 57.

The existence of the body presupposes that of the Karma ;[1] and the effectiveness of the latter depends upon the existence of the innate ignorance.[2] Thus, if there be no innate ignorance the other impurities will automatically disappear. It is because of this that at one place the innate ignorance is spoken of as the greatest and innermost cover ; the six sheaths, consisting of Māyā, Kalā, Niyati, Rāga, Vidyā and Kāla, as the inner and subtle cover ; and the body as the gross and outer cover.

MALAS OR IMPURITIES DEFINED.

1. ĀṆAVAMALA OR

INNATE IGNORANCE.

Innate ignorance is one of the manifestations, brought about by the universal Will[3] Power (Svātantrya śakti). It conceals the real nature of the Self. It is a mere consciousness of the supposed imperfection and limitation which is responsible for the rise of countless individual selves.[4] It is beginningless though destructible. It is the instrumental cause of the impurity, called Kārma mala, inasmuch as the power of Karma to affect the soul, depends upon its presence.

ITS DISTINCTION FROM INTELLECTUAL IGNORANCE.

We have already pointed out that the word "ignorance", whether used in reference to the individual self or the intellect, refers, not to a total absence of knowledge but to a limited knowledge which is the same thing as determinate knowledge, i. e. consciousness of something as such to the exclusion of all other things (Sarvo vikalpaḥ saṁsāraḥ). The intellectual ignorance (Bauddha ajñāna) is an affection of the limited self caused by a stimulus. The stimulus is of two kinds, internal

1. T. A., VI, 111.
2. T. A., VI, 82-3.
3. T. A., VI, 61.
4. T. A., VI, 60.

and external. The former is due to the revival of old impressions. But the latter arises from the contact of a certain sense with a certain external object. The spiritual ignorance is altogether different from it.[1] It is simply a consciousness of self-limitation, not as associated with the body, the mind or the intellect, but above all of them ; a consciousness which is present in the transcendental state of the individual self, a state in which the self rises above the material body and all that is connected with it, so that there is no experience of any thing that happens to the body ; a state in which there is no experience of pain of any kind even if the body be cut ; a state in which not only the senses and the mind cease to work but the vital airs also suspend animation. It is that element in the consciousness, which is responsible for the automatic break of that state (svato vyutthāna).

It is not always that there is conscious association of this limitation with the self. It can remain even in a sub-conscious state. That state of the individual self in which this innate ignorance or limitation is in a sub-conscious state is technically known as the state of purity (Turīyātīta). This[2] state does not automatically cease. It requires some external agency to break it. But when the self is perfectly free from it, there is no break or resumption of connection with the body etc.

It will thus be clear that the intellectual ignorance is dependent upon the connection of the individual self with the body, with which it co-exists: but the spiritual ignorance is independent of it. It is because of this difference that this system holds that liberation (Mukti) cannot be got through the intellectual knowledge only. The intellectual knowledge can effect salvation only if it is accompanied by the spiritual knowledge.

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1. T. A., VI, 76.

2. Ś. C., 425, (Bhūmikā.)

This innate ignorance is different from "Rāga", which, according to the Sāṅkhya, is the cause of bondage. For, while the latter is simply a quality of Buddhi responsible for the attachment of the individual to certain object or objects, the former is a mere consciousness of an imperfection, because of which the self is subjected to all kinds of later limitations. Rāga Tattva, on which we shall speak in the third chapter, is still a different thing. It is a desire for something undefined. Both of these, the Rāga of the Sāṅkhyas and the Rāga Tattva of the Śaivas, are further manifestations of the innate ignorance.[1]

This impurity of innate ignorance is independent of the other two impurities. It continues to exist even after they have been destroyed. It passes through four states before reaching that of total annihilation. And it is the association of one of these states with each of the five classes of beings of pure creation that constitutes the chief point of difference of each one of them from the rest.

It may briefly be stated here that, according to this system, creation is of two kinds, the pure and the impure.[2] From Māyā down to Earth, the creation is impure inasmuch as the knowledge of duality predominates in it. And from Śiva to Śuddha Vidyā the creation is called pure, because the experiencing entities of this creation are the universal beings who realise themselves actually as such and have for their experience the whole of the universe in different forms, but free from all limitations which characterize the determinate knowledge.

There are eight kinds of experiencers. Five belong to the pure creation, two to the impure and one to the transitional stage between the two. It is the association of one or more

1. T. A., VI, 57-9.

2. T. A., VI, 56.

of these impurities with the individual self which distinguishes each one of the eight experiencers from the rest. Two, Sakala and Pralayākala, belong to the impure creation. Every mortal in the state of creation (sṛṣṭi-daśā) is Sakala, because there are all the three impurities in him. These very mortals in the state of dissolution (Pralaya) are called Pralayākalas, because at that time they have no mortal coil, the body, which, with all that it can be associated with, is called the impurity of Māyā. Thus Pralayākalas have only two impurities. The experiencers of the transitional stage between the impure and the pure creations are known as Vijñānākalas.

(Māyordhve Śuddhavidyādhaḥ santi vijñānakevalāḥ)

These possess only one impurity,[1] that of innate ignorance, which is inclining towards destruction in their case.

This impurity of innate ignorance passes, according to Śaiva view, through four states before reaching that of total annihilation. Hence the remaining five subjects, who belong to the pure creation, Śāmbhava, Śaktija, Mantramaheśa, Mantreśa and Mantra, are represented to have the distinguishing mark of having the same perishing impurity but each in a different state[2]; in Śiva, for instance, it is in the state of non-existence (Dhvasta). Abhinava has given a large number of synonyms of Mala, each indicative of one of its functions in T. A., VI, 73–9.

2. KĀRMA MALA.

It has to be distinguished from karma-saṁskāra, which is simply an effect, left on the self by various kinds of mental and physical actions. It is essentially a mere desire, without specific objective reference, which is responsible for the countless associations of the self with other creations of Māyā. Its effectability and even its very existence depends on the

1. T. A., VI, 77, 81.

2. T. A., VI, 80.

innate ignorance. We shall revert to this topic in dealing with the Śaiva theory of Karm.

3. MĀYĪYA MALA.

All that the self is associated with because of both, the Kārma-mala and the karma-saṁskāra, is called Māyīyamala.[1]

THE MEANS OF LIBERATION FROM BONDAGE.

The perfect knowledge, not intellectual but spiritual, of the Ultimate Reality of the knowable (jñeya), the knowledge which is free from all limitations[2] and from the idea of duality in any form, is the means of liberation.

THE INTELLECTUAL AND THE SPIRITUAL KNOWLEDGE.

A distinction has to be drawn here between the intellectual and the spiritual knowledge (Bauddha and Pauruṣa jñāna) similar to that as has already been pointed out between the intellectual and the innate ignorance. The spiritual knowledge is that perfect knowledge which dawns upon a person, who has reached the highest stage in the spiritual development through the total annihilation of the innate ignorance.[3] It transcends the limit of language and is, therefore, to be known only through experience. Similarly, intellectual knowledge is that perfect knowledge by virtue of which a person transcends the difference between this and that, and sees only one whole and that too, as a manifestation of himself. The former comes from the Dīkṣā[4] and the latter from the study of the monistic philosophy.[5] The latter is more important than the former, not so much because it can liberate a person right in his life time, as because the Dīkṣā is inefficacious in bringing about salvation without the assistance of the Bauddhajñāna.[6]

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1. T. A., I, 56. 2. T. A., I, 72. 3. T. A., I, 78–9.
4. T. A., I, 79. 5. T. A., I, 81–2. 6. T. A., I, 83.

There are four ways to liberation, Anupāya, Śāmbhava, Śākta and Āṇava.[1] Each of these does not directly lead to the realisation of the Ultimate Reality.[2] Each of the succeeding, in the above order, leads to that which immediately precedes. It is the first alone which can be called the direct means.[3] The difference, however, between the first and the second i. e. Anupāya and Śāmbhava, is very slight. The former, therefore, is not counted as a separate way in some authoritative books of the system. In fact it is regarded as the highest stage of the latter (Śāmbhava).[4]

At some places the word 'Samāveśa' is found substituted for "Upāya". It is defined as a merging into its ultimate form, the highest reality[5] of that which, being apparently separate from the Ultimate, is limited. It is merging of the individual into universal. This gives us some idea of the chief point of distinction between one of the ways and the rest. The word "Samāveśa" literally means "complete or perfect immersion.' There are four such immersions. Beginning from the last, each one leads to the preceding one, up to the first, which alone is considered to be the direct way to salvation i. e. the realisation or the recognition of the Ultimate Reality. This process of immersion appears to be a complete reversal of that of emergence. Or, to put it more clearly, the process, involved in Mokṣa, is the complete reverse of that of Ābhāsa or manifestation. We know that, according to this system, creation is nothing but manifestation *without* of what is *within;* that, in the order of succession in manifestation, Ānanda, Icchā, Jñāna and Kriyā follow one another in their respective order; and that these stand for successive states of the universal consciousness in the process of manifestation. We also know that, corresponding to these very states in manifestation

1. T. A., I, 258.   2. T. A., I, 255–6.
3. T. A., I, 203.   4. T. A., I, 182.   5. T. A., I, 205.

or emergence, there are four states leading to complete immersion (samāveśa) as stated above. In fact two of these, namely, the Śākta and the Āṇava, are also called Jñānopāya and Kriyopāya respectively,[1] because they are mostly concerned with the manifestations of the powers of Jñāna and Kriyā respectively. And from the nature of description of the remaining two it is clear that Abhinava meant them also to be called Ānandopāya and Icchopāya respectively. Thus, just as in the course of successive manifestation of Ānanda, Icchā, Jñāna and Kriyā, each of the preceding leads to that which immediately follows, so in the course of the gradual immersion (krama-samāveśa or mukti) these very powers similarly merge into one another in the reverse order. For, mokṣa is nothing but, broadly speaking, an individual dissolution and, therefore, the opposite of manifestation.

The various stages in manifestation from Cit to Kriyā are admitted to correspond to those from the state of deep sleep to that of action. It would not, therefore, be wrong to say that the four stages leading from the mundane existence to the complete immersion in the Highest Reality, similarly correspond to those which are experienced in falling into sleep from the state of activity. If we carefully analyse our successive experiences from the time when we attempt to sleep to that when we actually fall asleep, we find that ordinarily there are four well definable stages. The first three are marked by the suspension of the physical, the mental and the volitional activities respectively and the fourth by the loss of distinct individual self-consciousness. If the distinctive features of the above four stages be kept in mind there will be very little difficulty in understanding the nature of the activity involved in and the result reached by, the four successive means to the final emancipation.

1. T. A., I, 186–7.

KRIYOPĀYA OR ĀṆAVOPĀYA.

Kriyopāya is that path in which the external things, such as repetition of certain religious formulas[1] (Mantra), which are nothing but creations of imagination (Kalpanā), are used as means to self-realisation. It is called Kriyopāya, firstly because to the follower of this path both, the consciousness of self and that of the objective universe, are equally prominent as in the characteristic experience "I am this" of the Sadvidyā[2] (Kriyā) stage of universal manifestation, and secondly, because the physical activities, such as repetition of a Mantra, as has been said above, play an important part in it. Shall we say that the repetition of a religious formula plays the same part in bringing about the liberation as does a lullaby in putting a child to sleep, a state of physical quiescence ?

JÑĀNOPĀYA OR ŚĀKTOPĀYA.

Jñānopāya is the second of the four ways in which repeated attempts have to be made to rise from the stage of the knowledge of duality to that of unity. When, for instance, a man begins with thinking "The self alone is all this" (Ātmaivedaṁ sarvam), and by the repeated attempt at elimination is able to rise to the unshakable knowledge of oneness (Nirvikalpa Jñāna) in the form "the self," he is said to follow the path of knowledge. It is called Jñānopāya because the mental activities of meditation are the most important factors in it. The activity involved in this may be compared to our autosuggestion in our attempt to sleep, which brings mental quiescence.

ŚĀMBHAVA MĀRGA OR ICCHOPĀYA.

It is a path in which the perfect knowledge, the knowledge of the Ultimate Reality,[3] comes through mere exercise of the

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1. T. A., I, 235. 2. T. A.. I, 186. 3. T. A., I, 235.

will power, without any serious mental effort at unification (Anusandhi) of ideas or elimination thereof; much in the same manner in which the knowledge of the real worth of a gem comes to an expert jeweller[1] at the very first moment of its sight without any great careful examination. It is called Śāmbhava mārga or the path of Icchā, because in it the exercise of will power is the important factor. The stage reached by this means is the one in which the world of experiences loses its definiteness and, therefore, may be compared to that which immediately precedes deep sleep and is marked by the presence of only vague ideas such as are conceived in desire.

ANUPĀYA–MĀRGA OR ĀNANDOPĀYA.

It is the same as we have discussed above under "Pratyabhijñā"[2]. It is called Anupāya, not because there is no use of any means whatsoever,[3] but because the elaborate means are but of little importance. It is that path by following which the Ultimate is realised even without Bhāvanā. The realisation of the Ultimate comes to the follower of this path in consequence of just a word from a responsible quarter as in the case of complex recognition, described above. The stage attained by this way may be compared to deep sleep, in which consciousness is free from all affections.

CONCEPTION OF MOKṢA, ACCORDING TO THE PRATYABHIJÑĀ.

Mokṣa, according to this system, is nothing but the state of perfect purity of consciousness.[4] It is the realisation of the Self, the Parā Saṁvit or the Supreme[5] Consciousness, which is beyond the reach of both thought and language and is the ultimate source, not only of both of them but also of all that

1. T. A., I, 186. 2. T. A., Ah. II, 39–40.
3. T. A., Ah. II, 3. 4. T. A., I, 62. 5. T. A., I, 192.

they imply or involve. It is purely subjective and, therefore, is both unilluminable (aprakāśya) by any external light and unknowable (ajñeya) by any means of knowledge. It transcends all; it surpasses all; it is the ultimate aim of all aims. It may be called consciousness, not such as we ordinarily have, but that which is a matter of experience of the Yogins in the pure or post-transcendental state of consciousness.

OTHER CONCEPTIONS OF MOKṢA FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF PRATYABHIJÑĀ SYSTEM.

This system believes in 36 categories or Tattvas. We shall deal with them in the third chapter and shall explain why only thirty six, neither more nor less, are accepted. Here we are concerned only with pointing out the view of the Pratyabhijñā about the conceptions of Mokṣa of other systems and with stating as to which of the 36 categories some of the prominent ones among them reach, because of their peculiar philosophical conceptions. In the 1st Āhnika of his Tantrāloka, Abhinava criticises the conceptions of Mokṣa of three systems, the Idealistic and the Nihilistic schools of Buddhism and the Sāṅkhya, as follows :—

VIJÑĀNAVĀDIN'S CONCEPTION OF MOKṢA.

The Citta (mind or self ?), the Vijñānavādins hold, is extremely pure by nature. Because of the beginningless ignorance, however, it is covered up with adventitious impurities, which are the cause of the appearance of the transitory world of phenomena. And because all the experiences of the phenomenal world are entirely due to the impurities, the former, therefore, automatically cease with the cessation of the latter[1]. Thus the Nirvāṇa is nothing but freedom from the impurities. It is to be attained through constant deep meditation and other practices enjoined in the Buddhist scripture.

1. T. A., I, 64.

ITS REFUTATION.

The defects of the above conception of Nirvāṇa are apparent. It conflicts with the well known Bauddha theory of momentariness. If all that exists, is momentary, so must be the mind also. And if so, it cannot have existence long enough to be affected by Bhāvanā and, therefore, there can be no possibility of Mokṣa which is simply its effect. Moreover, according to the Idealistic Buddhism, each moment (kṣaṇa) gives birth to another which is similar to it in all respects. How can then the veiled original moment produce one which is dissimilar to it, i. e., free from the veil ?

NIHILIST'S THEORY OF MOKṢA AND ITS REFUTATION.

According to the Nihilistic Buddhism (Sūnyavāda), even the Vijñāna of the Idealists has no existence : and Mokṣa is nothing but the realisation[1] of this nihility. But this is an impossible position. For, if nothing exists what can be realised and by whom ? But if, in order to get out of this difficulty, the existence of the 'realiser' be admitted, that would mean the abandonment of the fundamental principle. The Nihilist's conception of Mokṣa is thus as inconsistent with his fundamental principle as that of the idealist.

SĀṄKHYA CONCEPTION OF MOKṢA AND ITS CRITICISM.

The Sāṅkhya conception of Mokṣa is no better. The Sāṅkhya holds that the whole universe is an evolute of an eternal principle, called Prakṛti; that Puruṣa, the self, is altogether passive and simply looks indifferently on the work of the former; and that freedom from worldly bondage can be attained through the correct knowledge of the twenty-four categories of the Sāṅkhya system as distinct from the self. But the question, that the Śaiva raises against this theory, is, how

1. T. A., I, 66.

and where can this knowledge of distinction take place ? The Prakṛti is insentient and, therefore, no knowledge such as "I have been seen and, therefore, let me not work for him" can reasonably be attributed to her. The case of Puruṣa is no better. He is perfectly passive (nirlepa). The supposition, therefore, of any such affection in Puruṣa as that involved in knowing the distinction between himself and the twenty-four Tattvas would mean selfcontradiction.

These systems have thus failed to render a coherent account of the position they have attempted to maintain. Their founders and exponents have not been able to understand the true nature of the Ultimate Reality. They are not, however, as far away from the truth as the materialists. They have made approaches to it with varying degrees of success, some being a little nearer it than others. Each one of them has been able to grasp the real nature of some one or the other of the higher Tattvas which he has taken to be the ultimate reality. The Bauddha, for instance, has understood the real nature of the Buddhi Tattva, the Sāṅkhya that of the Puruṣa[1] Tattva, and the Pātañjala that of the Niyati Tattva.[2] These systems, therefore, can surely help in the attainment of the respective Tattvas which they fully explain. But none of them can bring about the complete self-realisation, the full recognition of the Ultimate Reality.

The followers of these systems, however, do rise above the level of the common man inasmuch as they get liberation, though partial, from the impurity, called Māyīyamala. But they cannot be spoken of as liberated (mukta) in the real sense of the term, because the remaining two impurities, namely the kārma and the āṇava malas, remain associated with them even after the realisation of what they consider to be the ultimate reality. The perfect freedom, therefore, this system holds, can be got only through the Pratyabhijñā.

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1. T. A., I, 69. 2. T. A., I, 70.

CHAPTER II.

ĀBHĀSAVĀDA.

or

"REALISTIC IDEALISM."

The aim of every system of philosophy is to explain the why, the what and the wherefrom of the knowable. Every system bases its conclusions on a careful study of facts of experience and the comparative importance of each depends upon how far it satisfactorily accounts for these facts. Abhinava claims this basis of facts for the Pratyabhijñā system. To the facts of experience, as has already been stated, he gives the first, to reason the second and to a scriptural authority only the last place as the basis of his theories.[1]

Abhinava differs in his explanation of the world of experience from both the realistic and the idealistic schools of Indian Thought. From the logical realism of the Nyāya and from the atomistic pluralism of the Vaiśeṣika he completely differs both in details and in fundamentals. From the realistic dualism of the Sāṅkhya, from the subjective idealism of the Bauddha and from the monistic idealism of the Vedānta, however, his difference is confined mostly to the fundamentals only. Because the Pratyabhijñā system, on which his explanation is based, admits, with some differences of course, the twenty-four categories together with the Puruṣa in common with the Sāṅkhya, the principle of momentariness and the Māyā, which are the characteristic doctrines of the Buddhism and the Vedānta respectively.

1. T. A., I, 149.

The world of experience, according to him, therefore, is not a creation the God, who is simply an active agent and brings the experienceables into being with the help of some such material cause as the atoms; nor is it an evolute of the Prakṛti, as the Sāṅkhya conceives; nor a purely subjective experience, as the Vijñānavādin represents; nor even a mere illusion, as the Vedāntin believes it to be. It is, he holds, real, because it is a manifestation of the All-inclusive Universal Consciousness or Self exactly as a creation of a yogin is a manifestation of an individual self. But it is ideal, because it is nothing but an experience of the Self and has its being in the Self exactly as our own ideas have theirs within us. Hence the Pratyabhijñā system, because of its theory of *Ābhāsavāda,* presented in these pages, is called the *"Realistic Idealism."*

ĀBHĀSA DEFINED.

All[1] that appears; all that forms the object of perception or conception; all that is within the reach of the external senses or the internal mind; all that we are conscious of when the senses and the mind cease to work, as in the state of trance or deep sleep; all that human consciousness, limited as it is, cannot ordinarily be conscious of and, therefore, is simply an object of self-realisation; in short all that is i. e. all that can be said to exist in any way and with regard to which the use of any kind of language is possible, be it the subject, the object, the means of knowledge or the knowledge itself, is Ābhāsa.

THE COMMON BASIS OF ĀBHĀSAS.

The explanations of the phenomenon of knowledge, as given by the dualists and the pluralists, have been declared unsatisfactory, because they present an insurmountable diffi-

1. I. P. V., I., 35–6.

culty in bridging the gulf that divides the self from the not-self. If the subject and the object are completely cut off from each other, have exclusive and independent existence, and are of opposite nature, like light and darkness, (Tamaḥprakāśavad viruddhadharmiṇoḥ, Ś. Bh.) how can there be any connection between the two, which is so very necessary for the production of the phenomenon of knowledge. The meeting of the self and the not-self, in this case, seems to be as difficult as that of the two logs which are carried by two different currents which separately lose themselves in the sands.

> Na hi pṛthak pṛthak parikṣīṇeṣu srotaḥsu taduhyamānāḥ tṛṇolapādayaḥ samanvayaṁ kaṁcid yānti,
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> I. P. V., I, 283.

The realistic idealism, therefore, puts forth its theory of the All-inclusive Universal Consciousness or Self.

ANUTTARA.

This All-inclusive Universal consciousness, this logical necessity satisfactorily to account for the phenomena of knowledge, is called Anuttara[1] (the Highest Reality) or Parā or Pūrṇā Saṁvid (Supreme or perfect consciousness) in this system. As the word Anuttara implies, it is a reality beyond which there is nothing : it is, therefore, free from all limitations. It is undefinable in terms of ordinary every day life.

> Na vidyate uttaram praśnaprativacorūpaṁ yatra
>
> P. T. V. 19.

It[2] cannot be spoken of as "this" or "that" nor as "not this" or "not that." It is "all", but not in the sense in which "all" is apprehended by the limited human mind. The mind cannot grasp it and, therefore, no talk about it is possible. It is not a thing to be perceived or conceived but

1. P. T. V., 9. 2. P. T. V., 21.

simply to be realised. Whatever word or words we may use to indicate it, we fail to convey the idea of its real nature; because the words stand for a certain definite idea, but it is indefinite, not in the sense that it is a shadowy nothing or nihility, but that it is much more than is signified by some word or words. All the statements to define it are like those of the proverbial four blind men who described an elephant to be something like a table, a broomstick, a rough pillor, or a winnowing basket, according as each of them could know it by feeling the back, the tail, the leg or the ear only respectively. Who can say that the conception of an elephant of each one of them was altogether wrong? Because nobody can deny that an elephant is partly like what each one of them separately described it to be. Nor can the conception be said to be wholly correct, because the elephant is not only as described by each one of them separately or even collectively but something more also. The Highest Reality is similarly all that which can possibly be conceived by those who possess the power of conception; but it is not that much only. It is much more than the limited human mind can imagine it to be.

The ideas of unity and multiformity, of time and space, and of name and form, are based upon certain ways and forms in which the Ultimate appears. The transitory world represents an insignificantly small part of the whole of the manifestation. It is, therefore, as unreasonable to apply these ideas to the Anuttara as such, as it would be to apply the ideas formed by each blind man separately to the elephant as such :—

"Uttaraṁ ca śabdanam, tat sarvathā 'īdṛśaṁ tādṛśam' iti vyavacchedaṁ kuryāt tad yatra na bhavati, avyavacchinnam idam anuttaram." P. T. V., 21.

This concept of the Anuttara is very much similar to that of the pure (śuddha) Brahman of the Vedāntin. Compare, for instance, the following quotation from the Tavalakāropaniṣad :—

"Na tatra cakṣur gacchati no vāg gacchati no mano na vidmo na vijānīmo yathaitad anuśiṣyād anyadeva viditād atho aviditād adhi." T. U., Ch. I, 3.

We shall discuss the concept of "Anuttara" at greater length in the context of the Kula system.

After the admission that the Ultimate Reality is beyond the reach of thought and language, the attempt of the Ābhāsavādin to speak on it is similar to that of the Vedāntin, who, as we have just pointed out, agrees to a very large measure with the former on this point. Both attempt to give an idea of the Ultimate in its relation to us as the Creator. Both admit that no definition of the Ultimate can be perfect and still both attempt to define it in words, which, according to them, express the reality in the best possible way.

THE ULTIMATE AS PRAKĀŚA–VIMARŚAMAYA.

The Ultimate, according to the Ābhāsavāda, has two aspects, the transcendental[1] (viśvottīrṇa) and the immanent (viśvamaya). The latter is described as "prakāśavimarśamaya". The conception of macrocosm of this system is based on a careful study of microcosm. In order, therefore, to show clearly as to what these two words really stand for, it is necessary to point out their import when they are applied to the individual self.

Each of the two words represents an aspect of the individual self. The Prakāśa is conceived to be very much like a

1. T. A., I. 104.

mirror. In this aspect, the self is simply a substratum of the psychic images, which are merely its modes or forms, due to the stimulus, received either from external objects, as at the time of direct perception, or from internal factors, the revived residual traces, as at the time of imagination or dream. These images have very great similarity with those, cast by external objects on a mirror, which shows them as one with itself without losing its purity or separate entity. The difference, however, between this aspect of the individual self and a mirror is that the latter, in order that it may receive reflection, requires an external light to illumine it. A mirror in darkness does not reflect any image. But the self shines independently of all external lights and does not need an illuminator, in order that it may receive reflection.

The word "prakāśa" implies the residual traces also which are essentially the same as their substratum. The reason is obvious. The reflections are essentially the same as their substratum. The psychic images, because of their being of the nature of reflection, are admitted to be essentially the same as prakāśa. And because these very psychic images, existing under a sort of cover, are called residual traces or saṁskāras, they too, therefore, are not regarded as different from prakāśa.

The prakāśa aspect, however, is not the most distinctive aspect of the individual self, because it is to a large extent common to other things also, such as mirror, crystal and maṇi. If, therefore, the individual self had been only prakāśamaya it would have been no better than a substance capable of receiving reflection. The word "Vimarśa" explains what other distinctive features it possesses and why it does not belong to the same category as that to which a maṇi or a crystal does.

"Vimarśa" stands for the distinctive aspect of the self. It signifies the capacity of the self to know itself in all its purity in the state of perfect freedom from all kinds of

affections; to analyse all its states of varying affections, due either to the internal or the external causes; to retain these affections in the form of residual traces (saṁskāras); to take out, at will, at any time, any thing out of the existing stock of the saṁskāras and bring back an old affected state of itself as in the case of remembrance; and to create an altogether new state of self-affection by making a judicious selection from the existing stock and displaying the material so selected on the back-ground of its prakāśa aspect as at the time of free imagination. The word "Vimarśa" stands for all this and much more. At times "āmarśa" and "pratyavamarśa" also are used as substitutes of "vimarśa"; but they always do not connote all that "vimarśa" does. It represents the distinctive aspect of the individual self and differentiates it from mirror, maṇi, crystal and similar other substances capable of receiving reflection. The point has very clearly been stated by Abhinava in his Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī as follows :—

> "Atha anyenāpi satā ghaṭena, yatovabhāsasya pratibimbarūpā chāyā dattā, tām asau avabhāso bibhrad ghaṭasya prakāśa ityucyate, tataśca ajaḍaḥ, tarhi sphaṭikasalilamukurādiḥ api evambhūta eva iti ajaḍaḥ syāt. Atha tathābhūtam api ātmānaṁ taṁ ca ghaṭādikaṁ sphaṭikādiḥ na parāmṛṣṭuṁ samarthaḥ iti jaḍaḥ, tathā parāmarśanam eva ajāḍyajīvitam antarvahiṣkaraṇasvātantryarūpam." I. P. V., I, 198.

Thus when the Pratyabhijñā speaks of the individual self as "Prakāśa-vimarśamaya" it means that the self is self-luminous and contains residual traces within; and that it is capable of receiving reflection, of knowing itself and others, of controlling what it contains within and of giving rise to new psychic phenomena with the residual traces which are essentially the same with itself.

Let us now see what does the expression "Prakāśavimarśamaya" mean when it is used with reference to the Universal Self. According to the Pratyabhijñā, as has been said before, the creation of the universe by the Universal Self is a manifestation without of what is already within on the back-ground of itself (svātmabhitti). The manifested universe is only apparently separate from the Self much as reflected external object is from a mirror.[1] It is in its essential nature exactly like the limited manifestation of an individual at the time of dream, remembrance, imagination or Yogic creation.[2] Its substratum is, as in the case of the limited manifestation, the prakāśa aspect of the Self which is affected in the same manner as the individual Buddhi (the self itself so called at the time of affection) is at the time of dream. The reasons, therefore, which justify the use of the word "prakāśa" in reference to the individual self hold good in the case of the Universal Self also. For, both 'shine' (prakāśate) and are capable of receiving reflection, of shining as one with the cause of affection and of making it one with themselves.

One point of difference, however, between the individual prakāśa and the universal, as substrata of what is reflected on them, has to be noted here; namely, that the affection of the former is caused, not only by the internal causes, as in the case of dream or imagination, but by the external also, as at the time of a direct perception. But, since the latter is universal and all-inclusive, its affection by any external cause is out of the question.

But the manifestation is a systematic action and requires a selection to be made out of the existing stock within. Therefore, it presupposes knowledge, will and self-consciousness (ānanda). Each of the above three attributes depends upon that which immediately follows in the order stated above ; because

1. T. A., II, 3-4. 2. I. P. V., I, 182.

without self-consciousness, as our experience tells us, there can be no desire; similarly without desire no knowledge is possible: and how can any systematic action be possible unless there be knowledge of the object, towards the accomplishment of which a particular activity is to be directed, and of the means by which the said object is to be achieved? The word "vimarśa", therefore, when used with reference to the Universal Self, stands for that power which gives rise to self-consciousness, will, knowledge and action in succession.

SVĀTANTRYA ŚAKTI.

This very "vimarśa" is spoken of as "Svātantrya", because its existence does not depend upon any thing else, as does that of will, knowledge and action, each of which depends for its existence upon what immediately precedes. This represents the principal power of the Highest Lord (Maheśvara) as the Self is often called. This includes all other powers, which are attributed to the Ultimate as the following quotations show :—

"Citiḥ pratyavamarśātmā parāvāk svarasoditā
Svātantryam etat mukhyaṁ tad aiśvaryam parameśituḥ."
I. P. V., I, 204.

"Eka evāsya dharmosau sarvākṣepeṇa vidyate
Tena svātantryaśaktyaiva yukta ityāñjaso vidhiḥ."
T. A., I, 107.

"Vastutaḥ punarapyahampratyavamarśātmā svātantryaśakti-revāsyāsti."
T. A., Comm., I, 108.

For the conception of the principal power of the Parama Śiva as Svātantrya, the Pratyabhijñā seems to be indebted to Pāṇini; because it is Pāṇini, who, so far as we know at present, first conceived the Svātantrya to be the chief characteristic of an agent.

"Svatantraḥ kartā." Pā. I, 4, 54.

For, according to this system, the relation between the Parama Śiva and the universe is that of the manifestor and the manifested or manifestable, that is, of the subject and the object; and because it is the power of "Vimarśa" which gives rise to self-consciousness etc. and distinguishes the subject, and because, unlike the will etc., it does not depend for its being and causal efficiency on any thing else, therefore, the word "svātantrya" has at places been substituted for "Vimarśa".

The word "Svātantrya" does not imply capriciousness, wantonness or self-willedness. The ultimate power, is not wanton, capricious or self-willed, according to this system, as a superficial reader of its literature often thinks. The simple implication of this expression, when used with reference to Parama Śiva, firstly is, that He has the same independent power over what He contains within, as we ourselves, as limited conscious beings, have over our saṁskāras, which lie within us before their rise, much as the universe lies within Him before its manifestation; and secondly, that just as in our case it is the power of consciousness (vimarśa) which is responsible for bringing the subconscious ideas into conscious state at the time of remembrance, imagination etc. so it is the svātantrya śakti which manifests without what lies within the Ultimate. The assumption of the svātantrya śakti will thus appear to be simple, natural and based on the fact of common experience and not a preposterous conception without any other basis than a theological prejudice, as some critics have opined.

"Svātantry śakti" is a very comprehensive expression of the Pratyabhijñā terminology. It is used with reference to the Universal Self when all the possible powers, which can be attributed to it (Self), are intended to be implied.[1] It is so

1. I. P. V., I, 214.

often to be met with in the Pratyabhijñā literature and the idea, implied by it, is so characteristic of this system that it is often called the Svātantryavāda.

OTHER NAMES OF SVĀTANTRYA ŚAKTI.

The Śaiva writers on the various branches of the monistic Śaivaism, looking at the Svātantrya aspect of the Universal Consciousness from different points of view, have given it different names. In the Śiva Sūtra of Vasugupta it is called 'Caitanya' for the simple reason that it has the power of uniting, separating and dealing in multifarious other ways with what is within.[1] It is called Sphurattā or Spanda in Spanda literature, because it represents that essential nature of the Universal Consciousness which is responsible for its apparent change[2] from the state of absolute unity. It is also called Mahāsattā, because[3] it is the cause of all that can be said to exist in any way. Another name by which it is referred to at some places is "Parāvāk",[4] because it represents the speech in its most subtle form.

PRAKĀŚA AND VIMARŚA EXPLAINED.

From what has been stated above two points become clear, namely, (I) that the word "prakāśa" is used for that aspect of the immanent Ultimate, which serves as a substratum for all that it manifests, exactly as the Buddhi does for the images that an individual builds up at the time of imagination; and (II) that similarly the word "vimarśa" stands for that aspect which is simply a power, which, for want of a better word, we call here "consciousness" ; a power, which, by giving rise to self-consciousness, will, knowledge and action in succession, is responsible for selection from what is already within and

1. I. P. V., I, 200.
2. I. P. V., I, 208–9.
3. I. P. V., I, 209.
4. I. P. V., I, 203.

manifestation of the so selected material as apparently separate from itself. The self-consciousness and the powers of will, knowledge and action, may be said to be different aspects of this very "vimarśa".

THE ESSENTIAL NATURE OF THE MANIFESTED AND THE MANIFESTABLE.

But now the question arises: if the power which is ultimately responsible for manifestation is "Vimarśa" and the substratum of manifestation is "Prakāśa" what about the manifested and the manifestable ? Are they different from both "prakāśa" and "vimarśa" and so something separate from the Ultimate ? The reply of the monistic Śaivaism to this question is that the manifestable and so naturally the manifested are prakāśa.

(Prakāśātmā prakāśyortho nāprakāśaśca siddhyati.)

I. P. V. I, 159.

The reason is not far to seek. This system holds that the manifested universe is brought about by the Ultimate exactly as are the objects of a dream by an individual and that the relation of the Ultimate with the manifested universe is the same as that which exists between the objects of a dream and the dreaming self. The objects of a dream and the residual traces of the former experiences, which are responsible for the rise of the appearances of a dream, are accepted to be essentially the same as the prakāśa aspect of the dreaming self. Believing, therefore, that what is true in the case of the microcosm is no less so in that of the macrocosm, the Pratyabhijñā holds that the manifestable and the manifested are essentially prakāśa.

THE IMPLICATION OF "PRAKĀŚA-VIMARŚAMAYA" SUMMARIZED.

Thus it appears that the word "Prakāśa" stands, not only for the common substratum of all the manifestables and the

manifested but also for the manifestables and the manifested themselves. Therefore, when this system speaks of the Ultimate as "prakāśavimarśamaya" it means to imply that the Ultimate, in its aspect of prakāśa, is both the universe, in either manifested or unmanifested state, and its permanent substratum; and that in its aspect of Vimarśa, it is that power which is ultimately responsible for keeping the universe in the state of perfect identity with itself, as at the time of Mahāpralaya, and for manifesting it as apparently separate from itself, as at the time of Creation.

THE NAMES OF THE ULTIMATE AND THEIR DISTINCTIVE IMPLICATIONS.

The Ultimate in its immanent aspect is referred to by three names with a distinctive implication in each case. The implied distinction refers to the relation of the Universal Consciousness with the manifestable. It is called Anuttara when the manifestable is in the state of absolute unity with it, as, for instance, at the time of total universal dissolution (mahāpralaya). When the relation of absolute unity is substituted by predominant unity (bhedābheda) it is spoken of as Śiva, as at the time of pure creation. The term Maheśvara, however, is applied only when the manifestable assumes distinct existence within the Universal Consciousness much as our thought currents or ideas do within ourselves, when we are about to deliver a very thoughtful speech. For a clear conception of the different relations of the manifestable with the Universal Consciousness, as implied by the words Anuttara, Śiva and Maheśvara, their comparison with the relations of speech with consciousness (self) in the states of Parā, Paśyantī and Madhyamā respectively, as described in the second chapter of the first part, will be useful.

The available literature does not speak much on the former two, perhaps, because the first represents a state of absolute unity of all and, therefore, has not got much that calls for an explanation, and the second is related to a creation, to which the perceptual and the inferential means of right knowledge do not apply : it is known from the Āgamas only. It is only the last, with which the Pratyabhijñā literature deals in detail. In fact, the Pratyabhijñā branch of the monistic Śaiva philosophy of Kashmir, which expounds the highest philosophy of the system, is primarily concerned with proving or establishing the existence of Maheśvara. The two Adhikāras, Jñāna and Kriyā, which cover more than four-fifths of the Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī, give simply an exposition of Maheśvara's two powers, after which the above mentioned Adhikāras are called. The following verses make it abundantly clear that the word "Maheśvara", in the Śaiva terminology, means the manifestor of the impure creation, on which all the worldly transactions depend :—

"Evamanyonyabhinnānām
Aparasparavedinām
Jñānānāmanusandhāna–
Janmā naśyejjanasthitiḥ
Na cedantaḥkṛtānanta–
Viśvarūpo maheśvaraḥ
Syādekaścidvapur jñāna–
Smṛtyapohanaśaktimān." I. P. V., 1, 103–6.

Our object in these pages, as set forth in the very beginning, is to explain the phenomena of knowledge of every day life. After discussing, therefore, a few questions which more or less relate to all the three aspects of the Universal Consciousness and the Ābhāsas in general, we shall mostly confine ourselves to the impure creation and the Maheśvara.

HOW ARE THE ĀBHĀSAS RELATED TO THE UNIVERSAL CONSCIOUSNESS ?

The monistic Śaiva conception of the macrocosm, as we have just pointed out, is based on a very careful study of the microcosm. The Śaiva holds that what is true in the case of the individual self is equally so in that of the Universal Self; for, both are identical; and that the Self is nothing but consciousness (Caitanya). We shall, therefore, be best able to answer the above question by pointing out how the individual manifestations are connected with the individual consciousness. We know of five states of the individual consciousness, the waking, the dreaming, the deep sleep, the transcendental and the pure, which are technically called Jāgrat, Svapna, Suṣupti, Turīya and Turīyātīta. The first three are well known. The last two refer to two kinds of concentrated states (Samādhi avasthās). The varying experiences of these states may be spoken of as the experiences of the unaffected (Śuddha) and the affected (Parimlāna) states of consciousness. The latter is not always due to the external stimulus. At the time of imagination and dream there is no such external stimulus as there is at that of the direct perception; but in the former case the consciousness is no less affected than in the latter.

If we analyse our consciousness as affected by imagination, we find two elements in it, the subjective and the objective, i. e. the imagining consciousness which is responsible for the rise of the images, of which it is itself both the back-ground and the perceiver, and the images themselves which have no other basis than the consciousness itself and are due to internal factors. These factors, in order that they may affect the consciousness in a certain order and not promiscuously all at once, have to be supposed to be within the control of some intelligent power. This controlling power is nothing else than the consciousness itself, which may also be called

self, because, as has already been pointed out, according to this system, self is nothing else than consciousness.

Now the question is how these factors are connected with the self, or rather, where and how do they exist before their rise ? Our experience tells us that they rise at our will from our consciousness independently of all external help and appear on the back-ground of consciousness and again merge in the same, much in the manner of waves in the ocean. If so, the answer to the above question is that just as the waves exist in the ocean before they rise, so do the images, which affect the purity of consciousness at the time of imagination, in the self, before they appear on the back-ground of its prakāśa aspect. This is exactly what Abhinava says in regard to the relation of Ābhāsas with the Universal Self in the course of discussion on the several meanings of the word "Anuttara" in the Parā Triṁśikā Vivaraṇa :—

"Tattvāntarāṇi ṣaṭtriṁśat anāśritaśivaparyantāni parabhairavānupraveśāsāditatathābhāvasiddhīni."

Thus, according to this system, all that has existentiality, from the Śiva down to the earth, exists within the Ultimate much in the same way as do our ideas within ourselves at the time when the self is in an unaffected state and so also all is externally manifested, at will, independently of all external causes. This explains why all that exists is called Ābhāsa. It is Ābhāsa because it is manifested (Ābhāsyate) by the Universal Self or because it is manifest (Ābhāsate).

It may be pointed out here that Abhinavagupta differs from Utpalācārya in regard to the number of categories of the Pratyabhijñā system. The latter admitted thirty six categories. In any case he does not talk of Anuttara and, according to the Bhāskarī, holds Śiva and Parama Śiva[1] or Maheśvara to

1. Bh., Vol. II, 212.

be identical. Abhinavagupta, however, under the influence of the Kula system, as presented in the Parā Triṁśikā, admitted the thirty seventh. In so doing he seems to follow the authority of the Āgama, quoted by Bhāskara Kaṇṭha as follows :—

"Yatparatattvaṁ tasmin vibhāti ṣaṭtriṁśadātmajagat"
Bh., Vol. II, 211.

And in the Mālinī Vijaya Vārtika, he propounds the thirty eighth category also, which he holds to be beyond the thirty seventh.

"Evañcaiṣa prakāśātmā saptatriṁśātmakātparaḥ"
M. V. V., 11.

In the Tantra Vaṭa Dhānikā also he expresses the same view as follows :—

"Upadeśyatayā sopi syādavacchedabhāgataḥ
Aṣṭātriṁśaṁ paraṁ dhāma yatredaṁ viśvakaṁ sphurat"
T. V. Dh., 8.

We shall discuss this point further in due course.

THE 'WHY' OF THE MANIFESTATION EXPLAINED.

Here it may be asked "Why does the Self manifest these Ābhāsas ?" Abhinava answers this question by saying that the nature of a thing cannot be questioned. It is absurd to ask why fire burns. To burn is the very nature of fire and so to manifest without what lies within is the very nature of the Self. It is natural for consciousness to assume a variety of forms. In fact, it is this that differentiates self from not-self. A jar, for instance, cannot change itself independently of external causes, but the self can and does :—

"Asthāsyadekarūpeṇa vapuṣā cenmaheśvaraḥ
Maheśvaratvaṁ saṁvittvaṁ tadatyakṣyad ghaṭādivat."

Our study of the microcosm fully supports the fact that such is the nature of the Ultimate Reality. Can we attribute the individual manifestation of dream or imagination to anything else than the very nature of the individual self ?

DOES THE ULTIMATE REALITY CHANGE ?

Here it may be asked : if the Ultimate Reality appears in all the perceptible forms it must be admitted to be changing ; how then can its eternal character be maintained ? In every day life the changeability and the destructibility are found universally concomitant. In fact, our idea of destructibility of such things as the sun and the moon is simply a matter of inference, drawn from the change that we perceive them undergo. Therefore, if the Highest Reality also changes, as it must, in order to appear in a variety of forms, it must also be transitory like momentary things of the world. Moreover, if the Highest Reality contains within all that it manifests how can it be represented to be one ?

To take up these questions in their respective order, let us find out what is meant by change. When a thing is seen with some additions it is said to have changed. When, for instance, we visit a certain place after a very long time and see very many things in addition to those which we saw on a former occasion, we say "the place is changed". Further, when the case is the reverse i. e. when we do not find many things which attracted our attention before, we say the same. The former kind of change is called "Āgama" (literally, coming in) or addition, and the latter "Apāya" (going out) or loss. There are two more kinds of change, known as transformation (Pariṇāma) and modification (Vikāra). When milk changes into curd it is said to have been transformed (Pariṇata); but when clay is changed into a jar, or gold into an ear-ring, it is said to have been modified (Vikāraṁ gamitaḥ). The chief

distinction between the above two kinds of change is that while in the former case the thing cannot recover its former condition : milk, for instance, once it changes into curd, cannot again become milk in any way : in the latter case such a recovery is very common. A lump of gold, for instance, after having assumed a number of forms, such as those of ear-ring, bangle etc., can again recover its old form of lump. It is thus clear that, while the first three kinds of change involve addition to or loss of the existing constituents, as in the first two, and irrecoverable loss of quality, as in the third, in the last there is simply a difference in the arrangement of the constituents. It is because of this that, while destructibility is admitted to be universally concomitant with the former three kinds of change, it is not so with the last one. How[1] else could the Vaiśeṣika, who holds the atoms to be eternal, maintain their indestructibility ? Because, according to him, these very atoms, being stirred by the Lord's wish at the time of creation and getting united with one another, form the various objects of the world, through the intervening stages of the 'binary' and the 'tertiary'. This is[2] what the Vedāntins also imply, when they say that the eternal Brahman is both the material and the operative cause of the world exactly as clay and gold and the potter and the goldsmith are of the earthen wares and gold ornaments.

If we analyse the idea a little further we find that such a change, as is always concomitant with destruction, presupposes the changing thing to be limited and so the existence of something apart from it, something that it becomes. A seed, for instance, changes into a tree and so is destructible, because it is limited in its nature and becomes, what originally it was not, by assimilating with itself what has a separate existence from it. The Highest Reality, according to the Pratyabhijñā, as

1. Ta. San., T. D., 9.

2. Ś. Bh., 337.

we have already shown, contains all within.[1] There is nothing apart from it which it can be represented to become. What takes place, when a thing is said to have been manifested, is simply this, that out of the unlimited mass of things, which lies within, it manifests certain things, at will, as separate from itself,[2] much as we do our own ideas at the time of imagination or dream. At all times, i. e. before, after and at the time of manifestation, the Ābhāsas are within the Absolute, as the waves are within the sea; and just as nothing goes out of or comes in the sea in consequence of the rise of waves so there is no substantial loss or gain to the Universal Consciousness because of the manifestation of Ābhāsas. Thus, the change, if we so prefer to call it, in the Absolute, according to the Ābhāsavādin, is simply a different arrangement of the ever existing material, much as that of atoms, according to the atomists, or, as that of entitative contents of the Brahman as the material cause of the universe, according to the Vedāntins. Therefore, just as the atomists and the Vedāntins maintain the eternality of their ultimate realities in spite of such a change so do the Ābhāsavādins.

MONISM EXPLAINED

As to the question : "How can the Ultimate Reality be said to be one, if it contains within all the Ābhāsas ?" the monist replies that that alone[3] can be said to be truly existent which exists independently of others. As all these Ābhāsas shine only on the background of the Absolute, much in the same manner as do the reflections in a mirror, so they cannot be said to have independent existence. And as this common basis of all the knowables is the only being that exists perfectly independently of others, so, this alone can be said to be truly existent (Sat). The system is held to be monistic, because,

1. I. P. V., I, 106. 2. I. P. V., I, 108. 3. I. P. V., I, 42-3.

according to it, the Anuttara alone really exists. The Ābhāsas are mere transitory appearances.

ARE ĀBHĀSAS REAL ?

No language is perfect. We cannot find a conventional expression for each shade of difference in our ideas, in any language. We have to depend upon approximations to convey the idea of subtle differences. We have, therefore, to understand clearly the implication of each word of a question regarding a philosophical problem. In fact, much of the confusion that we find in the writings of the later commentators on the ancient philosophical authorities is due to the fight over words. Let us, therefore, find out what is meant when the question of reality is raised about Ābhāsa, or rather, what do we mean when we ordinarily use the word "real". A thing is ordinarily considered to be real if it bears verification, if the experience of it is uncontradicted. The appearances of a dream are unreal, because our experiences of them are contradicted in the wakeful state : and much more so is the appearance of silver at the sight of a mother-of-pearl ; for, while the dream-silver does not disappear as soon as we approach it and can be used for all practical purposes so long as the dream lasts, the illusory silver does disappear at our approach. Thus, when we use the word "unreal" with regard to the things of the above instances, we do not mean that they are unreal exactly in the sense in which the sky-flower is regarded to be unreal. What we mean is that they are not as lasting as those of the ordinary wakeful state : we, however, do not deny their existence and their having been the objects of cognition ; because to say so would be a self-contradiction. In an illusion or a dream we do see a separate object and our experience also, concerning the sight of the object as such, remains uncontradicted ever afterwards ; for, nobody ever feels that he did not have such an experience.

But still, if that object is called unreal it is because of its not conforming to the conventional standard of reality in the wakeful state.

It may be asked here what is it that we see in an illusion or a dream ? Why does it last for so short a time, and why is its knowledge called erroneous, or rather, where does the error lie ? Leaving aside for the present the explanation of dream, if we take up only the illusion of silver and look at it from the point of view of the Ātmākhyātivādin, we get an explanation that it is nothing but a form that the limited self assumes at the sight of a mother-of-pearl because of the sudden and forceful revival of the Vāsanā. It is short-lived, like a flash of lightning, because, there is nothing behind it to support its existence as in the case of the illustration of lightning-flash. The mistake lies in considering what is purely subjective to be essentially objective in the ordinary accepted sense of the word. This explains also why the silver of an illusion is not perceptible to all like lightning-flash, though both of them are equally momentary. What we mean to point out is that what is really meant by unreal is not that the thing has no existence; for, if it were not existent nothing would have been seen ; but what is meant is that it is an individual subjective manifestation and as such it is of a different kind from the objective one, on which all worldly transactions depend.

We have seen above that the word Ābhāsa in this system is used in a very wide sense. It denotes all that appears in any way or form. Therefore, if the word "real" in the above question means "existent", or in other words, if the question is "Have the Ābhāsas got existentiality (Sattā) ?" the reply of the Ābhāsavāda would be "Yes". But, on the other hand, if the question is "whether the Ābhāsas have subjective or objective existence ?", the answer would be that this difference

is purely conventional and is assumed for practical purposes; it is, therefore, of the same nature as we feel between the objects of[1] a dream and those of a dream within another dream. It is a matter of common experience that at times, when we are dreaming, we dream a dream, and make exactly the same distinction between the objects of the continuous long dream and those of the shorter one, which ends within the longer, as we do in practical life between the objects of the wakeful and those of the dreaming state. The essential nature of the Ābhāsa is the same in both the cases, so that if one is called real the other is also real. In fact, the question, whether an appearance is subjective or objective, is not of much value, because the object of philosophy is not so much to point out the difference between one phenomenon, which is responsible for a certain kind of cognition, and another, as to explain in general why there is this cognitive change at all in the self and what it is that causes such a change. To say that one change is like another or that one cause of change is like another, as the Vedāntins always say that the external world is an illusion like the appearance of silver at the sight of a mother-of-pearl, is to avoid the real philosophical issue. We find that there are things which are external to self, it is another matter whether they are subjective or objective or more lasting or less ; and that they seem to affect the self so as to cause a variety of cognitions. The question, that philosophy has to answer, is, what are these things ? How have they come into being and how are they connected with the self, which they seem to affect ? This leads us to the treatment of Maheśvara.

MAHEŚVARA.

Maheśvara represents that state of the All-inclusive Universal Self in which, as has been said above, the Ābhāsas have a

1. I. P. V., II, 114.

distinct existence from the Self, though no less within the Self than in the state of unity, exactly as our thoughts have within ourselves at the time when we are about to deliver a thoughtful speech. As such the Universal Self is beginningless and endless, because the universe itself is such. It is omnipotent[1] and perfectly independent in the use[2] of its powers. It contains within all that is 'entitative' and 'illuminable'. It forms the permanent substratum of all that is objective. The object can have no more existence apart from and independently of the Maheśvara than a reflection can from a mirror. It is beyond the limitation of time, place and form. It is[3] a self-shining entity with which all the manifestations are connected exactly as the spreading rays are with a flame. It is perfectly free, because it does not require any prompting from without[4] to set about and accomplish its work. It is perfectly independent of both the external material and the instruments. It is spoken of as 'light'; but it is neither the recipient of light from the ordinarily known source, the sun, nor even is identical[5] with him or any other that can be thought of. It is perfectly independent of them. It is the ultimate source of all the sources of all lights.

KNOWABILITY OF THE UNIVERSAL CONSCIOUSNESS.

The Universal Consciousness is purely subjective. Objectivity cannot be[6] attributed to it, because such an attribution presupposes the existence of another knower, as different from and independent of it, and, therefore, is inconsistent with the original hypothesis of the universality of the Universal Consciousness. Its existence cannot be denied, because the

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1. T. A., I, 98–9.
2. I. P. V., I, 32.
3. T. A., I, 98.
4. I. P. V., I, 118.
5. I. P. V., I, 277.
6. I. P. V., I, 29.

very[1] act of denial presupposes a conscious being and that also similarly, in its turn, the Universal Consciousness to make the relation of the deniability possible. The individual selves are mere manifestations of it and their acts of knowledge are wholly dependent upon it. It is this very Universal Self, which sees and knows through the[2] innumerable bodies and as such is called the individual. It is the very life of the means of right knowledge, through which the existence of the external objects as such is established. How can the sword cut itself ? On this point there is perfect agreement between the Pratyabhijñā and the Vedānta. Like Utpalācārya's famous Kārikā :—

"Kartari jñātari svātmanyādisiddhe maheśvare
Ajaḍātmā niṣedhaṁ vā siddhiṁ vā vidadhīta kaḥ."
I. P. V., I, 29.

the Vedānta also says :—
"Vijñātāramare kena vijānīyāt." Br. U., 2-5-19.

THE POWERS OF THE UNIVERSAL CONSCIOUSNESS.

The Pratyabhijñā conception of power is different from that of the Naiyāyikas. According to the latter, it is a quality which cannot exist without a substratum and, therefore, presupposes a possessor. The knower, therefore, according to them, is different from the power of knowledge. But the former holds that the power is the very being of the possessor. The distinction between them is imaginary. It is just like giving a name to a collocation of a certain number of things and calling each constituent a possession of what is indicated by the said name. Take, for instance, a chair. It is a collocation of a certain number of pieces of wood, arranged in a certain way. Each piece is called by a separate name, indicative of its peculiar function, and all these, taken together, are given

1. T. A., I, 95-6.
2. I. P. V., I., 111.

a different name "chair". We speak of the leg, the arm and the back of a chair, as if chair had a separate existence from the legs etc. The difference between the Universal Consciousness and its powers is,[1] therefore, according to the Ābhāsavādin, not real but purely imaginary and conventional.

Similar is the case with the difference between one power and another. It is assumed because of the variety of its effects. It is of the same kind as is imagined between[2] the fire's power of burning and that of baking. In reality, however, all the powers, as we have already pointed out above, which are attributed to Maheśvara, are mere aspects of the one all-inclusive power, the Vimarśa or the Svātantrya Śakti.

THE KARTṚTVA AND THE JÑĀTṚTVA ŚAKTIS AND THEIR FUNCTIONS.

This system speaks of two kinds of manifestation, the external and the internal. For a clear understanding of the ideas of internality and externality of ābhāsas let us suppose that each ābhāsa is constituted by a separate current in the sea of the Universal Self. These currents always flow throughout the state of creation underneath the surface of the sea, and as such represent internal ābhāsas. To bring about their internal separate manifestation and to maintain them in the state of the internal separateness, is the work of Kartṛtva Śakti, omnipotence. At times, however, these currents are, for a moment, brought over the surface, as waves, and are put in such a position that that wave, which is capable of receiving reflection, can be affected by those which cast reflections. This is the work of the omniscience or power of knower (jñātṛtva śakti) and the affection of that wave which is capable of receiving reflection is the phenomenon of knowledge.

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1. T. A., I, 109. 2. T. A., I, 110.

THE ASPECTS OF THE JÑĀTṚTVA ŚAKTI.

The Jñātṛtva Śakti has the following three aspects :—

1. The power of knowledge (Jñāna Śakti)
2. The power of remembrance (Smṛti Śakti) and
3. The power of differentiation (Apohana Śakti).

THE POWER OF KNOWLEDGE.

The first[1] is that aspect of the power of the Universal Consciousness by virtue of which it takes out for separate manifestation only certain things from the unlimited mass which lies merged in it (svarūpād unmagnam ābhāsayati). The difference between the phenomenon of knowledge and the power thereof is, that the former is the eflect and the latter is the cause.

According[2] to this system, the subject is no less a manifestation than the object and both are momentary collocations of a certain number of ābhāsas or manifestations. A phenomenon of knowledge is, therefore, like the rise of two waves in the sea of the Universal Consciousness. One of these has Nairmalya, the capacity to receive reflection, and the other is without it. The former is called Jīvābhāsa (limited sentient manifestation) and the latter, jadābhāsa (insentient manifestation). When the rising sentient wave is affected by the insentient, which rises simultaneously with the former, as a mirror is by the objects, placed before, the phenomenon of knowledge is said to have taken place. Thus knowledge is simply the affected sentient wave of consciousness; but the power of knowledge is that capacity of the Universal Consciousness which is responsible for the rise of both the waves, necessary for the phenomenon of knowledge. This problem

1. I. P. V., I, 108. 2. I. P. V., I, 215.

we propose to take up for a detailed discussion in the section, dealing with the monistic Śaiva theory of perception.

THE POWER OF REMEMBRANCE.

But if both the sentient and the insentient ābhāsas are momentary so must be the knowledge also; and if so, then even the postulate of the power of knowledge fails to explain the "why" of all the worldly transactions. For, our experience tells us that our decision to try to gain or shun an object is reached after a sufficiently elaborate psychological process. The first thing that we do is to place, as it were, the experience of the present object by the side of that of a similar one in the past. Then we compare the two, draw a sort of inference as to the useful or harmful nature of what is present before us and accordingly decide to try to gain or shun it. The knowledge is momentary. It is destroyed in the very next moment after its production, but the comparison of experiences, necessary for motor response, requires its continuous existence in some form till the comparison is done. The theory of momentary knowledge, therefore, cannot satisfactorily account for the togetherness of experiences of different times on which all worldly transactions depend. Therefore, in order to explain the psychological phenomenon of the above description, the ābhāsavādins postulate another aspect of the omniscience, '*the power of remembrance*'.

The power of remembrance is that power of the Universal Consciousness by virtue of which it manifests itself in the form of such an individual self as can retain the effects of the external stimuli, received at the time of perception, and is able to revive them at that of a subsequent perception of a similar thing so as to make the unification of the experiences of both the present and the past times possible. The fact is

that the sentient[1] wave is like a momentary wave of light emanating from a permanent source. It is this source that retains in a sub-conscious state the idea of having sent out a wave towards a certain object and that of having received a stimulus of a certain kind therefrom. The point in question will become clear if in this case also, as we did in that of knowledge, we draw a distinction between the power and the phenomenon of remembrance. The former is that power which is the cause of such a limited perceiver as is the immediate permanent source of the emanating sentient wave and the latter is the effect thereof.[2] We take up the problem of remembrance for an exhaustive treatment in the 4th chapter.

APOHANA ŚAKTI

or

THE POWER OF DIFFERENTIATION.

It has been stated above that all that is, i. e., all that can be said to exist in any way or form, is within the Universal Self. For, consistently with the idea of its perfection we cannot admit the existence of any thing outside it. But both the psychic phenomena, the perception and the remembrance, presuppose the existence of both the cognisor and the cognised, not only as separate from the Universal Self but also (as separate) from each other. In fact, in our daily life we do not feel, as described above, that the subject and the object are like waves. On the contrary our experience is that they have independent and mutually exclusive existence. The Pratyabhijñā accounts for this fact by postulating the third aspect of the omniscience, the Apohana Śakti. It is that aspect of the omniscience which manifests each ābhāsa, whether subjective (jīva) or objective (jaḍa), as apparently completely cut off both from the Universal Consciousness and

1. I. P. V., I, 109. 2. I. P. V., I, 109 F. N.

from one another, though in reality[1] even at the time of such a manifestation they are one with their common substratum. Thus,[2] it is that power which is the cause of all the determinate knowledge of the limited self. This concept of the Universal Consciousness as the cause of all the psychological phenomena is in complete accord with the one, contained in the following line of the Bhagavadgītā:—

"Mattaḥ smṛtirjñānamapohanañca."

Bh. G., XV, 15.

KARTṚTVA ŚAKTI.

It may be stated at the very outset that the word Kartṛtva śakti is used in more than one sense. It is used in the sense of the creative power or power of manifestation in general: as such it means the same thing as Svātantrya śakti. Therefore, if we take Kartṛtva śakti in this wider sense the omniscience or jñātṛtva śakti will be simply an aspect of it. Abhinava has made this point very clear in the following words :—

"Sa cāyaṁ svatantraḥ..............................tadevāsya pārameśvaryam mukhyamānandamayaṁ rūpam iti pūrvamupāttaṁ 'kartari' iti. Tadeva svātantryaṁ vibhajya vaktuṁ 'jñātari' iti paścānnirdiṣṭam"

I. P. V., I, 31-2.

It is also used to denote that aspect of the Svātantrya śakti which is responsible for the innumerable varieties of the internal limited manifestation. These varieties, as the Jñātṛtva śakti reveals them, are manifested in two ways, viz., (1) by a simultaneous manifestation of many forms, each of which is substantially different and apparently separate from the rest, for instance, when we see a beautiful landscape with all its trees and creepers; and (II) by successive manifestation of

1. I. P. V., I, 111. 2. I. P. V., I, 110 F. N.

a large number of forms which so resemble one another that they are recognised to be the various forms of the same thing, as when we see a fawn frisking about. The former is called[1] Deśakramābhāsa, due to Mūrtivaicitrya, and the latter Kālakramābhāsa, caused by Kriyāvaicitrya. Thus "Kartṛtva śakti" in its limited sense, the sense in which we are using the expression here, means that aspect of the Svātantrya śakti which is responsible for the innumerable varieties of the internal limited manifestation. It has two aspects, the Kriyā śakti and the Kāla śakti.

KRIYĀ ŚAKTI.

Kriyā or action[2], according to this system, is nothing but an appearance of a long series of closely similar physical forms in so quick a succession as to produce a persistence of vision. Let us take, for instance, the hero of a drama, represented in a cinematographic film, and suppose that we are seeing that part of the film in which he is represented alone in a solitary place in a fit of anger, tearing his hair, grinding his teeth, rushing forward with a jerk, stopping suddenly and looking round wildly. At such a sight we use different expressions "tearing" etc., expressive of different kinds of the so called action, with reference to the hero. But let us ask "why ?" Is it not simply because of the appearance of a series of pictures, each of which, though different from the rest of the series, has yet enough common element to be identified with both the preceding and the following ; and does not each one of the expressions, expressive of an action, stand for the established convention which calls a certain number of similar successive pictures by one word ? For instance, when we say "the hero is rushing", does not the word "rushing" denote a set of pictures beginning with the one that represents the hero's first movement to raise one of his feet : and do we not use

1. I. P. V., II, 13. 2. I. P. V. II, 14.

that word simply because of production of persistence of vision and consequent consciousness that the same figure is doing all the movements indicated by the particular word ?

To make the idea clear let us state here briefly that, just like the Bauddha, the Pratyabhijñā also holds that the Ābhāsas are momentary and that the apparent continuity of a thing is due to the proportionately long series of similar ābhāsas, which follow one another in so quick a succession that we think that the same is having continuous existence. In the case of the flame of an oil-lamp, for instance, the flame, as the scientists tell us, is changing every moment. But as the old flame disappears the fresh energy comes in its place and is transformed into a new one with such quickness that we feel that the same flame is having continuous existence. The Trika, or the Pratyabhijñā, therefore, holds that an action is nothing but an appearance of the Universal Consciousness in those multifarious forms, a group of which is conventionally referred to by a single expression, much as the word "running" in the above illustration of the cinematographic film, is used for a large number of pictures beginning with the one, showing the first attempt at lifting of the foot, and ending with that which immediately precedes the first of the next group to be expressed by a similar word.

To make the point a little clearer let us take, for instance, a dream in which we see a person running and try to explain it psychologically. We know that a dream is nothing but a certain arrangement of the residual traces (saṁskāras), now revived owing to some unknown cause. Now the question is "does the running man of the dream represent one revived impression or more ?" The natural answer to this is "more" i. e. as many as there are pictures required to represent this movement in a cinema-show. According to the Pratyabhijñā, the universe is simply a manifestation of the Universal Cons-

ciousness very much similar to the individual manifestation of dream or the common lasting creation of a Yogin. Therefore, just as a running person is represented by a series of revived impressions in a dream and by a series of pictures in a cinema-show, so in ordinary worldly life each activity is represented by a series of ābhāsas. Kriyā śakti, therefore, is that aspect of the Kartṛtva śakti, which is responsible for such internal ābhāsas as, being externally manifested by the power of knowledge (jñāna śakti) give rise to the idea of action. These ābhāsas are connected or disconnected with one another[1] exactly as are the mental impressions in the case[2] of a dream or the various pictures in the case of a cinema-show. This[3] very power is responsible for such manifestations also as give rise to concepts of conjunction (Sambandha), generality (Sāmānya), place (Deśa), space (Dik) and time etc.[4]

KĀLA ŚAKTI.

Kāla śakti is another aspect of the Kartṛtva śakti, which is responsible for the manifestation of each constituent of the series of ābhāsas, on which the concept of action is based, as cut off from the rest, exactly as the Apohana aspect of the Jñātṛtva śakti manifests each constituent of the block of images 'formed on the mirror of Buddhi' as separate from the rest.

We may add here that the Universal Consciousness with the powers described in the foregoing pages is called Maheśvara on the analogy of a king. A person is called Īśa, Īśvara or lord because of his having control over a part of the world.[5] The Universal Consciousness is called Maheśvara because it controls, in every way, not only all that we can conceive but also all that which is beyond the conception of our limited power.

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1. I. P. V., II. 174–5. 2. I. P. V., II, 12.
3. I. P. V., II, 24. 4. I. P. V., II. 42. 5. I. P. V., I, 44.

CHAPTER III.

THE CATEGORIES OF THE ĀBHĀSAVĀDA.

In the preceding chapter we have dealt with the Ābhāsavādin's concept of the Universal Consciousness as the manifestor. In this chapter, therefore, we propose to give a brief exposition of the Manifested.

The Ābhāsavāda divides the manifested into thirty six categories. This division, as Abhinava very clearly states, is based, neither wholly on the scientific observation, nor purely or exclusively on the logical inference. The authority of the Āgamas[1] is its sole basis. This, however, does not mean that it has no support of the facts of experience and that it is simply a matter of belief. It means only this that it is not within the reach of the ordinary means of perceptional or inferential knowledge to reveal fully the essential nature and the full implication of each one of the Tattvas. It does not deny that it is a result partly of long intuitive (Yogic) experiments and partly of a careful study of mind and matter.

Of the thirty-six categories twenty-five i. e., from the Puruṣa to the earth are in common with the Sāṅkhya, with some slight differences in some cases, as we shall point out, while dealing with them separately; and one, namely the Māyā, is in common with the Vedānta, though not as one that cannot be spoken of as either being or not-being (Sadasadbhyām anirvacanīyā) but as a power of the Maheśvara. The remaining ten are common to both the dualistic and the non-dualistic schools of the Śaivāgama. Of these ten, which represent the first ten of the thirty-six categories, the

1. I. P. V., II, 186.

first five represent five powers or, to be more accurate, five aspects of the Ultimate Reality. The remaining five, which are placed between the Māyā and the Puruṣa in the order of manifestation, represent the limitations of an individual self.

These Tattvas can be classed as pure or impure, according as they belong to the pure or impure creation. The first five are said to belong to the pure creation inasmuch as they are manifested by the Śiva himself by the sheer force of his will, independently of any prompting cause, like Karma, or material cause, like Māyā[1]. The rest, i. e. from the Kalā to the earth, are created by Aghora or Ananta, with the help of Māyā. This is called impure creation because it is of limited nature. It is controlled by the law of Karma, because its purpose is to supply the necessary stimuli for the varying experiences of the countless souls, the experiences which these souls must undergo, according to their Karmas. These categories can also broadly be divided into two groups, the self-luminous, consisting of the sentient categories constituted by various kinds of subject (Pramātṛ), and the illuminable, consisting of the insentient categories such as the earth etc.

The categories are mere manifestations of the Ultimate, and as such are essentially the same as their source, and so are all the knowables, because they are mere collocations of some of the Tattvas. A collocation is said to belong to one category are another, according as a particular Tattva forms its basis by being the chief constituent of it. A jar, for instance, is said to be earthy, not because it is exclusively made up of earth, but because earth is its chief constituent.

PRALAYA AND MAHĀPRALAYA.

The universal dissolution (Pralaya) is of two kinds, the 'small' and the 'great'. In the former every thing gets dis-

1. T. A., VI, 55.

solved into its primordial substances and qualities. It is a state in which, according to the Sāṅkhya, the qualities (guṇas), namely, Sattva, Rajas and Tamas, are in a state of perfect equality; and, according to the Vaiśeṣika, every thing is reduced to atoms. The individual souls in this state are, as it were, in deep sleep, though still in the bondage of their past individual Karmas. Such a dissolution is referred to by the word "Pralaya".

We have not so far discovered sufficient material which might give us a very clear idea of the condition of the Tattvas in the state of "small dissolution", according to the Pratyabhijñā. There is, however, the following statement in the Tantrāloka :—

"Īśvarecchāvaśa kṣubdha bhoga lolika cidgaṇān
Saṁvibhaṅktum aghoreśaḥ sṛjatīha sitetaram"

which shows that in regard to the condition of the individual there is a complete agreement between the Sāṅkhya and the Vaiśeṣika on the one hand and the Pratyabhijñā on the other. The Pratyabhijñā view, however, on the Mahāpralaya is sufficiently clear in the existing literature. According to the available information, it is a state of perfect annihilation of all that is manifested. In this state the collocations and their constituents, the Tattvas, suffer the same fate, and the individual selves, their bondages, Āṇava, Kārma and Māyīya, having been snapped, lose their individuality and are completely merged in the Universal Self, the Ultimate Reality. This system believes in both kinds of dissolution. How this belief does not conflict with the theory of Karma, and, how creation of all kinds of limited selves does not make the Parama Śiva cruel or partial, we shall explain in the course of our treatment of the theory of Karma in the fifth chapter.

The creation of the physical universe is not wanton but purposeful. It is meant for supplying the necessary stimuli

for varying experiences which the innumerable souls must enjoy or suffer according to their individual Karmas. Hence it presupposes Karma as its prompting cause. At the time of "Pralaya" the souls with their individual Karmas, are, as it were, in a state of deep sleep. Therefore, when they wake up from the sleep of Pralaya, the Prompting cause, the Karma, being there, the creation can begin. The case with the Mahāpralaya, however, is different. In that the individual souls are not merely in deep sleep. On the contrary, they then completely lose their individuality and are perfectly one with the Ultimate. Their waking up, as after Pralaya, is, therefore, out of the question. The prompting cause being absent, how can the creation take place? It is because of this that the Naiyāyikas and the Vedāntins[1] etc. do not admit the Mahāpralaya.

The monistic Śaivaism, however, believes in the Mahāpralaya and reconciles this belief with its theory of dependence of the creation of the physical universe on the Karmas of the individual selves by attributing a wider meaning to the word "Karma" than that in which it is ordinarily used. In the literature other than that on the Pratyabhijñā, it means a certain effect that is produced on the limited self by the personal conviction of the potentiality of a particular action to lead to a certain experience at the time of maturation. But in the Pratyabhijñā literature it is used in another sense also, namely, the limited desire which has no reference to any particular object and which, according to this system, arises in a newly manifested limited self, just before the creation of a new physical world which follows a Mahāpralaya. This desire is without any objective reference, because it precedes the creation of object. It may, therefore, be spoken of as a mere eagerness on the part of the limited self to use its limited power. When the distinction of one from the other

1. V. S. S. Bh., 407.

is tried to be emphasised, the former is referred to as "Karma-saṁskāra" and the latter as "Kārmamala." Ordinarily, however, the simple word "Karma" is used for both.

To make the point clear let us add here that, according to this system, the creation, maintenance and destruction are governed by the law of Karma ; but the obscuration and the grace (Tirodhāna and Anugraha) depend entirely upon the will of the Lord. The obscuration is nothing else than the Lord's appearing in the form of the innumerable limited selves whose limitedness consists in their ignorance of their identity with the Universal Self, in mere consciousness of imperfection and in consequent limitation of their powers of knowledge and action. This limitation is technically called Āṇavamala. The powers of knowledge and action being limited, limitation in desire naturally follows. The above described assumption of the multifarious forms by the Universal Self precedes the new creation of the physical universe after a Mahāpralaya. The desire, therefore, that arises in the limited self, is naturally without objective reference. It is a mere eagerness to use the powers of knowledge and action, and as they are limited so the desire also has naturally to be so. This desire is called Kārmamala.

Therefore, when the Pratyabhijñā says that the Karma is prompting cause in the creation of the physical universe which follows Mahāpralaya, by the word "Karma" it means Kārmamala. For, how can there be any Karmasaṁskāra before that creation which comes after a total universal dissolution (mahāpralayānantarā sṛṣṭi) in which the souls having been made free from all kinds of bondages and limitations become one with the Universal Self ? Thus, according to this system, the grace is responsible for the total universal dissolution and the obscuration for the ordered creation that follows Mahāpralaya. The power of obscuration comes into play after a Mahāpra-

laya only, to supply the prompting cause for the new creation to proceed. In the case of the physical creation which follows Pralaya, the prompting cause in the form of Karma, as associated with the innumerable individual selves, being already there, the use of the power of obscuration is unnecessary. Both, the Mahāpralaya and the creation that follows, are, therefore, not possible, according to those systems which hold the Karma to be merely Karmasaṁskāra, and do not believe in the two independent functions of the Maheśvara, the obscuration and the grace. For, according to them, one of the most essential antecedent conditions of the creation is the Karmasaṁskāra, as the prompting cause. Therefore, if there be Mahāpralaya, i. e. if all were completely to merge in the Ultimate, if the individual souls were to lose their individuality and were to become free from Karma, there being no prompting cause, the fresh creation would not take place. The monistic Śaiva theory of Karma receives more detailed treatment in the fifth chapter.

TATTVA DEFINED.

A Tattva is that which lasts through the 'small dissolution' of the universe and is always present in its effects, in its collocations, or in the beings marked by certain characteristics peculiar to itself. It is pervasive in so far as it forms the basis of all the collocations belonging to that creation, of which it is the chief constituent. This world, in which we live, move and have our being, is called earthly (pārthiva), not because it is made up of earth alone, but because earth is its chief constituent.[1] The definition, however, seems to be a little complicated. It is not equally applicable in all its parts to all the *Tattvas*. For, though all are pervasive in the above sense, yet because of the difference in the essential nature of certain

1. T. A., VI, 3.

groups of the *Tattvas* from others and so of the things belonging to them, there is difference in the manner of pervasion. The earth, for instance, pervades what is earthly, as a material cause does its effects. Similarly the *Prakṛti* pervades its evolutes, according to the Sāṅkhya terminology, as qualities do their collocations, and the sentient *Tattvas*, from *Puruṣa* to Śiva, pervade those which have common characteristics with them, as a genus does the individual things. It is this fact which the words "the effect", "the collocation" and "the beings with common characteristics" are meant to indicate, as the following quotation shows :—

"Svasmin kāryetha dharmaughe
Yadvāpi sva sadṛg guṇe
Āste sāmānya kalpena
Tananād vyāptṛ bhāvataḥ
Tattattvaṁ kramaśaḥ pṛthvī
Pradhānaṁ puṁ Śivādayaḥ." T. A., VI,-4-5.

THE ORDER OF MANIFESTATION OF THE PURE CREATION.

The pure creation is a supersensuous creation. Just as the Naiyāyikas believe in the earthly, the watery, the airy, the fiery and the etherial beings and classify them according as any one of the five elements is the chief constituent of their bodies, so the Pratyabhijñā believes in five kinds of the supersensuous and super-natural beings, who are in no way connected with body, senses, vital airs, intellect or mind, and classifies them as Śāmbhava, Śaktija, Mantra-maheśvara, Mantreśvara and Mantra[1] according as any one of the five powers of the Universal Self (Parama Śiva), being (Cit), consciousness (Ānanda), will (Icchā), knowledge (jñāna) and action (Kriyā) predominates in them. The predominance of any one of these powers,[2] in the absence of all connections

1. T. A., VI. 52. 2. T. A., VI, 49.

with the material world, results only in a certain state of consciousness or an affection of the purity of self. These states very closely correspond to the successive states through which a person rises to the ordinary consciousness of the wakeful state from that of perfect senselessness, in which even breathing stops. These states can also be spoken of as similar to those, through which a Yogin descends from the transcendental state (Turīyāvasthā) to that of the ordinary worldly experience.

Leaving aside, for the present, the consideration of purely super-sensuous spiritual states, if we analyse the psychological movements which precede an ordinary action of daily occurrence, we come to the following two conclusions :—(I) that an individual, who is, after all, only an epitome of the Universal Self, possesses all the five powers attributed to the latter, and (II) that, in the former's activity, these powers, because of the dependence of each of the following, in the above order, on what immediately precedes, necessarily come into play in the same order in which they are supposed to be manifested in the pure creation. Imagine, for instance, an artist, sitting bent over his canvas. At one time he picks up a brush, dips it in a paint and takes it so near the canvas that an on-looker feels sure that he would give some artistic strokes to it : but suddenly he stops his hand, thinks a little, and then places the brush back again in its place. What is it that controls his activity ? Is it not an idea or mental image, which he is trying to produce, or rather, reproduce on the canvas, that does so ? And what is this idea after all ? Is it not an affection of the self ? If it is, will it be wrong to call it knowledge ? If not, does it not prove that the production of a new thing presupposes its knowledge which controls the productive activity ?

Now the next thing to be found out is as to why does a

particular idea control at a particular time, or rather, why does a particular idea arise at a certain time to the exclusion of all the rest ? Is it not because of the artist's will ? Is it not the power of will that gives rise to and maintains a certain idea for a certain time ? Has it not often been found that, when the control of the will weakens, other ideas rush in and spoil the work ? Does it not often happen that after a long sitting without any appreciable progress in the work, when he loses his patience, he spoils his own work by giving some random strokes and then in sheer disgust, as if in a fit of madness, tears his canvas to pieces ? Let it, however, be remembered that even these random strokes and the tearing of the canvas are not without a precedent idea for so doing; nor is the idea without the prompting of the will. For, before these acts of madness are done, this will, often finds expression in such words as "It is a hopeless task".

The invariable precedence of will to knowledge is thus undeniable. But is this will absolutely independent ? Can all the created will ? Or, can any limited creation always will ? If not, why ? A log of wood can never will, nor can a person in an utterly senseless condition. The will, therefore, apparently presupposes and depends upon consciousness.

This consciousness is inseparably connected with the 'being', as the power of germination is with a seed. This 'being' represents the ego, the entity, for which the word "self" stands in "self-consciousness" or the word "aham" in "aham asmi".

Thus a careful study of microcosm proves that both, the attribution of the five powers to Parama Śiva, the manifestor,[1] and the order of their manifestation, as conceived by this system, are based on the facts of experience and are not matters of purely religious belief.

1. T. A. VI, 48.

The conception of these powers or aspects of the Universal Self and their coming into play in the same order as shown above, is not altogether foreign to the Upaniṣad literature. For instance, compare the following :—

"Sadeva saumyedam agra āsīd ekam evādvitīyam......... tadaikṣata, bahu syām, prajāyeya, iti, tattejo asṛjata."

Ch. U. 6, 2, 1-3.

This passage is quoted by Śaṅkara to point out the distinction between the insentient creator, the Pradhāna of the Sāṅkhya, and the sentient creator, the Brahman of the Vedānta. While discussing this passage, Śaṅkara admits that the "being" (Sat) aspect is common to both, the Pradhāna and the Brahman, but it is the consciousness (īkṣatikarma) that constitutes the point of difference between them and that "being" precedes "consciousness".

But Śaṅkara's object in quoting and discussing the passage in question was simply to interpret the text of Bādarāyaṇa and to refute the Sāṅkhya theory of creation. He has, therefore, not discussed other points connected with the remaining two clauses. A careful study of the passage as a whole, however, shows that the Upaniṣad states all the five aspects of the Universal Self, in which the Pratyabhijñā believes, and that there is perfect agreement between the two in regard to the order of their manifestation. Even Śaṅkara admits that the 'being' is the first and the action is the last of the five aspects and that consciousness follows 'being'. We have, therefore, got to consider only the remaining two, indicated by the two clauses "bahu syām" and "prajāyeya" (may I be many, may I grow forth). It will be apparent even to a superficial reader that they express desire ; for, the finite verbs of both the clauses are put in the potential mood. But the question is as to whether there is any distinctive implication of each of the two. In our humble opinion the first simply states the rise of will

(desire) to become many, but the second the rise of an idea which controls the activity whereby the desire is to be realised, exactly as the mental image in the case of an artist, described in a preceding paragraph, controls his productive activities. One can become many in at least two ways, by dividing one's self into many, as a flame does into rays, or by growing itself into many, as a seed does through successive stages. The control of the idea of growth over the activity, wherewith the desire to become many is realised, consists in its directing the activity of the Universal Self into the channel of creation as opposed to that of self-division. It would, therefore, not be wrong to say that "prajāyeya" indicates the rise of the controlling idea (knowledge) precedent to the act of creation. Thus the Vedānta and the monistic Śaivaism appear to agree on the number, the nature and the order of manifestation of the five aspects of the Universal Self.

ŚIVA TATTVA.

Like the Sāṅkhya, which believes that in every evolute of the Prakṛti all the three qualities are present and that the distinction of one evolute from another depends upon the difference in the proportion of the constituent qualities of an individual evolute, the Pratyabhijñā also holds that in every manifestation of the pure creation all the five powers of the Universal Self are essentially present and that the difference of one manifestation from another is due to the predominance of one of the powers in a particular manifestation. Śiva Tattva is the first manifestation and the power of "being" (Cit) predominates in it. It is purely subjective, and has no objective or predicative reference. It is free not only from the impurities of Karma and Māyā but also from that impurity which is technically called Āṇavamala. The experience[1] of

1. I. P. V., I, 1.

this state, if the use of such a word be permissible, is pure "I". This experience may be compared to that of Nirvikalpa-samādhi. It is wrong to use even such a predicate as "am" in reference to it ; because "am" also implies some kind of relation of identity, which presupposes both the self-consciousness and the consciousness, howsoever vague or indefinite, of something apart from the self. Both the self-consciousness and the object are, however, later manifestations. How can, therefore, any talk of them in reference to Śiva be justifiable ? It may be said to represent that entity, the idea of which is conveyed by the word "self" in the compound "self-consciousness", when it is not used to refer to body, vital air, mind or Buddhi.

It has already been pointed out that Abhinavagupta differs from Utpalācārya in regard to the number of categories in so far as the latter admits thirty six only, while the former, under the influence of the Kula system, holds Anuttara[1] or Parama Śiva to be the thirty seventh ; and that Utpalācārya took Śiva and Parama Śiva to be identical. Accordingly Utpalācārya presents the Śiva Tattva, not as a level of transcendental experience in which the 'I', the 'Self' alone is experienced, as does Abhinavagupta, (Ahamiti purā bhāsayati yat), but as the metaphysical principle, which is the unity of the powers of knowledge and action, is omniscient and omnipotent, is capable of manifesting innumerable creations and annihilations of the entire mass of Tattvas (Categories) as mere reflections on itself and is not of the nature of 'Ābhāsa', though it appears in meditation and instruction as mere 'appearance' (Ābhāsa).

Tadetadaviyukta jñānakriyārūpaṁ kriyādvāreṇa sakalatattvarāśigata sṛṣṭisaṁhāraśata pratibimbasahiṣṇu yat tadupadeśa

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1. Bh., Vol. I, 5.

bhāvanādiṣu tathā bhāsamānamanābhāsamapi vastutaḥ Śiva-Tattvam.

Bh., Vol. II, 211.

In his conception of the first category, the Śiva, according to Abhinava's interpretation, Utpalācārya seems to repeat what he said in the beginning of the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Kārikā about Maheśvara as follows :—

"Kartari jñātari svātmanyādisiddhe Maheśvare"

Bh., Vol. I, 48.

This supports the view that Utpalācārya held Śiva and Parama Śiva or Maheśvara to be identical.

ŚAKTI.

The next category, the manifestation of which follows that of the Śiva, is the Śakti. This can scarcely be called the second Tattva. Its manifestation takes place almost simultaneously with the first : for, unless there be consciousness of what is manifested how can it be said to have been manifested at all ? It is, however, spoken of as the second, because the consciousness presupposes the "being" as the rays do a flame. Just as there can be no rays without a flame so there can be no consciousness without "being". But still just as in the successive manifestations of the light energy, flame undeniably precedes the rays, so, in those of the Universal Self, "being" precedes consciousness. Though the experience of the beings belonging to this state, like that of the preceding, is without any objective reference, yet it is not altogether without predicative reference. The experience of the Śaktijas is marked by the additional element of "am" to the "I" as "I am". In this the Ānanda Śakti predominates.

SADĀŚIVA.

This is the third category and the power of will predominates in it. The will, as our experience tells us, is not alto-

gether without any objective reference, nor is its object so distinct as that of knowledge. This Tattva, therefore, represents a very faintly affected state of the Self. It is a transitional stage between the unaffected state of the Śiva and the Śakti and the distinctly affected state of the Īśvara Tattva. The affection of the Universal Self at this stage may be compared to that of the limited self of an artist when the desire to produce a master-piece first arises within him.[1] It may also be compared to the extremely faint outline of an intended artistic production on a canvas.

The experience of the beings of this Tattva may be represented as "I am this". It has, however, to be remembered that the "this" which represents the universe, the cause of affection, is so indistinct that it can be said to affect the universal beings of this Tattva as little as a picture does a canvas when it is represented by extremely faint outlining dots only.

The experiencing entities, belonging to this category, are called Mantramaheśas. They are universal beings and because they are not perfectly free from the impurity, called Āṇavamala, their experience, therefore, is not without any objective reference. The object, however, is not of limited nature as in the case of the ordinary mortals. The whole universe constitutes their object and is conceived by them as identical with themselves (sarvasya avyatirekeṇa, I. P. V., I. 36).

ĪŚVARA TATTVA.

This is the fourth category. The power of knowledge predominates in it. It is marked by the rise to prominence of the "this" element of the Universal Self which had, but very faintly, begun affecting the Self in the Sadāśiva state. It is but natural, that the objective element should predominate in

1. I. P. V., II, 192–3.

it, because knowledge is nothing but an affection of the self, due to internal or external causes, and the distinction of the state of volition from that of knowledge is only this that the affection of the self in the former case is very faint but in the latter it is so very clear that the element of the self, which predominates in the former case, is thrown into the back-ground in the latter. The difference between these two states of the Universal Self may be compared to those of a canvas; the former to the one in which the intended picture is faintly outlined in hardly perceptible dots ; and the latter to the other in which the picture is fully drawn and the canvas is thrown so much in the back-ground that ordinary people instead of calling it canvas call it picture.

The idea of the predominance of the objective[1] element in the experience of the Īśvara state is conveyed in the Pratyabhijñā literature by giving the first position not to "I" as in the case of the experience of the Sadāśiva state "I am this" but to "this" as "this I am". It is perhaps to imply the idea of predominance of the objective element that this category is called "Īśvara Tattva", because lordliness of a lord consists in his holding what constitutes his lordliness, to be more important than his self.

SADVIDYĀ.

It is the fifth category and is marked by the predominance of the power of action. In this the objective element is neither so obscure as in the Sadāśiva nor so predominant as in the Īśvara, but it is, like the two pans of an evenly held balance (samadhṛta tulā puṭa nyāyena), in a state of perfect equality with the subjective.[2] The experience of this state may be expressed as "I am this".

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1. I. P. V., II, 191. 2. I. P. V., II, 196.

ANALOGY EXPLAINED.

It may be pointed out here that analogy of balancing beam (Samadhṛta tulāpuṭa nyāya) is referred to, not only to indicate the relation between the subject and the object in their universality in the Vidyā Tattva, but also in the Sadāśiva and the Īśvara, as the following quotations show :—

(i) "Yaḥ samadhṛtatulāpuṭanyāyena ahamidam iti parāmarśaḥ, tatkriyāśakti pradhānaṁ Vidyā Tattvam."

T. A., VI (Comm.) 50.

(ii) "Madhyame tu rūpe 'Ahamidam' iti samadhṛtatulāpuṭanyāyena yo vimarśaḥ sa sadāśiva nātha Īśvarabhaṭṭārake ca, idambhāvasya tu dhyāmalādhyāmalatākṛto viśeṣaḥ"

Bh., Vol. II, 223.

The question, therefore, arises : "What are the points which are intended to be brought out by means of this analogy in different cases" ? That the purpose of bringing in or referring to this analogy is different in each case is beyond doubt. For, the relation between the subject and the object in each case is different.

Abhinavagupta seems to be aware of this difficulty, connected with the reference to Samadhṛtatulāpuṭanyāya in different contexts and, therefore, seems to suggest a solution of it, as the following quotation shows :—

"Kartṛtāyā mukhyatve śūnyāderavaśyaṁ guṇatā, tasya tu mukhyatve

tasyā iti anayā vṛttyā pratipādite tulānatyunnatinyāyo labhyate".

I. P. V. V., Vol. III, 329.

The point may be elaborated as follows :—

There are two views about the analogy under reference— (i) popular (ii) scientific. According to the popular view, a person, skilled in weighing, can hold the balancing beam

(Tulā) 'straight' so much so that there would be no difference in weight between the weight and weighed. Scientific view, however, is "No line can be absolutely straight". The latter view seems to be referred to in the quotation, given just above.

Accordingly when this analogy is given in the context of the Sadāśiva and the Īśvara categories, the point that is intended to be brought out, is that just as in the case of the balancing beam, held straight, from the scientific point of view one end is lower than the other, so the difference between the experiences of the Sadāśiva and the Īśvara levels is due to the predominance of the subjectivity in the former and that of the objectivity in the latter. But this predominance is so subtle that it can be said to exists, not from the popular but from the logical, mathematical or scientific point of view only.

But when this analogy is given in the context of the Sadvidyā, the popular view about holding the balancing beam straight is emphasised. Accordingly the point that is intended to be brought out is that just as the two ends of an absolutely evenly held balancing beam are in absolutely straight line, neither is lower or higher, so in the experience at the Sadvidyā level, neither the subjectivity nor the objectivity predominates or occupies a subordinate position.

SADVIDYĀ AND VIDYĀ DISTINGUISHED.

The Sadvidyā Tattva is a distinct Tattva from the Vidyā Tattva, which represents one of the limited powers of a limited self. Although the experience of the Universal Self in the state of the Sadvidyā is to be expressed in the same words "I am this" as those required to state that of a limited individual self under the influence of the Vidyā, yet the implication in each case is fundamentally different. In the former, both,

"I" and "this", refer to the same thing i. e. both have Sāmānādhikaraṇya; there is no consciousness of the subject as quite distinct from that of the object; but in the latter case "I" refers to the limited subject and "this" to the limited object.[1]

THE TWO ORDERS.

The order, in which the Tattvas of the pure creation are given here, represents the one in which they rise from the Universal Self. The order of merging of these Tattvas back into the Universal Self, is the reverse of it. The self-recognition (ātma pratyabhijñāna) is nothing but merging of the individual self in the universal. It is, therefore, held by the Pratyabhijñā that an individual self, in order that it may get completely merged in the Universal Self,[2] has to pass through the successive states represented by the universal beings belonging to the (I) Sadvidyā, (II) Īśvara, (III) Sadāśiva and (IV) Śiva-Śakti Tattvas, which are classed as (I) Mantra, (II) Mantreśa, (III) Mantramaheśa, and (IV) Śiva. The chief point of distinction of one class from another is constituted by the association of each with one of the four states of Āṇavamala in the course of its destruction[3] i. e. (I) kiñcidhvasyamāna, (II) dhvasyamāna, (III) kiñciddhvasta, and (IV) dhvasta, respectively.

In the above manifestations of the Universal Self the objective universe is purely ideal and is realised as it is in reality. Their experiencing entities realise themselves as universal beings, which they really are, and their experiences also are free from all kinds of limitation. They, therefore, represent the sphere of the true knowledge and are spoken of as pure creation, which is characterised by freedom from limitation, as opposed to the impure which is the work of the Māyā and as such is distinctively limited.

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1. I. P. V., II, 195-7. 2. T. A., VI, 78. 3. T. A., VI, 80-1.

DIFFERENCE OF VIEWS ABOUT THE FIRST FIVE CATEGORIES.

In regard to the view that the first five categories from Śiva to Sadvidyā are characterised by the predominance of Cit, Ānanda, Icchā, Jñāna and Kriyā respectively,[1] there is difference of opinion. While Abhinavagupta holds the above view, which according to Jayaratha, who gives quotations from the Āgamic texts,[2] is in accordance with the Āgamic tradition, Somānanda in his Śiva Dṛṣṭi holds that Jñānaśakti characterises Sadāśiva.

Athāsmākaṁ jñānaśaktiryā sadāśivarūpatā Ś. Dṛ., 27.

And Utpalācārya in his commentary goes a step farther and asserts that Īśvara, Śiva and Parama Śiva are characterised by the predominance of Kriyā, Icchā and Cit Śaktis respectively, as the following quotation shows :—

"Jñānaśaktimān sadāśivaḥ, Udṛktakriyāśaktirīśvara iti. Ata evecchāśaktimayaḥ śivo yāvaccitsvātantryaśaktimān paryante Parama Śivaḥ." Ś. Dr., (Comm.) 27.

To discuss such differences needs more space than is available in the present volume. We propose to take them up in some future work.

MĀYĀ.

We have just pointed out the distinction of the experience of the beings belonging to the Sadvidyā from that of a limited individual under the influence of the Vidyā. In the former case "I" and "this" refer to the same entity, but in the latter to two separate things, i. e. in the former case the subject and the object are identical but in the latter they are different. In the former the idea of unity predominates, but in the latter that of duality or plurality preponderates. This may be consi-

1. T. A., V., 49. 2. T. A., V., (Comm.) 49.

dered to be a typical point of distinction between the pure and the impure creations. The first manifestation of the impure creation is Māyā. It is this Tattva, the manifestation of which, first of all, apparently breaks the unity of the Universal Self. It is the most distinctive power of the Universal Self in its creative aspect. It manifests diversity independently of any external helper or prompter.[1] It is conceived both as the power of obscuration and as the primary cause of all the limited manifestations. In its former aspect it is often referred to as "Moha"[2] and in the latter as "parāniśā"[3]. Its effect also, by transference of epithet (upacāra), is spoken of as "māyā". As such, Māyā is limited ; for, whatever is manifested as apparently separate from the Universal Self is essentially so. It is pervasive, because it is the cause of the universe. It is subtle, because it passes ordinary comprehension. As an aspect of the Universal Self it is eternal.[4]

The impure creation consists of two kinds of limited manifestations, the sentient and the insentient. The Māyā, as the force of obscuration, is responsible for the appearance of the one Universal Self as innumerable individual selves, whose distinguishing feature is the ignorance of their real nature (svarūpākhyāti) and consequent imperfection of their powers of knowledge and action :

> "Mohayati anena śakti viśeṣeṇa iti moho māyā śaktiḥ tasyāḥ vaśaḥ sāmarthyam mohana-kāryam prati avirāmaḥ yathoktam 'Māyā vimohinī nāma'.........".
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> I. P. V., I, 35.

But Māyā Tattva as the primary cause of all the insentient limited manifestations i. e. as Parāniśā, contains all the manifestables within :

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1. T. A., VI, 116.
2. I. P. V., I, 35.
3. T. A., VI, 116.
4. T. A., VI, 117.

"Kāryaṁ cāsyāṁ sadeva hi kalādi dharaṇī prāntam"

T. A., VIII, 4.

Its manifestative activities are controlled by the Maheśvara's will.

The supposition of Māyā as a principle of obscuration is both necessary and logical. For, if the Ultimate Reality is possessed of all the five powers, Cit, Ānanda, Icchā, Jñāna and Kriyā, and so is perfect in every way, and the universe is identical with it, it has to be explained : where does the plurality of selves with all their limitations come from; and what is the cause of the limited creation which forms the object of experience of the limited beings ? To account for these facts, or rather, to answer these questions it is that the Māyā is supposed to be the force of obscuration. As such, Māyā Tattva hides the true nature of the Self so that not only all its five powers are obscured but the universe also, which was in relation of identity with it, disappears. Thus there arises the occasion for the other aspect of Māyā, viz, as the cause of the limited universe, to come into play and produce the limited universe in all its parts almost simultaneously much as emblic myrobalan (āmalakī), being forcefully struck with a staff, lets fall its fruits.[1] Different authorities, however, have differently fixed the order of precedence and succession of the manifestations of Māyā and have accordingly represented them to be related by the relation of cause and effect to one another. Abhinava follows the authority of the Mālinī Vijaya Tantra in his statement of the order of manifestation of the things belonging to the limited creation.[2]

KALĀ.

This is the first product of Māyā. The obscuration by Māyā of the Universal Self leads to the affection of the latter

1. T. A., VI, 128. 2. T. A., VI, 129.

by the impurity, called Āṇavamala, in an innumerable variety of forms and so to the appearance of the Universal Self in the form of multifarious limited selves.

> "Māyā svīkāra pāratantryāt sarvajñatva sarvakartṛtvamayopi bodhaḥ sarvajñatvādi guṇāpahastanena akhyāti rūpam āṇavam malam āpannaḥ yena ghaṭākāśavat pūrṇa rūpāt cidākāśāt avacchedya parimitīkṛtaḥ san tadeva puṁstvam ucyate."
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> : P. S., (Comm.) 45–6.

Kalā, therefore, is that Tattva, which, being associated with the self, whose powers of knowledge and action have been obscured, partly restores[1] to it the power of action. It is related to a limited self not as an instrument to an agent, as the Vidyā and other limited powers are, but as its causal agent.[2] It is the knowledge of this Tattva, and not of the Prakṛti as distinct from the Puruṣa, that brings about the freedom from the bondage of Karma and places an individual in the higher category of beings, called the Vijñānākala, who are beyond the sphere of Māyā.[3] The knowledge of the distinction between Prakṛti and Puruṣa, as got through following the teachings of the Sāṅkhya, saves a soul only from going lower than the Pradhāna.[4] The Kalā is admitted to be an independent Tattva because of its independent function of bringing limited power of action to a subject, a function which is quite distinct from, nay, opposite to that of obscuration which is the characteristic function of the Māyā.

But here it may be objected that action, in order that it may lead to a tangible result, presupposes knowledge of the object which is intended to be accomplished and towards which the agent's activity has to be directed. The power of

1. T. A., VI, 136.
2. T. A., VI, 142.
3. T. A., VI, 143.
4. T. A., VI, 144–5.

knowledge having been obscured by the obscuring Māyā, how can the limited power of action, restored to the limited self by the Kalā, function? The Pratyabhijñā, therefore, believes in the following Tattva.

VIDYĀ.

It is a Tattva the association of which with the subject brings to the latter a limited power of knowledge. This may, more correctly, be spoken of as the power of discrimination, because its distinctive function is to know the various objects, reflected on the Buddhi, as distinct from one another. The assumption of the Vidyā as a different Tattva from the Buddhi is necessary; for, although the latter, being predominantly made up of Sattva, can receive reflection, yet, being simply a product of Guṇas and, therefore, insentient, it cannot know[1] either itself or that which is reflected on it.

Another question may be raised here, namely, that if the limited powers of knowledge and action are common to all the subjects, what is it that is responsible for the choice by each individual of different objects of his respective activities? The Pratyabhijñā postulates the following Tattva to answer this question.

RĀGA.

Rāga (attachment ?) is that power which is responsible for an individual's choice of a certain thing as an object of a particular activity, to the exclusion of all the rest that he knows.[2] It is not a mere absence of indifference (Avairāgya) which is conceived to be a quality of the Buddhi by the Sāṅkhya. It is rather that power which is responsible for the indifference (Vairāgya) itself. What is Vairāgya after all? Is it not indifference? And as such has it not got an object

1. T. A., VI, 151–2. 2. T. A., VI, 157.

of its own? How then can it take place without the assistance of the Rāga as conceived by this system?

KĀLA.

The Kāla Tattva (time) forms another limiting condition of the limited self. Different conceptions of Kāla have been discussed in Comparative Æsthetics Vol. I, Indian Æsthetics Second Edition p. 122–40.

NIYATI.

It is that power which limits the causal efficiency of every thing. It is because of this that fire only burns and the sesame sprout comes out of the sesame seed only. This also is one of the limiting conditions of an individual, because he is controlled in his activities by this power.[1]

The last mentioned four, Vidyā, Rāga, Kāla and Niyati, are the effects of Kalā Tattva.[2]

PURUṢA.

We have stated above how the Universal Self under the influence of its power, called Māyā, assumes the innumerable forms of limited selves, whose limitation consists in ignorance of their essential nature and consequent deprivation of the powers of knowledge and action. Such a sentient limited manifestation, when possessed of the five attributes Kalā etc., is spoken of as Puruṣa. The above five attributes together with Māyā, which is the cause of self-forgetfulness, as it were, of the Self, are at times spoken of as six covers. The deprivation of the Self of its powers of knowledge and action, consequent upon the obscuration of its real nature, is spoken of as "Āṇavamala". And the objectless desire to use the

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1. T. A., VI, 160. 2. T. A., VI, 161.

limited powers is called "Kārmamala", to which its future associations with insentient objects are due. The Puruṣa, therefore, is often described briefly as the Self affected by two impurities, the Āṇava and the Kārma Malas, but free from the third, the Māyīya-mala. It presents[1] purely the subjective element in the midst of the body, the senses, the vital airs, the mind and the Buddhi. It constitutes the 25th category. It is often referred to as Pumān, Pudgala or Aṇu. It represents the permanent aspect of the individual, retains residual traces (Saṁskāras) and passes through innumerable births and deaths. There is a marked similarity between the monistic Śaiva and the Sāṅkhya concepts of Puruṣa. The former also like the latter believes that there is no limit to the number of the Puruṣas and that the creation of the Prakṛti is for supplying the necessary stimuli for the varying experiences which these Puruṣas must enjoy or suffer according to their individual Karma. The conceptions of Malas and six covers, however, are peculiar to this system.

This very Puruṣa, when it momentarily identifies itself with body etc., is spoken of as the Dehapramātā and so on. Further, being entirely free from all kinds of association with the gross world at the time of the dissolution and lying in a state of deep sleep as it were, it is called Pralayākala. And when it is freed from the Kārma-mala and consequently from the limited experiences, which are peculiar to souls in the bondage of Karma, it is called Vijñānākala. As such it represents the transitional stage through which an individual self has to pass before reaching the state of the universal experiencer of the Śuddha Vidyā Tattva which is also called Mahāmāyā.[2]

Two points have to be specially noted in this connection viz., the word "Karma" in the above statement does not stand for the sum total of the effects, produced on an individual

1. T. A., VI, 164–5. 2. I. P. V., II, 200.

by his personal conviction that the deeds done by him would, at the time of maturation, lead to a certain result; it means simply an objectless desire, which is responsible for the association of the Self with the effects of Māyā, as we shall explain in the course of our treatment of the monistic Śaiva theory of Karma in the fifth chapter. Similarly the word "māyīya" stands for the gross body with all its gross constituents and associations (Śarīra-bhuvanākāro māyīyaḥ parikīrtitaḥ). In our above statement we are following the authority of Abhinava. Yogarāja holds a slightly different view.

THE SĀṄKHYA AND THE PRATYABHIJÑĀ CONCEPTS OF PURUṢA COMPARED.

According to the Sāṅkhya, the innumerable Puruṣas are independent entities; but, according to the Pratyabhijñā, they are the manifestations of the same Ultimate Reality. Further, Puruṣa, according to the former, remains always unaffected: it is a pure sentient entity (Puruṣastu puṣkara palāśavat nirlepaḥ kintu cetanaḥ). But, according to the latter, Puruṣa, though equally sentient, yet it does not remain entirely unaffected under all circumstances.

PRAKṚTI OR PRADHĀNA.

In the order of manifestation, the Prakṛti is the first objective manifestation. According to the Pratyabhijñā concept of causality, it is the first purely objective (vedyamātra) effect of the Kalā[1]. It represents the state of perfect equilibrium of the three qualities, Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. Taking the variety of its future effects into consideration (Bhāvi vedya viśeṣāpekṣayā), it is spoken of as the generic object (Vedya sāmānyātmakam). It is as countless as the Puruṣa, because each Puruṣa has a separate Pradhāna, (Tacca prati pum

1. T. A., VI, 171.

niyatatvāt anekam. T. A., Comm., VI, 172). It is stirred to productive activity for the sake of Puruṣa by the Svatantreśa or Ananta.[1]

COMPARISON OF THE SĀṄKHYA AND THE PRATYABHIJÑĀ CONCEPTS OF THE PRADHĀNA.

While both agree on the question of the Pradhāna being a state of equilibrium of all the three qualities, Sattva, Rajas and Tamas, and on that of its working for the sake of Puruṣa, they fundamentally differ on the following points :—

I. It is independent in its action, according to the Sāṅkhya; but, according to the Pratyabhijñā, it works only when it is stirred to activity by Ananta.

II. It is one according to the former, but many according to the latter.

We shall state Abhinava's arguments in support of the Pratyabhijñā theory of Pradhāna as well as those which he advances in refutation of that of the Sāṅkhya, in the 5th chapter.

BUDDHI.

It is a product of the qualities. It is capable of receiving reflection from all sides so that it receives the reflection of the light of the self from within as well as that of the external objects from without. The objects, which cast their reflections on Buddhi, are of two kinds : (I) the external, such as a gross object like jar, the reflection of which is received through the eyes, as at the time of perception ; and (II) the internal, i. e., the images built out of the revived residual traces (Saṁskāras) the reflections of which are not got through the eyes, but which affect the Buddhi no less, as at the time of free imagination, remembrance and dream. The

1. T. A. VI, 180.

apparent change of the mirror-like buddhi, due to a reflection, is technically called *buddhivṛtti*, or simply vṛtti or jñāna. We shall dwell at some lenghth on the important part that Buddhi plays in perception, in the next chapter.

THE SĀṄKHYA AND THE PRATYABHIJÑĀ CONCEPTS OF BUDDHI COMPARED.

Thus, the Sāṅkhya and the Pratyabhijñā agree on the conception of Buddhi so far as it is a common meeting place of both, the light of the Puruṣa from the one side and the reflection of the external object from the other. They, however, fundamentally differ on the nature of the source of internal light. According to the former, it is the pure self, (Śuddha Puruṣa) that casts its light on Buddhi; but according to the latter, it is one that is affected by two impurities, Āṇava and Kārma Malas. Further, according to the former, it is not objective (asaṁvedya), but, according to the latter, being an instrument of knowledge,[1] it is knowable, like any other instrument such as the mind.

AHAṄKĀRA.

It is a product of the Buddhi. It is responsible for the identification of the limited self with the Buddhi and consequent attribution of the latter's activity to the former. Its distinctive function is to control[2] the five vital airs within the system and so the life itself. It is distinct from self-consciousness (Ahambhāva), because while the latter is purely subjective (Svātma mātra viśrānti satattvaḥ) and, therefore, without any objective reference; the former is due to superimposition of the self on the Buddhi.[3]

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1. T. A., VI, 192. 2. T. A., VI, 185.
3. T. A.. Comm., VI, 185.

MANAS.

The Manas or mind is a product of Ahaṅkāra (egoity). The element of Sattva predominates in it. How, without its co-operation with senses, no sensation of any kind is possible, how it carves images out of the blocks of sensations and what other important parts it plays in perception, we shall show, while dealing with the Pratyabhijñā theory of knowledge in the next chapter.

THE REMAINING TWENTY TATTVAS.

The remaining twenty Tattvas are as follows :—

(I) The five senses or powers of perception, called Buddhīndriyas or jñānendriyas, namely, the powers of

(a) smelling (ghrāṇendriya)
(b) tasting (rasanendriya)
(c) seeing (cakṣurindriya)
(d) feeling-by-touch (sparśanendriya) and
(e) hearing (śravaṇendriya).

(II) The five capacities of activity, called the Karmendriyas, (organs of action ?) namely, the capacities of

(a) resting and enjoying passively (upasthendriya)
(b) rejecting or discarding (pāyvindriya)
(c) locomotion (pādendriya)
(d) handling (hastendriya) and
(e) voicing (Vāgindriya).

III. The five subtle elements (tanmātras) of

(a) smell (gandha tanmātra)
(b) taste (rasa tanmātra)
(c) form or colour (rūpa tanmātra)
(d) touch (sparśa tanmātra) and
(e) sound (śabda tanmātra).

IV. The five gross elements of

(a) earth
(b) water
(c) light
(d) air, and
(e) ether.

The first three groups originate from Ahaṅkāra with the predominance of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas respectively. And the five of the last group, namely, the gross elements, are the effects of the five of the preceding group of Tanmātras respectively.

Indriyas, according to the monistic Śaivaism, are not mere physical organs of smelling and handling etc. They are rather the powers of the individual self, which operate through these physical organs. Leaving aside the mind and the intellect, there are ten Indriyas. Five are responsible for the perceptual activities of smelling, tasting, seeing, touching and hearing and as such are mere manifestations of the Vidyā, the limited power of knowledge. The remaining five are similarly responsible for the five kinds of the physical activities of handling, locomoting, voicing, rejecting and resting or enjoying passively and as such are simply different forms of Kalā, the limited power of action.[1]

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1. T. A., VI, 199.

CHAPTER IV.

ABHASAVADA AS THE BASIS OF THE PRATYABHIJNĀ THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE.

Preliminaries and Presuppositions.

ĀBHĀSAVĀDA AND PRACTICAL LIFE.

Abhinava very clearly says, as has already been stated in the first chapter, that the practical utility of his system is that it explains the real nature of phenomenal existence and so enables its followers to recognise the Ultimate Reality. It is, therefore, meant for only those who are seeking the truth, who want to understand the real nature of the 'apparent'. As for those, who are completely engrossed in the worldly activities of momentary interest and, therefore, seek the explanation only of the apparent nature of the apparent, the view-point and the method of the Naiyāyikas is the best.[1] The Ābhāsavāda holds that each object, as we perceive it, is a momentary collocation of a certain number of ābhāsas; that the individual is in reality identical with the Universal Self and as such has no independent will of its own, but acts and moves as the latter makes it do; that whatever is, is ever one with the Universal Self and even when a thing appears to have a separate existence, it is as little independent of the Ultimate as the objects of a dream are of the dreaming self and that the difference between the real and the illusory i. e. between the silver, appearing at the sight of a mother-of-pearl, and the real silver or between the objects of a dream and those of the wakeful state, is purely conventional; both of them are equally real or unreal; the difference between them is of degree and

1. I. P. V., I, 25.

not of kind. But does a practical man of the world require the knowledge of all these philosophical concepts? Can such a knowledge help him in achieving what he has set his heart on? Abhinava's statement: "In practical every-day life the view-point of the Naiyāyikas is the best" seems, therefore, to have been inspired by the following words of Lord Kṛṣṇa :—

> "The enlightened should not disturb the minds of the unenlightened, who are given to active life, by talk of knowledge (jñāna)."
>
> Bh. G., III, 26.

In this respect he follows Śaṅkara who in his commentary on the very first Sūtra says :—

> "We maintain that the antecedent conditions are the discrimination of what is eternal and what is non-eternal; the renunciation of all desire to enjoy the fruit of one's action both here and hereafter; the acquirement of tranquillity, self-restraint and the other means and the desire of final release. If these conditions exist, a man may, either before entering on an enquiry into active religious duty or after that, engage in the enquiry into Brahman and come to know it, but not otherwise."
>
> (V. S., Th. 12.)

The philosophical knowledge of the phenomena of the external world is of as little use to the practical man of the world as the scientific knowledge of the mechanism of cinema is to one who goes to cinema simply for diversion.

Looking, however, at the world with a philosopher's eye and trying to explain it from the point of view of the Pratyabhijñā, we find that it represents only two kinds of manifestations (ābhāsas) of the Universal Consciousness, and that both of them are of limited nature. The one is sentient (Jīva) and

the other is insentient (Jaḍa). And because the perception, on which all our ideas of the external phenomena are based, presupposes both, therefore, before attempting an exposition of the theory of perception, we state here the Pratyabhijñā concept of both Jīva and Jaḍa.

THE LIMITED SENTIENT ĀBHĀSA.

It forms one of the thirty-six categories of this system. We have, therefore, already dwelt on it at some length in the preceding chapter. It may, however, be pointed out here that consistently with the postulate of the Universal Consciousness, the Pratyabhijñā holds, as the strict logic requires, that the limited self has no independent existence, and as such has no freedom of will or action. It is the Universal Self that wills and acts through every mind and body. On this point also this system seems to be in agreement with the Vedānta Sūtra and the Bhagavadgītā. Compare, for instance,

"Īśvaraḥ sarvabhūtānāṁ hṛddeśerjuna tiṣṭhati
Bhrāmayan sarvabhūtāni yantrārūḍhāni māyayā."
Bh. G., XVIII, 61.

and also

"Avidyāvasthāyāṁ kāryakāraṇasaṅghātavivekadarśino jīvasya avidyātimirāndhasya sataḥ parasmādātmanaḥ karmādhyakṣāt sarvabhūtādhivāsāt sākṣiṅaś-cetayiturīśvarāt tadanujñayā kartṛtva bhoktṛtvalakṣaṇasya saṁsārasya siddhiḥ." Ś. Bh., 552.

It has, as has already been pointed out, two aspects, the permanent and the transitory. The consciousness, with the beginningless impurities (malas) and six covers (kañcukas), which is free from association with body and vital air and is capable of retaining the effects of the external stimuli, received at the time of perception, represents the permanent aspect of the individual consciousness. It is a determinate consciousness

inasmuch as it is limited, though the limitation is not of any particular kind and, therefore, may be said to be as imaginary as describing a bare piece of land as a place without jar (śūnyaṁ bhūtalaṁ ghaṭābhāvaḥ).

This limited consciousness momentarily identifies itself at one time with body, as, for instance, when one has the consciousness "I am fat", at another with vital air as when one feels "I am strong", and at still another with Buddhi as at the time of determinate knowledge "I know this". Even a lay man knows this identification to be momentary : for, the soul gets dissociated, as all know, from the body in the deep sleep state and from the vital air and the Buddhi at the time of a fainting fit. Philosophically speaking, however, the dissociation of self from the object of identification is taking place literally every moment. For, according to the Pratyabhijñā, as according to the Bauddha, every object is momentary and both the psychological and the physical activities presuppose the identification of the self with the momentary manifestation of the body and the mind. How can, therefore, the activity of either kind be possible unless the renewal of the identification be admitted to be taking place every moment ? Hence the self in its aspect of identification with body etc. is represented to be transitory.

The fact is that the Pratyabhijñā has, in common with the Bauddha, the theory of momentariness of both the subject and the object and has fitted it in with its own conception of the All-inclusive Universal Consciousness, a conception which differs from the Vedāntic conception of the Brahman only inasmuch as the latter, according to Abhinava, is pure light (Śuddha prakāśa), while the former is not only Prakāśamaya but also has Vimarśa, the perfect power of control over what is Prakāśa (Prakāśa vimarśamayaḥ). Abhinava has not tried to hide this fact. He has very clearly stated in his Bṛhatī Vimarśinī

that if dualistic doctrine were given up by the so called Āgamikas; if Māyā were to be taken as the power of the Brahman by the Vedāntins; and if two Vijñānas, the Ālaya-vijñāna and the Pravṛttivijñāna, were to be admitted to be the manifestations of the Ātmeśvara or Maheśvara, the Universal Consciousness, by the Bauddhas, all differences between the Pratyabhijñā on the one hand and the Āgamikas, the Vedāntins and the Bauddhas on the other disappear. The latter become the exponents of the Pratyabhijñā philosophy :—

"Āgameṣu dvaitavyākhyāmapāsya, Brahmavāde avidyām māyāśaktīkṛtya vijñānadvayam ātmeśvarābhiprāyeṇa nirūpya siddhyatyeṣa janaḥ." I. P. V. V., Vol. III, 405.

and also

"Pārameśvareṣu tāvadāgameṣu śaivavaiṣṇavarahasyeṣu Vedānteṣu ca spaṣṭa evoktoyam asmaduktorthaḥ, Tadanusāriṇaiva sugatenoktaṁ 'Cittamātramidam,' yaduta traidhātukamiti tadatra vivaraṇa kārair durabhiniveśavaśena vipratārito janaḥ. Idameva tu tattvamiti tu tātparyam." Ibid.

We may add here one interesting argument in support of the momentariness of the bodily and the intellectual selves. It is generally admitted that at all hours of the wakeful state some kind of knowledge or another is taking place; that knowledge is simply an affected state of consciousness, due to an external stimulus and that a determinate knowledge is invariably preceded by an indeterminate. As we pass from knowledge of one thing to that of another, the transition is not usually sharp. One act of knowledge fades gradually into the next. If, for instance, we look at a coin for several moments, we feel that we have not had a single continuous perception. First we have the knowledge of the coin as a rupee, then that of the figure on it, then of its roughened edge and then of its date and so on. These acts of knowledge

so run into each other that it is ordinarily not possible to say exactly when one act of knowledge begins and the other ends. Another note worthy point in this connection is that the Pratyabhijñā, like the Vedānta, holds that all is one with the Universal Self at the time of the indeterminate knowledge.

(Aindriyake nirvikalpake sadāśiveśvaradaśābhyudayāt.)

Now if a new determinate knowledge is accepted to be taking place every moment and if it is invariably preceded by an indeterminate one, in which all is in a state of unity with the Universal Self[1], the irresistible logical conclusion from all this naturally is that the limited perceiver is manifested a-new every moment when knowledge takes place.

THE LIMITED INSENTIENT MANIFESTATION or JAḌĀBHĀSA.

An objective limited insentient manifestation is ordinarily called[2] Jaḍābhāsa : a jar, for instance. It forms the basis of one idea and as such is expressible by one word and has to be separately taken through the whole cognitive process in order that it may be cognised. It is momentary, because like the sentient limited manifestation, it is manifested a-new at the time of every cognition. But if we carefully analyse our knowledge of the jar we find that, though ordinarily taken to be one Ābhāsa, it is made up of many; it embodies as many Ābhāsas as there are words which can be used with reference to it by various analytical perceivers, looking at it from different points of view. To an ordinary perceiver it is a combination of Ābhāsas of roundness, materiality, externality, blackness and existence. But, if a scientist were to do an atomic analysis of the same, how many acts of perception will he

1. I. P. V., II, 66.

2. I. P. V., II, 69–71.

have to do and how many words will he require to describe the results of his analysis? Can any body say that the atoms of different kinds are not the constituents of what is ordinarily taken to be one thing? The Pratyabhijñā, therefore, holds that each Ābhāsa, as we perceive it, is a collocation of a certain number of Ābhāsas, each of which requires a separate perceptual activity for its perception, that the causal efficiency (artha kriyākāritva) of each depends upon its being determinately cognised and that the determinate cognition also depends upon the will, the immediate need and the analytical capacity of each perceiver.[1]

Imagine, for instance, a farmer hitting upon an oval piece of stone in the course of his farm work and suppose that it is a very precious stone, but that its brilliance is obscured by clay that has been covering it for centuries so that no eye but that of an expert jeweller can see its hidden value. Now the question is: Will this piece of precious stone have the same causal efficiency of arousing certain ideas or feelings in the case of the farmer as in that of an expert jeweller? If not, why? Let us ask the facts of common experience for a reply. And what reply do we get but that which has just been stated above, viz, the stone is a collocation of a certain number of Ābhāsas: its causal efficiency differs according as a greater or a smaller number of the constituent Ābhāsas is perceived, according to the perceptual capacity etc. of the individual perceiver.

Thus each individual lives in a world of his own, a world consisting, not of shadows and apparitions, as the Vivartavāda would have us believe, nor of the momentary creations of the beginningless Vāsanā of the individual, as the subjectivism of the Vijñānavāda would represent it to be, but of Ābhāsas, the apparent objects of perception or conception which have

1. I. P. V., II, 85-6.

got a separate existence from himself. Let it, however, not be forgotten that the world is not exclusively his own, as it would be if the Subjectivist's explanation of the universe be accepted, but that it has much in common with similar worlds of others. These are the common factors or the common elements in each individual world of Ābhāsas which make possible all the worldly transactions, which depend upon the co-operation of many.

The phenomenon of knowledge has been described in the 2nd chapter as very much like the rise of two waves, one subjective and the other objective, in the sea of the Universal Consciousness. The former has Nairmalya, the capacity to receive reflection, so that when it rises facing the latter and receives the reflection of the same, the phenomenon of knowledge takes place. This phenomenon is of various kinds. It is not always that the objective wave affects only one subjective wave, nor is it that even when it affects more than one, the affection that it causes, is always the same in all cases. The objective wave is a collocation of Ābhāsas and, therefore, only those constituents of it are reflected on a particular subjective wave which are in relation of knowability to the latter.

Buddhi is held to be like a mirror. The analogy of mirror, therefore, will clear the point in hand. If we take four mirrors and place them in different positions facing an object, we find that the reflection in all cases is not the same, though in each case there is enough common element to give us the idea of the reflected object being the same in all cases. Why is there this difference ? Is it not because of the difference in the position of each mirror ? And if so, then the same can be said to be the cause of reflection of only some of the constituent Ābhāsas of an objective wave on a certain subjective wave.

Imagine, for instance, two persons, one purchaser and the other seller, looking at the same thing, as we would ordinarily say. Does the article appear to be the same in every aspect to both ?[1] Do both the persons have the same perception and conception of the object as a whole and in its parts ? Experience says "no" to this and the Ābhāsavāda explains by saying that the constituent Ābhāsas of a collocation which cast reflection, differ according to the will, the need, and the motive force of the perceptual or the cognitive activity, in short, the point of view of the percipient.

THE CONSTITUENT ĀBHĀSAS.

Each constituent Ābhāsa is a separate entity and as such it is ever the same.[2] All the talk of change refers to combination only.[3] And the difference in the causal efficiency of a collocation depends upon the Ābhāsa with which it is combined or associated. The idea will become clear if we were to bear in mind that, according to this system, each idea, for which a word stands, is a separate Ābhāsa. Thus "seeing", "embracing" (āliṅgana), "present", "past", "far", "near" etc. are separate Ābhāsas. Suppose, for instance, that a person is in love with a lady. He meets her in one fine moon-lit night in a beautiful garden. They remain together for a few hours. Now the question arises : Will the causal efficiency of the lady in arousing certain feelings in the mind of her lover be the same throughout this time ? Will there be no difference in her causal efficiency at the moment when she is embracing her lover from that when she sits apart, with her eye-brows knit ? Will she not please her lover in the former and pain him in the latter case ? If she will, the question arises, why ? Ābhāsavāda replies that it is,[4] not because of

1. I. P. V., I, 261.
2. I. P. V., I, 320.
3. I. P. V., I, 322.
4. I. P. V., I, 329-30.

any change in the individual Ābhāsas, but because of difference in the combination. In the first case, when the lady is a source of pleasure, she, as a collocation, is combined with the "embracing" and the "near", but in the second case, with the "frowning" and the "far". What we mean to point out is this, that in both the cases, when the lady is embracing and when she is frowning, the mode, the form that consciousness assumes, is the same in respect of the lady, but the difference lies in this only, that in the former case she is combined with the Ābhāsas of "embracing" and "near", but in the latter with those of "frowning" and "far". Thus the difference in the causal efficiency of the principal Ābhāsa in a combination depends upon the constituent or the associated Ābhāsas. In fact, the causal efficiency also is a separate Ābhāsa.[1] Just like the causal efficiency the externality (bāhyatva) also does not constitute the essential nature of the manifested. In both the states, viz., of internality and externality i. e. at the time when it is within the Universal Consciousness and that when it is manifested as apparently separate from it, an object is essentially the same. Externality is simply an associated Ābhāsa. And for the unification of these Ābhāsas, as also for their manifestation, it is the Lord's will, the element of the will power in the Universal Consciousness, that is responsible.

The above statement makes it clear that one cognisable Ābhāsa is a collocation of many, that its causal efficiency differs with difference in the constituent or the associated Ābhāsas and that the combination of Ābhāsas is the work of the Lord's Svātantrya śakti. Here it may be asked : If each cognisable Ābhāsa is a collocation of many, why is it called one: and if the unification of Ābhāsas by the Lord's will is a necessary antecedent condition of all cognitions, is there any limit to

1. I. P. V., I, 330.

this unification ? In reply to this Abhinava says that the ordinarily innumerable uncognizable Ābhāsas form a cognizable one exactly in the manner in which innumerable unilluminative particles of light form an illuminating flame and, therefore, just as the latter is spoken of as one because of one causal efficiency, namely, that of dispelling darkness, so, for the same reason, the former also is so spoken of. A jar, for instance, though it is made up of many Ābhāsas such as big, round, bright, golden, heavy etc. yet, because it is conceived as having one causal efficiency at the time of cognition, it is spoken of as one. As regards the limit in the unification, he says that only such Ābhāsas are united as are not of a conflicting nature. The Ābhāsa of air, for instance, will not find union with that of form.[1]

REFUTATION OF THE RIVAL THEORIES OF PERCEPTION.

In the philosophical works of Abhinava where he criticises rival theories, the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī, for instance, the Bauddha figures as the chief opponent. In fact, the whole of the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī, with the exception of the Āgamādhikāra and the introductory Āhnika, is practically a reply to the Bauddha objections, recorded in the second Āhnika of the first chapter. The Sāṅkhya theories also have been criticised at places in both the Īśvara Pratyabhījñā Vimarśinī and the Tantrāloka, but that is only by the way. Here we propose to follow our author's maxim that to begin with the refutation of the rival theories, is the best way of establishing one's own. Therefore, before taking up the Pratyabhijñā theory of perception for an exposition, we first briefly state and then refute the Sāṅkhya and the Bauddha theories mostly with the help of the material, collected from Abhinava's own works.

1. I. P. V., II, 96.

SĀṄKHYA THEORY OF PERCEPTION.

According to the Sāṅkhya, the Buddhi is made up of three qualities, Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. It is predominated by the Sattva and, therefore, possesses the natural Nairmalya, the capacity to receive reflection on all sides. And though, in the condition of bondage, it is shrouded by the Tamas, yet it can partly receive the reflection of external objects, because the shroud of the Tamas is partly removed by the activity of the Rajas. It is insentient, because the qualities of which it is made are so, but still, being partly capable of receiving reflection, because of the working of the Rajas, as just pointed out, it receives light from the self-luminous self within. Thus a person is said to be knowing when the light of the self within, falling on the jaḍa Buddhi, comes in contact with the reflection of an external object falling on the same. Knowledge (jñāna), therefore, according to the Sāṅkhya, is nothing else than a form which, like a mirror, Buddhi assumes because of its being a meeting place of both, the light of the self-luminous self within and the reflection of an external object[1] without.

THE NECESSITY FOR SUCH AN ASSUMPTION.

The subject and the object are of fundamentally opposite nature. The former is self-luminous, but the latter is devoid of all light. The one is changeless, but the other is changing. Therefore, if the Puruṣa, who is unaffectable pure light, be the illuminator of the objects, which in themselves are devoid of all light, it would be difficult to explain why things are perceived in succession and why a jar shines (prakāśate) as distinct from a piece of cloth :—

"Sa ca prakāśa ityetāvat svabhāvaḥ svabhāvāntaram aprakāśarūpam bhogyam..............Sa ca prakāśamātra-

1. I. P. V., I, 71.

svabhāvatvenaiva yadi viśvasya prakāsaḥ tarhi viśvaṁ yugapat prakāśeta ghaṭaprakāśopi paṭaprakāśaḥ syāt iti viśvaṁ saṁkīryeta" I. P. V., I, 74.

The supposition of the self-luminousness of the object cannot explain the phenomena of knowledge. For, in that case it would be difficult to account for the limit and the degree of the individual knowledge. If every thing is self-luminous why should it not, like the self-luminous self, be always equally known to all ? Even the supposition that the perception is consequent upon the illumination of the object by the light of self cannot improve the position; for, in that case also, when the object has once become illuminated, it is difficult to find reason why it should not become equally manifest to all. About the sense-contact as the cause of perceptibility of the object to some and not to all and its refutation by Abhinava, we shall write in the course of our treatment of the Prakaṭa-tāvāda of the Mīmāṁsaka. The Sāṅkhya, therefore, puts forward the Buddhivṛtti theory of knowledge, as explained above.

REFUTATION OF THE SĀṄKHYA THEORY.

The above theory of the Sāṅkhya is not sound, firstly, because the analogy of mirror and jar, on which it is based, requires the reflecting and the reflected to be similar in their nature; but Buddhi and self are of fundamentally opposite nature; the one is sentient, but the other lacks sentiency; secondly, because, ordinarily that which is less bright casts its reflection on what is more so, but even the Sāṅkhya will not be prepared to admit that in point of Nairmalya Buddhi exceeds self : (But what about the reflection of a flame in a mirror or that of the sun in water ? It is perhaps because of the consciousness of this defect in his above argument that he puts forth another, the last and strongest.) and thirdly, because

the Sāṅkhya cannot satisfactorily answer the question that naturally arises in this connection as to whether Buddhi, in consequence of the reflection of the light of self, itself becomes light or not. In the latter case it will not be able to illumine the object exactly as the material light, reflected in a mirror, cannot, and, therefore, even when there is the reflection of the light of self on Buddhi the external object will not be illuminated (nārtha prakāśatā). Hence perception will be impossible. But if the case be the former i. e. Buddhi itself becomes an illuminant, the postulate of an illuminating Puruṣa becomes useless, because then all the objections to remove which a separate Buddhi Tattva is assumed by the Sāṅkhya will stand as before[1].

BAUDDHA THEORIES OF PERCEPTION AND THEIR REFUTATIONS.

Out of the four schools of Buddhism, only two, the Sautrāntika and the Vijñānavāda, have been taken up for criticism by Abhinava in connection with the theory of perception.

SAUTRĀNTIKA THEORY.

According to the Sautrāntika, every thing is momentary. The subject, the self-luminous consciousness (Bodha), is no less momentary than the object. But each of these gives rise to another, which, in its essential nature, is similar to itself, in the second moment. Thus a jar of the preceding moment, being in touch with a sense-organ, eye, for instance, gives rise to knowledge in the following moment which, in form, is similar to the object which casts its reflection. But the fact that the external object exists and that it is of a certain form, is a matter of inference only, drawn from the form of knowledge itself, because direct touch with it is not possible. Every

1. I. P. V., I, 77.

thing is momentary and so must be the jar also. Logically, therefore, it ceases to exist immediately after casting its reflection. But the direct touch requires the co-existence of the object and the affected consciousness which is the effect of the reflection of the former (sākāraṁ cittaṁ jñānaśabdavācyam). How can the two co-exist ? The one is the cause and the other is its effect. The cause must precede the effect ; therefore, if the object, which is the cause of the affection of consciousness, precedes the existence of the latter, as it must, it cannot remain in existence at the time of its effect. The direct touch with the object, therefore, is not possible*.

THE NECESSITY FOR SUCH A SUPPOSITION.

The chain of momentary self-consciousness, called Ālaya-vijñāna, is of the nature of pure light. It is uniform in its nature and is devoid of all diversity :

"Aṇumātramapi na rūpāntaram asya asti iti abhinno bodhaḥ".

But the object is admittedly of the opposite nature and as such is not self-luminous. How is then the phenomenon of the varying knowledge to be accounted for ? It cannot be said that it is the very nature of the limited consciousness to assume a variety of forms in succession ; for, in that case, it would not be possible to explain such an unaffected state as we experience at the time of deep sleep or as a yogin does in the state of Samādhi. Therefore, the explanation of the occasional varying affection of the limited consciousness (vicitrābhāsa) that the Sautrāntika gives is that it is due to the reflection of the external object on the self, due to the contact of the latter with the former. The object, however, that casts the reflection, is momentary and, therefore, is not

* S. D. S, Abhyankar's edition.

directly perceived as we have already stated. For this reason this school is also known as Anumeyārthavāda.[1]

ITS REFUTATION.

All determinate cognitions presuppose the direct perception of their respective objects and so does the inference, because it is a determinate cognition. We, for instance, can infer fire from smoke, but not without first knowing their universal concomitance from daily perception of fire and smoke together in kitchen or elsewhere. Therefore, if the external object is never perceptible no inference either can be possible of it.

The Bauddha may say here that an inference does not always presuppose the direct perception of the inferred, because it is unnecessary in the case of a generic inference (sāmānyatodṛṣṭa), where the nature of an invisible thing is inferred from a previously known general law such as that of causality. Soul, for instance, is inferred by the Naiyāyikas from the necessity that Buddhi and other qualities must reside in a substance, according to the general law that every quality must have a substratum. Similarly, to take another instance, senses are inferred from the fact of perception, because of the general law that every event must have a cause, though senses as such are never directly perceived. But it can be pointed out to him that in the case of the generic inference also the inferred is held to be not such as has never been directly known. Rather the fact is that it is always maintained to be as it has directly been perceived. If we take the instance of the inferred senses, we find that they are inferred, not as of some definite nature, but simply as certain causes which are responsible for the events of perception ; and the cause as

1. I. P. V., I, 166.

such we daily perceive directly, as for instance, when we see a seed changed into a sprout or threads into a piece of cloth.[1] And even if, for the sake of argument, it be admitted that an inference can be drawn even in the case of the unperceived, how will it be possible for the object, which is external to and in nature opposite from the self, to shine (ābhāsate) in the latter; because, as we have pointed out in the 2nd chapter, when we divide the subject from the object, the question of building the bridge from one to the other becomes difficult.[2]

VIJÑĀNAVĀDIN'S THEORY.

The sensationalists (Vijñānavādins) do not believe in the existence of the external world. According to them, there is a chain or stream of momentary self-consciousness, called Ālaya vijñāna santati or dhārā. This differs in the case of every individual and has an existence exclusive and independent of the rest of the innumerable similar chains, which are ordinarily known as souls. It has got a certain power, technically called Vāsanā, the capacity to give rise to the innumerable presentments (pravṛttivijñāna) or sensations which constitute the variety of daily cognitions. This Vāsanā also is momentary, like the stream of self-consciousness, and each Vāsanā of the chain thereof has got an independent capacity to give rise to a certain presentment. In fact, the presentment is due to the maturescence (Paripāka) of a link of the chain of Vāsanā. Thus, according to the sensationalists, a cognition is nothing but, as has been stated just now, a presentment, brought about by maturescence of a link of the chain of Vāsanā.[3]

ITS REFUTATION.

According to the Vijñānavādin, the existentiality is of two kinds, real and apparent, (paramārtha sattvam and Saṁ-

1. I. P. V., I, 188. 2. I. P. V., I, 190.
3. I. P. V., I, 167.

vṛti sattvam). The Vijñāna alone is real and all that appears in it (ābhāsate) has only an apparent existence. Now, although the apparent may be spoken of as unreal, yet its cause has, of necessity, to be admitted to be real, because, how can one reasonably speak of what is non-existent in reality, as the cause of the apparent ? How can, what is nothing in itself, be the cause of something ? But if to get out of this difficulty the Vijñānavādin were to admit the separate real existence of the Vāsanās, which are the causes of all that appears, he ceases to be Vijñānavādin; his theory, in that case, would be no better than that of the Bāhyārthavādin, who believes in the existence of the external world as the cause of variations in consciousness. The[1] only difference which then remains is that he calls what is external by the name of Vāsanā and not by that of Artha (object) as the Bāhyārthavādin does. Nor can the opponent say that these Vāsanās are the causes of presentments in that aspect of theirs in which they are real (yena rūpeṇa satyatā tena kāraṇatā). For, Vijñāna, which, according to the opponent, represents the real aspect of Vāsanā, has no variety in itself; the plurality of Vāsanā in its real aspect, therefore, is out of the question. How can then the variety in the presentment be explained ? And even if, for the sake of argument, variety in Vāsanā be admitted, then also, there being nothing like time, place or object, which may serve as the immediate cause of maturescence of a certain Vāsanā, how can the rise of only a certain presentment at a certain time to the exclusion of all the rest be explained ? [2]

Moreover,[3] if each stream of self-consciousness is different from all the rest ; if the sensations (pravṛttivijñāna) of each, being caused by its own Vāsanā, are exclusive and independent and if each soul is living in a world of its own, how can the

1. I. P. V., I, 167-8. 2. I. P. V., I, 168. 3. I. P. V., I, 174.

collaboration of many persons be possible in respect of the same object, as for instance, in lifting up of a heavy log? Thus the Vijñānavādin's theory fails to explain both the varying experiences of an individual and the common experience of a group. In fact, if we accept the Vijñānavādin's theory our world should be no better than the one, if there can be such a one, in which every soul, being, as it were, under the influence of a certain spirit, is living in a world of its own creation and, therefore, being completely cut off from the rest, is incapable of any attachment to or co-operation with any other.

PRATYABHIJÑĀ THEORY OF PERCEPTION.

The defects in the theories of knowledge of the rival systems, as pointed out above, are that the Sāṅkhya and the Anumeyārthavādin leave a gulf between the subject and the object by holding them to be mutually exclusive and perfectly independent; and the Vijñānavādin fails to explain the common and the individual experiences on which depend all worldly transactions. The Pratyabhijñā, therefore, holds that the phenomenon of knowledge owes its being solely to the will power of the Universal Consciousness, which at the time of each cognition manifests externally a-new the subject, the object and the means of cognition very much like a Yogin, who brings immediately into existence the innumerable objects, which he desires, by sheer force of will, without the assistance of any external thing whatsoever. In fact, if, in order satisfactorily to account for the phenomena of knowledge, the objects are to be admitted to exist, as they must be, if the facts of experience have not altogether to be ignored, they have necessarily to be admitted to be the creation of the Universal Subject. The modern philosophic thinkers also hold this to be the only sound philosophical view of the subject-

object relation as the following statement of Prof. Radhakrishnan shows :—

"When we divide the subject from the object the question of building the bridge from one to the other becomes difficult. Either we have to hold that the object is the creation of the subject or that there is no object at all."

(I. Ph., vol. I, 135.)

Abhinava has justified the above conclusion as follows :—

The object is not self-luminous (svātma vaśenaiva na tāvadvyavatiṣṭhate). For, had it been so, like self, it would have always been equally manifest to all and would not have stood in the relation of knowability to some percipient or percipients only at a particular time as the following judgements indicate :—

"This is now known to me."

"This shines (avabhāsate) to Caitra."

It has, therefore, to be admitted that manifestedness of the object depends upon some entity which is not only perfectly independent of but also of fundamentally opposite nature from the object inasmuch as it is self-shining. For, otherwise, it would as little help in the illumination of the object as one blind man can another. Again, this self-luminous entity, the subject, cannot be supposed to illumine the object without any connection with i. e. without being affected in any way by, the latter; for, in that case, its unaffectedness with regard to all being the same, it would be difficult to account for its illumining some only and not others. It is, therefore, held that when the self-luminous self faces some object or objects it throws its light on the latter. This light being reflected back by the obstructing object[1], the sensory image, forms an

1. T. A., VI, 156.

image of the latter on the mirror-like Buddhi which, according to this system, is nothing else than a state of the limited self.[1]

"Sopi yadi śuddho nirviśeṣo na tarhi nīlasyaiva vyavasthāhetuḥ bhavet pītādāvapi tasya tathātvāt, tadasau nīloparakto nīlonmukho nīlaprakāśasvabhāva ityābhāsaḥ san nīlasya vyavasthāpakaḥ, tatprakāśasvabhāvataiva hi tadvyavasthāpakatā." (I. P. V., II, 65).

It may be added here that Abhinavagupta admits, like the modern psychologists, that the objects cast their reflections on the senses. This view he has elaborately presented in the third Āhnika of the Tantrāloka in the course of his discussion on the theory of reflection (Bimba pratibimba Vāda). And we have discussed it in the context of Abhinavagupta's philosophy of Music in the second edition of the Comparative Æsthetics, Vol. I, pp 557–60.

In the last but one para we have confined ourselves to the presentation of the internal process which converts the sensory image, the stimulus of an external object on a sense-organ, into psychic state, the process, which begins after the formation of the image of an external object on a sense-organ. We shall soon discuss the whole process.

The illumination of only certain object or objects at a time to the exclusion of the rest, presupposes an apparently separate existence of both the subject and the object from the Universal Consciousness; for, if the subject be supposed to illumine the object which is one with the Universal Self, oneness of all with the latter being the same, the illumination of one to the exclusion of the rest will be inexplicable. Again, the illumining subject also, in order that the illuminable object may have separate existence from it, must itself be at least apparently separate from the All-inclusive Universal Consciousness; for,

1. P. H., 11-2.

otherwise, there being nothing outside the Universal Consciousness, the talk of separate existence of the illuminable from the illumining would be meaningless. But how can the separate existence of the subject be possible unless the Universal Consciousness itself were to assume some limitations and so to manifest its limited form as separate from both, itself and the manifested object ?

Here it may be asked : If the subject and the object are so separate from each other, what is it that connects them, what is it that places the latter in the relation of knowability to the former, or, in other words, what is it that brings about the phenomenon of knowledge ? The Pratyabhijñā says in reply that it is the means of knowledge (Pramāṇa). It is, as we pointed out above, the light proceeding[1] from the self-luminous self facing the object, the light which comes in touch with the object and being affected by the latter in a certain way, is reflected back and so gives rise to image in the Buddhi; the light which transforms into a psychic state the stimulus of an external object on the sense-organ which is resolved into a form of mechanical contact.

About the momentariness of the subject and the object we have already spoken. They being so, the momentariness of the means of knowledge is a matter of course, because it will naturally change, as has been said above, according as it will be affected by the object which changes every moment even from the point of view of an ordinary observer, at least in respect of time, if in no other respect. Thus, according to this system, both, the creation, which is an act of[2] the Universal Consciousness to manifest without, as apparently separate from itself, what exists within, and the dissolution, which is nothing but merging back in the Universal Consciousness of what is so manifested, are taking place every moment.

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1. I. P. V., II, 66. 2. I. P. V., II, 144.

INDETERMINATE AND DETERMINATE KNOWLEDGE.

Indeterminate knowledge is that which is not characterised by genus, admits of no specification and has no attribute of time, place, form etc. in common with any thing else.[1] It has no variety, because one knowledge can be said to be different from another only when the use of language is possible with regard to them; but it is impossible in the case of indeterminate knowledge. The first experience of the world by a just born baby is generally accepted to be a typical instance of this kind of knowledge. Determinate knowledge is the reverse of the indeterminate. The substitution of the negative part of the definition of the latter by the positive assertion gives a clear definition of the former.

THE PROCESS.

The Pratyabhijñā makes a very clear distinction between the physical and the psychological activities involved in perception. It recognises the optical sense to be separate from the eyeballs. It believes that not only the optical sense but others also receive the reflections of their respective external objects[2] and that an image, that is formed on the retina, is different from that on the real optical sense. Further, an image that is formed on a particular sense is different from another similar image on the Buddhi. The former is the cause and the latter is the effect; one is physical and the other is psychological. Therefore, when we speak of the object of illumination of the light of the self-luminous self we mean thereby the image on the sense.

What happens, when a certain perception takes place, is that[3] the mind (Manas) sets a certain sense to work; so long as there is no prompting by or the co-operation of the mind, the object, though reflected on the external sense, retina for

1. I. P. V., I, 53-4. 2. T. A., II, 45-7. 3. T. A., II, 50.

instance, does not cause any sensation.[1] The sense comes in touch with its object which is nothing but the reflection of the external object on sense-organ and receives its reflection,[2] which may be said to consist of a number of sensations.[3] This physical image is illumined by the light of knowledge proceeding from the self-luminous self, and casts its reflection through the medium of that very illuminating light as explained above, on the Buddhi. The latter may be called a psychological image in contrast to the former. This gives rise to the indeterminate consciousness i. e. the consciousness of the light of knowledge having been affected. It is called indeterminate knowledge, because it is not possible to say at this stage as to what exactly is the cause of the affection of the pure light of knowledge.

The psychological activity involved in perception corresponds to the physical in almost every way. It is, therefore, admitted by the Pratyabhijñā that the so called one act of perception is not really one action but a large number of them taken to be one because of their leading to one result, the judgement (pramiti):

(Na ekaikataḥ pramāṇāt sā pravṛttiḥ api tu
pramāṇa samūhādeva.)

Taking, for instance, the physical action, the formation of an image on the retina, for a critical analysis, we find that it is caused, not by a simple but a complex action ; an action which has clearly marked divisions, though they are not ordinarily recognised. It is admitted that no object is perfectly smooth, nor every part thereof has the same reflecting power. Naturally, therefore, different rays of the illuminating light meet not only different objects in succession, according to the respective distance of each of them from the source, but the

1. T. A., II, 47–8. 2. T. A., VI, 223. 3. T. A., VI, 224.

various parts also of the same object in the same way. Different rays then undergo different changes, due to partial absorption of light by the objects or parts thereof and similar other causes. Thus they, (different rays) because of their meeting obstructions at different points of time, howsoever imperceptible, are reflected back in succession and so come in touch in the same succession with the object, on which the image is formed. Now, since the reflected rays are responsible for the formation of an image on the retina, it has naturally to be admitted to have taken place, not all at once, without any order or succession, but gradually, point by point, in the same order in which each of the points is formed by a separate affected and reflected ray coming in touch with the retina. It is another matter that owing to the tremendous velocity of the light time-lag between one ray and another is imperceptible. We are here simply pointing out its theoretical existence which can, by no means, be denied.

Suppose a person is having three or four things in his fist and is showing them to another person by exposing them to the latter's view for the shortest possible time that the quickest movement of fingers can make possible. In such a case the percipient will get no idea whatsoever of the things so exposed. And suppose that next time he keeps the fist open for a little while so that the perceiver can have just a vague idea of its contents, and so on. Now the question is : what is it that gives rise to various kinds of perception, according as the things are kept exposed for shorter or longer time ? Is it not because at different times the light-rays, responsible for the rise of images on which the perceptual judgement is based, are affected differently because of the contact with different things or different parts of the same thing, which alone could be touched, because of the comparatively shorter or longer exposure ?

Thus, according to the Pratyabhijñā, whatever appears, whatever is capable of affecting the light in any way and so of contributing something, it may be a point, to the formation of an image on the retina, of causing a separate sensation, of being distinctively imaged in the Buddhi and ultimately, at the time of the most analytical determinate knowledge, of being referred to by a separate word, requires a separate perceptual activity from the time it affects a particular ray of light to that when it is cognised to have got a separate existence and is given a name :

> "Tatra ca pratyakṣam pratyābhāsam prāmāṇyam bhajate vimarśalakṣaṇasya pramitivyāpārasya ekaikaśabdavācyerthe viśrānteḥ, tadanusāritvācca pramāṇasya"
>
> I. P. V., I, 188–9.

It may be pointed out here that these innumerable perceptions, which take place within that which prompts the percipient to some kind of motor response, are not always conceived separately. Their separate conception as such depends upon, as we pointed out before, the individual will, liking and analytical capacity.

THE DISTINCTIVE PROCESS OF THE DETERMINATE KNOWLEDGE.

The whole process from the time of illumination of the object by an external light to that of its mirroring on the Buddhi, leads only to an indeterminate knowledge which consists in the consciousness of the Buddhi having been affected ; a consciousness with regard to which the use of language is not possible. After this, begins the process which is distinctive of the determinate knowledge.

When a person says "I am seeing a jar" it is not that he sees the jar alone. There are many other objects which are

reflected on the Buddhi through the retina. Of these also he has some sort of consciousness, which, of course, is different from that of the jar. Why then does he make a definite statement about the jar to the exclusion of the rest of the presentation? The Pratyabhijñā replies that it is because on that part alone of the whole of the presentation the mind has acted, because that alone has been carried through the process leading to determinate knowledge.

The determinative process begins with the selection by mind (Manas) of some points out of the mass reflected on the Buddhi.[1] It is like carving an image out of a big piece of stone. This is not all. For, every time a person sees a jar he does not feel it to be an altogether new thing; he sees many points in it in common with his previous perceptions; he knows it to belong to a familiar class, gives it a name, conceives liking or dislike for it and accordingly tries to gain or shun it. How does all this happen? The explanation, which the Pratyabhijñā offers, is that soon after the carving out of an image from the block or mass of points or sensations there takes[2] place a revival of the memory of a similar object perceived before; then, because of the law of association, wakes up the memory of its name and of the feelings that it aroused in the past (Eka sambandhi jñānam apara sambandhi smārakam bhavati), then follow the comparison of the presented and the revived images, the classification of the former with the latter and finally the attribution of the latter's name and qualities to the former and consequent liking or aversion for it according as it is associated with pleasant or unpleasant memories.

This is what takes place in the case of the perception of an extremely familiar object. The determinative process in the case of the unfamiliar is a little more complex inasmuch

1. I. P. V., II, 40-1. 2. I. P. V., I, 54-5.

as it involves elimination. Suppose a fossil botanist has to classify a new fossil, the structure of which has no marked similarity with any, known before, so that there is no clue as to its class. In such a case, there arise many images of previously perceived fossils which may have some similarity with the present. And although ultimately it is identified with only one of them, yet the judgement is not reached till after the identification with the rest has been found to be unreasonable as a result of a careful comparison.[1]

DETERMINATE KNOWLEDGE AND EXTERNAL OBJECT.

Determinate knowledge has no direct touch with the external object. (Arthāsaṁsparśino vikalpāḥ). This is in reality a Buddhist idea. But it has come into the Pratyabhijñā as a logical consequence of its having in common with the Buddhism the theory of momentariness as far as the 'apparent' is concerned. If the object is momentary and the determinate knowledge follows the indeterminate, it is obviously inconsistent with the theory of momentariness to say that the object of the indeterminate knowledge exists at the time of the determinate; still more so is the notion of its forming an object of the latter. But the Pratyabhijñā holds this view for an additional psychological reason, namely, that the determinative process consists in a reaction[2] of the mind on the sense data, recorded (to speak figuratively) on the Buddhi, in making a selection of a certain group of 'points' from the whole mass, in adding to the selected something from the old store of memory and in giving it a definite shape and name. It is the second process which leads to the judgement in regard to the object of perception, a process, without which[3] no subsequent recollection of a simply sensed object is possible, as, for instance, in the case of the innumerable objects, sensed through

1. I. P. V., I, 240. 2. I. P. V., II, 103. 3. I. P. V., I, 141–2.

the window of a mail train when she is running at a speed of fifty miles per hour. Thus the determinate knowledge is quite different from sensation which precedes it; and as such it is purely internal and is in no way directly connected with any thing that is external.

SUPERSENSUOUS EXPERIENCE OR ANUBHAVA.

What we have said above in regard to the psychological movements consequent upon the reflection of an external object on a sense, say, optical, in short means that knowledge or cognition is the result of a causal action of an external object on the self, that all its contents are purely subjective states of the cognising self, that the causal objective manifestation does not form a part of knowledge and that knowledge, if it reproduces reality, can contain only copies of the real and not the objects themselves. Thus it is clear that the self never comes in direct touch with the external object. It knows only the copies of the real but not the real. It cannot satisfy itself that the copies are true by comparing them with the original. Therefore, according to the psychological process described above, it is not possible to be certain that our knowledge is correct. Further, if all that the self can know are the reflections on the retina which, being proportionate to the dimension of the eyeball (in the case of an ocular perception, for instance), are much smaller than the original, how can the above explained theory of perception satisfactorily account for our common experience of such a huge thing as a mountain? It cannot be said to be a matter of inference, because inference presupposes the direct knowledge of the inferred and, according to the above theory, the real is known only through the copies. The theory of the All-inclusive Universal Consciousness may explain the fact of self and not-self coming together much in the same way as the sea accounts for the meeting

of two logs which are floating on it, but it cannot explain the above difficulties.

Abhinava, therefore, holds that the all-inclusiveness of the Universal Consciousness consists, not in its being simply a substratum of things of diverse kinds and of opposite nature, but in its being the essence of all that has existentiality (sattā) exactly as the earth is of all that is earthy. He asserts that just as earthiness of a jar depends upon its being essentially earthy i. e. being made up of earth ; and that just as jar, in order that it may have its being on earth, must essentially be earth, so all that is indicated by the word "all" in "all-inclusive Universal Consciousness", in order that it may have its being in the Universal Consciousness, should essentially be itself consciousness. This is what a strictly logical explanation of the phenomenon of knowledge requires. This is what Professor Radhakrishnan seems to imply when he says in his Indian Philosophy :—

"If truth means agreement of ideas with reality and if reality is defined as that which is external to thought what is not thought or made up of thought then truth seeking is a wild goose chase."

In the above quotation the learned professor seems to imply not only what we have already stated but also that the ascertainment of the correctness of our idea of the external, requires the object to be within the thought or consciousness to make the comparison possible. In this he seems to echo Abhinava's view on the matter. Abhinava holds that before the commencement of the above described psychic process, that is, at the time of rise of desire for perception, the cognising self becomes pervasive as far as the object or objects of perception and that the objects also appear in their essential nature of being made up of consciousness and become one with the self much in the same manner as the reflection does with the object that

has the capacity to receive it. Thus a phenomenon of knowledge may be said to be a union of the subjective and the objective waves of consciousness in the sea of the All-inclusive Universal Consciousness. This supersensuous knowledge is technically called 'anubhava', which implies the subject's becoming what the object is. Just as when we say that Devadatta imitates Yajñadatta (Devadattaḥ Yajñadattam anukaroti) we mean that the former does the same or similar thing as does the latter, so when we say "John experiences (anubhavati) a jar," it means, if we take the word "anubhavati" literally, that John becomes what the jar is. This is exactly what Abhinava has said in slightly different words in the Bṛhatī Vimarśinī quoted in a foot note in I. P. V., I, 42 as follows :—

> "Tathā ca ghaṭo mama sphuratīti korthaḥ, madīyaṁ sphuraṇaṁ spandanam āviṣṭaḥ madrūpatāmāpanna eva cinmayatvāt."

To clear the point let us quote Bhāskarakaṇṭha's explanation of Abhinava's text on which the above statement is based :—

> "Grahaṇasamaye bhāvasya māyayā bhāvatvena bhāsitaṁ nijaṁ sahajaśuddhaprakāśākhyaṁ svarūpameva pramātāram prati sphuṭībhavati, yataḥ tadā pramātā tadvastu prati didṛkṣāsamaye vyāpakībhavati yaduktam :—
>
> "Didṛkṣayeva sarvārthān yadā vyāpyāvatiṣṭhate
> Tadā kiṁ bahunoktena svayam evāvabhotsyate"
>
> "Vyāpakībhavaṁśca tadvastu svātmasātkaroti tanmayībhāvāsādanañca vastunaḥ śuddhaprakāśarūpatvāsādanameva pramātuḥ śuddhaprakāśamātra rūpatvāt."

CRITICISM OF THE RIVAL THEORIES.

The typical opponents of the above theory of subject-object union, as propounded by Abhinava, are the Mīmāṁsakas and

the Naiyāyikas. The rival theory of knowledge of the former is known as Prakaṭatāvāda and that of the latter as Kāraṇatāvāda. We take them up here separately for criticism.

PRAKAṬATĀVĀDA.

This theory is said to have been founded by Bhaṭṭa Kumārila. He holds that a phenomenon of knowledge presupposes some kind of relation between the subject and the object. This relation is brought about by the movement of the knowing self and is an object of internal perception (mānasapratyakṣa) alone. His conception of knowledge is that it is simply an act of the cognisor, which produces cognisedness (jñātatā) or manifestedness (prakaṭatā) in the object. The action of the agent, the cognition, is not directly perceptible; it can only be inferred from the quality of cognisedness produced by it in the object.

(Itthaṁ tadvādaḥ :—

Jñānaṁ nāma kriyā, sā ca phalānumeyā phalaṁ ca prakaṭatākhyaṁ viṣayadharmaḥ saiva vedyatā iti Kaumārilāḥ procuḥ I. P. V., I, 155).

He is a dualist and, therefore, in order to maintain the independent existence of the object, he denies the self-luminosity to knowledge. He does not admit the cognition to be directly cognisable; for, it would then require another cognition to cognise it and that too another still and so on ad-infinitum. His theory, therefore, in short is that the objects are known through cognition which has the capacity of manifesting them, though in itself it is only inferrable.

ITS REFUTATION.

If the subject and the object have an exclusive existence even at the time of cognition and if manifestedness, though

produced, belongs to the object exactly as do the other qualities such as blackness, for instance, in the case of a jar, it is difficult to explain why it is manifest to some only and not to others. If it gets manifestedness i. e. if it is made manifest, there is no reason why it should not become equally manifest to all. But, if the Mīmāṁsaka were to say that mere manifestedness of an object does not necessarily mean its connection with all perceivers so as to give rise to the particular consciousness "It is known to me" in each case, he has to be asked :—"Is the manifestedness of the object self-confined ?" Of course, it is not reasonable to suppose that the mere being of a thing makes it known to a perceiver without the subject's being connected with the object in some way; for, if it were so, all should be all-knowing. If, therefore, he were to admit the manifestedness of the object to be self-confined he will still find his position much the same, because then the object will not be known even to the person whose cognitional activity has produced cognisedness. For, the manifestedness of the object would be as much self-confined for him as for any one else. There should, therefore, be perfect ignorance of the objective world according to the Mīmāṁsaka theory. Nor can it be said that the relation of causality will determine the relation of knowability, that is to say, the object will have manifestedness, will shine, to him only whose cognitive activity has given it manifestedness; because, our experience tells us that an effect, after it has come into being, need not depend for its existence upon or shine only to him, who has been instrumental in bringing it into existence. For, if it were so, a jar, made by a potter, should have no existence independently of him and should shine only to him, just as the Mīmāṁsaka would wish the manifestedness to be manifest only to its creator. Mimāṁsaka theory of knowledge, therefore, is not acceptable, because it cannot explain the fact of individual experience.

THE NAIYĀYIKA THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE.

We are not here concerned with the Naiyāyika view of the process involved in perception. The point under discussion is the part that an object plays in the production of a phenomenon of knowledge. We, therefore, state here only that part of the Naiyāyika theory of knowledge which has immediate bearing on the question in hand. According to the Naiyāyika, the relation between knowledge and its object is that of the illuminator and the illuminated, much the same as between a lamp and the object on which its sheds its light.

"Jñānasyārtha-prakāśatvaṁ nanu rūpam pradīpavat"
(I. P. V., I, 156).

He also holds that variety in cognition is caused by variety of the instruments and objects.

ITS REFUTATION.

If the light of knowledge is to be taken as different from the object it has of necessity to be supposed to be uniform in its nature ; because it is the common element in all the multifarious cognitions, such as those of the red, the blue and the black. The red etc. cannot be considerd to be the very forms of knowledge : for, then all the notion of independence of the object becomes baseless. If, however, they are taken to be separately existing entities, the question arises : if it is with the help of the light of knowledge that we know the difference between the black and the blue, and if that light of knowledge is one and uniform in its nature, how can the blue be known as blue with the help of that very light, by means of which the black is known as black ? The opponent cannot say that the difference in knowledge is caused by that in the objects ; because that is just the point under discussion. The objects, as they have no luminosity of their own, cannot be apprehended

as different from one another. As for knowledge, it is admittedly of uniform nature. How can, then, the variety of cognitions which is a matter of every body's experience, arise? Moreover, how can, what is not shining, be made to shine? Because causal action of the agent presupposes, on the part of its object, the capacity for that action which the former makes the latter do. For instance, when a driver makes a horse go, he does so because the horse has itself got the capacity to go. Therefore, if the luminosity of the object of knowledge is to be taken to be the result of causal action of the light of knowledge, the object must be supposed to have some luminosity of its own. And if it be admitted to have that, there would cease to be any essential difference between the Naiyāyika and the Ābhāsavādin. The acceptance of this would mean giving up of his original theory of essential difference between knowledge and its object by the Naiyāyika.

The analogy also of a lamp to show the manner in which an object is illuminated by the light of knowledge, is not quite appropriate. Because, while a lamp shines independently of all objects, knowledge does not. Moreover, a lamp casts its light on the object and thus imparts to the latter its own luminosity, so that the appearance of the object varies with the light; but the opponent does not hold that knowledge affects its object in any such way.

THE POINT OF DIFFERENCE.

The chief point of difference between the theory of knowledge of the Ābhāsavāda and the rival theories of other systems, discussed above, is, that, while, according to latter, the object is separate from the subject and is related to the latter by some such relation as that of the instrumental cause with the effect or that of the illuminator with the illuminated; according to the Ābhāsavāda, subject and object are essentially one and

the phenomenon of knowledge is simply a result of their unification, i. e. 'merging' of the object in the subject. It has been pointed out in the preceding chapter how every thing is essentially of the nature of consciousness, object being no less so than the subject, and how phenomenon of knowledge is due to the momentary rise of the subjective and the objective waves, in the sea of the Universal Consciousness.

Now the question may be asked : if the object is essentially of the nature of consciousness why is it not equally manifest to all the subjects ? To this the Ābhāsavāda replies that a phenomenon of knowledge is not the result of mere existence of the subject and the object but that of the unification of the two by the relation of identity (tādātmya sambandha). We know that a thing, which is connected with another by such relation as is supposed by the Mīmāṁsakas and the Naiyāyikas to exist between the subject and the object, can exist independently of the related, but what is connected by relation of identity cannot do so. This explains why an object always shines on the back-ground of the cognising self, and why, though self-manifest, it is not equally manifest to all.

THEORY OF REMEMBRANCE.

The Pratyabhijñā psychology hinges on its central theory of the permanence of the experiencing self. In fact the psychological problems are introduced in the philosophical works of the system only to show that their satisfactory explanation is not possible without the assumption of permanence as one of the most essential attributes of the self. The phenomenon of remembrance is supposed to be one of the strongest proofs in its support. In this case also, as in that of the perception, the Buddhist theory is pointed out to be wholly unsatisfactory. We have seen what an important part the remembrance has to play in the determinate perception and so in practical daily

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life; how the image, which is cut out of the block of sensations, received from an external stimulus, and which, as such, is no better than the one on a canvas or in a cinema show, is made into a living one with the material supplied from the already existing stock in the memory; how, unless this image be associated with the past experiences of a similar object, it can neither give rise to any feeling nor to the consequent activity either to gain or to shun it; and lastly, how, without remembrance, no use of language of any kind is possible with regard to any thing whatsoever.

BUDDHIST THEORY OF REMEMBRANCE.

Remembrance[1] is a representative consciousness; it is a mere reproduction of a former state of consciousness. Unlike the indeterminate and the determinate perceptions, it has no object of its own; its object is the same as that of the former experience. For, if it were to have an object of its own it would cease to be remembrance, because, then the consciousness of the object would not be expressible as "that" (saḥ).

Here the question arises: if knowledge is a momentary phenomenon, every experience would naturally pass away the very next moment after its coming into being; how can then there be a representation of a former state of consciousness so as to make the phenomenon of remembrance possible? The assumption of a permanent self cannot explain it. For, even if the self be permanent, its experiences shall still have to be admitted to be momentary. This is what the facts of common experience require. Because in remembrance the consciousness of its object is associated with the idea of its absence. We refer to the object of remembrance as "that" and not as "this". But how[2] can we have the idea of absence if the experience together with its object

1. I. P. V., I, 60-1. 2. I. P. V., I, 63.

as such be having a continuous existence from the time of its production to that of its reproduction; or to say the same thing in other words, how can there be any talk of its reproduction which is the characteristic feature of remembrance? The former experience, therefore, with its object, being no more at the time of remembrance, what we require to produce the characteristic consciousness of remembrance is some such thing as can reproduce the object. It is, therefore, assumed that when we have a certain experience, a link of the chain of self-consciousness is affected in a certain way; and because each momentary self-consciousness before its destruction produces a similar one in the next moment, naturally, therefore, the subsequent self-consciousness carries a residual trace (saṁskāra) of the past experience. This residual trace, when revived at a later time because of a subsequent cognition, which has some common element with a past experience, has the capacity[1] of placing the subject-consciousness of that particular moment in the same relation to the object of the former experience as that in which it was when that experience first took place, exactly as that particular capacity, which is ordinarily known as elasticity, places the branch of a tree, which is perforce kept down for some time, back in its former position as soon as it is let off.

BAUDDHA CRITICISM OF THE NAIYĀYIKA THEORY.

The Bauddha raises the following question to refute the Naiyāyika theory of the self as a permanent substratum of Saṁskāra, which, as a quality, cannot exist independently :— Does the self change as a result of the production of the Saṁskāra or not? In the former case it ceases to be eternal, because eternality and changeability cannot coexist. In the latter case the assumption of Saṁskāra is useless. But if it be said

1. I. P. V., I., 64.

that it admits of no other change than that of Saṁskāra and as such is different from other changing things; then it is nothing else than a chain of consciousness which, as has been said above, being affected by a stimulus, retains its residual trace and, being combined with other factors, produces the particular phenomenon of knowledge, called remembrance, at a subsequent time.

REFUTATION OF THE BAUDDHA THEORY.

There are two points to be noted in connection with remembrance here; one, that the consciousness of remembrance is expressed in judgement as "that" and not as "this"; and the other, that all our subsequent activities with regard to the object of remembrance are determined, not by mere consciousness of the object as such, but by that of the pleasant or unpleasant experiences with which it was associated at the time of its former knowledge. Thus, if we accept the Buddhist explanation of remembrance as due to mere revival of residual traces of the former knowledge, not only we shall not have its characteristic consciousness "that" but also there will be nothing to determine our subsequent action; because the only thing that the residual traces can do is to place the subject in its former relation with that particular object, the residual trace of which has been revived, and if so, there is no reason why, the former subject-object relation having been restored, there should not consequently be the former consciousness expressible as "this". Moreover, the residual traces can represent the object alone and not its former experiences also; this consciousness, therefore, would lead to no action. The reason is obvious : we try to gain or shun an object according as we know it to have been the cause of pleasure or pain. This knowledge depends upon the representation of the past experience which, according to the Buddhist theory, is not

possible. It cannot be assumed here that the residual trace will represent the past experience also, because, according to the Buddhist, self being nothing but knowledge (jñāna), it cannot have the former experience, which is but a form of knowledge, as its object; because knowledge is self-luminous and cannot become an object of another (Dṛk svābhāsā nānyena vedyā). Nor can the Buddhist say that although the experience does not form an object of remembrance yet it seems to do so exactly as an object does in an erroneous perception ; because the chief feature of remembrance is the true reappearance of the object of former experience in all its associations. Therefore, if the appearance of the object in remembrance be taken to be false, remembrance would cease to be remembrance. It would become an erroneous knowledge.

REMEMBRANCE AND ERROR.

Let us, for the sake of clearness, point out the distinction between remembrance and erroneous perception. In the former case the object of mental reaction or inner perception (adhyavasāya) is the same image as was produced by former perception or sense-contact and is associated with all the then experiences. What happens is simply this that the psychic image of the object, which was cognised with all its distinction of time and place and name and form at the time of the former perception, does not merge again in the Universal Consciousness soon after the perception, but remains with all its associations of time, place and the then momentary manifested perceiver, under a veil as it were, in the permanent aspect of the individual self. The existence of the objective manifestation (Bhāvābhāsa) in this condition is technically known as Saṁskāra, and its revival consists simply in the removal of the veil from over it, so that as soon as the veil is removed, the object shines in all its past glory and associations. Thus, it is because of the reappearance of the object

in all its former associations, particularly that of the time, that the consciousness is expressed as "that".

But in the case of the perceptual error what appears is a new form and as such has no association with the past time and, therefore, is referred to as "this". The fact is, as we have already pointed out, that the mind is very quick in its work of carving an image out of the block of sensations and completing it in an unspeakably short time with the material taken from the old stock of memory. Thus, the image, that appears in the mirror of Buddhi at the time of an erroneous perception, is erroneous, not because it has no existence, nor even because it is not made up of the material supplied by an external stimulus, but because the material, taken from the old stock of memory, is so much that the little that is taken from the block of sensations may be considered to be too insignificant to justify its being called and considered to be an image of an external object. It is this little material taken from the immediate sensations which accounts for only a certain kind of affection of consciousness at the sight of a certain object even in erroneous perception; but for this, it would be difficult to explain why at the sight of a mother-of-pearl there is the erroneous perception of silver only and of nothing else.

To clear the point in hand further, it may be pointed out here that imagination is still a different thing from both remembrance and erroneous knowledge, because it is due neither to unveiling of an already existing image with all its associations, as in the case of remembrance, nor to building up of an image with material mostly taken from the old stock of memory, but a perfectly independent creation of the mind without any element taken from the immediate external stimulus, if there be any, and without any clear association with the past time. It is because of the new presentations in the erroneous perception and the imagination that their objects

are conceived as "this". But the consciousness of the object of remembrance is expressed as "that" because it is a mere representation.

THE PRATYABHIJÑĀ THEORY OF REMEMBRANCE.

Remembrance is a complex phenomenon. It requires an object, not a new presentation but a reproduction or representation of what has already been an object of some kind of determinate cognition. Further, in order that this object may lead to the characteristic judgement of remembrance "that" and determine the activity of an individual rememberer with regard to itself, the remembrance requires the represented object to be associated with the time of its former perception and with the feeling of pleasure or pain which it then aroused. The Buddhist explanation, based on the assumption of Saṁskāra, can place the momentary subject-consciousness in the same relation to the object in which it was on the occasion of the perception, but it can neither account for the characteristic judgement "that" nor the future activity with regard to the remembered. The Pratyabhijñā, therefore, puts forth the theory of unification of the Ābhāsas.

THE REMEMBERING SUBJECT.

The limited individual self, as we pointed out before, has two aspects, the momentary and the permanent. The first dissolves with the dissolution of the momentary identification with the body etc.; but the second lasts even through universal dissolution (Pralaya). And the objects of determinate cognition, i. e. the images, made up of the material taken from the sense-presentations and the old stock of memory, are also of two kinds. Some merge back into Universal Consciousness soon after the cognition, but others continue to have separate existence with their associations of time, place and limited momentary individual perceiver, with which they were mani-

fested as separate from the Universal Consciousness at the time of the former perception. They remain wrapped up, as it were, in the veil of darkness, (Shall we say they exist in a subconscious state ?) in the permanent aspect of the individual self exactly in the manner in which the Ābhāsas which get merged back into the Universal Consciousness live there. An object in this state is technically called Saṁskāra as we have already pointed out.

(Yo bhāvaḥ pūrvam anubhavakāle taddeśakālapramātrantarasācivyena pṛthak kṛto na ca ahantāyām eva vilīnīkṛtaḥ sa tādṛg eva tamasevācchādya avasthāpitaḥ saṁskāraśabdavācyaḥ I. P. V.. I. 118-9).

(Etena punaḥ smṛtiviṣayam anāgatya bhāvajātam ahantāyām eva līyata iti dyotitam. (Bhāskarī)

The remembering subject has got full power to unite or disunite the Ābhāsas, of which it is a permanent abode, just as the Universal Consciousness has over those which it contains within.

THE REMEMBERED OBJECT.

Remembrance is a determinate knowledge and as such cannot have an object of its own, because all the determinative activity is a kind of reaction on what has already been mirrored on Buddhi (gṛhīta grahaṇa svabhāvatvāt). Its object is the same as that of the former experience. From the time of the direct perception to that of remembrance, this object, this psychic image, has a separate veiled existence in the permanent limited perceiver and being revived at the sight of something similar, reappears.

THE OBJECTIVITY OF THE REMEMBERED EXPLAINED.

The remembered is not an object in the sense that it is illumined by the light, proceeding from the remembering self,

because it is an essential part of the experience itself, which being a kind of knowledge (Jñāna), is self-luminous and as such cannot be the object of another knowledge. Now naturally the question arises : if not in the above sense in what sense is it an object, or rather if the experience is self-shining and so is the object, how is it connected with remembrance ; in short, how does the phenomenon of remembrance arise ? The Pratyabhijñā replies that when the revival takes place the object shines as associated with the time of its former perception and the feeling of pleasure or pain which it then aroused. This is united with the momentary self-luminous self as identified with the body or the vital air etc. according to the nature of the thing remembered. This remembering self also has its own limitation of time of its manifestation. Thus when the constituent and the associated Ābhāsas of the object of former experience are united with those of the limited self of the time of remembrance there arises a new phenomenon, called remembrance, similar to that which is produced by hundreds of small lights shining together at one place.[1] The object of the former experience is called the object of remembrance, because at the time of remembrance it shines in the additional light of the self-luminous remembering self. It is called object of remembrance exactly in the manner in which an object, though illumined by various lights, is said to have been illumined by the one which illumines it in such a manner as is necessary for the immediate purpose.

This unification of Ābhāsas is responsible for the peculiar consciousness of the object as "that", because in remembrance there is the consciousness of both the times i. e. the time of the first appearance of the object in the past perception and that of its reappearance now in the additional light of the

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1. I. P. V., I, 124.

momentary remembering self as associated with the present time :

Tadānīntanāvabhāsana pṛthakkṛta śarīrādi sambandham anavadhūyaiva hi tatprakāśaḥ. Tataśca idānīntanāvabhāsana kālaparāmarśopi na nimīlati iti etat parāmarśa bhitti prādhānyena pūrva kāla parāmarśaḥ, iti viruddha pūrvāpara parāmarśa svabhāva eva "sa" iti parāmarśa ucyate.

I. P. V., I, 119.

Another point of interest in this explanation is that, according to this system, the object of the former experience can reappear with all its associations of past feeling of pleasure or pain, that it then generated, and be a prompter of the subsequent activities of the perceiver without involving the violation of the principle that one knowledge does not shine as an object of another; because the Pratyabhijñā theory of unification of Ābhāsas as the cause of remembrance does not place the former experience in the relation of an object to remembrance. According to this, the self-luminousness of the experience, which reappears at the time of remembrance, remains as much unaffected as the light of a lamp does remain even at the time when it illumines its former object in conjunction with other new lights. This unification of Ābhāsas is the work of the permanent limited perceiver, who is no other than the Maheśvara, now called by a different name, because of his appearing as the remembering self,[1] which retains within, all the former experiences with their associated objects, and appears at the time of remembrance,[2] as identical with the body or the vital air etc. according to the need of the occasion.

Thus the Pratyabhijñā seems to give a satisfactory explanation of English words "recollect" and "remember" which

1. I. P. V., I, 119–20. 2. I. P. V., I, 129.

stand for the activities (of the self) involved in the production of the phenomenon, we are discussing. It is a recollection, because it requires the old separately manifested Ābhāsas to be collected again as we pointed out above. And it is a remembrance, because it involves the reunification into one whole of the old Ābhāsas of the time of perception with the new ones of remembrance i. e. the old Ābhāsas which formed constituent parts (members) of the former complex Ābhāsa, which served as the object of perception, are again made the necessary constituents of the new complex Ābhāsa of remembrance.

CHAPTER V.

THE THEORIES OF EFFECTABILITY, CAUSALITY AND KARMA.

THE ĀBHĀSAVĀDA AND THE PHYSICAL PHENOMENA.

The two powers of the Maheśvara, namely, the powers of knowledge and action (jñāna and kriyā śakti) are most prominently mentioned in the Śaiva literature. The Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī, for instance, is primarily concerned with the exposition of these two powers in its first two voluminous Adhikāras. In the preceding chapter we have dealt with the power of knowledge. In this, therefore, we propose to give a brief idea of the power of action.

The[1] Ābhāsavādins, like some of the modern thinkers, have conceived the universe as broadly consisting of mind and matter. They attribute the psychological phenomena, as we have shown in a preceding chapter, to the omniscience (jñātṛtva śakti) of the All-inclusive Universal Consciousness (Parā saṁvid) and the physical to another similar Universal power, namely, omnipotence (Kartṛtva śakti). "Kriyāśakti" is an aspect of the latter. We have shown in the third chapter how it is responsible for such manifestations as give rise to the idea of action. Here we shall show how it manifests physical phenomena in general.

This conception of the Kriya śakti forms the chief point of difference between the different schools of Buddhism and the Ābhāsavāda. For, the former, perhaps finding it impossible to explain the variety of experiences referring to

1. I. P. V., II, 134-5.

the same thing at different times, have confined themselves solely to the explanation of the knowability of the "knowable". They are significantly silent about what happens to the object after it ceases to be the object of a perception and why is it that every time we perceive it there is found some difference in it; or rather, what is it that causes the difference in the thing which in its turn brings about a change in perception? If, for instance, we take the subjectivists, who hold that each cognition is due to the waking up of a certain Vāsanā, we find that they have failed to explain why only a certain Vāsanā wakes up at a certain time and no other :

"Na vāsanāprabodhotra vicitro hetutāmiyāt
Tasyāpi tatprabodhasya vaicitrye kiṁ nibandhanam".

I. P. V., I, 165.

Similarly, if we take the case of the Bāhyārthānumeyavādin, we find that though he accounts for difference in cognition by saying that it is due to difference in the external inferrable object, yet he too is silent as to why there is this change in the object itself.

THEORY OF EFFECTABILITY.

The thinkers of the Pratyabhijñā had noticed this weak point in the earlier systems and, therefore, took enough pains in their presentation of the system to explain this side also of the problem of human experience. In addition to the relation of 'knowability' of the contents of the All-inclusive Universal Consciousness to its power of knowledge, they believe in another relation, which for want of a better word we call here the relation of 'effectability' to another aspect of the same Universal Consciousness, namely, the power of action. The relation of knowability in this case consists in this that these contents are the objects of the operation of the power of knowledge of the Universal Consciousness, which at the time of

each cognition manifests some object or objects out of the mass, which lies merged within, as separate both from itself and from the individual perceiver. It is momentary. But the relation of effectability is constant, so that even when the object is not being known, that is, not being manifested as apparently separate from the Universal Consciousness to an individual perceiver, it does not altogether lose its separate existence; because it is still the object of operation of the power of action which involves its separate existence no less than does the power of knowledge. Just as the latter (the power of knowledge) is concerned with giving rise to the subjective and objective waves in the sea of the Universal Consciousness and uniting them so as to give rise to the phenomena of knowledge, so the power of action may be said to be concerned with effecting that which is necessary for the rise of the objective wave. To make the point clear let us suppose that each object of the physical universe is like an under-current or sub-current, which at times, because of the influence of the power of knowledge appears as a wave over the surface of the sea of Universal Consciousness and serves as one of the necessary constituents of a phenomenon of knowledge. Therefore, just as the under current is not co-existent with the wave so the physical phenomenon is not (co-existent) with the psychological, which is based upon the former. That power which produces the innumerable currents and keeps them going is the power of action (Kriyāśakti).

(......................"Sāntarviparivartinaḥ
Ubhayendriyavedyatvaṁ tasya kasyāpi śaktitaḥ."

Kumbhakārahṛdaye antarmanogocaratvāt pūrvam api svasaṁvidekātmatayā vicitratvena viśvasya bhedābhedātmanā parivartamānasya spandanena sphurataḥ yat antaḥkaraṇa bahiṣkaraṇavedyatvam ābhāsyate..............Naca kumbhakāre prāṇapuryaṣṭakabuddhidehaprāye tadetat sthitaṁ tasyāpi

jaḍatvāt tataḥ saṁvid eva viśvam ātmani bhāsayati śaktivaicitryāt. I. P. V., II, 141

THE PHYSICAL UNIVERSE AND THE ULTIMATE REALITY.

On the basis of what we have stated above it would not be wrong to say that the Pratyabhijñā conceives the Ultimate Reality not only as Universal Consciousness but also as Universal Energy. It is the latter, which, because of the Creative Desire (icchāvaśāt) appears in the forms of the innumerable physical phenomena much in the same way as the electric energy, because of the resistance, appears in the form of various lights. The Universal Energy and the Creative Desire, working in the aforesaid manner represent "kriyāśakti". Thus the physical universe, with all its varieties, is a mere manifestation of the Universal Energy and is connected with it exactly in the manner in which light is connected with electric energy. Just as innumerable lights, being mere forms of electricity, do not break up its unity, so the physical phenomena leave the unity of the Universal Energy undisturbed :

"Eṣa cānanta śaktitvād evam ābhāsayatyamūn
Bhāvān icchāvaśād eṣā *kriyā nirmātṛtāsya sā.*"

Eṣa purāṇaḥ pramātā amūn bhāvān ābhāsitapūrvān ābhāsamānān ābhāsayati avichinnena prabandhena, katham, icchāyā īśiturabhinnāyā avikalparūpāyā akramāyā vaśena 'sāmarthyena. Kutrāsya te bhāvāḥ sthitāḥ ? āha "anantaśaktitvāt" iti, viśve hi bhāvāstasyaiva śaktirūpeṇa svarūpātmatvena sthitāḥ." I. P. V., II, 136.

THEORY OF CAUSALITY.

The Pratyabhijñā conception of causality is not the same as that of the Satkāryavāda of the Sāṅkhya, which holds that the effect is present in the cause exactly as oil is in a sesame seed, nor as that of the pūrvāparībhāvavāda of the Bauddha,

which holds that of the two things, which come in the order of invariable immediate precedence and succession, the former is the cause and the latter is the effect. It is different from the Naiyāyika concept which differentiates between the material and the instrumental causes even in reference to the universal creation, as well as from that of a certain school of the Vedānta, which holds that the Brahman, as pure consciousness, without the power of 'freedom' or control is the cause of the universe.

It may be of interest to note in this connection that there is a complete agreement between the Śāṅkara Vedānta and the Pratyabhijñā in respect of the nature of the ultimate cause of the universe. Both hold it to be not only all-inclusive but also all-controlling. In support of this opinion we quote below some interesting passages from the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī and the Śāṅkara Bhāṣya on the Vedānta Sūtra for a comparative study :—

"Nanvetāvatā vijñānam eva brahmarūpam imām viśvarūpatāvaicitrīm parigṛhṇātu kim īśvaratāparikalpanayā ? ityāśaṅkyāha.

"Vāstavepi cidekatve na syād ābhāsabhinnayoḥ
Cikīrṣālakṣaṇaikatvaparāmarśaṁ vinā kriyā."
....................Tasmāt vāstavaṁ cidekatvam

abhyupagamyāpi tasya kartṛtvalakṣaṇā bhinnarūpasamāveśātmikā kriyā nopapadyate parāmarśalakṣaṇaṁ tu svātantryaṁ yadi bhavati tadopapadyate sarvam, parāmarśo hi cikīrṣā rūpā icchā tasyāṁ ca sarvam antarbhūtaṁ nirmātavyam abhedakalpenāste." I. P. V., II, 178–81.

and

"Prathamedhyāye sarvajñaḥ sarveśvaro jagata utpattikāraṇam mṛtsuvarṇādaya iva ghaṭarucakādīnām, utpannasya jagato niyantṛtvena sthitikāraṇam māyāvīva māyāyāḥ."

V. S. Ś. Bh, 345.

"Brahmāsya jagato nimittakāraṇam prakṛtiśca ityetasya pakṣasyākṣepaḥ smṛtinimittaḥ parihṛtaḥ." V. S. Ś. Bh., 354.

Like the Buddhist, the Pratyabhijñā also holds that the 'apparent' is momentary. Its conception of causality, however, is different, because the process which, according to this system, leads to the phenomenal existence is so. It holds that the Universal Energy, under the influence of the Creative Will, appears in the forms of innumerable objects of the universe, which, before their external manifestation, exist within the Universal Consciousness exactly as our own ideas do within ourselves, when we are about to deliver a very thoughtful speech. The life of each object, with all its innumerable changes, is constituted by a separate current of that Universal Energy which manifests itself in the innumerable successive forms, each of which represents a separate moment of existence in the so called life of that object. These forms come one after another with such quickness or velocity that their succession is not marked. Rather, the impression is that the same object is having continuous existence, as it is in the case of the flame of a lamp or in that of moving figure in a cinema-show.

Creation, according to this system, takes place in two ways. It may be in a regular order of successive manifestations, according to the universal law, technically called Niyati, which fixes the order of invariable immediate precedence and succession, in which the things, which are conceived as related to each other by the relation of cause and effect, ordinarily appear. All the effects ordinarily take place in this way. A seed, for instance, appears as a gigantic tree after the successive manifestations of sprout etc. Or it may be in contravention of this law of Niyati i. e. without any regular succession of manifestations as also without any ordinarily necessary material, as for instance, when a Yogin creates a city with all its palatial

buildings and beautiful gardens, with all kinds of living beings, by sheer force of his supernatural power.[1] In all manifestations the working of the sentient principle is the most important factor. This being so, the Pratyabhijñā naturally holds that the causal relation, as it is ordinarily conceived, is a mere convenient conventional assumption, based upon what is apparent and, therefore, cannot refer to reality. The real relation between the manifestor and the manifested is not that of cause and effect in the sense that the former constitutes the material of the latter, as does the Prakṛti of all her evolutes, according to the Sāṅkhya ; nor in that the manifestor works upon something that exists independently of it, as the God of the Naiyāyikas does on the independent atoms. The relation is similar to that which exists between the thinking self and the thought ; it is a subject-object relation (kartṛkarmabhāva sambandha).

The Pratyabhijñā concept of causality offers one explanation for all kinds of creations or manifestations. It is the same energy, it says, which is the cause of the sudden (akramika) and the successive (kramika) as well as the universal and the limited creations or manifestations. It tells us of the most essential common factor in all. It also explains the basis of the popular conception of the material cause of an effect in ordinary creation.[2] For, ordinarily whatever invariably unconditionally and immediately precedes the existence of a certain thing, is taken to be the material cause of what follows, provided that the qualities, which characterise the one that precedes, characterise also the other that follows.[3] A seed, for instance, is taken to be the cause of a sprout. And according to the Pratyabhijñā conception of the causality also, in the Niyati-controlled creation, the form, which is ordinarily taken to be the material cause of what follows, must precede

1. I. P. V., II, 150-1. 2. T. A., VI, 30. 3. T. A.,VI, 10.

that which is taken to be its effect, exactly as it must, according to the Satkāryavāda.

NECESSITY FOR SUCH A SUPPOSITION.

From what has been stated above it follows that the causal relation is in reality nothing but the subject-object relation. ("Kartṛ karmatva tattvaiva kārya kāraṇatā tataḥ" T. A., VI, Comm. 24). It is the Universal Energy, which, being moulded by the Creative Will, appears in the multifarious forms of the objective universe, just as the clay does in the forms of a jar, a dish, a cup and so on, as the potter's will moulds it. Let it not, however, be forgotten that the Universal Energy and the Creative Will are non-different from the Universal Consciousness. They can, at the most, be spoken of as the different aspects of the same Ultimate Reality.

Action is of two kinds. The one relates to an object and the other is confined within the agent. In the former case a conscious relation of the agent with the object, to which his action is related, is necessary. A potter, for instance, must have conscious relation with what he intends to produce. Both the theories of causality, namely, the Satkāryavāda of the Sāṅkhya and the Asatkāryavāda of the Nyāya and others, therefore, cannot stand. For, how can the insentient, which is devoid of the capacity of placing itself in a conscious relation with that object, to which its productive activity is related, produce an effect? The two, the seed and the sprout, are separate from each other, and, being insentient, are self-confined, i. e. there is no conscious relation between them similar to that which exists between the potter and the jar, that is to be created. Therefore, if such things be supposed to be related to each other as cause and effect, there is no reason why any two things should not

be supposed to be so related.[1] Moreovere, if the essential nature of the effect before it comes into being is non-existence, as the Nyāya holds, it can never become existent in any way. For, the essential nature does not change.[2] But if it be existence, as the Sāṅkhya maintains, what is then to be effected by the cause? It cannot be said that the cause effects manifestation. For, the same question can be raised with regard to the manifestation also[3] i. e. does the manifestation exist before manifestation or not? If it does, the activity to bring it about ceases to have any meaning. But, if it does not, how can it then be brought about? For, according to the Satkāryavāda, nothing that does not already exist can be brought about. The Pratyabhijñā, therefore, puts forth its own theory of causality.

CRITICISM OF THE BUDDHISTIC CONCEPTION.

The Buddhistic conception of causality also cannot explain the above difficulty. The Bauddha holds that whenever phenomena happen in a series, each particular phenomenon, as soon as it takes place, is invariably followed by another; that of the two phenomena the one that invariably, unconditionally and immediately precedes the other is called "the cause" and that which follows "the effect"; and that, every thing being momentary, the latter is altogether a new production and is in no way materially connected with the former, as in the case of the Sāṅkhya conception of causality, called the Satkāryavāda.[4]

The unsoundness of the above view is apparent. For, according to this, there is nothing which can justify one phenomenon being called the cause of another. The invariable precedence cannot be regarded as sufficient reason. For,

1. T. A., VI, 23. 2. T. A., VI, 25.
3. I. P. V., II, 139. 4. I. P. V., II, 168.

in that case any two phenomena, one of which is perceived following[1] the other, the two lunar mansions, Kṛttikā and Rohiṇī, for instance, shall have to be accepted as being connected by causal relation : or, for that matter, we shall have to suppose the pictures of a cinematographic reel, coming invariably one after the other, as connected with one another by causal relation. The Buddhist cannot say that it is not because of a mere incidence of invariable precedence that one phenomenon is called the cause, but because of its capacity to cause; and that it is not because of mere succession that the other is called the effect, but because of its capacity to be effected. For, such a conception of causality, in order that it may serve its purpose, presupposes conscious relation of the cause, which has the capacity to effect, with the object of its operation. According to the Buddhist hypothesis, however, the object is non-existent at the time of the causal activity. The causal operation, therefore, because of its being dependent upon its object, would not take place. And even if it be supposed to take place, it would lead to no result, because of its being objectless :

Atha pūrvatā nāma prayojaka sattākatvam paratā ca nāma prayojya sattākatvaṁ tarhi bījasya aṅkura prayoktrī sattā aṅkura viśrāntā aṅkurāntarbhāvamātmanyānayati, aṅkurābhāve prayoktṛtva mātraṁ syāt tadapi na kiñcit anyāpekṣatvāt tasya. I. P. V., II, 168–9.

CRITICISM OF THE SĀṄKHYA.

The explanation of the causal relation, as given by the Sāṅkhya, is no better. It holds that the cause and the effect are connected by the relation of identity (tādātmya). The defect of the theory is obvious; because, if the seed and the sprout be supposed to be identical, then the notion of their duality becomes meaningless. Therefore, either the seed or the sprout only can be said to exist; because, identity and separa-

1. T. A., VI, 17.

teness cannot co-exist.[1] Thus, according to the Sāṅkhya also, the causal activity will remain objectless. Nor can the assumption of evolution of one into multifarious forms improve the position of the Sāṅkhya; because evolution in itself is an action inasmuch as it consists in the assumption of multifarious successive forms by one at different points of time. Therefore, if the ultimate nature (prakṛti) be supposed to evolve, it ceases to be pure material cause. It becomes an agent[2] (kartṛ). Nor can it be said that the idea of the authorship (kartṛtva) of the ultimate nature is not against the Sāṅkhya conception : for, although the Sāṅkhya admits the Prakṛti to be an agent, yet such an admission is in conflict with its own theory of insentiency (jaḍatva) of the ultimate nature. The chief characteristic of an insentient thing is that it is of a certain fixed appearance and that by itself it cannot manifest itself in any other than the fixed form. A stone, for instance, cannot assume multifarious forms of a man, a tree, a mountain etc. and again after some time regain its original form. Therefore, if Prakṛti be insentient, its manifesting itself in diverse forms at the time of creation and again assuming the state of equilibrium of qualities at the time of universal dissolution would be as impossible as the assumption by stone of its original condition as stated above :

"Abhinnarūpasya dharmiṇaḥ satatapravahadbahutaradharmabhedasambheda—svātantryalakṣaṇam pariṇamanakriyākartṛtvaṁ yaduktaṁ tat pradhānāderna yuktaṁ jaḍatvāt, jaḍo hi nāma pariniṣṭhitasvabhāvaḥ prameyapadapatitaḥ."

I. P. V., II, 176–7.

CRITICISM OF THE VEDĀNTIN'S THEORY.

Even the assumption of the principle of pure Cit as the cause of the universe cannot explain the manifest variety.

1. I. P. V., II, 173. 2. I. P. V., II, 174.

Manifestation is a causal action and as such necessarily presupposes desire and this in order that it may lead to some definite action, must have an object of its own. This object before creation cannot have existence apart from the desiring self. It has, therefore, necessarily to be supposed to be one with the Self much as the words, that we utter, are one with ourselves at the time when we are preparing ourselves for some utterances. Hence the manifestation of the universe by pure Cit is out of the question.

THE PRATYABHIJÑĀ THEORY OF CAUSALITY.

In opposition to the Śuddhabrahmavādin, the exponents of the Pratyabhijñā, therefore, hold that the Ultimate Reality is Prakāśavimarśamaya i. e. it is not only all-inclusive but also all-controlling.[1] It is by virtue of the latter aspect that it manifests the universe, which is ever within itself in the form of universal energy, as apparently separate from itself on the back-ground of itself without losing its oneness,[2] much in the same manner as that in which a mirror manifests what is reflected on it. The most important difference between the two cases is that, while, in the case of an ordinary mirror, reflections are cast by an external object, in that of the mirror of the Universal Consciousness they are caused by its own powers (śaktis) which constitute different aspects of its Svātantrya śakti.[3]

Thus, according to the Pratyabhijñā, all that we see is a mere manifestation of the Universal Energy under the control of the Creative Will. When for instance, a seed develops into a sprout, it is the Universal Energy, underlying the seed,[4] soil, water etc., that manifests itself as a sprout; or when a potter, who also is a manifestation of the same energy, makes

1. I. P. V., II, 278-9.
2. I. P. V., II, 177.
3. T. A., II, 72.
4. I. P. V., II, 146.

a jar, it is the Creative Will that works through him on the Universal Energy, underlying the so called instrumental and material causes, and, according to the law of Niyati, brings the jar into existence through various stages.

THE PRATYABHIJÑĀ THEORY OF KARMA.

Here it may be asked : if it is the Creative Will that is working in and through the individual, if all that is accomplished is the work, not of the individual but of the Universal Self, how can then any merit or demerit attach to the former; how can the individual's experiences, good or bad, be attributed to his previous actions; and how can this concept of Kriyāśakti be reconciled with the accepted theory of Karma ? To this Abhinava replies in the 9th and the 13th Āhnikas of the Tantrāloka. His conclusion on this point is based on the combined authority of Śambhunātha[1] and Somānanda.[2]

The theory of Karma is meant to explain, not only the variety of an individual's associations and experiences and his freedom from them but also the variety that we find in the so called physical universe. Just as individual Karma determines individual experiences, so the sum total of all Karmas of all the individual selves determines the variety to be found in the physical universe, which supplies the necessary stimuli for innumerable experiences. The physical universe is not a capricious creation. It is created with a purpose. Its creation, therefore, is controlled by the necessities of that purpose. It is meant for meeting the innumerable shades of countless desires of an unimaginable number of limited selves; the selves which are mere limited manifestations of, or mere appearances assumed by, the Universal Consciousness by virtue of its power of obscuration (tirodhāna). To assume such appearances, is, according to the Ābhāsavāda, as also,

1. T. A., VIII, 69. 2. T. A. VIII, 72.

according to the monistic Vedānta, a mere sport of the Supreme.

The limitedness of an individual self consists in the limitation of its powers of knowledge and action.[1] It is called Svarūpākhyāti, because it is due to the ignorance of the real nature of the individual self. This limitation necessarily involves another, namely, limitation in desire : for, desire presupposes the knowledge of the desired and, therefore, cannot refer to what is beyond the reach of knowledge. The latter being limited, the former also has necessarily to be so. Before the creation of the physical universe, this limited desire is objectless; it is a mere eagerness on the part of the limited self to use its limited powers. It is the one cause of the future association of the soul with different kinds of bodies, suited for its realisation. It is responsible for the limited associations of the limited self. It is the cause of transmigration. It is the root of all actions or Karmas. It does not presuppose a connection with a body, because it is a function of the self and not of the body. If it were not so, a Yogin, having once reached the transcendental state i. e. having risen above the limitation of the body, would not be able to resume his connection with the same ; because, to break the transcendental state requires a conscious effort which presupposes the rise of desire : so that if the latter were always to presuppose a connection with the body, Vyutthāna would never take place. This limited desire is called Kārmamala, because it leads to action of a limited nature. It is determined by the Lord's will :—

"Īśvarecchāvaśād asya bhogecchā samprajāyate.
Bhogasādhanasaṁsiddhyai bhogecchorasya mantrarāṭ
jagadutpādayāmāsa māyāmāviśya śaktibhiḥ."

T. A., Comm., VI, 56.

1. I. P. V., II, 220.

The[1] limitation of desire is as beginningless as that of the powers of knowledge, and action; and both are due to the All-Controlling Universal Will. Not only this, even the freedom from these limiting conditions and the regaining of the godhead are due to the same[2] cause. It cannot be objected that if the Lord be responsible for the variety of limitation in respect of powers of knowledge and action and, therefore, of desire and other conditions and circumstances, in which we find the living beings, it would naturally follow that He is partial and cruel. For, some He has placed in very favourable circumstances, but others in the extremely adverse; some He has made so happy that they are envied by all who see them, but others so miserable that their very sight is heart-rending; some He liberates, but others He keeps in bondage. The reason is that this is a non-dualistic system and, therefore, the so called differently circumstanced individuals have no being apart from Him. And cruelty is cruelty and so partiality is partiality only if it be done in relation to another. Therefore, according to this system, there being no being having a separate being from the Universal Being, the notion of partiality and cruelty being practised by Him is baseless.[3] Nor can it be questioned : why He manifests this apparent diversity ? Because to do so is His essential nature and it is absured to question[4] it. It is as meaningless as asking why fire burns ?

KARMA AND CREATION.

In addition to the three functions of the Brahman accepted by Śaṅkarācārya, who interpreted the Brahma Sūtras according to the teachings of the Upaniṣads, namely, creation, maintenance and dissolution (sṛṣṭi, sthiti, saṁhāra), the Pratyabhijñā, in common with all other āgamic schools, believes in two

1. T. A., VIII, 74.
2. T. A., VIII, 82.
3. T. A., VIII, 71.
4. T. A., VIII, 72.

more, namely, obscuration and grace (tirodhāna and anugraha). It has to be very carefully noted here that only the last two functions are independent of Karma. Only the obscuration and the liberation are brought about by the Lord's independent power of will. The rest i. e. creation etc. depend upon the main prompting cause, the Kārmamala,[1] the sum total of the limited desires of the limited selves; because the satisfaction of these is the only purpose of the creation, as we have already pointed out above. In fact, in the Tantrāloka the question is raised : Why the creation etc. also are not attributed to the free will of the Lord, and why the Malas are assumed to be the prompting causes ? And Abhinava has replied to this as follows :—

The Creation is of two kinds, the impure and the pure i. e. with and without limitation. In the latter case Śiva himself is the creator and it is the work purely of His independent power of will. But the former is created by Ananta, who requires prompting causes, the Malas, to determine his creative activities.

("Nanu yadyevaṁ tat kim ebhiḥ antargaḍuprāyaiḥ malādibhiḥ, Īśvarecchaiva viśvasargādau nirapekṣā nimittam astu ityāśaṅkya āha :—

Itthaṁ sṛṣṭisthitidhvaṁsatraye māyām apekṣate
Kṛtyai malaṁ tathā karma śivecchaiveti susthitam.

Iha khalu uktayuktyā viśvatra sṛṣṭisthitisaṁhāralakṣaṇaṁ nijaṁ kṛtyatrayaṁ kartum īśvarecchaiva pragalbhate, kintu malaṁ karma māyāñca apekṣya, yat parameśvaraḥ

"Śuddhedhvani śivaḥ kartā
proktonantosite prabhuḥ."

ityuktyā māyīyedhvani anantamukhena sṛṣṭyādi vidadhyāt, na ca tasya īśvaravat ananyāpekṣameva svātantryaṁ samasti iti

1. T. A., VI, 56.

avaśyam eva malādyapekṣaṇīyam, anyathā hi katham pratipuṁ vicitraṁ sṛṣṭyādi syāt iti sarvaṁ susthaṁ."

T. A., VIII, Comm., 76-7.)

In our humble opinion, therefore, in view of what has been stated above, Prof. Radhakrishnan's statement in the very brief summary of the Pratyabhijñā system in his Indian Philosophy, requires some modification in respect of the prompting causality of Karma in the impure creation. His statement runs as follows :—

"The existence of a prompting cause, like karma, or material cause, like prakṛti, for the creation of the world is not admitted. Nor is Māyā the principle which creates illusory forms. God is absolutely independent, and creates all that exists by the mere force of His will." I. Ph. Vol. II, 732.

As regards the quotation from the Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī, given by the learned Professor, we may point out that it is connected with the discussion on the theory of perception and is meant to show how the objective wave is suddenly given rise to at the time of perception. And the illustration of Yogin refers to the sudden creation (akramikābhāsa) i. e. creation in violation of the law of Niyati, and is meant to show that this system does not believe in the material cause, like atoms, of the objective universe. This point we have already discussed at some length in the preceding pages, and we think that the Professor means to substantiate by this quotation only that part of his statement which denies a separate material cause and not that which is concerned with the denial of Karma as a prompting cause of the creation. And if so, we fully agree with him on that point.

It may be pointed out here that Śaṅkara agrees with Abhinava that the creation of universe is merely a sport of the Lord, that sportiveness is His nature and is unquestionable,

and that the grace is solely dependent upon the Lord's will. To support this statement we may give the following extracts from Thibaut's translation of the Śāṅkara Bhāṣya :—

"But (Brahman's creative activity) is mere sport such as we see in common life."

".........We see in every day life that certain doings of princes and other men of high position, who have no unfulfilled desires left, have no reference to any extraneous purpose, but proceed from mere sportfulness, as for instance, their recreations in places of amusement........... Analogously, the activity of the Lord also may be supposed to be mere sport, proceeding from his own nature without reference to any purpose. For, on the ground neither of reason nor of scripture can we construe any purpose of the Lord. Nor can His nature be questioned." (356-7)

"And if we are asked how we come to know that the Lord in creating this world with its various conditions, is not bound by regards, we reply that scripture declares that. Compare, for instance, the two following passages. "For He (the Lord) makes him, whom He wishes to lead up from these worlds, do a good deed." (359)

No doubt, this passage speaks of the grace being dependent upon the action of the recipient (Prāṇikarmasāpekṣam eva Īśvarasyānugrahītṛtvam), but the question is : on what does the action itself depend ? Does it not on the Lord's will ? How can then the ultimate dependence of the grace on the Lord's will be denied ?

Thus, when, in accordance with the limitations of powers of knowledge, action and desire, an individual self gets associated with body, senses, vital air and mind and is placed in the requisite circumstances for the realisation of the limited

desire, the universal will works through it. In reality, therefore, the individual self is not independent in its action nor does any merit or demerit, consequent upon the so called pious or sinful acts, attach to it; because, their piety and sinfulness are imaginary and conventional.[1] But among other effects of the universal will, there is this also that under its influence the individual self arrogates the authorship (kartṛtva) of the actions, so performed, to itself and is perfectly oblivious of the fact of its being simply a tool of the universal will. It is this self-arrogation of the individual which is responsible[2] for the attachment of merit and demerit to it. On this the idea of the individual piety or sinfulness is based.

One can very pertinently ask here : Why is the limited desire of the individual self spoken of as Karma and whether it is not strange to suppose the Lord to be perfectly independent in some of his functions but in others to be entirely dependent upon Mala etc. ? To the former Abhinava replies that Karma is that which results in some limited experience and so in further obscuration of the real nature of the experiencer. It is a different matter that in the ordinary use the word means something else :

"Karma tallokarūḍhaṁ hi yadbhogam avaraṁ dadat
Tirodhatte bhoktṛrūpaṁ saṁjñāyāṁ tu na no bharaḥ."

T. A., VIII, 161.

The limited desire of the limited individual is, therefore, spoken of as Karma, because it is the primary cause of all kinds of its associations and experiences, as shown above. And to the latter question he replies that it is unreasonable to assume one and the same thing to be productive of opposite effects. How can a thing, which is the cause of bondage, be the cause of liberation also ? It is to satisfy the demand of reason that

1. T. A., VIII, 70. 2. I. P. V., II, 149.

the Pratyabhijñā holds the Lord's grace, independently of any thing that is connected with Mala, Māyā and Karma, to be the only cause of liberation :

"Aṇusvarūpatāhānau tadgatāṁ hetutāṁ katham
Vrajenmāyānapekṣatvam ata evopapādayet."

T. A., VIII, 77.

KARMA DEFINED.

It is necessary here to point out the distinction between the Kārmamala and the Karmasaṁskāra. The former is the limited desire, as we have just stated, which is responsible for the future limited association of an individual self, after the Mahāpralaya, when the universe is created a-new. The latter, the Karmasaṁskāra, is a certain effect that is produced on a limited self; an effect, not that which, being revived, is responsible for the rise of phenomenon of remembrance, but that which is caused by the personal conviction of the potentiality of a particular action to lead to certain experiences at the time of its maturation.[1] Both these, the Kārmamala and the Karmasaṁskāra, may be spoken of as two aspects of the same thing. In fact, when the distinction of the former from the latter is not intended to be emphasised i. e. when the idea of both of them is intended to be conveyed, the simple word "Karma" is used. Karma in general, therefore, means that unseen factor which is responsible for the difference in the fruition of the same action done by a number of persons. Certain boys join the same school, are put under the same teacher, are given the same facilities and opportunities, and read the same courses for the same number of hours daily, but the result is not the same in all cases. Why? Certain children are born to certain parents, their surroundings are the same; the care that the parents bestow

1. T. A., VI, 85.

on each is the same and there is no difference in their external life. Will the result be the same in all cases ? And if not, why ? The Pratyabhijñā, in common with other systems of Indian philosophy, replies that it is due to Karma[1] in general, as defined above.

CONDITIONS NECESSARY FOR FRUITION OF KARMA.

Karma is like a seed and as such does not fructify soon after it is sown. It requires the fertile soil of self-arrogation[2] and the manure of similar actions to help its growth. Therefore, unless a person arrogates an action to himself, it would not fructify. In fact, this is the chief point of distinction between the two kinds of experiencers, the Pralayākalas and the Vijñānākalas. The former arrogate their actions to themselves and, therefore, are affected by the impurity called Kārmamala, but the latter do not and so are free from it. It is this very absence of self-arrogation that keeps the persons, who are out of their senses,[3] unaffected by the actions done in that state, as all the scriptures unanimously declare. The self-arrogation is thus the soil without which the seed of Karma cannot grow.

THE ASSOCIATED IDEA AND FRUITAION.

The result of an action, however, even when it is associated with the self-arrogation, is not always the same. It is greatly influenced by the associated ideas. When, for instance, a person practises certain austerities and desires that their fruit should go to the other person for whom he performs them, it is the other that gets the fruit and not the performer.[4] This idea is common to most of the religions. It is on this that engaging of the priests for prayer, fasting and other

1. T. A., VI, 98.
2. T. A., VI 85.
3. T. A., VI, 86.
4. T. A., VI, 87.

kinds of austerities to effect a certain desired end is based. Leaving the religious questions aside, if we analyse our daily experiences we find that the nature of the effect of an action in the form of a mental state of some kind depends, not on the action itself, but on the idea with which it is associated. Suppose, for instance, that two new motor cars are driven by two different persons; one is a servant, driving his master to a certain place, and the other is the owner himself. The act of driving is the same; both the cars are equally new; they are of the same maker and have similar accessories; but will the pleasure of driving be the same in both the cases, and if not, why ? Is not the difference due to the associated ideas ? Is not the littleness of the servant-driver's joy, as compared to that of the master, in driving a new car, due to the association of the idea of service ? Thus, as in ordinary life, so in the sphere of religion and morality, an act by itself is productive of no fixed fruit; its productivity differs with the difference in the associated ideas.

DIFFERENT STATES OF KARMA.

Karma is associated, not with the body but with the limited self, and, therefore, is not destroyed with the destruction of the body. It transmigrates with the soul and determines the soul's associations with the future body and its circumstances. It waits till it gets circumstances favourable for its growth and then it asserts itself. The state of Karma, when it is about to assert itself, is called the state of its maturity. When once this state is reached, nothing can stop it from running its course. Even the self-realisation cannot prevent it from fruition. Even the enlightened souls have to undergo the experiences[1] which follow the maturity of Karma. Even they can-

1. T. A., VI, 103.

not escape it. It is this maturity of the past Karma which is responsible for the difference in the result of the same action, done by a number of persons, as in the above stated case of school children. This state of Karma is technically called "Phalonmukhatā". As opposed to this, there is the other state in which, the circumstances being extremely unfavourable for its growth, a Karma remains dormant; it is called "Phalānunmukhatā". The[1] fructifiability of a Karma in the latter state can be destroyed by a counter-action such as charity, austerity and knowledge. The preventive measures against the fructification of Karma are like inoculations to safeguard a person against the attack of a certain disease. And just as inoculation, though effective, if it be done long before the attack, is yet useless when the attack has come, so charity, austerity and penance can prevent the fruition of a Karma, only if they be done long before its maturity or Phalonmukhatā. But they are of no use when it has attained maturity. The mature Karma is like a boulder, slipped from the top of a mountain, which knows no obstruction and must have its course till it reaches a table land.

KARMA AND LIBERATION.

The destruction of Karma is one of the most essential antecedent conditions of the liberation of soul. But let it be noted here that, according to this system, this is neither the only condition nor is this in itself Mokṣa. Even when the Karma is destroyed, there remains another impurity, called āṇavamala, associated with the self; and so long as this also is not destroyed there can be no emancipation.[2] In fact, the only difference between the experiencer, known as Vijñānākala, and Śiva, is that while both are equally free from Karma, the former has still got the āṇavamala, but the latter is free from that

1. T. A., VI, 102. 2. T. A., VI, 77.

also. This is another point of difference between the Vedānta and the Pratyabhijñā conceptions of Mokṣa. According to the former, liberation means simply liberation from the bondage of Karma (Naiṣkarmya), but, according to the latter, it means freedom from both the impurities, kārma and āṇava. It cannot be objected here that if the āṇavamala is the cause of the association of the soul with Karma why does not Vijñānakevala get into the bondage of Karma ? For, in the Vijñānākala state the āṇavamala is about to be destroyed and, therefore, loses its causal efficiency.[1]

HOW IS THE DESTRUCTION OF KARMA EFFECTED ?

We have pointed out above that the individual self is not free in its volition and action. These are the universal powers of will and action which are working in and through the individual. It is thus a mere tool and not a free agent. Under the influence of His will, however, it arrogates to itself the authorship of all that is done through the body, with which it has identified itself. But, when through His grace true light dawns upon it, it realises its oneness with the Universal Self. As a necessary consequence of self-realization, the identification with the body, together with the effect of self-arrogation of the deeds done in the state of ignorance (Moha), comes to an end. The[2] fruition of the past action, therefore, naturally becomes out of the question. This[3] nullification of the effect of self-arrogation of action, which follows the cessation of identification of the self with the body, is technically called karmadāha in the Śaiva literature :

> "Karmaṇaśca iyān dāho yad dehāhambhāvasaṁskāraguṇībhāvo nāma iti, sa ca vaiśvātmyam āśritāyāṁ saṁvidi ātmābhimānasya mukhyatvād bhavet ityuktam."
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> T. A., Comm., VI, 108.

1. T. A., VI, 79–80. 2. T. A., VI, 106–7. 3. T. A., VI, 108.

CRITICISM OF THE RIVAL THEORY OF THE SĀṄKHYA.

According to the Sāṅkhya, liberation is nothing but the cessation of the activity of Prakṛti towards a particular Puruṣa. But it may be asked : if Puruṣa is never really affected in any way and is simply pure consciousness (puṣkarapalāśavannirlepaḥ kintu cetanaḥ) in itself, it must ever be the same ; why is it then that Prakṛti is not active towards the so called liberated ? It cannot be said that the activity of Prakṛti requires the presence of 'the old habits of experience of Buddhi' (karmasaṁskāra) as a prompting cause, and because all the saṁskāras of the past actions of the liberated are destroyed, there is, therefore, nothing to prompt Prakṛti to work for the liberated. For, the opponent then may be asked : "What is it that is responsible for the destruction of Saṁskāras ?" It cannot be the experience of the fruit by the doer, because experience in itself is an act and, therefore, rather than destroying the Saṁskāras, would lead to the formation of another. Nor can the knowledge be the cause of destruction, because if the word "knowledge" means something which is to be got by performing the acts of piety, enjoined by the scripture, then it is only a fruit of a certain action and as such cannot rightly be represented to be the cause of destruction of the past Karmas. For, if fruition of one action is supposed to destory another action, there is no reason why fruition of those actions, by virtue of which one attains heaven, should not destroy those which result in knowledge.[1] Nor can this be said that knowledge does not destroy Karma, but simply sterilises it by removing ignorance, which is the most essential condition of its fruition. For, then the opponent may be asked to state what he means by ignorance. Is it a negation of knowledge which precedes the existence of knowledge (prāgabhāva) or that which follows its destruction (dhvaṁsa). In the former case

1. T. A., VIII, 9.

again, is it the negation of all kinds of knowledge or only of some? The former position is, of course, impossible. For, to deny all kinds of knowledge to a limited self is to deny sentiency and selfhood to it. The latter also is no better, because the absence of some kind of knowledge preceding its coming into being will always exist in the cases of both the bound and the liberated. For, according to the Sāṅkhya, the Puruṣa is simply sentient but not omniscient as the real self of the Vedāntin, so that even after liberation it can be spoken of as being without a certain knowledge preceding its existence. Nor can ignorance mean the absence of knowledge consequent upon its destruction. For, such an ignorance there will always be in the case of the liberated. But if the opponent were to say that ignorance means, not the absence of all knowledge, but simply wrong knowledge, then also it has to be made clear whether its causal relation to the fruition of an action depends upon its presence at the time of performance of the action or at that of the fructification. In the latter case, the accepted theory of each creation after dissolution being according to the individual Karmas falls to the ground. For, association of a Puruṣa with a body is a sort of fruition of certain Karmas. But how can the Karmas fructify unless there be ignorance and how can there be ignorance unless there be the association of self with a body? Because ignorance, according to the Sāṅkhya, is a quality of Buddhi, an evolute of Prakṛti, and as such it is non-existent at the time of dissolution. In the former case there is no reason why all Karmas should not fructify in the case of the ignorant and the enlightened alike, because the ignorance was present in both the cases at the time of performance. Nor can it be said that ignorance is co-existent with sentiency[1] and because sentiency lasts even through dissolution, ignorance

1. T. A., VIII, 20.

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1. T. A., VIII, 20.

also, therefore, is naturally present. For, in that case it will not be possible to deny the presence of ignorance even in the case of the enlightened; because the enlightened are no less sentient than the unenlightened and, therefore, it would be hard to explain why the Karma of the latter does not fructify.

SĀṄKHYA CONCEPTION OF IGNORANCE.

The evolution of Prakṛti has got twofold purpose to serve, namely, (I) to supply the necessary stimuli for the varying experiences which the Puruṣas have helplessly to suffer or to enjoy, according to their individual Karmas, and (II) ultimately to effect their salvation. The former is called Bhoga and is due to the identification of the self with Buddhi. The latter is called Apavarga and consists in the knowledge of difference between the self and the Buddhi and consequent cessation of the activity of the nature (Pradhāna) with reference to a particular self. Bhoga depends upon the arrogation by Puruṣa of the work of Buddhi to itself. Buddhi, according to the Sāṅkhya, is like a mirror, capable of receiving reflection from both the sides. Its capacity to receive reflection of the external object, however, depends upon its receiving light from Puruṣa. Thus Buddhi, though insentient in itself, appears to be sentient because of the reflected light. And Puruṣa too, though in reality indifferent to all the works of Prakṛti, yet, because of the co-evality of the reflection of the external objects on Buddhi with the reflection of its own light, arrogates to itself the agency of assuming the form of the external object, which, in fact, belongs to Buddhi. Apavarga similarly depends upon the distinctive knowledge that Buddhi is of changing nature and that Puruṣa is unchangeable and something different from Buddhi.

The beginningless ignorance of difference between the self and the Prakṛti or Buddhi is the prompting cause of the evolu-

tion of the latter for Bhoga.[1] After the rise of the knowledge of distinction, therefore, there remains nothing to prompt it to further action. Hence its evolutive activity towards that particular Puruṣa, on whom the knowledge has dawned, automatically comes to an end.

REFUTATION OF THE SĀṄKHYA THEORY.

From what has been stated it is clear that, according to the Sāṅkhya, release is nothing but cessation of the evolutive activity of Prakṛti, consequent upon the disappearance of the prompting cause, the ignorance of distinction between Puruṣa and Buddhi. But the defect of the Sāṅkhya theory is obvious. The Sāṅkhya is silent on the question of the relation of this ignorance. It cannot satisfactorily answer the query: "To whom does the ignorance belong?" For, it cannot be attributed to Puruṣa, because that would make freedom from it impossible; because Puruṣa, according to the Sāṅkhya, does not change. The loss of an attribute certainly means a change in the possessor; therefore, if it be said that ignorance belongs to Puruṣa who loses it at the time of liberation, the Sāṅkhya theory of unchangeability of the Puruṣa would fall to the ground. But if it be said that it belongs to Prakṛti or Buddhi, then Puruṣa being ever free from it, the notion that evolutive activity of Prakṛti is for the liberation of Puruṣa becomes absurd. Further, the Sāṅkhya cannot satisfactorily answer another question: if the ignorance lasts only so long as the knowledge of distinction between Puruṣa and Buddhi does not arise, when does this knowledge arise? It cannot be said that it arises when all the effects of Prakṛti have been seen, because they are limitless and, therefore, it is impossible to see all of them. Nor can a general knowledge of the nature of Prakṛti's evolutes be repre-

1. T. A., VIII. 21–2.

sented to be the cause of liberation : for, that being possible even from seeing one evolute there is no reason why any Puruṣa should be in bondage.

DUALISTIC ŚAIVA THEORY OF IGNORANCE.

According to the dualist school of Śaivaism, the recognised exponent of which is Kheṭapāla,[1] ignorance is something like a cover which hides the perfection of self in respect of the powers of knowledge and action. It is one, but possesses innumerable varieties of concealing power. It hides the perfection of each soul by a separate variety of its power. This, according to the dualist Śaivas, accounts for the difference in knowledge or ignorance of one soul from that of another. This also explains why at the liberation or destruction of ignorance of one soul, all do not get liberated or enlightened.[2] It is not a creation of Māyā : for, if it be so, there would be no reason why Māyā should not create it for the liberated also. It is not a mere negation or not-being of knowledge, but a positive entity, because it has the causal efficiency of hiding the perfection of the powers of knowledge and action of the Self. It is beginningless in itself and so is its association with the souls. It is insentient and is the cause of association of Karma and Māyā with the self. When the concealing power of this ignorance is nullified by divine grace (śaktipāta) in the case of a certain soul, it (soul) shines forth in its true glory. This removal of the veil of ignorance, this recovery of the hidden powers, this freedom from all kinds of limitations, is called Mokṣa, in the dualistic Śaiva literature.

REFUTATION OF THE DUALIST THEORY.

But what is the cause of the maturity (pāka) or destruction of this ignorance ? It cannot be action (karma), because

1. T. A., Comm., VIII, 36. 2. T. A., VIII, 30.

it is accepted to be the cause of the variety of pleasant or unpleasant experiences which a person enjoys or suffers. It is, therefore, unreasonable to represent it to be the cause of their cessation also. Nor can the Lord's will be said to be responsible for the said maturity : for, He is free from all partiality, and, therefore, if He be admitted to be the cause of destruction of ignorance, it would be difficult to explain why He frees only some and not all. Further, according to the dualist, the ignorance is beginningless and causeless. Assumption, therefore, of its destruction, whatever be its cause, is against our common experience; for, there is no instance of another thing which though both beginningless and causeless is yet destructible. The not-being of a thing before it actually comes into being, (prāgabhāva) has, of course, to be left out of consideration, because it is a non-entity and as such belongs to a different category from that of the ignorance which is an entitative being and possesses causal efficiency. It cannot be said that there is no destruction of ignorance but that its power falls into abeyance, like the fatal biting power of a snake in a charmed circle: because then there would follow simultaneous liberation of all and there will also be the possibility of all coming again back to bondage at the revival of the concealing power of ignorance.

There is a further question : How and what does the ignorance conceal ? Souls are eternal and unchangeable. The ignorance, therefore, cannot be supposed to affect them in any way. For, such a supposition would bring them down to the level of transitory things. Therefore, if it be said to conceal powers of knowledge and action by its mere presence in the proximity of the self, then there is no reason why it should not do so in the case of Śiva and other liberated souls. Moreover, if it conceals the powers of the self it conceals the very being of self, because self is nothing more than the said powers. How can then we know the very existence of the self ?

DUALIST THEORY OF KARMASĀMYA.

Now, leaving aside the question how and what the concealing power of ignorance conceals, if we were to take into consideration the question: "Why does it fall into abeyance ?" we find the dualist's position no better. They hold that the Lord's will, prompted by the equilibrium or equipoise of Karmas (karma-sāmya), puts in abeyance the concealing power of ignorance. The Karmasāmya, according to them, is a state of maturity of two equipotential Karmas of opposite nature. In this state each of the two Karmas is equally mature for fruition, but is prevented from yielding its fruit by another which also is equally mature and is trying to push its way to fruition. Because both are equally strong, therefore, neither can assert itself over the other. And the result is that not only neither of these two can fructify but others also, which would have borne their fruits in ordinary course, are prevented from so doing, because of their way to fruition having, as it were, been blocked by the struggle of the two equipotential Karmas. It is a case like that of two equally strong wrestlers trying to push their way through a small door through which only one person can pass at a time. The result is, as we often see at the opening of a barrier to a third class railway booking office window, that neither can pass ; and while they are fighting, each trying to assert his right over the other to purchase his ticket first, other poor passengers have helplessly to wait behind. This state is marked by the absence of feeling of both pleasure and pain alike. The reason is obvious. Mind can have only one experience at a time (Yugapaj jñānānutpattir manaso liṅgam). The fruition of a Karma is nothing but an experience. And because two experiences are not simultaneously possible, reasonably therefore, two Karmas cannot be supposed to fructify at the same time. Karmasāmya, therefore, according to the dualists, is both natural and logical.

REFUTATION OF KARMASĀMYA.

There are three kinds of action, pious, sinful and mixed. Two fructifiable actions cannot be performed simultaneously. Because an action, in order that it may have its necessary result, according to the law of Karma, must have the co-operation of mind, must be associated with some idea. In fact, the moral fruition of an action depends, not on the action itself so much as on the associated idea. It is because of this that motiveless action (niṣkāma karma) does not fructify. As the mind can have only one idea at a time so naturally two fructifiable actions cannot be done simultaneously. The performances of actions being in succession, their maturity also must necessarily be in succession. How can then two actions simultaneously attain maturity and produce Karmasāmya ? Further, even if simultaneous maturity of two equipotential actions be admitted, there arises a very important question as to whether other actions do or do not fructify after the Karmasāmya. In the former case, in spite of this Karmasāmya, the bondage of Karma will remain. In the latter case, cessation of the fruition of all actions being necessary, even those actions, which are responsible for the existence of the body, the life and other circumstances of the liberated, should necessarily stop fruition and, therefore, there should be instantaneous death of the freed.[1] Furthermore, if the equilibrium of two actions can prevent the fruition of all other actions, what does there remain for the Lord's will to accomplish, what is then the Śaktipāta assumed for ? Even if Śaktipāta be assumed to be necessary, the karmasāmya being the same in all cases, it is difficult to account for difference of Śaktipāta in different cases. The life of renunciation and other religious practices cannot explain it, because the limited selves cannot be assumed to be independent in

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1. T. A., VIII, 49.

their performance. For, if it were so, it would be difficult to explain why all do not perform them. If, therefore, it be supposed to be dependent on something else, that also logically will require something else still as a prompting cause and so on ad-infinitum.

The Pratyabhijñā, therefore, holds that, while obscuration and liberation are the works of the independent will of the Lord, creation, maintenance and destruction are dependent upon innate ignorance and Karma, and that this ignorance is not an insentient independent entity, as conceived by the dualists, but is a production of the Lord's will.[1]

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1. T. A., Comm., VIII 75.

CHAPTER VI

THE KRAMA SYSTEM.

THE KRAMA AS A DISTINCT SYSTEM.

The Krama system is distinct from the other two systems of the Kashmir thought, the Pratyabhijñā and the Kula, on every one of which Abhinavagupta has written. It has a different history, a distinct line of teachers and a different set of books in which it is propounded. It has much in common with the Kula system so much so that it is recognised to be akin to the Kula system by Abhinavagupta himself in his Tantrāloka in the fourth Āhnika, in which he points out that the conception of twelve Kālīs is common to both the Krama and the Kula. These twelve Kālīs are referred to in the Krama Stotra by an earlier authority, on which Abhinavagupta wrote a commentary, as well as in his own Krama Stotra.

The Krama system is distinct from the Kula, because while the latter is concerned with the Śāmbhavopāya, the former is the exponent of the Śāktopāya : the latter recognises the contemplation on "Aham" to be the only means to the realisation of the Ultimate and asserts that it is a direct means and that there are no stages through which its follower has to pass to reach the goal; the former asserts that the purification of the determinate idea is one of the means to liberation and that there are stages through which the determinate idea has to pass in order to attain perfect purity or clarity.

It is distinct from the Pratyabhijñā for reasons similar to those on account of which it differs from the Kula. For,

while the Pratyabhijñā system is primarily concerned with the thirty six metaphysical categories and holds that the 'recognition' (Pratyabhijñā) is the means to the immediate realisation of the Ultimate, the Krama system primarily confines itself to the mystic categories and holds that the realisation of the Ultimate is possible through stages only. In fact, the Krama system is so called, because it admits that the liberation can be attained through successive stages only.

The worship of Kālīs was an important aspect of the Krama system. For, Jayaratha in his commentary on the Tantrāloka discusses the question: why does Abhinavagupta deal with Twelve Kālīs only, while in the Anākhya Cakra the number of goddesses to be worshipped is stated to be different by some other authority. From this it is evident that ritualism had an important place in the Krama system. But the Kula system, which is recognised to be a monistic system, prohibited its followers to perform any rituals and the 'Trika' system which is admitted to be absolutely monistic (Paramādvaita) neither enjoined nor prohibited the performance of the rituals. Thus, from the ritualistic and metaphysical points of view as well as from that of the means of knowledge, the Krama system is distinct from both the Kula and the Pratyabhijñā or Trika.

The Krama system is recognised to be a distinct system by Abhinava in the Mālinīvijayavārtika, where he mentions it as a distinct system.[1] In the Tantrāloka he recognises it as a sister of the Kula system (Kramanaya sodara, T. A. III, 157). Jayaratha in his commentary on the Tantrāloka very frequently uses the word Krama Darśana or Krama-Naya,[2] and interprets the first benedictory verse of the Tantrāloka in three ways, as referring to (i) the Kula system (ii) the Krama system (iii) the parents of Abhinavagupta.

1. M. V. V., 20. 2. T. A., (Comm) III, 189, 190.

Therefore, there is no room for any doubt about the existence of the Krama as a distinct system.

THE NAMES OF THE SYSTEM.

The Krama system is so called because it admits that the purification of the determinate idea (Vikalpa saṁskāra. T. A., III, 2-3) is the means to the realisation of the Ultimate, which is of the nature of indeterminacy, and that this purification takes-place in successive stages from obscurity to perfect clarity, involving tendency to clarity, clarity in the process of becoming, clarity, greater clarity etc.[1]

It is also called (2) Kālīnaya,[2] because this system admits that the Ultimate Reality is Kālī, the performer of five functions, Kṣepa, Jñāna, Prasaṅkhyāna, Gati and Nāda, which have already been discussed in the chapter on the Paryanta Pañcāśikā. It is referred to as (3) Devīnaya,[3] because the Kālī, which it accepts to be the Ultimate principle, is a goddess (Devī). Some texts refer to it as (4) Mahānaya[4] or (5) Atinaya.[5] Maheśvarānanda, as has already been stated, calls it Mahārtha Darśana.

ORIGIN AND HISTORY OF THE SYSTEM.

Maheśvarānanda records a tradition,[6] which says that the Krama system, also called the Auttarāmnāya, because it arose in Kashmir, the Uttarapīṭha, originated from Śiva or Bhairava and that the first recipient of its teachings was Icchā Śakti or Bhairavī. This is the mythical account of the origin of the system. Jayaratha ignores it and recognises Śivānanda, who belonged to Kashmir, the Uttarapīṭha, to be the earliest known teacher of this system on the earth.

1. T. A., III, 4–5. 2. Ibid. 193. 3. Ibid. 196.
4. Ibid. 195. 5. Ibid. 195. 6. M. M., 195–6.

This Śivānanda apparently seems to be different from his namesake, mentioned by Maheśvarānanda, alias Gorakṣa, in the Mahārtha Mañjarī as the recepient of the principles of the system, which is referred to as Mahānaya, Auttarāmnāya or Auttara Krama,[1] from the Bhairavī. But there seems to be justification for identifying the two if we take into account the facts (1) that Maheśvarānanda deals with the Krama system so exhaustively (82–120) quoting from different texts on the system, such as the Krama Sadbhāva, the Krama Vāsanā, the Kramakeli etc. (2) that he calls the system Auttarāmnāya, meaning thereby the system that originated in Kashmir, which is recognised to be Uttarapīṭha, to which Jayaratha also refers : (Uttarapīṭhalabdhopadeśāt śrī Śivānandanāthāt. T. A. Comm. III, 192.) (3) that though he asserts that what is said in the Mahārthamañjarī is common to the sacred literature on the Kula system (Asyāmarthasthitiḥ saiva yā sarvatra kulāgame. M. M. 199.) yet if we take into account what Abhinava has said in the Mālinī Vijaya Vārtika in regard to the relation between the Krama and the Kula systems, namely that the former begins with and ends in the latter,[2] the above statement of Maheśvarānanda may be taken to be a more emphatic assertion of what Abhinava had said on the relation between the Vāma or Uttara Śāstra and the Kula : (4) that though he seems to be representing Śivānanda as very far removed from him by a line of teachers, yet it would not be unreasonable to say that he does not mean more distance than that of about four centuries from himself. For, he, being a successor of Kṣemarāja, belongs to the 12th century A. D. and the Krama system arose towards the close of the 7th and the beginning of the 8th century A. D.

Thus, if we take Śivānanda, referred to by Jayaratha, to be identical with Śivānanda, referred to by Maheśvarānanda,

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1. M. M., 195–201.   2. M. V. V., 38.

then the Mahārtha is another name of the Krama. This conclusion agrees with references to the Krama system as Mahānaya[1] in the quotations, given by Jayaratha in the course of his discussion on the Krama system.

But it may be asked : "What about his statement that in the Mahārtha Mañjarī the subject-matter is the same as in the Kulāgama ?" The reply is that Maheśvarānanda, following the clue, given by Abhinava, in his statement, as has already been pointed out, that the Krama system begins with and ends in the Kula, seems to have gone a step farther and is inclined to identify the two. In fact, he represents the well known work of Abhinavagupta, the Krama Keli, to be Kulāgama (Kramakelau kulāgame M. M., 190). The fact is that in the Āgamic literature also the teachings of the Kālīnaya, relating to Vāmeśvarī, were referred to as Kaulikī Vidyā as is made clear by the following quotation, given by Jayaratha :—

Eṣā tu kaulikī vidyā sarvasiddhi-pradāyikā
Vāmeśvaryavatāre tu prakāśatvamupāgatā
(T. A., (Comm.) III, 207.)

Śivānanda taught three female ascetics (i) Keyūravatī (ii) Madanikā (iii) Kalyāṇikā. They imparted the knowledge of the system to many, out of whom the three teachers (i) Govindarāja (ii) Bhānuka (iii) Eraka are well known. The first of these, namely, Govindarāja, taught Somānanda. From the second, Bhānuka, followed the line of teachers, among whom Ujjaṭa and Udbhaṭa were most prominent. To this Udbhaṭa Abhinavagupta seems to refer in the concluding verses of his Tantrāloka. The third, Eraka, did not have any pupil. He attempted to spread the system by means of Stotras that he wrote.[2] This statement of the line of teachers, according to Jayaratha, is based upon Abhinava's own statement in the Kramakeli.

1. T. A., III. 195. 2. T. A., (Comm.) III, 192–3.

Jayaratha mentions and quotes from many other exponents and teachers of this system such as Hrasvanātha, Bhojarāja, Somarāja etc., with whom we shall deal in the sequal.

From the account of the line of teachers, given above, it appears that the system arose towards the close of the Seventh and the beginning of the Eighth century A. D. Among the successive teachers, mentioned above, Somānanda is the one whose time is certain. He is assigned to the close of the first and the beginning of the second half of the 9th century A. D., because he was the great grand teacher of Abhinavagupta. And the earliest teacher of the system, Śivānanda, who is also referred to as Avatāraka Nātha,[1] probably because he was recognised to be the first propagator of the Krama system on the earth, is removed from Somānanda by only two intervening generations, one represented by Madanikā etc. and the other by Govindarāja etc. Therefore, it seems to be reasonable to think that the system arose towards the close of the Seventh and the beginning of the Eighth century A. D.

LITERATURE ON THE KRAMA.

It is very painful to find that the vast literature on the Krama system, referred to in the Tantrāloka and the Mahārtha Mañjarī, is mostly lost. That there were basic Āgamas, which presented the Krama system, and that every one of the successive teachers of the system from Śivānanda to Mahāprakāśa wrote some work or works is abundantly clear from references to and quotations from them. But not a single of the original works has been traced so far. Our account of the literature on the Krama system is, therefore, mostly an account of the lost literature, which is known from references only. We shall attempt to arrange the works in an historical order as follows :—

1. T. A., (Comm.) III, 195.

1. The original Āgamas.
2. The works of early teachers like Śivānanda and Ereka.
3. The works of unknown authorship.
4. The works of Abhinavagupta and his successors in Kashmir and Cola.

(1) THE ORIGINAL ĀGAMAS.

(i) KRAMASADBHĀVA.

The Krama Sadbhāva seems to belong to the Āgamic literature, because it is in the form of dialogue between Śiva and Pārvatī. The important point of distinction of this Āgama from others such as the Rudra Yāmala is that in this case Pārvatī is the speaker, while Śiva is the enquirer or hearer : but in other Āgamas the case is the reverse. This seems to indicate that the Krama system attached greater importance to Śakti than to Śiva. This, therefore, seems to be one of the earliest books on the system. The following quotation supports the point :—

"Tanme kathaya suśroṇi vistareṇa Yathāvidhi"

Iti praśnānantaram :—

Purā yat kathitaṁ deva pañcavāha mahākramam.

M. M., 108.

The Krama Sadbhāva is known from four references to and quotations from it in the Mahārtha Mañjarī.

(1) Maheśvarānanda talks of the worship of nine powers in succession in the body and says that thereafter the gods, Gaṇapati etc., have to be worshipped. It is interesting to note that Abhinava also talks of these gods in his Dehastha Devatā-Cakra Stotra. In this context he asserts that the names of

these gods have to be kept secret and quotes the Krama Sadbhāva in support of his view.[1]

(2) The Mahārtha Mañjarī enjoins a form of worship, distinct from that ordinarily known, inasmuch as it consists in the realisation of the identity of all that is objective with the inner subject, the Parama Śiva, present in the body, surrounded by powers of perception and action. In this connection the worshipper is enjoined to remember different circles (Cakras), Pīṭha, Pañcavāha, Netra-Traya and Vṛnda, each of which is constituted by a number of powers, Kalās or Śaktis.[2] The last Cakra is a group of them in so far as it consists of Dhāma, Mudrā, Varṇa, Kalā, Saṁvitsvabhāva, Bhāvasvabhāva, Pāta and Aniketa.[3]

Now Pāta consists in the realisation of identity of the Pañcavāha with the Vṛnda Cakra as also of the five powers, creation, maintenance, annihilation, indefinable (Anākhya) and Freedom (Bhāsā) with five types of Śidhas, Jñāna, Mantra, Melāpa, Śākta and Śāmbhava. In support of the latter Maheśvarānanda refers to and quotes from the Krama Sadbhāva.[4]

(3) The powers of creation etc. are analysed into many. Thus the power of creation includes within Ten powers, Kriyā, Jñāna, Icchā, Udyoga, Pratibhā and also Sṛṣṭi, Sthiti, Saṁhāra, Anākhya and Bhāsā. Maheśvarānanda has shown on the basis of analysis of creative activity of a human being, e. g. a potter, how the former five are involved in it. In support of this view he quotes from the Krama Sadbhāva.[5]

(4) In connection with the five powers of the Lord, a question is raised : In which order should they be worship-

1. M. M. 88.
2. Ibid., 86–92.
3. Ibid., 92–6.
4. Ibid., 97.
5. Ibid., 101.

ped ? Maheśvarānanda, who was a follower of the tradition,[1] established by Devapāṇi, worshipped them beginning with Sṛṣṭi. In justification of this tradition as one based upon the authority of the Āgama he quotes from the Krama Sadbhāva.

It is quoted by Jayaratha in his commentary on the Tantrāloka[2] and is referred to by Abhinavagupta,[3] who refers to it as Krama, which is interpreted by Jayaratha not only as "Krama Darśanam" but also as the Krama Sadbhāva, from which he quotes in support of the view that the worshipper ought to free his mind from doubt of every kind. This seems to be a conclusive evidence to justify the admission that the Krama Sadbhāva is a work on the Krama system. It appears that the names of the twelve goddesses differed in different texts. Thus the same is referred to as Rudrakālī in the Krama Sadbhāva but[4] as Bhadrakālī in the Pañca śatika.

(ii) KRAMA SIDDHI.

The Krama Siddhi was an Āgama dealing with the Krama system, as it appears from the following quotation in which Mahādevī is addressed :—

Gurvāyattaṁ kramajñānam ājñāsiddhikaraṁ param
Krama jñānān mahādevi trailokyaṁ kavalīkṛtam.

M. M., 109.

Here the speaker is Mahādeva and the hearer is Mahādevī. But at another place the case is the reverse as the following quotation shows :—

"Saṁvit kramamimaṁ deva śṛṇu vakṣyāmi Sundara."

M. M., 97.

Thus it appears that there were two traditions of the Krama system; one recognised the ultimate principle to be male,

1. M. M., 108.
2. T. A., III, 190.
3. T. A., Ah. XII, 105–7.
4. T. A., III, 172.

Śiva, while the other held it to be female, Śakti or Kālī. May be that Kālīnaya presents that tradition which admitted the Kālī or Kālasaṅkarṣiṇī to be the ultimate principle.

It is quoted four times by Maheśvarānanda :—

(1) There are five forms in which the Universal energy or power expresses itself. They are Vyomavāmeśvarī, Khecarī, Dikcarī, Gocarī and Bhūcarī. Some authorities differed in regard to their order. Maheśvarānanda quotes the Krama Siddhi in support of the order in which he states them[1] as above.

(2) Pāta consists in the identification of various types. One of them is the identification of the five forms of manifestation with the five powers of creation etc. In support of this identification he quotes from the Krama Siddhi.[2]

(3) Maheśvarānanda holds that in each of the five powers, Sṛṣṭi etc. others are necessarily present. But a power is called Sṛṣṭi or Sthiti simply because the power of creation or that of maintenance and so forth is most predominent in the group. To support this view he refers to the Krama Siddhi.[3]

(4) Maheśvarānanda admits on the authority of the Krama Siddhi that the grasp of the Krama system leads to the acquisition of all kinds of powers and that it depends upon the teacher.[4]

(iii) BRAHMA YĀMALA.

The Brahma Yāmala, seems to have been a work on the Krama system similar to the Rudrayāmala on the Kula system. It had a section on the method of contemplation on Raktā, one of the twelve goddesses, dealt with by Abhinavagupta in his Krama Stotra : "Tadā Raktā devī tava sakalabhāveṣu nanu

1. M. M., 89. 2. Ibid., 97.
3. Ibid., 101. 4. Ibid., 109.

mām". (K. S., 16.). She is referred to as Raktakālī in other works on the system.[1] According to this, a person contemplating on Raktā for a month becomes Ācārya without being initiated by a teacher. For, Raktā herself initiates him successively as Samayī at the conclusion of contemplation for three days and eighteen hours; as Putraka after seven and half days; as Sādhaka after fifteen days and as Ācārya after a month.

The Krama system, therefore, is the one which shows the way to the realisation of the Ultimate independently of a teacher.[2]

(iv) TANTRARĀJA BHAṬṬĀRAKA.

The Tantrarāja Bhaṭṭāraka was held in very high esteem as is indicated by the use of the word "Bhaṭṭāraka". May be that it was an Āgama. It also dealt with the thirteen Kālīs like the Pañcaśatika.[3]

(2) THE WORKS OF THE EARLY TEACHERS.

It is very unfortunate that the works of the early teachers of the Krama system are not traceable. We do not know even their names. But the fact that they wrote some works is abundantly clear from quotations which are attributed to them. In this section, therefore, we shall content ourselves with mentioning the names of the authors and drawing attention to the quotations from their untraced works.

(i) ŚIVĀNANDANĀTHA.

Śivānanda, as we have already stated, was the first earthly propagator of the Krama system. For this reason he was called-Avatārakanātha also.[4] He was the recipient of spiritual grace of the goddesses Jayā etc. in Kāmarūpa[5]. He seems to have

1. T. A., (Comm) III, 160-1. 2. T. A., III, 70-1.
3. Ibid., 189. 4. Ibid., 197. 5. Ibid., 201.

written two works, in one of which he held the number of goddesses to be worshipped in the Anākhya Cakra to be twelve[1] and in the other to be thirteen.[2]

(ii) ERAKA.

Eraka was a grand-pupil of Śivānanda, because he received the teachings of the Krama from the Yoginīs, Keyūravatī etc., who were graced by Śivānanda. He may, therefore, be said to belong to the close of the 8th century A. D. He wrote a number of Stotras to popularise the teachings of the Krama system.[3]

(iii) HRASVANĀTHA.

Hrasvanātha's position in the history of the Krama system cannot be stated very definitely. But his name occurs in the context of the discussion on the number of pupils of Kakāra-devī, alias Keyūravatī, in the course of the refutation of the earlier view that she had only three pupils. The fourth pupil that is pointed out was Naverakanātha. Hrasvanātha's name comes thereafter, but with the object of pointing out that he did not have five pupils only. For, Somarāja mentions Bhoja-rāja as the sixth. Therefore, if we accept him to be a pupil of Keyūravatī, he, like Eraka, would belong to the close of the 8th century A. D. But the text does not make it clear whether all these were contemporaries or they were successors to one another. Therefore, it is a controversial point.

In any case he is very much earlier than Jayaratha, who holds that Hrasvanātha, Bhojarāja and Somarāja suceeded one another. According to him, Hrasvanātha was removed from Somarāja, whom he quotes, by one generation, represented by Bhojarāja,[4] the teacher of Somarāja.

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1. T. A., III, 198.
2. Ibid., 197.
3. Ibid., 193.
4. Ibid,, 196–7.

Referring to Hrasvanātha Jayaratha says the following :—

"Hrasvanāthenāpi svalipivivaraṇe asya pāṭhasya dṛṣṭatvāt" (T. A., III, 206).

This text seems to be doubtful. More correct reading seems to be "Hrasvanāthasyāpī" instead of "Hrasvanāthenāpi". If we accept this correction then it would mean that Hrasvanātha had written a commentary on the Krama Stotra and that this commentary together with the original in the hand-writing of Hrasvanātha was accessible to Jayaratha. In it the second verse in praise of Kālānalarudrakālī was found. On the basis of this he asserts that in the Krama Stotra each of the two goddesses Yamakālī and Kālāgnirudrakālī is praised in two verses. But if we do not accept the amendation then it would mean that Jayaratha had access to some other work of Hrasvanātha, the name of which he does not mention, wherein he came across a statement on the basis of which he says what has been stated above. It would then mean that Hrasvanātha also had seen this verse in his Manuscript of a commentary (on the Krama Stotra).

(iv) SOMARĀJA.

The opinion on Somarāja's date has to depend upon that of Hrasvanātha, who was his grand-teacher. The only thing, therefore, that can be said with certainty is that he was prior to Jayaratha, who quotes him. He wrote a work in which he described the line of teachers of the Krama system ending with Bhojarāja whose pupil he was.[1]

(3) WORKS OF UNKNOWN AUTHORS.

(i) KRAMA SŪTRA.

The Krama Sūtra was an important work on the Krama

1. T. A., III, 196–7.

system. It was commented upon by Kṣemarāja.[1] It was in aphoristic form as its title and the following quotation from it show :—

"Bāhyādantaḥ praveśaḥ abhyantarādvā bāhyasvarūpānupraveśaḥ."

There are two ways of the realisation of the Ultimate. One demands merging of the external into the internal and the other consists in looking upon the external as grossification of the internal. The one is followed by a Yogin of the limited power and the other by a perfect Yogin.

(ii) KRAMODAYA.

There are two quotations from the Kramodaya. One refers to the five limiting powers of the Śiva, because of which he appears as an individual subject, namely, Kalā, Vidyā etc.,[2] and the other enjoins Dūtī Yajana before the commencement of the worship of nine powers in the body.[3]

(iii) PAÑCAŚATIKA.

The Pañcaśatika was a work on the Krama system presenting the idea of the twelve Kālīs very similar to that presented in the Krama Stotra by an earlier authority than Abhinavagupta, whose name we have not been able to trace out. It is quoted by Jayaratha to show that what Abhinava says about the twelve Kālīs is in consonance with both the Krama Stotra and the Pañcaśatika. But there is just one point on which the Pañca Śatika differed from the Krama Stotra, namely, that it included Sukālī in the list of Kālīs and admitted the number of Kālīs to be thirteen[4] and not twelve as presented in the Krama Stotra. The Pañca Śatika, also called Devī Pañca

1. M. M., 166.
2. Ibid., 50.
3. Ibid., 87.
4. T. A., III, 189.

Śatika, seems to be a very early text. It was known to Somānanda.[1]

Like the Kālīkula, which we shall deal with in the Chapter on the Kula system, it gave the line of teachers. From a quotation, given by Jayaratha, it appears that the line of teachers, that it gave, came down to the 7th century A. D. For, it mentions Śivānanda, the founder of the Krama system, with three of his predecessors, and gives the names of their wives also as follows :—

1.	Niṣkriyānanda :	Jñānadīpti
2.	Vidyānanda :	Raktā
3.	Śaktyānanda :	Mahānandā
4.	Śivānanda :	Samayā.[2]

This line of teachers is not that of the teachers of the Kula system but that of the Krama, nor is this work a work on the Kula system, because in referring to it Jayaratha says "Śāstrāntaroditāḥ" (T. A., Ah. XXIX, 32.), given in texts other than those on the Kula system.

Here it may be stated by the way that from what has been stated above it is clear that it is wrong to say that Abhinava's teacher in the Krama system or Kālīnaya was Bhūtirāja, a pupil of Cakrabhānu as some have said.[3] For, the method of worship, pointed out by this Bhūtirāja, is based on the Pañca Śatika, according to which the number of goddesses to be worshipped is not twelve. How can then Bhūtirāja be spoken of as the teacher of the view that twelve goddesses are to be worshipped, as propounded by Abhinavagupta ? Therefore, it is clear that this Bhūtirāja was not the teacher of Abhinava in respect of the aforesaid view. The fact is that Abhinava was taught the Pañca Śatika by the same teachers as taught

1. T. A., III, 194. 2. T. A., Ah. XXIX, (Comm.) 31.

3. T. A., (Comm.) III, 193.

him the Trika.[1] It is a controversial point and needs further investigation.

(iv) SĀRDHAŚATIKA.

The Sārdhaśatika also dealt with the thirteen Kālīs, like the Pañca Śatika, including Sukālī[2] (Svakālī ?). It differed from the Krama Stotra in so far as it mentioned Sthitikālī immediately after Sṛṣṭikālī instead of Raktakālī. It also named the Kālīs differently in some cases. We do not know who was its author.

(v) KRAMA STOTRA.

The Krama Stotra under reference is the one that was written by an authority earlier than Abhinavagupta. On this Abhinavagupta wrote a commentary, called Kramakeli. It is quoted by Jayaratha in his commentary on the T. A., III, 157-88. to show that Abhinava in the presentation of the twelve Kālīs strictly follows it. We do not know the name of its author.

It follows the authority of another Āgama than the Krama Sadbhāva where the number of Kālīs is mentioned to be Seventeen. This Āgama is quoted by Jayaratha, and it is pointed out that those who held that the Krama Stotra follows the Krama Sadbhāva are wrong.[3]

There was a controversy about the readings in the Krama Stotra as well as about the number of verses in it; and there were many other commentaries on it[4] besides that of Abhinavagupta, called the Kramakeli.

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1. T. A., (Comm.) III, 194.
2. T. A., III, 161.
3. T. A., III, 190–1.
4. Ibid., 202.

(vi) MAHĀNAYA PRAKĀŚA.

The Mahānaya Prakāśa, as the very title indicates, is a work on the Krama system. For, as we have already pointed out, Mahānaya is another name of the Krama. Apart from this, references to it in the Mahārtha Mañjarī are in the context of typical doctrines and views of this system, for instance, (a) body is the greatest seat of Divinity[1] (b) the conception of Bhairavī Mudrā[2] (c) the use of wine, woman and meat in the performance of the ritual[3] (d) importance of the Krama as a way to the realisation of the Ultimate.[4] Therefore, there can be no doubt about its being a work on the Krama system.

This view is supported by the contents also of the work. For, it deals with various goddesses, Vyomeśī, Khecarī etc. (P. 19); various Cakras (Circles) Prakāśa (P. 21) Ānanda (P. 23) Mūrti (P. 24), Vṛnda (P.27) etc., which constitute the distinctive features of the Krama system.

THE AUTHOR.

We do not know the name of its author. Though, on the basis of hearsay, it is attributed to Abhinavagupta by the editor, Mr. Sāmbaśiva Śāstrī, yet it may be pointed out that to mention his name in the introduction and the colophon to each Chapter of big works is the distinctive practice of Abhinavagupta. He refers to himself by name even in small Stotras, like the Bhairava Stava. To accept the Mahānaya Prakāśa to be from the pen of Abhinavagupta, therefore, is against this fact. Even the last lines of the published edition:—

"Etadarthānusāreṇa Stotrabhaṭṭārake mayā
Sphuṭaṁ ye vivṛtāḥ ślokāstat................."

do not seem to support the hearsay, for the following reasons:–

1. M. M., 87.
2. Ibid., 94.
3. Ibid., 120.
4. Ibid., 179.

(i) "Bhaṭṭāraka" is an expression which expresses the feeling of veneration for that in connection with which it is used. Take for instance "Śrīśambhubhaṭṭāraka" (P. S. 58) or "Śeṣabhaṭṭāraka" (P. S. 196). The use of the word "Bhaṭṭāraka" in connection with his own Stotra seems to be against the authorial convention. Abhinavagupta, therefore, who is so well known for the very careful choice of expressions in his works, cannot, without any substantial ground, be supposed to have gone against the convention.

(ii) In the second line occurs the word "Vivṛtāḥ" which means "commented upon." This word, therefore, does not fit in with "Stotrabhaṭṭarake". For, a stotra is a set of verses in praise of the deity, which the author adores. It is not concerned with commenting upon verses. The reading of the verse under discussion, therefore, seems to be corrupt.

(iii) Abhinavagupta, in referring to his own Stotras, refers to them as "Mayaiva Stotre" as in the Parā Triṁśikā Vivaraṇa, pp. 22, 59, 163, 188, 222.

But there is no doubt about it that the Mahānaya Prakāśa belongs to a period near about that in which Abhinavagupta lived. For, with the help of the internal evidence, we can establish that it was written after the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Kārikā by Utpalācārya, who being the grand teacher of Abhinavagupta, is admitted to belong to the first half of the 10th century A. D.; because it quotes from the said work the following line :—

"Prakāśorthoparaktopi sphaṭikādi jaḍopamaḥ" (M. P., 15). And it is evident from the following quotation, given by Jayaratha (close of the 12th and beginning of the 13th century A. D.) :—

"Pūjā nāma na puṣpādhyairyā matiḥ kriyate dṛḍhā
Nirvikalpe mahāvyomni sā pūjā hyādarāllayaḥ"
(T. A., (Comm.) Ah. IV, 124).

which occurs in the Mahānaya Prakāśa p. 45; that it was composed before the close of the 12th century A. D. This conclusion is supported by the additional fact that some of the quotations from the Mahānaya Prakāśa e. g. (i) "Evaṁ vidhaṁ yadadhigantumihātma tattvam" (ii) from 'Prāyohi maithune madye māṁse ca paridṛśyate"—to "Anenaivāśayenātra parabrahmopalabdhaye" (iii) "Anyairāvarakatvena ye bhāvāḥ parivarjitāḥ.", given by Maheśvarānanda (12th century A. D.) in the Mahārtha Mañjarī on pages 179, 120–1, 183, are actually found in the Mahānaya Prakāśa on pages 1, 48, 52, 54, respectively. It is another matter that many others are not traceable there, because the published work is incomplete. These may have occurred in the portion which has not so far been discovered.

The author of the Mahānaya Prakāśa, wrote some other works also on topics, bearing on the Krama system, as is evident from his own references to them such as

"Tatprapañcitamanyatra" M. P., 4.
"Yat stutaṁ stotramālāyām mayaiva" M. P., 47.

ANOTHER MAHĀNAYA PRAKĀŚA.

The Mahānya Prakāśa, which is referred to in the Mahārtha Mañjarī, is different from another work, bearing the same title, which has been published by the Research Department of Kashmir, and is in Kashmiri language. That this work also deals with the Krama system is evident, not only from the title of the work and discussion of the various meanings of the word "Mahānaya" from page 11to 22; but also from the treatment of Vāmeśvarī, Dhāma, Mudrā, Pīṭha, Vṛnda Cakra etc., which are characteristic features of the Krama system.

This work, being written in Kashmiri language, shows that interest in the Krama system was not confined to the

learned only in Kashmir but extended to the laity also : exactly as the Mahārthamañjarī, written in Mahārāṣṭrī language, indicates popular interest in the system in Mahārāṣṭra.

ITS AUTHOR AND HIS TIME.

There is no doubt about the name of the author of the Mahānaya Prakāśa in Kashmiri language, which is called Mahārtha Prakāśa also. For, the author gives his name as Śitikaṇṭhācārya, not only in the colophon to each chapter, but also in the concluding verse of the work wherein he declares that he was able to realise the objective of his life because of following the Krama system.

We know that the Krama system was founded or rather systematised for the first time by Śivānanda in Kashmir at the close of the 7th and the beginning of the 8th century A. D. and that he taught three female ascetics (i) Keyūravatī (ii) Madanikā (iii) Kalyāṇikā. Jayaratha in his commentary on the Tantrāloka quotes a verse, which says that fourteen generations intervened between Keyūravatī and Cakrabhānu :—

"Śrīkeyūravatītaḥ prabhṛti Cakrabhānuśiṣyāntam
Santatayotinayasya prathitā iha ṣoḍaśaivettham."

T. A., Ah. IV, 195.

And Śitikaṇṭhācārya speaks of Cakrabhānu as his grand teacher, who had eight pupils. One of them was Īśānā, who initiated him into the Krama system.

"Śiṣyaughāgraṇīrbhānupādaḥ aṣṭānāṁ śiṣyāṇāṁ prabhuḥ,
yanmadhyādrājñī Īśānākhyā madantaṁ pāramparyanidānam"

(M. P. (K) 107).

That by the word "Bhānu" he means Cakrabhānu, he himself makes clear in the very next page wherein he says :—

"Bhānuḥ—Śrīcakrabhānuḥ"

Thus it is clear that sixteen generations intervened between Śivānanda and Śitikaṇṭhācārya. Allowing, therefore, Twenty-five years for each generation, we come to the conclusion that our author lived about the close of the 12th century A. D.

This discussion on the date of Śitikaṇṭhācārya throws an interesting light on the question : "Was Bhūtirāja, a pupil of Cakrabhānu, the teacher of Abhinavagupta in the Krama system ?" If Cakrabhānu was grand teacher of Śitikaṇṭhācārya and was removed from Śivānanda by fourteen generations and, therefore, belonged to the first half of the 12th century A. D., it would be historically wrong to speak of Bhūtirāja, who was a pupil of Cakrabhānu, as a teacher of Abhinava, who belonged to the second half of the 10th and the first half of the 11th century A. D. Further, only two generations intervened between Śivānanda and Somānanda, who was great grand teacher of Abhinavagupta. Therefore, Abhinava was removed from Śivānanda by five intervening generations only. How can then a pupil of Cakrabhānu, who was removed from Śivānanda by fifteen generations, be spoken of as a teacher of Abhinava ? Bhūtirāja, referred to by Abhinava as his teacher, is different from this Bhūtirāja, a pupil of Cakrabhānu.

(vii) MAHĀNAYA PADDHATI.

The Mahānaya Paddhati is another work of an unknown author dealing with ritualism of the Mahānaya or Krama as the title and reference to it indicate.[1]

1. M. M., 112.

(4) WORKS OF ABHINAVAGUPTA AND HIS SUCCESSORS IN KASHMIR AND COLA.

(i) KRAMAKELI.

The Kramakeli was Abhinavagupta's commentary on the Krama Stotra by an earlier authority. This Stotra is different from that of Abhinavagupta, which also has the same title. It is quoted by Jayaratha to show that the conception of the twelve Kālīs, admitted by the Kula system, is the same as that of the Krama.

It is referred to in the Mahārtha Mañjarī in the following contexts :—

1. The Mahārtha Mañjarī discusses the various forms in which the Svātantryasaṁvit Śakti (the conscious power of freedom[1]) of the Parama Śiva (the Highest Lord) expresses itself. They are Sṛṣṭi, Sthiti, Saṁhāra, Anākhya and Bhāsā. The last is identical with Svātantrya[2]. They are slightly different from the five powers of the Maheśvara, admitted in the Pratyabhijñā system. The difference lies in this that the Krama admits Anākhya and Bhāsā in place of Tirodhāna and Anugraha in the Pratyabhijñā system. Each of these is analysed into various aspects, called Kalās.

Analysing Anākhya, which represents the Parā or, more strictly, Sūkṣmā and the level of experience, represented by which corresponds to the Turīya, it asserts that it has 13 aspects, Kalās or Śaktis.[3] They represent the potential being of the twelve Indriyas, five powers of action, five senses of perception, Manas and Buddhi, and the Ahaṅkāra, the ego-feeling, which is the embodiment of all the twelve, mentioned before. But it points out that these thirteen Kalās, which are referred to as potential thirteen Indriyas, have to be understood, not as those

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1. M. M., 100. 2. Ibid., 105. 3. M. M., 104.

operative in a living organism, but as subtle motions (Parispandatayā) of the twelve forms of the powers of creation etc. together with the Bhāsā, present in the Turīya, as the thirteenth.

In this context he refers to the Kramakeli of Abhinavagupta to support the view that in each of the powers of creation, maintenance and annihilation, the four, Sṛṣṭi, Sthiti, Saṁhāra and Anākhya, are present and, therefore, they are of twelve forms.[1]

2. Second reference comes in the course of discussion on Bhāsā, which is identical with the Svātantrya Śakti and represents the experience at the level of the Turīyātīta, in which the powers have their being as completely identical with the Lord and, therefore, which is characterised by the total absence of determinacy. But it is wrong to assume that the Turīyātīta state is that in which there is no power of consciousness. For, to admit that would mean that it is an insentient state. In this context there is a reference to the Kramakeli in support of the view that the Turīyātīta state is a conscious state.[2]

3. The third reference comes in the context of the discussion on "Mantra". Maheśvarānanda holds that Mantra is that experience which is entirely free from all objective relations, in other words, it is the experience of the Vimarśaśakti. He quotes the Kramakeli in support of his view.[3]

4. The fourth reference is found in the course of the presentation of the Śāmbhavopāya, and accordingly in that of the discussion of the metaphysical view that the entire universe is related to the Ultimate much as reflection is to the reflecting surface like the mirror; the refutation of the Vivartavāda as conceived by the Vedāntin and the interpretation of the Vivarta

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1. M. M., 104. 2. M. M., 106. 3. Ibid., 127.

as a synonym of Pratibimba. Here the Kramakeli is quoted in support of the view that Vivarta means Pratibimba.[1]

5. Maheśvarānanda raises the following question :—

The four sets of Tantras, which have proceeded from the four mouths, Eastern, Western, Northern and Southern, are recognised to be authoritative by those who are well versed in the Śaivāgamas; why then is it that here the study and the following the teachings of that set which proceeded from the top mouth (Ūrdhvavaktra) is emphasised as the primary means to the final emancipation ? And the reply that he gives is that in all the Āgamas Anuttara is recognised to be the ultimate goal; hence Anuttarāmnāya is admitted to be the most important. In this context he quotes from the Kramakeli in support of his[2] view.

6. In the same context the Kramakeli is quoted again in support of the view that Manthāna Bhairava, who is also referred to as Kuleśvara, is capable of doing what is most difficult, independently of all that is external,[3] and is the ultimate resting place of all.

7. The Kramakeli is stated to be the book in which Abhinava presented the view that in the Bhagavadgītā Kṛṣṇa propounded the Krama system to Arjuna[4].

8. And finally Maheśvarānanda quotes the Kramakeli in support of his view that bow (Vandana) means identification with the one to whom one bows.[5]

(ii) KRAMA STOTRA.

This is one of the available works of Abhinavagupta on the Krama system. It is given in Appendix C to this volume.

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1. M. M., 156. 2. M. M., 178. 3. M. M., 179.
4. Ibid. 190. 5. Ibid. 192.

It deals with the twelve goddesses, to be worshipped in Anākhya Cakra. It closely follows the earlier Krama Stotra by an unknown author.

(iii) DEHASTHA DEVATĀCAKRA STOTRA.

According to the Krama system the body itself is to be worshipped as the seat of divinity (Pīṭha) and its different constituents have to be identified with different gods such as Gaṇapati and Vaṭuka.[1] Abhinavagupta in the Dehasthadevatācakra Stotra makes an obeisance to each one of these deities. According to this, Prāṇa is to be identified with Gaṇapati : Apāna with Vaṭuka : Cit with Ānanda Bhairava : Vimarśa with Ānanda Bhairavī : Buddhi with Brahmāṇī : Ahaṅkṛti with Śāmbhavī : Manas with Kaumārī : Śabda with Vaiṣṇavī : skin (Tvak) with Vārāhī : eye (Dṛk) with Indrāṇī : tongue (Jihvā) with Cāmuṇḍā : nose (Ghrāṇa) with Mahālakṣmī. This work, therefore, points out the different parts of the body which have to be identified with different deities, according to the Krama system.

It may be pointed out here that this practice of the Krama system to identify parts of the body with various deities is common to the Vedic rituals.

(iv) COMMENTARY ON KRAMA SŪTRA.

Kṣema Rāja, a well known pupil of Abhinavagupta, is famous for his writings on the Pratyabhijñā system. Now our careful study reveals that he was an equally authoritative writer on the Krama system also. That he wrote a commentary on the Krama Sūtra, we learn from a reference to and quotation from it in the Mahārtha Mañjarī. Herein he asserted that a a perfect Yogin has the experience of the perfect self even from

1. M. M., 88.

the experience of what is objective, because he looks upon it as himself.[1] He seems to have written some other works also on this system ; for instance, the one is that in which he discussed Pañcavāha etc., the ideas of which have been borrowed by Maheśvarānanda, according to his own admission.[2]

(v) KRAMA VĀSANĀ.

The Krama Vāsanā was a work from the pen of the grand teacher of Maheśvarānanda. It is known from the two references to and quotations from it in the Mahārtha Mañjarī. The one occurs in the course of pointing out the successive stages in the realisation of the Ultimate. According to this, the identification with Prāṇa precedes drying up of the impurities, which is followed by their burning up, which consists in the removal of their residual traces and leads to the self-realisation.[3] The other comes in the course of the presentation of a peculiar conception of Aṅganyāsa as the indeterminate grasp of all determinate ideas such as those of different parts of the body.[4]

(vi) ṚJUVIMARŚINĪ.

The Ṛjuvimarśinī was a commentary on the Nityāṣoḍaṣikārṇava Tantra, as is clear from Bhāskararāya's commentary on it,[5] from the pen of the grand-teacher of Maheśvarānanda, whose name is not mentioned. That it was a commentary on the said Āgama is evident from the following quotation from the Āgama and commentary on it with the remark that the Āgamic quotation has been explained by my grand-teacher in the Ṛjuvimarśinī as follows :—

Yaduktamāgame "Caturājñākośabhūtaṁ" iti yacca vyākhyā-

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1. M. M., 166. 2. Ibid. 90. 3. M. M., 115.
4. M. M., 117. 5. N. S. A., 22.

tamasmatparamagurubhiḥ Śrīmadṛjuvimarśinyām "Catuṣpīṭhādhiṣṭhātṛ . ..." M. M., 178.

Another quotation[1] from it shows that it was a work on the Krama system. For, it is in justification of use of Prākṛta by Maheśvarānanda in his Mahārtha Mañjarī and the admission that the system arose in Kashmir. It runs as follows :—

Sampradāyasyāsya Kāśmīrodbhūtatvāt prākṛtabhāṣāviśeṣatvācca yathāsampradāyaṁ vyavahāra ityupadeśaḥ. (M. M., 193)

Other references to it come in the contexts of typical views of the Krama system :—

(a) The conception of Pūjā as the realisation of the entire objectivity as resting on the Cit.[2]
(b) The object of worship is one's own true self.[3]
(c) The Parā is the essential nature of the Parama Śiva.[4]

(vii) MAHĀRTHA MAÑJARĪ AND (viii) MAHĀRTHODAYA.

On Maheśvarānanda's Mahārtha Mañjarī we have already written in an earlier section and shown that Mahārtha is another name of Mahānaya, which is very frequently used for the Krama. The other work of this author on this system is Mahārthodaya as the very title and reference to it on page 108 and a quotation from it on page 132 show.

(ix) TANTRĀLOKA. VIVEKA.

Jayaratha in his commentary, the Viveka, on the Tantrāloka of Abhinavagupta, gives very valuable information on the Krama system, particularly in Āhnika IV, in which Abhinava discusses the Krama system as a sister system to Kula or Trika.

1. M. M., 193.
2. M. M., 112.
3. Ibid. 123.
4. Ibid. 129.

Jayaratha inherited the tradition[1] of the Krama system, which was unbroken up to his time, from his teacher.

KRAMA SYSTEM AS ONE OF THE EARLIEST SYSTEMS OF KASHMIR.

The period from the close of the 7th to the 12th century A. D. was a period of intense philosophical speculation in Kashmir. Many systems, all based on the Āgamas and the results of the spiritual experiments, according to the method, prescribed in the Yoga Pāda, arose, or to be more accurate, were built up during this period. One recognised Śakti to be the ultimate principle, though its followers called themselves Śaivas. Such a system is criticised by Somānanda in his Śiva Dṛṣṭi in Chapter III. It was allied or akin to the monistic Śaivaism, propounded by Somānanda, because he refers to its followers as "Svayūtyhya"[2], belonging to the same herd or group, as that to which he himself belonged. He criticises this Śākta system and points out that the admission of Śakti as distinct from Parā (Parā Saṁvid), as a little grossification of it, means the admission of a substratum of Śakti and, therefore, of Śiva.[3]

Another system that developed in Kashmir, though it originated in Kāmarūpa, as has been pointed out in the 1st part, dealing with the history of this system in Chapter V, was the Kula. The Parātriṁśikā is a work, which deals with Akula, Kula and Kaulikī Śakti and, therefore, without much fear of contradiction may be recognised to be a work on the Kula system. Somānanda commented on it.[4] But Somānanda's commentary was difficult. Abhinavagupta, therefore, wrote another commentary on it and many others also wrote

1. T. A., III, 198.
2. S. Dr., 94.
3. S. Dr., 95.
4. P. T. V., 16.

their own commentaries. It appears that after Somānanda, the tradition of the Kula system in Kashmir was ignored. Abhinavagupta, therefore, felt the necessity of going out of Kashmir to Jālandhara to inherit its tradition from Śambhunātha. We do not know of another person earlier than Somānanda, who wrote on the Kula system. The existence of this system in Kashmir, therefore, cannot be recognised in a period earlier than the second half of the 9th century A. D.

The third system, which is known as the Pratyabhijñā, originated in Kashmir from the pen of Somānanda and was recognised to be a new system by his pupil, Utpalācārya, who elaborated it in his Īśvara pratyabhijñā Kārikā and two commentaries on it.

The Spanda branch was revealed to Vasugupta by Śiva through an inscription in the first half of the 9th century A. D.

The tradition of the Krama system, however, as we have pointed out earlier, goes back to the close of the 7th and the beginning of the 8th century A. D. and continued unbroken in Kashmir so much so that Abhinava found a teacher of this branch, Lakṣmaṇagupta, in Kashmir. On the basis of the available evidence, therefore, we admit the Krama system to be one of the oldest monistic systems of Kashmir.

THE TWO TRADITIONS OF THE KRAMA SYSTEM.

It appears that there were two traditions of the Krama system. One recognised Śiva to be the ultimate principle and, therefore, admitted the Vyomavāmeśvarī etc. to be manifestations of Śiva.[1] The other held Kālī or Kālasaṅkarṣiṇī to be the ultimate reality, pervading and completely swaying all,

1. M. M., 89.

including the Vyomavāmeśvarī. She is recognised to be the seventeenth Kalā and to be essentially light of consciousness (Prakāśa) and freedom (Vimarśa). These two tendencies are reflected in the Āgamas also, as we have pointed out earlier. For, in some Āgamas or the portions of them Devī, Pārvatī, or Bhairavī is the speaker and in others Śiva is so. On account of the tendency to emphasise the Śakti or Kālī, this system is referred to as Kālīnaya or Devīnaya.

Somānanda was opposed to accepting Kālī or Śakti as the ultimate principle on account of the convention of the grammarians, who held that feminine gender is a particular form of the masculine and, therefore, is dependent on it. He maintained that the reference to the Ultimate Reality in the feminine gender is due to the excessive devotion of the Śāktas to the Śakti.[1]

And Somānanda was a great influencial thinker of Kashmir and was one of the early exponents of the Krama system, as we have shown in the historical part. Naturally, therefore, it seems, he lent his support to that tradition of the Krama system, found in the Āgamas, which maintained Śiva to be the ultimate principle. But others stuck to the other tradition. Hence we find both the traditions persisting.

Abhinavagupta in his Tantrāloka upholds that tradition of the Krama, which accepted the Kālī to be the ultimate principle. He identifies Kālī with Parā (Parā Saṁvid) and asserts that Parā Saṁvid herself is called Kālī on account of performing the five acts, Kṣepa, Jñāna, Prasaṅkhyāna, Gati and Nāda in succession. He, therefore, it is clear, does not consider the objection of Somānanda against accepting Kālī as the highest principle to be very sound.

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1. S. Dr. (F. N.) 94.

Maheśvarānanda, however, though accepting the Kālasaṅkarṣaṇī to be the all-pervasive principle in the main, does not attach much importance to the gender and refers to Parameśvara as the spring of the five currents (Vāhāḥ parameśvarasya sphuraṇa dhārāḥ. M. M. 99). But while explaining the reason why he deals with the Mahārtha or Krama in seventy verses in the Mahārtha Mañjarī, he asserts that he does so because the Reality appears to mystics in seventy forms,[1] sixty-four constituting the Vṛnda Cakra, five, referred to as Pañcavāhāḥ, plus Kālasaṅkarṣiṇī, which pervades all and of which the sixty-nine are the manifestations. In fact he identifies the Siddha Yoginī, which appeared to him while he was contempleting, with Kālasaṅkarṣaṇī[2] and, therefore, seems to be more inclined to accept Kālasaṅkarṣaṇī or Kālī to be the ultimate principle than Parameśvara.

THE ŚĀKTA TENDENCY IN THE KRAMA SYSTEM.

There are two characteristic features of Śāktism (i) recognition of the ultimate principle to be the female (ii) the use of "Pañcamakāra"–Matsya (fish) Madirā (wine) Māṁsa (meat) Mudrā (symbolic presentation with hands etc.) and Maithuna (sex- union)–in the performance of ritual. And we have pointed out in the foregoing pages that one of the two traditions of this school accepted the Kālī to be the ultimate principle. It may be added here that it advocated the use of wine, meat and woman in the performance of the ritual.[3]

THE PROBLEM OF MORAL TURPITUDE IN THE KRAMA RITUAL.

Śāktism has been condemned by the contemporaries on account of moral turpitude, as they think, involved in the

1. M. M., 198. 2. Ibid. 192. 3. M. M., 182.

performance of its rituals, because in them wine, woman and meat are enjoined to be used. This condemnation is simply an echo of the earlier, which was common in the days of Abhinavagupta also. The two of the systems, on which he has written, the Krama and the Kula, have this feature in common with Śāktism. Abhinavagupta, therefore, undertook to explain how it does not mean moral turpitude.

He points out that the use of wine is common to the Vedic rituals also. For instance, in the performance of the sacrifice, called Śautrāmaṇi,[1] the use of wine is enjoined. Similarly in the Naramedha a Brāhmaṇa is enjoined to kill a Brāhmaṇa.[2] And in the hoary past the sages are said to have eaten not only beef but human flesh also.[3] The problem of moral turpitude in the performance of rituals, because of their involving acts which are not right from the ethical point of view, is common to the Vedic rituals also. In attempting a solution of this common problem he raises the basic problem : Is a thing by its nature pure, holy (Śuddha) or impure, unholy (Aśuddha) : ? or putting it in ethical terms : "Is an action by its nature right or wrong ?" And he attempts to solve it as follows :—

Purity or impurity (Śuddhi or Aśuddhi) is not the essential quality or nature of any object. For, in that case the purification of a thing, of which the scriptures talk, would be impossible, because the essential nature cannot change, but if it changes it is not essential. Purity and impurity have, therefore, to be admitted to be the ideas of a particular subject, which are firmly associated with a thing. This alone can explain why what is pure (Śuddha) to one person is not so to another.[4] For, the idea of purity of one thing and impurity of another is inspired by the scripture in which an individual has faith.

1. T. A., III, 272.
2. Ibid., 274.
3. Ibid., 268.
4. T. A., (Comm.) III, 272.

The Śaiva conception of purity and impurity is philosophical. According to this, whatever is recognised to be one with the Saṁvid is pure and what is not so recognised is impure. Hence to those who look upon the whole universe as identical with self, the distinction between pure and impure does not exist.[1]

THE USE OF PROHIBITED AS A TEST OF SELF-REALISATION.

A person, who has realised the whole universe as identical with himself, has to test whether this realisation is factual or not. And, therefore, he is enjoined to make use of that, the use of which is prohibited by the Śāstra and is condemned by the worldly people, to find out if his realisation of the oneness of all with self is true.[2] Accordingly some sages are said to have eaten the beef and even the flesh of man. It is this conception of Śuddhi that alone can justify the smelling and drinking of wine in the Vedic sacrifice, Sautrāmaṇi,[3] and the sacrifice of a Brāhmaṇa by a Brāhmaṇa.[4]

These rituals, which required the use of the prohibited or performance of acts which from the ethical point of view are wrong, were strictly guarded secrets and were meant for the few, who had reached the spiritual level at which the distinction between right and wrong or holy and polluted completely disappears, so that the unqualified may not perform them and disturb the ethical social order. In fact the common man is prohibited to do what is meant for the spiritually great.[5]

THE KRAMA AS A PENTADIC SYSTEM.

The Krama system is a pentadic system in so far as it thinks in terms of groups of five concepts, ideas or postulates (Pañcā-

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1. T. A., (Comm.) III, 266. 2. Ibid. 269.
3. T. A., III, 272. 4. Ibid. 274. 5. T. A., III, 269–70.

rthakrama padavī. M. M., 98). It was recognised as such by Kṣemarāja,[1] whom Maheśvarānanda follows. Thus the basic pentade, which represents the five forms, in which the Absolute manifests itself (Parameśvarasya sphuraṇadhārāḥ) and is referred to as Pañcavāha, consists of Vyomavāmeśvari, Khecarī, Dikcarī, Gocarī and Bhūcarī. The powers of the Lord, which the Krama system recognises, are five; they are powers of creation, maintenance, annihilation, unnamable and freedom (Sṛṣṭi, Sthiti, Saṁhāra, Anākhya and Bhāsā). The aspects of speech, which were recognised to be three by Bhartṛhari and four by Somānanda, are admitted to be five by this system : they are Parā, Sūkṣmā, Paśyantī, Madhyamā and Vaikharī. The groups, which are enjoined to be contemplated upon are five. They are Śrīpīṭha, Pañcavāha, Netratraya, Vṛndacakra and Gurupaṅkti.[2] And the subjective powers or aspects of the Absolute are also held to be five, They are Cit, Ānanda, Icchā, Jñāna and Kriyā.

This pentadic tendency finds expression in an attempt to interpret even those groups, which are admitted to consist of more than five, as essentially identical with the basic pentade. Thus though Śrīpīṭha consists of nine aspects (Kalā) (1) original subjective stir (Ādyaspanda) (2) extrovert subjective tendency (Prasaraṇaunmukhyarūpā śaktiḥ) (3) the stir of the means of knowledge, the powers of perception (Pramāṇasphuraṇarūpaḥ kaścidindriyamayaḥ parispandaḥ) (4) the rise of the tendency in the means to apprehend determinately (Vastuvyavasthātmikā tatsphurattā) (5) awareness of the objective, which, looked at from the philosophical point of view, falls within the five elements. The objective, therefore, being divided into five, makes up the total nine. This group of nine is held to be identical with that of the five by ignoring the division of the objective into five elements.[3]

1. M. M., 90. 2. M. M., 86. 3. M. M., 88.

Similarly three eyes (of Śiva) (Netratraya), right, left, and in the forehead, which symbolically represent the three aspects of the universe, the subject, the means and the object, and are referred to as Mūrti, Prakāśa and Ānanda Cakras respectively, are identified with Pañcavāha. For, the Khecarī, the individual subjective power, presupposes the Vyomavāmeśvarī, the universal subjective power : and the Prakāśa Cakra, which stands for the means of knowledge, is the union of Dikcarī and Gocarī[1] which represent the powers of senses of perception and of organs of action respectively. And Vṛnda Cakra also is admitted to consist of five groups (1) Jñānasiddhas, (2) Mantrasiddhas, (3) Melāpasiddhas, (4) Śāktasiddhas and (5) Śāmbhavasiddhas. We shall explain the technical terms in the proper context.

THE CAUSE OF THE PENTADIC TENDENCY.

The pentadic tendency that we find in the Krama system is not exclusively its own. There is another Śaiva system, called Lakulīśa Pāśupata, which propounds dualism-cum-monism (Bhedābheda) and shows this tendency, as has been shown in the Bhāskarī Vol. III. PP. CXII and CXXXIV ff. In this case the pentadic tendency was inspired by the five Mantras of the Taittirīya Āraṇyaka, which supplied the material for the conception of the five aspects of Śiva to be contemplated at the five stages on the path to final emancipation. This trend was followed in the Gaṇa Kārikā, which gives the summary of the fundamentals of the system in eight pentades.

The Krama system, however, seems to have been made to think in terms of pentades by the original conception of the five functions of the ultimate principle, called Kālī, i. e.

1. M. M., 91-2.

Kṣepa, Jñāna, Prasaṅkhyāna, Gati and Nāda or by the mythical conception of the five faces of Śiva.

ESSENTIAL IDENTITY OF THE PENTADES.

The Krama system distinguishes between Parā Saṁvid and Parā Vāk. The former is the Absolute and the latter is an aspect of it and is conceived as identical with Vimarśa or freedom. The Parāsaṁvid, Kālasaṅkarṣaṇī or Kālī as unity of consciousness and freedom (Prakāśavimarśamaya) expresses itself in five basic forms, which are spoken of differently from different points of view. The system is primarily concerned with pointing out the purification of the determinate idea or thought so as to reduce it to indeterminacy, as the way to final emancipation. The basic forms, admitted by it, are, therefore, naturally those which are responsible for the rise of determinate idea as well as for its such purification as removes all that gives determinacy to it and makes it shine as indeterminacy. Such forms are five, Vyomavāmeśvarī, etc., because they are admitted to be capable of revealing the true nature of the self as well as concealing it.[1]

But it holds that from different points of view they appear differently. Thus from the point of view of the powers of the Absolute they appear as Cit, Ānanda, Icchā, Jñāna and Kriyā: from that of the grossification of the Absolute, through various stages, into gross sound, they appear as Parā, Sūkṣmā, Paśyantī, Madhyamā and Vaikharī[2]: from that of the powers which are responsible for manifesting the universe in various states, they are called Sṛṣṭi, Sthiti, Saṁhāra, Anākhya and Bhāsā.

It also recognises the identity of these basic forms with the five aspects of the articulate sound in its rise from the

1. M. M., 25.   2. M., M., 89–90.

origin, i. e. Vimarśa, Vindu, Nāda, sphoṭa and Śabda. This is the view that was presented by the followers of Abhinavagupta, such as Kṣemarāja, in the presentation of the Krama system. It persisted in the tradition that was inherited by Maheśvarānanda.

DIFFERENCE OF VIEWS ON THE ASPECTS OF SPEECH (VĀK).

The systems of philosophy differed from one another in regard to the aspects of speech (Vāk). The philosophy of grammar, presented by Bhartṛhari in his Vākyapadīyam, admitted three only, Paśyantī, Madhyamā and Vaikharī. Somānanda, the founder of the Pratyabhijñā school of Kashmir, criticised the grammarian's view that the Paśyantī is the highest and subtlest aspect and added Parā to the three, accepted by Bhartṛhari. But the Krama system, being a pentadic system, adds one more to the four i. e. Sūkṣmā and puts it between Parā and Paśyantī.

It may be pointed out here that these five aspects of speech were admitted by the Siddhānta Śaivas as follows :—

The Siddhānta Śaivas admit three primary categories : Pati, Pāśa and Paśu. Under Pāśa they subsume five dependent categories : Mala, Māyā, Karma, Nirodhaśakti and Vindu. The last, the Vindu, is a very important concept in the Siddhānta Śaivaism. It is very closely connected with various aspects of speech, Parā, Paśyantī etc., discussed by grammarians, like Bhartṛhari and Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa, as also by the founder of the Pratyabhijñā school of Kashmir. In fact, Vindu is recognised to be synonymous with Parā[1] and Vaikharī, Madhyamā, Paśyantī and Sūkṣmā are admitted to be its evolutes. As the Sūkṣmā is very little known, it is necessary to state here what it means.

Sūkṣmā is self-luminous. It is the most intimately connected

1. R. Tr., 30.

limiting condition of the individual subject. It is so united with the subject that it is not easily distinguishable. It is present even in the state of deep sleep. The realisation of its distinction from the limited subject (Puruṣa) definitely leads to the liberatīon.[1]

In regard to it there is difference of opinion between the grammarians, who admit the Śabda Brahma (Sound-Absolute) and the Siddhānta Śaivas. The former hold that it is the sixteenth aspect of the limited subject and as such it is inherently present in him. But the Siddhānta Śaivas hold that it is an evolute of Bindu, and therefore, freedom from it is necessary for the attainment of the final emancipation. For detailed information about the Bindu, the reader may refer to the Bhāsakarī Vol. III, PP. LXXXV–XCIX.

Thus the Krama system in its conception of the five aspects of speech seems to have been influenced by the Siddhānta Śaivaism. In any case, the five aspects are common to both the systems, though there are bound to be differences in this regard on account of the one being a monistic and the other a dualistic system as we shall point out in the sequal.

Another point, to which the attention of the reader has to be drawn, is that in identifying Parā etc. with the five aspects of the Supreme, the Krama system agrees with the Pratyabhijñā. For, in the latter also Citi is identified with the Parā Vāk (Citiḥ pratyavamarśātmā Parā Vāk svarasoditā. Bh., Vol. I, 250). And Paśyantī is identified by Somānanda with Sadāśiva (Athāsmākaṁ jñānaśaktiryā sadāśivarūpatā/Vaiyākaraṇa sādhūnām paśyantī sā parā sthitiḥ. Ś. Dr., 36.).

THE RISE OF THE ADDITIONAL TWO ASPECTS OF SPEECH EXPLAINED.

We know that Bhartṛhari admitted three aspects only of

1. R. Tr., 30–32.

speech (i) Paśyantī (ii) Madhyamā (iii) Vaikharī. The question, therefore, naturally arises : what were the influences, which were responsible for the rise of the conception of the additional two aspects (i) Sūkṣmā and (ii) Parā ?

We shall show in the course of our presentation of the Kula system that it was Somānanda, who logically established the conception of Parā as different from and higher than that of Paśyantī, after the criticism of Bhartṛhari's view of Paśyantī as the highest aspect of speech, as the Sound–Absolute.

Somānanda points out that 'Paśyantī', being derived from the root "Dṛś to see", necessarily has objective reference, because "Dṛś" is a transitive verb. It involves the duality of the seer and the seen and, therefore, to admit it as the Ultimate is inconsistent with the monistic view, upheld by the Philosophers of grammar.

It appears that even those early exponents of the philosophy of language who admitted three aspects only of speech, such as Bhartṛhari, were concerned with the ultimate aspect of speech, which they held to be Paśyantī, not only as the metaphysical principle, but also as the ultimate origin of the articulate sound, produced by human organism. This is very clear from Somānanda's criticism of the view of the Vaiyākaraṇas, which may be stated as follows :—

Somānanda asks the Vaiyākaraṇa who admits Paśyantī to be the highest aspect of speech : "Does the Paśyantī exist in the body only, or outside also i. e. every where ?" And points out that neither of the two alternatives is rationally sound. For, the admission of the first alternative would mean the acceptance of the view that it is limited. The second makes the other two aspects, Madhyamā and Vaikharī, useless, because in the latter two also the being of the Paśyantī will have

to be admitted. To justify the admission of the Madhyamā and Vaikharī on the ground that in those states Paśyantī functions, not independently, but as necessarily in co-operation with Nāda and Bindu, would go against the conception of its independence.

Paśyantī kiṁ śarīrentarbahiḥ sarvatra vā sthitā
Antaravyāpitā tasyā bāhye kim madhyamādinā
Prasarennādabindvādi sāpekṣā cedanīśvarī. Ś. Dṛ., 63.

Further, there is another question that the Vaiyākaraṇa has to answer if he admits the Paśyantī to be in the body : "Does each body have a separate Paśyantī or one pervasive Paśyantī is present in all the bodies ?" The former position would mean the admission of many Paśyantīs and, therefore, is inconsistent with the monistic view, upheld by the Vaiyākaraṇa. The latter would make it impossible to explain why the all-pervasive Paśyantī, setting the vital air in motion, does not do so in all organisms, because of its pervasiveness, and why, therefore, all organisms do not produce the sound simultaneously. For, in case the Paśyantī be admitted to set the vital air in a particular organism alone in motion and not in others, duality of its essential nature will have to be admitted : and such an admission is against the accepted monistic view. Nor can it be said that the diversity of the Paśyantī is not real but simply due to the relationship with different bodies, much as is the apparent diversity of a crystal, because of its being affected by various things at different times. For, it is admitted by the Vaiyākaraṇas that the diverse forms, which are due to the different relations and affections, are not real and, therefore, can have no causal efficiency.

Pratideham pṛthak kiṁ sā sarvatraikyena vā sthitā
Nānātvaṁ tatpṛthaktvena tadaikyātsamaśabdatā
Śarīraiḥ pravibhāgaścettanyasatyāni te sthitiḥ.

Ś. Dṛ., 64.

The view—that the earlier exponents of the philosophy of language, who maintained that there are three aspects only of speech, admitted the relation of the Paśyantī with human organism to account for the motion of the vital air, necessary for the production of the articulate sound,—seems to find support in the assertion by a later authority on the subject, who admitted four aspects of speech, including the Parā, and whose view is quoted by Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa in his Parama Laghu Mañjūṣā as follows :—

Parāvāṅmūlacakrasthā Paśyantī nābhisaṁsthitā
Hṛdisthā Madhyamā jñeyā Vaikharī kaṇṭhadeśagā.
P. L. M., 11.

A similar view seems to be propounded by Kṣemarāja in his commentary on the Sāmba Pañcāśikā, verse 4. The interesting thing about it is that while quoting the verse :—

"Avibhāgā tu paśyantī sarvataḥ saṁhṛtakramā
Svarūpajyotirevāntaḥ sūkṣmā vāganapāyinī."

he, as a follower of Abhinavagupta, interprets "Sūkṣmā", not as standing for a separate aspect of speech, but as an adjunct of Paśyantī. Similarly he explains "Svarūpajyotiḥ" also, not as a definition of "Sūkṣmā", but as a compound qualifying Paśyantī :—

"Svarūpajyotirūpām paśyantyākhyām."
(S. P., Comm. 4.)

This is by the way. The point that is to be carefully noted is that he holds Parā to be in the Suṣumṇā or Madhyadhāma.

"Mitrāvaruṇasadanāt agnīṣomamayātmanaḥ
Parā-vāk pradhānāt."

Kṣemarāja clearly admits that the letters arise first from the Parā, which is also referred to as "Cijjyotiḥ" in union with the subtle vital air which occupies a subordinate position.

"Prāṇaprasaṅgāt prasūtānudbhūtān (Varṇān) Tatra cijjyotiṣi guṇībhūtasūkṣmaprāṇasaṅgāt..........."

From all this it is clear that there was a tradition that admitted the relation of the highest aspect of speech, whether it was accepted to be Parā or Paśyantī, with the body to account for the rise of the articulate sound. The criticism of Somānanda, against the relation of the highest aspect of speech with body, which seems to have been a matter of tradition, had to be answered. And the attempt to answer it seems to have led to the postulation of the Sūkṣmā as the fifth aspect of speech, distinct from both Parā and Paśyantī. In fact Rāmakaṇṭha, in his Nāda Kārikā, while attempting to justify the admission of Nāda, which he holds to be identical with Sūkṣmā, distinctly refers to the problem "why at the time of the rise of the determinate thought, which is possible with the rise of speech only, in one person, similar thought does not rise in all, as his commentator elucidates :—

Iha hi eka puruṣa vimarśakāle sarveṣām tadudayādarśanāt parasparatobhinnasvabhāvaiḥ paśvātmabhirhetubhūtaiḥ pratyavasthābhinnā eva nādāḥ saṁvedyante." N. K., 10.

SŪKṢMĀ AS IDENTICAL WITH NĀDA.

The dualist Śaiva accounts for the rise of the articulate sound, not in terms of Parā, such as is recognised by the monists as identical with Vimarśa, but in terms of a condition of the limited subject, techenically called "Nāda" which is an evolute of Bindu, the first dependent category of "Pāśa".

Nāda is undifferentiated unity of all expressions and meanings. It is as innumerable as are the individual subjects. It is insentient, though self-luminous, because it is an evolute of Bindu, a dependent category of Pāśa, which is insentient.

Epistemically it is the seed of entire 'knowledge' which is signified by words at the empirical level. The various forms of knowledge are the forms of Nāda, and the individual subject grasps the objects determinately because it is related to Nāda. 'Knowledge', therefore, that a limited subject has, does not belong to him inherently, but to a limiting condition of him, the Nāda. Here the Nādavādin fundamentally differs from the Vaiśeṣika, according to whom the relation between the limited subject and the knowledge is that of inherence.

Nāda, as the cause of the articulate sound, manifests Akṣara Bindu, the set of subtle sound-images, undifferentiably united with a meaning, as soon as desire for the expression of a thought arises in the subject. The Nāda as the undifferentiated unity of all words and meanings is called Śūkṣmā. The Akṣara Bindu, the undifferentiated unity of a particular set of sounds and its meaning, which is manifested by Nāda or Śūkṣmā, is called Paśyantī. Madhyamā is nothing but a clear picture of the successive letters, which constitute a word. It is prior to the activity of vital air, which is responsible for the gross audible sound. And Vaikharī is the audible sound which is due to vital air, checked at different places of articulation and let off.

The dualistic Śaivas thus answered the question "Why articulate sound is not produced from all organisms simultaneously ?" by postulating Nāda or Śūkṣmā, as a separate limiting condition of each individual subject, capable of manifesting Akṣara-Bindu.

Another point that is important in this connection is that the dualist Śaivas admit that Bindu, which is also called Para-Nāda, is the cause of the Nāda or Śūkṣmā, and call it Parā. Thus we find that all the five aspects of speech, of which the Krama system talks, were admitted by some of the dualist Śaivas, though others identified Bindu with Kriyāśakti, and

Parā with Śūkṣmā and, therefore, held the aspects of speech to be four only.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE KRAMA AND DUALIST ŚAIVAISM ON THE CONCEPTION OF THE ASPECTS OF SPEECH.

The Krama system does not admit the five aspects of speech to be insentient as do the dualist Śaivas; because of their identifying Parā with Bindu, a dependent category of Pāśa, which is insentient; and because of their holding Nāda or Śūkṣmā to be a limited manifestation of Bindu, such as constitutes a limiting condition of the individual subject and manifests itself as Akṣara–Bindu etc. On the contrary, it holds them to be sentient in so far as it identifies Paśyantī, Madhyamā and Vaikharī with the powers of will, knowledge and action respectively; conceives Śūkṣmā to be nothing more than the undifferentiated unity of all the three, similar to that of various colours in the Yolk of peacock's egg; and, therefore, maintains Sūkṣmā to be the first movement or stir in the Universal Consciousness :—

> Śūkṣmā tu śikhaṇḍyaṇḍarasanyāyāt uktavāktrayaśavalībhāvasvabhāvā pratyagdṛṣṭuḥ parameśvarasya udyogalakṣaṇā vṛttiriti ākhyāyate. M. M., 129.

And finally it identifies Parā with Vimarśa.

KĀLĪ AS THE ULTIMATE METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLE.

The word Kālī is derived from the root Kala to throw out (Kala kṣepe), or Kala to go or to know (Kala gatau), or Kaḷa to count (Kala saṁkhyāne) or Kala to sound (Kala śabde). Thus the word Kālī has five meanings :—

(i) One that externally manifests what lies within : (ii) that grasps what is so manifested as identical with itself : (iii) that marks out the manifested as distinct from one another as

"It is this and not not-this" : (iv) that manifests the manifested as related to itself much in the same manner as the reflection is to the reflecting surface such as mirror etc. : (v) that brings about the disappearance of all that is manifested and shines in its true original form as pure self-consciousness (Nadanamātra).[1]

In spite of manifesting itself in various forms it remains free from succession and simultaneity; its essential nature as Parā saṁvid remains unaffected. For, the time has being in relation to the limited subject only. As succession and simultaneity presuppose time, they can have no reference to the unlimited.

The Kālī, the ultimate principle, performing the aforesaid five functions, is called Mātṛsadbhāva, Vyomavāmeśvarī or Kālakarṣaṇī, for the following reasons :—

(I) The Krama system maintains that all that figures in any experience, may it be the subject, the object, the means of knowledge or knowledge itself, and even that which is beyond the experience of the limited subject, is the manifestation or expression of the universal, conscious and free energy, exactly as all that figures in dream is the expression of the limited dreaming individual. Accordingly it asserts that just as the various experiences and their objects etc. which the different individuals, figuring in dream, have, are nothing but the forms in which the mind of the dreaming individual expresses or manifests itself, so all experiences of all living beings and all that these experiences presuppose and imply are manifestations or expressions of the universal, conscious and free energy.

From this philosophical point of view the Krama system calls the Kālī by the name of Mātṛsadbhāva, because it admits

1. T. A., III, 203–5.

that the Ultimate, the free, self-luminous and conscious energy, manifests itself preponderently in succession in the forms of twelve Kālīs in the experience of the limited subject, in consequence of which the individual realises itself as the universal subject and attains liberation, the oneness with the free and self-luminous consciousness.[1] In popular language, however, we would say that the individual attains liberation after the experience of the twelve forms of Kālī in succession.

(II) The Kālī is called Vyomavāmeśvarī, because she is the Ultimate power that manifests all pentades.[2] She is nothing but the power of consciousness (Cit-Śakti), which is perfectly free and in terms of which every phenomenon is to be accounted for.[3] She is the highest reality. She shines in every thing. Nothing can have being independently of her.[4]

The Krama system is very much allied to the Kula system so much so that the teachings of this system are referred to as Kaulkī Vidyā in the Niśāṭana Tantra. It is recognised to be an aspect of the Kula system, which was revealed by the Kālī in her incarnation as Vāmeśvarī. Hence for this additional reason also, Kālī is called Vāmeśvarī[5] or Vyomavāmeśvarī.

The various systems which arose in Kashmir, are primarily concerned with the explanation of the Parā. Somānanda, accounting for the rise of the gross, articulate and meaningful sound (Vaikharī), held that its ultimate source is the Parā,[6] and that there are two intermediate stages, between Parā and Vaikharī, each succeeding being grosser than the preceding, and called them Paśyantī and Madhyamā. The exponents of the Pratyabhijñā system, attempting to account for the entire

1. T. A., III, 206.
2. M.M., 89.
3. Ibid 90.
4. Ibid, 91.
5. T. A., III, 207.
6. S. Dr., 92.

universe from the metaphysical point of view, held the Parā to be identical with the power of freedom (Svātantrya Śakti) and maintained the whole universe to be its manifestation.[1]

The Kula system, following its own technique, represented it to be identical with the Kaulikī Śakti with which the Akula, the Anuttara, is inseparably ever united.[2]

The Krama system is concerned with the purification of the determinate idea as a means to the final emancipation. Therefore, analysing the process from the gross determinacy to the final indeterminacy, it held the Parā[3] to be the final indeterminacy to be realised, called it Mahābhairava Caṇḍograghorakālī, asserted that the final indeterminacy is reached through eleven stages, which are all manifestations of Parā Saṁvid and called them Sṛṣṭikālī etc. as has been stated elsewhere.

But the purification presupposes the existence of what is purified. Accounting, therefore, for the rise of the determinate idea (Vikalpa), the purification of which it enjoins, the Krama system conceived the Parā Saṁvid as Vāmeśvarī, as the manifester of what is essential for the rise of determinate idea, held that it has four powers which are responsible for the rise of determinate idea and called them Khecarī (the subjective power) Dikcarī (the power of internal senses) Gocarī (the power of external senses) and Bhūcarī (the power that is responsible for the external world.)[4]

Thus Vyomavāmeśvarī is nothing but Cicchakti in so far as it is responsible for the manifestation of all that is necessary for the rise of the phenomenon of knowledge, the subject, the internal and external means and the object.[5] These very five powers from metaphysical and mystical points of view

1. Bh., Vol. I, 250. 2. T. A., II, 74-5.
3. T. A., II, 186-7. 4. M.M., 25. 5. Ibid, 89.

are experienced and are spoken of as Cit, Ānanda, Icchā, Jñāna and Kriyā. In accounting for the rise of the articulate and meaningful sound, they are called Parā, Sūkṣmā, Paśyantī, Madhyamā and Vaikharī : in explaining the rise of any sound, articulate or inarticulate they are referred to as Vimarśa, Vindu, Nāda, Sphoṭa and Śabda (Sound). From the point of view of various states of the creation, they are spoken of as Sṛṣṭi, Sthiti, Saṁhāra, Anākhya and Bhāsa.[1]

They (the powers) are often spoken of as three, subject, means and object, representing the three eyes of Śiva,[2] Mūrti, Prakāśa and Ānanda Cakras, having seventeen, twelve and sixteen aspects respectively. These three are often referred to as Icchā, Jñāna and Kriyā.

Summarising the conception of Vyomavāmeśvarī we may say that it is that power, which holds or contains within every thing that figures in experience as well as all that is necessary for its rise and throws it out of itself at will, much as a person suffering from Cholera ejects what is in the stomach through mouth.[3] It is nothing but the power of consciousness, Cit-Śakti, which is essentially freedom and, therefore, the power to manifest all.[4] It is the highest reality. It is the topmost of powers. It is undividedly present in all. It is the common aspect of all.[5]

To this, Abhinavagupta, in his Paryanta Pañcāśikā, refers as a lake from which the four currents in the forms of Khecarī etc. flow : and in this the seeker of the supreme bliss is enjoined to merge himself and all that figures in determinate experience.

There are two views about it in the available literature : one is presented by maheśvarānanda, who holds that it is one

1. M. M., 89–90. 2. M. M., 91–2. 3. Ibid, 89.
4. Ibid., 90. 5. M. M., 91–2.

of the five currents, which originate from the Highest Lord, Parameśvara, and, therefore, it is one of His powers : the other is upheld by Abhinava who maintains the Kālī to be the ultimate principle in his exposition of the Kalīnaya and holds Vyomeśvarī or Vyomavāmeśvarī, Kālaśaṅkarṣiṇī, and Mātṛsadbhāva to be identical with Kālī. This view is echoed in the Paryanta Pañcāśikā also, where, as has already been pointed out, he speaks of the Khecarī etc. as four currents flowing from the Vyomeśvarī. This point will be discussed in detail in the proper context. This much, however, must be noted here that Maheśvarānanda holds that Vyomavāmeśvarī is different from Kālasaṅkarṣiṇī.[1]

(III) Kālī is called Kālasaṅkarṣiṇī, because she is not limited by time (Kāla), which is essentially of the nature of succession, in spite of her manifesting herself in all forms in succession, because her essential nature remains unaffected even when she manifests them.

KĀLASAṄKARṢAṆĪ AS IDENTICAL WITH BHĀSĀ.

The Krama system admits five powers, of creation, of maintenance, of annihilation, indefinable (Anākhya) and Bhāsā. Of these Bhāsā is the most important. It is also called Pratibhā.[2] It is identical with the Cit-Śakti or Svātantrya. It transcends all. It bestows grace on all. The entire universe, as related to the various activities, creation etc., which are but its own forms, is within it as a reflection is within a mirror. But it does not presuppose a separate existence of what is reflected. The reflected is its own manifestation, exactly as the ideas which appear in strange combinations in dream are manifestations of the individual subject. It is free from the distinction of self and not-self. In it there is no

1. M. M., 194. 2. M. M., 105.

duality of any kind. It is of the nature of indeterminacy. Whatever is reflected on it is non-different from it. It is both the universe and its substratum. It is the embodiment and the basis of the sixteen powers, which in the Sāṅkhya system are spoken of as sixteen effects and which appear as the universe. As such it is recognised to be the Seventeenth power.[1] It is light of consciousness (Prakāśa) and freedom (Vimarśa). It is the unity of both and, therefore, from analytical point of view it is conceived separately as Bhairava and Bhairavī.

It expands and contracts or opens up and closes like a lotus. When it expands it manifests itself as Fifty letters of the Indian alphabetical system, which stand for the basic ideas which are the essential contents of the multitude that constitutes the universe. But its contraction is marked by various stages. The first is that at which it appears as nine 'Circles' (Cakras) Mūrti, Prakāśa, Ānanda, Vṛnda, plus five, represented by Sṛṣṭi, Sthiti etc. In the second stage it reveals itself in the form of Pañcavāhas, the five forms of manifestation, Vyomavāmeśvarī etc. At the third stage it manifests itself as the Bīja, the seed of the variety that we find in the universe i. e. the Ūnatā Śakti which springs from the Vāk, the Parā (Vāgbhave Bīje M. M. 106.).

It may be noted here that although in the Tantrāloka the word Bīja is used for all the vowels and, therefore, for the powers represented by them, yet primarily the word Bīja is used for Saṁvid, the Akūla (T. A., II, 96–7). But here it cannot be supposed to be used for Anuttara or Akula. For, that is mentioned separately after the Bīja. Hence it has to be admitted to be used for Ūnatā, which is recognised to be the cause (Bīja) of the variety in the universe (Idam tad bhedasandarbha bījaṁ cinvanti yoginaḥ T. A., II, 87–8).

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1. M. M., 105–6.

Thereafter the stage of contraction that follows is the Anuttara Kalā (Shall we say Anuttarā ?). For, in the Tantrāloka, the Svātantrya, Cit or Vimarśa is referred to as Anuttarā, which is also spoken of as Pratibhā, a word which is used for Bhāṣā (T. A., II, 74). And finally comes "Self-consciousness" (Svātmaparāmarśamātra). Thus the "Self-consciousness" is the ultimate principle, according to the Krama system. Hence it is a monistic system.

Now Bhāsā, which is spoken of as beyond the sixteen powers, as the seventeenth power, is identical with, is nothing else than, Kālasaṅkarṣaṇī.[1] The identification with the Ultimate consists in the experience of this Seventeenth power. Kṛṣṇa, while instructing Arjuna, as presented in the Gīta, is admitted by the followers of the Krama system to have realised his identity with Kālasaṅkarṣaṇī, which is beyond time; and it is asserted that Kṛṣṇa was able to assume the divine form, in which he appeared to Arjuna, because of the said identification.

Kālasaṅkarṣaṇī is called Rudra Raudreśvarī also. She pervades the sixty four aspects of the Vṛnda Cakra and the Pañcavāha, consisting of Vyomavāmeśvarī etc. and completely sways over them. Hence she is the Absolute from the point of view of the Krama system.[2] Accordingly she is spoken of as essentially of the nature of light of consciousness and "freedom" : and it is because of this essential nature that she is referred to as Bhairava and Bhairavi from the analytical point of view.[3] This very Kālasaṅkarṣiṇī is very often referred to as Kālī by the layman as well as the learned.[4] She comprehends both the all-transcending Lord and the universe that is transcended (Ṣoḍaśādhikayā viśvaṁ taduttirṇaḥ para-

1. M. M., 184–5. 2. M. M., 194.

3. Ibid, 106. 4. Ibid, 107.

meśvaraśca dvitayamapi saṅgrahyate M. M., 106.). The conception of Kālasaṅkarṣiṇī is common to both the systems, the Krama and the Kula.[1]

TWELVE KĀLĪS.

The twelve Kālīs stand for a very important group of concepts in the Krama system. They have been discussed in the Pañca Śatika, the Sārdha Śatika and the Krama Stotra by an authority earlier than Abhinavagupta. They drew special attention of Abhinavagupta, who has not only dealt with them in his commentary, the Kramakeli, on the earlier Krama Stotra, but also has written a Krama Stotra himself in praise of them.

They constitute one of the many Cakras (Circle), which, though discussed from the mystic point of view primarily, are interesting from psychological, ethical, epistemic and metaphysical points of view also. It is very difficult to present them with such clarity as the contemporary readers would demand, because they are not only mystic but also are the closely guarded secrets of the system and are dealt with by the original authorities only partially and summarily. Abhinavagupta states this to be the reason for not dealing with them in detail.[2] Not only this, they have purposely been dealt with in such a manner that the reader may not be able to get a clear idea of them, as Jayaratha in his commentary on the Tantrāloka points out.[3] We shall try to make the conceptions as clear as possible.

The Krama system admits the five powers of the Ultimate, creation (Sṛṣṭi) maintenance (Sthiti), annihilation (Saṁhāra), assumption of the indefinable state (Anākhya) and freedom (Bhāsā); and looks upon the first four as Cakras or circles,

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1. P. T. V., 24. (F. N.) 2. T. A., III, 155. 3. Ibid, 161.

having ten, twenty two, eleven and twelve aspects (Kalās) respectively. We shall discuss the conception of Cakras in a subsequent section and shall show how there is difference of opinion about the number of aspects of the Anākhya-cakra. In presenting the twelve Kālīs, we follow Abhinavagupta. He admits, in both, the Tantrāloka and the Krama Stotra, that the number of aspects of the Anākhya Cakra or the Kālīs to be worshipped therein, is twelve only. He holds that in the mystic experience at the Anākhya level the Kālī, as the Ultimate metaphysical principle, appears in twelve forms in succession in the consciousness of the mystic and that the final emancipation is attained when the mystic realises the last of them.

In accounting for the twelve forms he asserts that the Kālī, Parā-Saṁvid or the Universal Self-consciousness, is perfectly free. Its freedom in mystic context at the Anākhya level consists in its manifesting the four aspects of its freedom, the powers of (i) creation (Sṛṣṭi) (ii) maintenance (Sthiti) (iii) annihilation (Saṁhāra) (iv) assumption of indefinable form (Anākhya), in relation to (i) subject (Pramātā) (ii) means (Pramāṇa) (iii) object (Prameya), and so in assuming twelve forms.

The twelve Kālīs are presented by Abhinavagupta as follows :—

Kālasaṁkarṣiṇī, as has already been stated, is the Parā Saṁvid, as she is before the manifestation, having all as identical with herself. She manifests all, subject, object, means of knowledge and knowledge.

1. Sṛṣṭikālī : This very Parāsaṁvid, when the will to create arises in her and the would—be creation shines in outline objectively within her, is called Sṛṣṭikālī. This is the conception of creative power in relation to the object.

2. Raktakālī : When the Parāsaṁvid after the manifestation of the objective world manifests herself as means of knowledge in the form of five senses and gets affected by the externalised objective world, she is called Raktakālī. The Sthiti, the existence of the object of sense, is nothing more than this. This is the conception of the power of maintenance in relation to the object.

Here the system makes the following assertions :—

(i) The means of knowledge is nothing but the extrovert form of the subject.[1]

(ii) The means is the means only when it is affected by the object.

(iii) The subject, therefore, in itself is not directly affected by the object. It is only its extrovert form that is so affected.

(iv) The object of knowledge has no determinate being in itself. Its determinate being depends on its relation with the means of knowledge.

3. Sthitināśakālī : The same Parāsaṁvid is called Sthitināśakālī,[2] when she is intent upon terminating her extrovert form and, therefore, the objective world, because of her inclination to rest within herself in the form of the consciousness "I have known the object". This is the conception of the power of annihilation in relation to the object.

The Krama system is an idealistic system. It holds that the entire Universe is nothing but an idea of the Parā Saṁvid[3] and exists in the Parā Saṁvid exactly as the ideas do in the individual mind : that the external manifestation consists in manifesting what is identical with it as separate from it : that every phenomenon of knowledge is due to the momentary

1. T. A., III, 160. 2. T. A., III, 162-3.

3. T. A., III, 124.

manifestation of all aspects of it, including the subject, object and means, by the universal mind : and that at the time of the rise of every objective knowledge they are created anew. This means that the object has its external being only at the moment it affects the extrovert form of the subject, the means of knowledge ; that its external being is destroyed as soon as it is known, and, therefore, becomes the content of mind, the idea. The Sthitināśakālī seems to stand for this view.

4. Yamakālī: The same Parāsaṁvid is called Yamakālī when she assumes the form of limited subject, and, in its extrovert form, that of the means of knowledge, at first gives rise to doubt, whether a particular thing ought or ought not to be done, because of the conflicting injunctions of different scriptures on the same point, and then turning away from the scriptural injunctions, which belong to the sphere of Niyati, manifests herself in her true form, as beyond injunctions, as transcending the Niyati and the laws in its sphere.

The Yamakālī presents the conception of the indefinable power in relation to the idea of the object of experience, because it is responsible for the rise of doubt about the object of experience, that is present as a mere idea, as well as its removal or destruction. This power is admitted to be indefinable, because it performs opposite functions. It explains the loss of consciousness of distinction between the moral and the immoral in the follower of the system.

The following four are those which are intent upon the annihilation of the aspect of means of knowledge.[1]

5. Saṁhārakālī : After the destruction of doubt or its objects, the same Parāsaṁvid brings about the disappearance of the externality of the objects as related to the means of know-

1. T. A., III, 165.

ledge and grasps them within as one with herself. As such she is called Saṁhārakālī.

Saṁhārakālī presents the conception of the power of creation in relation to the means of knowledge. (Pramāṇagataṁ sṛṣṭisvarūpam. T. A, III, 168.) We have to distinguish between the Sthitināśakālī and the Saṁhārakālī. In the former the idea of object is still separate from the subject. The experience at that level is "I have known the object". But in the latter the experience is "the objects of experience are non-different from me".[1]

6. Mṛtyukālī : The Saṁhārakālī is of the nature of death (Mṛtyu) in so far as it brings about the disappearance of externality of objects.[2] But it is related to the objectivity in so far as it realises the entire objectivity as non-different from itself. But this objectivity can have its being only if it rests on the Subject (Pramātṛ) that is free from all limitations in so far as it is free from objective affection in itself. Therefore, the objectivity is said to merge in the pure subject, because it has its being in the subject in so far as it is an affection of Pramāṇa that rests on the subject. Hence it is spoken of as the state of being or existence (Sthiti) of the Pramāṇa, the means of knowledge. Mṛtyukālī is so called, because it ingulfs even the Saṁhārakālī.[3]

7. Rudrakālī or Bhadrakālī : Immediately after dissolving the multitude of the objects, as has been stated above, the Parāsaṁvid gives rise to a definite object in the mind of an individual subject. To this object, which is a revived mental picture of a particular action done in the past, the doubt is related. The doubt about it is, whether it was right or wrong. And the certainty about its being right or wrong is responsible

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1. T. A., III, 167. 2. T. A., III, 168.
3. Ibid., 168–9.

for its fruition in the pleasant or unpleasant experiences here or hereafter.

The conception of Rudrakālī attempts to reconcile conflicting religious beliefs. It explains why the followers of different religions, doing the deeds enjoined by the respective scriptures, get the promised desired fruit, though such deeds are prohibited by another religion. The fruit of an action, according to this, is dependent on the unshakable belief[1] in the rightness of it. The belief in a particular religion and in the rightness of the action enjoined by it arise from the innate mental disposition of the individual.

Belief in the rightness of an action generally precedes the performance of it. But very often this belief is rudely shaken by the unpleasant experiences, which occasionally a religious minded performer of the religious act has, in spite of his being strictly religious. The doubt about the rightness of the act, consequent on unpleasant experiences, destroys its fructifiability. Rudrakālī represents the power of annihilation in relation to the means of knowledge. The annihilation of the Pramāṇa, consists in the rise of doubt about a scriptural authority in accordance with which a deed was done in the expectation of a good result, because the result is contrary to the expectation.

The conception of Rudrakālī attempts to explain why an action, enjoined by one religion, if done by its follower in accordance with the scriptural injuction, yields the promised result, though it is prohibited by another. It points out that the unshakable faith in the rightness of the religious injuction is the cause of the expected fructification of the action.[2] It also explains why a religious act often does not lead to the expected result. It asserts that futility of the action is due to the loss of faith, does not matter what is its cause.

1. T. A., III, 170. 2. T. A., III, 171.

The reason why Abhinavagupta prefers the name Rudrakālī to Bhadrakālī is that this aspect of Saṁvid not only grossifies what is dissolved, but also dissolves what is grossified. "Ru" means to grossify and "Dra" means to dissolve.

8. Mārtaṇḍakālī: The group of twelve Indriyas, including five senses of perception, five organs of action, Manas and Buddhi, is like the sun inasmuch as it illumines. The Ahaṅkāra or the Ego-feeling, though in other contexts it is recognised to be an internal sense, yet here it is not counted as such, because it is in relation of identity with the subject (Pramātā) and as such it grasps every object, to whichsoever Indriya it may be related. All the Indriyas function only when related to Ahaṅkāra exactly as an ax functions only when related to the hand. (Ahamaṁśasparśitayā pramātrabhedini. T. A., III, 177).

Thus Mārtaṇḍakālī is nothing but the Parāsaṁvid in so far as she brings about the merging of all the twelve means, counted above, in the Ahaṅkāra. Mārtaṇḍakālī represents the Anākhya power in relation to Pramāṇa in so far as it brings about the identification of the twelve means with the ego-feeling (Ahaṅkāra) so much so that they completely lose their being and as such become unnamable (Anākhyamityākhyāśūnyamucyate.........Tacca tattvadṛṣṭyā saṁhṛtānām pramātrādīnāṁ saṁhartṛsvabhāvasaṁvidagnimātra pāriśeṣyarūpatayā niscīyate. (M. M., 103–4).

9. Paramārkakālī: The preceding four are the aspects of Parāsaṁvid which eat up or destroy the means of knowledge and action. The following four beginning with the Paramārkakālī are such as destroy the limited subject. Paramārkakālī represents the creative power in relation to the limited subject in so far as it brings about the emergence of the limited subject through merging of the Ahaṅkāra in it.

The subject is of two types,[1] limited by body etc. and free from such a limitation. The former is called Kālāgnirudra in so far as it is a subject that is limited by time, wishes to avoid certain things and to enjoy certain others and has the impurity technically called Āṇavamala (T. A., III, 180).

Paramārkakālī is that aspect of the Parāsaṁvid, which is responsible for merging of the Ahṅkāra, the thirteenth of the means, which is almost perfect, because of its inclination towards the state of subject (Pramātṛtonmukhībhāvāt pūrṇakalpaḥ T. A., III, 179.) in the limited subject.

10. Kālānalarudrakālī : The same Parāsaṁvid is called Kālānalarudrakālī, when she brings about the identification of the limited subject with the Universal Self, in whom the entire objectivity has its being and who manifests the whole universe. Kālānalarudrakālī represents the power of maintenance in relation to the limited subject in so far as it makes the limited subject rest in the universal.

The experience at this level is "I am all this". It is called Mahākālī in so far as it holds within itself every thing, not excluding even the time. This idea is symbolised in the phallic form of Śiva, called Mahākāleśvara, installed in the Śaiva Temple at Ujjayinī.

The experience at the level of Kālānalarudrakālī, which is technically called Mahākāla and is represented as "I am all this" is not an indeterminate experience, for the simple reason that it admits of presentation in words. It is a determinate experience, though essentially different from all those, which a limited subject has at the empirical level, because the individual at this level merges in the universal subject and the means of knowledge is not the empirical but the transcend-

1. T. A., III, 179.

ental, technically called Śuddha Vidyā. Hence the Krama system admits the determinate experience to be of two types as follows :—

The self (Ātman) is self-luminous. It is not objective in its nature and, therefore, is never the object of knowledge. It is perfectly independent and every thing is reflected on it exactly as an object in the proximity of a gem is reflected on it. Now if the multiplicity of objects that is reflected on the self is apprehended in distinction from one another as well as from the self, the determinate knowledge arising therefrom is technically called *Naiśa* or *Māyīya* in so far as it is a product of Māyā, the ignorance that gives rise to the idea of duality. But if all that is reflected is known as identical with the self "I am all this" it is the product of pure means of knowledge, Śuddhavidyā, which is the means to the grasp of the objective world as it is truly i. e. as identical with the self.[1]

The gradual purification of the determinate idea enables a person to realise the world as identical with the self and removes the idea of distinction between the two.[2] The determinate knowledge, which is due to Śuddha Vidyā, is of many types according to different means, employed for its rise. Some of the means, besides the purification of idea, suggested for the realisation of the external world as one with the self, are the mystic bath and mystic worship.[3]

11. Mahākālakālī : The experience, which characterises Mahākāla, is "I am all this". But there is a higher experience in which the "this" element is absent. The distinction between these two experiences is that in the former the "I" rests on the "this". But in the latter the "this" being absent the "I" rests within itself. The Parāsaṁvid is called Mahā-

1. T. A., III, 115–6. 2. Ibid., 117. 3. Ibid., 119.

kālakālī in so far as she brings about the merging of the "I" which shines in opposition to "this" as "I am all this" into the "Pure I", the "Perfect I", the "Akula", which is free from all relations to the "objectivity", the "this". This represents the power of annihilation in relation to the subject.

12. Mahābhairavacaṇḍograghorakālī: In the "Perfect I", the "Akula", the subject, the object, the means of knowledge and the knowledge are in perfect identity with pure Self-Consciousness.

Mahābhairavacaṇḍograghorakālī stands for that state of the Parāsaṁvid which does not admit of adequate presentation in words and, therefore, is called Anākhya. It is nothing but Vimarśa, Svātantrya or Parā when it does not manifest itself in subject, object, means of knowledge or knowledge and, therefore, is free from all relations.

This is called Parā, because the rest of the aforesaid are her manifestations. This means that in every one of the twelve Kālīs the other eleven are present. On account of this in the context of worship 144 Kālīs are mentioned.

DIVERGENT TEXTS ON THE NUMBER OF KĀLĪS.

According to Abhinava, Kālīs are twelve, as has been stated above. But it may be pointed out that in some of the texts on the Krama system e. g. the Pañcaśatika, the Tantrarāja and the sārdhaśatika, Sukālī also is mentioned along with Sṛṣṭikālī etc. How can then, in presenting the Kula system as almost the same as the Krama, the assertion that there are Twelve goddesses, is justifiable[1] ? The reply to this is as follows :—

In the Krama Sadbhāva Seventeen goddesses are enjoined to be worshipped in the Anākhya Cakra.

1. T. A., III 189-90.

"Saptādaśī tu sā kālī viddhi sarvārthakāriṇī"

From this it is clear that there is no fixity about the number of goddesses to be worshipped in the Anākhya Cakra. Hence there is no fault in the statement that twelve goddesses are to be worshipped in the Anākhya Cakra.

In the Kramakeli also Abhinavagupta has expressed the same view and has given the line of teachers by whom this system was propounded and from the last of whom (Lakṣmaṇagupta) he got instruction in the Krama system.

DIFFERENCE IN THE ORDER OF KĀLIS.

The order in which the twelve Kālīs are mentioned differs in different texts. Very often, in order to maintain secrecy in regard to real order, in which the universal consciousness manifests itself, the Kālīs are stated in different orders. The order in which they are given in the Tantrāloka is the real and logical.[1]

THE CONTROVERSY ABOUT THE NUMBER OF THE KĀLĪS IN THE KRAMA SYSTEM.

The Krama system is primarily a mystic system. It gives mystic meanings to even the ordinary words such as bath (Snāna) and worship (Pūjā) as has been explained elsewhere. Abhinavagupta recognises the number of Kālīs to be twelve and refutes the view of those who admitted them to be thirteen as follows :—

It is admitted that the Parā-Saṁvid, on account of its freedom, manifests itself in twelve forms. Now if it were to shine separately from the twelve forms, there would be the possibility of justifying the admission of the thirteenth.[2] But it does not shine separately from the twelve forms. For, in that case the forms, not being of the nature of Saṁvid, would

1. T. A., (Comm.) III, 161-2 2. T. A., (Comm.) III, 129.

not shine. Therefore, the Saṁvid alone would shine; consequently there is no possibility of the shining of thirteen forms. But if it be said that the Parā Saṁvid, though separate from the twelve forms yet shines in them exactly as the universal, though separate from the individual objects, which are classed under it, shines in them: therefore, it cannot be said that the forms of the Parā-Saṁvid cannot shine separately from it: the reply is as follows :—

The analogy is wrong. For, those who admit the universal to shine in the individual objects admit also that the universal and individual have independent being. But we do not admit the twelve to have separate being from the Parā-Saṁvid. For, nothing can have being in separation from it, nothing can shine separately from it: the shining of Saṁvid consists in shining in those forms.

Nor can it be said that the Parā Saṁvid shines in those forms, which are merely of the nature of self-produced reflections on it, as well as in unaffected form. For, our view is that unconditioned and unaffected Saṁvid has real being and that on account of its freedom, it manifests itself in twelve forms. Thus at the time when it manifests itself in affected forms it does not shine unaffectedly.

Nor can it be asserted that Parā Saṁvid is both transcendental (Viśvottīrṇa) and immanent (Viśvamaya). As the latter it has twelve forms. These together with the former will make up thirteen forms. The reason is as follows :—

The question is: Do the two forms, transcendental and immanent, have their being simultaneously and independently of each other like the two horns of a bull; or does it (Parā-saṁvid) persist in its essential being as pure self-consciousness even when it manifests itself as the universe? That the former alternative is untenable goes without saying. For,

if it were not to manifest itself as the universe it would cease to be free (Svatantra). As regards the latter, it may be said that it implies that though in its essential nature it is free from all affections yet it appears as affected on account of its freedom. If we accept this implication, we cannot assert that the Parā Saṁvid has thirteen forms. For, such an assertion can be justifiable only if we admit the unaffected and the affected forms to have their being in isolation from each other like the two rods of iron. But that is not the case. For, the unaffected form does not shine simultaneously with the affected, exactly as an actor does not, while acting out certain parts. For, in acting, though in reality the being of the actor cannot be denied, yet he does not shine as such, but as the character that he presents. Thus the Parā Saṁvid, while manifesting itself as the universe, undoubtedly remains in its essential nature as pure consciousness, but it does not shine as such so as to justify the view that it has thirteen forms even when it manifests itself as the universe.

In its transcendental form it is unnamable and unspeakable (Anāmaka, Anākhya). In reference to that form it is wrong to speak of its oneness and purity : because that implies its distinction from duality and impurity ; but at that stage there is nothing to distinguish from.

From the above discussion it is clear that there is not much difference between the exponents of the two views about the number of forms of the Parā Saṁvid. Abhinavagupta does not count the transcendental form along with the immanent ones, because the former does not shine together with the latter, though he also does not deny that the former has its being. The exponents of the view of the thirteen forms count the transcendental and immanent forms together.

It may be pointed out here that Abhinavagupta himself, in admitting thirty seven categories in his exposition of the

Pratyabhijñā system, has counted the transcendental and immanent forms together to make up the number thirty seven, though Utpalācārya, probably because of the reasons advanced above, did not accept the categories to be thirty seven. The fact is that Abhinavagupta in presenting a particular tradition of a system, is strictly faithful to the tradition that he undertakes to present.[1]

THE CONCEPTION OF CAKRAS AS THE DISTINCTIVE FEATURE OF THE KRAMA SYSTEM.

Abhinavagupta was very learned in grammar. Therefore, in order to show that his conception of Cakra is based upon the meanings of the roots from which the word is derived, and, therefore, is originally associated with the word, he gives the various derivations of the word. Cakra is so called because it (i) shines (Kasī vikāśe) (ii) gives (spiritual) satisfaction (Caka tṛptau) (iii) cuts the bondages (Kṛtī chedane) (iv) possesses the power of action[2] (Dukṛñ-karaṇe). The Cakras are the moving circles or wheels. They have been conceived on the analogy of the circle of light, that is produced by fire-brand, moved in circle with great velocity. (Ālātacakracchāyayā M. M., 108.) The ideas, which the conception of the moving circle emphasises, are that the different powers (Kalās), which constitute a Cakra, operate in such a quick succession that the succession is not at all noticeable; that the succession is continuous i. e. these powers succeed one another, not once or twice, but so long as the manifestative activity of the universal energy lasts; that one power (Kalā) passes into another, we may say, as the bulbous root passes into leaf, if we take a grosser analogy;[3]

1. T. A., (Comm), III, 134.
2. T. A. Ah. XXIX, 76.
3. M. M., 109.

and that in every one of the powers the others are present as leaf, bud, fruit etc. are in the seed.

To illustrate the point let us take up the five powers of creation, maintenance, annihilation, assumption of indefinable form and Bhāsā. Each of them is conceived as a circle of powers. In each of the first four the remaining three are necessarily present; and each ultimately ends in Bhāsā. And though from the analytical point of view Bhāsā is nothing but the power of consciousness (Cit-śakti), yet if we look at it as the one that manifests the entire universe independently on its own self like a picture on a canvas or reflection on a mirror, we have to admit that Bhāsā is essentially of the nature of the five powers. Thus every one of the powers is essentially an embodiment of all the five powers; each one is a pentade of five powers.

But they are closely connected with one another. From the last, the fifth, constituent of the preceding pentade the following pentade arises : and the first constituent of the following pentade rests on the last of the preceding.[1] It is on account of this relation of the powers with one another that not only each of them is conceived to be a moving circle but also all of them are admitted to constitute a bigger circle. For, the movement or action of these powers is conceived to be, not along a straight line, but in circle, to convey the idea of the infinite recurrence of the function of each of them.

Hence the Krama system holds that the Bhāsā is not removed from the power of creation by the intervening three powers, maintenance etc., as ordinary people think, but it is the very basis of the rise of the power of creation.[2]

SEVENTY CATEGORIES OF THE KRAMA SYSTEM.

Among the many means of the realisation of the Ultimate[3]

1. M. M., 109. 2. M. M., 109. 3. T. A., III, 64–5.

the Krama system admits (i) the grasp of the true nature or the most essential aspect of any one of the Cakras, some of which have already been discussed and more shall be dealt with shortly, and (ii) the purification of the determinate idea "I am all this" as important. Thus although all the Cakras are of mystical importance in so far as they are the means to the realisation of the Ultimate through contemplation on them, yet the two, the Pañcavāha and the Vṛnda, have in addition the metaphysical importance also.

Metaphysical Cakras are the moving circles or, putting it figuratively, they are the wheels with spokes, in which the Reality expresses or manifests itself. They are the forms in which the Absolute concretises itself and, therefore, may be spoken of as categories. For, the categories are the forms of the Absolute. Their conception has been influenced by epistemic considerations. Subject, object and means are the presuppositions of knowledge. The subject is of two types, (i) universal and (ii) individual, and the means also are of two kinds (i) internal and (ii) external. These four together with the object make the total five, which represent the basic Cakra or Circle, technically called Pañcavāha, consisting of Vyomavāmeśvarī, Khecarī, Dikcarī, Gocarī and Bhūcarī; standing for the universal subject, individual soul, internal means, external means and object respectively.

According to the Krama system, the entire diversity of the manifested is reducible to the Pañcavāha[1] from the epistemic point of view. For, what the Pañcavāha stands for is the necessary presupposition of every objective experience, which is common to the spiritualists and laymen. That is as follows :—

Every experience at the empirical level has objective refe-

1. M. M.. 106.

rence. The object, therefore, as a fact of experience, is undeniable, in spite of the difference among various schools of philosophy about its essential nature. Bhūcarī, therefore, which stands for the current of the power of the Absolute that manifests the entire objectivity, is to be accepted. But to experience is to act. And action needs an instrument, with which it is performed. For instance, to cut a piece of wood we need an axe. The Gocarī, therefore, has to be accepted in so far as it accounts for the being of the means of perception and action, the five powers of perception and those of action. Further, the said means are not independent in bringing about the experience. For, very often it happens that the senses, even when in contact with the objects, do not give rise to the experience. The assumption of Dikcarī, therefore, which is responsible for the being of internal senses, without the co-opration of which the external senses are ineffective, cannot be questioned. Furthermore, the means, as our experience tells us, is effective only if it be related to and be employed by an agent. The admission of the Khecarī, therefore, as a current of power that explains the being of the individual subject, is logical. Lastly the universal subject, as the common meeting ground and the ultimate spring of all the four, is an epistemic necessity. Therefore, Vyomavāmeśvarī as the universal subject is a necesary epistemic postulate.

Thus the five aspects or the spokes of the Pañcavāha Cakra stand for the five primary categories of the Krama system, as conceived from the epistemic point of view. This Cakra is important from the mystic point of view also. For, it points out the universal subject as the most important of its five aspects and, therefore, shows the way (i) to the realisation of the Ultimate in the ordinary objective experience through concentration on the ultimate presupposition of every experience, the universal subject; and (ii) to the recognition that the

individual subject, object and means are His manifestations and, therefore, are essentially identical with Him. This Pañcavāha is not only a means to liberation, as pointed out above, but also the cause of bondage if its true nature is not realised.[1]

Thus the Krama system admits five primary categories, represented by five currents (Pñcavāha). In addition to these it recognises sixty four dependent categories, represented by sixty-four aspects of the Vṛnda Cakra, subsumed under five main concepts (i) Jñāna-siddhas (ii) Mantra-siddhas (iii) Melāpa-siddhas (iv) Śākta-siddhas and (v) Śāmbhava-siddhas. They are identical with Pañcavāhas[2] and, therefore, stand for the five primary categories, the object, the means, the limited subject, pure subject (Śuddha Pramātṛ) and the Parā Saṁvid respectively.

Here there seems to be a little discrepancy. For, Pañcavāha, as discussed elsewhere, is represented to be made up of, object, external senses, internal senses, individual subject and Cit-Śakti, or universal subject. But here the distinction between the internal and external senses is ignored and the subject is represented to be of three types instead of two. But this is more than what we can explain in the present state of our knowledge of this system.

Under Jñāna-Siddhas are subsumed sixteen effects (Vikāras), including eleven Indriyas and five gross elements. The conception of effects (Vikāra) here is the same as referred to in the Sāṅkhya Kārikā 3 (Ṣoḍaśakastu vikāraḥ).

The means of knowledge, including five senses of perception, five powers of action, Manas and Ahaṅkāra are twelve. They are of two types according as they are occupied with the external object or rest in the self, turning back from the objects. (Kadācit......Viṣayāvagāhana–vaicitryāt anyadā viṣayebhyaḥ

1. M. M., 25. 2. M. M., 97.

pratyāvṛtya svātmamātraviśrāntivyāpṛtatvācca prakāradvayopapattyā. M. M., 97.)

Thus they are twenty four and are subsumed under Mantrasiddhas.

The essential nature of the subject is that it makes the object shine through the means of knowledge. Therefore, in the activity of the subject the operation of the means of knowledge predominates. Hence twelve Indriyas are subsumed under Melāpa-siddhas.

The Puryaṣṭaka, consisting of five subtle elements and Manas, Buddhi and Ahaṅkāra, is subsumed under Śāktasiddhas.

The four powers, technically called Ambā, Vāmā, Raudr and Jyeṣṭhā are subsumed under Śāmbhavasidhas.

Thus there are sixty four dependent categories. That these dependent categories are not strictly logical, but have been admitted under the influence of practical mysticism, seems to have been the view of Maheśvarānanda, who says that he is repeating like a parrot what he heard from his teachers.[1]

In this way the Krama system, as presented by Maheśvarānanda, admits Seventy categories: five primary, Sixty four dependent, with Kālasaṅkarṣiṇī, Rudraraudreśvarī or Kālī at the top.[2]

Maheśvarānanda presents his system in Seventy verses, to indicate that he is primarily concerned with the presentation of these seventy fundamentals of the system.

THE UNIVERSE AS MANIFESTATION OF THE UNIVERSAL ENERGY.

The Krama system seems to be under the influence of Budhhism in so far as it admits the theory of momentariness. Every

1. M. M., 98. 2. Ibid., 194.

thing in the world, it holds, is subject to the operation of the four powers of creation etc., which operate in such a quick succession that the succession remains unnoticed. That is as follows :—

There is universal energy, Śakti, which expresses itself in the forms of the subjects, means and objects of experience at all levels much as the electric energy transforms itself in various forms in which consumers utilise it. But it is not material, lifeless and blind but conscious and, therefore, self-aware. It is original and not generated. It does not exhaust itself in its manifestation, but remains unchanged in itself in spite of its innumerable expressions. This idea can be conveyed by means of various analogies. We may, therefore, say that the universal energy manifests every thing just like an individual dreaming subject who manifests the figures, which appear in dream; and, therefore, just as the dreaming individual does not exhaust himself in dreams so does not the conscious universal energy in its manifestations. But the figures of dream are the effects of the revived residual traces of the past experiences and, therefore, presuppose the existence of the objective world that exists independently of the limited individual. The manifestations of the universal energy, however, are original. They are direct expressions of the conscious energy. They arise from it like waves and merge back into it. They have their being potentially in it. And soon after the actualisation of the potential, the actual returns to the potential form.

The manifestation is a continuous process. It does not mean bringing into being a world, which may have its being independently of the universal energy, once it has been created, exactly as a jar has, once it has been produced by the potter. The objects of the world are being continuously created, maintained, annihilated and reduced to indefinable state, much like the flame of an oil-lamp. We know that the

flame, which an ordinary person thinks to be persisting for a duration of time, is not the same. It is being continuously replaced by others, which arise at the outer end of a wick, because of the convertion of the energy, supplied by oil, drawn by the wick, into them. It means that the flame is being created, maintained, destroyed and reduced to indefinable state every moment.

Thus the Krama system holds that the universe is the expression or manifestation of the conscious universal energy; that it is constantly changing; that every object is like a flame of a lamp; that the continuity of the object that appears, is due to the manifestation of similar forms in such quick succession as causes persistence of vision; that the energy, after it has manifested itself in a particular form, is not lost, but with the annihilation of the object it returns to its original state.

This is the implication of the assertion that the universe is subjected to the powers of creation etc., that universe has being within the conscious universal energy[1] and that the creation etc. come one after another in such a quick succession that the succession cannot be noticed.[2]

COMMON MYSTIC TENDENCIES OF THE KRAMA SYSTEM AND THE UPANIṢADS.

In the Indian mystic tradition very often the eye is represented to be the place of the Supreme and the follower of the mystic path is enjoined to contemplate on Him in the eye. For instance, in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad 4, 15, 1, the eye is spoken of as the abode of the Brahman. And Śaṅkara, commenting on the Bādarāyaṇa Sūtra "Antara Upapatteḥ" 1, 2, 3, 13, and the following, has established that the being, which

1. M. M., 105. 2. Ibid. 108.

is said to be there, is the Brahman. In the Śaiva Āgamic literature a similar tradition is recorded. For instance, such a tradition is found in the Yoga Sañcāra Āgama and is referred to by Abhinavagupta in his Tantrāloka Ch. IV in the context of discussion on the Krama system.

According to this, each eye has four orbits (Maṇḍala) (i) white (ii) red (iii) white-black and (iv) black. The first is the abode of the group of sixteen goddesses, the second of twelve, the third of eight and the fourth of four.[1] In each of these four orbits one of the four powers, of creation, maintenance, annihilation and of manifesting itself in indefinable form, respectively predominates and so does one of the four, object (Prameya) means, (Pramāṇa) subject (Pramātā) and knowledge (Pramiti). Thus in the first orbit the group of goddesses consists of sixteen, because therein all the four, object, means etc. have separate being, and four powers related to each of them produce the total of sixteen. But in the second, the red orbit, the means predominates and the object has its being as its affection only and, therefore, as one with the means. Hence it does not have four forms which are due to the relation of the four powers with the object. Accordingly here the group consists of twelve goddesses only.[2] This group of twelve goddesses seems to be slightly different from that, dealt with earlier, in so far as that group is constituted by the relation of the four powers to subject, object and means, eliminating the knowledge (Miti) itself, while the group under discussion eliminates the object.

It admits not only the eye to be the place of Parā-Saṁvid but also every other means of knowledge and action as also every other part of physical organism.[3] In this respect also

1. T. A., III, 136-7. 2. T. A., (comm.) III, 138.
3. T. A., III, 153.

it agrees with the Upaniṣads, in which, as pointed out in the Brahma Sūtra and Śaṅkara's commentary on it, other places also, besides the eye, are pointed out as the places[1] of Brahman where it has to be contemplated on.

THE KRAMA SYSTEM AND THE ŚĀKTOPĀYA.

The Krama system is closely related to the Śāktopāya. In fact, Abhinava discusses it in the context of this means to the realisation of the Ultimate. The Śāktopāya consists in the purification (saṁskāra)[2] of the determinate knowledge (Vikalpa) by removing or eliminating from it all the elements of determinacy so as to reduce it to pure indeterminate idea which the Ultimate is.

It admits the momentariness of the determinate idea, exactly as do the subjectivist Bauddhas, the Vijñānavādins. Therefore, it holds that in the process of purification, the determinate idea gives rise to a slightly purified idea, which is similar to it, and that to another, better purified, and so on[3] till it reaches the stage of pure indeterminacy.[4]

TRUE LOGIC (SATTARKA) AND ŚĀKTOPĀYA.

The "I" at the empirical level is determinate, because of its association with what appears to be objective in its nature. The Śāktopāya points out the way to eliminate from it all that is associated with it so that it may shine in its true glory as pure universal self-consciousness. And the sole means that is pointed out is the true logic (Sattarka), the logic, that is concerned, not with what is empirical, but with what is spiritual; that springs from the intellect which has risen above the empirical level and, therefore, is capable of bringing about the self-

1. B. Su., I, 2, 4, 14.
2. T. A., III, 2.
3. Ibid, 3.
4. Ibid, 6.

recognition by uprooting the apparent distinction between the subject and the object.[1] Such a true logic (Sattarka) at its highest level, when it penetrates through the veil of ignorance, which makes what is essentially subjective in its true nature appear as objective, and grasps the true subjective nature of what appears to be objective, is called Bhāvanā.

TRUE LOGIC (SATTARKA) AS THE BEST PART OF YOGA.

This system is closely connected with the Yoga system, which is distinct from the one, propounded by Patañjali in his Yoga Sūtra. For, while Patañjali admits Eight parts of Yoga;[2] it admits six only, eliminating Yama, Niyama and Āsana, and adding Tarka,[3] which it recognises to be the best of all parts in so far as it enables its follower to find out what is to be shunned.[4]

TWO TYPES OF TARKA (LOGIC).

The Tarka is recognised to be of two types (i) one that attempts only to defeat the opponent without any regard for truth and, therefore, consists in the employment of fallacious reasons (ii) the other is concerned with the discovery of the truth, with the grasp of the distinction of the acceptable from what ought to be rejected. The former is condemnable and the latter is to be followed, because it is a means of discovering the truth.

Sattarka is very often spoken of as Sadvidyā, the Lord's will or the Divine grace.[5] It may thus be said to be identical with grace. Accordingly the prompting by Sattarka to approach the right type of teacher may be said to be His grace.[6]

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1. T. A., III, 12.
2. Y. S., Ch. II, 29.
3. T. A., III, 15.
4. Ibid, 14.
5. T. A., III, 39.
6. Ibid, 39-40.

This is of three types (i) that which is inborn (Sāṁsiddhika) (ii) which is due to the teaching, received from a good teacher or (iii) to the study of Śāstras. Of these each preceding is better than the following. The person in whom the true logical faculty is inborn does not need any initiation into religion or a teacher. Every Śāstra becomes clear to him because of the divine grace. Such a teacher is called Akalpita Kalpaka.[1] It is recognised to be the highest form of Yoga, because it directly leads to the realisation of the Ultimate; but Yama, Niyama, Āsana and Prāṇāyāma are the indirect means[2] to it.

THE KRAMA AND THE RĀJAYOGA.

The krama system seems to follow the Rājayoga, which admits that the vital air (Prāṇa) and the mind (Manas) are interdependent, so much so that the former goes to whatever place the latter does,[3] and that perfect control over the mind means perfect control over the vital air, so that if a person is able to concentrate his mind on the self, the vital airs, Prāṇa and Apāna automatically cease to function and the third, Udāna, of itself enters into the suṣumṇā and goes up to Brahma-Randhra so that there arises the experience of the Self free from all objective limitations.[4] Accordingly in opposition to the Yoga system, which asserts the importance of the Eight parts, Monistic Śaivaism looks upon all of them as unimportant or rather useless, because they are not the direct means to self-realisation. For, Yama, Niyama, Āsana and Prāṇāyāma are the external means, because they are related to the body.[5]

To show that Pratyāhāra etc. also are not the direct means to the self-realisation, we may state the essential nature of each of them, according to the authoritative texts as follows: —

1. T. A., III, 59,
2. Ibid, 94–5.
3. H. Y. P., 179–80.
4. T. A., III, 96.
5. Ibid, 94.

(i) Pratyāhāra consists in giving up of the pursuit of their respective object by the senses of perception and in following the mind (Manas), that has been fixed upon a particular object that has been imaged within, and in having it as their object in common with the mind. The conception of Pratyāhāra will become clear if we remember that in the case of the ordinary individual the mind follows the senses in so far as it has the same object as is grasped by the senses. In the case of the Pratyāhāra, however, reverse is the case, because the senses follow the mind and have for their object the same as is imaged within and on which the mind is concentrated, so much so that they seem to grasp it as if it were sensuous.[1] Thus it is that the inner visualisation takes place.

Dhāraṇā is the fixing of the mind at any particular part of the body such as the heart, where the deity is to be contemplated upon.[2]

Dhyāna consists in the continuous flow of the ideas of the same type, referring to the object of contemplation, without any break in it on account of coming in of dissimilar idea.

Samādhi consists in intering or merging of the mind in the object of contemplation in such a way that the distinction among the subject, object and means of contemplation completely disappears. The conceptions of Pratyāhāra etc., stated above, make it clear that all these together or separately are not the direct means to the realisation of Parā-Saṁvid, which is free from all limitations, because they have for their object something that is of limited nature.[3]

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1. Y. S., (Comm), Ch. II, (Sū.) 54.
2. Y. S., (Comm), Ch. III, (Sū.) 1–2.
3. T. A., III, 101.

UTILITY OF OTHER PARTS OF YOGA.

Though this system admits six parts of the Yoga,
(Prāṇāyāmastathā dhyānaṁ pratyāhārotha dhāraṇā
Tarkaścaiva samādhiśca ṣaḍaṅgo yoga ucyate.)

yet it refers to the eight, admitted by Patañjali, to imply that whatever be the number of parts of the Yoga, that one may admit, each preceding is related as a means to the following of them and that Sattarka only is the direct means to the realisation of the Ultimate.[1] But other recognised aspects of Yoga are not entirely useless. For, regular and persistent practice of bodily posture, control of breath, and withdrawal of the senses from their respective objects and making them follow the mind, produce great refinement in body, vital air and intellect (Buddhi) respectively. They do not affect the pure subject in any way, because it is unchanging. And regular practice of self-control (Yama) and of sacred injuctions (Niyama) have a social value and are helpful in the development of the monistic outlook in so far as they make the practiser treat others exactly in the manner in which he treats himself e. g. they make him desist from the acts of cruelty to others exactly as he does so in regard to himself.

THE MEANS TO LIBERATION.

The Krama system recognises that one and the same means to the realisation of the Ultimate cannot be effective in all cases. The capacities and tendencies of the individuals differ. The means, therefore, for different types of aspirants has to be such as suits them and, therefore, there is necessity of variety of them. Accordingly it admits innumerable means.[2] Some of them are as follows :—

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1. T. A., III, 102. 2. T. A., III, 62.

(i) REALISATION OF THE TRUE NATURE OF INDRIYAS.

It holds that the realisation of the Indriyas (internal and external senses and the organs of action), not as Indriyas, capable of receiving stimulus from outside and, therefore, of assuming different forms, or of performing different physical actions, but as the powers of the self (Vṛttirūpatāparihāreṇa śaktirūpatayā parijñānāt T. A., III 64) brings about the attainment of the knowledge of the true self, which is the essential nature of the individual self.

(ii) EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE AS A MEANS TO SELF-REALISATION.

According to this system, the objective world is nothing but the grossification of the Saṁvid, the Universal conscious energy, through obscuration or concealment of its essential nature. The limited subject also is only limited manifestation of the same, because it enjoys limited freedom in respect of the twelve means, consisting of the five senses of perception and five powers of action, operating predominantly in the five organs of action, and Manas and Buddhi. They are but extrovert forms of the limited subject. And the knowledge is but a form of consciousness, consequent upon the contact with an object through the means of knowledge.

This system, therefore, holds that even the subject-object contact leads to the grasp of the Ultimate, if the experiencing subject, being free from the purposive attitude towards the objective world and being satisfied with its mere knowledge, rests within itself after the rise of the cognition "I have known the object"[1] and attempts to get at the ultimate cause of the whole experience.[2]

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1. T. A., III, 140. 2. Ibid. 142.

(iii) REALISATION OF THE IMPERCEPTIBLE SUCCESSION OF CIRCLES OF POWERS.

We have dealt with the five powers or forms of activity of the Absolute and shown how they are conceived as quickly moving circles, so connected with one another that they form a bigger circle, and how in relation to the object these forms of activity follow one after the other in such a quick succession that the succession is not cognisable, exactly as in the case of penetration of thousand petels of lotus, placed one upon another, by a sharp needle. The Krama system holds that the realisation of this succession is the realisation of the Self and that the liberation in life is nothing but this realisation (Etat kramaparāmarśa eva svātmavimarśarūpo jīvanmokṣaḥ M. M. 109).

This seems to be very much like the Kṣaṇikatvaparāmarśa of the Bauddha. From what has been stated above, it appears that the Self-realisation is nothing else than the realisation of Bhāsā, which is nothing but Freedom (Svātantrya or Cit-Śakti) expressing itself in unnoticeably quick succession of the activities of creation etc. in relation to the world that is within, like a reflection in a mirror (M. M., 105.)

(iv) MYSTIC METHODS OF WORSHIP, BATH ETC.

Both, Abhinavagupta and Maheśvarānanda, point out the mystic methods of worship, bath etc. as the ways to the realisation of the Self.[1] Space does not permit us to deal with every one of them in detail. We shall, therefore, confine ourselves to discussing the mystic method of worship only.

According to both, the worship consists, not in offering flowers etc. to any image, but in the grasp of the true nature of the self ("Tasmāt svasvarūpaparāmarśa eva paramā pūjā"

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1. T. A., III, 119 and M. M., 110 ff.

M. M., 110, and "Saṁvidaikātmyenāvasthānaṁ pūjā" T. A., III, (Comm.) 211).

In this context Abhinavagupta raises a very important problem as follows :—

The most essential aspect of worship is the use of a religious formula (Mantra). But if it be something different from the Self then it would make it difficult to get identified with the Saṁvid or Self. But if no Mantra is to be used how can the method be called worship (Pūjā) ?

His solution is as follows :—

The religious formulas, as sets of words, are in themselves ineffective. Their efficacy depends on the rise of the user above the level of individuality. The more the user of a religious formula abandons individuality the more effective they are. But if the individual retains his individuality perfectly in tact the Mantra used by him is absolutely ineffective. The mystic worship, therefore, consists in the realisation of the "Aham", the Universal "I", which is the spring of power of all Mantras[1] and is the highest Mantra. It does not need any other Mantra, because it is not concerned with any worldly objective, to the realisation of which the ordinary Mantras lead.

The mystic worship does not need any definite place, such as a temple, to perform it, nor any invocation (Āvāhana) etc. It may be performed wherever and whenever possible.[2]

1. T. A., III, 224.

2. Ibid. 210.

CHAPTER VII

THE KULA SYSTEM

NAMES OF THE SYSTEM.

The system, presented in the following pages, is called Kula, because the ultimate principle, according to it, is Kula; which is beyond even the highest category, the Śiva; from which and in which the entire universe arises and into which it gets merged[1]; which cannot be spoken of as either Śiva or Śakti; which is all-transcending light of consciousness and is essentially absolutely free[2]; which, because of its freedom, manifests itself first of all as Śiva and Śakti; which is spoken of as Kula to distinguish it from its first manifestation "Śiva", which is spoken of as Akula; beyond which there is nothing; which is unity of Anuttara and Anutttarā, a unity in which the two are completely merged in each other axactly in the manner in which two Akāras merge when they are unified according to Pāṇini's aphorism "Atoguṇe" or in which the ingredients of the Pānaka Rasa mix with one another or the constituents of the æsthetic configuration do to give rise to what is called Raśa by Indian Æstheticians.

In the Āgamas it is referred to as both "Kula"[3] and "Kaula" and is recognised to be the highest system. An Āgamic authority mentions the Vedas, dualistic Śaivaism, the Vāmamārga, Dakṣiṇamārga and Kaula in order of succession, admits that every one of the following is superior to the preceding and asserts that there is no system higher than the Kaula. It may, however, be pointed out here that another

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1. T. A., II, (Comm.) 75. 2. T. A., II, (Comm.) 75.

3. T. A., I, (Comm.) 48.

Āgamic authority holds the Mata system, presented in books like the Mata Śāstra, referred to in the Tantrāloka Ah. IV, 294, 299, to be higher than the Kula, and Trika[1] to be the highest of all. We shall discuss the various meanings of "Kula" and "Trika" in the proper contexts.

It is called Kaulism, because its followers are called Kaulas in so far as they admit Kula to be the Ultimate Reality and aspire to attain oneness with it. And the system is referred to as Kaulism exactly as the system that is followed by those who admit Śiva to be the ultimate reality and aspire to attain oneness with Him, is called Śaivaism. "Kula" is different from the Maheśvara, with which the Pratyabhijñā system of Kashmir Śaivaism is primarily concerned and which is a purely metaphysical conception to explain practical life, based on the unification of sensations.

The Pratyabhijñā system was founded by somānanda in his Śivadṛṣṭi and expounded by Utpalācārya and Abhinavagupta in the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Kārikā, Vṛtti, Vivṛti, Vimarśinī and Vivṛti Vimarśinī. The Kula system is historically prior to it, because Somānanda commented on the Parā Triṁsikā, which primarily presents the Kula system and belongs to the available earlier literature. It is wrong to assume that the Kula system propounds the same means to final emancipation as does the Pratyabhijñā. For, in that case the assertion of Utpalācārya that he is giving publicity to a new path, propounded by Somānanda, becomes meaningless. Abhinavagupta in his Tantrāloka, Āhnika III draws distinction by pointing out that the Kula system shows a way to final emancipation which is different from Anupāya and is called Śāmbhava.[2]

TRACEABLE HISTORY OF THE KULA SYSTEM.

It appears that the followers of the various Śaiva systems,

1. T. A., I, (Comm.) 49. 2. T. A., II, 1.

which arose in Kashmīr, knew the importance of the history of the systems. Accordingly not only different books such as the Kālīkula and the Pañcaśatika were written, giving the lines of the successive teachers from the earliest time of the propagation of the system down to that when these works were composed, but also, in order to keep the historical backgrounds of the systems fresh in the minds of the followers, the worship of the line of teachers, in which the remembrance[1] of the line was essential, was introduced.

But unfortunately these books seem to be irrecoverably lost. We know them from references only in the available works. In tracing the history of the Kula system we have to put together the scattered references to the teachers, leaving probable gaps to be filled up by the future researches in the field. As these texts were written for the religious purpose, we find in them historical material mixed up with the mythical.

Mythically the history of the Kula system is traced back to Satya Yuga, through Tretā, Dvāpara and Kali. And the Siddhas, their wives and sons, who are admitted to have propounded this system in different Yugas, are mentioned as the objects of worship in the performance of Kula Yāga.

Thus Khagendra was the propounder of Kaulism in the Satyayuga. His wife was Vijjāmbā. He had two sons, Vaktaṣṭi and Vimala. The names of their wives were Illāī Ambā and Ananta Mekhalāmbā respectively. All of them are to be worshipped in the East.

Kūrma was the propounder in the Tretā. His wife was Maṅgalā Śakti. His two sons were Jaitra and Avijita. Illāī Ambā and Ānanda Mekhalā were respectively their wives. They are to be worshipped in the South.

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1. M. M., 86.

In the Dvāpara the system was propounded by Meṣa. His wife was Kāma Maṅgalā. His sons were Vindhya and Ajita. Their wives were Kullāī Ambā and Ajara Mekhalā respectively. They are to be worshipped in the West.

In the Kali Macchanda was the revealer. His wife was Kuṅkuṇāmbā. He had six sons (i) Amaranātha, (ii) Varadeva, (iii) Citranātha, (iv) Alinātha, (v) Vindhyanātha, (vi) Guḍikānātha. The names of their wives were respectively as follows :—

(i) Sillāī (ii) Eruṇā (iii) Kumārī (iv) Bodhāī (v) Mahālacchī (vi) Apara-Mekhalā.

It appears that Macchanda was a king, because his sons, referred to above, are spoken of as princes (Rājaputra).[1] The names of their successors had at the end (i) Ānanda (ii) Avali (iii) Bodhi (iv) Prabhu (v) Pāda (vi) Yogin respectively. Their distinctive Mudrās were (i) Thumb (ii) Forefingure (iii) Mid-fingure (iv) Ring-fingure (v) Little fingure of the right hand and (vi) Little fingure of the left respectively.

The different parts of physical organism, where they primarily practised concentration (Chummā) were (i) Brahmarandhra (ii) Kuṇḍalinī (iii) Bhrūmadhya (iv) Heart (v) Navel (vi) Kanda.

The places where they (i) lived (Ghara) (ii) took alms (Pallī) and (iii) attained spiritual greatness (Pīṭha) were as follows :—

Name	Ghara	Pallī	Pīṭha
1. Amara	Paṭṭilla	Dakṣiṇāvarta	Tripura
2. Varadeva	Karavilla	Kumbharikā	Kāmarūpa
3. Citra	Ambilla	Villa	Aṭṭahāsa

1. T. A., Ah., XXIX, 29.

4. Alinātha	Śavara or Pulinda	Aḍavī	Devīkoṭṭa
5. Vindhyanātha	Śaravilla	Akṣara	Dakṣiṇāvarta
6. Guḍikānātha	Aḍavilla	Dombī	Kaulagiri

Besides these, who had their descendants, there were others, who remained celebate. They are (i) Bhaṭṭa (ii) Indra (iii) Valkala (iv) Ahīndra (v) Gajendra (vi) Mahīdhara.[1]

There were many who had no definite bodies and are mentioned in the Kālīkula.[2]

RISE OF THE KULA SYSTEM IN THE 5TH CENTURY A. D.

We have already stated that the monistic Śaiva Tantras were introduced in Kashmir towards the close of the 4th century A. D.; that the fourth Tāntrika school, which was called "Ardha-Tryambaka", originated from a descendant of Tryambaka on daughter's side and that the exponent of this school, from whom Abhinavagupta learnt it, was Śambhunātha. We, therefore, hold, as has already been indicated, that "Kulamārga" and "Ardha-Tryambakamaṭhikā" stand for the same school of Śaivaism and accordingly assert that the Kula system arose in the 5th century A. D.

We have referred to Macchanda alias Mīna, who is recognised to be the revealer of the Kula system in Kaliyuga. The question arises now : Is he identical with the descendant of Tryambaka on the daughter's side, who was the founder of the Ardhatryambaka school, which has been identified with the Kula system ? We do not find the name of the founder of the Ardhatryambaka school. But Macchanda is admitted to be the originator of the Kula system in the Kali age. Therefore, there seems to be justification for identification of the two. If this conclusion be accepted, we can assign Macchandâ to the 5th century A. D.

1. T. A., Ah., XXIX, 30. 2. T. A., Ah., XXIX, 31.

We know of Sumati, Somadeva and Śambhunātha, the great grand teacher, grand teacher and teacher respectively of Abhinavagupta in Kaulism and, therefore, can trace the history of the Kula system back to about the middle of the 9th century. Thus there is a gap of about four centuries between Macchanda and Sumati to be filled up to complete the historical account of the system.

In the Tantrāloka Āhnika XXVIII Abhinava talks of ten early teachers of the Kula system. They are all said to have used wine, meat and woman. They are (1) Ucchuṣma (2) Śavara (3) Caṇḍagu (4) Mataṅga (5) Ghara (6) Antaka (7) Ugra (8) Halahalaka (9) Krodhī (10) Huluhulu. This list is taken from the Devīyāmala Tantra Chapter 52, according to Abhinava's own statement. This lends further support to the view that the list is of the Kaulika teachers.[1]

Further, in the 29th Āhnika of the Tantrāloka, which is exclusively concerned with the secret practices of the Kaulism and in which the line of the Kaula teachers, beginning with Khagendranātha is given as object of worship, Jayaratha, in his introduction to verse 43, raises the question why the four teachers,[2] namely (1) Niṣkriyānanda (2) Vidyānanda (3) Śaktyānanda (4) Śivānanda, and their wives (1) Jñānadīpti (2) Raktā (3) Mahānandā (4) Samayā respectively, are not mentioned ? Abhinava's reply to it is that they are not to be formally worshipped but simply to be remembered.

If we take these four also to be successive Kaulika teachers and add them to the ten, mentioned earlier, we get a total of fourteen successive teachers. And if, according to the traditional method, we allow a period of 25 years for each, we can fill up the gap of about four hundred years between the sons of Macchendra and Sumati, the great grand teacher

1. T. A., Ah., XXVIII, 166-7. 2. T. A., Ah., XXIX, 31.

of Abhinava in Kaulism. Accordingly the line of teachers of Kaulism from Macchendra to Abhinava would be as follows :—

1. Macchendra alias Mīna.
2. His sons Amaranātha etc.
3–12. Ucchuṣma to Huluhulu, mentioned in the Devīyāmala.
13–16. Niṣkriyānanda to Śivānanda, referred to by Jayaratha on the basis of the Pañcaśatika.
17–19. Sumati to Śambhunātha referred to by Abhinavagupta.

Thus the Kula system seems to have continued to live from the 5th century to the time of Abhinavagupta in unbroken line of teachers, given above. At this stage of our information we cannot give further details.

LITERATURE ON KAULISM.

History of the literature on Kaulism extends over a period of about one thousand and three hundred years from about the Fifth century A. D., when Kaulism was first propounded by Macchanda, a descendant of Tryambaka on the side of his daughter in Assam (Kāmarūpa), to about the 18th century A. D. when Bhāskararāya of Kāśī commented upon the Nityāṣoḍaśikārṇava. The literature consists of the Āgamas, the books based on them and the commentaries. Most of this literature is known from references only. It is, therefore, very difficult to assign definite historical positions to the authors and their books. However, a very careful study of the available literature gives certain clues to assign some authors and their products to different periods and to arrange them in a sort of historical order, as the following pages will show.

Abhinavagupta is of definitely known date. The books, therefore, referred to by him, can definitely be said to be

prior to him. Such books as are distinctly recognised by him to deal with Kaulism are given below.

LITERATURE ON KAULISM REFERRED TO BY ABHINAVAGUPTA.

1. Kālīkula T. A. Ah. XXIX, 31. and XXXV, 374
2. Siddhayogīśvarīmata T. A., Ah., XXXVII, 400.
3. Malinīvijayottara „ „ „

It contains the essence of the Siddhayogīśvarīmata and therefore, is later than that. Ibid

4. Ratnamālā T. A., Ah., XXIX, 39. and XXXVII, 400.

It is expressedly recognised to be a Kulāgama in T. A., (Comm.) Ah. XXVIII, 53.

5. Virāvali
6. Hārdeśa
7. Khecarīmata
8. Yonyarṇava
9. Siddhā Tantra
10. Utphullakamata
11. Nirmaryādaśāstram

(5–11:) T. A., Ah. XXIX 112-3

12. Triśiromata Ibid., 6, 99, 112-3.
13. Gamaśāstra Ibid., 99.
14. Tantrarāja Ibid., 69.
15. Brahma Yāmala Ibid., 8.
16. Mādhavakula (a part of the Tantrarāja) Ibid., 40.
17. Devyāyāmala Ibid., 40.
18. Kulakramodaya (Comm.) Ibid., 44.
19. Yogasañcara Ibid., 57.
20. Triśirobhairava (Comm.) Ibid., 70.
21. Kulagahvara T. A., Ah. XXIV, 311.
22. Devīyāmala (Devyāyāmala ?) T. A., Ah. XXVIII, 166.
23. Nityātantra Ibid., 51.

(i) THE ORIGINAL ĀGAMAS.

1. THE SIDDHAYOGĪŚVARĪ TANTRA.

The Siddhayogīśvarīmata,[1] also called Siddhayogīśvarī Tantra,[2] was a very voluminous work, consisting of Hundred Crore of verses. It primarily dealt with philosophy (Vidyā), the highest aspect of Śaivaism, though it did not completely ignore others (Mantra, Mudrā and Maṇḍala). It presented not only all the currents of Śaivaism, monistic, dualistic and dualistic-cum-monistic, but also dealt with the branches of learning, both empirical and spiritual. It was successively summarised in three Crore, twelve thousand and still fewer verses. The last summary is available now. In the first summary Yoga was emphasised and it was called the Mālinīvijaya. Much information is not available about the second. The third was called Malinīvijayottara. Herein the two paths, Vāma and Dakṣiṇa, were recognised to be the essence of all the Tantras. They were synthesised into one and this synthesis was called Kaula, which was accepted to be a very important aspect of the Trika. Hence the Mālinīvijayottara is recognised to be an important work on Kaulism.

SYNTHETIC VIEW.

Abhinavagupta, as taught by Śambhunātha, takes a synthetic view of all the sacred texts of all the religions and systems of philosophy, which are recognised to be outgrowths of religions, in the 35th Āhnika of the Tantrāloka, which is called Śāstra-Sammelana. He asserts the importance of the tradition, not only in the context of the verbal authority (Āgama), presented in the religious texts, which are almost invariably held to be revealed, but also in relation to the in-

1. T. A., Ah. XXXVII, 400. 2. T. A., Ah. IX, 7.

ference and even perception.[1] Accordingly he holds that the Āgama is one only, including all the empirical branches of learning (Laukika-śāstra) and the various systems of religion and philosophy, giving the necessary disciplines and pointing out different paths to the realisation of different objectives, which persons with different physical, intellectual and spiritual equipments aim at. The ultimate goal to be realised through all of them is the Trika, which is synonimous with Kula, which is as important among all the systems of philosophy as life is in physical organism, and which is present in all the systems as fragrance is in flower or oil in oil-seed.[2] Hence he admits that different sacred texts are the parts of the one original Āgama.

Ekasmadāgamāccaite khaṇḍakhaṇḍā vyapoddhṛtāḥ
Loke syurāgamāḥ (T. A., Ah. XXXV, 376.)

TWO TRADITIONS ABOUT THE ĀGAMA.

There are two traditions about this original Āgama. The one is based upon the Siddhā Tantra etc. And this is related to different Śaiva systems only. The original Śaivāgama, according to this, consisted of Nine Crore verses and it had its own line of teachers as has already been stated in chapter "Historical Background of his thought". We do not know the name of this Āgama. It is not mentioned in the texts accessible to us so far.

The other tradition relates to the Śiddhayogīśvarī Tantra which originally dealt with all the branches of learning, empirical and spiritual, as has already been stated.

THEORIES OF EVOLUTION AND DEVOLUTION.

To the modern reader the history of the Śaiva thought, detailed above, would look to be absurd. His mind is domi-

1. T. A., Ah. XXXV, 355–7. 2. T. A., Ah. XXXV, 373–4.

nated by the theory of evolution, therefore, in relation to the history of a thought he is accustomed to look for more from less and not the reverse. It is, therefore, necessary to remind him that the Indian tradition admits that the golden age was in the past and that the present is the iron age. It holds that the present age, the Kaliyuga, is the age of degeneration, which has come through slow devolution from Satya-Yuga through Tretā and Dvāpara. This general attitude towards what is, is reflected in the historical account, given above. This is one of the reasons for our giving the first place to the Siddhayogīśvarīmata in the historical account of literature on Kaulism.

But this will not convince the reader. It may, therefore, be added that the Mālinīvijaya Tantra, which is summary of the Siddhayogīśvarīmata[1], is very frequently referred to as Śrīpūrvaśāstra, implying that it is the first of the Tantras. Therefore, the first place assigned to it among the Tantras, particularly among those which are of recognised authority on the Kula system, seems to be justifiable even from the modern historical point of view.

The word "Pūrva" in the alternative title "Srīpūrvaśāstra", by which the Mālinīvijaya Tantra is known, cannot be interpreted as referring to the eastern face, from which it may be supposed to have proceeded, because the Kula system, to which it belongs, is recognised to have proceeded from the top-mouth, as we shall show subsequently. This assertion is supported by the fact that it is referred to in the Kulārṇava as follows :—

Lokadharma viruddhopi Siddhayogīśvarīmate (K. Ar., 17.)

2. RUDRAYĀMALA TANTRA.

The Rudrayāmala Tantra is historically prior (i) to the Vāmakeśvarī Tantra, which, according to its own statement,

1. T. A., Ah. XXXVII, 400.

is closely related to the former, deals with matters left out by it and refers to it[1] (ii) to the Jñānārṇava, which contains a reference to it[2] (iii) to the Nityāṣoḍaśikārṇava, which is posterior to the Jñānārṇava[3] and (iv) to the Tantrarāja, which came after the Nityāṣoḍaśikārṇava.[4] But we cannot say definitely whether it came before or after the Kulārṇava. For, reference to one in the other has not been traced so far. But we place the Kulārṇava after the Rudrayāmala, because the former begins with benedictory verses, which is a definite sign of the later date, while the latter begins with the question of Bhairava to Bhairavī, without any benedictory verses in the beginning.

Yāmala Tantras were of recognised authority on the Kaulism that Abhinavagupta propounds, as is clear from Abhinava's reference to the Brahmayāmala in the context of the use of Surā, the Śivarasa, in the performance of the Kula Yāga.[5] And the Rudrayāmala was held to be of very great importance, because the concluding portion of it, constituting the text of the Parātriṁśikā, is commented upon by so many important authorities, including Somānanda and Abhinava, and is recognised to present Kaulism by the latest commentator, Rājānaka Lāsaka, as we have already stated.

We have pointed out in an earlier Chapter "Historical Background of His Thought" that there were eight Yāmala Tantras among the sixty four monistic Tantras, recognised by Abhinavagupta. It may be noted here that in the Vāmakeśvara Tantra, or to be more accurate, in the commentary by Bhāskararāya on the Nityāṣoḍaśikārṇava section of it, the list of the eight Yāmala Tantras, as we shall show subsequently, is different. Only three Tantras, Brahma Yāmala, Viṣṇuyāmala and Rudrayāmala are common to both the lists : the rest are different.

1. V. T., 121. 2. J. A., 119. 3. N. S. A., 27.
4. N. S. A., 6. 5. T. A., Ah. XXIX, 8.

From the text, published under the title "Rudrayāmalam" edited by Jīvānanda Vidyāsāgara, it appears that the Rudrayāmala is later than the Viṣṇuyāmala and the Brahmayāmala. For, it mentions the Rudra Yāmala after the above two. Further, the published text is only a later part of the Rudrayāmala (Uttara kāṇḍa). This means that the tradition of the .Rudrayāmala was still being systematised, when the Viṣṇūyāmala and the Brahmayāmala existed in fully completed form.[1] Furthermore, the colophon at the end of every chapter runs as

"Iti śrī Rudra yāmala uttaratantre".

And we know from the occurrence of the word "Uttaratantra" in the Nāṭyaśāstra of Bharata "Śeṣamuttaratantreṇa Kohalaḥ kathayiṣyati" (N. S., 474) that this word is used for a supplementary work immediately following the original. Therefore, there does not seem to be much doubt about it that the published text of the Rudra Yāmala is a supplement to the original and that the Rudrayāmala Tantra was completed after the Viṣṇuyāmala and the Brahmayāmala.

The fact that the published Rudrayāmala does not present the full text of the work is supported by the following facts. (1) The Parātriṁśikā, as we have pointed out earlier, is the concluding part of the Rudrayāmala Tantra. But the verses, constituting its text, are not found in the published Rudrayāmala. (2) The Parātriṁśikā contains a dialogue between Bhairava and Bhairavī, in which the latter questions and the former answers. But in the published text the reverse is the case.

The fact is that the published portion of the Rudrayāmala Tantra came not only after the Siddhayogīśvarīmata, mentioned above, but also after many more, because the path,

1. R. Y., 1.

pointed out by it, is admitted to enable the person, following it, to master many Tantras. "Yasmādrudro bhavejjñānī nānātantrārthapāragaḥ" and "Mayoktāni ca tantrāṇi madbhaktāya paṭhanti ca" R. Y., 14.

There is, however, no doubt about it that the published text deals with matters connected with the ritualistic and the religious aspects of the Kula system. For, it has definite sections like "Kulācāravidhi" (P. 20) "Kaulānāṁ sandhyā" (P. 228) "Kaulatarpaṇam" (P. 228.) and refers to Kaulika,[1] Kuladravya,[2] Kaulamārgaparāyaṇa;[3] asserts that neither the successful practice of Yoga nor the consequent attainment of the final emancipation is possible without following the path pointed out by the Kula system,[4] which is admitted to be the highest.[5]

The Rudrayāmala was completed, it seems, after both Buddhism and Kaulism had spread to China and the Tāntrika aspect had developed in Buddhism. For, Vaśiṣṭha is advised to go to China, which is spoken of as the land of Bauddhas, to learn the Kaulika practices[6] and is said to have become a perfect Yogin in consequence of the frequent use of wine, meat, fish, woman and Mudrā.[7]

It has many verses in common with the Bhagavadgītā with very slight difference. For instance :—

Krodhādbhavati sammohaḥ sammohāt smṛtivibhramaḥ.
Smṛtibhraṁśād buddhināśo buddhināśādvināśanam.

(R. Y., 182 and Bh. G., Ch. II, 63.)

It contains several verses which are found in the Kulārṇava also e. g.

Tṛṇaparṇodakāhārāḥ satataṁ vanavāsinaḥ
Hariṇādimṛgāścaiva tāpasāste bhavanti kim.

(R. Y., 15 and K. Ar., 7.)

1. R. Y., 71. 2. Ibid., 80. 3. Ibid., 133. 4. Ibid., 141. 5. Ibib., 153. 6. Ibid., 152. 7. Ibid., 155.

It describes sixty four Āsanas.[1] It seems to refer to Kālidāsa. "Kālidāsavākyagatā Kālidāsasusiddhidā" (R. Y., 289.) It was influenced by Vaiṣṇavaism. For, it advocates devotion to Kṛṣṇa,[2] gives Mantras to worship Kṛṣṇa with and a Kṛṣṇa Stotra.[3]

It frequently talks of Kulāgama,[4] refers to all the Tantras,[5] asserts that Buddhism in China was influenced by Kaulism,[6] mentions the Sūkṣma Tantra by name[7] and sixty-four Tantras collectively[8] and counts Lakulīśa among Rudras.[9] From all this it is clear that the published portion of the Rudrayāmala is a very late work,

3. KULĀRṆAVA TANTRA.

The Kulārṇava Tantra, as its very title indicates, is a popularly recognised text on Kaulism. Its historical position is very definite. It is later than Siddha Yogiśvarī Mata, which is so frequently quoted and referred to by Abhinava in the Tantrāloka (Vide appendix B). For, the latter is mentioned in the former (Lokadharmavinodopi Siddha Yogiśvarī Mate, K. Ar., Ch. II, 88). It is earlier than the Vāmakeśvarīmata in which it is referred to, according to Bhāskararāya, the commentator on the Nityāṣoḍaśikārṇava, which is a part of the Vāmakeśvara Tantra. For, commenting on the word "Anyāni" in the 2nd verse of the first chapter he says :—

Anyānyapi Kulārṇava, Dakṣiṇāmūrti Saṁhitā, Sanatkumāra Saṁhitā, Parānanda Tantrādīni (N. S. A., 25).

The Kulārṇava asserts that Kaulism arose after the Vedas and Āgamas; that it presents the essence of both and that it was propagated by Para Śiva and persisted in the oral tradi-

1. R. Y., 192. 2. Ibid., 303. 3. Ibib., 309–15.
4. Ibid., 192. 5. Ibid., 212. 6. Ibid., 239.
7. Ibid., 246. 8. Ibid., 359. 9. Ibid., 369.

tion only till it was recorded in the authoritative books on the system.[1] By the time the Kulārṇava was completed, Kaulism had assumed the form of a distinct system of philosophy which was called Kula Darśana : "Dhanyomanuṣyalakṣeṣu jānāti Kula Darśanam." (K. Ar., Ch. III 28.). It may be pointed out here that the printed Kulārṇava has "Kulaśādhanam" instead of "Kuladarśanam" as in the MS. The system was also called "Kaula"

"Na Kaulādhikadarśanam" (K. Ar., Ch. III, 119.)
Here again the published text reads as

"Na Kaulasamadarśanam"

But in Chapter V, 45 the word Kaula Darśana occurs and the reading in the published text and the MS. is the same "Śrī Kauladarśane cāpi Bhairaveṇa mahātmanā".

KAULISM AS ŪRDHVĀMNĀYA.

The Kaulism originated from the top-mouth of the five-faced Śiva. It is, therefore, recognised to be the highest of all the schools. According to the Kulārṇava, there is no higher system of philosophy than that presented in the literature on Kaulism. It asserts that of the Vedic, Vaiṣṇava, Śaiva, Dakṣiṇa, Vāma, Siddhānta and Kaula systems each following is higher than the preceding.[2]

It is called Ūrdhvāmnāya, because it is above the "Law" (Niyati)[3], moral or physical; as also because it is higher than those Āgamas which are bound by moral law. The moral and physical principles are binding, effective or operative within the sphere of Niyati. But there is a sphere beyond Niyati where, it is admitted, the physical laws do not operate. Thus a great Yogin is admitted to be capable of producing every-

1. K. Ar., Ch. II, 10.

2. Ibid., Ch. II, 7–8.

3. Ibid., Ch. III, 18.

thing by sheer force of will, independently of the physical things which are necessary for their production in the sphere of Niyati, the physical order. The Kaulism holds that just as physical laws are ineffective in the case of Yogins so are the moral laws in the case of the follower of Kaulism who is outside the sphere of Niyati.

NO BIFURCATION OF RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY IN THE KULĀRṆAVA.

The Kulārṇava asserts the true knowledge to be the direct cause of salvation and declares that mere observance of religious formalities is absolutely useless. It asks :—

Is mere besmearing of the body with ashes and dust the cause of salvation : and if so, do the dogs, who always lie in dust and ashes become liberated ? Does exposing the body to heat and cold or indiscriminately eating anything, whether fit or unfit for human consumption, lead to liberation : if so, do the swines attain it ? Does asceticism consist in living on grass, leaves and water : if so, are deer ascetics ?[1]

It holds that mere verbal knowledge of the Śāstras is as ineffective in removing the innate ignorance as is the mere talk of the lamp in dispelling darkness;[2] that so long as the mind runs after the objects of desire, so long as there is egoism associated with the body and things are looked upon as "mine", there is no possibility of the realisation of the Reality;[3] and that the salvation is attainable through following the path, pointed out by the literature on the Kula system. Philosophy,[4] according to Kaulism, is not merely a speculation about the Reality. It is a way of life that leads to the factual union with the Ultimate. The knowledge of the true nature of the

1. K. Ar., Ch. I, 82–8.
2. Ibid., Ch. I, 99.
3. Ibid. Ch. II, 17–8.
4. Ibid., Ch. II, 38.

Ultimate, therefore, is as important as the way of life. In Kaulism, therefore, there is no bifurcation of religion and philosophy.

BIRTH IN HIGHER CASTE OF NO IMPORTANCE.

For the realisation of the Reality the birth in the higher caste and observance of the rules of different stages of life (Varṇāśrama) are not necessary qualifications.[1] Kaula is one who is devoted to Kula.

Kulapūjārato devi svayaṁ Kaulo na cetaraḥ. K. Ar., Ch. III, 68.

DEGENERATION AMONG THE FOLLOWERS OF THE KAULISM.

By the time the Kulārṇava was written, degeneration had already set in among the followers of the Kaulism. There were many, who did not inherit the tradition and, therefore, were ignorant of the secrets. They were preaching the Kaulism as they thought and imagined it to be.[2] They seem to have advocated the use of wine, woman and meat as a means to liberation, waving aside the spiritual and psychological training as an antecedent condition and transcending the empirical level as the main objective of their use.

The Kulārṇava asserts that the following of the Kaulism is not pleasant and easy as the ignorant people think. It is as difficult as walking on the edge of a sword and as risky as holding a lion by the ear[3] or holding a serpent in hand, because herein the 'wine' meat and woman are to be used, not for the satisfaction of the sensuous desires, but for the realisation of the highest spiritual value by ascending from the sensuous to the spiritual level, just when the 'wine', meat and

1. K. Ar., Ch. II, 50. 2. Ibid., Ch. II, 117-21.

3. Ibid., Ch. II, 123.

woman are producing their highest effect on the physical organism. Thus, for instance, in the course of the performance of the Ādiyāga, the performer, who has taken meat, drunk wine and is in touch with woman so as to experience sex-joy at the highest degree, is asked to withdraw his mind completely from the senses and to concentrate on the "joy" (Ānanda) as completely dissociated and free from the sensuous element. If he fails to do so he is morally and socially guilty. How difficult such an act is, the reader can very well imagine. He will think it to be impossible. Let him, therefore, remember that the following of the Kula system means doing something that would look to be impossibe to an ordinary man.

The path to final emancipation, pointed out by Kaulism, is very dangerous in so far as in it there is very great danger of moral degeneration and social corruption. From the statement in the Kulārṇava, referred to above, it is clear that by the time the Kulārṇava was completed great degeneration had set in among the followers of Kaulism.

EMPHASIS ON MOTIVE.

The Kulārṇava recognises that 'wine' is not to be even looked at and touched, much less it is to be taken. It enjoins, like the Dharmaśāstra, various forms of penance[1] in case they are touched or taken. It forbids its use by three higher castes.

As regards the meat it holds that all those who permit, connive at, or take pleasure in killing animals, sell, purchase, prepare, help in preparation or eat the meat are morally guilty.[2]

But it enjoins the use of both, 'wine' and meat in the performance of the Kaulika rituals. It counts twelve kinds of

1. K. Ar., Ch. II, 128. 2. Ibid., Ch. II, 133.

'wine' and gives the method of preparing them in Chapter V. It points out that in enjoining the use of 'wine' and meat in the Kaulika rituals, it is doing what is common to the Vedic literature. It asserts that just as drinking of Soma by Brāhmaṇas in sacrifices does not mean a sin, so does not drinking of 'wine' in the Kaula rituals.[1] From the context it is clear that Soma was an intoxicant. Similarly in regard to killing of animals for sacrificial purposes it points out that it is enjoined in the performance of various sacrifices even in the Vedas[2] though it is prohibited for personal pleasure or satisfaction. Therefore, how can what is not objectionable in the Vedic rituals become so in the Kaulika ?

To justify the use of 'wine' and meat, it emphasises the importance of motive and says that the person who takes wine and meat for mere sensuous satisfaction is a sinner.[3] But if he takes them to grasp the meaning of Mantra, to concentrate the mind and to cut the bondages, he commits no sin. We know that motive is a very important factor to be considered in settling the true value of an action. Kṛṣṇa in the Bhagavadgītā has recognised it. Even the modern courts of justice in their judgements on action take it into account. The Kaulism, therefore, cannot be singled out for condemnation on account of its advocating the use of wine and animal sacrifice for higher spiritual purpose.

WHY DO THE YOGINS USE 'WINE' ?

The Kulārṇava, in common with the Vedāntin, admits that Ānanda, "bliss", is the essential nature of the Brahman and, therefore, that of the individual self, which is identical with the Brahman. The self is in the body and the 'wine' makes

1. K. Ar., Ch. V. 86. 2. Ibid 40.

3. Ibid 82–3.

the Ānanda aspect of the self manifest.[1] Hence it is used by the Yogins, who are capable of rising above the sensuous and concentrating on Ānanda as such. The motive of the use of 'wine' being the grasp of the Ānanda, the follower of the Kula system has to be very careful. In fact, according to the Kulārṇava, that person alone is Kaulika, whose body and mind are not affected beyond control by the drinking of 'wine', but who is led by it to identification with the Highest.[2]

The knowledge of the true nature of the Ultimate Reality is the essential condition of the use of 'wine' in order that the person may be able to direct his mind to it and enter into it.[3] According to the Kulārṇava, therefore, it is necessary that the person, who uses 'wine' in the course of performance of the Kaula ritual, must be both, Yogin and philosopher.

KAULISM AS SYNTHESIS OF BHOGA AND MOKṢA.

Kaulism points out a path to the union with the Ultimate through the enjoyment of the pleasures of the world in so far as it advocates the use of 'wine' meat and woman. It synthesises the pleasure (Bhoga) and liberation (Mokṣa) and, therefore, is recognised to be the highest way to final emancipation :

"Bhogayogātmakaṁ Kaulaṁ tasmāt sarvādhikam priye"

(K. Ar., III, 23).

LATER INTERPOLATIONS.

There are some statements in the Kulārṇava, which are mutually contradictory. For instance, drinking is said to be of three types, divine (Divya), heroic (Vīra) and brutish (Paśu). Divine is that which is done in the presence of

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1. K. Ar., Ch. V, 76.
2. Ibid 74.
3. Ibid 70.

the goddess.[1] Heroic is that which is done in the posture, called Vīra. Free drinking is bruitish. The last is said to lead the drinker to hell.

And 'Wine' is to be taken in a quantity which does not adversely affect the senses and does not change the facial expression.[2]

The following statement soon after the above seems to be a later interpolation, because it is inconsistent, not only with what has gone before but also with the motive itself :—

He should drink again and again till he falls on the ground and rising should drink .again. Such a drinking frees man from the rebirth.

The goddess is pleased if a person drinks so much as to feel exhilarated. Bhairava is pleased if he drinks so much that he faints. All the gods get pleased if he drinks so much that he vomits.[3]

DIFFERENCES IN THE MANUSCRIPT AND PRINTED EDITION OF THE KULĀRṆAVA.

The colophon at the end of each chapter of the Kulārṇava MS. No. 449 of 1884-86 of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, states the number of Granthas in the book to be one lakh and a quarter "Sapādalakṣagranthe". From this it appears that the edition, published by Jīvānanda, contains only a fragment of the whole Tantra. This conclusion is supported by the colophon at the end of the seventeenth chapter, which says that the chapter belongs to the fifth part "Sapādalakṣagranthe Pañcama-Khaṇḍe". The MS., a copy of which is in our possession, contains all the seventeen chapters,

1. K. Ar., Ch. VII, 103-4. 2. Ibid. 106.

3. Ibid. 109-10.

included in the published edition. Of course there are differences in reading and scribal mistakes.

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF A MAN IN SAMĀDHI (SAMĀDHISTHA) ACCORDING TO THE KULĀRṆAVA.

The person in Samādhi sits like a stone, because his vital airs do not function. He thinks nothing and, therefore, the Reality shines to him of itself. His senses are obsolutely motionless. His mind (Manas) and vital airs are merged in the self. He is conscious of neither pleasure nor pain. His mind does not function, therefore, there is no rise of any desire in him. The distinction between the individual soul and the universal completely disappears to him. His self is as undistinguishable from the Universal[1] as water poured in water or milk in milk.

INFLUENCE OF THE BHAGAVADGĪTĀ.

In advocating motiveless and selfless action, the Kulārṇava echoes the teaching of the Bhagavadgītā. It says that no living being can totally abandon action. The man of renunciation, therefore, is one who acts without any expectation of the fruit. The selfless action of one who has risen above the ego-feeling,[2] does not affect him exactly as water does not the lotus-leaf.

It quotes the following verse from the Bhagavadgītā with very slight variation without saying that it is a quotation :—

Yaḥ śāstravidhimutsṛjya (Bh. G., XVI, 23 and K. Ar., V, 93)

SOME FEATURES WHICH ARE COMMON TO OTHER SYSTEMS.

The Kulārṇava admits and enjoins many things which are common to other Śaiva systems. It enjoins the worship of

1. K. Ar., Ch. IX, 8–15. 2. Ibid. 124–9.

Śrīcakra.[1] It mentions Khecarī, Vyomacarī and Bhūcarī.[2] In the context of the purification of the bodies, gross (Sthūla), subtle (Sūkṣma) and transcendental (Para),[3] it admits thirty six categories, classifying those from Prakṛti to earth as impure, from Māyā to Puruṣa as pure-cum-impure and from Śiva to Vidyā[4] as pure. Thus it talks of three types of categories, Aśuddha, Śuddhāśuddha and Śuddha.

It injoins the worship of the various Cakras including the Vṛnda,[5] which is the most important from the point of view of the Krama system, according to Maheśvarānanda. The Kulapūjā, preceded by the worship of the Vṛnda Cakra, is admitted to lead to Sālokya.

It admits six pāths[6] (Ṣaḍadhva) : four aspects of speech, Parā etc.[7] : three impurities, Āṇava, Kārma and Māyīya[8] : thirty six categories[9] : the importance of initiation (Dīkṣā)[10] which, it holds, changes the individual into Śiva, just as purified and processed murcury does iron into gold.

4. JÑĀNĀRṆAVA.

The Jñānārṇava is concerned with Nityā. According to the colophon, it is "Nityā Tantra". Nityā has sixteen forms, the highest of which is Tripurā, or Tripura sundarī, as we shall soon show. The Jñānārṇava gives information about Tripurā as she essentially is, as is clear from the following question put by Devī :—

Tripurā parameśāna jñānamārgeṇa sūcitā
Tattva rūpeṇa kathaya yadyahaṁ tava vallabhā. J. A., 3.

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1. K. Ar., Ch. VI, 9.
2. Ibid. Ch. VII, 14.
3. Ibid. 78–82.
4. Ibid. 87.
5. Ibid. Ch. X, 12–3.
6. Ibid. Ch. XIII, 76.
7. Ibid. 81.
8. Ibid. 86.
9. Ibid. 90.
10. Ibid. Ch. XIV, 92.

It seems that there was a group of Tantras that dealt with the religion and philosophy which admitted Nityā to be the highest object of worship and the ultimate philosophical principle. This fact is indicated by the colophon at the close of each chapter :—

"Iti Śrīmajjñānārṇave Nityā Tantre......"

It contains repeated references to the Kula system; enjoins contemplation on Nityā, the revealer of the true nature of the ultimate reality,[1] and worship of Cakra,[2] according to Kaulika practices. It advocates the Dūtīyāga and the use of 'wine' and meat in it, when the performer is able to rise to the level of indeterminacy. It admits that the use of the intoxicant is prohibited, but asserts that the prohibition applies to those who are at the empirical level and not to the spiritually great.[3] It recognises all human beings to be equal. It discards totally the distinction of caste.[4] From all this it is aparent that the Jñānārṇava presents an aspect of the Kula system.

Historically it came after the Yāmala Tantras, like the Rudrayāmala etc., to which it distinctly refers.[5] It came before the Nityāṣoḍaśikārṇava, which includes it in the list of 64 Tantras, given in the section called the Nityāṣoḍaśikārṇava. It discusses various Cakras, like the Sthiti, Vindu etc.,[6] and different Vidyās, like the Nandikeśvara, Kāmarāja[7] etc. It refers to various systems of philosophy such as the Śaiva, Śākta, Brāhma, Vaiṣṇava, Sūrya and Bauddha.[8] It contains the following verse, which is used very commonly by the worshippers :—

1. J. A., 10.
2. Ibid. 84.
3. Ibid. 107.
4. Ibid. 113-4.
5. Ibid. 119.
6. Ibid. 37.
7. Ibid. 41.
8. Ibid. 70.

vanaspatirasotpanno gandhāḍhyo dhūpa uttamaḥ.
Āghreyaḥ sarvadevānāṁ dhūpoyam pratigṛhyatām.
(J. A., 17.)

It was commented upon by Śaṅkarānanda, who was a predecessor of Bhāskararāya, as is clear from the following references in the commentary on the Nityāṣoḍaśikārṇava :—

1. "Śatapatrakairitiślokavyākhyāvasare...... ... ityuktaṁ Śaṅkarānandaiḥ" N. S. A., 121.
2. "Etena jñānārṇavīyavacane........... Śaṅkarānandanāthasya bhrama eva" (Ibid. 170)

From the latter quotation it is clear that at many places Bhāskararāya did not agree with Śaṅkarānanda's interpretation of the Jñānārṇava.

5. NITYĀṢOḌAŚIKĀRṆAVA, A PART OF THE VĀMAKEŚVARA TANTRA.

The word Kula stands for (Śakti)[1] which is called Nityā also. In the context of discussion on the day, auspicious for the performance of the Kaula rituals, Abhinavagupta refers to those who have thoroughly studied the Nityātantra.[2] Therefore, the Āgamas, concerned with the presentation of Nityā, have to be recognised as dealing with the Kula system.

The Vāmakeśvara Tantra in a part of it, called Nityāṣoḍaśikārṇava, deals with Nityā. Hence it has to be included in the list of books on Kaulism. But the Vāmakeśvara Tantra is not accessible to us in full. Only a part of it, Nityāṣoḍaśikārṇava, is before us. We, therefore, cannot say much about the whole of the Vāmakeśvara Tantra. But the Nityāṣoḍaśikārṇava is a very late part of it, because it refers to the following Tantras :— (1) Mahāmāyā, (2) Śambara, (3) Yoginī, (4) Jāla śambara, (5) Tattvaśambara, (6) Bhairavāṣṭaka, (7–14) Ba-

1. T. A., (Comm) Ah. XXVIII, 51. 2. Ibid. 51.

hurūpāṣṭaka, (15–22) Yāmalāṣṭaka, (Brahmayāmala, Viṣṇuyāmala, Rudrayāmala, Lakṣmīyāmala, Umāyāmala, Skandayāmala, Gaṇeśayāmala, Jayadrathayāmala), (23) Candrajñāna, (24) Vāsuki, (25) Mahāsammohana, (26) Mahocchuṣma, (27) Vātula, (28) Vātulottara, (29) Hṛdbheda, (30) Tantra bheda, (31) Guhyatantra, (32) Kāmika, (33) Kalāvāda, (34) Kalāsāra, (35) Kubjikāmata, (36) Tantrottara, (37) Vīṇā, (38) Trotala, (39) Trotalottara, (40) Pañcāmṛta, (41) Rūpabheda, (42) Bhūtoḍḍāmara, (43) Kulasāra, (44) Kuloḍḍīśa, (45) Kulacuḍāmaṇi, (46) Sarvajñānottara, (47) Mahākālīmata, (48) Mahālakṣmīmata, (49) Siddhayogīśvarīmata, (50) Kurūpikāmata, (51) Devarūpikāmata, (52) Sarvavīramata, (53) Vimalāmata, (54) Pūrva, (55) Paścima, (56) Dakṣa, (57) Uttara, (58) Niruttara, (59) Vaiśeṣika, (60) Jñānārṇava, (61) Virāvali, (62) Aruṇeśa, (63) Mohinīśa, (64) Viśuddheśvara.[1]

And, according to Bhāskararāya, it refers to the Kulārṇava, the Dakṣiṇāmūrti saṁhitā, the Sanatkumārasaṁhitā, the Parānanda Tantra etc. by the words "Anyānyapi".[2] Hence it is placed after the Jñānārṇava here.

It may be pointed out here that the Vāmakeśvarīmata, published in the Kashmir Sanskrit Series as No LXVI with Jayaratha's commentary, the Vivaraṇa, is not the whole of the Vāmakeśvara Tantra, but the first five Chapters of the Nityāṣoḍaśikārṇava, which formed a part of the Vāmakeśvara Tantra, as pointed out by Bhāskararāya in one of the introductory verses in his commentary on the Nityāṣoḍaśikārṇava.[3] A comparison of the text of the Vāmakeśvarīmata with that of the Nityāṣoḍaśikārṇava will satisfy the reader that the above statement is correct. Another point, which is worthy of note, is that Jayaratha's commentary runs up to the 33rd

1. N. S. A., 22–3. 2. Ibid. 25. 3. Ibid. 1.

verse of the 5th Chapter : but, according to the Ānandāśrama edition, the 5th chapter consists of 44 verses.

The Nityāṣoḍaśikārṇava is a part of the Vāmakeśvara Tantra, as has just been pointed out. It consists of eight chapters, of which the first five deal with the external worship of Nityā, which has sixteen forms : (1) Mahātripurasundarī, (2) Kāmeśvarī, (3) Bhagamālinī, (4) Nityaklinnā, (5) Bheruṇḍā, (6) Vahnivāsinī, (7) Mahāvidyeśvarī, (8) Dūtī, (9) Tvaritā, (10) Kulasundarī, (11) Nityā, (12) Nīlapatākā, (13) Vijayā, (14) Sarvamaṅgalā, (15) Jvālāmālinikā, (16) Citrā. The last three are concerned with the internal worship.[1] The last portion, consisting of three chapters from 6th to 8th, is called "Nityā Hṛdaya" or "Yoginī Hṛdaya".[2] It was a very popular Tantra for many centuries and, therefore, had many commentaries[3] by Gaurīkānta[4] etc.

It is a work on the Kula system. For, the conception of the Parā or the Vimarśa Śakti as Nityā, which is recognised to be of sixteen forms,[5] is an aspect of the Kula system, as is very clear from many statements of the competent authorities like Jayaratha, Bhāskararāya, Subhagānanda etc. To convince the reader, a quotation from each of the two available commentaries is given below :—

Ūrmiriti bhoginītyapi kubjeti Kuleśvarīti jagaduryām
Śrīkālakarṣiṇītyapi kuṇḍalinītyapi ca naumi tāṁ devīm
Ityādyuktam tat sākṣāt kulaśāstratayā vyapadiṣṭe amusmin paramopādeye śāstre (V. M., 28.)

Kulavidyetyetasyā eva nāmāntaram (N. S. A., 59).
In fact in the original text of the Nityāṣoḍaśikārṇava itself, the teachings contained therein are referred to as Kula-Vidyā.[6]

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1. N. S. A., 177. 2. Ibid., 6. 3. Ibid., 7.
4. Ibid., 5. 5. Ibid., 25. 6. Ibid., 58.

COMMENTARIES AND COMMENTATORS ON THE NITYĀ-ṢOḌAŚIKĀRṆAVA.

The Nityāṣoḍaśikārṇava was a very popular Tantra for many centuries in and outside Kashmir. It had many commentaries and commentators. But only two, one by Jayaratha and the other by Bhāskararāya, are available. Others are known from references only in the two. References are very brief, so much so that in some cases the names of the commentaries only are mentioned without giving the names of the authors and in others authors only are referred to. Thus we know of the Ṛjuvimarśinī, Artharatnāvalī[1] and many commentaries by the Kashmirian authors[2]; of the commentators such as Lakṣmaṇa,[3] Gaurīkānta,[4] Śivānandanātha, Vidyānandanātha[5], Śaṅkarānandanātha[6] etc., and of Śrīharṣa Dīkṣita,[7] who wrote a commentary on the Śāradātilaka also.

It appears that Subhagānanda also wrote a commentary, not only on the Tantrarāja, a fact that is recognised by Bhāskararāya, who quotes a verse from the Tantrarāja and the commentary, Manoramā, on it,[8] but also on the N. S. A., because he is said to have interpreted the word "Yoginīḥ" in N. S. A., Ch., I, 134 as referring to all the Śaktis attending on the Devī (Devīparivāra-bhūtanikhila-Śāktiparam iti tu Manoramāyām. N. S. A., 72.). From this it is clear that his commentary on the Nityāṣoḍaśikārṇava also was called Manoramā.

This view seems to find support in another reference to the Manoramā, wherein Subhagānandanātha is said to have repeated in his commentary on the benedictory verses in the beginning of the Nityāṣoḍaśikārṇava, what was said on them

1. N. S. A., 22-3.
2. Ibid., 16, 17.
3. Ibid., 22.
4. Ibid., 23.
5. Ibid., 32.
6. Ibid., 73.
7. Ibid., 111.
8. Ibid., 74.

by earlier Kashmirian commentators.[1] This means that before Subhagānanda many commentaries on it had been written.

The two Tantras, (i) the Svacchanda and (ii) the Netra, definitely have Kaulika tendencies, though we cannot say that they exclusively deal with Kaulism. For, the former, according to Jayaratha's interpretation, seems to recognise the Kula system to be the highest[2] in so far as it leads to the realisation of the Highest Reality : and the latter, among other things, presents worship, according to Kaulism.[3] Historically the former is prior to the latter, because, according to Jayaratha's interpretation the Netra Tantra gives a description of Mṛtyujit, according to the Svacchanda,[4] Caṇḍa, Trīśirobhairava etc.

6. SVACCHANDA TANTRA.

The Svacchanda Tantra is one of the eight Yāmala Tantras, according to the Śrī Śrīkaṇṭhī, quoted by Jayaratha, as has already been stated. But, according to Bhāskararāya, as we learn from his statement in his commentary on the Nityāṣoḍaśikārṇava, it is not so. He gives the following list of Yāmala Tantras : (1) Brahmayāmala (2) Viṣṇuyāmala (3) Rudrayāmala (4) Lakṣmīyāmala (5) Umāyāmala (6) Skandayāmala (7) Gaṇeśayāmala (8) Jayadrathayāmala (N. S. A., 23). He does not state the authority, on which his list is based.

In its earlier recension it consisted of Hundred Crore verses,[5] like the Siddhayogīśvarīmata. The published recention is only a summary of it. It presents the tradition, founded by Śrīkaṇṭha.[6] It is the most important among the Tantras, ema-

1. N. S. A. 16–7
2. S. T., VI, 54–5.
3. N. T., I, 260.
4. Ibid., 225.
5. S. T., I, 9.
6. S. T., III, 69.

nating from the Southern face of Śiva.[1] It is, therefore, accepted as an authority on the Kula system, which is a synthesis of the two paths, Southern and Northern.

ITS HISTORICAL POSITION.

On the basis of the internal evidence, it seems to be a very late Tantra. In any case it cannot be placed earlier than the close of the 2nd century A. D., because it refers, not only to the Pāśupata system, founded by Lakulīśa, who lived in the 2nd century A. D., as has been shown in the Bhāskarī Vol. III, pp. XXVIII–XXX., but also to the Mousula system, founded by Musulendra, a pupil of Lakulīśa, who also was born in Kārohaṇa or Kayārohaṇa.[2] It refers to the Kāmaśāstra,[3] the Citraśāstra,[4] Vālmīki and Vyāsa,[5] fully constructed theatre (Nāṭyaśāla) and three Hundred and sixty systems of philosophy, including Buddhism, Jainism, Sāṅkhya, Pāśupata etc. and states which of the Tattvas is reached by their respective followers.[6] It mentions 18 Rudras, whose names are almost the same as those of the Eighteen Dvaitādvaita Tantras.

ITS SUBJECT-MATTER.

It begins with the statement of the chief characteristics of a teacher, who ought to be approached for guidance in the path to final emancipation; gives the essential qualifications of a disciple, who may be initiated ; the kind of place where the rituals should be performed ; religious formulas to contemplate on; the time when the rituals, such as offering sacrifices to the deities and throwing oblations into fire, should be performed; the method of purifying the various things necessary for the performance of the rituals; the means of attaining

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1. S. T., IV, 26.
2. S. T., VI. 52–3.
3. S. T., V, 51.
4. Ibid., 241.
5. Ibid. 350.
6. S. T., VI, 34–52.

spiritual power ; and the rules to be strictly adhered to.[1] It deals with the six paths to final emancipation (1) Varṇa (2) Pada (3) Mantra (4) Kalā (5) Tattva (6) Bhuvana; with Śaiva conception of time,[2] geography, categories and the process of creation and destruction. By the way it states method of interpretation of dreams[3] and rites to be performed in case one has a bad dream. It asserts that the distinction of caste disappears after the initiation into Śaivaism.[4]

7. NETRA TANTRA.

The Netra Tantra is latter than the Svacchanda Tantra. For, it presents the conception of the conquerer of death "Mṛtyujit", according to the Tantras, emanating from the Southern mouth of Śiva, such as the Svacchanda, Caṇḍa and Triśirobhairava[5], as has already been stated. It is called "Mṛtyujit" also just for this reason.[6] It is referred to by Abhinavagupta as Mṛtyuñjaya (Vide Appendix B) in his Tantrāloka. That by "Mṛtyuñjaya" Abhinavagupta means the Netra Tantra is made clear by Jayaratha, who commenting upon "Śrīmanmṛtyuñjaye proktam" (T. A. Ah. XVI, 24.), quotes from the Netra Tantra with the introductory remark "that is what is said there" (Taduktaṁ tatra). It refers to many other Tantras like the Totula, Kriyā-kāla, Guṇottara etc.[7]

It is called Netra Tantra, because it is concerned with the presentation of the philosophy, underlying the mythical conception of the third eye of Śiva.[8] It is called Mṛtyujit, because the path, pointed out in it, enables a man to conquer death.[9]

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1. S. T., I, 11–3.
2. S. T., III, 168.
3. S. T., II, 2–11.
4. Ibid., 329.
5. N. T., I, 225.
6. N. T., II, 158.
7. Ibid., 199.
8. N. T., I, 12.
9. N. T., II, 297.

It presents the conception of Mṛtyujit as related to the various schools of Śaivaism, Ūrdhva, Dakṣiṇa, Vāma and Kula.[1] It gives the method of worship according to both Ūrdhvāmnāya and Kulāmnāya in Chapters 11th and 12th respectively.

8. TANTRARĀJA.

The Tantrarāja is a very late Tantra. It came not only after the sixty four Tantras, enumerated earlier in the context of the Nityāṣoḍaśikārṇava, but also after the nine Tantras, which dealt with Nityā and which are enumerated by Subhagānandanātha in his commentary, Manoramā,[2] as follows :—

(1) Sundarīhṛdaya	(2) Nityāṣoḍaśikārṇava
(3) Candrajñāna	(4) Mātṛkātantra
(5) Sammohana Tantra	(6) Vāmakeśvara
(7) Bahurūpāṣṭaka	(8) Prastāra Cintāmaṇi
(9) Meru Prastāra.	

But, according to Bhāskararāya, as pointed out in his commentary on the Nityāṣoḍaśīkārṇava, this enumeration is defective, because it counts Nityāṣoḍaśikārṇava, Sundarīhṛdaya and Vāmakeśvara separately, while in fact they are not separate Tantras. For, the Nityāṣoḍaśikārṇava is a part of the Vāmakeśvara Tantra and the Sundarīhṛdaya is the second half of the Nityāṣoḍaśikārṇava,[3] dealing with the inner worship.

The Tantrarāja does not present any new thought. It is a systematic presentation of what had been said in the Nine Tantras, dealing with Nityā. The necessity of the Tantrarāja arose, because the aforesaid nine Tantras dealt with different matters separately and, therefore, being interdependent, they confused the disciples. Hence for practical purposes a compact presentation of the whole of the discipline for the

1. N. T., I, 252. 2. T. R., 2. 3. N. S. A., 7.

realisation of Nityā was necessary. The following lines convey this idea :—

Tesāmanyonyasāpekṣyājjāyate mativibhramaḥ
Tasmāttu nirapekṣam me tantram tāsām vada prabho.
(T. R., I, 2.)

The Tantrarāja, according to some authorities, is recognised by Śaṅkarācārya as the 65th Tantra in his Ānanda Laharī verse 31 which runs as followes :—

Catuḥṣaṣṭhyātantraiḥ sakalamabhisandhāya bhuvanam
Sthitastattatsiddhiprasavaparatantraḥ pāśupatiḥ
Punastvannirbandhādakhilapuruṣārthaikaghaṭanā
Svatantraṁ te tantraṁ kṣititalamavātītaradidam

They argue that the word "Nirapekṣa" in T. R., I, 2, quoted above, means independent of others (Svatantra). Therefore, this and no other Tantra can be said to be referred to in the Ānanda Laharī.

But Bhāskararāya holds that it is the Vāmakeśvaratantra, and not the Tantrarāja, that is referred to as the 65th. He refutes the argument of Subhagānandanātha by pointing out that, according to its own statement the Tantrarāja is not an independent Tantra. It depends upon the Nityāṣoḍaśikārṇava, a part of the Vāmakeśvara Tantra, as the following quotation shows :—

"Nityāhṛdayasamproktasphuṭopāyena bhāvayet"

But Gaurīkānta held that in the passage of the Ānanda Laharī, the word "Svatantra" stands for the Jñānārṇava.[1]

According to Abhinava, the Tantrarāja presents one of the traditions of secret worship, enjoined by literature on Kaulism. He refers to the Mādhavakula, which, according to Jayaratha, is a recognised part of the Tantrarāja. In this tradition the

1. N. S. A., 45.

teachings of the Devīyāmala and the Mādhavakula were synthesised.[1] The Tantrarāja, therefore, is a work on Kaulism.

Some portions of the Tantrarāja, for instance, the twelve verses from 88 to 99 in Chapter II in praise of the goddess, are directly borrowed from the Nityāṣoḍaśikārṇva, according to Subhagānandanātha, who, in his commentary, copies the commentary on them by an earlier Kashmirian thinker, as he himself says.[2]

(ii) SEMI-ĀGAMIC LITERATURE.

1. THE KĀLĪKULA.

In Kaulism the spiritual preceptor held the most important place, because he was the bestower of the grace, on which the liberation primarily depended. According to this system, he alone could be a spiritual preceptor who was free from all bondages; was completely one with the Bhairava[3] and could by a mere glance infuse such a spiritual knowledge into the disciple as raised him to the spiritual level similar to his own.[4] And the teacher's wife also was equally important, because the spiritual instruction preferably was imparted through her. Hence in the Kaulika ritual, called Ādiyāga, the worship of the line of teachers is very much emphasised.[5] Accordingly grew up the literature, which gave the line of teachers from the earliest time. The Kālīkula is the work that gives such a line. It is definitely a work on the Kula system, because it asserts that Kula is essentially present in all Śāstras much as smell is in a flower.[6]

Abhinavagupta very frequently refers to it in his Tantrāloka so as to give some idea of the contents of this book.

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1. T. A., Ah. XXIX, 40.
2. T. R., 36.
3. T. A., III, 53.
4. Ibid., 54.
5. T. A., Ah. XXIX, 23.
6. T. A., Ah. XXXV. 373-4.

From these references it is clear that it not only gave the line of teachers but also discussed the auspicious days for the performance of the Kaulika rituals;[1] recognised the highest objective, which could be realised through following the path, pointed out by the Śaivāgamas, to be Trika and admitted it to be identical with Kula; and held the Kaulism to be the essence of all the Āgamas.[2] From the use of the word "Ādi" after the Kālīkula in the following, it appears that there were many works on the lines of the Kālīkula :—

"Trikakālīkulādike" (T. A., Ah. XXVIII, 7.)

(iii) KASHMIRIAN CONTRIBUTION TO THE LITERATURE ON KAULISM FROM THE 9TH CENTURY A. D.

It appears that Kaulism at one time had spread, not only all over India but over China also. We have already stated that it originated in Kāmarūpa (Assam) in the 5th century A. D. From there it seems to have spread to South India. For, the great grand teacher of Abhinava in Kaulism belonged to the Southern Pīṭha :—

"Kaściddakṣiṇabhūmīpīṭhavasatiḥ śrīmānvibhurbhairavaḥ...

Lokebhūt Sumatistataḥ .... (T. A., I, (Comm.) 236). We do not know at this stage, whether it spread to Jālandhara directly from Assam or through South India. But this much is certain that it existed in Jālandhara. For, Abhinavagupta went there to learn it from his teacher in this branch, Śambhunātha. And in the performance of the Kaulika worship, Abhinavagupta, following earlier authorities, has enjoined the worship of the Jālandhara Pīṭha, because there the system was established by a succession of great spiritualists, both male and female.[3]

1. T. A., Ah. XXVIII, 7. 2. T. A., Ah. XXXV, 373-4.
3. T. A., Ah. XXIX, 23.

And there is definite evidence to show that it existed in Kashmir in the 9th century A. D. For, from that time down to the 13th century A. D. works on different aspects of Kaulism were written by successive Kashmirian thinkers, some of which are available and others are known from references only.

In Kāśi also we find its followers and commentators on the authoritative works on Kaulism in the 18th century A. D. as we shall show.

PROPAGATION OF THE VĀMAKEŚVARĪ MATA IN KASHMIR IN THE 9TH CENTURY A. D. BY ĪŚVARAŚIVĀCĀRYA.

The system of philosophy, presented in the Vāmakeśvara Tantra, also called Vāmakeśvarī Mata, is apparently an aspect of the Kula system, as pointed out elsewhere. In Kashmir, it was first propagated by Īśvara Śiva. He wrote a commentary on the Vāmakeśvara Tantra as is clear from references to it by Jayaratha.[1] He lived in the 9th century A. D., because he was the abbot of Sūra Maṭha, founded by Sūra, a minister of Avantivarman, King of Kashmir in the 9th century A. D., as is clear from the following quotation :—

Śrīsūramaṭhādhipaterlebhe guruvara-paramparopanatam
Cakramidamīśvaraśivāt pūrvācāryosmadīya eva purā.
(V. T., 48.)

It is interesting to note in this connection that Jayaratha speaks of Īśvaraśiva as an "Avatāraka" which means "One who brought Vāmakeśvara philosophy down to the earth". Does this mean that he for the first time systematically presented the tradition of the Vāmakeśvarī aspect of the Kula system ? This interpretation seems to find support in the statement of Jayaratha himself, who uses the word "Avatā-

1. V. M., (Comm.) 47.

raka" in connection with "Macchanda", who is recognised to be the first propagator of the Kula system in Kaliyuga :—

Tadavatārakaṁ Turyanāthameva tāvat prathamaṁ kīrtayati (T. A., (Comm.) I, 24.).

Thus the work of Īśvara Śiva in connection with the Vāmakeśvarī Mata in Kashmir, seems to be the same as that of Macchanda in regard to the Kula system.

But it may be pointed out here that Jayaratha uses the word "Avatāra" in the sense of propagation. For, just as he speaks of Macchanda as "Avatāraka" of the Kula system in Kāmarūpa, so he does of "Avatāra of the same through a succession of Siddhas and Yoginīs in Jālandhara :—

"Pīṭhamiti Jālandharaṁ yatastatsiddhayoginīkrameṇa asya darśanasya avatāraḥ" (T. A., (Comm.) Ah. XXIX, 23).

Here the word "avatāra" cannot be accepted to mean original revelation : for, that is admitted to have been done by Macchanda. Therefore, the word "Avatāraka" in the context of Īśvara Śiva also may be taken to be in the sense of the first propagator in a particular region i. e. Kashmir. This interpretation is supported by the fact that Jayaratha says that the two Ācāryas, Īśvara Śiva and Śaṅkararāśi are the Avatārakas of this system in Kashmir.

"Asya darśanasya etadeva ācāryadvayaṁ Kāśmīreṣu avatārakam" (V. M., 48)

For, we cannot admit two persons to be founders of the same system.

WAS ĪŚVARAŚIVA AUTHOR OF THE RASAMAHODADHI ?

Jayaratha in connection with the relation of Īśvaraśiva with the Rasamahodadhi says :—

"Sa eva Rasamahodadhiślokānāṁ sākṣāt pravartayitā" (V. M., 48)

The word "Pravartayitā" means "author". This word coupled with "Sākṣāt" seems to emphasise that he directly, personally, was the author of the Rasamahodadhi, which was in metrical form. Thus from the point of view of Jayaratha, undoubtedly Īśvaraśiva was the author of the Rasamahodadhi.

On account of the authorship of this work he is recognised to be a greater authority than Śaṅkara Rāśi, who also commented on the Vāmakeśvarīmata, but differed from Īśvaraśiva in the interpretation of some verses, particularly 88–9 of the first Chapter, as pointed out by Jayaratha, who, for the aforesaid reason, is inclined to prefer Īśvaraśiva's interpretation.

Jayaratha, besides many smaller quotations,[1] gives a lengthy quotation from the Rasamahodadhi about the drawing of Cakra and seems to refer to Īśvaraśiva as "Gurupuṅgava"[2] and to hold him to be the author of the work. The Rasamahodadhi was explained by the followers of Caryānanda in a ridiculous way. Jayaratha, therefore, rejects their explanation.

ŚAṄKARARĀŚI.

Śaṅkararāśi was a contemporary of Īśvaraśiva. They were the first propagators of the philosophy of the Vāmakeśvarīmata, as an aspect of Kaulism in Kashmir :—

"Vastuto hi asya darśanasya etadeva ācāryadvayam Kāśmīreṣu avatārakam" (V. M., 48.).

He also wrote a commentary on the Vāmakeśvarīmata, but differed from Īśvaraśiva on many important points, very often on account of difference in readings of the text. He was as important an authority as Īśvaraśiva, so much so that when the divergence between the two was pointed out by those who had great respect for Īśvaraśiva's view and, therefore, were inclined

1. V. M., 62, 71, 97. 2. Ibid. 34.

completely to ignore the view of Śaṅkararāśi, Jayaratha asserted at first that both the views are equally authoritative and, therefore, provide an alternative, though subsequently he conceded that Īśvaraśiva is a greater authority.[1]

VIŚVĀVARTA.

Viśvāvarta, it seems was a younger contemporary of Īśvaraśiva. He is said to have directly inherited the tradition from the two first propagators of the system in Kashmir. He orally presented the system so well that its tradition got firmly established and continued up to the time of Jayaratha.[2] But by the time of Jayaratha so much degeneration had come in the school that some of its followers, who were not duly initiated and, therefore, did not know the secret practices, which made the Mantras effective, prompted by the monetary motive, stooped to steal the fragments of the MSS., containing the Mantras, and to sell them to ignorant poeple, because they were recognised to be of great efficacy in securing the worldly ends.[3]

DĪPIKĀNĀTHA.

Dīpikānātha was a very early commentator on the Vāmakeśvara Tantra. But it cannot be said definitely that he commented on the whole of the Tantra. For, the quotation, given from an earlier authority by Jayaratha, refers to the Vṛtti on the four and half verses from the second half of verse 45 to 49 "Kāmasthaṁ kāmamadhyastham" etc. He was the first of a number of successive commentators.[4] Jayaratha pays homage to him in the beginning of his commentary "Vivaraṇa" on the Vāmakeśvarīmata.[5]

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1. V. M., 48. 2. Ibid., 48. 3. Ibid., 55.
4. Ibid., 115. 5. Ibid., 1.

KALYĀṆA VARMAN.

Kalyāṇavarman lived four generations before Jayaratha. He is referred to as Vṛddhaprapitāmaha. Therefore, he seems to have lived about the close of the 11th century A. D. He also commented on the Vāmakeśvaramata.[1] He differed from Īśvaraśiva on many points in his interpretation. He was an authority of so well established reputation that Jayaratha refers to a view that his interpretation is an alternative to that of Īśvaraśiva.[2] His commentary was looked upon to be so authoritative that a contemporary of Jayaratha managed to steal or to take possession of it by force to write a worthless commentary himself. Jayaratha condemns it very vehemently.

ALLAṬA.

Allaṭa was one of the commentators, referred to by name, whose interpretation of the Vāmakeśvara Tantra Jayaratha rejects,[3] because he misunderstood the view of Śaṅkararāśi. He propounded certain new views, which were not acceptable even to his own teacher.

There were many other commentaries besides these, which are referred to as "Anyaiḥ" etc.[4] And there was a Vārtika also on it as we know from the commentary of Jayaratha, who was probably the last in the line of commentators in Kashmir.

KALLAṬA AS AN AUTHOR OF A WORK ON KULA SYSTEM.

We have already spoken on Kallaṭa's works on the Pratyabhijñā. Here we have to add this much only that from Abhinava's reference to and quotation from Kallaṭa's work it is clear that he wrote at least one work on the Kula system also.[5]

1. V. M., 118. 2. Ibid., 48.
3. Ibid., 54–5. 4. Ibid., 9. 5. T. A., Ah. XXIX, 88.

That the work under reference was on the Kula system is evident from the quotation itself. For, it states the reason why in the Kaulika literature there is emphasis on the employment of the Dūtī for imparting instructions to the initiated. It asserts that Suṣumṇā in a woman naturally opens up more easily than in man. (Svaśarīrādhikasadbhāvabhāvitām. T. A., Ah. XXIX, 88). Jayaratha comments on it as follows :—

"Svārasikamadhyadhāmapravikasvaratayā."

Kallaṭa had many teachers such as Tapana, Moṭaka etc.[1]

ŚAMBHUNĀTHA (10th CENTURY A. D.)

We have already written about Śambhunātha earlier. Here we have only to add that he is recognised to be a very eminent thinker among the successors of Tryambaka[2]; that he was the foremost among the pupils of Sumati[3]; that the name of his Dūtī was Bhagavatī and that he wrote a work, called the Tantrasadbhāvaśāsana, which among other things dealt with Mantras to be used by the followers of Kaulism, desirous of different Siddhis.[4]

TRADITION OF KAULISM IN KĀŚĪ IN THE 18th CENTURY A. D.

At present we do not know the time when the Kaulism spread to Kāśī. But in the 18th Century A. D. we find Bhāskararāya, alias Bhāsurānanda, commenting on the Lalitāsahasranāma, which is recognised to be a work for the followers of the Kula system, as is clear from the statement of Narasiṁha Yajvan, a teacher of Bhāskararāya himself, who wrote the Paribhāṣā on the Lalitāsahasranāma and who was, it seems, a follower of the Kula system. For, he speaks of

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1. T. A , Ah. XIII, 206.
2. T. A., Ah. VI, 77–8.
3. M. V. V., 1.
4. T. A., Ah. XXX; 214.

Tripurā as "Kulanidhi" and her union with Paramaśive, which is the most essential feature of the Kula system :—

Tripurāṁ kulanidhimīḍeruṇaśriyam
.............................Kāmarājaviddhāṅgām
Lalitānāmasahasre chalārṇasūtrānuyāyinyaḥ
Paribhāṣā bhāṣyānte saṁkṣepāt Kaulikapramodāya
L. S. 2–3.

And Bhāskararāya is represented to be Parāśakti personified by his distinguished pupil, Jagannātha alias Umānandanātha, in his Bhāskaravilāsakāvyam :—

Yasyākāraḥ sā parāśaktireva Bh. V., Verse. 17

From the text like the Parātriṁśikā and Abhinava's commentary thereon we know what Parā is and, therefore, are led to the irresistible conclusion that Bhāskararāya was a perfect Kaula.

From the little that Bhāskararāya has said about himself in the beginning, at the end and in the colophon at the end of the last Chapter of the Setubandha, we learn that the name of his father was Gambhīrarāya, who was a jewel of the learned, was devoted to Śiva, lived in Kāśī and used to drink Soma; that his mother's name was Konamāmbā;[1] that he was taught eighteen branches of learning by a teacher, named Nṛsiṁha; that he was taught the Nityāṣoḍaśikārṇava by an older classfellow of his in the traditional way and was made familiar with the secrets hidden therein;[2] and that before starting his commentary, he thoroughly studied not only other Tantras but also the Vedas, the Smṛtis, the Nyāya philosophy, the Purāṇas etc.

GAMBHĪRARĀYA, THE FATHER OF BHĀSKARARĀYA.

Gambhīrarāya gives his ancestry on the side of mother as

1. N. S. A., 1. 2. Ibid., 350.

well as on that of father in the Viṣṇusahasranāmapadyaprasūnāñjali[1] as follows :—

On the side of mother.

1. Mudgala
2. Nārāyaṇa I
3. Aṇṇāji
4. Nārāyaṇa II. He was the maternal uncle (Mātula) of Gambhīrarāya, and taught him all the Āgamas.

On the side of father.

1. Ekanātha
2. Tukadeva
3. Yamāji. He was the father of Gambhīrarāya. He was duly initiated (Dīkṣāvān). His wife's name was Candramā.

Gambhīrarāya was a responsible officer in the court of Muslim ruler of Bījāpur (Vijāyapura). He, as desired by his master, presented the Eighteen sections (Parvas) of the Mahā bhārata in Persian. He mastered all the Śāstras and wrote many books. He performed many sacrifices to please Indra. In old age he lived in Kāśī and at the end attained union with Śiva in union with Śakti (Sāmba).[2]

This brief account of Gambhīrarāya, the father of Bhāskararāya, tells us that the Āgamic lore was heriditorv in his family; and that whatever Vedic rites Gambhīrarāya may have performed, for the attainment of the final emancipation he followed Kaulism. For, the type of liberation that he is represented to have attained is the characteristic feature of the Kaulism.

BHĀSKARARĀYA'S BIRTH AND LIFE.

Once Gambhīrarāya went with his wife to Bhāganagarī (Hyderabad-Deccan) on an important work of his master. And

1. Sau. Bh., (Intro) 8. 2. Ch. K., Verses 1–2

there was born Bhāskararāya. We do not know the exact date of his birth. But two works of his (i) the Saubhāgyabhāskara, his commentary on the Lalitāsahasranāma (ii) the Setubandha, his commentary on the Nityāṣoḍaśikārṇava, are available in print and they give the dates of their completion in the concluding verses. According to them, the first was completed on the 9th day of the brighter half of the month of Āśvina in the year 1785 of the Vikrama era (Modacchāyāmitāyāṁ śaradi) (1728 A.D.) : and the second was finished on the 13th day of the darker half of the month of Phālguṇa in the year 1655 of the Śaka era (Śivarātrau śake Śarmacāpe) (1733 A.D.).

That this interpretation of the text showing the year of composition is correct, is borne out by the fact that Bhāskararāya's pupil, Umānandanātha, mentions the year of completion of his Nityotsava to be the Kali year 4876 (1775 A.D) (Kalyabdeṣu rasārṇavakarivedamiteṣviha vyatīteṣu).

We know that Bhāskararāya made extensive study of the various branches of learning before he started writing his works. It is, therefore, reasonable to suppose that he began his authorial work, not in his teens or early twenties, but about the thirtieth year of age.

And the Saubhāgyabhāskara, his commentary on the Lilitāsahasranāma, which was completed in 1728 A.D. is not the first work from his pen. He had written the following works, before taking up the Saubhāgyabhāskara, as we know from references to them in it :—

1. Varivasyārahasya, 9, 75, 171.
2. Chandobhāskara, 36, 137, 168, 171.
3. Mīmāṁsakavādakautūhala, 57.
4. Śivastava, 59, 85, 87, 231, 232.
5. Bhāvanopaniṣad Bhāṣya, 71.
6. Devīstava, 137.

Further, there are references at least to two future works (i) commentary on the Vāmakeśvara Tantra (ii) commentary on the Laghustava, which indicate that at least the plans of these works were clear in his mind, as the following quotations show :—

(i) Tānyapi catuḥṣaṣṭhirvāmakeśvara tantre gaṇitāni. Tāni taṭṭīkāyāmasmābhirvivecayiṣyante Sau. Bh., 72.

(ii) Laghustave..................Tāni tu taṭṭīkāyāmevāsmābhirvyākhyāsyante Ibid., 133.

Thus it is clear that in 1728 A.D when he wrote the Saubhāgya Bhāskara, he was of fairly advanced age. Roughly speaking, if we consider him to be of 45 years of age at that time, he may be said to have been born in about 1683. A.D.

His father shifted to Kāśī when Bhāskararāya was a mere child. For, his sacred thread ceremony (Yajñopavīta) was performed by his father in Kāśī[1]. As a child he was taught to worship the goddess of learning with a Mantra. As a result of this worship he was able to master various branches of learning without much labour. He showed logical skill in the assembly of the learned even at the age of seven and won the heart of the king[2]. He married Ānandī[3] and had a son, Pāṇḍuraṅga, from her[4], He lived in Kāśī for some time and performed Somayajña there[5].

After the completion of the Saubhāgya Bhāskara at Kāśī, Bhāskararāya, at the request of his loving pupil, Candrasena Yādava[6], who was the commander-in-chief of the king of Bhosala (Bhonsle) and the son of Dhānāji Yādava, shifted to the bank of Narmadā. He travelled all over India and installed Śrīcakra (Cakreśvara) in the temple of Annapūrṇā in

1. Bh. V., (Verse) 7.
2. Ibid., 9.
3. Ibid., 23.
4. Ibid., 25.
5. Ibid., 33.
6. Ibid., 34.

Kāśī; Gambhīranātha in Koṅkaṇa; Pāṇḍuraṅga in Mūlahrada; Vajreśvara in Setubandha; Bhāskareśvara in Bhāskarapura; Kahaleśa in Cola; and built a temple in honour of Candralāmbā in Sannati Kṣetra.[1].

He engaged the contemporary followers of different schools of philosophy, such as those established by Vallabha and Mādhva, and defeated them.[2] He completed the Setubandha, his commentary on the Nityāṣoḍaśikārṇava, in the temple of Saptakoṭīśvara,[3] situated in the vicinity of the Western sea[4] in Gomantikā (Goa) in 1733 A. D. He took the last Śamādhi and attained unity with Śiva in the Madhyārjuna Kṣetra on the bank of Sahyādrijā[5] some time after 1750 A.D.

The following books are admitted to have been written by Bhāskararāya by his pupil, Jagannātha :—

(1) Caṇḍabhāskara (2) Vādakautūhala (3) Candrodaya (Bhāṭṭopapada) (4) Rasikarañjanī, a commentary on the Madhyakaumudī (5) Nyāyamaṇḍana (6) Sautrabhāṣya (7) Vārtikarāja (8) Vṛttopapada (9) Candrodaya (10) Chandaḥkaustubha (11) Candraśālā (12) Kaṭorī (13) Madhurāmla Kāvya (14) Subhāṣita Bhāskarāṅka (15) Śivadaṇḍa (16) Muktakāḥ (17) Smṛtitattva (18) Commentary on the Sahasrabrāhmaṇa bhujividhikhaṇḍa by Baudhāyana (19) Śaṅkhacakrādyaṅkana prāyaścitta (20) Pradoṣabhāskara (21) Tricabhāskara (22) Kuṇḍabhāskara (23) Exposition of 108 names of Aṣṭamūrti (24) Gaṇeśasahasranāmavyākhyā, called the Khadyotinī (25) Candralāmbā Māhātmya–Vyākhyā (26) Nāthanavaratna Mañjūṣā (27) Bhāvanopaniṣadbhāṣya (28) Śrīsūktabhāṣya (29) Kaulopaniṣadbhāṣya (30) Commentary on the Traipuramahopaniṣad (31) Saubhāgyabhāskara (32) Saubhāgya Candrodaya (33) Setubandha (34) Varivasyārahasya (35)

1. Bh. V., (V.)37. 2. Ibid., 30–1. 3. N. S. A., 350.
4. Sau. Bh., 24. 5. Bh. V., (V.) 110.

Commentary, called the Ratnāloka, on the Kaulakalpasūtra by Paraśurāma (36) Mālāmantroddhāra (37) Commentary, called the Guptavatī, on the Saptaśatī (38) Śataślokī.

According to the tradition, current in the learned Brāhmaṇa families even today, Bhāskararāya was a very prolific writer and wrote about hundred works. He refers to the following in his commentary on the Nityāṣoḍaśikārṇava :—

1. Saubhāgyabhāskara (N. S. A., 14, 26, 90, 344.)
2. Mīmāṁsāvādakautūhala (Ibid., 39.)
3. Varivasyārahasyavyākhyā (Ibid., 190.)
4. Varivasyāprakāśa (Ibid., 303.)
5. Chandaḥ kaustubha (Ibid., 212.)
6. Śivastuti (Ibid., 253.)
7. Vṛttacandrodaya (Ibid., 144.)
8. Commentary on the Bhāvanopaniṣad (T. R. Intro. 5.)

HIS SUCCESSORS.

The view that Bhāskararāya belonged to the close of the 17th and the first half of the 18th Century A. D., finds support in the tradition that there have been only Eight disciples in succession from Bhāskararāya to the present day.

According to the tradition, current among the followers of Kaulism in Kāśī, Bhāskararāya travelled through out India. He established a Maṭha in Vasumatī (in Hyderabad district) and put his own disciple Śukānanda as the head priest in it.

The line of successive disciples from Śukānanda is as follows :—

1. Deśikānanda, Śukānanda's son.
2. Yajñeśānanda. ,, grand son.
3. Dharmānanda
4. Dhīrānanda
5. Bhūmānanda
6. Ambānanda

} They did not belong to the family of Śukānanda.

The writer of these pages had direct contact with him in Kashmir.

7. Nārāyaṇa Śāstrī Khriste. Ex Principal of the Government Sanskrit College, Banaras, now converted into Sanskrit University.

8. Vaṭukanātha Śāstrī (His son)

Thus the history of the Kula system is traceable from the 5th century A. D. down to the present time.

PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH TO THE KULA SYSTEM.

PRELIMINARY.

Kaulism presents a monistic current of the Śaiva Philosophy of Kashmir. It mainly follows the authority of the Rudra Yāmala Tantra, which is one of the group of eight Yamala Tantras, referred to by Abhinavagupta in the 1st Āhnika of the Tantrāloka, as interpreted by Jayaratha.[1] It is primarily concerned with the highest triad (Trika) of Śiva, Śakti and their union. It emphasises the importance of union (Yāmala), mutual reaction of Śiva and Śakti, from the metaphysical point of view. It is the system which was followed in practice, not only by Abhinavagupta but also by his parents. In fact Abhinavagupta is called Yoginībhū, because his parents followed the Kaula method in their sex-union, which resulted in the birth of Abhinava. In the Kaula rituals Dūtī and Śivarasa (a kind of wine) are necessary : and Abhinavagupta in the pen-picture, drawn by Madhurāja Yogin, a reflection of which in paint is given in the beginning of this book, is presented to be attended by the Dūtīs, each with a jar of Śivarasa in her hand.

It is a very difficult system. This fact is recognised even by Abhinavagupta, who says that he was able to understand it

1. T. A, Ah. I (Comm.) 42.

only because of its clear exposition by Śambhunātha, his teacher in this branch,[1] and will be realised by the reader if he attempts to handle such texts on it as the Parātriṁśikā Vivaraṇa, in which he will find the word Anuttara interpreted in sixteen different ways; the words "Kula" and "Trike" used in many opposite senses; and even the word "Katham" explained in many ways.

There are three triads (Trikas) recognised in the Śaivāgamic literature (i) Para, consisting of Śiva, Śakti and their union (ii) Parāpara, including Parā, Parāparā and Aparā (iii) Apara, comprising Śiva, Śakti and Nara. The Kula system is primarily concerned with the Para, the highest, triad, and emphasises the importance of the union (Yāmala) of Śiva and Śakti. Its exposition was so difficult that nobody attempted it. Hence Abhinavagupta took it up in his commentary, the Vivaraṇa, on the Parā Triṁśikā. We know of a commentary on the Parā Triṁśikā by Somānanda from Abhinava's reference to it. We do not know much about its content, excepting what Abhinava says about it. But from Abhinava's statement, referred to above, it appears that Somānanda also did not touch the highest triad. May be that Somānanda attempted an interpretation of the text from the point of view of the Yogic practices (Yogamārga) and, therefore, ignored the highest triad. But Abhinavagupta, taking it up for an exposition from the angle of vision of the path of knowledge (Jñānamārga), had to devote special attention to what Somānanda had left out. For, the text admits of approach from the two points of view[2]. Though in the Tantrāloka also Abhinava deals with the Kula system[3], yet the correctness of the assertion about the non-existence of any book, dealing with the highest triad, remains unquestionable; because chronologically it is later.

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1. T. A., I, 31. 2. P. T. V., 250. 3. T. A. I, 23-4,

There are three influences, which shaped the Kula system as presented by Abhinava :—

(i) The Philosophy of language, as presented by Bhartṛhari, led Somānanda to the conception of Parā. This, under the influence of the æsthetic conception of the poetic power or genius (Pratibhā), was improved upon by Abhinava as Parā-Pratibhā, the metaphysical principle, in terms of which the manifestation, not only of the Devanāgarī alphabetical system from 'A' to 'H', the combinations of the letters thereof, the words and sentences, as admitted by the Vaiyākaraṇas like Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa, who accepted Somānanda's conception of Parā, but also of all that is signified by them, is explained. Tām parām Pratibhāṁ devīṁ saṁvidante hyanuttarām. (T. A., II, 74.)

(ii) Nandikeśvara, an older contemporary of Pāṇini, was, according to the available information, the first to give a philosophical explanation to the letters of the Alphabetical system as found in the first fourteen Śutras of Pāṇini. (Vide the Bhāskarī, Vol. III pp. XLIX-LI and CLXXX-CLXXXV) This led the Śaivas to explain the Devanāgarī alphabetical system in terms of the Kula system as presented in the concluding part of the Rudra Yāmala Tantra, which constitutes the text of the Parā Triṁśikā, which was taken up by Abhinavagupta as the basis of his presentation of the Kula system in his commentary, the Vivaraṇa.

(iii) Sex union occupies a very important place in the Vāmamārga. Kaulism is a synthesis of both the paths, Vāma and Dakṣiṇa. Therefore, the sex-union retains its important place in it as a means to the rise to the highest spiritual level. This union seems to have influenced the conception of Yāmala, the union of Śiva and Śakti. For, it is admitted to be similar to that of the generative fluids of the opposite sexes in the sex-union, which leads to the birth of child : and the Kaula theory of the origin of the universe, not from either Śiva or

Śakti alone in isolation from each other, but from their union, is based on the analogy of the origin of the child from the union of two persons of opposite sexes.

LIMITATION OF THE PRESENTATION.

According to Abhinava, the essence of the entire Kula system is contained in the first four verses of the Parā Triṁśikā. He, therefore, emphatically asserts (Udbhujāḥ phūtkurmaḥ) that if a person follows the teaching contained therein, he will have the false notion of duality completely destroyed, will attain the state of Anuttara and will be liberated in life time (Jīvanmukta).[1] Herein he discusses most of the important concepts of the Kula system, such as Kula, Akula, Kaulikasiddhi, Kaulikī Śakti, Anuttara, Parā etc.

After the Parā Triṁśikā Vivaraṇa, he took up the exposition of the Kula system in his encyclopaedic work, the Tantrāloka, in Āhnika III, wherein he elaborates not only some of the Kaula philosophic concepts, referred to above, but also those, which are symbolised by the letters of the Devanāgarī alphabetical system : and in Āhnika XXIX, wherein, according to his own statement, he deals with the whole of the ritualistic aspect of the Kaulism[2] in addition to the stray remarks, scattered over the whole work. We shall, therefore, confine ourselves primarily to these two texts in our presentation of the summary-view of the Kula system here.

CONFUSING TECHNICAL TERMS IN THE SYSTEM.

The technical terms, like Kula, Akula, Trika, Tantra etc. are used in many different and opposite meanings in the literature on the Kula system. Accordingly these terms are often

1. P. T. V., 96–7.
2. T. A., Ah. XXIX. 1.

differentiated from but equally often are represented to be synonimous with one another so that the reader gets confused. It is, therefore, necessary to discuss the various meanings in which they are used, so that the reader may not get confused, when he comes across the conflicting statements such as "Kula is distinct from Trika" at one place and "Kula is identical with Trika" at another, and may be able to understand what different ideas are conveyed by them in different contexts.

DIFFERENT MEANINGS OF THE WORD "KULA".

The word "Kula" is derived from the root "Kula"[1] which means to grossify or solidify or to group or collect like members of the same family (Kula saṁstyāne bandhuṣu ca : Bandhuśabdena tadvyāpāro gṛhyate. S. Kau. 352.). It is formed by affixing "Ka" according to Pāṇini's rule "Igupadhajñāprīkiraḥ kaḥ" (3-1-135) (Kolatīti kulam). Accordingly it means :—

(i) Group or collection of all that is gross or subtle, including the different types of the limited subject, vital air, senses of perception, organs of action and all that is objective in its nature and is related by causal relation.

(ii) All that is but the grossification of the Ultimate Consciousness (Bodha) and is looked upon as bondage, because of the freedom of the Ultimate.

(iii) Kula is often spoken of as the rays of the Ultimate Consciousness (the Bhairava) exactly like the rays of the sun. But it is admitted that 'Kula' shines as one with the Ultimate Consciousness to the liberated; that the experience of the liberated consists in the consciousness of everything as one with the self; and that such an experience is the experience of the highest bliss (Paramānanda)[2], which is free from all limitations, temporal and so forth.

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1. P. T. V., 32-3. 2. P. T. V, 35.

(iv) It occurs in the sense of the Ultimate Reality, distinct from even the highest category, Śiva. In fact in contrast to the Ultimate, the Anuttara, the Kula, the highest category, Śiva, is called Akula.[1] But it may be pointed out here that often the word "Akula" is used for Anuttara.[2] It is, therefore, very important to take into account the whole context in which these words occur to determine the meaning in different contexts.

It may be noted here that Jayaratha, whom we have followed in the discussion of different meanings of the words 'Kula' and 'Akula' in the preceding paragraph, seems to be a little confused in the interpretation of the verse :—

Akulasyāsya devasya kulaprathanaśālinī
Kaulikī sā parāśaktiraviyukto yayā vibhuḥ

T. A., Ah. III, V. 67.

Here Jayaratha interprets 'Akula' as Śiva, the first category, and speaks of Kaulikī Śakti as belonging to Śiva. This is not in harmony with verse No. 143.

Anuttaram paraṁdhāma tadevākulamucyate
Visargastasya nāthasya kaulikī śaktirucyate.

For, here Anuttara is spoken of as Akula and Kaulikī Śakti is said to belong to it. In fact Jayaratha himself says that in the verse under reference there is nothing new, but reference in conclusion to what had been asserted in the beginning.[3] But he is not to blame. For, such an irregularity in the use of expressions Kula and Akula for the Anuttara exists in the basic literature, the Āgamas, from which he quotes in justification of his interpretation of Abhinava's text.

(v) Very often the word 'Kula' is used for the objective world[4] and the power, the Śakti, (which is the very nature of

1. T. A., Ah. III, 74-6.
2. Ibid., 145,
3. Ibid., 146.
4. Ibid., 76.

the Ultimate and, therefore, is essentially identical with the Anuttara, though it is talked of as distinct from the Ultimate from the analytical point of view,) which is responsible for the manifestation of the universe, is called Kaulikī.

(vi) It occurs in the sense of the power of the highest Lord, which is responsible for creation and annihilation, is the cause of every thing and is above and beyond all that is created. It is the "freedom". The entire universe has its being in a state of unity in it just as different colours of peacock have theirs in the yolk of peacock's egg. It is essentially of the nature of consciousness. (Saṁvid or Ātman).[1]

The conception of Kula as Ātman (Kulamātmasvarūpantu. T. A., Ah. XXIX, 4.) is very important in so far as it gives an idea of what is meant by Ātmopāya in the Paryanta Pañcāśikā. It suggests that Ātmopāya may be interpreted as Kulopāya.

The word "Kula" occasionally stands (vii) for the entire manifestation, which is connected with Bhairava, exactly as the rays are with the sun[2] (viii) for vital air, body etc. (ix) for the union of Śiva and Śakti[3] (x) for the Reality within which all the categories from the earth to the five Brahmans have their being[4] (xi) for the power of the Bhairava, which is nothing but Vimarśa-Śakti[5] (xii) for body[6] (xiii) for the unnamable and indefinable (Anākhya) state[7] (xiv) for shape (Ākāra)[8] (xv) for power (Śakti) which is called Nityā also.[9] This meaning of Kula is very important : for, it enables us to settle that the Āgamas, which deal with Nityā, and the books, which are based on them, come under the literature on the Kula system.

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1. T. A., Ah. XXIX, 3–4.
2. P. T. V., 35.
3. Ibid., 36.
4. Ibid., 208.
5. Ibid., 164–5.
6. T. A., I. 5.
7. Ibid., 9.
8. Ibid., 12.
9. T. A. (Comm.), Ah. XXVIII, 51.

(xvi) Kula means the power of the Highest Lord that brings about creation and annihilation, the highest cause, the 'Freedom' (Svātantrya). It is called Piṇḍa,[1] because all that is manifested has its being in it in an undifferentiated state.

(xvii) Very often the word Kula is used for highest bliss, Saṁvid, Self or even body. This is very much the same as discussed in article vi.

(xviii) The word Kula is used in reference to sacred days. For instance, Māghī Pūrṇimā is called Kula Parva (T. A., Ah. XVIII, 51-2.). It occurs in the sense of (xix) generation (T.A., Ah. XXVIII, 30.). of (xx) Śakti (T. A., Ah. XXVIII, 51,) of (xxi) Nityā-Cakra, (T. A., Ah. XXVIII, 51.) of (xxii) Dakṣiṇāyana and in contrast with this Akula is used for Uttarāyaṇa, (T. A. Ah., XXVIII, 52) and of (xxiii) that from which every thing emerges and in which every thing merges back, that on which every thing rests, that which is distinct from both Śiva and Śakti. (T. A., Ah, XXXV, 373.)

DIFFERENT MEANINGS OF "TRIKA".

(i) TRIKA AS AN OBJECT OF WORSHIP.

The ritual, consisting in the worship of Cakra (mystic diagram) is an important aspect of Kaulism as a religion. In the sacred literature of Śaivaism a very large number of mystic diagrams, representing the Ultimate Reality, are mentioned. The number of lines in different diagrams differed from one to innumerable[2], according as the Ultimate Reality was attempted to be represented in an unmanifested form and, therefore, as absolute unity, or as manifesting itself in different powers. In certain contexts the Kula system admitted three powers, Parā, Parāparā and Aparā[3]. In the Devanāgarī alphabetical system, which is

1. T. A., Ah. XXIX, 3-4.

2. T. A., I, 152-4. 3. T. A., I, 153.

interpreted in the Kula system as standing for the thirty-four categories, admitted by it, these three powers are recognised to be represented by three letters, A, I and U, are called Anuttarā, Icchā and Unmeṣa. The first of these is referred to as Parā-Pratibhā, Kaulikī-Śakti,[1] Sūkṣmā-Kuṇḍalinī-Śakti,[2] Vimarśaśakti[3] etc.; the second is referred to as Icchāśakti and the third as Jñānaśakti.[4] The word 'Trika' stands for the group of the above three powers, symbolically presented in the mystic diagram by three lines,[5] for the realisation of the meaning of 'Aham' through its worship,[6] the most important aspect of which is recognised to be the identification with the object of worship.[7] It is formed by affixing 'Kan' in the sense of group (Saṅgha) to the word 'Tri' according to Pāṇini's rule "Saṅkhyāyāḥ saṁjñāsaṅghasūtrādhyayaneṣu" (5-1-58).

(ii) TRIKA AS THE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE.

The word 'Trika' is used for the ultimate objective to be realised by following the path, pointed out in the Śaivāgama.[8] As such it does not stand for the group of three powers as before, but for the Ultimate Reality, referred to in the system as 'Kula', because the entire universe is nothing but grossification of it, as has already been stated.

In this context Abhinava admits Trika to be non-different from Kula. For, answering a supposed objection :—"In the Āgamas Kula is maintained to be beyond the categories of Śiva and Śakti and is asserted to be that in and from which entire universe arises and in which it merges back and, therefore, is admitted to be the Ultimate Reality. How can then Trika,

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1. T. A., II, 74–5.
2. Ibid., 77.
3. Ibid., (Comm.) 139.
4. Ibid., 233.
5. T. A., Ah. XXXIII, 347.
6. Ibid., 336–7.
7. Bh., Vol I, 18.
8. T. A., Ah. XXXV, 373.

instead of Kula, be held to be the ultimate objective?" he points out that Trika itself is called Kula, because it grossifies into the universe.[1]

The word 'Trika', as synonymous with 'Kula' in the above sense, means (i) that which is grasped through the third power in the ascending order i. e. Parā-Pratibhā or Vimarśa Śakti (Tṛtīyayā grahaṇam asya). For, according to Pāṇini's rule "Tāvatithaṁ grahaṇamiti lugvā (5-2-77) the affix 'Kan' is added to the word Tṛtīya in the sense of 'grasping through' and the affix 'Tīya' is optionally dropped. This meaning is in consonance with the recognised Śaiva view that the Ultimate is grasped through Śakti.

"Yathālokena dīpasya kiraṇairbhāskarasya vā
Jñāyate digvibhāgādi tadvacchaktyā Śivaḥ priye"
(P. T. V., 83. F. N.)

(iii) It may mean that which has three important aspects (Trayaḥ āṁśāḥ yasya), namely, Anuttarā, Icchā and Unmeṣa. As such it is formed by affixing Kan to the word 'Tri' according to Pāṇini's rule "Sosyāṁśavasnabhṛtayaḥ" (5–1–56).

(iv–vi) We have already given other three meanings of this word in the first Chapter of this part, while discussing the names of the system.

(vii) TRIKA FOR THE PRATYABHIJÑĀ PHILOSOPHY.

We know that the word Trika is used for the philosophy, presented in the monistic Śaivāgamas, revealed to humanity by Durvāsas, through his mind-born son, Tryambaka, at the behest of Śrīkaṇṭha; and that Somānanda, the founder of the Pratyabhijñā school of the monistic Śaiva philosophy, was a distant successor of Tryambaka. In the introduction to the 9th verse of the Tantrāloka, Ah. I, in which Abhinava offers

1. T. A., Ah. XXXV, 373.

obeisance to Śrīkaṇṭha, Jayaratha speaks of the system, introduced to humanity through the descendants of Tryambaka, as "Saḍardhakramavījñāna. (Nikhilaśāstropaniṣadbhūtasya ṣaḍardhakramavijñānasya Traiyambakasantānadvāreṇāvatārakatvāt. T. A., I, 28).

We know that "Ṣaḍardha" stands for "Trika". And Jayaratha uses the word "Trika" in the commentary presumably to remove the doubt about the meaning of Ṣaḍardha.

"Maṭhikāntaragurūṇām Trikārthe gurutvābhāvāt"

(T. A., I, 29)

Abhinavagupta himself in the very next verse pays his homage to the exponents of the Pratyabhijñā system like Somānanda, Utpala and Lakṣmaṇagupta. And Jayaratha points out that this verse contains special reference to the teachers of the same school as that referred to in the preceding verse:—

> "Pūrve jayanti guravaḥ" iti sāmānyena kṛtepi namaskāre... ...paramopādeyasvaprakāśa-svātmeśvara-pratyabhijñāpana-parasya tarkasya......viśeṣaprayojakīkāreṇa guru-paramaguru-parameṣṭhinaḥ punarapi parāmṛṣṭumāha." T. A., I, 30.

It is, therefore, indisputable that the word Trika is used for the Pratyabhijñā system also.

(viii) TRIKA USED FOR THE HIGHEST MYSTIC SYLLABLE.

The word Trika has been used in so many meanings that the reader is likely to get confused when he comes across such a statement as "Trika is higher than Kula". For, the word "Trika" has been used for the Pratyabhijñā system also, as has been pointed out above. An ordinary reader is, therefore, likely to interpret it as "Pratyabhijñā system is higher than Kula system". But that would be a wrong interpretation. To emphasise this point, Abhinava, in the introduction to the

18th verse of the Parā Triṁśikā, clearly points out that 'Trika' stands for the combination of three letters, s, au and Visarga, (Sauḥ), which constitutes the highest Mantra, the 'heart' itself, and which is beyond Mantra, Mantreśa and Mantra Maheśa.

One who realises the meaning of "Sauḥ" attains the union with the highest reality even without the practice of Yoga, which leads to the visualisation of the various Cakras[1]; without being initiated and, therefore, without seeing the various diagrams, representing triadent, lotus etc., which are prepared in the performance of the ceremonials, connected with the initiation; and without seeing the congregation of Yoginīs. For, it is the belief of the Śaivas that all Yoginīs meet every month on the 14th day of the dark half. A person who somehow is able to reach there gets some drink and attains the highest spiritual knowledge.

Such a person becomes a favourite of all gods and knows all that is within their knowledge. He becomes the Lord of all spiritual forces. He attains oneness with the original stir (Sāmānyaspanda). He becomes Akula.

(IX) THE WORD "TRIKA" USED FOR THE KULA SYSTEM.

The word "Trika" is very often used for the Kula system. The reason for this use is that the Kula system recognises three powers, Parā, Parāparā and Aparā. (Kulaprakriyāyāṁ tisraḥ śaktayaḥ parādyāḥ. T. A., I., 153.) Accordingly it is called Trika because it deals with them (Trikaṁ parādiśaktitrayābhidhāyakaṁ śāstram. T. A., I. 150).

We know that, according to the Kula system, Niyati and Kāla are not separate categories. For, in accounting for the

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1. P. T. V., 251–2.

rise of different categories from the letters of the alphabetical system, which represent the contents of the "pure I-consciousness" (Śuddha-Aham-Parāmarśa), Abhinava asserts that from the four semivowels (Y, R, L and V) arise Rāga, Vidyā, Kalā and Māyā respectively.[1] In the light of this assertion, the non-admission of the two categories, Niyati and Kāla, comes out to be a distinctive characteristic of the Kula system. Therefore, when Abhinava points out this non-admission as a distinctive feature of the Trika,[2] he cannot be interpreted as referring to the Pratyabhijñā, which recognises both of them to be separate categories. The conclusion, therefore, that the word "Trika" is often used for "Kula" is inevitable.

Another reason for the use of the word "Trika" for the Kula system is that it is primarily concerned with the presentation of the triad, consisting of Śiva, Śakti and their union. And to distinguish it from "Trika" which is often used for the Pratyabhijñā, it is called Anuttara Trika, because the conception of Anuttara is its chief distinctive feature. That by Anuttara Ṣaḍardha or Trika the Kula system is meant is made clear by Abhinava himself, who declares that what he says on the Anuttara Trika is what he learnt from Śambhunātha and his Dūtī, Bhagavatī[3].

But very often the word "Trika" without the adjunct "Anuttara" is used for the Kula system, as has been pointed out above.

(X) TRIKA USED FOR THE LOWEST TRIAD.

The Kula system admits three triads (i) highest (para) consisting of Śiva, Śakti and their union (Yāmala) (ii) lower (Parāpara) including the three powers, Parā, Parāparā, and

1. P. T. V., 113
2. Ibid., 119.
3. T. A., I, 33–4.

Aparā, and (iii) lowest (Apara). In the Kaula system the word "Trika" is occassionally used for the lowest triad, comprising Nara, Śakti and Śiva. The first is dominated by the idea of multiplicity, the second by that of duality but the last is characterised by unity[1].

TRIKA AND KULA SYSTEMS DISTINGUISHED.

Although, as we have pointed out earlier, the word Trika is used for the Kula system, yet occasionally the two are distinguished from each other. For instance, in the context of the discussion on different types of grace, on account of which different individuals follow different schools of the Śaivāgama one after another, the Kula system is referred to as distinct from the Trika and the latter is represented to be the highest of all. It is interesting to note here that Abhinavagupta and the Āgamic text, quoted by Jayaratha, both seem to admit Kula and Kaula to be two systems. But Kaula may be interpreted as an adjunct of Kula, as the word "Hṛdaya" is that of Ṣaḍardha (Trika) as pointed out by Jayaratha[2].

The distinction between the two is pointed out as follows:–

The Kula system is monistic, but the Trika is absolutely monistic. In the former the worship of external phallic emblem is prohibited, but in the latter it is neither prohibited nor enjoined[3].

In the former keeping of matted hair and the use of ashes are prohibited : in the latter they are neither prohibited nor enjoined[4]. The same is the case with the observance of fast, visiting of sacred places etc.

In the Trika system perfect freedom in regard to the use of means to the realisation of the Ultimate is given to its follower.

1. P. T. V., 79.
2. T. A., Ah. XIII, 181.
3. T. A., III, 286.
4. Ibid., 288–9.

One is free to follow any means that suits him at a particular time[1].

KULA AND TANTRA DISTINGUISHED.

At many places Abhinava distinguishes between Kula and Tantra. In fact, according to Jayaratha, the Tantrāloka is concerned with the presentation of the views of Tantra and Kula[2]. The latter of the two is more important than the former in so far as it is recognised to be the direct means to freedom from the world. The word Tantra is used for the monistic Śaiva tradition, which was founded by Tryambaka and was maintained by his descendants and followers[3]. Abhinavagupta himself in the beginning of the Tantrāloka distinguishes between the two by separately offering obeisance to the teachers in the Tāntrika lore as distinct from those in the Kula system[4].

In the context of the Dīkṣā of one who has died at some distant place and, therefore, whose dead body has not been seen by either the priest, who performs the Dīkṣā, or by the relatives of the dead, who request the priest to perform it (Parokṣa Dīkṣā), the distinction between the Kaulika Dīkṣā and the Tāntrika is drawn and the former is represented to be higher than the latter[5]. This also clearly points out the distinction between Kula and Tantra.

THE DISTINCTION OF THE TANTRA, THE KULA AND THE TRIKA SYSTEMS, ACCORDING TO KṢEMARĀJA.

The fundamental distinction of the Tantra, the Kula and the Trika systems from one another relates to the Ultimate,

1. T. A., III, 302.
2. T. A., I, 24.
3. Ibid., 27.
4. T. A., I, 31.
5. T. A., Ah. XXI. 238.

according to Kṣemarāja. He points out that the Tāntrikas maintain the Ultimate to be transcendental : the Kaulas regard it to be immanent : but the followers of the Trika philosophy hold it to be both, transcendental and immanent.

Viśvottirṇamātmatattvamiti Tāntrīkāḥ
Viśvamayamiti kulādyāmnāyaniṣṭhāḥ
Viśvottīrṇaṁ viśvamayaṁ ca iti
Trikādidarśanavidaḥ

P. Hr., 18.

KAULISM AS A RELIGION.

In Śaivaism there is no bifurcation of religion from philosophy. The religious aspect of it is concerned with the discipline that leads to the realisation of the highest reality, pointed out by its philosophy. The Ultimate Reality, that this system admits, is not a mere rational postulate, is not what reason leads to, but what is realised through a discipline. The discipline is not the same for all, but different for different individuals at different spiritual levels. Kaulism as a religion is concerned with three types of its followers, (i) those who have reached the lower level of indeterminacy, who are capable of realising every one of the things, represented by fifty letters of the alphabetical system, to be identical with the 'Self' much as the reflection is with the mirror,[1] slowly and gradually one after another[2] to reach the level of indeterminacy, (ii) those to whom the entire objectivity shines as 'Self' even when they are at the empirical level from the point of view of an objective observer[3], (iii) those who are incapable of rising to any level of indeterminacy and to whom nothing shines as identical with 'Self'[4]. Accordingly it prohibits the practice of the external religious rituals by the first; allows perfect freedom

1. T. A., II, 246.
2. Ibid., 249–50.
3. Ibid., 251.
4. Ibid., 261.

in respect of them to the second; asserting that those who have reached the highest level of indeterminacy, to whom every thing is non-different from the self even in the ordinary life, are free to perform or not to perform the ritual ; and enjoins the third type to perform all the rituals to qualify themselves to follow the Kula system.

In an earlier section, dealing with the distinctive features of the Kula and the Trika systems, we have stated, on the basis of the text, that these systems differ from each other in so far as the former prohibits the following of the religious practices such as the worship of the external phallic form, keeping of matted hair, visiting the sacred places etc., but the latter allows perfect freedom in regard to them. Therefore, Abhinava's assertion that in the Kula system perfect freedom is allowed in respect of religious rituals, such as bath etc.[1] seems to be self-contradictory. It seems that Abhinava anticipated this misunderstanding and, therefore, clarifies his view, which may be stated as follows :—

We know that Śaivaism admits four means to the final emancipation, Āṇava, Śākta, Śāmbhava and Anupāya, the preceding of which is the means to the following; that Anupāya is the characteristic feature of the Pratyabhijñā system, as propounded by Utpalācārya, and that the word Trika is often used for the Pratyabhijñā system. But we have to remember that Abhinava admits that Anupāya is the highest phase of the Śāmbhavopāya[2] and therefore, the Kula system in its highest phase is identical with the Pratyabhijñā or Trika. Hence there is no self-contradiction in the two statements referred to above.

The Kaulism prohibits those who are at the lower level of indeterminacy from performing external ritual[3] like the wor-

1. T. A., Ah. XXIX, 6. 2. T. A., I, 182. 3. T. A., II, 260.

ship of the phallic form, because that presupposes duality : but allows perfect freedom[1] to those who are at the higher level and who look upon everything as non-different from Self.[2] The performance of the external rituals is necessary for those who are unfit to follow the Śāmbhava path, with which the Kula system is concerned, but are desirous of following it.[3] The performance of different rituals qualifies the performer to follow the path, pointed out by the Kula system, i. e. Śāmbhavamārga. The rituals are discussed in the context of the Āṇavopāya in the Tantrāloka, Āhnika V–XXVIII.

TWO TYPES OF RITUALS IN KAULISM.

According to the Kula system, rituals are of two types (i) external (Bāhya) such as the worship of the phallic form, keeping of matted hair etc. (ii) secret (Rahasya),[4] all that is connected with "Kula Yāga" which is discussed in the T. A., Ah. XXIX. The one is preparatory, in consequence of the performance of which a person becomes qualified to follow the distinct path, the Śāmbhavamārga, pointed out by the Kula system. But the other is of the nature of (i) a test[5] to find out whether the follower has truly realised the identity of everything with the 'Self' and is capable of rising to the highest level of indeterminacy in a situation in which it is the most difficult to leave the empirical level : or (ii) a means to help the qualified to reach the desired level of indeterminacy,[6] through checking the vital air so as to make it enter the Suṣumṇā and contemplating on the union of Śiva and Śakti[7] : or (iii) a way to produce a child, like Abhinavagupta,[8] technically called Yoginībhū.

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1. T. A., Ah. XXIX, 2. 2. Ibid., 6. 3. T. A., II, 261.
4. T. A., Ah. XXIX, 1. 5. T. A., Ah. XXIX. (Comm.) 73–4.
6. Ibid., 93. 7. Ibid., 100–2. 8. Ibid., 111–2.

The main objective, that it points out for the realisation by its followers, is the unitary experience of Śiva and Śakti, similar to that which æsthete has of the various constituents of an æsthetic configuration; the experience that all subjects, objects etc. are mere manifestations of the Kula.

The parts of the secret Kaula ritual, performed (i) as means to the realisation of the said experience or (ii) as the test to find out whether the follower has attained the spiritual level at which everything is realised as mere manifestation of the Kula or (iii) for the production of a Yoginībhū, are characterised by the use of such things as are prohibited by other scriptures,[1] such as meat, wine and woman. When they are used as means, they are for the realisation of identity with the Bhairava, through merging the limited personality or self in the idea, contained in the Mantra which is to be employed in the performance of the particular ritual[2] and controlling of the vital air so as to make it enter the Suṣumṇā, as has been pointed out earlier.

THE PLACE OF BHĀVANĀ IN THE KULA SYSTEM IN THIS CONTEXT.

Bhāvanā is a mental activity by which the idea, which a mystic attempts to grasp, becomes gradually clear on account of persistent effort. It refers to what is not clear.[3] It occupies an important place in the secret ritual, performed as a means to the realisation of identity of himself with the idea, presented in the Mantra, which the performer of the rite has to repeat mentally,[4] so as to realise the state of Bhairava, to ascend the transcendental level of identity of the individual with the universal.

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1. T. A., Ah. XXIX, 7.
2. Ibid., 19.
3. T. A., Ah. XXVIII, 143.
4. T. A., Ah. XXIX, 19.

But Bhāvanā has no meaning to one who has reached the level of higher indeterminacy, at which the entire universe shines as one with the 'Self',[1] the level in reference to which the Kula system holds views identical with the Pratyabhijñā, as has been pointed out earlier.

THE POINT OF VIEW FOR THE PROPER APPRECIATION OF THE SECRET KAULA RITUAL.

For the proper appreciation of the secret ritual, prescribed for the followers of the Kula system, it is necessary to look at it, not from the objective, social or ethical point of view, but from the subjective spiritual point of view, and to keep in mind the qualifications, necessary in the person, who wishes to perform it. For, it appears to be highly objectionable from the former two points of view for the following reasons :—

The Indian society has been moulded by three currents of thought (i) Brahmanism, represented in the Vedas and allied literature, the Brāhmaṇas, the Upaniṣads and the Smṛtis, (ii) Buddhism and (iii) Jainism. All of them point out the path of renunciation to the realisation of the highest objective of human life, the final emancipation. Though in the Veda killing of animals is permissible for sacrificial purposes, yet it is recognised to be a sin, even if done for the said purpose, and penance is prescribed for one who does it. But the Jainism and the Buddhism preached non-violence and held it to be the highest religious principle, which has been accepted to be the highest political principle also in the contemporary Indian society under the influence of Mahātmā Gāndhī. The use of wine has been condemned by all and the present leaders of the Indian nation stand committed to make India "dry". And no man of character can stand even the talk of sexual relation with any other woman

1. Bh., Vol. II, 311.

than one's own lawful wife. To the social reformer, eager to build up an ideal society, and to the moralist, anxious to maintain the highest ethical standard in the society, a religion that enjoins the use of meat and wine and advocates freedom in sexual relation as a means to the realisation of the ultimate reality, would look to be not only ridiculously strange but also extremely abominable.

From the objective social and ethical points of view the secret ritual, prescribed by the Kula system, therefore, will naturally appear to be very objectionable and condemnable. For, the Kaulism is a synthesis of the two paths (i) Vāma and (ii) Dakṣiṇa, pointed out in the sixty-four monistic Śaivāgamas[1]. And, therefore, in common with the Vāmamārga[2], it enjoins the use of meat, wine and woman in the performance of the secret ritual, called Kulayāga. For the proper appreciation of the secret ritual of Kaulism, therefore, it is necessary to look at it, not from the objective social or ethical point of view, but from the subjective and spiritual. We shall elaborate this point in due course.

KAULISM AS A SYNTHESIS OF THE TWO PATHS, VĀMA AND DAKṢIṆA.

In the sixty-four Āgamas, the two paths are primarily pointed out, (i) Dakṣiṇa (ii) Vāma. The one emphasises the importance of Śiva and the other that of Śakti. Each has its distinctive group of four, (i) Mantra (ii) Vidyā (iii) Mudrā (iv) Maṇḍala[3]. These have been dealt with in the Tantrāloka, wherein Āhnika XXX is concerned with Mantra and Vidyā, XXXI with Maṇḍala and XXXII with Mudrā. Of these the second, the Vidyā, is recognised to be the most important in the Siddhayogīśvarīmata, the essence of which is given in the Mālinī Vijayottara.

1. T.A., XII, 400. 2. Ibid., 395.

3. T.A., Ah., XXXVII, 397-8.

Vāma and Dakṣiṇa Mārgas are so called because they proceeded from the two faces, called Vāma and Aghora or Dakṣiṇa[1]. For, according to Sāyaṇa, the five well recognised faces of Śiva, from which the Āgamas are admitted to have proceeded, face different directions. Of these Vāmadeva faces the North, Aghora faces the South[2] and Īśa is at the top and turned upward.

This seems to explain why the two paths, which are synthesised in the Kula, are called Vāma and Dakṣiṇa. The Dakṣiṇa path is so called, because the Āgamas, on which it is based, proceeded from the face, called Aghora, which faces the South. And the Vāma is so called because it recognises the authority of the Śaivāgamas, which emanated from the face, called Vāmadeva, which faces the North. The additional reason for calling the path, pointed out by the Śaivāgamas, which originated from the northern face, "Vāmamārga" seems to be the influence of the mythical conception of the two Śaiva categories, Śiva and Śakti, as husband and wife, Mahādeva and Pārvatī. And the wife, according to the Indian tradition, is always to the left of the husband in the performance of the religious rituals. Accordingly in Indian art Pārvatī is invariably presented to the left of Mahādeva. In fact the word Vāmā in Sanskrit, for this reason, stands for wife. Vāma Mārga, therefore, seems to be so called because it emphasises Śakti in its philosophy.

NECESSITY FOR THE SYNTHESIS OF THE TWO PATHS.

It appears that the Vāma and the Dakṣiṇa paths became very unpopular, because the followers of them ignored the true spiritual value. The Vāmamārga was used for the terrible ends of causing the death and bringing about the separation of lovers

1. T. A., I, 39. *2. Bh., Vol. III, CXVI–VII.

and the Dakṣiṇa was followed for attaining limited spiritual powers to achieve the material ends.[1]

Kaulism, therefore, seems to have sprung up as a reaction against the materialistic outlook of the followers of the two paths. It synthesised the two, emphasised the importance of the true spiritual value, pointed out that the lower ends are the impediments to the attainment of the liberation and accordingly gave the most important place to the Vidyā, reducing Mantra, Mudrā and Maṇḍala to subordinate position.

The Kaula system (Kaulamārga), therefore, should not be identified with Vāmamārga or Dakṣiṇamārga. It is distinct from both. The two paths, Vāma and Dakṣiṇa, begin with and end in Kaulism.[2]

THE QUALIFICATIONS, NECESSARY FOR THE PERFORMANCE OF THE SECRET KAULA RITUAL.

Only those great souls;–who have grasped the Ultimate, which is essentially of the nature of indeterminacy; whose objective is purely spiritual and not material or social in the least[3]; who have attained such a perfection in the Rājayoga, as distinct from the Haṭhayoga, that they can detach their minds, at any stage, from the most stimulating sensuous situation and can, by sheer force of will, make the vital air get into the central vein (Madhya-nāḍī, Suṣumṇā) and be perfectly free from the sensuous affection; who have got such a control over themselves[4] that while their senses are in close contact with the most enjoyable objects, they remain perfectly detached from them so much so that they can terminate sense-contact at the time of the experience of the greatest sensuous joy and be at one with the Highest Subject ;—are recognised

1. T. A., Ah. XXXVII, 400.
2. M. V. V., 38.
3. T. A., Ah. XXIX, 73.
4. Ibid., 79–80.

to be qualified for the performance of the secret Kaula ritual (Ādiyāga) in which the use of meat, wine and woman is necessary. It is meant for those only who are capable of rising to the level of indeterminacy and remaining there.[1]

THE AIM.

The parts of the secret ritual of the Kaulism, in which meat, wine and woman are used, are not only means to the attainment of the spiritual greatness, but also are tests. The end in view, with which they are performed by the spiritually great, is not to enjoy wine and woman, but to find out whether he has got such a control over the mind as to withdraw it from the most enjoyable object at the time when it is being enjoyed most and to concentrate it on the pure Self.[2]

THE KAULA CONCEPTION OF BRAHMACĀRĪ.

Kaulism has a very peculiar conception of Brahmacārī. According to it, Brahma is 'Bliss' (Ānanda). This bliss is not only spiritual but also material. The material bliss is experienced in the sex-union (Maithuna). The use of wine and meat invigorate the physical system so that the person with vigour so acquired is able to experience the material bliss. Thus wine and meat help in its experience.

It admits, however, that the material bliss is not an end in itself. It is simply a means to the spiritual bliss : they are related exactely as are the suggestive language and the suggested spiritual idea : the one points to the other. Hence the wine etc. have to be used, not for the attainment of material bliss as an end in itself on account of intense desire for it, but simply as means to the realisation of the spiritual bliss.[3]

1. T. A., Ah. XXIX. (Comm.) 2.

2. T. A., Ah. XXIX, 74.

3. Ibid., 67.

Hence Brahmacārī is one who uses the three as means to the realisation of the spiritual bliss.[1]

YOGIC MOVEMENT OF VITAL AIR AND SECRET RITUAL OF KAULISM.

To understand the true significance of the secret ritual of the Kula system, it is very important to understand the very close relation of the ritual with the movement of the vital air from heart to the highest tip of the Suṣumṇā (Dvādaśānta), controlled by the will of each of the two who participate in it.

To this relation the attention of the reader is repeatedly drawn in the Tantrāloka Āhnika XXIX, in which the various parts are dealt with, by the use of such words as Parānanda,[2] Jagadānanda[3] etc. which are highly technical terms and are explained in the fifth Āhnika, which among other things is concerned with the upward movement of the vital air.

THE THREE MS (MAKĀRATRAYA) OF THE KAULISM.

The Kaulism, as has already been pointed out, synthesises the two paths, Vāma and Dakṣiṇa. The former emphasised the use of five things, the names of which begin with "M" (Pañcamakāra), (i) Madya (wine), (ii) Māṁsa (meat), (iii) Maithuna (sex-union), (iv) Matsya (fish), (v) Mudrā (putting the hands in such a way that they may present something that symbolises the Reality) in the performance of the prescribed rituals. The Kaulism however, in its synthesis of the two paths, seems to have discarded the last two and retained the use of the first three, which in the books, dealing with the rituals, are referred to as Makāratraya.[4]

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1. T. A., Ah. XXIX, 65.
2. Ibid., 82.
3. Ibid., 84.
4. Ibid., 65.

WINE.

The medical value of different types of wine is well recognised, not only in the Indian system of medicine but also in the Western. In India different types of mildly intoxicating drinks, prepared in a variety of ways out of various ingredients, are prescribed for curing different diseases. Broadly speaking they are of three types (i) that which is prepared by keeping a number of flowers, fruits, barks etc. in certain quantities in water, for a number of days, and by putting the prescribed quantity of yeast in it at fixed times, without boiling, is called Āsava (ii) that which is prepared by boiling the ingredients in the prescribed way is called Ariṣṭa[1] (iii) that which is distilled, is called Madirā.[2]

In the Indian medical science the intoxicants are recognised to have blunting effect on both sensibility and intellect :—

Buddhiṁ lumpati yaddravyam madakāri taducyate
Tamoguṇapradhānañca yathā madyaṁ surādikam
Śārṅgadhara Saṁhitā. (I, 4, 21–2).

But it is also pointed out that it puts keen edge on intellect and tones up the entire system if taken in right quantity :—

Buddhismṛti-prītikaraḥ sukhaśca prāṇānnanidrārativardhanaśca
Sampāṭhagītasvara—vardhanaśca proktotiramyo prathamo mado hi
Śā. Sam., 1, 4, 21–2 (Comm.)

In the literature on the Kula system spiritual value of 'Wine' is very much emphasised. In the Kulārṇava, for instance, it is asserted that the mere sight of it frees a person from all the sins; by smelling it one gets the fruit of performing hundred scrifices; its touch means the acquisition of the religious

1. Śā. Sam, 233. 2. K. Ar., 44–5.

merit, that accrues from visiting hundred sacred places; and the person, who takes it, gets the liberation of four types[1].

Abhinavagupta points out that in the Brahma Yāmala Tantra 'wine' is called "Śiva Rasa", a term which is used by Madhurāja Yogin in the Dhyāna Ślokāḥ, and asserts that without it neither the worldly pleasure nor the liberation can be got. He divides it into two types : (i) artificial and (ii) natural. The former is subdivided into three (i) Paiṣṭī, (ii) Kṣaudrī and (iii) Gauḍī. The latter is of one type only i. e. of grape[2]. It is as effective as the purified murcury. Gods love it. But it is to be taken only after the worship of Bhairava and identification with the idea, symbolised by the Mantra, which the worshipper is enjoined to repeat mentally[3].

MEAT.

Meat is of three kinds : of those who (i) fly in the air (literally sky) (ii) move on earth (iii) live in water. Any one of them may be used in the performance of the secret ritual[4]. Wine is to be used always with meat[5].

DŪTĪ.

A Dūtī,[6] necessary in the performance of the secret ritual, is to be a woman who can personify Śakti; has the eyes, rolling with intoxication; lips red like the ripe fruit of Bimba; beautiful teeth; face with well knit eye-brows; eyes, beautiful like those of a fawn in fear; charming smile; hair, dark like a multitude of glittering black bees; eye-brows, bent like the bow of cupid; complexion similar to that of melted gold; ears, decked with ear-ornaments, beautifully engraved; neck,

1. K. Ar., 46.
2. T. A., Ah. XXIX, 8–9.
3. Ibid., (Comm.) 11.
4. K. Ar., 47.
5. Ibid., 47.
6. T. A., (Comm.) Ah. XXIX, 68-9

similar to a beautiful conch shell, and decorated with ornaments of high class; body slightly bent with the weight of rising breasts, looking beautiful like the frontal globe on the forehead of an elephant; well turned long arms; fingures, like the hoods of five-hooded serpant, ornamented with rings, studded with gems, shedding variegated lustre; face, which in beauty is similar to the full moon; waist, comparable to rainbow or the waist of a big lion or an ant; thighs of the shape of the stalk of plantain or of the trunk of elephant; three folds of skin on the abdomen; round hips; slow gait; ankles, beautiful like the wheels of cupid's chariot; beautiful feet; voice, sweet like the tinkling of anklets; movement, similar to that of an elephant in rut; stature long like bamboo; tone, low and stammering like that of a goose; who is bedecked with ornaments of gold, long necklaces, garlands of sweet-smelling flowers and crest-jewel, looking like the hoods of a big five-hooded serpant; who is eager for a good betel; whose face is sportively turned from the object of love in feigned repulsion of his advances with a "Sītkāra", like that of a dancer or a singer in the course of presentation of a dance or a song; whose mind is free from greed and infatuation and is concentrated on Śakti; who is essentially of the nature of Cit, and is continuously experiencing the pure bliss of identification with the Bhairava. In short. Dūtī is to be a woman, who has all the external excellences, such as are necessary from the point of view of the Kāma Śāstra in the context of love, as well as a bent of mind that is necessary for final emancipation from the point of view of the Kula system.

But exponents of the Kaulism had realised that such a woman is extremely difficult to find. Therefore, they asserted the greatest importance of the mind, that could merge in the Bhairava, and looked upon the external excellences to be unimportant and unessential.[1]

1. T. A., Ah. XXIX, 70–1.

This Dūtī could be mother, sister, daughter, grand-mother, sister's daughter or daughter's daughter. Accordingly it is recognised to be of six types. They are to be preferred to any other, who is not directly related, because with them there is greater identity of nature on account of both uterine and spiritual relations.[1]

Though, according to some Āgamic text, wife also could be Dūtī, yet Abhinavagupta does not count her among those who could be so. For, in the performance of the secret ritual the mind has to be kept perfectly free from "sex-desire" (Riraṁsā) and has to be so directed as to get completely merged in the highest reality that is perfectly free from all limitations. But in the case of one's wife there is the possibility of the rise of the sex-desire.[2] In admitting Dūtī to be of six types only, Abhinava follows the authority of the Sarvācāra Hṛdaya,[3] though in other texts many more types are admitted.

THE METHOD OF THE PERFORMANCE OF THE KULA–YĀGA.

The place, where the Kula-Yāga is to be performed, should smell sweet because of the burning incense. The worshipper should enter it after worshipping the threshold, sit facing the North, purify different parts of the body with sacred formulas[4] as also the things necessary for the performance of the ritual;[5] identify himself with the Bhairava through identification with the idea symbolised by or presented in a particular Mantra;[6] worship deities of the internal and external senses by taking a little wine[7] and then, if he likes to view the entire objectivity as a mere reflection of the Supreme principle of consciousness,[8]

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1. T. A., Ah. XXIX, 72. 2. Ibid., 72–3 3. Ibid., 74.
4. Ibid., 16. 5. Ibid., 17.
6. Ibid., 19. 7. Ibid., 20.
8. T. A., Ah. XXIX, (Comm.) 21.

worship a human skull or fruit of coconut, placed on a red piece of cloth, spread on the ground[1], and different gods and Siddhas in different quarters.[2] Thereafter he should perform what is known as Aṅganyāsa even in the Vedic rituals : i. e. he should touch different parts of the body, remembering the various places, recognised to be sacred in the Śaiva literature (pīṭha), such as Aṭṭahāsa, Kaulagiri etc.[3] and identify himself with the group of powers (Śaktis) presiding over them.[4] And finally he has to contemplate on the religious formula[5] (Mantra), mentally repeating it as many times as may be necessary, checking the vital air so as to make it enter the Suṣumṇā.[6] At the end of the Japa, he should perform Havana, offering oblations to fire, which numerically should be one tenth of the number of times for which the religious formula[7] has been repeated.

THE ARRIVAL OF DŪTĪ.

After the performance of the parts of the ritual, presented above, the Dūtī is brought to scene.[8] The part of the ritual, connected with the Dūtī is extremely secret (Rahasya). Therefore, full details of it are not available. Hence there is obscurity in regard to many points. To understand the importance of the secret Kaula ritual it is very necessary to remember the following :—

(i) The secret Kaula ritual is called Ādiyāga for the following reasons :—

(a) It is the means to the experience of Pure Consciousness or Self.[9]

(b) It is primarily concerned with the principal circle[10],

1. T. A., Ah. XXIX, (Comm.) 22.
2. Ibid., 23.
3. T. A., Ah. XXIX, 42–3.
4. Ibid., 44.
5. Ibid., 56–7.
6. Ibid., 60.
7. Ibid., 58.
8. Ibid., 63.
9. Ibid., 112.
10. Ibid., 113.

the state of the highest subject (Mukhyacakrātmaka para pramātṛdaśā).

(c) It is the principal rite (Ādiścāsau yāgaḥ).

Thus from the very name of the ritual it is clear that its objective is spiritual but not sensuous.

(ii) Ānanda is the Brahman, or Ānanda is the essential nature of the Brahman. This idea is common to the Vedānta. But the Kaulism holds that 'Ānanda', in a form, is experienced in the body also at the time of 'sex-union' (Maithuna)[1] by one whose physical system is invigorated by meat and wine. Shall we call it Viṣayānanda ?

(iii) Brahmacārī is one who makes use of the three Makāras, Madya, Māṁsa and Maithuna, as has already been stated.[2]

(iv) Those who do not make use of the three Makāras in the performance of the Kaula ritual, as well as those who use them outside the ritual for mere satisfaction of sensuous desire, are beasts.[3]

(v) The three Makāras are capable of bringing about the manifestation of the Ānanda aspect of the self (Svātmānanda vyañjakatayā) and, therefore, have to be used for bringing that about, but not for mere sensuous satisfaction.[4]

(vi) Only those great souls, who possess true knowledge and are capable of rising to the level of indeterminacy, are entitled to use the three Makāras.

(vii) Dūtī, apart from the six types, mentioned directly by Abhinavagupta, is of countless types.[5]

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1. T. A., (Comm.) Ah. XXIX, 64–5.
2. Ibid., 65.
3. Ibid., 66.
4. Ibid., 67.
5. Ibid., 74.

(viii) The use of wine, meat etc. invigorates the senses. And scents, burning incense, garlands of sweet-smelling flowers etc. give fresh vitality to the vital air.

(ix) The contact of the senses with the external objects, which causes agreeable sensations, and drink and food, such as invigorate the physical system, produce a state of freedom from want (Nairākāṅkṣya) and bring about the upsurge of the bliss in the consciousness (Cit)[1] or, to put the same idea in other words, make the self bloom. Two things may be pointed out here.

(a) It is admitted in the literature on Indian Æsthetics that in the Śṛṅgāra, in which there is the satisfaction of all senses, and, therefore, there is the synthesis of all sensuous pleasures, the heart blooms.[2] The authorities on the Kula system seem to admit a similar state of the self in the Dūtī-Yāga, which has every thing in common with Śṛṅgāra.

(b) Abhinavagupta in his Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vivṛti Vimarśinī 'admits that there is a stage in the process of æsthetic experience, in which the Self experiences itself as affected by Sthāyin; but that is not the final stage'. He definitely asserts that the final stage in the æsthetic experience is that in which there is the experience of Paramānanda[3] and that in it even the basic mental state, awakened by dramatic presentation, sinks into the subconscious. He holds that the æsthetic experience, in its final stage, belongs to the level of Vyatireka Turīyātīta, in which all objectivity merges in the subconscious and the subject, the Self, shines in its Ānanda aspect.

Therefore, what is stated in regard to the Ādiyāga is very much like what is said in regard to the æsthetic configuration, presented on the stage, as a means, to the realisation of Paramānanda.[4] The difference lies in the context and the sub-

1. T. A., Ah. XXIX (Comm.) 77. 2. D. R. (G) 162.
3. I. P. V. V., Vol. II, 178-9. 4. T. A., Ah. XXVIII, 10.

jective conditions. In one case the context is of the æsthetics and the subjective conditions are æsthetic susceptibility etc. : in the other case the context is of the religion and the subjective conditions are the capacity to rise to the level of indeterminacy etc.

(x) It is asserted in the Spanda Kārikā,–which, according to Utpala Vaiṣṇava, is a work of Kallaṭa, who is a recognised authority on the Kula system also, as has been pointed out earlier,–that at the time when an emotion, such as that of anger or love etc., rises to the climactic point, senses automatically cease to function, and the 'original motion' (Spanda) shines clearly. Therefore, a Yogin, who is making persistent effort to grasp it, gets a clear vision of it, if, at the time of the rise of an emotion, he becomes introvert and ends the emotion[1] by withdrawing the internal senses from the objective. This view is supported by the Vijñāna Bhairava.[2]

And in the Tantrāloka it is admitted that in the sex-union, both in the beginning and at the end, 'Ānanda' becomes manifest and that the rest of the self on it (Ānanda) leads to the realisation of identity with the Brahman.[3]

(xi) Kaulism admits that just as identification with Garuḍa makes the poison ineffective, i. e. just as a person who has identified himself with Garuḍa remains unaffected by the poison that he takes, so a person who has identified himself with Bhairava remains unaffected by the sin consequent on the use of wine etc., because he transcends the empirical level at which their use means sin.[4]

THE MUTUAL WORSHIP.

The Dūtī and the worshipper, the one identifying herself with Śakti and the other with Śiva, with the object of entering

1. S. N., 39–40.
2. Ibid,, 40.
3. T. A., II, 164–5.
4. T. A., Ah. XXXVII, 396.

into the state of pure subjectivity, should behave towards each other, like two persons of opposite sexes in sex-relation. They should satisfy all the senses,[1] remaining entirely free from all attachment, and, therefore, without losing control over themselves. Thus, when on account of the satisfaction of circle of senses the Ānanda aspect emerges, they should rise above the empirical level so that the senses stop their respective functions and rest on the manifested Ānanda,[2] which leads to the realisation of the perfect unity of Śiva and Śakti. This unity is referred to as 'Kaula' in so far it is neither transcendent nor immanent but is the origin of both.[3] For the realisation of this 'Unity' the performer of the Dūtīyāga is enjoined to check the flow of the vital air from every side and send it up to the tip of Suṣumṇā.[4]

Thus it is clear that the use of three Makāras, Madirā, Māṁsa and Maithuna, in the performance of the secret Kaula ritual is not for the satisfaction of the senses as the end, but is a means to the realisation of the Supreme Reality by those who have the necessary qualifications, who can remain detached even while enjoying sensuous pleasure, who can rise above the empirical at the time of the greatest sensuous enjoyment, and can check the flow of vital air so as to send it up to the tip of Suṣumṇā and, therefore, in whose case the question of moral turpitude cannot arise, because the morality or immorality does not lie in the act itself but in the motive.

THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE KULA SYSTEM.

The systems of philosophy such as the Vedānta, the Bauddha etc., point out the renunciation of the world as the sole means to the final emancipation. Giving up of all worldly en-

1. T. A., Ah. XXIX, 78. 2. Ibid., 79–80.
3. Ibid., 83. 4. Ibid., (Comm.) 101.

joyments is absolutely necessary to follow the paths, shown by them. They recognise Bhoga to be the greatest obstacle on the way to Mokṣa. The Kula system shows a way, in which Bhoga, instead of being an obstacle, is a means to Mokṣa. It presents the stumbling block of Bhoga as the stepping stone to Mokṣa.

It is admitted in the Indian Æsthetics that art presents the Absolute in sensuous garb; that the sensuous enjoyment of a work of art, leads to the grasp or realisation of the Absolute, if the necessary subjective conditions are present in the experiencer. Similarly the Kaulism also admits the sensuous enjoyment to be a means to the realisation of the Ultimate. Hence while other systems emphasise antagonism between Bhoga and Mokṣa, this system harmonises and synthesises the two. This harmony and synthesis is reflected in the picture of Abhinavagupta, which presents him playing upon the stringed instrument, the Vīṇā, with two Dūtīs, with jars of wine in their hands, waiting upon him, but his eyes, expressive of the experience of 'Ānanda'.

EVOLUTION OF KAULISM AS A SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY.

There are two characteristic features of the Kaulism as it developed in Kashmir in the hands of Somānanda and Abhinavagupta, both of whom took up the Parā Triṁśikā as the basic text on the Kula system and presented the Kaulism in their commentaries. They are (i) the conception of Parā, which forms a part of the title of the text, on which they base the system and in the commentaries on which they present it; and (ii) the interpretation of the Indian alphabetical system in terms of the categories of the Kula system.

If we cast a glance at the history of Sanskrit literature, we find that the discussion on the aspects of 'speech' (Vāk), of which Parā is the highest, was started by the grammarians.

Though some eminent later authorities on the Philosophy of grammar, like Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa, trace the origin of Parā to the Vedic passages, such as :—

"Catvāri śṛṅgāstrayo asya pādā"
and
"Catvāri vāk parimitā padāni"

holding that the word "Catvāri" therein refers to the four aspects of 'speech' (Vāk) including Parā; yet they are not supported by Patañjali, who clearly interprets the word "Catvāri" therein to mean, not the four aspects of speech, but four types of word, noun, verb, prefix and particle :—

"Catvāri padajātāni nāmākhyātopasarganipātāśca"
(M. Bh., 37).

But Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa in his Udyota points out that the four aspects of speech are implied in the above statement of Patañjali by the use of the particle "Ca" therein :—

"Bhāṣye padajātāni Parā–Paśyantī–Madhyamā–Vaikharī rupāṇi, ata evāgre Nipātāśceti cakāraḥ saṁgacchate"
(M. Bh., (Ud.) 38)

According to Somānanda, however, the Parā was not recognised, not only by Patañjali but also by Bhartṛhari. For, in his Śiva dṛṣṭi he asserts that the grammarians hold the Paśyantī to be the highest aspect of speech, which, from the Śaiva point of view, is nothing more than the power of knowledge, which characterises the Sadāśiva category :—

Athāsmākaṁ jñānaśaktiryā sadāśivarūpiṇī
Vaiyākaraṇasādhūnāṁ paśyantī sā parā sthitiḥ (S.Dr., 26.)

The literature on the aspects of 'speech', on which Bhartṛhari's discussion on the subject in his Vākya Padīyam is based, seems to be irrecoverably lost. We know from references that a big work, expounding the system of Pāṇini and covering one

Lakh of Granthas, was written by Vyāḍi;[1] that Vasurāta, the teacher of Bhartṛhari, wrote a digest of the original Vyākaraṇāgama, written by Rāvaṇa[2], on which the Vākyapadīyam is based; that on the Sūtras of Pāṇini there were commentaries, written by Kuṇi etc., before Patañjali wrote his Mahābhāṣya;[3] and that Bhartṛhari himself wrote a commentary on the Mahābhāṣya, which, according to Kaiyaṭa, served as the basis of the commentary "Pradīpa"[4]. But we do not know what they said on the aspects of speech. However, if we accept Somānanda's interpretation of Bhartṛhari's view on the problem, we can say that the highest aspect of 'Speech', called 'Parā', which is one of the basic concepts of the Kula system, was not recognised by Bhartṛhari, who, according to the account of Chinise traveller Yi-tsing, died about 651 A.D.

Whatever view we may hold about Bhartṛhari's admission or non—admission of Parā, one thing is undeniable that the grammarians propounded a view of the 'Sound-Absolute' (Śabda Brahma) which led to the rise of the conception of Parā in the mind of Somānanda. This Parā was recognised as the central and most essential aspect of the Absolute as admitted by Utpalācārya in his Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Kārikā :—

"Citiḥ pratyavamarśātmā parā vāk svarasoditā
Svātantryametanmukhyaṁ tadaiśvaryaṁ paramātmanaḥ"

and as the mistress of the three powers (Parā Triṁśikā) of will, knowledge and action by Abhinavagupta in his Parā Triṁśikā Vivaraṇa.

BHARTṚHARI'S VIEW OF THE SOUND-ABSOLUTE (ŚABDA BRAHMA).

The Sound–Absolute is beginningless, endless and causeless (Taccānimittatvādakṣaram. V. P., (Comm.) 1). It appears as

1. V. P., Ch. II, (Comm.) 283.
2. Ibid., 285–6.
3. M. Bh., (Pra.) 538.
4. Ibid., 5.

'Meaning' or object. The entire universe has its being from it. It is the origin of all that on which practical life depends. For, Bhartṛhari admits the entire field of experience, the objective world, to be essentially identical with or non-different from the Sound-Absolute, exactly as the Vedāntin holds the phenomenal world to be the 'appearance' of the Brahman and, therefore, to be non-different from it; (Tadananyatvam ārambhaṇaśabdādibhyaḥ V. S.) or as the Vijñānavādin admits the known objects to be non-different from Vijñāna, Buddhi or Saṁvid; because the object and its knowledge invariably simultaneously figure in consciousness, just as do jar and clay of which it is made. And, therefore, just as jar and clay are essentially identical, so are the object and its knowledge (Sahopalambhaniyamādabhedo nīlataddhiyoḥ).

In the Sound-Absolute there are innumerable powers, which are the very .being of it and, therefore, are non-different from it :—

Śabdatattve Brahmaṇi ekatvāvirodhinyaḥ samucitāḥ atmabhūtāḥ śaktayaḥ santi......
Śaktibhyo Brahmaṇaḥ apṛthaktvepi āropitaḥ pṛthaktvāvabhāsaḥ V. P. (Comm.) 2.

But these powers are not independent in their operation or function. For, admission of their independence would mean chaos. For instance, if the powers of creation, maintenance and destruction in relation to an object were to operate simultaneously, will there be anything but chaos ? Bhartṛhari, therefore, admits the Supreme power, the Kālaśakti, which controls the operation of the dependent powers. The manner of control is very clearly brought out by means of an analogy, which may be presented as follows :—

A fowler holds a number of birds by means of strings, tied to them; and lets them move to the place where some grain is

scattered in order to entice free birds and to ensnare them. But when free birds have flocked together, he pulls them slowly back, in order to bring all of them to a point, at which they can be conveniently entrapped.[1]

What is pointed out by means of the analogy is that just as the birds, held by the fowler by strings, are not independent in their movements and are under the control of the fowler, so are not the various powers of creation etc. independent in their operation and similarly they are controlled by the Supreme Power, called Kālaśakti.

The point, that is of very great importance from the point of view of one who is attempting to show the evolution of the Kashmir Śaiva thought from the Philosophy of grammar, is that this controlling supreme power is recognised to be Svātantrya or Svātantrya–Śakti at two places in the commentary (i) Kāṇḍa I, V. 3 (Comm.) (ii) Kāṇḍa III, S. 9, V. 14. (Comm.).[2] For, it means that the Sound-Absolute, (Śabda Brahma) as the metaphysical principle, admitted by the philosophers of grammar, is "Free" (Svatantra), has the power of freedom (Svātantrya-Śakti) as identical with or non-different from it. This view is the metaphysical interpretation of the conception of the subject (Kartā) of a sentence, which Pāṇini recognised to be free (Svatantraḥ Kartā 1, 4, 54). This is accepted in the monistic Śaiva system of Kashmir by all authorities from Somānanda to Kṣemarāja, who has beautifully presented it as "Citiḥ svatantrā viśvasiddhihetuḥ" P. Hr. 1.

To accept the ultimate metaphysical principle to be without freedom such as the Brahman of the Vedāntin is accepted to be, is to betray the ignorance of the Grammar.

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1. V. P. (Comm., Ban.) 5–6.

2. V. P. (Comm.) Ch I. p. 2. and Ch. III, p. 346.

THE DIFFERENCE OF THE MONISTIC ŚAIVAS FROM THE PHILOSOPHERS OF GRAMMAR.

While there is agreement between the monistic Śaivas and the philosophers of grammar in respect of the admission of 'freedom' as the power of the Ultimate, there is difference in regard to its essential nature. The Ultimate is referred to as Paśyantī by the exponents of the philosophy of grammar. But Somānanda points out that the word "Paśyantī" cannot correctly signify the Ultimate Metaphysical principle, which is characterised by the absence of all multiplicity and distinction so much so that even the subject is not separate from the object; nor is there temporal or spatial succession.[1] The reason may be stated as follows :—

The word Paśyantī is derived from the root Dṛś to see, with the affix Śatṛ, signifying the relation of the act of seeing with the present time. It is a transitive verb and, therefore, the action signified by it must be related to an object. Now if the act of seeing, related to the present time, be admitted to belong to the highest aspect of speech (Vāk) as Bhartṛhari maintains, the question arises : What is the object to which it is related ? It cannot be asserted that it is related to the external empirical objects. For, they are, according to the theory of Vivarta or 'appearance', false appearances and, therefore, the Vāk, if accepted to be related to them, cannot be maintained to be 'real' (Satyā). Further, Paśyantī is held to be characterised by the absence of all duality, including that of the subject and the object. How can this position be maintained if it be accepted to have the objective relation ? Nor can it be said that it is related to object, on account of 'ignorance' (Avidyā). For, then the question arises : Is the ignorance real or unreal ? In the former case monism fails, because two realities will have been admitted. In the latter case the relation between

1. S. Dr., 45.

Paśyantī Vāk and Avidyā becomes impossible, because the Avidyā is non-existent. And to admit that Paśyantī itself is unreal is to adopt the most indefensible position, because that would mean that the Brahman, called "Paśyantī", is unreal.

Nor can it be said that Paśyantī first creates the objects and then sees them. For, to admit that Paśyantī, which is real, creates what is unreal, is an illogical position. Further, it may be asked : Are the objects to be created, known or unknown to Paśyantī ? The 'perception' of the objects before creation is not possible. And the creation of the unknown is not in consonance with the Philosophy of grammar.

Thus the Śaiva conception of the fourth aspect of speech seems to have evolved out of the criticism of Paśyantī as presented above.

TWO CONCEPTIONS OF PARĀ.

Parā, that evolved out of criticism of Paśyantī, is different from Parā, with which Kaulism is concerned. For, Parā as the highest aspect of speech (Vāk) beyond Paśyantī, is the power of self-awareness, self-consciousness (Vimarśa), which distinguishes the sentient from the insentient. It is what distinguishes the self-luminous subject from the self-luminous objects like lamp or diamond. It holds within the remaining three aspects as identical with itself. (Garbhasthitasakala-paśyantīmadhyamāvaikharīrūpasakalavākprapañcā. Bh., Vol. I, 253.). It is called Vāk, because it refers to the universe by means of inner sound in indeterminate apprehension.

(Vakti viśvamabhilapati pratyavamarśena iti Vāk. Bh. Vol. I, 253.)

THE CONTEXT OF THE PROBLEM OF PARĀ IN THE ĪŚVARA PRATYABHIJÑĀ.

In the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Kārikā of Utpalācārya the pro-

blem of Parā is discussed in the context of the power of knowledge (Jñānaśakti) in the fifth Āhnika of the Jñānādhikāra.

The approach of the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Kārikā to the problem of metaphysics is very interesting inasmuch as it shows that the metaphysical principle, presented in it, is the presupposition of every phenomenon of knowledge and that the practical life is possible on the basis of the monistic Śaiva Metaphysical principle only. It denies essential difference between mind and matter, thought and thing, or subject and object. It rejects dualistic explanation of the phenomena of knowledge for similar reasons as those advanced by the subjectivists such as the Vijñānavādin in the East and Berkeley in the West. It rejects subjectivism also, because the subjectivist hypothesis completely shuts up every individual subject in his own world and, therefore, fails to explain the common objective world, wherein the individuals can co-operate in a common undertaking. It also rejects pure idealistic monism, which holds the world to be mere illusion.

Its theory of emanation of the whole universe, including subject, object, means of knowledge and knowledge itself, from the Universal Mind, reminds us of the Philosophy of Plotinus.

It holds that emanation is nothing but manifestation of what is identical with the Universal Mind as separate from itself. But the manifested, even in the state of separateness from the Mind, is no less within the Mind than in the state of identity, exactly as our thoughts are within ourselves even when they are objectified. The universe has no existence independently of the Mind exactly as the dream has no being independently of the dreaming subject. The world process is the process within the Mind. The phenomena of knowledge, related to individual subject, are the phenomena in the Universal Mind, exactly as thoughts, feelings and cognitions of

different types, which the individuals, figuring in a dream, have, are in the dreaming subject. Just as it is the dreaming subject that knows, remembers and differentiates in the persons, which appear to do so in dream, so it is the Universal Mind that does so in all individual minds.

Hence in the context of metaphysics, which attempts to explain the phenomena of determinate knowledge, on which the practical life depends, Utpalācārya and Abhinavagupta speak of the Universal Mind as expressing its 'freedom' (Svātantrya) in the forms of the powers of knowledge (Jñāna), remembrance (Smṛti) and differentiation (Apohana), which consist in manifesting the objects, which even at the empirical level are essentially identical with the Universal Mind, as separate from the manifested individual subject (Anujjhitasaṁvidabhedasya bhāvasya kalpitapramātrapekṣayā bhedena prakāśanam bhagavato jñānaśaktiḥ. Bh. Vol, I, 197), in uniting them with and in differentiating them from one another respectively.

It asserts that the shining of the perceptible objects as "this", as separate from the individual subject at the empirical level is logically possible only if they be admitted to be within the Universal Mind, if even at the empirical level they retain their identity with the Universal subject.[1] The reasons in support of the view may be stated as follows :—

When an object is experienced, there arises the judgement "Object shines to me" (Arthaḥ mama avabhāsate). Let us analyse it. Does it mean that object is independently self-luminous (Avabhāsate) ? Is the luminosity (Avabhāsana) the essential nature of the object ? Is luminosity identical with the object ? Does the object cause its knowledge independently (Grahaṇasamaye sthitam "prakāśate" ityevaṁ rūpam prakāśakartṛtvambhavati. Bh., Vol. I, 198.)

1. Bh., Vol. I, 198.

Obviously luminosity cannot be accepted to be the essential nature of or identical with the object, nor can the object be admitted to be the cause of knowledge independently. For, in that case it will be difficult to explain why it does not shine to all equally, exactly as the self-shining subject does; because every body knows the self, the "I". But if it be said that the shining of the object is confined to itself; then it would not shine to any body. In fact it would be difficult to make even this assertion that the luminosity of the object is confined to the object. For, in the absence of any relation of the object with the knowing subject, no statement can be made about its essential nature. If it be said that the subject by means of its own light makes the object shine i. e. is the cause of the shining of the object; it would again become difficult to explain, why the object, having become luminous, does not shine to all. Further, in the case of the admission that the object does not shine itself and that its shining depends on the light of conscious subject, proceeding through the senses, in co-operation with the 'mind' (Manas) and the external light, such as that of the sun or lamp, it would again be difficult to explain why it shines to a particular individual only, after it has been made to shine by the causes, mentioned above.

With these and similar other arguments, fully discussed in the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī and the Bhāskarī Vol. I, 196, ff., it is established, that the object of knowledge is essentially of the nature of light of consciousness or idea and that this light of consciousness (Prakāśa) is the same in all objects : for, otherwise the unification of ideas, so very necessary for determinate cognition, would be impossible. Hence the phenomena of knowledge cannot be accounted for either in terms of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika or of any of the three schools of the Buddhistic philosophy, Vijñānavāda, Bāhyārthānume-

yavāda and Bāhyārthavāda. Accordingly there is no alternative to the monistic Śaiva theory of the Ābhāsavāda.

THE IDENTITY OF UTPALĀ'S CONCEPTION OF PARĀ WITH THAT OF SOMĀNANDA.

The context, in which the problem of Parā is discussed by Utpalācārya, makes it abundantly clear that Parā, with which he is concerned, is what Somānanda had pointed out to be higher than Paśyantī. In fact he refers to Paśyantī as lower than Parā, recognising it to be Parāparā state, which characterises the Sadāśiva category.[1] Of course, he identifies it with Svātantrya, Sphurattā, Spanda and Mahāsattā.

IMPROVEMENT IN THE CONCEPTION OF PARĀ, MADE IN THE PARĀ TRIṀŚIKĀ.

From what has been stated above it is clear that Utpalācārya's conception of Parā, as higher than Paśyantī, is just what the philosophers of language or grammar have admitted from the time of Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa. Therefore, the conception of Parā as the mistress of the powers of will, knowledge and action (Parā Trīśikā) is an improvement on the former.

THE RELATION OF PARĀ TO THE ULTIMATE REALITY.

The conception of Parā presents an analytical view of the Ultimate. Parā is not Brahman, as the Vaiyākaraṇa holds. It is an undeniable, inseparable, aspect of the Ultimate Reality, which is not pure unity, but unity of Prakāśa and Vimarśa, Anuttara and Anuttarā, or Akula and Kaulikī Śakti, from different analytical points of view.

The Kaulism divides the whole universe under two heads (i) expressive sound (Vācaka) (ii) expressed object (Vācya). According to it, the world is not illusion, as according to the

1. Bh., Vol. 1, 254.

Vedānta and the philosophy of grammar, which, according to some, in common with the former uses the word "Vivarta" to indicate the type of being that the world has; but 'real'. It may, however, be remembered that the word "Vivarta" seems to be used in the Vākya Padīya in a slightly different meaning from that of 'illusion'. Therefore, this inseparable aspect is referred to as Parā in the Kula system, when the ultimate origin of the expressive sound is pointed out. But when the rise of the entire universe, including both "sound" and "meaning" is intended to be accounted for, it is referred to as Kaulikī Śakti or Anuttarā, according as the Ultimate Reality is spoken of as Akula or Anuttara.[1]

THE PROBLEMS RELATING TO ANUTTARA.

According to Abhinavagupta, the most important problems, connected with the Kula system, are discussed in the first four verses of the Parā Triṁśikā.[2] Therefore, on account of the limitation of space in the present volume, we shall mostly confine ourselves to the treatment of the problems, stated therein, of course, not excluding a few more to give a complete summary of the system.

Abhinavagupta interprets the very first two words "Anuttaraṁ Katham" in three ways so as to raise three problems :— (i) Does the knowledge of Anuttara as transcendent or as immanent reality lead to the liberation in life ? (ii) What is the essential nature of Anuttara ? Is Anuttara of the nature of consciousness (Jñāna) or of that of the object of consciousness (jñeya)? In either case it would not be free from diversity. For, one form of consciousness differs from another and so does one object from another. (iii) Is the realisation of "Anuttara", as conceived by the Kula system, possible in the state of liberation only or in that of bondage also ?[3]

1. T. A., II, 74–5. 2. P. T. V., 96–7. 3. Ibid., 32.

The various explanations of Anuttara embody the metaphysical, mystic and epistemic theories of the Kula system. From Metaphysical point of view it is that in which the entire universe has its being both before and after the creation, from which it springs, with which it is essentially identical, which is the essential nature of every thing, which is evershining and which does not shine to the individual subjects because of its freedom.[1] From the mystic point of view it is that experience in which the individual is completely merged in Śakti, which also loses itself in the Bhairava or Anuttara, represented in the alphabetical system by the first letter 'A'. From epistemic point of view it is the presupposition of all phenomena of knowledge.

Anuttara is explained at two places in the Parā Triṁśikā Vivaraṇa, in the commentary on the 1st verse and on the second half of the third. In the former it is explained in sixteen ways. And at the conclusion of the discussion, Abhinavagupta asserts that the conception of Anuttara in the Kula system is as important as is the heart in the physical organism; that it is of the nature of a knot; and that the clear grasp of the Anuttara depends on the clear knowledge of the sixteen aspects of this knot, represented by sixteen explanations of the word "Anuttara".[2]

Some of the meanings of Anuttara, pointed out at the two places, referred to above, are common. But we are giving them here to facilitate the understanding of the text. We have, therefore, not hesitated to repeat the same idea, if it has been found twice in two different contexts.

SIXTEEN MEANINGS OF ANUTTARA.

Anuttara is that (i) which is higher than and beyond the thirty six categories from Śiva to Earth. The categories have

1. P. T. V., 88. 2. Ibid., 31.

their being in it and, therefore, it is superior to them. It is perfectly self-shining and absolutely independent. (ii) In regard to it no questions and answers are possible.[1] (iii) It is the highest Reality to be realised in the highest type of liberation, which consists in complete freedom from all the impurities. (iv) Uttara means going beyond (Urdhvataraṇakramaḥ). Thus a Yogin through concentration of mind at the various circles (Cakras) in the navel, heart etc. in succession, goes higher and higher. Anuttara is that spiritual level, from which there is no going beyond. (v) Uttara means bondage, from which freedom is attained (Uttaranti yasmāt). Anuttara, therefore, means that state in which there is absolutely no bondage of any kind. (vi) Uttara means liberation from something (Uttaraṇam uttaraḥ). Anuttara, therefore, means that from which there is no liberation. (vii) Uttara means the use of expression (Uttarañca śabdanam). Anuttara, therefore, is that in regard to which no use of any expression is possible; which cannot be spoken of as "this" "that" "like this" or "like that".[2] It is indefinable. (viii) The impossibility of the use of expression in regard to Anuttara implies that it is indeterminate. Therefore, Anuttara is that the objective contemplation on which is not possible.[3] (ix) Uttara means subsequent and, therefore, that which springs from something. Accordingly it means (x) Paśyantī etc. or (xi) Aghorā etc. or (xii) Parā, Aparā etc., all of which spring from Anuttara when we look upon it from the metaphysical point of view. Therefore, from the mystic point of view Anuttara is that state in which Paśyantī etc. have no determinate being.[4] (xiii) In the Śaivāgamas it is admitted that the teacher can push the disciple to higher spiritual level by transfusing his own spiritual power into him whom he wants to grace. But that is not possible in the case of the highest spiritual level, the Anuttara.

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1. P. T. V., 19.
2. Ibid., 21.
3. Ibid., 22.
4. Ibid., 24.

Abhinavagupta points out that this is signified by the word "Anuttara" as follows :—

'Nud' means to push (Nud preraṇe). 'Tara' literally means to reach the opposite shore and, therefore, to attain the objective. Accordingly "Nuttara" means that which can be attained through a push given by another. Anuttara, therefore, means that which cannot be attained through teacher's push. (Nudā preraṇena taraḥ taraṇaṁ yatra na bhavati tat Anuttaram. P. T. V., 25).

(xiv) The fourteenth interpretation of "Anuttara" is very closely connected with the Śaiva conception of Śūnya. For, Abhinavagupta interprets "An" as Śūnya Pramātā. "An" means the act of what is called "living" (Jīvanākhyā vṛttiḥ), which is associated with the body[1] etc. and in the performance of which the 'agent' is free from identification with different powers. This agent or subject is called Śūnya Pramātā. Anuttara, therefore, means that in which Śūnya is thoroughly predominant (Tasya anaḥ uttaratvaṁ sarvataḥ paramārthatayā ādhikyaṁ yatra).

To get a clear idea of what is really meant by Anuttara in this context, it is necessary to remember that in the Śaiva philosophical literature there are two conceptions of both, "Jīvana" and "Śūnya". Jīvana means the activity of living. Though, dealing with individual Śūnya-Pramātā in his Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī and in the Vivṛti Vimarśinī, Āgamādhikāra Āhnika II verses 13–15, Abhinavagupta admits it (Śūnya-Pramātā) to be the principle of life (Śūnya eva jīvaḥ) in so far as it is responsible for setting the five vital airs in motion, which is the necessary condition of the working of all the internal and external Indriyas[2] : yet it has to be kept in mind that the Śūnya in itself is insentient and that the power

1. P. T. V., 25–6. 2. Bh., Vol. II, 263.

of setting the vital airs in motion does not really belong to it as such : but it belongs to the Self that has identified itself with Śūnya, because of its "freedom" (Śūnya evāhantā akṣacakrodvalitā jīvanam).

Thus the Self is admitted to be the true principle of life. This is what Utpalācārya has established in his Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Kārikā. In fact, the recognition of the Self is logically established because the Self is the principle of life, which is only one, the plurality of Jīvas being due to the limiting conditions only (Jīvānām abheda eva. Bh., Vol. I, 67). Hence the principle of life is Śiva Himself.

Bhāskara Kaṇṭha, in his commentary on the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī, has pointed out that the Śūnya Pramātā, that has the experience of "nothing" (na kiñcit) in deep sleep, is limited. But if he be free from limitations, he is Śiva. (Śūnyapramātuscāpavedyasuṣuptatvam na kiñcidrūpaparimitapramatṛrūpatvāt, aparimitabhāve tvasyaiva śivatvam. Bh., Vol. I, 322.)

Thus, Anuttara from the point of view of the Pratyabhijñā system would mean that state in which Śiva predominates. From the point of view of the Kula system, however, this interpretation would be unacceptable. For, the Kaulism differentiates between Śiva and Anuttara. It accepts the latter to be higher than the former. The Kaulas, therefore, attempt to interpret it in the light of another conception of Śūnya, which is as follows :—

The 'Light of consciousness' (Prakāśatattvam), free from limitation of the power of will etc., separates from itself the entire objectivity, that has its being as one with it, as that which is to be manifested, and experiences itself as transcendental. As such it is called Śūnya, in so far as it is absolutely contentless.[1]

1. P. T. V., (F. N.) 26.

Anuttara, therefore, in the strict Kaulika sense, is that in which the Śūnya, as presented just above, predominates; i. e. it is nothing but pure contentless light of consciousness, free from even such limitation as the power of will.

(xv) 'A' means the power, which rests on the Supreme Light of Consciousness (Mahāprakāśa); which is beyond the Māyā; which is not the object of hearing; which is not heard of in the Vedic literature; which is not a product; which is essentially the self-consciousness of the waveless ocean of 'Cit'; which is present in both the "I" experiences, (1) the individual, which is the starting point of the manifestative activity, and (2) the universal, which is perfect, because it comprehends the entire universe and, therefore, is the culminating point in the rise to the supreme experience; which is present in the first "I" (Aham), which is the starting point of the manifestative activity, as well as in the last which comprehends the entire universe. (Śāktollāsamayī prathmā bhūmiḥ 'Aham' iti, Viśvāmarśamayī pūrṇāhambhāvabhūmiḥ paryavasānabhūmirityarthaḥ) P. T. V. (F. N. 27.). "Nut" means inclined to creative activity. "Tara" means domineering over all. Thus, Anuttara means that in which the power, represented by "A", inclining towards creative activity, is predominant (Asya nudaḥ taraḥ yatra).[1]

(xvi) "Nut" means to propel i. e. the action which is characterised by spatial succession. "Anut" means that which is without such an action (Nāsti nut yatra) such as the ether (Ākāśa), which from the popular point of view is such in so far as it is all-pervasive and, therefore, there is no place to which it can move. "Anuttara" therefore, means that which is more without action than even Ākāśa. For, in relation to Ākāśa we can talk of action on account of the sound waves, which are related to it by the relation of inherence.

1. P. T. V., 27–8.

But in relation to the 'Absolute' (Saṁvid) no talk of action, characterised by succession, is possible.

There are two conceptions of action (Kriyā) in the Śaiva philosophy : (i) characterised by spatial and temporal succession (Sakramā) (ii) free from it (Akramā). The former is admitted in the limited beings and the latter in the ultimate metaphysical principle;[1] which is omnipotent inasmuch as it is perfectly free; whose freedom is absolutely without limitation of any kind; which is the perfect 'I' (Aham) in so far as it holds within all that admits of being referred to as "this"; which in its transcendental state is without any limited manifestation; which is ever shining; which is perfectly free from limitations of time and space, which are characterised by the succession of limited 'this' and 'not-this'. The action that is admitted in the Absolute as metaphysical principle is nothing but self-consciousness, which is called 'Vimarśa' in the Matsyodarīmata :—

"Saṁvittattve tu...........idantābhāsa-
tadanābhāsasāradeśakālāpekṣakramābhāvāt
akramaiva svātmavimarśasaṁrambhamayī
Matsyodarīmatādiprasiddhā vimarśābhidhā kriyā."
(P. T. V., 28).

OTHER MEANINGS OF ANUTTARA.

(1) Anuttara is that with which the entire objectivity is essentially identical.[2]

(2) It is the basis of or underlies the entire diversity so that when, on account of the spiritual discipline, a person discards the empirical point of view, the entire diversity shines in its true nature as Anuttara. Therefore, Anuttara is that

1. Bh., Vol. II, 10–11 2. P. T. V., 81.

which shines to a spiritualist in the entire objectivity, when the empirical point of view is discarded.

(3) It is such as cannot be presented by any text, not excluding even the Rudra Yāmala Tantra,[1] in which an attempt is made to do so. It is the presupposition of all that is said in reply to the question regarding its essential nature. It is the resting place of the power of consciousness (Cicchakti) that weilds the Triśūla, the three powers of will, knowledge and action. It is that from which proceeds the great creation (Mahāsṛṣṭi) including innumerable creations, annihilations etc.[2] It is that transcendental consciousness in which the entire universe, consisting of different types of subject, object, means, elements etc., has its being as identical with it. The universe, in the state of identity with the Anuttara, is free from the limitation, due to mutual exclusion, and is not referrable as "this" but is identical with the "pure I-consciousness" (Ahamparāmarśamātrābhinnameva).[3]

This conception of the Anuttara is a metaphysical necessity. For, if the objective universe is to be admitted to be the externalised thought or idea of the Universal Mind, the admission of its identity with the Universal Mind before its externalisation is a logical necessity; because the externalisation is possible of that only which is present within.

(4) It is that in whose predominant Śakti or power the entire universe, subsumed under thirty six categories,[4] has its being after its creation by the universal stir.

The Kaulism admits the distinction between Bhairava or Anuttara and Śakti. The distinction is constituted by the universal stir and the particular which characterise the two respectively. But it asserts at the same time that there is no

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1. P. T. V.,82.
2. Ibid., 83.
3. Ibid., 84-5.
4. Ibid., 86.

essential difference between them; that the difference is admitted for the purpose of instructing the pupils and enabling them to follow the path, pointed out by the system; that they are inseparably united as the universal and particular or self and consciousness; and that in fact Anuttara is the only one Reality, which is essentially omnipotence, which is represented by "I" (Aham), which is nothing but 'free consciousness' (Vastutaḥ punarekameva svatantra–cinmayamahamityaiśvarya-śaktisāram Anuttaram. P. T. V. 86.)

(5) Anuttara is that in which the entire objectivity, which is experienced as "Mine" (Mama) by the limited individuals, has its being as identical with it. It is what is represented as Ma Ha A (म ह् अ) in so far as in grasping the state of annihilation the individual (Nara), who is essentially of the nature of Vindu, represented by 'M', is merged in Śakti, represented by 'H' and this also is merged in Anuttara, represented by 'A'[1].

Anuttara is that from which the entire objectivity springs and in which alone it has its being. It is ever self-shining and, therefore, is undeniable.[2] It is that with which the entire objectivity is essentially identical.

(6) Anuttara as a state in mystic experience is discussed in the context of Ādiyāga in Āhnika XXIX of the Tantrāloka. Here Abhinavagupta makes it clear that in the context of the Kula system *Anuttara is that state in which* the union of Śiva and Śakti is fully realised and consequently all duality disappears. It is a state about which no talk is possible. It is neither immanent nor transcendental. This is the highest state, attainable by the follower of the Kula system. (Paraṁ Kaulam)[3] Abhinavagupta holds this view in the highest regard as is clear, according to Jayaratha, from Abhinava's quoting from his own Stotra in this context.[4]

1. P. T. V., 86–7. 2. Ibid., 87–8.
3. T. A., Ah. XXIX. 83. 4. Idid., 118.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL NECESSITY OF ADMISSION OF ANUTTARA AS PURE CONSCIOUSNESS.

We have discussed the various meanings of the word "Anuttara", which stands for the Ultimate Reality from the various points of view, and have pointed out that it is used for pure consciousness also. The Kaulism holds that this pure consciousness (Saṁvid) is not only a metaphysical necessity, as we have pointed out earlier, but also a psychological necessity. That is as follows :—

The indeterminate cognition precedes the determinate, which refers in succession to the various things of recognised opposite nature such as jar, cloth etc. It contains within itself all things which are subsequently determinately grasped, in a state of non-distinction from one another; just as in the consciousness of variegated colour (Citra jñāna) all the colours, which give rise to the idea of variegation, are present; or just as house, tank, garden etc. are present in the perception of a city by one who looks at it from the top of a mountain. It arises between two determinate cognitions, one that has ended and the other that is about to rise.

The two indeterminate cognitions, which give rise to the two determinate, have got to be admitted as distinct from each other, because each of them gives rise to a distinct determinate cognition. Accordingly a gap between one complete cognitive activity, which begins with the rise of an indeterminate cognition and culminates in the rise of the determinate, and the other cannot be denied. This gap is constituted by the shining of the pure consciousness (Saṁvid) as free from all affections.

Admission of the permanent conscious principle,—which persists through all the varying affections of it; the continuity of which is not broken by all that figures in it; which shines unaffected between two cognitive processes and so separates them from one another;—is necessary to account for remem-

brance of the past experiences.[1] For, if 'Saṁvid' be not between one complete cognitive activity and the other, there being some thing else between them, because the intervention cannot be denied, the residual traces, the Saṁskāras, which are left by varying experiences on the Saṁvid, as figuring in the individual subject, and to which alone remembrance is due, will be impossible.

THE REALISATION OF THE ANUTTARA THROUGH THE ACTIVITY OF VITAL AIR.

The Kaulism admits Prāṇa (Vital air) to have six forms or to function in six ways (Ṣaṭprakārasya prāṇasya. T. A., Ah. V, 357). These are divided under two heads, general and particular (Sāmānyaviśeṣarūpatayā. T. A., Ah. V, 357). Under the first (the general) comes that which is internal and on account of which an organism is said to be living. We can get a clear idea of it if we distinguish it from the remaining five. For, an organism is admitted to be living even when the vital air is not functioning in any one of the remaining five ways e. g. a Yogin in Samādhi is admitted to be living, though he does not inhale or exhale nor does his heart beat. Under the second are subsumed the five, Prāṇa, Apāna, Udāna, Samāna and Vyāna.

Accordingly the Kaulism talks of six successive levels of experience. The first of them is associated with Śūnya and the remaining five with the five functions of the vital air. They lead to the realisation of the state of the Anuttara,[2] which is beyond all the six. At each of these levels there is a distinct type of experience of bliss; therefore, they are called (i) Nijānanda (ii) Nirānanda (iii) Parānanda (iv) Brahmānanda (v) Mahānanda (vi) Cidānanda (vii) Jagadānanda. And

1. P. T. V., 106–7   2. T. A.. Ah. V, 357.

the perfect rest of the mind at the last level is recognised to be the state of Anuttara.[1]

The fact, that the level of experience, called Jagadānanda, is the one that the Kaulism helps its followers to realise and that the conception of Jagadānanda constitutes the distinctive feature of the Kula system, is clear from a reference to it in the very first verse of the Tantrāloka, wherein Abhinava refers to this system. (Hṛdayaṁ Jagadānandādiśabdavācyaṁ tathyaṁ vastu. T. A., I, 4.)

The seven levels of experience are presented by Abhinavagupta as follows :—

(i) Nijānanda consists in the experience of the self as completely dissociated from all that is objective in its nature. It is due to concentration on purely subjective aspect of the Śūnya, completely eliminating the objective, in the heart,[2] the recognised principal centre of the Self in the whole of physical organism.[3] It is called Nijānanda, because it is the experience of the self, which is essentially of the nature of bliss.

(ii) Nirānanda consists in the experience of what is different from the subject or self as such and, therefore, is different from the Nijānanda. It may be said to be the experience of the extrovert form of the self, the Pramāṇa. For, it is due to the rise of the Prāṇa up to the Brahmarandhra, the Dvādaśānta. And Prāṇa is spoken of as Pramāṇa, which is nothing but an extrovert form of the self.[4]

(iii) Parānanda is not the experience of the contentless subject as the first. In it there is the experience of objects as aspects of the self. Accordingly here the self is no more extrovert as in the Nirānanda stage. Here there is the realisation of its fullness and freedom from want (Anantaprameyāṁśa-

1. T. A., Ah. V, 356.
2, Ibid., 350.
3. Ibid., 330.
4. Ibid., 350.

pūraṇāpāna nirvṛtaḥ. T. A., Ah. V., 349) and, therefore, the self rests in itself. It is experienced when the internal air descends from Brahmarandhra to the heart and, therefore, assumes the form of Apāna. It is called Parānanda, because herein the bliss is due to the objective content of the Self.[1]

(iv) Brahmānanda is that experience in which the objective contents of the self are grasped, not in succession as in the Parānanda, but simultaneously. It is so called because it is an experience of spiritual bliss, increased because of its being caused by the entire objectivity as a whole. (Meyena sambhūya kṛtatvād braṁhitena Brahmarūpo yosāvānandaḥ T, A., Ah. V, 351.) It arises when the internal air assumes the form of Samāna in the heart.

(v) Mahānanda is an experience higher than the above. In fact it is called Mahānanda for this very reason. In it there is no subjective extrovertness; nor is there the experience of any objectivity. It is the pure subjective experience.[2] It is due to the assumption of the form of Udāna by the internal air and its going up through the Suṣumṇā.

(vi) Cidānanda is the experience of the Self, manifesting itself as the subject, object and means of knowledge; as pervading all from Kalā to earth; but as transcending every thing in spite of its manifesting every thing. It is entirely free from all that is insentient, because the insentient as such has no being in that state.[3] This experience arises when Udāna assumes the form of Vyāna in the Suṣumṇā.

(vii) Jagadānanda is the experience of the Self, free from all limitations, because nothing outside it has being, because everything is experienced as self, exactly as at the empirical level, when the self is identified with body, the body is experienced as the self, but not as separate from it, as its limitation.

1. T. A., Ah. V, 350-1. 2. Ibid., 352. 3. Ibid., 353.

It is the experience of perfect freedom, Svātantrya. Here there is no room for contemplation; because there is nothing different from the self. It is so called because all the earlier levels of experience have their being in it and spring from it. The rest in this experience is the realisation of the Anuttara.[1]

THE WAY TO RISE TO THE TRANSCENDENTAL LEVEL OF THE SUPREME BLISS FROM THE SENSUOUS.

Like the modern psychologists the Kaulism admits the relation between senses of perception and the Brain. But unlike the psychologists it recognises a connection between the senses and the self and holds that the pleasant sensations, speaking figuratively, make it bloom and that the experience of happiness is the experience of the self as such by the self.

But this experience may be the experience of the limited self, the self as identified with body etc. In such a case the self is not perfect and, therefore, the experience of the bliss is naturally imperfect, because the self, limited as it is, is full of longings of different types, the satisfaction of one of which makes it look for another. And this experience of imperfect happiness does not last long, because the senses do not continue to bring the desired sensations.[2]

But this imperfect happiness is admitted to be suggestive of the perfect, exactly as the constituents of an æsthetic configuration, presented on a stage or in a poem, are suggestive of the basic emotion, in the experience of which the æsthetic experience at the emotive level primarily consists. And just as the æsthetic experience is experienced by him alone, who gets completely deindividualised or universalised, so is the perfect happiness. There is, however, this difference between the rise of the æsthetic experience and that of perfect happiness that

1. T. A., Ah. V, 356. 2. T. A., Ah. XXIX, 81.

while in the case of the former the æsthetic susceptibility (Sahṛdayatva) in co-operation with the æsthetic presentation automatically and unconsciously brings about the deindividualisation : in the latter case it depends upon the Yogic power of the experiencer to send the vital air to the Suṣumṇā and, therefore, involves the will.

This has, however, to be remembered that the perfect bliss does not rise immediately after the forcing of the vital air into Suṣumṇā. The particular types of vital air are five. The perfect bliss, therefore, arises only when all the types of it have gone into Suṣumṇā and the universalised self rests on the Jagadānanda, as described earlier.

We know that the æsthetic experience is not the experience of a basic emotion in isolation from the situation, mimetic changes and the transient emotions, which, presented dramatically or poetically, suggest it : on the contrary, it is the experience of the first in union with the last three. Similarly the Kaulism admits that, when vital air in the form of Apāna enters into Suṣumṇā, there is the rise of Parānanda, in which the elements of the universalised objective aspects of the sense-experiences are present exactly in the manner in which they are in the æsthetic experience as a whole without distinction of parts.

Thus slowly through successive stages of the Brahmānanda, Mahānanda and Cidānanda, which have been dealt with earlier, arises Jagadānanda, which is the experience of Śiva and Śakti in such a union that their distinction from each other completely disappears. It is neither the experience of the transcendental nor that of the immânent Self. It is entirely unpresentable in any way. It is the highest experience, according to the Kaulism. The rest on this is the experience of Anuttara.[1]

1. T. A., Ah. XXIX, 84.

ANUTTARA AS THE THIRD BRAHMAN.

The Kaulism admits a triad of Nara, Śakti and Śiva, which represents duality (Bheda), duality-cum-unity (Bhedābheda) and Unity (Abheda) respectively. These three are very often referred to as Apara, Parāpara and Para. Brahman, according to the followers of this system, is the third of this triad i. e. Śiva, which is unity. But it is not such a unity as is admitted by the Vedāntin in the conception of the Brahman, who, therefore, is not very different from the Śūnya, admitted by the Śūnyavādin Bauddha. It is not static but dynamical. It pulsates with creative energy. It is perfect. It is essentially the power of self-consciousness (Ānandaśatkyekaghana)[1]. It is blissful, and the bliss consists in the upsurge of the creative energy.

Brahman is the highest of triad of Nara, Śakti and Śiva. It is the essence of Śakti, which in itself is the essence of Nara.[2] It is the object of worship to those who have not realised their identity with such all-surpassing energy. It has sixteen aspects, represented by 16 vowels of the alphabetic system. Occasionally it is said to have seventeen aspects when Anuttara Kalā is taken into account.[3]

It is both transcendental and immanent. It is transcendental, when it is like still, motionless, waveless ocean. As such it is essentially light of consciousness (Prakāśaghana) such as is not self-aware or self-conscious, though the capacity to become self- aware or self-conscious is undeniable.[4] It is characterised by the absence of distinction between the subject and the object and accordingly by the four aspects of cognitive activity, desire to know, illumination of the object, determinative activity and definite awareness.[5] It is one with bliss (Ānanda) represented by four letters "Ṛ, Ṝ, Ḷ and Ḹ.

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1. P. T. V., 221. 2. Ibid., 220. 3. Ibid., 223-4.
4. Ibid., 205. F. N. 5. Ibid., 224.

It is spoken of as the third Brahman, in so far as it is essentially objectless will, which is the third from Kriyā in the reverse order of the powers, Kriyā, Jñāna and Icchā; which has its being in the power of bliss, which is essentially nothing more than that which manifests itself in will. It is the union of forty categories, including Parabhairava, three highest powers, Śiva, Śakti and their union, and the ordinarily recognised thirty six categories. It is ever shining and can be grasped through contemplation. The practice of Yoga is unnecessary for those who are purified by the fall of divine grace on them (Śaktipāta).

The third Brahman (Tṛtīyaṁ Brahma) can be interpreted from the point of view of Icchā also. For, Icchā is the third from Anuttara. Icchā is spoken of as Brahman, because it is great and because it is perfect in so far as it is full of what is the object of desire, though the object is not different from it.[1] It is united with all the forty categories as stated above. They are one with it. It is essentially of the nature of Consciousness and in the order of manifestation follows Ānanda, which in itself marks the culminating point of the Anuttara state, which is essentially Akula.

Īśvara also is spoken of as Brahman. Because it is great inasmuch as it represents the state of growth of Icchā : because herein what was in unity with it, is manifested separately from it. It is the first motion or operation of Kulaśakti. Herein forty categories have their being as united with one another and form the object of consciousness of the supreme power.

ANUTTARA AS VIJÑĀTAMĀTRA.

Anuttara is Vijñātamātra in so far as (i) it is really aware of the subject, object, means of knowledge and knowledge it-

1. P. T. V., 226.

self as non-different from itself : (ii) it is ever shining and, therefore, in regard to it the contemplation, which is meant for clear grasp of what is obscure, is unnecessary : (iii) it is free from or is characterised by the absence of all that is objective and the Māyā, the principle of ignorance and the cause of diversity as such.[1]

THE PHILOSOPHICAL INTERPRETATION OF ALPHABETICAL SYSTEM AND THE PLACE OF ANUTTARA IN IT.

The philosophical interpretation of the system of articulate sounds, the letters, as found in the fourteen aphorisms in the beginning of Pāṇini's Aṣṭādhyāyī, was given by Nandikeśvara in his Nandikeśvara Kāśikā. The system of philosophy that he built up on the basis of his interpretation has been discusses in the proper historical setting in the Bhāskarī Vol. III under "Nandikeśvara Śaivaism" PP. XLIX–LI and "Advaita Śaivaism of Nandikeśvara" PP. CLXXX–CLXXXV.

The Kaulism offers a philosophical interpretation of the Indian alphabetical system from 'A' to 'H' which is in use even to-day. It is evident that this interpretation was given after the full evolution of the Śāradā script, which is in use in the learned families in Kashmir even to-day and in which almost all the MSS discovered in Kashmir were written. For, Abhinava in his Tantrāloka, according to the commentary of Jayaratha, refers to the shapes of the letters of the Śāradā script; and so do the quotations also from the Āgamic texts, given in support of the interpretation.[2] For instance, there are such references to the first and the eleventh letters.

While the Pratyabhijñā system is concerned with accounting for what the words stand for, the Kaulism devotes special attention to the manifestation of the sounds of the Indian

1. P. T. V., 39. 2. T. A., II, (Comm.), 77.

alphabetical system, of which the words are made. It holds that the categories, under which all the experienceables are subsumed, are nothing but further grossifications of the letters.

'A' AS ANUTTARA.

The Kula system, in its explanation of the manifestation of the letters from 'A' to 'H' seems to have been influenced by the analogy of the sex-union (Caryākrama). For, there are repeated references to it in this context. The conception of Anuttara, which is represented in the alphabetical system by the first letter 'A', well illustrates the point in hand. We know that the birth of a child is due, neither to the male nor the female alone, but to the union of the two and consequent harmonious mixture of semen (Vīrya) of the male and menstrual discharge (Rajas) of the female, so that the two lose their separate entity as we can see in the yolk of peacock's egg. Accordingly the Kaulism holds that the Ultimate Principle, which manifests every thing, is not pure unity but unity of Anuttara and Anuttarā, represented by 'A' in which the two lose themselves in each other exactly as the two Akāras merge in each other when they are united, according to Pāṇini's aphorism "Atoguṇe", as has already been stated. It asserts that to admit the creation from a single principle or even two independent principles, existing in separation from each other, is against the fact of experience.

Thus the letter 'A' is Anuttara, the highest principle, according to the Kaulism, exactly as it is the Brahman, according to Nandikeśvara :—

"Akāro Brahmarūpaḥ syānnirguṇaḥ sarvavastuṣu."

It may be pointed out here that just as the Prakāśa aspect of the Ultimate is referred to as Anuttara, so the Vimarśa

aspect is spoken of as Anuttarā.[1] The latter is often talked of as Kaulikī Śakti, Parā, Parā Pratibhā, Kālakarṣiṇī etc. from different points of view. We shall explain the implications of these expressions in subsequent sections.

'Ā' AS ĀNANDA ŚAKTI.

But according to Pāṇini, two Akāras not only completely merge into each other so as to result in short "A", but also so unite, according to Pāṇiṇi's aphorism "Akaḥ savarṇe dīrghaḥ", as to give rise to long "Ā". This type of union is technically called "Yāmalarūpa" or "Saṅghaṭṭa".[2] Accordingly the Kaulism asserts that the union of Anuttara (Śīva) and Anuttarā (Śakti) gives rise to Ānanda and from that the creation proceeds exactly as from the union of two persons of opposite sexes sex-joy arises and from that proceeds what is responsible for the birth of a child. 'Ā' stands for Ānanda Śakti, which is more perfect (Pūrṇa) than Śiva, the transcendental (Para), and Śakti, the immanent (Apara). For, it is both transcendental and immanent. The former two are limited, but it is free from limitation.[3] It is spoken of as the essence, the heart and the highest Visarga.

'I' AS ICCHĀ ŚAKTI.

'I' stands for Icchā Śakti. It arises when in the union of the two the desire to create springs up. It is free from relation to object that is external to it. In it, therefore, there is no element of duality. It is the first stage of extrovertness. It is a mere tendency to become extrovert (Bahiraunmukhyamātrarūpiṇī). It is characterised by the experience that is referred to in the Vedic text by the word Aghora, contemplation on which is enjoined in the Pāśupata Sūtra. It holds within innumerable powers, which are represented in the Kaulism by the goddesses,

1. T. A., II, 74. 2. T. A., II, 81. 3. T. A., II, 81–2.

called Aghorā Devīs, who are essentially of the nature of 'freedom' and, therefore, are free from duality. It transcends them and, therefore, is called "Parā."[1]

'Ī' AS ĪŚANA.

'Ī' stands for Īśana. This represents universal desire, not simply as tending to be extrovert but as becoming extrovert and manifesting itself in innumerable powers which are called Aghorās'[2]. This idea seems to have developed from the Vedic idea of Īśāna.

'U' AS UNMEŚA.

The letter 'U' stands for that stage of the universal mind in which it appears as power of knowledge, which is called Unmeśa. It is characterised by the rise of the first idea of the universe, to be manifested, in the universal mind that was before the rise of this idea simply universal consciousness, aware of itself and resting within itself.[3] it is a stage in the manifestation of the Universal Mind that is characterised by duality cum-non-duality. It constantly manifests the powers which are capable of, not only hurling men down to the low level of earthly existence but also of elevating them to union with the Absolute. They are called Ghorās.

'Ū' AS ŪNATĀ.

'Ū' represents the stage at which the idea of the objective world, to be manifested, assumes diversity and predominance so that the power of knowledge gets limited. It is called Ūnatā. It is the beginning of the existence of the objective world.

'Ṛ' represents the union of the static will (Akṣubdhā icchā) with the power of fire in its active state.

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1. T. A., II, 83. 2. Ibid., 84. 3. Ibid., 85.

'R̥̄' represents the union of active will with the power of fire.

'Ḷ' represents the union of restful Icchā with static energy.

But 'Ḹ' represents the union of active will with static energy.[1]

'E' stands for the union of Anuttara with Icchā, manifesting itself in powers of knowledge and action. Hence it is spoken of as Trikoṇa (Triangle). Here there is the influence of Śāradā symbol of this sound as '△'.

'Ai' represents the predominance of Anuttara and Ānanda in the midst of three powers of will, knowledge and action.

'O' represents union of Anuttara and Ānanda with Unmeśa.

'Au' represents the union of the two, Anuttara and Ānanda, once again with 'O'. Here Kriyāśakti is clearest.[2] In 'E' it is obscure. In 'Ai' it is clear. In 'O' it is clearer. Kriyā Śaktī is responsible for the being of Ghoratarā Devīs, which lead men lower and lower.

'Au' as the union of powers, is also responsible for revealing the Absolute to the limited subject. But this power itself is not revealed by any other and, therefore, it is spoken of as Nirañjana. This is referred to as Triśūla also, because it is the harmonious union of the three powers of will, knowledge and action. In it the powers are free from objective reference. For, in the state of union no power can have objective reference, because the object of one is the negation of those of the others.[3]

'Aṁ' or Vindu indicates that the Supreme Power, (Anuttara śakti), though it manifests itself in various forms from Ānanda to Triśūla by delimiting itself, yet it does not lose its

1. T. A., II, (Comm.) 90 2. T. A., II, 111.

3. Ibid., 114–5.

essential nature, its being as all-transcending light of consciousness remains unaffected. This Vindu, the transcendental light of consciousness, resting at three places in human organism, Brahmarandhra, central point between two eyebrows and heart, manifests itself as Śiva, Śakti and Nara, or as Śiva, Vidyā and individual soul respectively. But even in manifesting itself as such it does not lose its essential nature. This Vindu manifests itself in each living individual as Jīva also, which manifests itself in all letters from 'A' to 'H', of which all expressions are made; as also in the forms of Prāṇa and Apāna. Manifesting itself even as Jīva, Vindu does not fall from its essential nature. It shines independently of the illuminating light of the Sun and the Moon : rather the latter owe their luminosity to it. For, the same transcendental light, delimited by earthly or watery substance, shines as moon etc.

This Vindu as a letter of the alphabetical system is different from 'M' exactly as 'Ṛ' 'Ḷ' and 'Ḥ' are different from 'R', 'L', and 'H'.

'Aḥ' represents the power of creation that is characterised by dualism–cum-monism (Parāpara).[1] It may be pointed out here that this system admits three powers of creation, Parā, Parāparā and Aparā. They are recognised to be represented in the alphabetical system by 'Ā', 'Aḥ' and 'H' : and their manifestations are admitted to be characterised by unity, unity-in-diversity and diversity respectively. The two dots (Vindus), which in the symbolical presentation of it, in the alphabetical system, are shown after 'A', are indicative of the grossification of the higher power of creation (Para Visarga) represented by 'Ā'. Accordingly the limited subjects, objects and means of knowledge, manifested by it in its extrovert aspect, are gross. Hence though they are essentially identical with Parā

1. T. A., II, (Comm.) 141–2.

Saṁvid (the ultimate conscious principle) yet appear to be different from it as well as from one another.

Just as the Sāṅkhya talks of Sañcara and Pratisañcara i. e. creation and destruction, because of evolution of the Tattvas from and merging of them back in, their respective causes, so the Kaula system also speaks of this Parāpara Visarga and its opposite, the Śakti Kuṇḍalinī; and Prāṇa Kuṇḍalikā and its opposite the Parā Kuṇḍalinī. When the Parāpara Visarga ceases to be extrovert and, therefore, is like a serpant in deep sleep and rests within itself, it is called Śakti Kuṇḍalinī in so far as it is identical with Parā Saṁvit. Further, it is admitted that the first manifestation of this power of creation is the vital energy (Prāṇa). Therefore, at the time of its first manifestation it is called Prāṇa Kuṇḍalikā. But when it slowly reaches the last stage of introvertness it is called Parā Kuṇḍalinī in so far as it becomes one with Pure Consciousness, resting within itself.[1]

Conception of the three forms of Parāpara Visarga, as discussed above, is closely related to and points out the way to merging back in the Parā Saṁvit. For, the way to merger is to check the vital energy from becoming extrovert, from running to the external objects through various senses of perception and organs of action, by making it introvert and identifying it with Parā Kuṇḍalinī by taking the process of introvertion to the extreme through the intervening stage of Śakti Kuṇḍalinī.

The created are not outside the power of creation exactly as the waves are not outside the ocean. Just as the waves are the various forms of the ocean, which it assumes on account of the energy that is there as identical with it, so the manifestations at different levels of the operation of the Visarga Śakti (the power of manifestation) are the forms in which it expresses itself.[2] 'H' represents the lowest stage of the power of

1. T. A., II, (Comm.) 142. 2. T. A., II, 147.

creation. It is due to the grossification of Parāpara Visarga, discussed above. Hence it is called Apara Visarga. It is also called Haṁsa, Prāṇa, Vyañjana and Sparśa.[1]

THE INFLUENCE OF SEX-LIFE ON THE KULA SYSTEM.

Visarga as a part of the alphabetical system has a phonetic value which is equal to one fourth of the consonant 'H'.[2] In the mystic literature on the Kaula system it is spoken of as Kāmatattva. It is a sound that is not due to regulated flow of the air from wind-pipe and its check at any particular places of articulation.[3] Hence it is inarticulate sound (Nāda-mātra). It does not change. It is automatic and does not presuppose desire to utter for its being. It is ever continuous. It is essentially the eternal Nāda that is independent of the stroke of air at any place of articulation. As such it is subtle and, therefore, cannot be the object of that mental concentration or contemplation, which requires a gross object. Even as such it becomes a little grossified in the throat of a lady at the time of sex-union, when her mind gets perfectly free from all objective relations, and becomes perceptible as "Hā Hā". The Kaulism asserts that a person who is able to concentrate his mind on Kāma Kalā, as a little grossified in the form of "Hā Hā", can bring all beings under his control and can bring them even into being.[4]

It is a very important contribution of Śaivaism that it emphasises the spiritual aspect of the sex-life. To the Śaiva the sex-life is not for the satisfaction of the sex-instinct. It is not for the satisfaction of the blind passion as it is to a modern man, ignorant and regardless of the higher values, religious, ethical and spiritual. It is an aspect of religious life. It is the first sacrifice (Ādiyāga). Herein the man has to raise him-

1. T. A., II, 144.
2. Ibid., 147.
3. T. A., II. (Comm) 149.
4. T. A., II, 148.

self from the sense-level to the spiritual by identifying himself with the divine being in order that the progeny may be possessed of the divine idea. For, ideas domineering over the minds of the parents at the time of sex-union, become the dominant ideas in the progeny. It was the realisation of the spiritual aspect of the sex-life by the parents of Abhinavagupta that was responsible for the birth of such an intellectual and spiritual giant.

Kavarga : The Kaulism admits that in each of the powers, Cit, Ānanda, Icchā, Jñāna and Kriyā, all the rest also are present. Hence it holds that from Anuttara, represented by 'A' in the alphabetical system, arises Kávarga, which consists of five letters from K to Ṅ.

Cavarga arises from Icchā.

Ṭavaraga springs from Icchā as affected by its object that is fiery in its nature, which in the alphabetical system is represented by 'Ṛ'.

Tavarga owes its being to Icchā as related to its object that is earthy in its nature and is represented by Ḷ in the alphabetical system.

Pavarga is the manifestation of Unmeśa, represented by 'U'.

These twenty five letters of the alphabetical system represent Twenty five categories from earth to Puruṣa. They are objective in their nature and constitute the entire objective world. They are capable of being in touch with senses. Hence they are called 'touchables' (Sparśāḥ).

THE RISE OF THE SEMIVOWELS (ANTASTHA).

In the course of the treatment of 'I' and 'Ī' it has already been stated that both of them represent Icchā Śakti, the power of will, and that the distinction of one from the other lies in this that the former has no external objective reference but the latter does have it. The semi-vowel 'Y' represents Icchā Śakti in its inclination towards what is dissimilar to it, e. g. Anuttara,

represented by 'A', that belongs to a different category of articulate sounds (Vijātīya).

Similarly 'U', 'Ṛ', 'Ḷ', both short and long, as presented earlier, in their inclination towards what is dissimilar, e. g. Anuttara, are represented by 'V', 'R', 'L' respectively. In all these cases the influence of Pāṇini's aphorism is apparent and Jayaratha himself refers to it in the course of his commentary.[1]

This also has already been stated that the letters 'I', 'Ṛ' 'Ḷ' both short and long, represent Icchā Śakti in relation to objects of different types. Accordingly it is admitted that these letters 'Y', 'R', 'L', when used as constituents of the mystic syllables, symbolise the Śaktis and, therefore, give them the powers to dry up, to burn and to stabilise respectively the object in reference to which they are used in mystic practices. Similarly 'V' is admitted to invigorate or to strengthen.[2] This is the mystic explanation of the semivowels in the queer combinations of sounds in the religious formulas such as Aim, Hṛm̄, Klīm etc. Philosophically the semivowels represent the four categories, Rāga, Vidyā, Kalā and Kāla respectively. In grammar the semivowels are called 'Antastha' in so far as they stand between vowels and consonants and are formed by slight contact of vocal organs. But in the Kaulism they are so called because the powers, represented by semivowels, have their being in the powers represented by 'I' and 'U', namely Icchā and Unmeśa.[3] Another reason why they are called "Antastha" is that they represent the four categories, Rāga etc. which are the powers, which give individuality to the individual subject and as such are in him in relation of identity. The Parā Triṁśikā and the Vivaraṇa of Abhinavagupta on it differ from the Tantrāloka in so far as the former count Māyā instead of Kāla in the four Śaiva categories represented by semivowels.[4]

1. T. A., II, 157.
2. Ibid., 157.
3. Ibid., 159.
4. P. T. V., 113.

Thus the philosophical interpretation of these letters has been clearly influenced by grammar. And there are novel explanations of 'Sparśa', Antastha, as has already been stated, and of Ūṣma, as will be given. These explanations elucidate the philosophical conceptions of them such as fit in with the Kaulism.

PHILOSOPHICAL INTERPRETATIONS OF RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS.

There is also an attempt by the exponents of the Kaulism to explain the religious symbols in terms of philosophy. For instance, they hold that the phallic emblem symbolises the Absolute, the Anuttara; so does the female organ (Yoni) the Kaulikī Śakti, the Absolute freedom : and the resting of the former on the latter symbolises the inseparable union of the two. To understand the importance of the philosophical explanation of the object of worship in the Śaiva religion, it is necessary to remember that such an object has been worshipped in India for over five thousand years from the time of Indus Valley Cultures to the present day. Similarly the Triśūla, the Trident, which is invariably found in all the Śaiva temples, is admitted to symbolise the three powers, Icchā, Jñāna and Kriyā.

THE RISE OF THE SIBILANTS.

'Ś', 'Ṣ' and 'S', the sibilants, represent three forms of Icchā, one free from objective relation, and the other two related to two types of object, fiery and earthy, externalised by the power of freedom (Svoṣma). It may be remembered here that the three forms of Icchā are represented by three letters in the alphabetical system 'I', 'Ṛ' and 'Ḷ' which stand for will, unrelated to any external object, related to what is of the nature of fire or that of the earth respectively. These three

forms of will, symbolised by 'I' 'Ṛ' and 'Ḷ' give rise to three sibilants 'Ś', 'Ṣ' and 'S', respectively.[1]

Here again the Kaulism seems to have been influenced by sex-life. It represents 'S' to be the seed of nectar (Amṛta-Bīja) and the highest spiritual reality and asserts that it becomes manifest in sex-life, when at the first stimulation of the organ as well as at its terminating point spontaniously a sound closely resembling the last of the sibilants (Sītkāra) proceeds from the mouth. At such a time mind withdraws from the rest of the world. Therefore, if one can raise the mind from the lower levels, such as the physical, intellectual etc., at such a time and take it to that of pure consciousness, one can attain the highest spiritual level.

'S' is spoken of as Nirañjana, 'unmanifestable'. It manifests or illumines (Vyaktīkaraṇa) the highest reality which is essentially the highest light of consciousness (Paramaprakāśātma):[2] but itself is not manifested by any other.

'H' is the further grossification of Visarga, as has already been stated. These four, Ś, Ṣ, S and H, are called Ūṣma, because they are the manifestations of the power of the Absolute, the freedom.[3]

'Kṣ' represents the union of consonants. It is called Kūṭa-Bīja. The Kaulas hold that not only vowels combine and represent a combination of powers symbolised by them, but the consonants also.

PSYCHOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF DIPTHONGS.

The Kaulism holds that the object of experience has no being independently of the knowing subject. This is signified by the dipthongs 'E', 'AI', 'O', 'AU'. It asserts that this view

1. T. A., II, 162. 2. T. A., II, (Comm.) 171.
3. T. A., II, 176.

is based upon the psychological analysis of the objective experience. For, the experience of the object arises only when the object rests on, is reflected on, the subjective light of consciousness, but neither before nor after the time of rest on the subject. Subject and object are relative terms. And the relation that is admitted by the Kaulism is similar to the one that is found between 'A' and 'I' in the production of dipthong 'E' : i. e. they are so related that they fuse into one. In this fusion the first element, the 'A', predominates.[1]

MONISM EXPLAINED.

There are fifty letters in the alphabetical system. Each of them, as explained above, represents a separate thing. Thus there are fifty things, according to the Kaulism. The question, therefore, arises : "Are all of them real ? And if so, how can monism be maintained ?" The Kaulism attempts to justify its monistic position as follows :—

It holds that every thing is essentially of the nature of consciousness. The fifty letters of the alphabetical system represent the basic forms of consciousness. But they are not absolutely independent. The letters from 'K' to 'H' have their being before their external manifestation in the Svaras (Vowels). This fact is indicated by the word "Vyañjana" by which they are called. For, it means that they are manifested (Vyajyate iti Vyañjanam).

Among the Svaras (Vowels) also, the last ten from 'Ṛ' to 'Aḥ' are of the nature of combination, either of two vowels as in the case of 'E' etc. or of a vowel and a subtle element of a consonant as in the case of 'Ṛ' etc. as has already been explained.

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1. T. A., II, 184.

As regards the remaining six, the long three are due to the relation of the realities signified by short three, Anuttara, Icchā and Unmeśa, with their respective objects, which are their own manifestations[1] and, therefore, are essentially identical with them. For, the object of experience is essentially identical with the subject, as has already been shown on the basis of psychological analysis.

The Kaulism is called Trika, because it admits three powers, Cit (Anuttarā), Icchā and Unmeśa, to be essential, in so far as the power of freedom, Svātantrya Śakti, according to it, is nothing but harmonious union of these three powers.[2] It is also called Trika for the reason that it admits these three powers to be the three ways of entering into the Ultimate. For, identification with any one of them leads to the identification with the Anuttara, the Bhairava.[3]

But the question still remains : "Does not the admission of three powers go against monism ?" And Icchā and Unmeśa also have their respective objects of experience. "Does not it, therefore, mean the admission of more than one ultimate subject and, therefore, will not such an assertion go against monism ?" The reply of the Kaulism to these may be stated as follows :—

The three powers are not independent but the manifestations of the power of freedom (Svātantrya Śakti), which is nothing but the unity of them. It is an idealistic system and conceives the Ultimate to be of the nature of mind and admits the power of freedom to be the power of the mind to manifest itself in all forms of thought. For, mind can be said to be mind, as distinct from all that is not-mind, only if it be capable of original stir, consisting in self-awareness, which is presupposed by will, which itself is presupposed

1. T. A., II, 183–4. 2. Ibid., 186–7. 3. Ibid., 188.

by knowledge; because, for the rise of phenomenon of knowledge, the powers of self-awareness, will and knowledge are absolutely necessary. As the mind is mind simply because it knows, therefore, logic needs the assumption of the three powers. But mind can exist, as in the case of the Avyatireka Turīyātīta Samādhi, even without self-awareness and can become self-aware automatically. The power of self-awareness, therefore, has got to be admitted in it. This power of self-awareness is called power of freedom. Other powers of mind, such as those of will and knowledge, arise from it and, therefore, are its manifestations. Hence though they are admitted to be important yet they are not recognised to be absolutely independent.

To get over the difficulty to maintain monism, caused by the admission of the mind and its power or power and its possessor, the Kaulism asserts that the duality, involved in admission of mind and its power, is due to the analytical approach to the mind : the power is identical with its possessor, as salt is with the sea-water[1] : or, to take the analogy from Pānini's grammar, as one 'A' is with another in the assimilation of the following 'A' with the preceding, according to Pāniṇi's rule "Atoguṇe" 6–1–97 in such illustration as Sīmanta.[2] Just as one "A" is perfectly identical with the other in the above illustration, and it is only the analytical approach that brings out the distinction of one from the other, so in the Ultimate, the subjective and the objective principles or Anuttara and Anuttarā or Bhairava and Kaulikī Śakti are thoroughly identical. Therefore, monism remains unimpaired in spite of admission of Kaulikī Śakti, because of the recognition of its identity with Anuttara in the highest stage.

As regards the admission of more than one subject, it may be pointed out that the subjective nature of Icchā and

1. T. A., II. 192. 2. Ibid., 161.

Unmeṣa is not absolute but relative only. For, though they are subjects in relation to their respective objects yet they are objects in relation to the Anuttara, as is testified by letters 'E' and 'O', which represent the conjunction of 'A' with 'I' and 'U' respectively and, therefore, of Anuttara with Icchā and Unmeṣa as objects of experience. The admission of more than one subject also, therefore, does not go against monism. For, only one of them, the highest, represented by 'A', is so absolutely and the rest are so relatively only.

THE MEANING OF AHAM.

In Pāṇini's system of grammar there is the technique of referring to a group of letters by mentioning the first and the last letters. This is called Pratyāhāra. Thus the word "Ac" stands for all vowels from "A" to "Au". The Kaulism accepts this technique in the interpretation of the word "Aham". It holds that "Ah" in "Aham" stands for all letters of the alphabetical system from "A" to "H" and, therefore, signifies all the basic ideas, manifested by the Absolute, the Anuttara, in union with the power of freedom.

And "Am", the last part of the word "Aham", stands for Vindu and signifies that the Absolute, the Anuttara, though manifesting in all forms of thought, represented by letters of the alphabetical system, does not lose its essential nature, rests in its own unbroken light of consciousness.[1]

The word "Aham" ordinarily is used as equivalent of English word "I", which presents a determinate idea of self as distinct from not-self. But when it is used in the context of the Kaulism for the highest subject, which is unity of the Anuttara and Anuttarā, or the Absolute and its power of freedom, it does not stand for a determinate idea, because there

1. T. A., II. 193–4.

is nothing from which the Highest Subject can be contradistinguished. It represents the perfect, outside and independently of which there is nothing.[1] For, all the basic ideas, represented by letters from 'Ā' to 'H', and, therefore, all ideas, which are of the nature of configuration of some of them, (and there is no object of common experience which is not such) arise from and rest in the Absolute in so far as they are in its power of freedom which rests on Him.[2] It represents, in other words, the absolute Unity of subject, object and means of knowledge and, therefore, stands for the Supreme Thought, the "Bhairava".[3] The efficacy of all the religious formulae (Mantras) depends upon the rise to this Supreme Idea.[4] It is the highest religious formula (Paramantra). It is the capacity to rise to this idea that is the characteristic of a spiritual preceptor.

INFLUENCE OF THE UPANIṢADIC THOUGHT.

The Kaulism developed under the influence of the Upaniṣadic thought, as presented in the Aitareya Upaniṣad. Abhinavagupta refers to this fact.[5] He points out that the influence of the sex-life on the Upaniṣadic thought is very clear; that 'A' is recognised to be "Brahman" and that the menstrual discharge (Rajas) and semen are recognised to be fire (Agni) and sun (Āditya) respectively. And Jayaratha in his commentary gives extensive quotations in support of these views as follows:—

"Yadetat striyām lohitam bhavatyagnestadrūpaṁ tasmāttasmānna bībhatseta, Atha yadetat puruṣe reto bhavatyādityasya tadrūpaṁ tasmāttasmānna bībhatseta"

Ai. U.

"Aḥ iti Brahma tatrāgatamahamiti." T. A., II, 217.

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1. T. A., II, 195. 2. Ibid., 196. 3. Ibid., 198.
4. T. A., II, 212. 5. T. A., II, 215.

KAULIKĪ ŚAKTI.

The two important questions, which are raised in the beginning of the Parā Triṁśikā, are (i) what is Anuttara and (ii) what is Kaulikī Śakti ?[1] The first we have attempted by discussing the various meanings of "Anuttara" and by pointing out its place in the Kula system, on the basis of the philosophical interpretation of the Indian alphabetical system. Let us, therefore, now discuss the conception of the Kaulikī Śakti.

This Kaulikī Śakti is discussed in the Parā Triṁśikā Vivaraṇa in the course of the commentary on verse 2; in the presentation of the various meanings of Mahābhāgā in verse 3; and in the Tantrāloka Volume II, from Page 74 onward. It is referred to as Anuttarā, Parā–Pratibhā, Khecarī etc., according as it is looked at from different points of view, metaphysical, mystic, idealistic, epistemic, psychological etc. For, the peculiarity of the Kashmir Śaiva thinkers in general and of Abhinavagupta in particular is that their philosophical concepts are not narrow so that they can explain only a certain field of experience and not others. On the contrary, they are so broad and comprehensive that every phenomenon can be explained in terms of them.

KAULIKĪ ŚAKTI AS A MOTIVE FORCE.

It is a fact of experience that when we know an external insentient object, we experience some subtle motion within. The Kaulikī Śakti is that which is responsible not only for this subtle motion but also for that which is found in body, vital air etc. It is the power that is present in the Brāhmī etc. as also in the Suṣumṇā, which is the central point in the whole of the nervous system from the point of view of Yoga.

1. P. T. V., 61.

The entire universe has its being in it just as the lotus seeds do in the seed-vesel of lotus. It is present in the body and vital airs etc., but is essentially different from them.[1] It is that to which the Prakāśa, the Anuttara, is related by the relation of identity.

It is to be very clearly remembered that the Bhairava is responsible for both the creation and annihilation and that in the former the power, the Śakti, predominates and in the latter that in which the 'Śakti' has its being. Accordingly when the texts talk of the creation they often speak of Anuttara as present in the Śakti as identical with it.[2] Creative state is Aham but the annihilatory state is Ma Ha A.

FIVE MEANINGS OF MAHĀBHĀGĀ, AS DEFINITIONS OF THE KAULIKĪ ŚAKTI.

(i) Mahābhāgā is that, devotion to which, according to the instruction, given in the literature on the Kula system, brings to the devotee almightiness.[3] (ii) It holds within all the thirty six categories, admitted by different schools of Śaivaism. The highest category, the Śiva, is just an aspect of her. (iii) The Mahān (Buddhi) which at the empirical level receives the reflection of the external object, is also just an aspect of her in so far as it is nothing but Cit or Saṁvid which is spoken of as Buddhi when it determinately grasps the manifestations of the "power of freedom" (Svātantrya). This idea is echoed by Kṣemarāja in his famous aphorism "Citireva cetanapadādavarūḍhā cetyasaṁvedinī Cittam". (iv) The fourth meaning is very closely connected with the Kaula theory of pleasure and pain. It is, therefore, necessary to state it here briefly.

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1. P. T. V., 61–2.
2. P. T. V., (F. N.) 63.
3. P. T. V., 66.

THE KAULA THEORY OF PLEASURE, BASED ON THE CONCEPTION OF KAULIKĪ ŚAKTI.

Every system of thought has its own theory of pleasure and pain. According to the Sāṅkhya, it is the experience of the predominant Sattva in external objects or in the forms of the Buddhi itself, such as the religious merit or virtue, wisdom and freedom from attachment. According to the Vaiśeṣika, it is an experience which is invariably agreeable. (Anukūlavedanīyaṁ sukham). According to the Mahābhārata (S. P., 295, 7.), Sukha is the object of desire (Yadiṣṭaṁ tat sukham prāhuḥ). Bhartṛhari holds that pleasure is nothing but the removal of discomfort, pain or suffering.

"Pratīkāro vyādheḥ sukhamiti viparyasyati janaḥ"
Some followers of the Vedānta maintain Sukha to be mere negation of pain (Duḥkhābhāvarūpa).

The Kula system in the presentation of the theory of pleasure seems to accept or at least refers to the Sāṅkhya theory that virtue, power etc. are the forms of the Sattva aspect of the Buddhi and that pleasure is nothing but the experience of the predominant Sattva. But it improves upon the Sāṅkhya conception in the light of the distinct conception of the qualities (Guṇās), according to the Kashmir Śaiva Thought, which may be presented as follows :—

All the three schools of Kashmir admit the identity of the individual subject with the Universal Self, like the Vedānta. But the apparent difference between the two lies in this that the former identifies itself with the intellect, vital air, body etc., and, therefore, its powers of knowledge and action are limited. The individuality of the individual consists in the ignorance of its true nature as identical with the Universal, due to the aforesaid identification.

Now Sattva is nothing but the limited power of knowledge and so Rajas is the limited power of action. They constitute

the limitations of the individual and are responsible for the experiences of pleasure and pain. This point may be elaborated as follows :—

The Ultimate Reality is self-luminous and self-conscious (Prakāśavimarśamaya). The two, self-luminosity and self-consciousness, are inseparable. This is the mystic conception of the Reality. In the metaphysical context the self-consciousness or Vimarśa is spoken of as "freedom" (Svātantrya) or "freedom to be" (Sattā-Bhavanakartṛtā, Bhavane svātantryam) in so far as it is responsible for the manifestation of the entire universe. As such it is called the power of action which is responsible for all volitional, mental and physical phenomena. But this very self-consciousness or Vimarśa is called Ānanda (Spiritual bliss) when it rests on the Prakāśa aspect.

To the Ultimate metaphysical principle, the entire manifestation shines as "I", as identical with the Self. But at the lower levels of Sadāśiva and Īśvara the manifestation does not shine as "I" but as "this". That which is responsible for the appearance of the manifestation as not-self, not-I, "This" or object is called the Māyā or Mahāmāyā at the empirical and the transcendental levels respectively. The Māyā is of the nature of negation, darkness or obscuration, because it is responsible for negation or obscuration of the true nature of the manifested as Self and its appearance as not-self or object. In itself it (Māyā) is the negation of both Sattā and Ānanda. It is nothing more than a form of the power of action.[1]

The Prakāśa at the level of the Sadāśiva appears as the power of knowledge; and Vimarśa appears as the power of action at the level of Īśvara, because they are related to distinct objectivity, the "This", because of the influence of the Mahāmāyā.

1. I. P. V. V., Vol. III, 361.

When the "this" is split up into innumerable "thises", because of the influence of the "Māyā" at the empirical level, the powers of knowledge, action and obscuration appear as Sattva, Rajas and Tamas.[1]

Thus the Śaiva conception of qualities (Guṇas) is different from that of the Sāṅkhya. For, the Sāṅkhya holds them to be aspects of Prakṛti in their state of equilibrium and, therefore, to be the ultimate constituents of the objective world. But to the Kashmir Śaivas, they are not such. On the contrary, they are limited powers of knowledge, action and obscuration (Māyā), as has been stated above. Three things, however, have to be remembered : (i) that Sattva is a limited form of the power of knowledge and so Rajas is that of the power of action (ii) that these powers appear in their freedom from limitations at the level of Sadāśiva and at that of Īśvara, respectively, where the totality of manifestations is experienced, not as "I" but as "This" on account of the Mahāmāyā, which is nothing but a form of the power of action : and (iii) that the powers of knowledge and action are but forms of Prakāśa and Vimarśa respectively.

Accordingly the Śaiva explains why the Sattva is of the nature of light (Prakāśa) and pleasure (Sukha) as follows:—

The Ultimate origin of Sattva is the Vimarśa, which resting on the Prakāśa, from which it is inseparable, is called Ānanda. The Sattva, therefore, is pleasure and light (Sukhaprakāśamaya) because it shares the nature of both Prakāśa and Vimarśa or Ānanda, because it is nothing more than Prakāśa and Ānanda, appearing as limited by individuality. For, the difference between Ānanda and Sukha and the Universal light of consciousness and the individual is that the former is free from all limitations but the latter is limited.

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1. Bh., Vol. II, 285.

Similarly he explains why Rajas is essentially action and pain by drawing attention to the facts that it originates from the power of action and that in it the light (Prakāśa) is mixed up with darkness (Aprakāśa), because Rajas is mixture of Sattva and Tamas : accordingly pain is consciousness of being of an object coupled with the awareness of its not-being as desired.[1] He also explains why pleasure and pain are not mere negations of each other, as some Vedāntins hold, by referring to their ultimate origin from Sattā (the power to be).

THE FOURTH MEANING OF MAHĀBHĀGĀ.

In presenting the fourth meaning of Mahābhāgā Abhinavagupta dissolves the compound as "Mahasya sarvatokhaṇḍita-paripūrṇanirargalanirapekṣasvātantrya – jagadānandamayasya ā-īṣadbhāgāḥ sukhalakṣaṇā aṁśā yataḥ" (P. T. V., 68–9).

This may be explained as follows :—

The word "Bhāga" ordinarily means "part" which may still be united with the whole. But here it is used in the sense of part that is separated from the whole as is a drop of the water separated from the ocean, because of the striking of the wave against a rock. This meaning is got by adding the affix "Ac" to the word "Bhāga", according to Pāṇini's aphorism "Arśa ādibhyoc". Thus it means a part that is separated from the whole and is determinately experienced as distinct, not only from that of which it is a part but also from other things.[2]

"Maha" means the Ultimate Reality that is characterised by unbroken, continuous, perfect, unrestrained and obsolutely independent freedom, and is essentially of the nature of the highest bliss, technically called Jagadānanda, which is explained in the section "Realisation of Anuttara through the activity of vital air".

1. Bh., Vol. I, 290–1. 2. P. T. V., 67–8.

Ā means "small". "Bhāga" means the separated parts, called Sukha.

Mahābhāgā or Kaulikīśakti, therefore, means that because of which the individual subject experiences 'pleasure' which is but a small particle of the highest bliss technically called Jagadānanda.[1]

This point will become clear if we remember that, according to the Kaulism, pleasure is due to entering into or resting on the Visargaśakti or Kaulikīśakti, which is the highest and the greatest bliss. But the limited subject at the time of experience of pleasure is not aware that he is resting on the Kaulikīśakti or Visarga Śakti. Hence he has the experience of a part only of it, which is called Sukha.[2] That is as follows :—

We are familiar with the two important technical terms in the Kashmir thought, Prakāśa and Vimarśa, and know that Ānanda is nothing but the rest of the latter on the former that is inseparable from it. In the case of the individual subject the two are obscured by the principle of obscuration, the Māyā, and, therefore, appear as limited. The limited appearance of Prakāśa and Ānanda in the limited subject is called the quality of Sattva. It is limited light of knowledge. It has limited objective reference. It illumines some object to the exclusion of the rest. This much is due to the Prakāśa aspect. It is on account of this that Sattva is admitted to be 'luminous' (Prakāśa). But Prakāśa is inseparable from Vimarśa : and the latter resting on the former is Ānanda. Therefore, in the individual subject the limited Vimarśa, resting on the limited Prakāśa, is pleasure (Sukha) which is distinct from Ānanda. For, Ānanda is the rest of Vimarśa on Prakāśa, in their absolute freedom from all limitations. This explains why the Śaiva admits the Sattva to be not only of the nature of light but of that of pleasure also.

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1. P. T. V., 68–9. 2. Ibid., 69.

(v) Which shares in or gets one with the Ma Ha A, the Absolute in the state of dissolution.[1]

Thus the Kaulikīśakti from the mystic point of view is that the concentration on which leads to the acquisition of omnipotence. Metaphysically it is the origin of all the thirty six categories. Epistemically it is that which receives the reflection of external objects in so far as Buddhi is just an aspect of it, because Buddhi is nothing but Cit itself when it grasps the limited manifestations determinately. Psychologically it is the principle in terms of which the essential nature of Sattva and, therefore, of pleasure is explicable.

KAULIKĪ ŚAKTI AS A FACTOR IN SENSE-EXPERIENCE.

This very Kaulikī Śakti, as the power of hearing, unites together the units of articulate sounds, the letters, which owe their being to its own subtle slight motions, as they strike the drum of the ear in succession, and grasps them together. As such it is "the freedom to unify" (Anusandhānākhyaṁ svātantryam). It is responsible for all activities of the senses of perception, which lead to the rise of perceptual knowledge in consequence of putting together of the sensations, as well as of those of the organs of action.[2]

It may be added here that this view of the Kaulikī Śakti is in perfect consonence with the Vedāntic view, presented in the Kaṭhopaniṣad (2–3) as follows :—

"Yena rūpaṁ rasaṁ gandhaṁ śabdasparśau ca maithunam
Etenaiva vijānāti kimatra pariśiṣyate."

So far we confined ourselves to the presentation of the various concepts of the Kaulikīśakti on the basis of the Parā Triṁśikā Vivaraṇa. In the following few paragraphs we shall

1. P. T. V., 69. 2. Ibid., 71.

discuss the concepts of the same as found in the Tantrāloka, though some of the concepts are essentially the same as those discussed above.

KAULIKĪ ŚAKTI AS THE POWER OF MANIFESTATION.

The Ultimate, the Anuttara, manifests itself as Śiva and Śakti and various innumerable objects of the world through His power (Śakti). This Śakti, through which the universe (jagat) is manifested is called Kaulikī Śakti. In this context the universe is referred to as Kaula and Akula. It is called Kaula in so far as it has its being in the Kula, the Anuttara (Kule bhavam). It is called Akula inasmuch as it is manifested and, therefore, is different from Kula, which is not manifested. (Kulādanyadavabhāsitaṁ Śiva lakṣaṇam akulam).

It may be noted here that the universe, which is referred to as both Akula and Kaula in this context, is spoken of as having its being in both the Kula or the Anuttara, and the Kaulikī Śakti. In the latter it is said to exist in relation of identity.

This seems to imply that the Universe is within the Śakti and is spoken of as within the Anuttara inasmuch as the Śakti, within which the universe is, is in relation of identity with Anuttara, exactly as what is in the house can be said to be in the Ākāśa, because the ether in the house is essentially identical with universal ether.

This is the metaphysical conception of the Kaulikī Śakti. It shows its relation with the universe as also its peculiar function. According to this, the universe has its being in it as identical with it.

(Kule bhavam akulātma kaulam, tadyasyām antastādātmyena astīti Kaulikī Śaktiḥ. T. A., II, 76.)

And its peculiar function is that it manifests the universe as apparently external to it: it grossifies what exists in it in a subtle form.

(Kulādyadanyadavabhāsitam.........tasya prakāśaikarūpatvena dyotamānasya sā parā viśvāpūraṇasvabhāvā,

T. A., II, 75.)

KAULIKĪŚAKTI AS PARĀ–PRATIBHĀ.

We have discussed the conception of Parā as the ultimate origin of all articulate sounds in the context of the Parā Triṁśikā in Chapter II of the first part; have shown, in the course of tracing the evolution of the Kaulism, how the concept of Parā was accepted by the later writers on the Philosophy of language under the influence of the Śaivāgamic system, like Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa, though the earlier authorities on the subject, like Bhartṛhari, did not admit it; and have pointed out in the Indian Æsthetics, second edition, P. 572–4, that the inarticulate musical sounds, produced by human organism, belong to gross Paśyantī and those produced by musical instruments do to gross Madhyamā, a view which is a mere reflection of what Abhinavagupta has said on the subject in the Tantrāloka Āhnika II P. 226–32.

The concept of Kaulikīśakti as Parā–Pratibhā is an improvement on that of Parā. For, while the concept of Parā is concerned with the explanation of the rise of the gross articulate sound or the inarticulate musical sound from the Sound–Absolute, the concept of Parā Pratibhā is an attempt to account for every thing, whether sound or the thing signified, in terms of a single principle.

Thus, Parā is that in which all the letters have their being in the original, unconventional and eternal form, as identical with it. It is free from even the touch of limitation. It is

of the unsurpassed unitary nature. But as Pratibhā it holds within, not only Paśyantī etc. but also the endless variety of objects as identical with itself. For, it is not reasonable to admit that any thing that is not in it has its being anywhere. It is the first, the original, consciousness. As such it is called "Parā-Pratibhā."[1]

This metaphysical conception of Parā as Pratibhā seems to have been the origin of the poetic conception of 'Pratibhā' (Poetic genious), because the poetic genius holds within all the poetic ideas, which find expression in poetry, exactly as the Parā Pratibhā holds within the endless variety of objects that it manifests.

But we do not know which of the two concepts, Parā as Sound–Absolute or Pratibhā as poetic faculty, is historically prior. Therefore, we may as well say that the Monistic Śaivaism of Kashmir seems to have been influenced by the poetic conception of Pratibhā, the poetic genius, which is the capacity to build up in imagination such constructs as are not built merely out of the material in the stock of memory, but are entirely new. The Ultimate is admitted to have such a power in the highest degree. It is called "Parā-Pratibhā", and is recognised to be capable of manifesting the entire universe, independently of any external aid, much as the poetic genius is of producing new imaginative constructs.[2] This power is called Anuttarā also. This is admitted to be essentially Parā-Vāk.

KAULIKĪŚAKTI, THE PARĀ–PRATIBHĀ, AS UNIVERSAL INDETERMINACY.

This system admits that the vital air blows over a distance of sixteen Tuṭis (a Tuṭi is two and a quarter fingure-widths) when an individual subject determinately perceives an object.[3]

1. P. T. V., 102.
2. T. A., II, 74.
3. P. T. V., (F. N.) 104.

(Nīlaṁ gṛhṇataḥ prāṇastuṭiṣoḍaśakātmā vedyāveśaparyanta-mudeti). When vital air covers the distance of the first Tuṭi there is no consciousness of diversity whatsoever. In the second there is the subtle emergence of the subject. In the last there is complete grasp of the object. In the last but one there is clear consciousness of the subject. Out of the remaining twelve, in the first six the various stages of the indeterminate cognition arise and so do those of the determinate cognition in the last six.

In the rise of indeterminate cognition there are four stages (i) tendency to rise, (ii) commencement of the process of rise : (These take place in two Tuṭis each, because they are of the nature of slight motion, which being of nature of succession necessarily involves more than one moment) (iii) completion of the process of rise (iv) discharge of its causal function. Each of these last two takes only one Tuṭi.

Similarly in the rise of determinate cognition there are five stages. In the first stage indeterminacy tends to disappear. In the second it completely disappears. In the third the determinacy tends to rise. In the fourth the process of rise begins : it takes place in two Tuṭis. In the fifth there is clear emergence of the determinate idea.

This analysis of the cognition is made to explain the mystic practice of the Śaivaism of Kashmir. The Kashmir Śaiva mystics, like Kallaṭa, hold that control of the vital air at the second Tuṭi and concentration of mind on the Subject, which appears in it and is characterised by omniscience and omnipotence, lead the mystic to the acquisition of omniscience and omnipotence.

And Abhinavagupta makes use of this view of the mystics to explain the Kaula conception of Parā Saṁvid as follows :—

Though the conception of four stages of the indeterminate cognition, presented above, may not appear to be very scientific and psychological to an ordinary reader, yet those who are thoroughly familiar with Indian thought, in which the four stages or successive forms of speech (Parā, Paśyantī, Madhyamā and Vaikharī) are recognised, will immediately see that the analysis of the indeterminate cognition into four stages is on the same lines as that of speech into Parā etc., and will admit the rationality and soundness of the former, much as that of the latter. Of course, ordinarily neither the perceiver is conscious of the four stages of the indeterminate cognition, nor is the speaker of those of the speech.

The analysis of the cognitive process, involved in the rise of determinate cognition, presented above, reveals that it is necessarily preceded by the indeterminate, which has four stages; and that between two indeterminate cognitions there is an undeniable gap (Antarāla[1]), which is constituted by Pure Consciousness (Saṁvid). For, without it, the two cannot be separated from each other. Admitting, therefore, that what is true of microcosm is equally so of macrocosm, Abhinava holds that the Kaulikīśakti is like universal indeterminate cognition and as such holds within all that appears in the externalisation of the universe, exactly as all that appears in the determinate cognition is necessarily in the indeterminate; and that this Kaulikīśakti presupposes pure consciousness (Saṁvid) exactly as the indeterminate cognition in an individual subject presupposes the subject in which the cognition rises.

The admission of the pure Saṁvid as the presupposition of all cognitions, indeterminate or determinate, is very much like the Ālaya Vijñāna, admitted by the Vijñānavādin Bauddha, to which Abhinavagupta explicitly refers in this context.[2]

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1. P. T. V., 106. 2. Ibid., 108–9.

CONCEPTION OF MOKṢA IN THE KULA SYSTEM.

The Kula system speaks of Mokṣa or 'Liberation' in different terms, such as (i) Khecarīsāmya or Khecarīsamatā, (ii) Bhairavaikātmya, (iii) Kaulikasiddhi. It is discussed in different contexts in the Parā Triṁśikā Vivaraṇa and in the Tantrāloka Āhnika III. In fact the purpose (Prayojana) of the Parā Triṁśikā, according to Abhinavagupta, is to bring about liberation in life (Jīvanmukti). Various interesting problems are discussed in this connection e. g. How is it got ? What are the means to it ? What is the experience that the finally emancipated has ? How does the objective world appear to the liberated in life (Jīvanmukta) ? We shall discuss them in due order.

(i) MOKṢA AS KHECARĪSĀMYA.

The Kula system speaks of Mokṣa as Khecarīsāmya or Khecarīsamatā. It is referred to in the very first verse of the Parā Triṁśikā :—

"Anuttaraṁ Kathandeva sadyaḥ kaulikasiddhidam
Yena vijñātamātreṇa Khecarīsamatāṁ vrajet".

It stands for both, liberation in life and that after separation from the physical body.

JĪVANMUKTI AS KHECARĪSĀMYA.

Jīvanmukti as Khecarīsāmya consists in looking upon the various states of mind, as affected by anger, desire, avarice etc. to be identical with Anuttara and in recognition of the self as non-different from Anuttara. To bring out the full implication of "Khecarīsāmya" let us discuss the meanings of its components, (i) Khecarī and (ii) Sāmya.

(i) "Khecarī" stands for a concept of the power of the Ultimate, in terms of which the experiences of the limited in-

dividual subject are accounted for. For, Khecarī is conceived as the power that has its being in the 'Kha', the Brahman,[1] the Anuttara, as identical with it and as such is responsible for the rise of the objective knowledge in the individual subject as well as for his pursuit of certain things and avoidance of others. It manifests itself as internal and external senses as well as their respective internal and external objects, such as pleasure, desire, anger etc. and jar etc. respectively. But in spite of this, it remains unaffected in its essential nature.

Thus Khecarī is responsible for the manifestation of the apparent diversity, which is essentially identical with it.[2] And itself it is identical with Anuttara as its very name implies.

(Khe Brahmaṇi abhedarūpe sthitvā carati viṣayamavagamayati. P. T. V. 39.)

(ii) "Sāmya" is the opposite of "Vaiṣamya". And Vaiṣamya consists in looking upon the diverse mental affections and the external objects, which cause them, to be essentially different from Anuttara.[3] It is due to the ignorance of the essential nature of the true self. The transmigratory existence and bondages are due to it.[4]

Khecarī–sāmya, therefore, consists in looking upon the various states of mind, affected by anger, desire, avarice etc. and the external objects, which cause them, as identical with Anuttara and in recognising the individual self as non-different from Anuttara. It is due to the removal of ignorance of the essential nature of the self. It is the realisation of the identity of the individual self with the Universal, similar to that of Khecarī with Anuttara.

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1. P. T. V., 39.
2. Ibid., 40.
3. Ibid., 41.
4. Ibid., 40.

CONCEPTIONS OF KHECARĪ ETC. IN THE KULA SYSTEM COMPARED WITH THOSE IN THE KRAMA.

We have just discussed the concept of Khecarī in the Kula system. It may be added here that it is the topmost of the five powers. Its place in the Kaulism is the same as that of Vyomavāmeśvarī or Vyomeśvarī in the Krama system. But in the Krama system Khecarī is a very narrow concept, in terms of which the being of the individual subject only is accounted for.

The concepts of the remaining four powers in the Kula system may be presented as follows :—

When Khecarī manifests itself as Śūnya Pramātā in the deep sleep, in which there is no consciousness of distinction of the subject from the object, it is called Vyomacarī. When it manifests itself as the Prāṇa Pramātā in deep sleep in which there is consciousness of pleasure, as a mere form of consciousness (Śaṁvinmātradṛgullāse), it is called Gocarī. When it manifests itself as a subject in dream,–in which the objects of experience have no being independently of the dreamer, are essentially subjective and as such are really non-different from him, though they are apprehended differently and, therefore, are spoken of as different from him,–it is called Dikcarī. But when it manifests itself as a subject in wakeful state, in the objective world,–in which the distinction between the subject and the object is clear in so far as the experience is related to objects which have being independently of the experiencing subject and are such as can be experienced, not only by a particular subject but by all others also,–it is called Bhūcarī.[1]

The latter four, however, are non-different from the Khecarī. Not only these four powers but also the limited subject,

1. P. T. V., 39.

the mind, the senses and external objects are essentially non-different from the Khecarī. For, nothing different from it can shine. It also appears as desire, aversion, anger and other emotions, which being looked upon as different from the Anuttara, are responsible for bondage, which is of three types, Āṇava, Kārma and Māyīya, as has already been stated.

The Krama system also discusses similar five powers, calling them Vyomavāmeśvarī, Khecarī, Dikcarī, Gocarī and Bhūcarī. But their functions are different. They are conceived to account for the phenomenon of knowledge and action at the empirical level, as has been explained in the course of the discussion on Seventy categories of the Krama system. But the Kula system adopts them to explain the four states of the subject, and to account for the being of objects, means, internal states etc.

KHECARĪSĀMYA AS FINAL EMANCIPATION.

We have discussed above 'Khecarīsāmya', as standing for the Kaula conception of the liberation in life (Jīvanmukti). But, as pointed out there, it stands for the final emancipation also. As such it consists, not in looking upon the entire manifestation as identical with Anuttara and in recognising the individual self as non-different from the Universal. On the contrary, it signifies the realisation of the essential nature of the Absolute, the Anuttara,[1] the ever-shining, as united with the perfect power, the Khecarī or the Kaulikīśakti : the power, which is related to the Anuttara in the same manner as that in which the creative energy is to man : the power, which, in ultimate analysis, is nothing but the Self-consciousness, in which the "this", which is but the grossification of the "I", is present in the same manner as flower is in seed.[2] It is the union with Anuttara as united with the Khecarī, Anuttarā

1. P. T. V., 45. 2. P. T. V., 45 (F. N.)

or Kaulikīśakti; the union in which the liberated gets united with the Anuttara in the same manner as that in which Anuttarā is united with the Anuttara. Accordingly the experience of the final emancipation is the experience of the Supreme Bliss (Ānanda), because Anuttara united with Anuttarā, is nothing but bliss, as has already been stated in the course of the metaphysical interpretation of the Indian alphabetical system.

(ii) MOKṢA AS BHAIRAVAIKĀTMYA.

We have discussed the Kaula conception of liberation (Mokṣa) as Khecarīsāmya. There is much in common between the two conceptions of Mokṣa (i) Mokṣa as Khecarīsāmya and (ii) Mokṣa as Bhairavaikātmya, as the following lines will make clear.

JĪVANMUKTI AS BHAIRAVAIKĀTMYA.

Just as the conception of Mokṣa as the attainment of similarity with Khecarī, gives us an idea of liberation in life as well as of that after the fall of the body, so does the conception of Mokṣa as identity with Bhairava (Bhairavaikātmya). The liberation in life, according to the latter conception, consists in the realisation of the manifested, the diversity of the categories, which is ordinarily looked upon as bondage, as identical with one's own self that is free from all limitations and, therefore, shines in its true light as the perfect egoity. It is entering into unity with the Highest Reality,[1] Bhairava. To the liberated, the objective world does not shine objectively as something different from him. It shines as the content of his self-consciousness, exactly as in the ego-feeling "I am thin" "thinness" shines as the content of "I".

1. P. T. V., 18.

This conception of the world from the point of view of the liberated, is different from that of the Vedāntin "Sarvaṁ khalu idam Brahma".

This can be attained by him only who is a product of sex-union[1] in which male identifies himself with Śiva and female with Śakti and, therefore, who is capable of keeping others in bondage or freeing them from it at will.

To him every religious formula (Mantra), which presents a determinate thought, and the movements of hands and feet in order to put them in a definite shape (Mudrā) shine as one with the highest power, as non-different from it.

It is characterised by the consciousness of insentient objectivity, the body, the vital air and the Śūnya, as nothing but sentiency; and by the rise of the individual subject to the level of the Universal. It is free from desire, determinate cognition and limited action. It is attained in consequence of perfect and continuous concentration and full realisation of the meaning of "Sauḥ" i. e. I am Sadāśiva : the entire creation proceeds from me.

THE OBJECTIVITY FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE LIBERATED IN LIFE, ACCORDING TO THE TANTRĀLOKA.

Abhinavagupta has dealt the Kula system not only in the Parātriṁśikā Vivaraṇa, but also in the Tantrāloka, as has already been stated. To give a complete idea of the liberated in life it is necessary to add here what is stated in the Tantrāloka on the subject. There the relation of the manifested universe with the Ultimate is pointed out to be similar to that between a reflecting surface and the reflected. Accordingly the presentation of the experience of objectivity by the liberated in life is clearly influenced by the theory of reflection

1. P. T. V., 242-3.

(Bimba-pratibimbavāda). It is, therefore, asserted that to the liberated in life the entire objective world appears as a mere reflection on the self[1] and, therefore, as really non-different from it, though appearing differently; exactly as the reflection of a city on a mirror is really non-different from the mirror, though it appears as different. He looks upon the entire objective world that is reflected on him as his own manifestation. He thinks that he himself is shining as all that is reflected. He does not chant any religious formula, nor does he perform any Mudrā, nor practices any religious rituals, nor worships god. For, he looks upon all that as himself.

(iii) MOKṢA AS KAULIKĪ SIDDHI.

We have discussed the various meanings of the word "Kula". One of them presents the conception of the Ultimate Reality as that which concretises or grossifies as the entire objectivity (Kolati saṁstyānībhavati iti Kulam). The conception of Mokṣa as Kaulikī Siddhi is influenced by the idea of Kula as presented above. Thus Kaulikī Siddhi presents the experience of the objectivity by the liberated in life. To him the entire objectivity, which is nothing but a grosified form of the Ultimate, looses its grossness and appears as nothing but "bliss" (Ānandarūpa),[2] as identical with Vimarśa (Freedom), which constitutes the 'heart' the most important aspect, of the Ultimate, the transcendental principle of consciousness.

It consists in the experience of bliss, which is nothing but the experience of identity with the Supreme Principle of Consciousness, the Śiva, in indissoluble union with Vimarśa, which, from the analytical point of view, is as important an aspect of Śiva as the heart is of physical organism.

The Kaulism holds that the contemplation etc. are not the immediate means to the realisation of the Ultimate; that

1. T. A., II, 246. 2. P. T. V., 34.

grace only is such; that the vital air in the body is instrumental in bringing about the realisation of the entire field of experience as one with the Ultimate Consciousness; that the grace, without any previous Yogic practice, makes the vital air ascend to the Brahma Randhra through the Śuṣumṇā and helps the recepient of the grace to realise factually the identity of all with the Ultimate. The *Kaulikasiddhi*, therefore, is so called because body, vital air etc. (Kula) are instrumental in its attainment.[1]

Kaulikasiddhi is interpreted from the mystical as well as the metaphysical point of view. The above is the mystic interpretation. Metaphysical interpretation may be stated as follows :—

One of the recognised meanings of the word "Kula" is the objective universe. Kaulika, therefore, means that which has its being in Kula (Kule jātaḥ or Bhavaḥ) i. e. all that has its being in the universe. "Siddhi" means "separate manifestation" (Bhedāvabhāsanā). Thus Kaulikasiddhi means manifestation of the entire objective variety as separate from the Ultimate Principle as well as from one another. Hence Anuttara is spoken of as "Kaulikasiddhida" in so far as it is responsible for bringing about the manifestation of everything.[2]

ŚĀMBHAVOPĀYA, THE MEANS TO THE LIBERATION, AS CONCEIVED BY THE KULA SYSTEM.

In the Śaiva literature generally four means are recognised, Āṇava, Śākta, Śāmbhava and Anupāya. They have been discussed in an earlier chapter. Each of them is for a different type of person. Thus, there are some who are so graced that they can purify the determinate idea "I am all this" so as to eliminate all the elements of determinacy from it indepen-

1. P. T. V., 36. 2. Ibid., 38.

dently of the use of any external means such as Japa etc. For them the Śāktopāya is prescribed. Others cannot do so. For them Āṇavopāya is presented.[1]

But neither of the above two means is a direct means to the realisation of the Ultimate. The Āṇava leads to the Śākta and the latter to the Śāmbhava, which alone is admitted to be the direct means. Hence the Śāmbhavopāya is called Śākṣādupāya.[2] This is the means, which is enjoined by the Kaulism.

Abhinavagupta refers to it by different names, such as Anuttaropāya, Ātmopāya, Icchopāya, Ananyopāya, Abhedopāya, Paropāya and Anupāya. Some of these names are used for the means, propounded in the Pratyabhijñā system e. g. Anuttaropāya and Anupāya. It is, therefore, necessary to point out their distinctive implications in the context of the Kula system as distinct from that of the Pratyabhijñā.

(i) "Anuttaropāya" is a word that is used for Anupāya as well as for Śāmbhavopāya. Anupāya is called Anuttaropāya, because there is no means higher than this, because it is related to Ānanda Śakti, which is the highest.[3] But when this word is used for Śāmbhavopāya, it means the way which leads to the realisation of the Anuttara.

(ii) Śāmbhavopāya is referred to as Ātmopāya, because it is the distinctive means, enjoined by the Kula system : and Kula is recognised to be essentially nothing but Ātman (Kulam ātmasvarūpantu. T. A., (Comm.) Ah. XXIX, 4.). It is referred to as such in the Paryanta Pañcāśikā, Verse No 20.

(iii) It is called Icchopāya, because it is related to Icchāśakti[4] : just as Anupāya is called Ānandopāya because of its relation to Ānandaśakti. The relation of the Śāmbha-

1. T. A., III, 310–11.
2. T. A., I, 181–2.
3. Ibid., 255–6.
4. Ibid., 255.

vopāya with Icchā Śakti implies that in the final spiritual experience attained through this, there is an element of objectivity, similar to that which we experience in desire (Icchā). But in that, got through Anupāya, there is complete freedom from objective relation, similar to that which characterises the experience of bliss (Ānanda).[1]

(iv) It is called Ananyopāya, because the Nandiśikhā Tantra, in the dialogue, quoted by Abhinava, represents it (Śāmbhavopāya, consisting in the contemplation on and in the attempt at the realisation of the meaning of "Aham") to be the only means to the realisation of the Śiva, the Ultimate. The dialogue runs as follows :—

Devī : Śiva cannot be presented in language. What is then the means to realise Him ?

Śambhu : The Viveka, the self-realisation (Svātmaparāmarśa), the grasp of the meaning of "Aham", is the only means. It brings about the freedom from Māyā and gives rise to Prātibhajñāna.[2]

We shall soon discuss "Prātibhajñāna".

(v) It is called Abhedopāya in so far as the idea of unity or non-difference predominates in it. But the Śāktopāya is characterised by unity-in-difference (Bhedābheda) and the Āṇavopāya is by 'difference' (Bheda).[3]

(vi) It is called Paropāya[4] by Abhinavagupta in the course of a summary-view of the Tantrāloka towards the close of the 1st Āhnika and at the commencement of the third Āhnika, in which he discusses Śāmbhavopāya;[5] because he recognises it to be the highest means. For, according to him, "Anupāya" is simply the culminating point of the Śāmbhavopāya, as we shall soon show.

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1. T. A., I, 256. 2. T. A., Ah. XIII, 104–5.
3. T. A., I, 248. 4. Ibid., 288. 5. T. A., II, 1.

(vii) It is called Sākṣādupāya, because it is the only direct means to the attainment of the highest knowledge (Parajñāna). But it may be asked here: What about the Anupāya, propounded by Somānanda and Utpala in their presentations of the Pratyabhijñā school? In reply to this Jayaratha in the course of his commentary says that Anupāya is the highest phase of the Śāmbhavopāya.[1]

The identity of the two paths to final emancipation, Anupāya and Śāmbhavopāya, has been recognised by Abhinavagupta himself[2] in so far as both of them are concerned with Anuttara. But they are talked of as distinct from each other in so far as the former concentrates on Anuttara primarily as Prakāśa, but the latter imaginatively splits it into Freedom, Svātantrya or Vimarśa for a clearer grasp of it.[3]

Thus the chief distinction of the Pratyabhijñā from the Kula system, from the metaphysical point of view, is the greater emphasis on the Śvātantrya Śakti.

ŚĀMBHAVOPĀYA AND PRATIBHĀ.

Śāmbhavopāya, which the follower of the Kula system is enjoined to follow, is recognised to be essentially identical with Pratibhā.

"Śāmbhave Pratibhātmani"

T. A., (Comm.) Ah. XIII, 100.

This Pratibhā is recognised to belong to every individual as naturally[4] as fluidity belongs to water. But it may be covered up by impurities, like a gem by dust and, therefore, may not shine. Other means such as Śākta and Āṇava are meant for freeing it from the dust-like obscuring impurity and making it shine.

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1. T. A., (Comm.) I. 182.
2. T. A. II, 1.
3. T. A., (Come.) II, 1.
4. T. A., Ah. XIII. 89.

The word "Pratibhā" is used in mystical, metaphysical, religious, æsthetical and psychological contexts in different meanings. But every one of them has an element in common with the rest.

MYSTIC CONCEPTIONS OF PRATIBHĀ AND PRĀTIBHAJÑĀNA IN PATAÑJALI.

Patañjali, it seems, was historically the first to discuss Pratibhā in the context of mysticism. Abhinavagupta in his Tantrāloka refers to him and quotes from the Yoga Sūtra the following :—

Prātibhādvā sarvam. Y. S., 3, 33.

in support of the view that a person, in whom the 'spiritual knowledge due to Pratibhā' (Prātibhajñāna) has arisen, can know and accomplish every thing.[1] This view was maintained by Somānanda, Kalyāṇa and Bhavabhūti and was propounded in the commentary on the Parā Triṁśikā.[2]

In their conceptions of Pratibhā and Prātibhajñāna, and Viveka and Vivekajajñāna, Patañjali and Abhinavagupta have much in common, though they fundamentally differ, because one is under the influence of the dualistic Sāṅkhya and the other is under that of the monistic Śaivaism. Thus, according to the interpretation, given by Vijñāna Bhikṣu in his Vārtika, Pratibhā is the power of knowing things independently of stimulation of senses by the corresponding external objects and even without learning of them from the talk about them by one who knows. Accordingly the Prātibhajñāna is unacquired knowledge.

Prātibhaṁ svapratibhottham
anaupadeśikaṁ jñānam. (Y. D. (Vārtika) 348.

Pratibhā, according to Patañjali, is the power of the mind

1. T. A., Ah. XIII, 95. 2. Ibid., 96.

(Manas) to know the subtle that cannot be object of sense-perception, as well as the sensuous, the sense-contact with which is not possible, because of the presence of other things between the senses and the objects to be known, or temporal or spatial distance :—

Prātibhāt sūkṣmavyavahitaviprakṛṣṭātītānāgatajñānam.

S. P. Bh. on Y. S., 3, 36.

Tataḥ Prātibhāt sūkṣmādi pañca sākṣātkārātmakam mānasam. (P. R. on Y. S. 3, 36).

Pratibhā upadeśādi nairapekṣyeṇa
Sūkṣmādīnāṁ mānasaṁ yathārthajñānam
Tatsāmarthyam Prātibham. (Vārtika) (Ibid.)

Viveka and Vivekajajñāna are distinguished from Pratibhā and Prātibhajñāna at one place, but are held to be identical at another. That is as follows :—

The discussions on Pratibhā and Viveka come in the context of the treatment of the spiritual powers, which a Yogin is able to get in consequence of conscentrations on different things, in the third chapter of the Yoga Sūtra. Here, in the aphorism No. 33 "Prātibhādvā sarvam", it is asserted that a Yogin, in whom the capacity to know the unsensed and untaught has arisen, can know and accomplish every thing. Here the knowledge, that is due to Pratibhā (Prātibhajñāna), is spoken of as the precursor of the complete knowledge of distinction of every thing from all other things (Vivekajajñāna) exactly as the dawn (Uṣā) is that of the sun. Thus the Pratibhā and Viveka, and Prātibhajñāna and Vivekajajñāna are distinguished from each other.[1]

But in aphorism No. 54 "Tārakaṁ sarvaviṣayaṁ sarvathāviṣayam akramaṁ ceti vivekajaṁ jñānam" the Prātibhajñāna and Vivekajajñāna and, therefore, Pratibhā and Viveka are spoken of as identical.

1. Y. D., 348–9.

The reason for distinguishing them from one another seems to be similar to that on account of which the dawn is distinguished from the sun. No body can deny the apparent difference between them. But just as the dawn and the sun are essentially identical, so are Pratibhā and Viveka, and Prātibhajñāna and Vivekajajñāna. Hence to speak of them as identical is not without any rational ground.

The following question is raised in this context: What is the justification for discussing the Prātibhajñāna, which is admitted to be unacquired, in the third chapter, which is concerned with the discussion of the powers, which are acquired by means of concentration on various things? And in reply it is asserted that the Pratibhā and, therefore, Prātibhajñāna may also be acquired by means of concentration on "Kṣaṇa", the indivisible fraction of time and the succession thereof. "Kṣaṇa tatkramayoḥ saṁyamādvivekajaṁ jñānam" (Y. S., 3, 52.). It may be remembered that here Vivekajajñāna and Prātibhajñāna are taken to be identical.

SIMILAR CONCEPTIONS OF PRATIBHĀ AND PRĀTIBHAJÑĀNA IN ABHINAVAGUPTA.

Abhinavagupta discusses the mystic conceptions of Pratibhā and Prātibhajñāna in the course of the detailed discussion on the categories as means to the realisation of the Ultimate in the Tenth Āhnika, and in dealing with the problem of grace in the Thirteenth Āhnika of the Tantrāloka primarily.

POINTS OF AGREEMENT WITH PATAÑJALI.

(i) He agrees with Patañjali that Pratibhā is the power of knowing the unsensed and untaught and that Prātibhajñāna is the knowledge that is due neither to the working of the senses in relation to their respective objects, nor to the study

of the literature concerning them, nor preceptor's teachings.[1] He calls the Prātibhajñāna by the name of Mahājñāna just for the reason that it is not acquired through any external means.[2]

(ii) He is one with Patañjali in admitting that the Prātibhajñāna gives the possessor the power to know and to accomplish every thing. He compares it with the proverbial Cintāmaṇi,[3] which is recognised to be capable of yielding every thing that may be desired by its possessor; and to emphasise the agreement quotes Patañjali's aphorism :—

'Prātibhādvā sarvam".

AGREEMENT WITH DIFFERENCE.

Abhinavagupta, like Patañjali, differentiates between Pratibhā and Viveka and Prātibhajñāna and Vivekajajñāna. But he differs, not only in the conception of Viveka but also in regard to the priority of the one to the other. Patañjali in his Yoga Sūtra is under the influence of the dualistic Sāṅkhya. The Viveka, therefore, according to him, is the knowledge of the distinction of Puruṣa from Prakṛti as also the knowledge of every thing with all its special attributes as distinct from every other thing, as has already been stated.

But Abhinavagupta is a Śaiva monist. Viveka, therefore, according to him, is both an act and a means. Viveka as an act, consists in reflecting over the essential nature of the self and consequent realisation of unfitness of the worldly object as the object of pursuit and of Śiva alone as that which is to be realised.[4] It gives rise to the spiritual knowledge (Prātibha jñāna), which brings about liberation, which is nothing but identity with the highest reality.

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1. T. A., Ah. XIII, 87 2. Ibid. (Comm.) 87.
3. T. A., Ah. XIII, 97. 4. T. A., (Comm.) Ah. XIII, 106.

But Viveka as a means is that which enables a person to think on the true nature of the ultimate principle of consciousness, which is beyond the reach of the senses and other means of knowledge.[1]

From what has been said, another point of difference comes out : namely, that, according to Abhinava, Pratibhā is not the harbinger of Viveka, but the case is quite the reverse. The reason for this may be stated as follows :—

It has already been pointed out that Abhinavagupta deals with the problem of Pratibhā in the context of grace. And it may be added here that he upholds the principle of "Freedom" not only in the context of creation etc. but also in that of "Grace".[2] There are degrees of it.[3] The clearest indication of one's being graced is the devotion to Śiva. It is of twenty seven types.[4] The highest type of grace liberates the graced immediately. The grace, lower than the above, which is technically called "Madhyatīvra", puts an end to the ignorance and is responsible for the rise of spiritual power (Pratibhā) such as is capable of visualising and realising the ultimate Reality, independently of any preceptorial instruction or study of the Śāstra.[5] Such a grace not only brings about the liberation of the graced but also gives him the power to liberate others by just casting a glance with his blissful eyes.[6]

This visualisation may be firm or shaky.[7] The latter needs a teacher, study of the scripture and reasoning to attain firmness. The former is the best. The person, who firmly visualises and realises the Reality, does not need any Dīkṣā. But the one whose visualisation and realisation are shaky has to resort to Bhāvanā[8] or contemplation etc.

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1. T. A., Ah. XIII, 112-3. 2. Ibid., 82. 3. Ibid., 86.
4. T. A., (Comm.) Ah. XIII, 87. 5. T. A., Ah. XIII, 86.
6. Ibid., 87. 7. Ibid., 89. 8. Ibid., 93.

The problem of relation between Pratibhā and Viveka and, therefore, their distinction from each other, comes in the context of the slow grace (Manda Śaktipāta).[1] We shall soon discuss Abhinava's conception of Pratibhā in detail. For our immediate purpose it is necessary to remember that Pratibhā is admitted to be inherent in every sentient being in some degree or the other. But it may not be manifest for various reasons. There are various means to bring about its manifestation in different contexts. In the context of the slow grace the means that is pointed out is the Viveka, as has been presented above. The manifest Pratibhā, therefore, according to Abhinava, follows Viveka.[2]

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PATAÑJALI AND ABHINAVA ON THE ESSENTIAL NATURE OF PRATIBHĀ.

According to Patañjali, as has been shown earlier, Pratibhā is a power of mind (Manas). Abhinavagupta does not agree with this view. His view in the proper context may be presented as follows :—

The Prātibhajñāna is represented to be of two types (i) got through the instruction, given, and initiation (Dīkṣā), performed by the teacher (ii) got independently of the preceptorial instruction and initiation. But in every case it is admitted to be such as cannot be got through internal or external sense. The question, therefore, arises : "How can the knowledge, got through the preceptorial instruction, be spoken of as that which is got independently of the internal or external sense ? For, the instruction is received through the external sense of hearing in co-operation with the internal senses, Manas and Buddhi.

The reply to it may be stated as follows :—

1. T. A., Ah. XIII, 103. 2. Ibid., 105.

According to Kashmir thought, the principle of consciousness (Citi) and intellect (Citta or Buddhi) are not essentially different from each other. The former, when knowing an external object, that is apprehended as different from it as well as from other objects, is called Citta. As such it is insentient. But when that which is apprehended or shines in consciousness, is not experienced as different from it, nor is it distinguished from other objects, the Buddhi loses its distinction from Citi.

The Prātibhajñāna is spoken of as that which is beyond the reach of senses, because in it the content of experience does not figure objectively as distinct from the cognising principle and, therefore, cannot be said to be related to Buddhi, which grasps what is separate from it. On the contrary, it is related to Citi itself as non-different from it.[1] Hence the Prātibhajñāna is admitted to be a knowledge that is beyond the reach of the senses.

It may be pointed out here that Buddhi is spoken of as insentient inasmuch as it is limited. For, according to Kashmir thought, though everything is essentially of the nature of the light of consciousness, yet all that is limited is recognised to be insentient (Jaḍa).

Paricchinna prakāśatvam
Jaḍasya kila lakṣaṇam. T. A. Ah. III, 101.

Abhinavagupta clarifies the idea of Pratibhā as a means of knowledge in which the known does not figure objectively as separate from the cognising principle, by asserting that the individual, in whom Pratibhā has become manifest, rises to the level of Sadvidyā[2] though still in the possession of the external and internal senses. The implication of this assertion will become clear if we remember that in the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā

1. T. A., (Comm) Ah. XIII, 120-1. 2. Ibid., 118.

Vimarśinī, Abhinavagupta maintains that Sadvidyā is the means of knowledge in the case of the graced, which enables him to grasp the objectivity as it really[1] is, i. e. as non-different from the self. Pratibhā, therefore, as a means of grasping the real is the same as the Sadvidyā.

ANOTHER POINT OF AGREEMENT WITH DIFFERENCE.

Patañjali, as we have pointed out earlier, maintains that Pratibhā and Prātibhajñāna, though generally unacquired and unacquirable, may also be acquired by means of concentration on Kṣaṇa. Abhinavagupta agrees with this view. But he differs in so far as he does not recognise the contemplation on Kṣaṇa as a means to the acquisition of Pratibhā. On the contrary, he holds the concentration on the second Tuṭi to be such a means. That is as follows :—

We have already discussed the movement of the vital air to the distance of thirty six fingur-widths at the time of the rise of the determinate knowledge. This distance is divided into sixteen parts, each consisting of two and a quarter fingur-widths, technically called Tuṭi. Checking the vital air at the first Tuṭi and concentration of mind there, lead to the realisation of identity with Śiva. And similar check and concentration at the second Tuṭi result in the acquisition of omnipotence and omniscience by the Yogin. For, this is the level of Śakti, which, because of its being capable of the original new creations, is spoken of as Pratibhā.[2] In this context Jayaratha repeats what was said by Abhinava in the Dhvanyāloka-locana in defining the Pratibhā in a poet :—

"Navanavollekhaśālinī"[3]

In so doing he follows Kallaṭa, to whom he explicitly refers.[4]

1. Bh., Vol. II, 230.
2. T. A., Ah., X, 143.
3. T. A. (Comm) Ah. X, 144.
4. Ibid., 142.

ABHINAVA'S CONCEPTION OF PRATIBHĀ.

Abhinavagupta discusses the problem of Pratibhā in many contexts.

Mystic context :—

We have just compared the views of Patañjali and Abhinavagupta on Pratibhā in the context of mysticism. What more Abhinavagupta says on Pratibhā in such context may be stated separately as follows :—

Pratibhā is the spiritual power, on account of which a person remains indifferent to the powers (i) to hear the sound coming from the greatest distance, (ii) to enter into another's body etc., which he gets in consequence of the rise of Viveka, the knowledge, on account of which a person is able to concentrate on otherwise unknowable Saṁvid.[1] This Pratibhā makes its possessor rest on the Śiva, the 'Highest light' and enables him to realise the entire objectivity to be nothing more than Śiva, exactly as the reflected images are essentially nothing more than the reflecting surface.[2]

Pratibhā may be dim in the beginning in some cases but it becomes bright as a result of the preceptorial instruction and initiation, performance of the ritual, practice of Yoga etc. They are like the puff, which removes the ashes from over the cinders and makes them shine brightly : or they are like water and manure which bring about the full development of the seed of Pratibhā into a full grown tree.[3]

All the religious practices are meant for bringing about the manifestation of the Pratibhā, the Sāṁsidhikajñāna.[4] It destroys the impurity, called Māyīya.[5]

This Pratibhā may be shaky or firm. In the former case

1 T. A., (Comm.) Ah. XIII, 112–3. 2. Ibid., 114–5.
3. T. A., Ah. XIII, 111. 4. Ibid., 97. 5. Ibid., 105.

to attain firmness it needs reason,[1] the study of the Śāstra, preceptorial instruction, hearing the stories of those who attained freedom from attachment etc. The shaky Pratibhā expresses itself in the reason that leads to the grasp of identity of everything with the Self or in the power to understand sacred texts thoroughly independently of teachers and so on. Such a reason is often referred to as Prātibhajñāna or Tarka, which is recognised to be the best of the parts of Yoga (Tarko yogāṅgamuttamam. T. A., III, 14).

And Prātibha mahājñāna consists in realising or looking upon both bondage and liberation and so upon every thing as forms of one's own self independently of any preceptorial instruction or the study of the sacred scripture. It is due to the lower type of grace (Madhyatīvra śaktipāta[2]). The liberation is consequent on such realisation.

According to different types of grace, there are different types of Pratibhā also. Thus the lower type is capable of bringing about the liberation of its possessor only, exactly as the glow-worm can illumine itself only. The higher can liberate many, much as a gem can spread its light to others, in close proximity to it. But the highest can liberate all exactly as the sun illumines all.[3]

The Śāmbhavopāya is admitted to be essentially of the nature of Pratibhā, the power that is responsible for the rise of the true knowledge of the Ultimate Reality, because the final emancipation of the follower of this path is due to the spiritual knowledge that it (Pratibhā) gives rise to.

RELIGIOUS CONCEPTION OF PRATIBHĀ.

Pratibhā, in religious context, is recognised to be identical with the 'Power of freedom' (Svātantryaśakti). As such

1. T. A., Ah. XIII, 90. 2. Ibid., 86. 3. Ibid., 101.

it is admitted to manifest itself in the forms of the twelve goddesses which are the objects of worship in the Krama system, as also of others which are worshipped for the realisation of different purposes.[1]

METAPHYSICAL CONCEPTION OF PRATIBHĀ.

We are dealing with the three monistic systems of Kashmir here, the Krama, the Kula and the Pratyabhijñā. We have discussed the conception of Pratibhā in the Krama system in dealing with a recognised text on it, the Krama Sadbhāva, and have pointed out that the power of creation is divided into ten and Pratibhā is the fifth of them: and under the shoulder heading "Kālasaṅkarṣinī as identical with Bhāsā" we have shown how Pratibhā and Bhāsā are synonymous terms and, therefore, Pratibhā is identical with Kālasaṅkarṣiṇī, the ultimate metaphysical principle of the Krama system.

And in the course of our treatment of the Kula system we have referred to the three influences which shaped the Kula system and have shown how Somānanda's conception of Parā was 'improved upon by Abhinava as Parā-Pratibhā, the metaphysical principle, in terms of which the manifestation, not only of the letters of the Devanāgarī alphabetical system from 'A' to 'H', the combinations thereof, the words and sentences, but also of all that is signified by them is explained'; how Kaulikī Śakti is referred to as Anuttarā, Parā-Pratibhā, Khecarī etc; and have presented the metaphysical significance of Parā-Pratibhā under the heading "Kaulikī Śakti as Parā Pratibhā". Here, therefore, we shall confine ourselves to the presentation of the metaphysical conception of Pratibhā, according to the Pratyabhijñā system.

1. T. A., I, 157-8.

THE CONCEPTION OF PRATIBHĀ IN THE PRATYABHIJÑĀ SYSTEM.

The conception of Pratibhā in the Pratyabhijñā system is discussed in the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī I, 7, 2. Here it is established that Pratibhā is Maheśvara. That is as follows:—

The Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī is an answer to the Bauddha objections against the fundamental principle of the Pratyabhijñā system, the concept of permanent subject, which is perfectly free, is the origin and basis of all phenomena and, therefore, is called Maheśvara. The basic difference between the Buddhism and the Pratyabhijñā is that the former holds the subject be no less momentary than the object: but the latter, while admitting the momentariness of the object, asserts the existence of permanent subject and the identity of the individual and the universal.

For a proper understanding of the concept of Pratibhā, according to the Pratyabhijñā system, it is necessary to keep the above and the following fundamental of the school in mind :—

The Pratyabhijñā deals with metaphysical, ethical, epistemic and psychological problems, not in isolation from one another, but as intimately connected, and, therefore, propounds a metaphysical view, such as serves as the basis of all others. It improves upon the Buddhism, so as to show that unless this improvement be accepted, practical life is not possible. For instance, remembrance is an important factor in giving determinacy to indeterminate affection of mind or thought in so far as it gives rise to the consciousness of word for the organised group of sensations, without which determinacy in thought is not possible, even according to the Buddhist (Sābhilāpaṁ vikalpākhyam). It also makes the percipient of an object aware of the pleasant or unpleasant experience

that he had of it in the past and so determines his attitude and action in regard to it.

The Realistic Idealism of Kashmir asserts that determination of action or behaviour towards a perceived object can not be explained in terms of residual traces of the objects, perceived in the past (Saṁskāras), as the Buddhist maintains or as do the contemporary psychologists who admit 'modified structure of organism, mostly modified brain structure' left by the past experience and call it 'memory trace' ; though they admit at the same time that they do not know the exact nature of this trace. The reason is obvious. It is not only the objective reference in remembrance that needs explanation and can be explained in terms of residual trace, but also awareness of the pleasant or unpleasant experience aroused by it in the past, on account of which it is referred to, not as "this" but as "that". Remembrance determines the attitude and the action of the percipient of an object, because in it not only is the awareness of the object known before, but also of the experience that it then aroused. But the past experience of the object cannot become the object of remembrance, like the object itself. For, one cognition does not become the object of another, because every cognition is admitted to be self-luminous (Dṛk svābhāsā nānyena vedyā. Bh., Vol. I, 124.). Therefore, if it were to become an object of another, it will lose its essential nature of self-luminosity. Thus the remembrance such as can be accounted for in terms of the residual traces cannot explain practical life. Hence the monistic Śaivaism of Kashmir admits the all-inclusive Universal Consciousness, which is free to unify or separate the various cognitions, and is characterised by three powers of perception, remembrance and differentiation, and call it Maheśvara.

The powers rest on the Universal Consciousness, not in the sense that it is simply their substratum as the Naiyāyika would

say, but in the sense that they have their being as one with it and that it is free to make use of them at will separately or jointly or merge them in itself so that they have their being in a state of identity with it. Hence the Universal Consciousness is called Maheśvara.

The Āhnika VII of the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā, in which the problem of Pratibhā is discussed, is concerned with the presentation of the arguments in detail to establish, in the light of the philosophy of language, that the powers rest on the Universal Consciousness. That is as follows :—

PRATIBHĀ.

The consciousness of objectivity is an undeniable fact. It may be related to the perceptual, memorial or imagined object. The psychological analysis of it from the point of view of the Pratyabhijñā, reveals two elements in it : (I) the means of knowledge (Pramāṇa), the extrovert light of consciousness, which is technically called Buddhi or Citta ; and (II) its affection, the reflection of the external objects in a temporal and spatial order in perception; of the internal, which is in the stock of memory, in remembrance ; or of what is freely imagined by an imaginative mind, as in imagination. This consciousness of objectivity, as analysed above, is technically called Pratibhā.

This picture of Pratibhā is given to prove that this consciousness of objectivity, has no independent but dependent or related being, and that on which it depends or rests or to which it is related, is nothing but the introvert light of consciousness, with which the extrovert light of consciousness, the Buddhi, is essentially identical; the difference between them being that of introvertness in one case and of extrovertness in the other. The introvert light of consciousness is called Mahe-

śvara from the point of view of the Idealism or Absolutism and may be spoken of as the free mind (Citiḥ svatantrā), that manifests the entire objectivity, much as the human mind manifests the objects which appear in dream; or as the imaginative mind of a great poet pictures up the configuration that he presents in the poem. He (Maheśvara) may also be spoken of as Free Will, from the point of view of the Voluntarism, in so far as He is admitted to manifest the universe, much as a man possessed of great spiritual power (Yogin), brings into being all the desired objects by sheer force of will.

The Pratyabhijñā system argues in the light of the philosophy of language to prove that the objective consciousness or the consciousness of the objectivity depends on or is related to Maheśvara, as follows :—

It draws distinction between the meanings of "Bhā" to shine and "Pratibhā" to shine to. It asserts that though often the predicate "Pratibhāti" is used in the sense of 'shines' and not 'shines to' e. g. "Ghaṭaḥ pratibhāti" or "Jar shines"; yet such a use is not strictly grammatical and is due to the extremely purposive attitude of the percipient, in which the object figures predominently. For, if the person, who makes such a statement, be asked "To whom does it shine ?" he will at once say "To[1] me". Thus it is clear that the act of shining for which the word "Pratibhāti" stands, belongs, not to jar but to the mind or the knowing subject i. e. the jar does not shine independently; its shining depends on the Mind.

The philosophy of grammar admits seven categories of case. The second category is one of the relational categories. One of the dependent categories, subsumed under it, is technically called "Lakṣaṇa", a relation that is signified by the prefix "Prati" in Sanskrit or by preposition "to" in English.

1. Bh., Vol. 1, 348.

In Sanskrit it may also be denoted by prefix Anu or Pari. Thus, Pratibhāti and Anubhāti mean the same thing, according to Pāṇini's aphorism "Lakṣaṇetthaṁbhūtākhyānabhāgavīpsāsu pratiparyanavaḥ (1, 4, 90).

If we keep the above in mind and interpret the following in the light of it :—

Tameva bhāntam anubhāti sarvam
Tasya bhāsā sarvamidaṁ vibhāti

(K. U., 5, 15.)

we find that the Vedānta also admits that the objectivity does not shine independently and that its shining depends or rests on the Reality, the Ātman, the Brahman.

The question now arises : The Reality being one, wherefrom comes the plurality that shines in a temporal and spatial order in relation to the One ? The reply from the point of view of the Pratyabhijñā is that it is the Freedom, the Svātantrya Śakti, which is identical with the Ātman, the Maheśvara, that manifests the innumerable varieties of the objects, which differ in forms and actions and, therefore, appear in a temporal and spatial order, as separate from itself.

Pratibhā, therefore, is nothing but the extrovert light of consciousness, affected by the variety of objects in a temporal and spatial order, much as a mirror is by the objects, reflected on it, as has been stated above.[1]

But this "Pratibhā", though it appears to have temporal as well as spatial succession, on account of the reflection of the external or internal objects, yet in itself it is without any succession, temporal or spatial, much as the mirror is in spite of the succession in the objects, reflected on it. Further, one of the constituent elements of Pratibhā, as analysed above, is the extrovert light of consciousness, and as such in its

1. Bh., Vol. I, 351–2.

internal and introvert aspect or form (Antarmukhena vapuṣā) it is absolutely free from succession of every type, including the temporal and spatial. Furthermore, the consciousness of the object, if it is determinate, presupposes the mental activity (i) to organise the sensations into organic wholes, (ii) to distinguish and differentiate them from one another and (iii) to relate the wholes to one another so that they form the bigger whole, which figures before the mind's eye. The Pratyabhijñā or Realistic Idealism recognises these to be the functions of the introvert aspect or form of the Mind, and calls it Pramātā, the subject, the mind that is free in the performance of these acts and in itself is pure subjective consciousness, free from all limitations of time and space, in relation to which alone the entire objectivity shines or to which the objectivity is necessarily related.

Abhinavagupta points out that the "Pratibhā", the consciousness of objectivity, is undeniable. It is a fact of every body's experience. But the introvert light of consciousness (Saṁvid),—in relation to which alone Pratibhā is Pratibhā, consciousness of objectivity is factually consciousness of objectivity; on which the consciousness of objectivity depends; which in reality is without any succession (Akramā) though it appears to be marked by succession, when it becomes extrovert and is affected by external objectivity;—is generally not taken into account in the concept of Pratibhā, because of the ignorance.[1] The purpose of the discussion on Pratibhā is primarily to draw attention to the subjective basis of the objective consciousness.

Now if we take Pratibhā, not in isolation from the pure subjectivity, the mind, the introvert light of consciousness, on which it depends and rests, but in conjunction with it; if we remember (i) that the determinacy in objective conscious-

1. I. P. V. V., Vol. II, 340.

ness is not possible without the activity of the mind that selects, differentiates and organises the sense-data ; (ii) that external objectivity is nothing but thought of the Universal Mind : (iii) that the individual mind is essentially identical with the Universal ; then Pratibhā is nothing but Maheśvara. For, the Realistic Idealism differs from the Vedānta in so far as it admits the Ultimate Reality to be not only transcendental, as does the Vedānta, but also as immanent. It calls the transcendental "Anuttara", from the mystic point of view, and the immanent it gives a separate name "Maheśvara" from the metaphysical point of view, and holds that the experience, that the individual has, is really the experience of the Universal.[1]

Abhinavagupta asserts that this view of identity of Pratibhā and Maheśvara is implied[2] by the word "Saḥ" instead of "Sā", used by Utpalācārya, in the following verse, on which the above discussion on Pratibhā is based :—

Yā caiṣā pratibhā tattatpadārthakramarūṣitā
Akramānanta–Cidrūpaḥ pramātā sa maheśvaraḥ

Bh., Vol. I, 348.

This conception of Pratibhā seems to have been maintained by the predecessors of Abhinavagupta. For, he quotes one of them, Bhaṭṭa Candrānana, in support of this view as follows :—

Paśyato rūpamālekhād bhāto bhānānuṣaṅgi yat
Pratīpabhānaṁ pratibhā bhāvānām ātmasaṁśrayā.

(I. P. V. V., Vol. II, 339.)

BHARTṚHARI'S CONCEPTION OF PRATIBHĀ.

Bhartṛhari does not seem to have drawn a very clear distinction between the two metaphysical terms Vivarta and

1. Bh., Vol. I, 334. 2. I. P. V. V., Vol. II, 340

Pariṇāma. He uses both of them in one and the same verse as follows :—

Śabdasya pariṇāmoyam ityāmnāyavido viduḥ
Chandobhya eva prathamam etad viśvaṁ vyavartata
V. P. Ch. I, V. 121.

He does not seem to have used the word Pariṇāma in the sense in which it is used in the Sāṅkhya system, namely the real change of cause into effect, such as that of milk into curd. Nor does he seem to have used the word "Vivarta" in the sense in which it is used by the monistic Vedānta, namely, the false appearance of one thing as another e. g. of mother-of-pearl as silver.

But in his conception of causality he has emphasised one point which shows that his idea of the effect has similarity, not only with that of the Sāṅkhya but also with that of the Vedānta i. e. the effect is essentially of the nature of cause e. g. jar is essentially of the nature of clay; the essential aspect of clay is necessarily there in jar.[1] However, his conception of Pariṇāma is not identical with that of the Sāṅkhya. There seems to be the Bauddha influence in it. We know that the Vijñānavādin admits the identity of the object of knowledge with the knowledge, because of their invariable togetherness (Sahopalambha-niyamādabhedo nīlataddhiyoḥ). This is evident from the reasons, advanced by him in support of the view that the Sound-Absolute is the cause of all that is necessary in practical life, the subject, the object, the means of knowledge and action.

Vāktattvameva bhoktṛbhogyabhogarūpeṇa vivartate, na bāhyaṁ vastu kiñcidasti. V. P. (Comm. Ban.) 94.

We have stated here Bhartṛhari's conception of causality, because it is very necessary to keep it in mind in attempting

1. V. P., (Comm.) Ch. I, V. 121.

to settle the meaning of "Pratibhā", particularly because the commentary does not throw any light on this point. All the worldly actions, whether of men or of animals and birds, are spoken of as due to Pratibhā which springs from 'words'.[1] It is an undeniable factor in all actions. Let us discuss it.

Bhartṛhari deals with the problem of Pratibhā from the psychological, ethical and metaphysical points of view. Approaching the problem from the psychological point of view, he accepts the Pratibhā to be the meaning of a sentence, which determines the action and behaviour of the being in which it arises; discusses the psychological activity involved in its rise; and explains what the psychologists call the instinctive action or behaviour of animals and birds, in terms of it. Dealing with it from the ethical point of view he points out how it enables a man of character to react to a complex situation, in which the right decision in regard to reaction is impossible on the basis of empirical data. And handling it from the metaphysical point of view, he declares the empirical world to be nothing but Pratibhā.

BHARTṚHARI'S CONCEPTION OF PRATIBHĀ AS THE MEANING OF A SENTENCE.

Bhartṛhari admits that meaning of a sentence as a whole is distinct from those of the words which constitute it. He asserts that the meaning of each word is grasped separately in the same order of succession as that in which the words are uttered by a speaker and are heard by a hearer. The meanings of words constitute the cause, which is responsible for the manifestation of the meaning of the sentence, which is different from those of the separate words, grasped in succession.

1. V. P., (Comm.) Ch. I, V. 122.

This meaning is unitary in character and is called Pratibhā[1]. The meaning of a sentence, according to Bhartṛhari, is a unity, similar to that of Pānaka Rasa[2], in which the various ingredients are so thoroughly mixed up that they give rise to a taste, which is different from that of every one of them separately. The relation between the meanings of the constituent words of a sentence and of the meaning of the sentence as a whole is similar to that between the ingredients of Pānaka Rasa and the Pānaka Rasa itself.

This meaning can neither be presented in definite terms to others, nor does it admit of grasp in definite form by one who is conscious of it.[3] It is called Pratibhā because it figures objectively before the experiencing subject as distinct from him. (Prati-pratīpam Bhāti-bhāsate iti Pratibhā).

Pratibhā is also conceived as an unconscious activity which is responsible for the unification of the meanings of the words of the sentence.[4] We are familiar with this activity of unification of sensations in the rise of determinate knowledge in both the Kantian and the Monistic Śaiva systems. Bhartṛhari, recognises similar activity in the rise of the meaning of a sentence as a whole from the consciousness of meanings of the words in succession.

But as a meaning of a sentence as a whole, it is, as it were, a combination of the meanings of the words of the sentence : therefore, it is admitted to be related to them as an effect is to a cause, Utility of the words lies in giving rise to this meaning.

(Padārthānām vāsau viṣayatvena vartate, Tanniṣṭhāste sāphalyam bhajante. V. P., (Comm.) Ch. II, V. 147.

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1. V. P., Ch. II, V. 145.
2. Ibid., 90.
3. Ibid., 146.
4. Ibid., 147.

The rise of the unitary configuration of ideas from a sentence, which is technically called Pratibhā, may be due to the acquired knowledge of the conventional meanings of the constituent words in the present life or the residual traces of them, caused by various factors in the past life; but the action that follows the awareness of it, is thoroughly in accordance with it, both in the case of men and animals, like horses, lions and elephants.[1]

PRATIBHĀ IN ETHICAL CONTEXT.

The configuration of ideas similar to that which determines the action or behaviour at the empirical level, is admitted to be aroused by a complex ethical situation also, in which a man of character finds himself, but on the basis of empirical facts cannot decide as to how to react to it. A typical instance of it is Duṣyanta in the vicinity of Kaṇva's hermitage, where he sees Śakuntalā talking to her friends, Priyaṁvadā and Anusūyā, and watering the plants, and falls in love with her. The situation, as it is before him, makes him doubt the rightness of the feeling of love for her, because he has been told that she is Kaṇva's daughter. He is, therefore, unable to decide as to how to react to the situation and behave towards Śakuntalā. This situation, because of the presence of the necessary subjective conditions, gives rise to a unitary configuration of ideas (Pratibhā), which is the meaning of the voice of conscience, and, therefore, serves as the means to settle the rightness of love, that has arisen in him, and guides the future course of action.[2]

PRATIBHĀ AND INSTINCTIVE BEHAVIOUR.

The unitary configuration of ideas is aroused not only by a set of words, constituting a sentence that enters into the

1. V. P., Ch. II, V. 148. 2. Ibid., 149.

ears and the situation in which a man of character may find himself, but also by time. For, it is admitted to be due to the revival of the residual traces of the past birth. And this revival in some cases is found to be due to no other factor than time. It is said that cuckoo lays her egg in the nest of crow, who hatches it and nourishes the young one till the arrival of the spring season : and that the spring brings about the maturity of residual traces of the past birth so that there arises in the young cuckoo the configuration of ideas which guides the movement of the sound apparatus so as to make it produce the sweet note, and makes it recognise its own distinction from crow and fly from its nest. Similar time factor is responsible for the unitary configuration of ideas, which guides the activity of the birds to make beautiful nests.[1]

It is this Pratibhā that is responsible for likes and dislikes, action necessary to take nourishment and characteristic actions of different types of beings soon after the birth, such as jumping by deer.

These activities are spoken of as instinctive by the modern psychologist. But what Bhartṛhari points out is that they are in accordance with the unitary configuration of ideas, which are due to the residual traces of the past birth. This Pratibhā is admitted to be of many types, according to the number of causes which are responsible for its rise i. e. inborn tendency, practice of art, study of the literature, concerning it, mental concentration (Yoga), effect of the meritorious deeds done in the past (Adṛṣṭa), gift.[2]

METAPHYSICAL VIEW OF PRATIBHĀ.

From the metaphysical point of view Bhartṛhari admits the entire empirical world to be nothing but Pratibhā[3]. Helā-

1. V. P., Ch. II, V. 150–2. 2. Ibid., 154.

3. V. P., Ch. I, V. 119.

rāja, in the benedictory verse at the beginning of his commentary on the third Chapter of the Vākya Padīya, speaks of Pratibhā as essentially of the nature of pure bliss and seems to identify it with the Absolute, as conceived by the philosophy of language.

"Dhāmānandasudhāmayorjitavapus tatprātibhaṁ saṁstumaḥ."

This view finds support from Harivṛṣabha's commentary which definitely identifies Pratibhā with Paśyantī, the Sound-Absolute, according to Bhartṛhari.

"Vāgvikārāṇām prakṛtiṁ paśyantyākhyām pratibhām".

V. P. (Comm.) Ch. I, V. 14

Helārāja, who was one of the teachers of Abhinava, seems to have been influenced by the monistic philosophy of Kashmir. For, the conception of the Absolute as essentially of the nature of pure bliss, does not seem to be traceable in the Vākyapadīya; but it is the most important concept of the monistic Śaiva philosophy of Kashmir, in so far as the Absolute, according to it, is Prakāśa-Vimarśamaya, and Vimarśa is nothing but Ānanda or Svātmaparāmarśa, as has been explained earlier.

There is an interesting point, to which the attention of the reader must be drawn. Harivṛṣabha, who, according to the tradition, is no other than Bhartṛhari himself, in his commentary on verse 14 of the first chapter, talks not only of Paśyantī, which, according to him, is the original cause (Prakṛti) of all sound-evol utes (Vāgvikāra) and is identical with Pratibhā ; but also of Parā-Prakṛti, and accepts the latter to be higher than the fo rmer. Here Parā-Prakṛti is not to be interpreted as Parā, the fourth and the highest aspect of speech. For, as Somānanda has pointed out, this idea is foreign to the mind of Bhartṛhari and is the recognised contribution of the monistic Śaivaism of Kashmir, presenting the philosophical views of the Śaivāgamas.

"Tasmācca sattāmātrāt pratibhākhyācchabdāt pūrvayoga-bhāvanābhyāsāt pratyastamitasarvavikārollekhām parām prakṛtim pratipadyate"

(V. P., (Comm.) Ch. I, V. 14.)

Here Bhartṛhari seems to present Paśyantī to be both immanent and transcendental.

And sphoṭa, on which we have spoken earlier, is also spoken of as essentially identical with Pratibhā, the meaning of sentence (vākyārtha). (Vaiyākaraṇasyākhaṇḍa eva sphoṭalakṣaṇo vākyārthaḥ. (V. P. (Comm.) ch. II, V. 144.)

PRATIBHĀ IN THE CONTEXT OF ÆSTHETICS.

THE PROBLEM OF PRATIBHĀ IN THE NĀṬYA ŚĀSTRA OF BHARATA, ACCORDING TO ABHINAVAGUPTA.

The difference between drama and poetry is primarily that of form. The appeal of the one is to both the æsthetic senses, the eye and the ear; but that of the other is to the ear only. In one different characters themselves speak in the languages natural to them : in the other the poet speaks for all of them in his own language. In one the situation and the mimetic changes are presented by scenic arrangement and the movements of different parts of the body; in the other they are presented in the language only. But in respect of what is to be heard, particularly that which is metrical in form, drama and poetry are identical. The question, therefore, naturally arises : Did Bharata have an idea of Pratibhā and the intellectual background (Vyutpatti) which are looked upon as the most essential qualifications for the poetic production ?

To get an answer to this question we have to remember that Bharata very often does not talk in direct technical terms, but in suggestive mythical terms. This view is supported by Abhinava's interpretation of Bharata's text in the Abhinava

Bhāratī. Accordingly if we try to get at the technical meaning of the mythical term that he uses for the first mythical dramatist and, therefore, poet, who is represented to have composed the first drama, a Samavakāra, entitled Amṛtamanthana, which was the first to be presented on the fully constructed stage,[1] we find that Bharata had an idea of Pratibhā, the creative poetic genius. For, he represents Pitāmaha, Prajāpati or Brahmā, to be not only the originator of dramaturgy but also the author of the said first drama. And the creative power is recognised to be the most distinctive characteristic of Brahmā in Indian mythology. Therefore, such a reference to Brahmā, suggests that Bharata recognised 'the creative power' to be the most essential in poet. In fact Abhinava has interpreted the word Prajāpati to mean this as follows :—

Evaṁ pitāmahasadṛśena sarvadā nāṭyaveda-śarīra-rūpaka-nirmāṇe kavinā bhāvyamiti. A. Bh., Vol. I, 15-6.

To emphasise the greatest importance of the creative power in the poet, Ānanda Vardhana also speaks of the poet as 'Prajāpati' in reference to the poetic world (Kāvya saṁsāra).

Apāre kāvyasaṁsāre kavirekaḥ prajāpatiḥ
Yathāsmai rocate viśvaṁ tathedam parivartate.
Dh. L., (B) 498.

As regards the intellectual background (Vyutpatti) Bharata says definitely that there is no knowledge, spiritual or worldly, no craft, no technical science, no art, which does not find place in the dramatic presentation. Thus he asserts the importance of the vast intellectual background in the poet or dramatist. The same idea is conveyed by the types of critics and their general intellectual background, which are very clearly stated by Bharata.

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1. A. Bh., Vol. I, 87.

The function of the critics was to point out the merits and demerits of the dramatic presentation. There were nine points to which their criticism was directed. And for criticism on every one of these points there was a separate critic. These were (i) religious ceremony (ii) acting (iii) metre (iv) language (v) war (vi) make-up (vii) polite behaviour in the context of love (viii) music and (ix) service[1]. And every one of the critics, who gave his judgement separately on one of these points, had to be not only an expert in his own branch but also had to have the general intellectual background[2]. To satisfy such critics the dramatist or the poet also had to be thoroughly familiar with the various branches of learning.

PRATIBHĀ IN THE CONNOISSEUR.

It is admitted that the poetic activity, the working of the mind of the poet, shines objectively to those who are well versed in poetic literature and practice of the art, just at the moment when they look at the poetical work, that springs from Pratibhā. Abhinava admits that the power of mind to which the poetic activity shines objectively is the Pratibhā[3].

In a verse that serves as an illustration of the Lakṣaṇa, called Samādhi, the words are so chosen and arranged that besides the conventional meaning, it gives rise to a suggested meaning in the mind of an æsthete. The power of the mind that arouses such a meaning is recognised to be Pratibhā.[4]

PRATIBHĀ IN THE ACTOR.

The success of the dramatic presentation primarily depends on the success of the actors in presenting characters of the piece and upon the clear grasp of characteristic features of

1. A. Bh., Vol. III, 313. 2. Ibid., 311–2.
3. A. Bh., Vol. II, 298. 4. Ibid., 337.

the characters which they represent. That which gives a very clear idea of the character to the actor is Pratibhā[1].

INFLUENCE OF BHARATA ON THE WRITERS ON SANSKRIT POETICS IN THE CONCEPTIONS OF PRATIBHĀ AND VYUTPATTI.

Bhāmaha, Vāmana, Ānanda Vardhana, Rājaśekhara and Abhinavagupta historically came in the order of succession and have dealt with the power or powers, necessary for the poetic production. Among the poeticians, whose works are available, Bhāmaha was the first to talk of Pratibhā as the poetic power, responsible for rare poetic production.[2] He talked of Śakti[3] also, but did not distinguish Pratibhā from it. He seems to have looked upon Pratibhā and Śakti to be synonimous.

While emphasising the supreme importance of Pratibhā, he points out the close study of grammar, prosody, lexicon, history, logic, arts, close association with those who are skilled in poetic art and full familiarity with the works of earlier poets, as antecedent conditions of the poetic production. He asserts that in poetic production the different parts must necessarily have proper relation with one another[4] and accordingly devotes a separate chapter to logic.

Thus, Bhāmaha recognises Pratibhā[5] to be the main source of poetry. But in so doing he seems to follow Bharata, as interpreted above. As regards the intellectual background of the poet he clearly follows Bharata. In fact in emphasising the necessity of the vast intellectual background he seems to repeat Bharata with necessary modifications :—

Na sa śabdo na tadvācyam na sa nyāyo na sā Kalā
Jāyate yanna kāvyāṅgamaho bhāro mahākaveḥ

(K. A., 32.)

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1. A. Bh., Vol. III, 306. 2. K. A., 1.
3. Ibid., 41. 4. Ibid,, 32. 5. Ibid., 1.

In stating the particular branches of learning also, the knowledge of which he considers to be necessary in the poet, he seems to repeat much of what was said by Bharata in regard to the qualifications of the critics. Compare for instance :—

Śabdacchandobhidhānārthā itihāsāśrayāḥ kathāḥ
Loko yuktiḥ kalāśceti mantavyā kāvyayairamī

K. A., 2.

And

Śabdacchandobhidhānajñā nānāśāstravicakṣaṇāḥ
Evaṁ vidhāstu kartavyāḥ prāśnikā daśarūpake

A. Bh., Vol. III, 312.

In including the knowledge of the facts of empirical world and that of logic in the above quotation, he is indebted to Bharata. For, Bharata had repeatedly said that what was not explicitly mentioned by him had to be learnt from the world (Lokādevāvagantavyāḥ) and had recognised knowledge of the "Vidyā" to be an essential qualification of the dramatist. And Vidyā is admitted to have four branches, and logic is one of them :—

Ānvīkṣikī trayī vārtā daṇḍanītiśca śāśvatī
Vidyā hyetā catasrastu lokasaṁsthiti hetavaḥ.

VĀMANA'S APPROACH.

Vāmana does not say much that had not been stated by Bhāmaha on Pratibhā and intellectual background, necessary in poet. He emphasises the importance of the knowledge of the three; (i) the world (ii) branches of learning and (iii) miscellany, which he recognises to be Kāvyāṅgas in so far as they are helpful in the poetic production. For, one of the accepted meanings of the word "Aṅga" is "Upakāraka" (Pradhānasyopakārakam aṅgam) : and in the commentary it is clearly

stated that what are spoken of as "Aṅgas" are necessary and helpful in poetic production.[1]

The fact is that Bhāmaha had used the word "Kāvyāṅga" in connection with word, meaning, logic and arts.[2] And though he had mentioned Pratibhā separately as the source of poetry and counted grammar, prosody, lexicon etc. as those the knowledge of which he considered necessary for poetic production : yet he also had emphasised the importance of the study of earlier poetical works and of learning the art from those, proficient in it.

These very things, pointed out by Bhāmaha, as necessary for poetic production, were put under three Kāvyāṅgas (helpers in poetic production), (i) knowledge of the world (ii) different branches of learning (iii) miscellany, by Vāmana. And a few things like practice and concentration which are not directly stated by Bhāmaha, are implied by those mentioned by him. One is, however, surprised to find that Vāmana puts Pratibhā under miscellany and there too he gives last but one place to it; though he recognises it to be the most important in so far as he holds that without it poetic production is as impossible as sprout without seed.[3] According to him, it is a certain bent of mind which is due to certain factors in the past life.

DAṆḌIN'S APPROACH.

Daṇḍin in his Kāvyādarśa, recognises Pratibhā to be the first of the three sources from which poetry springs; Pratibhā, vast and clear intellectual background and constant practice. He admits it to be natural (Naisargikī), to be the gift of nature.[4] But unlike Bhāmaha, he maintains that some kind of poetic

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1. K. Su., 25, 29.
2. K. A., 32.
3. K. Su., 30.
4. K. Ad., 95.

production is possible on account of close application to study and continuous practice of the poetic art. He asserts that Pratibhā can be acquired to some extent.[1] According to the commentator, Pratibhā and Śakti are synonimous. Thus Daṇḍin also, in his presentation of the causes of the poetic production, is under the influence of Bhāmaha, though he puts all knowledge, acquired from various sources, counted separately by Bhāmaha, under Śruta.

PRATIBHĀ, ACCORDING TO ĀNANDA VARDHANA AS INTERPRETED BY ABHINAVAGUPTA.

Pratibhā, according to Ānanda Vardhana, is that which enables a poet to produce poetical works which pulsate with the suggestible meaning and on account of which he is called a great poet.[2]

It is necessary, not only in the poet for the production of the suggestive poetry, but also in the æsthete for the grasp of the suggested meaning. The suggestive poetry can arouse the suggestible meaning in him alone who has got the Pratibhā, the power to visualise the suggested meaning. But in order to be able to visualise the suggested meaning it presupposes[3] clear grasp of the primary, the secondary and the contextual meanings of the piece of poetry.

It is not simply a matter of inference, reached from the good poetic products, but a matter of direct experience. That is as follows :—

Abhinavagupta, following Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, compares poetry, proceeding from the lips of a poet, to a cow, from whom milk, the æsthetic idea, flows on account of affection for the calf, the æsthete, who experiences it subjectively by losing

1. K. Ad., 97.
2. Dh. L. (B) 91.
3. Ibid., 62, 68, 69.

himself in it, by entering into it, and not objectively, as a Yogin experiences the state of another's mind, because of his Yogic power, attained through hard Yogic practices. For, Pratibhā in a poet is the intellect (Buddhi[1]) that is capable of producing flawlessly beautiful new æsthetic configurations, because the poetry flowing from the lips of poet is the Pratibhā, manifesting itself in æsthetic configuration and because the æsthete experiences it through identification with the focal point in it, through entering into or merging in it; therefore, he experiences Pratibhā directly in its act of manifesting the æsthetic configuration. Hence the experience of the power of poetic production by the æsthete is not a matter of inference but experience of what is directly present.[2]

Pratibhā is conceived not only as the poetic power that is responsible for producing flawlessly beautiful new æsthetic configurations, but also as the power of imagination which builds up new imaginative constructs, necessary for the picturasque presentation of the æsthetic configuration.[3] It is that which produces new æsthetic configurations such as give rise to æsthetic experience.[4] It is of innumerable types, because it introduces innumerable types of suggested meaning in the presentation of the familiar themes.[5] It is the introduction of the suggested meaning that gives newness to an old theme. But to introduce such a meaning is the work of Pratibhā.[6] Ānanda Vardhana admits that the endlessness of the variety of Pratibhā and accordingly of the poetic production is due to the endlessness of the types of Dhvani. According to him, it is the element of the suggested meaning that gives the look of newness to an old theme exactly as the new leaves and flowers in the spring do to the trees.[7]

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1. Dh. L., (B) 91-2. 2. Ibid., 92.
3. Ibid., 317. 4. Ibid., 508.
5. Ibid., 522. 6. Ibid., 537. 7. Ibid., 527-8.

He holds that poetry flows from poetic genius spontaneously, without any laborious effort on the part of the poet,[1] but only when it has attained maturity because of the meritorious deeds of the past and the continuous practice of the art.[2]

PRATIBHĀ ACCORDING TO RĀJAŚEKHARA.

Rājaśekhara's approach to Pratibhā is from the æsthetic piont of view. Pratibhā, according to him, is one of the essentials of poetic production. It occupies a subordinate position to the power of poetic production (Śakti), which, though inherent, needs the mental concentration and the constant practice of the art to become manifest. There is very great difference and distance between Śakti on the one hand and Pratibhā and Vyutpatti on the other. Śakti is a presupposition of Pratibhā. Pratibhā is one of the functions or powers of the poetic genius. It consists in vividly bringing before the mind's eye of the poet all that is necessary for the poetic production, the set of words, complete meaning, the figures of speech, the method of presentation. It is that which enables a poet to grasp clearly by mind what has never been the object of perception. It is what makes a born blind a great poet. It is on account of Pratibhā that a great poet can describe the scenes, never seen by him, in a charming and appealing way.[3]

It is of two types, according as it is responsible for (i) the rise of the poetic vision[4] in the poet's mind or (ii) for the complete grasp of the poetic vision[5] by the connoisseur, through careful perusal of and contemplation on the poetic production.

This Śakti seems to be referred to by Mammaṭa in his Kāvya Prakāśa. But Mammaṭa, as a summariser of earlier

1. Dh. L., (B) 550. 2. Ibid., 551.
3. K. M., 11–2. 4. Ibid., 12. 5. Ibid., 13.

views on poetics, does not add any thing to what had been said on the subject by competent authorities. In stating the three factors,[1] which are mainly responsible for poetic productions, (i) the poetic power (Śakti) (ii) intellectual background, due to the study of the Śāstras and observation of natural facts (Nipuṇatā) and (iii) practice of the art, he mainly follows Rājaśekhara, who admitted all the three, as has been pointed out above. However, Mammaṭa puts them on the same level and does not recognise causal relation of one with another, as did Rājaśekhara.

He follows Ānanda Vardhana in admitting Pratibhā to be that aspect of the mind, which grasps the suggested meaning[2] from the conventional.

It may be noted here by the way that Jagannātha, in his Rasagaṅgādhara, ignores the poetic power (Śakti) and the conception of Pratibhā as one of the functions of the poetic power such as brings before the mind's eye of the poet all that is necessary for poetic production, the set of words, complete meaning, figures of speech, the method of presentation, as Rājaśekhara maintained. According to Jagannātha, Pratibhā is the poetic vision, which is such a harmonious combination of words and meanings, or thought and expression, as serves as the basis or the primary cause of poetic æsthetic presentation (Kāvya). This may be due to the boon of a god or a spiritually great man, or to careful study of the various branches of learning and observation of the facts of the world, or to the persistent practice of the art. He differs from Mammaṭa in admitting each of the above three as an independent cause of poetic production.[3] For, Mammaṭa recognised the combination of them to be the cause of poetry.

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1. K. Pra., 2–3.
2. Ibid., 22.
3. R. G., 8.

Another point that needs discussion in connection with Rājaśekhara is as follows :—

Rājaśekhara uses the word "Vyutpatti", not in the sense of the intellectual background, due to the study of the various branches of learning, but in that of the capacity to differentiate between the befitting and the unbefitting, right and wrong.[1] The question, therefore, arises : Did he consider the study of the Śāstras to be necessary for poet. The reply is that according to him, the study of the various branches of learning is necessary for both the poet and the connoisseur. For, he divides the entire literature into two (i) Śāstra and (ii) Kāvya and holds that in the case of poet the study of the Śāstras should precede the poetic production, because poetry reflects the entire culture of the nation, embodied in the various branches of its literature; and because to poet his intellectual background is the means to find out such ideas as make poetry what it should be, exactly as a lamp is to get at the desired things in darkness.[2] And the knowledge of the various branches of learning is admitted to be necessary condition for the study and appreciation of poetry, because proper understanding of the ideas of poet by the lover of poetry presupposes an intellectual background similar to that of the poet.

He recognises not only the study of the Śāstras under a good teacher but also the practice of the art as necessary for poetic production. He holds that there can be no poet by nature and that one who attempts to write poetry without the study of the Śāstras simply makes himself ridiculous[3] and is obstinately obstinate.

BHAṬṬA TAUTA'S CONCEPTION OF PRATIBHĀ.

We have not so far discovered any work of Bhaṭṭa Tauta. But from a quotation, probably from the Kāvyakautuka, it

1. K. M., 16. 2. Ibid., 2. 3. Ibid., 15.

is clear that he admitted that Rasas are suggested and that Lakṣaṇa, Guṇa, Alaṅkāra, Sandhyaṅga, Vṛtti and all that which is referred to as Vācyābhinaya, are the means of æsthetic presentation, employed by mature Pratibhā for suggesting Rasa, exactly as a raft is that of crossing the river.[1]

A VIEW OF PRATIBHĀ, KNOWN FROM ABHINAVA'S REFERENCE.

In the context of discussion on Lakṣaṇa in his commentary on the 16th Chapter of the Nāṭya Śāstra, Abhinavagupta refers to a view, according to which the activity of the poet, which is responsible for poetic production, is divided into three types (i) that which introduces in the poetic production the qualities (Guṇas) such as sweetness (Mādhurya) etc. and such suggestive words and meanings as suggest Rasa (ii) that which embellishes it (iii) that which brings in the Lakṣaṇas. These are referred to as the first, the second and the third stirs (Parispanda) of the poet. Accordingly Pratibhā is recognised to be the first stir.[2]

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN RĀJAŚEKHARA AND ABHINAVAGUPTA ON ŚAKTI, PRATIBHĀ AND VYUTPATTI.

Rājaśekhara differentiates between Śakti and Pratibhā, and recognises Pratibhā to be one of the important factors in the poetic production. According to him, Śakti is the presupposition of both Pratibhā and Vyutpatti in so far as they are the products of Śakti. He holds, as we have already pointed out, that Pratibhā is that, which brings before the mind's eye of the poet all that is necessary for the poetic production. Similarly Vyutpatti is that which differentiates between befitting and unbefitting, and right and wrong. Abhinavagupta, being under the influence of the Kula

1. A. Bh., Vol. III, 78. 2. A. Bh., Vol. II, 296.

system, which recognises Pratibhā to be identical with Parā or Anuttarā and of that of the Pratyabhijñā, which admits the identity of Pratibhā and Maheśvara, holds Śakti to be synonimous with Pratibhā.[1]

And because Pratibhā, being identical with Parā or Maheśvara, is all powerful, therefore, the recognition of a separate power to distinguish between right and wrong, as admitted by Rājaśekhara, is unnecessary. Hence in the Ghaṭa Karpara Kulaka Vivṛti Abhinavagupta does not admit the distinction between Śakti or Pratibhā and Vyutpatti.

But Abhinavagupta uses the word Vyutpatti in many other senses also, two of which are important in the present context: namely (i) the knowledge (Jñāna) or intellectual backgroud that is due to the study of different branches of learning[2] (ii) the unlearnt and unacquired skill, which the modern psychologists would refer to as instinct, which is found in some degree in every being, not excluding even the birds, which make beautiful nests. Accordingly Abhinava admits the distinction between Pratibhā and Vyutpatti, asserting the former to be the cause and the latter to be the effect.[3] But often, emphasising the identity of cause and effect, he speaks of identity of Vyutpatti in general and Pratibhā.

MAHIMA BHAṬṬA ON PRATIBHĀ.

Pratibhā was an important concept of poetics, not only among the predecessors of Abhinavagupta, as we have pointed out earlier, but also among his contemporaries and successors. Thus Mahima Bhaṭṭa wrote a work, the Tattvokti Kośa, which has not been traced so far, in which he dealt with the concept of Pratibhā. Giving a summary view of it in the Vyakti

1. Dh. L., (B) 317.
2. Ibid., 40.
3. T. A., Ah. XIII, 89.

Viveka, he recognises it to be the power of knowledge, which is due to the rise above the limitations of individuality and identification with the Universal Self, and which is nothing but the third eye of Śiva, capable of grasping directly all that is in all the three worlds.[1]

PRATIBHĀ AS AN EVIDENCE OF THE IDENTITY OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND MAHEŚVARA.

The Realistic Idealism holds that the Universal Mind is all-inclusive, has within itself potentially what it manifests externally; that even in practical life at the empirical level, the sphere of Māyā, the Lord (Maheśvara) Himself, out of His free will, manifests Himself, primarily as a subject, limited by body, vital air etc. and makes the mass of objects, that lies within Him as identical with the Self, shine externally as "This"[2] : that the clarity in the perceptual cognition and comparative obscurity in remembrance are due to the fact that in the former the object is manifested by the free will (Svātantrya), but in the latter the manifestation of the object is due to the revival of the residual traces of the past experiences : that the imagination is of two types (i) purposive and (ii) free. The configuration of ideas that appears objectively in the former case is entirely made up of the material taken from the stock of memory, but each constituent is entirely free from association with time of the past experience: but in free imagination, the imagination of a great artist, a poet, for instance, the images, which figure before the mind's eye, are due, not to the external stimulus as in the case of perception; nor to the revival of the residual traces of the past experiences associated with the past time, as in the case of remembrance; nor to the revived past ideas, free from association with the time of the past experiences, as in purposive

1. V. V., 390–1. 2. Bh., Vol. I, 329.

imagination : on the contrary, they are the manifestations of free will[1] and as such are not the objects of common experience.

Rājaśekhara, in his Kāvyamīmāṁsā, supports this view and points out that images, which figure in the poetic imagination, are not necessarily such as have been constructed out of the elements or bits of the past experiences. For, there have been born blind poets, Medhāvi, Rudra, Kumāradāsa etc., who have vividly presented the objects of ocular perception, though they never could see any thing.[2]

Therefore, this picturing up of what has never been the object of empirical knowledge and the objective grasp of the so pictured up, lead us to the conclusion (i) that the individual mind is essentially identical with the Universal Mind, the Maheśvara : for, in no other way can the picturing up of the unknown be explained : (ii) that it can cast off the limitations of individuality and can not only manifest externally any thing at will but also grasp it objectively : (iii) that if we interpret "Pratibhā" not only as that which, being reflected on the mirror of extrovert light of consciousness, the Buddhi, shines objectively (Pratīpa-bhānam pratibhā) but also as that on the basis of which alone it shines objectively; as that which is responsible for the manifestation of what shines objectively (Pratibhāpayati iti Pratibhā); if we take the shining objectivity in conjunction with that which makes it so shine, then Pratibhā is the Universal Mind or the individual mind universalised, with its free objective manifestations shining in opposition to it, though still resting on it. Hence Pratibhā is admitted to be the All-inclusive Universal Consciousness, the Maheśvara, in the Pratyabhijñā system. This is very much like the identi-

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1. Bh., Vol. I, 338. 2. K. M., 11–2.

fication of Pratibhā with Paśyantī or Sphoṭa in the philosophy of language, discussed earlier.

Pratibhā raises the individual from the level of individuality to that of the Sadvidyā. If a person does not descend from that he gets liberated and becomes Śiva.[1]

Further ellucidation of the concept of Pratibhā will be found in Comparative Æsthetics Vol. III "Indian And Western Æsthetics" in the section on 'poetic genious' or 'Kavi Pratibhā'.



THE END

1. T. A., Ah. XIII, 118.

APPENDIX A.

Textual authorities indicated by foot-notes.

Page 4.

1. तदनन्तरमेष कामरूपानधिगत्याभिनवोपशब्दगुप्तम् ॥
अजयत्किल शाक्तभाष्यकारं स च भग्नो मनसेदमालुलोचे ।
Ś. D., ch. XV, Ś. 158.

2. स च भग्नोऽभिनवगुप्ताचार्यो मनसेदं वक्ष्यमाणं विचारयामास ।
Ś. D., Comm., ch. XV, Ś. 158.

Page 5.

1. अन्तर्वेद्यामत्रिगुप्ताभिधानः प्राप्योत्पत्तिं प्राविशत्प्राग्र्यजन्मा ।
श्रीकाश्मीरांश्चन्द्रचूडावतारैर्निःसंख्याकैर्पावितोपान्तभागान् ॥
P. T. V., 280.

Page 6.

1. निःशेषशास्त्रसदनं किल मध्यदेशस्तस्मिन्नजायत गुणाभ्यधिको द्विजन्मा ।
कोप्यत्रिगुप्त इति नामनिरुक्तगोत्रः शास्त्राब्धिचर्वणकलोद्यदगस्त्यगोत्रः ॥
तमथ ललितादित्यो राजा स्वकं पुरमानयत् ।
प्रणयरभसात् कश्मीराख्यं हिमालयमूर्धगम् ॥
T. A., XII, 404–5.

2. तस्मिन् कुबेरपुरचारु शितांशुमौलिसांमुख्यदर्शनविरूढपवित्रभावे ।
वैतस्तरोधसि निवासममुष्य चक्रे राजा द्विजस्य परिकल्पितभूरिसम्पत् ॥
T. A., XII, 411.

3. तस्यान्वये महति कोऽपि वराहगुप्तनामा बभूव भगवान् स्वयमन्तकाले ।
गीर्वाणसिन्धुलहरीकलिताग्रमूर्धा यस्याकरोत्परमनुग्रहमाग्रहेण ॥
तस्यात्मजः चुखुलकेति जने प्रसिद्धश्चन्द्रावदातधिषणो नरसिंहगुप्तः ।
यं सर्वशास्त्ररसमज्जनशुभ्रचित्तम् माहेश्वरी परमलङ्कुरुते स्म भक्तिः ॥
Ibid.

Page 7.

1. विमला इति वर्णकला आश्रयः आलम्बनं यस्याः विमलकलाभिधाने-
त्यर्थः·················

अस्य हि ग्रन्थकृतः नरसिंहगुप्तविमलाख्यौ पितरौ इति गुरवः।

T. A., Comm., I, 14.

Page 8.

1. शिवशक्त्यात्मकं रूपं भावयेच्च परस्परम् ।
न कुर्यान्मानवीं बुद्धिं रागमोहादिसंयुताम् ॥
ज्ञानभावनया सर्वं कर्तव्यं साधकोत्तमैः ।
............तदेवम्
एवंविधसिद्धयोगिनीप्रायपितृमेलकसमुत्थतया
तादृङ्मेलककलिकाकलिततनुर्यो भवेद्गर्भे ।
उक्तः स योगिनीभूः स्वयमेव ज्ञानभाजनं भक्तः ॥
इत्युक्तनीत्या स्वात्मनि निरुत्तरपदाद्वयज्ञानपात्रतामभिदधता ग्रन्थकृता निखिलषडर्धशास्त्रसारसंग्रहभूतग्रन्थकरणेऽप्यधिकारः कटाक्षीकृतः।

T. A., Comm., I, 14–15.

Page 9.

1. वसुरसपौषे कृष्णदशम्यामभिनवगुप्तः स्तवमिममकरोत्।

Bh. S., V. 11.

2. षट्षष्ठिनामके वर्षे नवम्यामसितेऽहनि ।
मयाभिनवगुप्तेन मार्गशीर्षे स्तुतः शिवः ॥

K. S., V. 30.

Page 10.

1. इदमत्र रहस्यम्, पुरा किल काचिद्वलभौ पठतां बहूनां ब्राह्मणबालकानामध्ययनशाला आसीत्। तत्र पठन् कश्चिद् गौडबालोऽतिसौबुद्ध्यान्मुखरत्वाच्च निखिलबालानां भयप्रदत्वेन बालवलभीभुजङ्ग इति गुरुणा व्यपदिष्टः। स चाचार्यतामुपगतः, इति सकलरहस्याभिज्ञः श्रीवाग्देवतावतारो (मम्मटः) गूढं तन्नाम अभिनवगोपानसीगुप्तपाद इति वैदग्ध्यमुखेनाभिव्यनक्ति।

B. B., 95.

Page 11.

1. अहमप्यत एवाधःशास्त्रदृष्टिकुतूहलात् ।
नास्तिकार्हतबौद्धादीनुपाध्यायानसेविषम् ॥

T. A., VIII, 206.

2. एते सेवारसविरचितानुग्रहाः शास्त्रसारम् ।
प्रौढादेशप्रकटसुभगं स्वाधिकारं किलास्मै ॥
यत्संप्रादुः............

T. A., XII, 415.

Page 12.

1. कश्चिद् दक्षिणभूमिपीठवसतिः श्रीमान् विभुर्भैरवः
पञ्चस्रोतसि सातिमार्गविभवे शास्त्रे विधाता च यः।
तस्याभूत्सुमतिस्ततः समुदभूत्तस्यैव शिष्याग्रणीः
श्रीमाञ्छम्भुरिति प्रसिद्धिमगमज्जालन्धरात्पीठतः॥
T. A., Comm., I, 236.

2. कुलप्रक्रियागुरुमप्युत्कर्षयति । भगवत्या सह शम्भुनाथ एकः ।
T. A., Comm., I, 31.

3. श्रीशम्भुनाथभास्करचरणनिपातप्रभापगतसंकोचम् ।
अभिनवगुप्तहृदम्बुजम्..................
T. A., I, 51.

4. पित्रा स शब्दगहने कृतसंप्रवेशः ।
T. A., XII, 413.

5. आमर्दसन्ततिमहार्णवकर्णधारः सद्देशिकैरकवरात्मजवामनाथः ।
T. A., XII, 413.

6. अथोच्यते ब्रह्मविद्या सद्यःप्रत्ययदायिनी ।
शिवः श्रीभूतिराजो यामस्मभ्यं प्रत्यपादयत् ॥
T. A., Comm., III, 194.

7. श्रीनाथसन्ततिमहाम्बरघर्मकान्तिः श्रीभूतिराजतनयः स्वपितृप्रसादः ।
T. A., XII, 414.

8. देवी त्रिंशतिकेपि अस्य श्रीसोमानन्दपादेभ्यः प्रभृति त्रिकदर्शनवदेव गुरवः।
T. A., Comm., III. 194.

त्रैयम्बकप्रसरसागरवीचिसोमानन्दात्मजोत्पलजलक्ष्मणगुप्तनाथः ।
T. A., XII, 414.

9. भट्टेन्दुराजचरणाब्जकृताधिवासहृद्यश्रुतोऽभिनवगुप्तपदाभिधोऽहम् ।
Dh. L., I,

10. सद्विप्रतोतवदनोदितनाट्यवेदतत्त्वार्थमर्थिजनवाञ्छितसिद्धिहेतोः ।
A. Bh., Vol. I, I.

11. श्रीचन्द्रचन्द्रवरभक्तिविलासयोगानन्दाभिनन्दशिवभक्तिविचित्रनाथाः ।
अन्येऽपि धर्मशिववामनकोद्भटश्रीभूतीशभास्करमुखप्रमुखा महान्तः ॥
T. A., XII, 415

Page 13.

1. तत्र हास्याभासो यथास्मत्पितृव्यस्य वामनगुप्तस्य :—
लोकोत्तराणि चरितानि न लोक एष संमन्यते यदि किमङ्ग वदाम नाम ।
यत्त्वत्र हासमुखतत्त्वममुष्य तेन पार्श्वोपपीडमिह को न विजाहसीति ॥
A. Bh., Vol. I, 297.

2. सोऽनुग्रहीतुमथ शाम्भवशक्तिभाजं स्वभ्रातरं निखिलशास्त्रविमर्शपूर्णम् ।
यावन्मनः प्रणिदधाति मनोरथाख्यम्··············

T. A., XII, 415.

3. अन्ये पितृव्यतनयाः शिवशक्तिशुभ्राः क्षेमोत्पलाभिनवचक्रकपद्मगुप्ताः ।
ये संपदं तृणममंसत शम्भुसेवासंपूरितं स्वहृदयं हृदि भावयन्तः ॥

T. A., XII, 417.

Page 14.

1. माता व्ययूयुजदमुं किल बाल्य एव दैवो हि भाविपरिकर्मणि संस्करोति ।
··················
माता परं बन्धुरिति प्रवादः स्नेहोतिगाढीकुरुते हि पाशान् ।

T. A., XII, 413.

2. तारुण्यसागरतरंगभरानपोह्य वैराग्यपोतमधिरुह्य दृढं हठेन ।

T. A., XII, 412.

3. साहित्यसान्द्ररसभोगपरो महेशभक्त्या स्वयंग्रहणदुर्मदया गृहीतः ॥
स तन्मयीभूय न लोकवर्तनीमजीगणत् कामपि केवलं पुनः ।
तदीयसंभोगविवृद्धये पुरा करोति दास्यं गुरुवेश्मसु स्वयम् ॥

T. A., XII. 414.

दारासुतप्रभृतिबन्धकथामनाप्तः

I. P. V. V., Vol. III. 405.

Page 15.

1. इति कालतत्त्वमुदितं शास्त्रमुखागमनिजानुभवसिद्धम् ।

T. A., IV, 202.

2. तद्दृष्टिसंसृतिच्छेदिप्रत्यभिज्ञोपदेशिनः ।
श्रीमल्लक्ष्मणगुप्तस्य गुरोर्विजयते वचः ॥
अप्यसंख्यनवास्वादचमत्कारैकदुर्मदा ।
येनानुत्तरसंभोगतृप्ता मे मतिषट्पदी ॥

M. V. V., 2.

3. देवीत्रिंशतिकेपि अस्य श्रीसोमानन्दपादेभ्यः प्रभृति त्रिकदर्शनवदेव गुरवः ।

T. A., Comm., III, 194.

Page 16.

1. एवं क्रमकेलावप्येतद्गर्भीकारेण यदनेन ग्रन्थकृता व्याख्यातं तत्रापि अन्यथा न किंचित् संभावनीयम्······························यदुक्तं तत्रैवानेन

यथैकः श्रीमान् वीरवरः सुगृहीतनामधेयो गोविन्दराजाभिधानः........
यत्प्रसादादासादितमहिमभिरस्माभिरेतत्प्रदर्शितम् ।

T. A., Comm., III. 191-2.

2. एवं तन्त्रप्रक्रियोपासन्नगुर्वभिमुखीकरणानन्तरम्
विश्रान्तिस्थानतया कुलप्रक्रियागुरुमप्युत्कर्षयति ।

T. A., Comm., I, 31.

3. श्रीभट्टनाथचरणाब्जयुगात्तथा श्रीभट्टारिकाङ्घ्रियुगलाद् गुरुसन्ततिर्या।
बोधान्यपाशविषनुत्तदुपासनोत्थबोधोज्वलोऽभिनवगुप्त इदं करोति ॥

T. A., I, 16.

Page 17.

1. रुद्रशक्तिसमावेशस्तत्र नित्यं प्रतिष्ठितः ।
सति तस्मिंश्च चिह्नानि तस्यैतानि विलक्षयेत् ॥
तत्रैतत्प्रथमं चिह्नं रुद्रे भक्तिः सुनिश्चला ।
द्वितीयं मन्त्रसिद्धिः स्यात् सद्यः प्रत्ययकारिका ॥
सर्वतत्त्ववशित्वं च तृतीयं लक्षणं स्मृतम् ।
प्रारब्धकार्यनिष्पत्तिश्चिह्नमाहुश्चतुर्थकम् ॥
कवित्वं पञ्चमं ज्ञेयं सालङ्कारं मनोहरम् ।
सर्वशास्त्रार्थवेत्तृत्वमकस्माच्चास्य जायते ॥

T. A., Comm., VIII, 136.

2. समस्तं चेदं चिह्नजातमस्मिन्नेव ग्रन्थकारे प्रादुरभूदिति प्रसिद्धिः।
यद्गुरुवः
अकस्मात्सर्वशास्त्रार्थज्ञत्वाद्यं लक्ष्मपञ्चकम् ।
यस्मिञ्छ्रीपूर्वशास्त्रोक्तमदृश्यत जनैः स्फुटम् ॥

T. A., Comm., VIII, 137.

Page 18,

1. इत्थं गृहे वत्सलिकावतीर्णे
स्थितः समाधाय मतिं बहूनि ।
पूर्वश्रुतान्याकलयन् स्वबुद्ध्या
शास्त्राणि तेभ्यः समवाप सारम् ॥

T. A., XII, 425.

Page 19.

1. तस्मिन् कुबेरपुरचारुशितांशुमौलिसाम्मुख्यदर्शनविरूढपवित्रभावे
(V. भागे) ।

वैतस्तरोधसि (V. मूर्धनि) निवासममुष्य चक्रे
राजा द्विजस्य परिकल्पितभूमिसंपत् ॥

T. A., XII, 411.

2. प्रवरपुरनामधेये पुरे पूर्वं काश्मीरिकोऽभिनवगुप्तः ।
मालिन्यादिमवाक्ये वार्तिकमेतद्रचयति स्म ॥

M. V. V., 135.

3. विक्षिप्तभावपरिहारमसौ चिकीर्षन् मन्द्रः स्वके पुरवरे स्थितिमस्य बब्रे ।

T. A., XII. 419

Page 20.

1. श्रीमानभिनवगुप्ताचार्यः श्रीकण्ठनाथ एवेति ।
प्रतिपद्यतामितरथा व्याख्यातृत्वं कथं भवेदित्थम् ॥

Gu. Pa., Ś. 23.

2. द्राक्षारामस्य मध्ये स्फटिकमणिमये मण्डपे चित्ररम्ये
पुष्पस्रग्धूपदीपैर्बहलपरिमले चर्चिते चन्दनाद्यैः ।
वाद्यैर्गीतैः सनृत्यैः सततमुखरिते योगिनीसिद्धसंघै-
राकीर्णे स्वर्णपीठे मृदुतलिमतले बद्धमुक्तावितानें ॥ १ ॥
आसीनः क्षेमराजप्रभृतिभिरखिलैः सेवितः शिष्यवर्गैः
पादोपान्ते निषण्णैरवहितहृदयैरुक्तमुक्तं लिखद्भिः ।
द्वाभ्यां पार्श्वस्थिताभ्यां शिवरसकरकं पूर्णताम्बूलपेटीं
दूतीभ्यां बिभ्रतीभ्यामपरकरलसन्मातुलिङ्गोत्पलाभ्याम् ॥ २ ॥
आनन्दान्दोलिताक्षः स्फुटकृततिलको भस्मना भालमध्ये
रुद्राक्षोल्लासिकर्णः कलितकचभरो मालया लम्बकूर्चः ।
रक्ताङ्गो यक्षपङ्कोल्लसदसितगलो लम्बमुक्तोपवीतः
क्षौमं वासो वसानः शशिकरधवलं वीरयोगासनस्थः ॥ ३ ॥
जान्वासक्तैकहस्तः स्फुटपरमशिवज्ञानमुद्राक्षसूत्रो
वामश्रीपाणिपद्मस्फुरितनखमुखैर्वादयन्नादवीणाम् ।
श्रीकण्ठेशावतारः परमकरुणया प्राप्तकाश्मीरदेशः
श्रीमान्नः पातु साक्षादभिनववपुषा दक्षिणामूर्तिदेवः ॥ ४ ॥

Dh. Ś., 1-4.

Page 21.

1. कर्पूरागरुकस्तूरीकक्कोलैर्यक्षकर्दमः ।
गात्रानुलेपनी वर्तिर्वर्णकं स्याद्विलेपनम् ॥

A. Ko., Ch. II. V, 133.

2. एकं पादमथैकस्मिन् विन्यसेदूरुसंस्थितम् ।
इतरस्मिंस्तथा बाहुं वीरासनमिदं स्मृतम् ॥

Ś. C., Vol, IV, 412.

3. शिवरसः पुं० अन्नोदकजे, त्रिरात्रस्थापिताम्नाम्बुरसे ।

Ś. C., Vol. IV, 568.

श्रीब्रह्मयामलेऽप्युक्तं सुरा शिवरसो बहिः ।
तां विना भुक्तिमुक्ती नो पिष्टक्षौद्रगुडैस्तु सा ॥
स्त्रीनपुंसकपुंरूपा तु पूर्वापरभोगदा ।
द्राक्षोत्थं तु परं तेजो भैरवं कल्पनोज्झितम् ॥
एतत्स्वयं रसः शुद्धः प्रकाशानन्दचिन्मयः ।
देवतानां प्रियं नित्यं तस्मादेतत्पिबेत्सदा ॥

T. A., Ah. XXIX. Vs 11–13.

Page 22.

1. आकाशाग्निमरुज्जातो नाभेरुर्ध्वं समुच्चरन् ।
मुखेभिव्यक्तिमायाति स नाद इतीरितः ॥
स च प्राणिभवोऽप्राणिभवश्चोभयसंभवः ।
आद्यः कायभवो वीणादिभवस्तु द्वितीयकः ॥
तृतीयोऽपि च वंशादिभव इत्थं त्रिधा मतः ।
... ...
न नादेन विना गीतं न नादेन विना स्वरः ।
न नादेन विना रागस्तस्मान्नादात्मकं जगत् ॥

Ś. C., Vol. II. 1372.

2. मूलमन्त्रप्रदे श्री गुरौ ॥ यथा ।
शरणं नहि मम जननी न पिता न सुता न सोदरा नान्ये ।
परमं शरणमिदमेव चरणं मम मूर्ध्नि देशिकन्यस्तम् ॥ इत्याचार्यार्या ।

Ś. C., Vol. II. 1244.

3. यो मेलने क्वचन देशिकयोगिनीनाम् ,
अद्य प्रभृत्यखिल एष गुरुक्रमौघः ।
त्वय्येव संक्रमित इत्युपलालितोऽभूत् ,
तस्मै नमोऽभिनवगुप्तगुरूत्तमाय ॥

Gu. Pa., (MS.) V. 7.

4. सिद्धान्तवामभैरवयामलकौलत्रिकैकवीरविदाम् ।
अभिनवगुप्तः श्रीमानाचार्यपदे स्थितो जयति ॥

Gu. Pa., (MS.) V. 21.

Page 23.

1. श्रीशक्तित्रितयावियोगि हृदयं बिभ्रत्तदेकात्मसा-
द्भावाविर्भवदात्मभावनिभृतोल्लासाध्वविस्पन्दितम् ।
श्रीमद्भैरवधाम तद्विजयतां भक्तान्तरात्मस्फुरत्
स्तोत्रप्राभृतसंग्रहोन्मुखतया यद्विश्वरूपायते ॥

I. P. V. V., Vol. I. 1,

Page 25.

1. गुरुभ्योपि गरीयांसं युक्तं श्रीचुखुलाभिधम् ।
वन्दे यत्कृतसंस्कारः स्थितोऽस्मि गलितग्रहः ॥

M. V. V., 1.

2. पूर्वश्रुतान्याकलयन् स्वबुद्धया शास्त्राणि तेभ्यः समवाप सारम् ।

T. A., XII, 425.

Page 39.

1. ग्रन्थं कथामुखमहातिलकाभिधानं
न्यायोक्तषोडशपदार्थनिरूपणाभिः ।
यो वादिनां व्यरचद्विजयाय वादे
तस्मै नमोऽभिनवगुप्तगुरूत्तमाय ॥

Gu. Pa., (MS.) V. 9.

2. एतच्च मया कथामुखतिलके वितत्य निरूपितम् ।

I. P. V. V., Vol. I, 20.

Page 44.

1. सच्छिष्यकर्णमन्द्राभ्यां चोदितोऽहं पुनः पुनः ।
वाक्यार्थं कथये श्रीमन् मालिन्यां यत्कचित्कचित् ॥

M. V. V., 2.

2. प्रवरपुरनामधेये पुरे पूर्वे काश्मीरिकोऽभिनवगुप्तः ।
मालिन्यादिमवाक्ये वार्तिकमेतद्रचयति स्म ॥

M. V. V., 135.

3. एतदष्टादशे तत्त्वमधिकारे भविष्यति ।

M. V. V., 58.

अष्टादशे तत्पटले तत्त्वं सम्यग् विभाव्यते ।

M. V. V., 104.

4. निर्णीतमेतदन्यत्र मयैव विततं यतः ।
तदलं प्रकृतं ब्रूमः

M. V. V., 33.

एतावानत्र संक्षेपो व्यासोऽन्यत्र तु दर्शितः ।

M, V. V., 12-3.

5. भैरवं यामलं चैव मताख्यं मङ्गलं तथा ।
चक्राष्टकं शिखाष्टकं बहुरूपं च सप्तमम् ॥
वागीशं चाष्टमं प्रोक्तमित्यष्टौ वीरवन्दिते ।

T. A., I, 42.

6. ब्रह्मयामलमित्युक्तं विष्णुयामलकं तथा ।
स्वच्छन्दश्च रुरुश्चैव षष्ठं चाथर्वणं स्मृतम् ॥
सप्तमं रुद्रमित्युक्तं वेतालं चाष्टमं स्मृतम् ।

T. A., I, 42.

Page 45.

1. श्रीसोमानन्दकल्याणभवभूतिपुरोगमाः ।
तथा हि त्रीशिकाशास्त्रविवृतौ तेऽभ्यधुर्बुधाः ॥

T, A., VIII, 96.

2. इतीदृग् व्याख्यानं त्यक्त्वा यदन्यैर्व्याख्यातम्, यद्यपि पदवाक्यसंस्कार-विहीनैः सह व्रीडावहा गोष्ठी कृता भवति·········

P. T. V., 93.

Page 46.

1. त्रिंशिका इत्यपि गुरवः पठन्ति, अक्षरवादसाम्यात् न तु त्रिंशच्छ्लोकयोगात् त्रिंशिका ।

P. T. V., 17.

2. त्रीशिका इति तिसृणां शक्तीनां इच्छाज्ञानक्रियाणां··············ईशिका ईश्वरी ।

P. T. V., 16-7.

Page 47.

1. उक्तं श्रीत्रिकसूत्रे च T. A., Ah. XIII. P. 101.
श्रीत्रिकसूत्रे इति—त्रिकप्रमेयसूचिकायां श्रीपरात्रीशिकायामित्यर्थः ।

T. A., Comm., Ah. XIII. P. 101.

2. अनुत्तरप्रक्रियायां वैतत्येन प्रदर्शितम् । अनुत्तरप्रक्रियायामिति—श्रीपरा-त्रीशिकाविवरणादौ इत्यर्थः ।

T. A., VI, 249.

Page 48.

1. प्रत्यवमर्शश्च अन्तरभिलापात्मकशब्दनस्वभावः, तच्च शब्दनं संकेतनिर-पेक्षमेव अविच्छिन्नचमत्कारात्मकं............अकारादिमायीयसांकेतिक-शब्दजीवितभूतं नीलमिदं चैत्रोहमित्यादिप्रत्यवमर्शान्तरभित्तिभूतत्वात् ।

I. P. V., I, 205.

Page 51.

1. परमेश्वरः पञ्चविधकृत्यमयः सततमनुग्रहमय्या परारूपया शक्त्या आक्रान्तो वस्तुतोऽनुग्रहैकात्मैव न हि शक्तिः शिवाद् भेदमामर्शयेत् । सा च शक्तिः लोकानुग्रहविमर्शमयी प्रथमतः परामर्शमय्या पश्यन्त्या आसूत्रयिष्यमाणा-नन्तशक्तिशताविभिन्ना प्रथमतरं परमहामन्त्रमय्याम् अदेशकालकलितायां संविदि निरूढा, तावत् पश्यन्त्युद्भविष्यदुक्तिप्रत्युक्त्यविभागेनैव वर्तते । सैव च सकलप्रमातृसंविदद्वयमयी सततमेव वर्तमानरूपा । ततस्तु पश्यन्ती यद्यदभीप्सितं तत्तदेव समुचितकारणनियमप्रबोधितं बोधसूत्र-मात्रेणैव विमृशति, यथा अनेकभावाभावज्ञानसंस्कारसंस्कृताया मेचक-धियः स्मृतिबीजप्रबोधकौचित्यात् किञ्चिदेव स्मृतिर्विमृशति न हि प्रथम-ज्ञानकाले भेदोऽत्र अस्फुरत्, यत्र वाच्यवाचकविशेषयोरभेदः । मध्यमा पुनः तयोरेव वाच्यवाचकयोर्भेदमादर्श्य सामानाधिकरण्येन विमर्शव्या-पारा । वैखरी तु तदुभयभेदस्फुटतामय्येव ।

P. T. V., 4-5.

Page 52.

1, अनुत्तरं कथं देव सद्यः कौलिकसिद्धिदम् ।
येन विज्ञातमात्रेण खेचरीसमतां व्रजेत् ॥

P. T. V., 3.

2. वक्ष्यमाणग्रन्थस्य कुलतन्त्रप्रक्रियात्मकत्वेन द्वैविध्येऽपि ।

T. A., I., 24.

3. "तस्य मे सर्वशिष्यस्य नोपदेशदरिद्रता"
इत्यादि दृशा सर्वत्रैव गुरूपदेशस्य भावात् आत्मनि भूयोविद्यत्वं दर्शयता ग्रन्थकृता अस्य ग्रन्थस्यापि निखिलशास्त्रान्तरसारसंग्रहाभिप्रायत्वं दर्शयति ।

T. A., Comm., I., 29.

Page 53.

1. ……………दृश्यते तच्छिवाज्ञया ।
मया स्वसंवित्सत्तर्कपतिशास्त्रत्रिकक्रमात् ॥

T. A., I., 149.

2. इति सप्ताधिकामेनां त्रिंशतं यः सदा बुधः ।
आह्निकानां समभ्यस्येत्स साक्षाद्भैरवो भवेत् ॥

T. A., I., 288.

Page 54.

1. इत्थं गृहे वत्सलिकावतीर्णे स तन्निबन्धं विदधे महार्थम् ।
T. A., Ah. XXXVII, 425.

2. आचार्यमभ्यर्थयते स्म गाढं संपूर्णतन्त्राधिगमाय सम्यक् ।
T. A., Ah., XXXVII, 418.

3. सोप्यभ्युपागमदभीप्सितमस्य यद्वा स्वातोद्यमेव हि निनर्तिषतोऽवतीर्णम् ।
T. A., Ah. XXXVII, 419.

4. न तदस्तीह यन्न श्रीमालिनीविजयोत्तरे ।
देवदेवेन निर्दिष्टं स्वशब्देनाथ लिङ्गतः ॥

T. A., I., 35.

Page 56.

1. सद्विप्रतोतवदनोदितनाट्यवेदतत्त्वार्थमर्थिजनवाञ्छितसिद्धिहेतोः ।
माहेश्वराभिनवगुप्तपदप्रतिष्ठः संक्षिप्तवृत्तिविधिना विशदीकरोति ॥
A. Bh., Vol. I, 1.

2. तस्मात् सतामत्र न दूषितानि मतानि तान्येव तु शोधितानि ।
A. Bh., Vol. I. 280.

3. उपादेयस्य संपाठस्तदन्यस्य प्रतीकनम् ।
स्फुटव्याख्या विरोधानां परिहारः सुपूर्णता ॥
लक्ष्यानुसरणं श्लिष्टवक्तव्यांशविवेचनम् ।
संगतिः पौनरुक्त्यानां समाधानसमाकुलम् ॥
संग्रहश्चेत्ययं व्याख्याप्रकारोत्र समाश्रितः ।
A. Bh., Vol. I, 1-2.

Page 57.

1. एवं भरतमुनिः परवदात्मानं प्रकल्प्येयन्तं ग्रन्थमभिहितवान्, अन्येत्वि-
यन्तं ग्रन्थं कश्चित् शिष्यो व्यरीरचत्……………तदसत्, एकस्य

ग्रन्थस्यानेकवक्तृवचनसन्दर्भमयत्वे प्रमाणाभावात्। स्वपरव्यवहारेण पूर्वपक्षोत्तरपक्षादीनां श्रुतिस्मृतिव्याकरणादिशास्त्रेष्वेकविरचितेषु अपि दर्शनात्। A. Bh., Vol. I, 8.

Page 58.

1. संशितव्रता इति—अभ्यासे शक्ताः।
A. Bh., Vol. I, 17.

2. मामाहेत्यादरातिशयः।
A. Bh., Vol. I, 17.

वेदज्ञा इति ग्रहणधारणसामर्थ्यम्।
A. Bh., Vol. I, 16.

3. ऋषय इति दर्शा(दर्शना ?)दषिरिति ऊहापोहयोग्याः।
A. Bh., Vol. I, 17.

4. अनेन झटिति कविहृदयग्रहणयोग्यत्वं नाट्याचार्यगुण इति सूचयति।
A. Bh., Vol. I, 21.

5-6. कुशला इति ग्रहणधारणयोग्याः।
विदग्धाः ऊहापोहसमर्थाः।
प्रयोगः परिषदि प्रकटीकरणम्।
A. Bh., Vol. I, 16.

7. विनेयानां तत्र रागद्वेषमध्यस्थतादिना तन्मयीभावाभावे प्रीतेरभावेन।
A. Bh., Vol. I, 27.

8. रूपमिति मुखरागस्य बलमित्याङ्गिकस्य।
A. Bh., Vol. I, 28.

9. यावन्निजहृदयरसविलसद्विकस्वरनिर्वारचमत्कार............तावच्छिक्षाशतैरपि वैचित्र्यमनाहार्यम्।
A. Bh., Vol. I, 22.

10. विदूषकतापसादिनाम्नां तथाकर्मिणां निर्वचनलब्धार्थयुक्त्या भूमिकाविशेषोपयोग इति।
A. Bh., Vol. I, 19.

11. प्रगल्भाः परिषद्यभीरवः।
A. Bh., Vol. I, 16.

Page 59.

1. मण्डपस्य सर्वस्याधिष्ठाता सौम्यप्रकृतिः सोमप्रधानो योज्य इति दर्शयति चन्द्रमा इति ।

A. Bh., Vol. I, 31.

2. वेदिका रङ्गवेदिका तत्र तीक्ष्णोऽधिष्ठातेत्यर्थः ।

A. Bh., Vol. I. 31.

3. अनेन चैतत्तुल्या एव मण्डपरक्षकाः केचिन्नियोज्या इति दर्शयति ।

A. Bh., Vol. I, 31.

4. पार्श्वे स्वयमिति राजादेस्तत्स्थानमित्युक्तम् ।

A. Bh., Vol. I, 32.

5. षट्त्रिंशकं भरतसूत्रमिदं विवृण्वन् ।

A. Bh., Vol. I, 1.

page 60.

1. तदनन्तरन्तु भवद्भिः शुचिभिरित्यादिभिर्भरतमुनिरचितो ग्रन्थो, मध्येऽत्र षट्त्रिंशदध्याय्यां यानि प्रश्नप्रतिवचनप्रयोजनवचनानि तानि तच्छिष्यवचनान्येवेत्याहुः ।

A. Bh., Vol. I; 8.

2. षट्त्रिंशदाह्निकमिदं भरतोक्तनाट्यवेदं रसैरुपचितं नवभिर्विवृण्वन् ।
यो भारतीमभिनवां रचयाञ्चकार, तस्मै नमोऽभिनवगुप्तगुरूत्तमाय ॥

Gu. Pa., (MS.) V. 10.

3. भट्टेन्दुराजादाम्नाय विविच्य च चिरं धिया ।
कृतोऽभिनवगुप्तेन सोऽयं गीतार्थसंग्रहः ॥

Bh. G. S., Introd., Ś. 6.

4. तच्चरणकमलमधुपो भगवद्गीतार्थसङ्ग्रहं व्यदधात् ।
अभिनवगुप्तः सद्द्विजलोटककृतचोदनावशतः ॥

Bh. G. S.. Concl., Ś. 2.

5. कृत्यमिदं बान्धवार्थम् ।

Bh, G. S., Concl., Ś. 3.

6. तास्वन्यैः प्राक्तनैर्व्याख्याः कृता यद्यपि भूयसा ।
न्याय्यस्तथाप्युद्यमो मे तद्गूढार्थप्रकाशकः ॥

Bh. G.S., Introd., Ś. 5.

Page 62.

1. येऽप्यन्यदेवताभक्ता इत्यतो गुरुरादिशत् ।
T. A., I, 162.

Page 73.

1. हठविद्यां हि मत्स्येन्द्रगोरक्षाद्या विजानते ।
स्वात्मारामोऽथवा योगी जानीते तत्प्रसादतः ॥
H. Y. P., 7.

2. अशक्यतत्त्वबोधानां मूढानामपि संमतम् ।
प्रोक्तं गोरक्षनाथेन नादोपासनमुच्यते ॥
H. Y. P., 201.

Page 75.

1. यया विना नैव करोति किञ्चिन्न वेत्ति नापीच्छति संविदीशः ।
तस्यै परस्यै जगतां जनन्यै नमः शिवायै शिवव‍ल्लभायै ॥
R. P., 4.

2. अमे अम्बिके अस्वरूपे अनाख्ये उमे रौद्रि वामे महालक्ष्मि माये ।
परे देवते पञ्चकृत्यैकलोले शिवे भैरवि श्रीमति त्वां प्रपद्ये ॥
R. P., 7.

3. मुग्धा पुस्तकहस्ता मुग्धेन्दुकला ललाटनेत्रवती ।
शारदशशाङ्कधवला दयामयी कापि देवता जयति ॥
R. P. 22.

4. वेदप्रसिद्धाद्विविधप्रभावात् पादप्रभावात्परदेवतायाः ।
द्वैधप्रदा स्वात्ममहाविभूतेर्भेदप्रथा मे सकला निवृत्ता ॥
R. P., 18.

Page 76.

1. श्रीतन्त्रालोके बिम्बप्रतिबिम्बवादः सम्पूर्णः ।
B. P. V., (MS.)

2. अत्राभिनवगुप्तेन भासितं तदनुत्तरम् ।
T. C., P. 6361.

Page 78.

1. परिपूर्णा कृतिरियं श्रीमदाचार्याभिनवगुप्तनाथस्य पर्यन्तपञ्चाशिका नाम ॥
P. P., 22.

2. संकोचं दलयति हृत्सरोरुहाणां गोभिर्यः सकलदिगन्तसर्पिणीभिः।
आलोकं दिशतु दृशामलौकिकं नः सः श्रीमानभिनवगुप्तनाथसूर्यः॥
Gu. Pa., V. 4.

Page 79.

1. पर्यन्तसंपदुपपादनकल्पवल्ली पञ्चाशिका परमकारुणिकेन येन।
प्रोक्ता रिवहाद्वयनये जनतां नियोक्तुं तस्मै नमोऽभिनवगुप्तगुरूत्तमाय॥
Gu. Pa., V. 8.

2. सत्संवित्समयमहाब्धिकल्पवृत्तानाचार्याभिनवगुप्तनाथपादान्।
आमूलादमलमतीनुपन्नयन्त्या वाग्वल्ल्याः प्रचुरफलो ननु प्ररोहः॥
M. M., 202.

3. चितिः प्रत्यवमर्शात्मा परा वाक्स्वरसोदिता।
स्वातन्त्र्यमेतन्मुख्यं तदैश्वर्यं परमात्मनः॥
Bh., Vol. I, 250.

4. सर्वाः शक्तीः कर्तृत्वशक्तिः ऐश्वर्यात्मा समाक्षिपति। सा च विमर्शरूपा इति युक्तम् अस्या एव प्राधान्यम्।
Bh., Vol. I, 267.

5. प्रकाशस्यात्मविश्रान्तिरहंभावो हि कीर्तितः।
उक्ता च सैव विश्रान्तिः सर्वापेक्षानिरोधतः॥
स्वातन्त्र्यमथ कर्तृत्वं मुख्यमीश्वरतापि च।
Bh., Vol. I, 35.

6. सत्ता च भवनकर्तृता सर्वक्रियासु स्वातन्त्र्यम्। सा च खपुष्पादिकमपि व्याप्नोति। Bh., Vol. I, 258-9.

7. तत्र वाचकं ग्राहकभागावस्थितं परसूक्ष्मस्थूलभेदेन वर्णमन्त्रपदात्मकं त्रिधा, वाच्यमपि ग्राह्यभागाभिनिविष्टं कलातत्त्वभुवनात्मकम्।
S. T., II. (Comm.) 51.

Page 80.

1. सोऽयं समस्त एवाध्वा भैरवाभेदवृत्तिमान्।
तत्स्वातन्त्र्यात्स्वतन्त्रत्वमश्नुवानोऽवभासते॥
T. A., Ah. XI, 45.

2. अकामात्संसृजेत्सर्वं जगत्स्थावरजङ्गमम्।
स्वतेजसा वरारोहे व्योम संक्षोभ्य लीलया॥
S. T., Vol. VI, 4.

इत्थमेकैव परमेशेच्छाशक्तिः परसूक्ष्मस्थूलरूपतया मेयाभाससूत्रणामयी समना व्यापिनीशक्तिरिति चोच्यते एकस्या अपि इच्छायाः सूक्ष्मरूपज्ञानक्रियाशक्तिसंभेदेन त्रित्वात् ।

S. T., Vol. VI, 7.

3. Refer to Foot Note No 7. Page 79.

4. क्रमो भेदाश्रयो भेदोऽप्याभाससदसत्त्वतः ।
आभाससदसत्त्वे तु चित्राभासकृतः प्रभोः ॥

Bh., Vol. II, 14.

मूर्तिवैचित्र्यतो देशक्रमसाभासयत्यसौ ।
क्रियावैचित्र्यनिर्भासात्कालक्रममपीश्वरः ॥

Bh., Vol. II, 16.

Page 81

1. तत्रापि क्वचित् आभासे प्रमातॄन् एकीकरोति नितम्बिनीनृत्त इव प्रेक्षकान्। तावति हि तेषाम् आभासे ऐक्यम् ।

Bh., Vol. I, 239.

2. तदेवं पञ्चकमिदं शुद्धोऽध्वा परिभाष्यते ।
तत्र साक्षाच्छिवेच्छैव कर्त्र्याभासितभेदिका ॥

T. A., VI. 55.

3. चित्तत्त्वं मायया हित्वा भिन्न एवावभाति यः ।
देहे बुद्धावथ प्राणे कल्पिते नभसीव वा ॥
प्रमातृत्वेनाहमिति विमर्शोऽन्यव्यपोहनात् ।
विकल्प एव स परप्रतियोग्यवभासजः ॥

Bh., Vol. I, 312–13.

परसंविदात्मा प्रमाता तावत् भेदेन्धनदाहकत्वादग्निः, स एव च अहं प्रतीतिमात्रस्वरूपः—स्वस्वातन्त्र्यात् बुद्धीन्द्रियाद्यात्मना द्वादशधा प्रस्फुरन् प्रमाणदशामधिशयानः 'सूर्य' इत्युच्यते, प्रमाणं च प्रमातुरेव बहिर्मुखं रूपम् । T. A., III, 126.

Page 82.

1. Refer to. F. N. 3. Page 81.

2. संकल्पेषु यद्यपि क्षेत्रज्ञस्यैव स्वातन्त्र्यम् तथापि चित्परमार्थताया न्यग्भावयितुम् अशक्यत्वात् ईश्वरस्यैव तत् वस्तुतः ।

Bh., Vol. I, 420.

3. तथा हि संविदेवेयमन्तर्बाह्योभयात्मना।
स्वातन्त्र्याद्वर्तमानैव परामर्शस्वरूपिणी॥

T. A., III 124.

Page 83.

1. पञ्चैव पञ्चवाहपदव्यामिति। वाहाः परमेश्वरस्य स्फुरणधाराः। ताश्च पञ्च, अन्यूनानतिरेकितयोपलभ्यमानत्वात्। तन्मयी च या पदवी विश्वगमागमस्थानभूता प्रवृत्तिः। ताः पञ्चैव कला इत्यन्वयः। एव-कारेण पञ्चवाहशब्दस्यान्वर्थतोच्यते। ते च वाहाः व्योमवामेश्वरी खेचरी दिक्चरी गोचरी भूचरीति च भवन्ति।

M. M., 89.

2. क्षेपो ज्ञानं च संख्यानं गतिर्नाद इति क्रमात्॥
स्वात्मनो भेदनं क्षेपो भेदितस्याविकल्पनम्।
ज्ञानं विकल्पः संख्यानमन्यतो व्यतिभेदनात्॥
गतिः स्वरूपारोहित्वं प्रतिबिम्बवदेव यत्।
नादः स्वात्मपरामर्शशेषता तद्विलोपनात्॥

T. A., III, 203–4.

Page 84.

1. तदेव चेदानीं विभज्य दर्शयन्, क्रमनयसोदरतामस्य दर्शनस्या-वेदयति। T. A., III, 157.

2 खे ब्रह्मणि अभेदरूपे स्थित्वा चरति-विषयमवगमयति, तथा हानादा-नादिचेष्टां विधत्ते स्वरूपे च आस्ते इति खेचरी अन्तर्बहिष्करणतदर्थ-सुखादिनीलादिरूपा, तथा हि वेद्यवेदकभावानुल्लासिपदे शून्ये संवि-न्मात्रदृगुल्लासे संवेद्यगतान्तरैक्यरूपदिश्यमानभेदोल्लासे, स्फुटभेदोद्रेके च क्रमेण व्योमचरी-गोचरी-दिक्चरी-भूचरीभूता याः शक्तयः ता वस्तुत उक्तनयेन स्वभावचरखेचरीरूपशक्त्यविभक्ता एव—इत्येकैव सा पारमे-श्वरी शक्तिः।

P. T. V., 39–40.

3. सृष्टिक्रमेण यथा अविकृतानुत्तरध्रुवरूपविश्रान्तो भैरवभट्टारकः सकल-कलाजालजीवनभूतः सर्वस्य आदिसिद्धोऽकलात्मकः, स एव प्रसरात्मना रूपेण विसर्गरूपतामश्नुवानो, विसर्गस्यैव कुण्डलिन्यात्मक-ह-शक्ति मयत्वात्।

P. T. V., 55-6.

4. स्वातन्त्र्यशक्तिरेवास्य सनातनी पूर्णाहन्तारूपा परा मत्स्योदरी महासत्ता स्फुरत्तोर्मिः सारं हृदयं भैरवी देवी शिखा इत्यादिभिरसंख्यैः प्रकारैस्तत्र तत्र निरुच्यते। पूर्णाहन्तैव चास्यानुत्तरानाहतशक्तिसंपुटीकारस्वीकृतादिक्षान्तवर्णभट्टारिका तत एव स्वीकृतानन्तवाच्यवाचकरूप षडध्वस्फारमयाशेषशक्तिचक्रक्रोडीकारान्त कृतनिःशेषसर्गप्रलयादिपरम्पराप्यक्रमविमर्शरूपैव नित्योदितानुच्चार्यमहामन्त्रमयी सर्वजीवितभूता परा वाक्। एषैव भगवत इयद्विश्ववैचित्र्यचलत्तामिव स्वात्मनि प्रथयन्ती स्पन्दते इत्यर्थानुगमात् स्पन्द इति इहोच्यते।

S. K. (Comm.) 66. and

Refer to F. N. 5 Page 79.

Page 85.

1. 'अभितः स्फुटं रूपं व्यङ्क्ष' इत्यनेन क्रियाशक्तेः सन्ध्यक्षरेषु यथाक्रमम् अस्फुटं, स्फुटं, स्फुटतरं, स्फुटतमं च, रूपमस्ति इत्यावेदितम्।

T. A., (Comm.) II 106.

2. अत्रानुत्तरशक्तिः सा स्वं वपुः प्रकटस्थितम्।
कुर्वत्यपि ज्ञेय-कला-कालुष्याद्बिन्दुरूपिणी॥

T. A., II 116.

3. या तूक्ता ज्ञेयकालुष्यभाक्क्षिप्रस्थिरयोगतः।
द्विरूपायास्ततो जातं टताद्यं वर्गयुग्मकम्॥
उन्मेषात्पादिवर्गस्तु यतो विश्वं समाप्यते।
... ...
इच्छा या कर्मणा हीना या चैष्ट्येन रूषिता॥
शीघ्रस्थैर्यप्रभिन्नेन त्रिधाभावमुपागता॥

T. A., II 153 and 162.

Page 86.

1. प्रथमतरं परमहामन्त्रमय्याम् अदेशकालकलितायां संविदि निरूढा।

P. T. V., 4.

2. ततश्च प्रागियं शुद्धा तथा भासनसोत्सुका।
सृष्टिं कलयते देवी तन्नाम्नागम उच्यते॥
ततः—परस्या एव संविदस्तत्तत्प्रमात्रादिरूपत्वेन परिस्फुरणाद्धेतोः, तथात्वेन स्फुरणात्प्राक्, शुद्धा—प्रमात्रादिनियतरूपानारूषिता इयं 'श्रीकालसंकर्षिणी—' शब्दव्यपदेश्या परा संविद्देवी। ....'सृष्टिं कलयते बहिरासूत्रितप्रायं भावजातं विमृशति, अत एव तन्नाम्ना—अन्वर्थेन 'श्रीसृष्टिकाली' शब्देन।

T. A., III, (Comm.) 157–8.

Page 87.

1. कालो द्विधाऽत्र विज्ञेयः सौरश्चाध्यात्मिकः प्रिये। कलयति जन्मस्थित्यादिविकारषट्केन परिच्छिनत्ति जगद्यः पारमेशक्रियाशक्तिस्पन्दात्मा 'कालो' 'द्विधा' इत्येकरूपोऽपि बाह्याभ्यन्तरतया संस्थितः।

S. T., III, 168.

2. नाडित्रयकृताधारो मार्गत्रयव्यवस्थितः।
गुणत्रयसमाविष्टस्त्रिधावस्थाव्यवस्थितः ॥
कारणैः षड्भिराक्रान्तः शक्तित्रितयसंयुतः।
इच्छाज्ञानक्रियाविद्धः सोमसूर्याग्निमध्यगः॥
एतत् नाडीत्रयादिक्रमेण व्याचष्टे।
दक्षनासापुटे चैव नाडी वै पिङ्गला स्मृता।
इडा चैव तु वामेन सुषुम्णा मध्यतः स्थिता॥
एतन्नाडीत्रयमेव मार्गत्रयमित्याह ।
दक्षिणे देवमार्गस्तु पितृमार्गस्तथोत्तरे ।
मध्यमः शिवमार्गस्तु………… ॥

S. T., III, 256–7.

3. केवलं बुद्ध्युपादाना क्रमरूपानुपातिनी।
प्राणवृत्तिमतिक्रम्य मध्यमा वाक्प्रवर्तते॥

S. Dr., 44., (F. N.).

4. षोडशकले पुरुषे पञ्चदशकलानां परिणामशालित्वेऽपि षोडशीरूपैका चित्कला परिणामस्य साक्षिभूता परमामृतस्वरूपा तिष्ठति।

V. P., (Comm. Ban.) 118.

5. पश्यन्ती यस्यां वाच्यवाचकयोर्विभागेनावभासो नास्ति सर्वतश्च सजातीयविजातीयापेक्षायां संहृतो वाच्यानां वाचकानां च क्रमो देशकालकृतो यत्र क्रमविवर्तशक्तिस्तु विद्यते।

V. P., (Comm. Ban.) 117.

Page 88.

1. अवर्गे तु महालक्ष्मीः कवर्गे कमलोद्भवा।
चवर्गे तु महेशानी टवर्गे तु कुमारिका॥
नारायणी तवर्गे तु वाराही तु पवर्गिका।
ऐन्द्री चैव यवर्गस्था चामुण्डा तु शवर्गिका॥
एताः सप्त महामातृः सप्तलोकव्यवस्थिताः।

S. T., I, 29.

कलाभिरकारादिवर्गाधिष्ठायिकाभिर्ब्राह्म्यादिभिस्तद्वर्णभट्टारकाधिष्ठातृभूताभिश्च श्रीमालिनीविजयोक्तदेवतारूपाभिः कलाभिरकारादिवर्णैर्विलुप्तविभवः।

S. N. 68.

Page 89.

1. चित्स्वाभाव्यादसौ देवः स्वात्मना विमृशन् प्रभुः।
अनाश्रितादिभूम्यन्ता भूमिकाः प्रतिपद्यते ॥

P. P., 6.

2. 'यत्परतत्त्वं तस्मिन् विभाति षट्त्रिंशदात्म जगत्।' इति न्यायेन सप्तत्रिंशपरशिवान्तः शिवादिधरण्यन्ततत्त्वषट्त्रिंशकस्य भानमुक्तम्। इह कथं सदाशिवादिधरण्यन्तस्य तत्त्वचतुस्त्रिंशकस्य शिवतत्त्वान्तर्भानम्। सत्यम्, मालिनीशास्त्रादिरूपेषु परमाद्वैतपरेषु सारशास्त्रेषु तथैवोक्तमस्ति, तत्र ह्ययमभिप्रायः, सदाशिवतत्त्वान्तः शुद्धविमर्शरूपशक्तिस्पर्शः पुष्टो नास्ति, वेदान्ताभिमतनिर्विमर्शप्रकाशरूपशान्तब्रह्मतत्त्वरूपत्वात् तस्य, इति विमर्शरूपा शक्तिरपि पञ्चत्रिंशत्त्वेन कथनीयैव, तद्युक्तः शिवोऽपि सदाशिवादन्य एवेति तस्य षट्त्रिंशत्त्वम्।

Bh., Vol. II, 211-12.

3. परमशिवः—शुद्धप्रकाशरूपः।·················एवंविधात् स्वरूपात्–स्वस्मात्–अन्याननुयायिनः, अन्यत्रासंबन्धिन इति यावत्, रूपात्–उपादानभूतात् 'तत्कुलं विद्धि सर्वज्ञ शिवशक्तिविवर्जितम्' इति नीत्या अनुत्तरकुलरूपाद् वपुषः।

Bh., Vol. I, 3-5.

4. तत्र वाचकवाच्यात्मस्पन्दयोरेकशः प्रभोः।
स्थूलसूक्ष्मपराभासक्रमयोः षड्विधाध्वता ॥

P. P., 7.

Page 90.

1. अनुत्तरविसर्गात्मविश्रमोदययामलम् ।
संघट्टशिवशक्त्योस्तदन्तरेणान्यशक्तयः ॥
आनन्देच्छेशतोन्मेषा ऊनता चेशनेच्छयोः।
अस्फुटस्फुटभेदेन वेद्योल्लासस्तयोर्द्विदुः ॥
आनन्दानुत्तराभ्यां च सन्धीभावोऽथ वेदना।
वेद्यानां प्राणभूतेति पूर्णं तद्भैरवं वपुः।
वेद्योल्लासोऽयमिच्छायामीशने चैकतः स्थितः ॥
स्थूलत्वेन पृथिव्यादिभूतपञ्चकतामियात्।

सूक्ष्मत्वेन च गन्धादिपञ्चतन्मात्रतां ततः ॥
करणत्वेन संस्पर्शादिन्द्रियाणां द्विपञ्चताम् ।
वेद्यतायाः छादनेन वेतृतोद्भासनक्रमे ॥
मनोऽहंबुद्धिताम्, एषामविभागे प्रधानताम् ।
पुरुषत्वं च संकोचविकासौ यदपेक्षया ॥
अभूवन्नित्यसंयोगाद् द्विरूपादुभयात्मनः ।
इच्छा स्वरूपादुन्मेषादन्यथानुत्तरायुतात् ॥
चतस्रश्शक्तयोऽन्तस्थाः पुंसोऽस्यान्तश्च धारिकाः ।
चिद्द्वयोर्मो जडभूमेश्च मायामय्यस्त्रिशङ्कुवत् ॥
इच्छाशक्तेस्त्रिरूपायास्तिस्रोऽन्याश्शक्तयोऽभवन् ।
विसर्गोऽयमथात्यर्थं स्फुटोऽभूत् सृज्यविस्तरात् ॥
एतत्सृष्ट्यात्मशक्तीनामितरेतरमिश्रणात् ।
भवेत्क्षोभान्तरं नास्माद्, विसर्गाद् बाह्यतो भवेत ॥

P. P., 30-39.

2. संहृत्य सर्वतश्चिन्ताम् (अह) मित्यनुशीलयन् ।
अविकल्पां स्वसंवित्तिं प्रत्याक्षां प्रतिपद्यते ॥

P. P., 21.

3. अनुत्तरविसर्गात्मशिवशक्त्यद्वयात्मनि ।
परामर्शो निर्भरत्वादहमित्युच्यते विभोः ॥
अनुत्तराद्या प्रसृतिर्हान्ता शक्तिस्वरूपिणी ।
प्रत्याहृताशेषविश्वानुत्तरे सा निलीयते ॥
तदिदं विश्वमन्तःस्थं शक्तौ सानुत्तरे परे ।
तत्तस्यामिति यत्सत्यं विभुना सम्पुटीकृतिः ॥
तेन श्रीत्रीशिकाशास्त्रे शक्तेः संपुटिताकृतिः ।
संवित्तौ भाति यद्विश्वं तत्रापि खलु संविदा ॥
तदेतत्त्रितयं द्वन्द्वयोगात्संघाततां गतम् ।
एकमेव परं रूपं भैरवस्याहमात्मकम् ॥

T. A., II, 195-8.

4. त्रिवहं त्रिपथं त्रिस्थं कालं सा कर्षति स्वतः ।
बहिस्ततश्चात्मनीति श्रीपरा कालकर्षिणी ॥

P. P., 42.

5. Refer, to F. N. 2 Page 86.

6. एषा वस्तुत एकैव परा कालस्य कर्षिणी ।
शक्तिमद्भेदयोगेन यामलत्वं प्रपद्यते ॥

T. A., II, 223.

7. मातृसद्भावसंज्ञास्यास्तेनोक्ता यत्प्रमातृषु ।
एतावदन्तसंवित्तौ प्रमातृत्वं स्फुटीभवेत् ॥
वामेश्वरीति–शब्देन प्रोक्ता श्रीनिशिसंचरे ।

T. A., III. 206.

8. इति पञ्चविधामेनां कलनां कुर्वती परा ।
देवी काली तथा कालकर्षिणी चेति कथ्यते ॥

T. A., III, 205.

9. परामर्शात्मकत्वेन विसर्गाक्षेपयोगतः ।
इयत्ताकलनाज्ज्ञानात्ताः प्रोक्ताः कालिकाः क्वचित् ॥

T. A., II, 235.

Page 91.

1. अस्योच्चारे कृते सम्यङ्मन्त्रमुद्रागणो महान् ।
सद्यस्तन्मुखतामेति स्वदेहावेशलक्षणम् ॥

P. T. V.. 218-9.

2. तदस्मिन्परमोपाये शाम्भवाद्वैतशालिनि ।
केऽप्येव यान्ति विश्वासं परमेशेन भाविताः ॥

T. A., II, 259.

3. जयताज्जगदुद्धृतिक्षमोऽसौ भगवत्या सह शंभुनाथ एकः ।
यदुदीरितशासनांशुभिर्मे प्रकटोयं गहनोऽपि शास्त्रमार्गः ॥

T. A., I, 31.

4. तच्च साक्षादुपायेन तदुपायादिनापि च ।
प्रथमानं विचित्राभिर्भङ्गीभिरिह भिद्यते ॥
तत् इति परमपरं वा ज्ञानम् । साक्षादुपायेन इति शाम्भवेन । तदेव हि अव्यवहितं परज्ञानावाप्तौ निमित्तम्, स एव परां काष्ठां प्राप्तश्चानुपाय इत्युच्यते ।

T. A., I, 181-2.

Page 92.

1. उपाये नाग्रहः कार्य उपेया भैरवी स्थितिः ।
यासौ स्वसंवित् तामेव सर्वोपायां समाविशेत् ॥

P. P., 50.

2. विद्यातत्त्वादा शिवान्तं तदभिन्नः परः शिवः ।
उपदेश्यतया सोऽपि स्यादवच्छेदभागतः ॥
अष्टात्रिंशं परं धाम यत्रेदं विश्वकं स्फुरत् ।

T. V. Dh., Ah. III, V. 16-7.

Page 95.

1. घटकर्परेण घटितं कविना कलापकाव्यं यद् यमकैः।
तस्य मयाऽर्थविवरणं करणीयं कारणं धियः सुधियाम् ॥
Gh. K. (Comm.) Di (MS.)

2. शाके खेन्दुशरेन्दुभिः (१५१०) परिमिते मासे नभस्येऽसि-
तेऽष्टम्यां श्रीगुरुनीलकण्ठतनयो ज्योतिर्विदामग्रणीः।
गोविन्दो घटकर्परस्य विवृतिं शिष्टाज्ञयाऽल्पामिमां
बालानां हृदयङ्गमां समकरोट्टीकाकृतां हर्षदाम् ॥
Gh. K. (Comm.) Go. (MS.).

Page 96.

1. घटखर्पर-पानीय-वाहनाद् घटखर्परम्।
इति नाम्ना श्रुतं तस्माद् योजनं तस्य दुर्घटम् ॥
Gh. K. (Comm. MS.)

2. इति चतुर्भुज-सुत-भट्ट-कमलाकर-विरचिता कविश्रीकालिदासकृतस्य घटकर्परकाव्यस्य घटकर्परयोजिनी टीका समाप्ता।
Gh. K. (Comm. MS.).

3. अस्मिन् श्रीघटकर्पराख्यकविताबोधे हि ये नोद्यमं
कर्तारः किल कुर्युरेव बहुशश्चक्रुश्च कुर्वन्ति वा।
ते के के कथमन्यथैव सुधियो व्याकर्तुमज्ञश्चिरात्
संयत्ता अपि नेशिरे कथमिदं स्वान्तस्य मे सद्गतिः॥
Gh. K. (Comm.) Ra. (MS.)

4. ताराचन्द्राभिधेयेन बालव्युत्पत्तिहेतवे।
घटकर्परटीकेयं संशोध्य प्रकटीकृता ॥
Gh. K. (Comm.) Ta. (MS.)

5. इति श्रीकालिदासकृते घटकर्परकाव्ये टिप्पणं समाप्तिमगमत् ॥
Gh. K. (Comm.) Śan. (MS.)

Page 98.

1. कवेर्वृत्तस्य वा नाम्ना नायकस्येतरस्य वा।
नामास्य सर्गोपादेयकथया सर्गनाम तु॥ S. D., 533.

Page 99.

1. एको हि दोषो गुणसन्निपाते निमज्जतीन्दोरिति यो बभाषे।
नूनं न दृष्टं कविनापि तेन दारिद्र्यदोषो गुणराशिनाशी ॥
N. Sa., V, 17.

2. संघात—संघातलक्षणञ्चेदं काव्यम् । यदुक्तम् :—
'यत्र कविरेकमर्थं सर्गेणैकेन वर्णयति ।
स काव्य-संघातः स निगदितो वृन्दावन–मेघदूतादिः' ॥ इति ।
Gh. K., (Comm.) Di. (MS.)

3. ते नृत्यभेदाः प्रायेण संख्यया विंशतिर्मताः ।
Bh. P., 255

Page 100.

1. Refer to F. N. 3 Page 96.

Page 101.

1. सम्प्रति परां काष्ठामारूढेन भासेन तत्पूर्वा स्वकीया दशा न विस्मृता। यतोऽनेन पूर्वचरितं घटकर्परेण उदकवहनमेव प्रतिज्ञातम् । प्रतिज्ञां चेमामसहमानाः परे कवयः परिहसितुमनसो विक्रमार्यसभ्यमेनं भासं तज्जातिस्मारक-घटकर्पर-नाम्ना व्याजह्रुः । K. An.

2. किञ्च अत्र कर्ता महाकविः कालिदास इति अनुश्रुतमस्माभिः । न चास्य काव्ये तृणमात्रमपि कलङ्कपात्रमुत्प्रेक्षितवन्तो मनोरथेऽपि सुप्तेऽपि सहृदयाः । Gh., (Comm.) Abh., V. 20.

Page 106.

1. कवीन्दोरिन्दुराजस्य ते सच्चित्तविकासकाः ।
बोधांशवो विगाहन्तां भूर्भुवः स्वस्त्रयीमपि ॥
तत्परामर्शधवलमनःकोकनदो मनाक् ।
काव्येऽभिनवगुप्ताख्यो विवृतिं समरीरचत् ॥
Gh., (Comm.) Abh., V. 21.

Page 108.

1. त्रयो लयास्तु विज्ञेया द्रुतमध्यविलम्बिताः ॥
N. S., XXXI, 343.

2. कलाः षोडश विज्ञेया मात्राः सर्वेष्व(षु ?) वस्तुषु ।
तस्याश्चैव चतुर्भागः पादभागः प्रकीर्तितः ॥
N. S., XXXI. 365-6.

3. गेयानि सप्तगीतानि मन्द्रकोऽथोऽपरान्ततः ।
प्रतर्यो वेणको विद्याद् ह्युल्लोप्यश्चोत्तरं तथा ॥
N. S., XXXI, 364.

The text, as printed, seems to be corrupt. Not only the names of Gītas are wrongly printed but also six only

are given out of the seven, referred to in the verse itself and subsequently discussed. Could the text have been as follows :—

गेयानि सप्त गीतानि मन्द्रकोऽथोऽपरान्तकः ।
प्रकर्यावेणको रोविन्दोल्लोप्यौ चोत्तरन्तथा ॥

4. द्विविधं मन्द्रकं तत्र चतुर्वस्तु त्रिवस्तु च ।
शीर्षकेण समायुक्तं तत्तु ज्ञेयं त्रिवस्तुकम् ॥

N. S., XXXI, 364.

Page 109.

1. एते प्रबन्धा नृत्तात्मकाः, नव्यात्मकनाटकादिविलक्षणाः । राघवविजय-मारीचवधादिकं रागकाव्यम् ॥

A. Bh. Vol. I, 183.

Page 110.

1. गीयत इति गीतं काव्यं तस्य यः प्रकर्षेण योगस्तदर्थानुप्रवेशलक्षण-(स्त ?)माश्रित्य न छायाम्, आसमन्ताच्छ्रित्वा, अङ्गविक्षेपिताङ्गत्वं सामरस्यलयसत्त्वादिना नृत्यैतच्छन्दस्वभावमपि यदभूत्ताण्डवप्रभृतिनृत्तं तद्गीयमानरूपकगतवर्णालङ्कारलयपदार्थवाक्यार्थसम्मिलितं यत्तत्प्रवर्त्यताम् ।
A. Bh., Vol. I. 182.

2. नाट्ये ह्यङ्गं गीतकं चेत्युभयमप्यप्रतिष्ठितम् । तथा च करचरणचारी-मण्डलादि यत्तत्राङ्गोपयोगि तत्स्वरूपेण लयादिव्यवस्थया वा अनियतमेव यथारसं प्रयुज्यमानत्वेन विपर्ययात् ।

A. Bh., Vol. I, 168.

Page 111.

1. क्वचिद्गीयमानं रूपकाभिधेयप्राधान्यं यथा शिल्पकादौ, क्वचिद्वाद्यप्राधान्यं भाणकादिषु भग्नतालपरिक्रमणादौ । क्वचिन्नृत्तप्राधान्यं यथा डोम्बि-कादिप्रयोगानन्तरं हुडुक्कावाद्यावसरः अत एव तत्र लोकभाषया चिल्लिमार्ग—इति प्रसिद्धिः । चारीमार्गे ह्यसावङ्गप्राधान्यात् तत्रापि वैचित्र्येण मध्ये मध्ये गीतवाद्यादेरपि प्राधान्यम् । वाद्यस्यापि कूप (तु घन ?) (कुतपघन ?) सुषिरावनद्धभेदेन प्राधान्यं यथा योगं विवेचनीयमित्यलं बहुना ।
A. Bh., Vol. I, 168-9

Page 113.

1. दशरूपकभेदवल्लास्यताण्डवप्रयोगो नाट्यभेद एव च तत्र पूर्णानुकार रूपत्वात् ।····················नाट्यमेवेदमिति कीर्तिधराचार्यः ।

A. Bh., Vol. I, 208.

2. क्वचिद्गीयमानं रूपकाभिधेयप्राधान्यम् ।.........A. Bh., Vol. I. 168.
अभिनीयमानोरागकाव्यादिः कृतः । A. Bh., Vol. I, 174.

3. तथाहि—गीतमेव तदान्यार्थं तदन्यगत्वेन (तदङ्गत्वेन ?) नृत्तादि । यथा डोम्बिकादौ ।.....................
या काचिद्देवतेत्युच्यते तस्याः पश्चान्नृत्तेन परितोषणं कार्यम् । तन्मध्ये च तदीयायुधवाहनकर्मभावाभ्य (द्य ?) नुकारी अङ्गप्रयोगो विधेयः ।
A. Bh., Vol. I, 168 and 170.

4. तत्रापि वर्णाङ्गं (ङ्ग ?) प्राधान्यं क्वचिद्यथा प्रस्थानादौ क्वचिद्गीयमानं रूपकाभिधेयप्राधान्यं यथा शिल्पकादौ—क्वचिद्वाद्यं (द्य ?) प्राधान्यं भाणकादिषु भग्नतालपरिक्रमणादौ । क्वचिन्नृत्तप्राधान्यं यथा डोम्बिकादिप्रयोगानन्तरं हुड्डुक्कावाद्यावसरः, अत एव तत्र लोकभाषया चिल्लिमार्ग इति प्रसिद्धिः । A. Bh., Vol. I, 168.

Page 114.

1. अत एवैतत्स्थानोपजीविभिरेव श्रीराणकादिकविभिर्डोम्बिकादौ चतुरपसारकः प्रयोगः । A. Bh., Vol. I, 190.

2. तानि च्छन्दकानि यान्यद्यत्वे नृत्ततालात्मना डोम्बिकानर्तकीलयचरणादिरूपेण प्रसिद्धानि । A. Bh., Vol. I. 195.

3. नाट्यरूपत्वे हि साक्षात्कारकल्पानुव्यवसायसम्परत्युपयोगिनः पात्रं प्रति भाषानियमस्य छन्दोऽलङ्कारादिनियमोऽवश (श्य ?) रूपाद्योग (द्युप ?) योगिन आहार्यविषयस्य जात्यंशकादेति; परिक्रमादेश्च स नास्त्यैवोपयोगो भवेत् । A. Bh., Vol. I, 178.

4. मूलभूतस्य च पाठ्यस्य सम्भावनानुषक्तमाकाशभाषितमपि स्यात् पादताडितकादि भासा (ण ?) रूपक इव ।
A. Bh., Vol. I, 178.

5. कलहान्तरितेयं खण्डितेयं नृत्यतीति व्यवहार औपचारिकः ।
A. Bh., Vol. I, 178.

Page 115.

1. एवं नाट्यायितशङ्काप्यत्र न काचित्, मूलभूतस्याभिनयस्यैवाभावात् । तद्भावे यथा—'मुंचइ वलवि अंअअ इरो अगु हंसणलिण अग्गि चिडज्ज' इत्यादौ मूर्च्छादिसाक्षात्कारः शय्यायाञ्चाङ्गनिपतनादि वाहुस्तथा नृत्तकाव्येऽपि स्यात् । A. Bh., I, 178–9.

2. तन्नाट्यलक्षणप्रयोजनाभेदादित्यसिद्धो हेतुः, तदाह नृतं कर्तृ कश्चिदर्थ-मर्थ्यमाणं (नं ?) साक्षात्कारं प्राप्यमाणं नाट्यवेदमपेक्षते येन लक्षणाभेदः स्यात्। तथा न कश्चिदर्थः सामाजिकान्प्रति व्युत्पादनीयधर्माद्युपाया-न्यतमं व्यपेक्षते, येन प्रयोजनाभेदोऽपि स्यादित्यतो हेतोरेतन्नृत्तं प्रवर्तितं नृत्तवाचोयुक्त्यैव व्यवहृतम्।

A. Bh., Vol. I, 179.

3. तथाहि तालाध्याये (अ–३१) वर्धमानासारितकगीतकपाणिकान्ते च्छन्दकप्रयोगश्चतुष्पदाप्रयोगश्चाभिधास्यते।

A. Bh., Vol. I. 194 and 196.

4. Refer to F. N. 2, Page 114.

Page 116.

1. Refer to F. N. 1. Page 114.

Page 117.

तत्र वस्तुनिबद्धानि त्रीणि गीतकानि मन्द्रकमपरान्तकं प्रकरी च।

A. Bh., Vol I, 195.

Page 119.

1. तत्रावतरणं कार्यं नर्तक्याः सर्वभाण्डिकम्॥
क्षेपप्रतिक्षेपकृतं तन्त्रीगानसमन्वितम्।
प्रथमं त्वभिनेयं स्याद्गीतके सर्ववस्तुकम्।

A. Bh., Vol. I, 195.

2. वस्त्विति मागध्यादिगीतिः।

A. Bh., Vol. I, 258.

3. सर्वेषामेव गीतानां वस्तुष्ववयवेषु च।
विविधैकैकवृत्तानि त्रीण्यङ्गानि भवन्ति हि॥

N. S., Ch. XXXI, V. 268 ff.

4. एवं वस्तु निबन्धेष्वङ्गनिबन्धेषु संभाव्योपेक्षया अवान्तरविदारीमभि-(हि ?)मोपनता(तो ?)गीतवैचित्र्या(त्र्य ?)वर्णाङ्गभेदो निरूपितः। नन्वेवं सर्वा(र्वेऽ ?)ङ्गनिबद्धा एव स्युः। सत्यम्, किन्तु ते वस्तुतत्त्वेनात्मनि भागयोगे तदाश्रयाण्यङ्गानि निवेश्यन्ते। वस्तुप्राधान्यपात इति तत्कृतो व्यपदेशो युक्त उल्लोप्यकादौ तु वर्णाङ्गनिबन्धनैव भागपरिकल्पना।

A. Bh., (MS.) Ch., XXXI, V. 275.

Page 120.

1. उपोहनं मुखं तेषां युग्मं प्रतिमुखं भवेत् ।
N. S., Ch. XXXI, V. 194.

2. प्रतिमुखदेहसंहाररूपाङ्गविभागेन नृत्तविशेषसिद्धये विदारिविच्छेदः ।
A. Bh., (MS.) Ch., XXXI, V. 258.

3. आसारितानां संयोगो वर्धमानक इष्यते ।
N. S., Ch. XXXI, V. 225.

4. उपोह्यन्ते स्वरा यस्मात् तस्माद् गीतं प्रवर्तते ।
तस्मादुपोहनं ज्ञेयं स्थायिस्वरसमाश्रयम् ॥
N. S. Ch. XXXI, V. 241.

5. उपोह्यन्ते स्वरा येनेति । गात्रवीणायां येन वा करणमात्रेण स्वरा उपोह्यन्ते, भावनीत्यारम्भिण इह विषयाः क्रियन्ते । ऊह्यन्ते च धार्यन्ते उत तदुपोहनं उपवहनमित्यपि दृश्यते ।
A. Bh., (MS.) Ch. XXXI, V. 241–2.

Page 121.

1. अस्य तु द्विकला शम्या तालश्च द्विकलः स्मृतः ।
द्विकला च पुनः शम्या तालश्च द्विकलस्तथा ॥
ततः शाम्या(शम्या ?)ततस्तालः सन्निपातमतः परम् ।
शाखेयं प्रतिशाखे तु नित्यमन्यपदा स्मृता ॥
N. S., Ch. XXXI, V. 347–8.

2. चतुर्विंशतिकले वस्तुगत्या तद्व(तद्वत्पातं ?)त्पातं गतान्त्यद्वादशकलात्मा प्रतिशाखेति वस्तुनि मन्तव्यम् ।
A. Bh., (MS.) Ch. XXXI, V. 341.

3. उपोहनप्रत्युपोहनाभ्यामङ्गैः शाखाप्रतिशाखाभ्यां च युक्तं निर्युक्तं निश्शेषस्वरूपयोगात् ।
A. Bh., (MS.), Ch. XXXI, V. 416.

निर्युक्तं पदनिर्युक्तमनिर्युक्तं तथैव च ।
त्रिविधं चैव विज्ञेयं सप्तरूपं प्रयोक्तृभिः ॥
N. S. Ch. XXXI, V. 416.

Page 122.

1. प्रथमे वस्तुन्याक्षिप्तिकामुपोहनं च प्रयुज्य नर्तकी प्रवेशः । द्वितीयादौ प्रत्युपोहनम्, पदयोजना तु तन्त्रीगानान्वितं कृत्वा, क्षेपप्रतिक्षेपयोः कृतं

परिसमाप्तता यत्र, तादृगवतरणात्कार्यं सर्वभाण्डवाद्याद्याविर्भावम्। प्रथममित्यादावित्यर्थः। वस्त्वेव वस्तुकं तत्सर्वमादावभिनेयं पुनर्नृत्तेन योज्यम्।

A. Bh., Vol. I, 195.

2. शेषमित्यादि। आवर्तान्तराणि शुद्धनृत्तप्रयोज्यानि।

A. Bh., Vol. I, 197.

Page 123.

1. तत्र वाद्यविधिमाहावर्तमानगीतवशादङ्गं शाखाचारीप्रयोगात्मकं यदा वर्तते तदा वाद्य-प्राधान्येन नृत्तम्; वाद्यस्य यथासम्भवं वैचित्र्यं प्रदर्शनीयम्।

A. Bh., Vol. I, 197.

2. स्त्रीपुंसयोस्तु संलापो यस्तु कामसमुद्भवः।
तज्ज्ञेयं सुकुमारं हि शृङ्गाररससम्भवम्॥

A. Bh., Vol. I 199.

Page 124.

1. यस्मिन्नङ्गे प्रसादं तु गृह्णीयान्नायिका क्रमात्।
ततः प्रभृति नृत्तं तु शेषेष्वङ्गेषु योजयेत्॥
... ...

लब्धास्थाबन्धा यदि भवति तत इति प्रियोऽसन्निहितो भवति तदा नृत्तं योज्यमेव।

A. Bh., Vol. I, 202.

Page 126.

1. "काकुर्व (व) क्रोक्तिर्नाम शब्दालङ्कारोऽयम्' इति रुद्रटः।

K. M., 31.

Page 128.

2. किञ्च अत्र कर्ता महाकविः कालिदास इति अनुश्रुतमस्माभिः। न च अस्य काव्ये तृणमात्रमपि कलङ्कपात्रमुत्प्रेक्षितवन्तो मनोरथेऽपि सुहृदोऽपि सहृदयाः।..............तेन अस्य परिसमाप्तिधुरोद्वहस्य अपि धुरन्धरत्वमविकलमेवेति।

Gh. V., 20.

3. यमकादिनिबन्धे तु पृथग्यत्नोऽस्य जायते।
शक्तस्यापि रसेऽङ्गत्वं तस्मादेषां न विद्यते॥

Dh. L., 87.

4. रसाक्षिप्ततया यस्य बन्धः शक्यक्रियो भवेत् ।
अपृथग्यत्ननिर्वर्त्यः सोऽलंकारो ध्वनौ मतः ॥

Dh. L., 85.

Page 129.

1. 'बहुज्ञता व्युत्पत्तिः' इत्याचार्याः। सर्वतोदिक्का हि कविवाचः । तदुक्तम्—
'प्रसरति किमपि कथञ्चन नाभ्यस्ते गोचरे वचः कस्य ।
इदमेव तत्कवित्वं यद्वाचः सर्वतोदिक्काः ॥' 'उचितानुचितविवेको व्युत्पत्तिः'इति यायावरीयः। 'प्रतिभाव्युत्पत्त्योः प्रतिभा श्रेयसी' इत्यानन्दः सा हि कवेरव्युत्पत्तिकृतं दोषमशेषमाच्छादयति ।

K. M., 16.

2. कवीनां शक्तिरेव बलीयसी, सा एव लोकोत्तरा व्युत्पत्तिरिति अभिधीयते; न तु अन्या कविशक्तेर्व्युत्पत्तिर्नाम काचित् यदुक्तं मया एव पुरूरवोविचारे ।

Gh. V., 21.

Page 134.

1. भैरवो भैरवी देवी स्वच्छन्दो लाकुलोऽणुराट् ।
गहनेशोऽब्जजः शक्रो गुरुः कोट्यपकर्षतः ॥
नवभिः क्रमशोऽधीतं नवकोटिप्रविस्तरम् ।
एतैस्ततो गुरुः कोटिमात्रात्पादं वितीर्णवान् ॥
दक्षादिभ्य उभौ पादौ संवर्तादिभ्य एव च ।
पादं च वामनादिभ्यः पादार्धं भार्गवाय च ॥
पादपादं तु वलये पादपादस्तु योऽपरः ।
सिंहायार्धं ततः शिष्टात् द्वौ भागौ विनताभुवे ॥
भागं वासुकिनागाय खण्डाः सप्तदशत्वमी ।
स्वर्गादर्धं रावणोऽथ जह्रे रामोऽर्धमप्यतः ॥
विभीषणमुखादाप गुरुशिष्यविधिक्रमात् ।
खण्डैरेकान्नविंशत्या विभक्तं तदभूत्ततः ॥
खण्डं खण्डं चाष्टखण्डं प्रोक्तं पादादिभेदतः ।
पादौ मूलोद्धरावुत्तरबृहदुत्तरे तथा कल्पः ॥
सांहितकल्पस्कन्धवन्नुत्तरं व्यापकं त्रिधा तिस्रः।
देव्योऽत्र निरूप्यन्ते क्रमशो विस्तारिणैव रूपेण ।
नवमे पदे तु गणना न काचिदुक्ता व्यवच्छिदा हीने ॥
रामाच्च लक्ष्मणस्तस्मात् सिद्धास्तेभ्योऽपि दानवाः ।
गुह्यकाश्च ततस्तेभ्यो योगिनो नृवरास्ततः ॥
तेषां क्रमेण तन्मध्ये भ्रष्टं कालान्तराद्यदा ।

तदा श्रीकण्ठनाथाज्ञावशात्सिद्धा अवातरन् ॥
त्र्यम्बकामर्दकाभिख्यश्रीनाथा अद्वये द्वये ।
द्वयाद्वये च निपुणाः क्रमेण शिवशासने ॥
आद्यस्य चान्वयो जज्ञे द्वितीयो दुहितृक्रमात् ।
स चार्धत्र्यम्बकाभिख्यः सन्तानः सुप्रतिष्ठितः ॥
अतश्चार्धचतस्रोऽत्र मठिकाः सन्ततिक्रमात् ।

T. A., Ah. XXXVI, 381–8.

Page 136.

1. ततः स भगवान् देवादादेशं प्राप्य यत्नवान् ।
ससर्ज मानसं पुत्रं त्र्यम्बकादित्यनामकम् ॥
तस्मिन् संक्रमयामास रहस्यानि समन्ततः ।
सोऽपि गत्वा गुहां सम्यक् त्र्यम्बकाख्यां ततः परम् ॥
तन्नाम्ना चिन्हितं तत्र ससर्ज मनसा सुतम् ।
खमुत्पपात संसिद्धस्तत्पुत्रोऽपि तथा तथा ॥
सिद्धस्तद्वत्सुतोत्पत्त्या सिद्धा एवं चतुर्दश ।
यावत्पञ्चदशः पुत्रः सर्वशास्त्रविशारदः ॥
स कदाचिल्लोकयात्रामासीनः प्रेक्षते ततः ।
बहिर्मुखस्य तस्याथ ब्राह्मणी काचिदेव हि ॥
रूपयौवनसौभाग्यबन्धुरा सा गता दृशम् ।
दृष्ट्वा तां लक्षणैर्युक्तां योग्यां कन्यामथात्मनः ॥
स धर्मचारिणीं सम्यक् गत्वा तत्पितरं स्वयम् ।
अर्थयित्वा ब्राह्मणीं तामानयामास यत्नतः ॥
ब्राह्मणेन विवाहेन ततो जातस्तथाविधः ।
तेन यः स च कालेन काश्मीरेष्वागतो भ्रमन् ॥
नाम्ना स संगमादित्यो वर्षादित्योपि तत्सुतः ।
तस्याप्यभूत् स भगवानरुणादित्यसंज्ञकः ॥
आनन्दसंज्ञकस्तस्माद् उद्भभूव तथाविधः ।
तस्मादस्मि समुद्भूतः सोमानन्दाख्य ईदृशः ॥

Ś. Dr., Ch. VII, 220–1.

Page 158.

1. श्री कल्लटाय..............
एवं रहस्यमप्येष मातुलीयाय चावदत् ।
श्रीमत्प्रद्युम्नभट्टाय सोऽपि स्वतनयाय च ।
श्रीमत्प्रज्ञार्जुनाख्याय प्रादात्सोऽप्येवमावदत् ॥

श्रीमहादेवभट्टाय स्वशिष्यायाप्यसौ पुनः ।
श्रीमच्छ्रीकण्ठभट्टाय प्रददौ स्वसुताय च ॥
तस्मात्प्राप्य करोम्येष सूत्रवार्तिकमादरात् ।
दैवाकरिर्भास्करोहमन्तेवासिगणेरितः ॥

Ś. S. V., Introd.

Page 160.

1. इति प्रकटितो मया सुघट एष मार्गो नवो
गुरुभिरुच्यते स्म शिवदृष्टिशास्त्रे यथा ।
तदत्र निदधत्पदं भुवनकर्तृतामात्मनो
विभाव्य शिवतामयीमनिशमाविशन् सिद्ध्यति ॥

I. P. V., II. 271.

2. श्रुत्वा सौजन्यसिन्धोर्द्विजवरमुकुलात् कीर्तिवल्यालबालात् ।
काव्यालङ्कारसारे लघुविवृतिमधात् कौंकणः श्रीन्दुराजः ॥

K. Sa., 86.

भट्टकल्लटपुत्रेण मुकुलेन निरूपिता । सूरिप्रबोधनायेयमभिधावृत्तिमातृका॥

B. R. C. XXVIII.

त्रैय्यम्बकप्रसरसागरवीचिसोमानन्दात्मजोत्पलजलक्ष्मणगुप्तनाथः ।

T. A., XII. 414.

Page 161.

1. इति कथितमशेषं शैवरूपेण विश्वं जगदुदितमहेशांघ्रयाज्ञया स्वप्रभाजा ।

Ś. Dr., 219.

2. प्रतिपादितमेतावत् सर्वमेव शिवात्मकम् ।
न स्वबुद्ध्या शिवोदाता शिवो भोक्तेति शाश्वतः ॥

Ś. Dr., 219.

Page 162.

1. श्रीमदूर्मिमहाशास्त्रे सिद्धसन्तानरूपके ।
इदमुक्तं तथा श्रीमत्सोमानन्दादिदेशिकैः ॥

T. A., Ah. II., P. 39.

2. श्रीसोमानन्दमतं विमृश्य मया निबद्धमिदम् ।

P. T. V., 282.

तदुक्तं श्री सोमानन्दपादैः.........निजविवृतौ, तद्ग्रन्थिनिर्दलनार्थं एव अयमस्माकं तच्छासनपवित्रितानां यत्नः ।

P. T. V., 16.

Page 163.

1. वृत्त्या तात्पर्यं टीकया तद्विचारः सूत्रेष्वेतेषु ग्रन्थकारेण दृब्धम् ।

I. P. V., I, 3.

2. सूत्रं वृत्तिर्विवृतिर्लघ्वी बृहतीत्युभे विमर्शिन्यौ ।
प्रकरणविवरणपञ्चकमिति शास्त्रं प्रत्यभिज्ञायाः ॥

S. D. S., P. 191

3. सन्त्येव सूक्तिसरितः परितः सहस्राः
स्तोत्रावली सुरसरित् सदृशी न काचित् ।
या कर्णतीर्थमतिशय्य पुनाति पुंसः
श्रीकण्ठनाथनगरीमुपकण्ठयन्ती ॥

Ś. Pa., Ś. 8.

Page 164.

1. विभ्रमाकरसंज्ञेन स्वपुत्रेणास्मि चोदितः ।
पद्मानन्दाभिधानेन तथा सब्रह्मचारिणा ॥
ईश्वरप्रत्यभिज्ञोक्तविस्तारे गुरुनिर्मिते ।
शिवदृष्टिप्रकरणे करोमि पदसंगतिम् ॥

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Page 165.

1. श्रीशास्त्रकृद्घटितलक्ष्मणगुप्तपादसत्योपदर्शितशिवाद्वयवाददृष्टः ।

I. P. V. V., Vol. III, 406.

2. अथोच्यते ब्रह्मविद्या सद्यः प्रत्ययदायिनी ।
शिवः श्रीभूतिराजो यामस्मभ्यं प्रत्यपादयत् ॥ इति
एतद्विद्यात्रयं श्रीमद्भूतिराजो न्यरूपयत् ।
यः साक्षादभजच्छ्रीमाञ्छ्रीकण्ठो मानुषीं तनुम् ॥

T. A., III., 194.

3. गुरुभ्योऽपि गरीयांसं युक्तं श्रीचुखलाभिधम् ।
वन्दे यत्कृतसंस्कारः स्थितोऽस्मि गलितग्रहः ॥
ततो गुरुतरः श्रीमान्भूतिराजो महामतिः ।
जयताद्भक्तजनतासमुद्धरणसाहसः ॥

M. V. V., 1.

Page 166.

1. श्रीभूतिराजमिश्रा
गुरवः प्राहुः पुनर्वह्नी रुद्रशतम् ॥

T. A., Ah. VIII, 265.

2. अथोच्यते ब्रह्मविद्या सद्यः प्रत्ययदायिनी ।
शिवः श्रीभूतिराजो यामस्मभ्यं प्रत्यपादयत् ॥
सर्वेषामेव भूतानां मरणे समुपस्थिते ।
यया पठितयोत्क्रम्य जीवो याति निरञ्जनम् ॥

T. A., XII, 196.

3. श्रीनाथसंततिमहाम्बरघर्मकान्तिः ।
श्रीभूतिराजतनयः स्वपितृप्रसादः ॥

T. A., XII, 414.

Page 168.

1. आप्तोक्तिरागमस्सोपीत्येवं पौष्करसंहिता ।
नादरूपतया पूर्वं शिवेनाविष्कृतः पुनः ॥
सदाशिवादिरूपेण तेनैवासौ पृथक् पृथक् ।
कामिकादिप्रभेदेन शिष्येभ्यः संप्रकाशितः ॥
अष्टाविंशतिसंख्योसौ सिद्धान्त इति संज्ञितः ।

Mr. T., Introd. 2.

2. सिद्धान्ते कर्म बहुलं मलमायादिरूपितम् ।

T. A., XII, 400.

3. सैद्धान्तिकास्तु नैतदनुमन्यन्ते ।

T. A., Comm. VI. 221.

4. सिद्धान्ते कर्म बहुलं मलमायादिरूपितम् ।
स्वल्पपुण्यं बहुक्लेशं स्वप्रतीतिविवर्जितम् ॥
मोक्षविद्याविहीनञ्च विनयं त्यज दूरतः ।
(विनयं तन्त्रप्रधानं शास्त्रम्)

T. A., XII, 400--1.

Page 169.

1. ग्राह्यमवश्यं शिवशासनम् ।
द्वावाप्तौ तत्र च श्रीमच्छ्रीकण्ठलकुलेश्वरौ ॥
द्विप्रवाहमिदं शास्त्रं सम्यङ् निश्रेयसप्रदम् ।
प्राच्यस्य तु यथाभीष्टभोगदत्वमपि स्थितम् ॥

तच्च पञ्चविधं प्रोक्तं शक्तिवैचित्र्यचित्रितम् ।
पञ्चस्रोत इति प्रोक्तं श्रीमच्छ्रीकण्ठशासनम् ॥
तदष्टादशधा स्रोतः पञ्चकं यत्ततोप्यलम् ।
उत्कृष्टं भैरवाभिख्यं चतुःषष्टिविभेदितम् ॥

T. A., XII, 396–7.

Page 170.

1. तथा चाह गुरुः सिद्धस्सद्योज्योतिः "खेटपालाद्यैः" इति । सद्योज्योतिप्रभृतिभिरित्यर्थः ।

T. A., Comm., VI. 211.

2. यं चानुशासयामास भगवानीशसंमतः ।
उग्रज्योतिर्गुरुः श्रीमान् सर्वविद्यासरित्पतिः ॥

M. K., 63.

3. "इत्यवदत्तत्त्वानि सद्योज्योतिः सुवृत्तिकृत्" इति । श्रीमद्भौरववृत्तेरेवसुवृत्तित्वेन प्रसिद्धत्वात् ।

T. T. N., Comm., 2.

4. इत्यवदत्तत्त्वानि सद्योज्योतिः सुवृत्तिकृत् ।

T. San., Comm., 52.

Page. 172.

1. ततोभूल्लाट उत्तुङ्गशिवो विन्ध्ये व्रतीश्वरः ।
कल्याणनगरीवासी गुरुः पद्धतिकृत्सुधीः ॥
सर्वविद्याधिपो यस्य कनीयानार्यदेशजः ।
सर्वागमार्थनिर्णेतुः श्रीभोजनृपतेर्गुरुः ॥

T. P., Introd, 4.

Page 173.

1. शाङ्करकण्ठश्रीमद् विद्याकण्ठादनुग्रहं लब्ध्वा ।
नारायणकण्ठ इमां तत्पुत्रो व्यरचयद् वृत्तिम् ॥

Mr. T., 456.

2. इति नादसिद्धिमेनामकरोच्छ्रीभट्टरामकण्ठोऽत्र ।
नारायणकण्ठसुतः काश्मीरे वृत्तपञ्चविंशत्या ॥

N. K., 14.

साक्षाच्छ्रीकण्ठनाथादिव सुकृतिजनानुग्रहायावतीर्णा-
च्छ्रुत्वा श्रीरामकण्ठाच्छिवमतकमलोन्मीलनप्रौढभास्वान् ।

श्रीविद्याकण्ठभट्टस्तदिदमुपदिशन् नादिदेशैतदेनां
स्पष्टार्थामत्र लघ्वीं विरचय विवृतिं वत्स सर्वोपयोग्याम् ॥

Mr. Vr., P. 4.

रामकण्ठमहाकण्ठकण्ठीरवपदानुगः ।
न कुतार्किकमातङ्गगर्जितेभ्यो बिभेम्यहम् ॥

Mr. Vr., Di., 1.

Page 174.

1. श्रीरामकण्ठसद्वृत्तिं मयैवमनुकुर्वता ।
रत्नत्रयपरीक्षार्थः संक्षेपेण प्रकाशितः ॥

R. Tr., 107.

2. रामकण्ठकृतालोकनिर्मलीकृतचेतसा ।
रत्नत्रयपरीक्षेयं कृता श्रीकण्ठसूरिणा ॥

R. Tr., 107.

3. स्तोत्रकारस्य पितामहः परमेश्वराख्यः अपराजितः पिता ।

S. C., Comm., 10.

Page 175.

1. तत्त्वसंग्रहचन्द्रस्य प्रकाशाय वितानिता ।
श्रीनारायणकण्ठेन बृहट्टीका शरन्निशा ॥

T. San., 1.

Page 176.

1. श्रीमदघोरशिवाह्वयेन गुरुणा श्रीजन्यया व्याख्यया
लोकेऽपि प्रथितेन कुण्डिनकुलं चोलेष्वलंकुर्वता ।
श्रीसर्वात्मशिवांघ्रिपद्मरजसामाराधकेनामला-
च्छ्रीतत्त्वत्रयनिर्णयस्य विवृतिर्लेशादियं निर्मिता ॥

T. T. N., 22.

2. येनाकारि कवीश्वरेण रसवान् आश्चर्यसाराह्वयः
पाखण्डापजपश्च काव्यतिलको भक्तप्रकाशस्तथा ।
नाट्येष्वभ्युदयश्च सुन्दरगिरा शैवेषु सद्वृत्तय-
स्तेनाघोरशिवेन साधु रचिता रत्नत्रयोल्लेखिनी ॥

R. Tr., 108.

Page 178.

1. केचन माहेश्वराः शैवागमसिद्धान्ततत्त्वं यथावदीक्षमाणाः ।

S. D. S., 174.

Page 184.

1. शेषं प्रस्तारतन्त्रेण कोहलः कथयिष्यति ।

Bh. Su., Ch. XXXVII, Ś. 18.

Page 185.

1. तुम्बुरुणेदमुक्तम्—
'अङ्गहाराभिधानात्तु करणै रेचकान्विदुः' इहाप्येतन्मुनेर्मतमिति लक्ष्यते, यत्सहशब्देन तत्र तत्र निर्दिशति ।

A. Bh., Vol. I, 165.

Page 186.

1. परोक्षेऽपि हि वक्तव्यो नार्या प्रत्यक्षवत् प्रियः ।
सखी च नाट्यधर्मोयं भरतेनोदितं द्वयम् ॥

A. Bh., Vol. I, 172.

2. एतावत (न्त ?) एवैत इत्यत्र नियमो विवक्षितः । तेन मौग्ध्यमदभाव-विकृतपरितपनादीनामपि शाक्याचार्यराहुलादिभिरभिधानं विरुद्धमित्यलं वहुना ।

A. Bh., Vol. III, 164.

3. आसां कलातालमानेन लक्षणमुक्तं रघुनाथेन ।

A. Bh., Vol. I, 255.

Page 187.

1. प्रतिज्ञाचाणक्ये तन्महाकविना भीमेन राजापि विन्ध्यकेतुः शकार इति भूयसा व्यवहृतः ।

A. Bh., Vol. II, 161.

2. सर्वेषां वृत्तानामित्यादावर्थः । समासेन जयदेवोऽभ्यधात्—'सर्वादिमध्यान्तग्लौ त्रिकौ म्नौ भ्यौ ज्रौ स्तौ' इति ।

A. Bh., Vol. II, 244.

Page 188.

1. विश्रान्तौ चात्र वृत्तभङ्गोऽर्थभङ्गोऽभिनेयोऽत्र श्राव्यत्वाद्भट्टशङ्करादिभिरुपगतमेतत् "क्वचिदुपान्त्यो वा" इति ।

A. Bh., Vol. II, 245.

Page 193.

1. आञ्जनेयो मातृगुप्तो रावणो नन्दिकेश्वरः ।
स्वातिर्गुणो विन्दुराजः क्षेत्रराजश्च राहुलः ॥

S. R., Vol. I, (An) 6.

2. अत एव श्रीहर्षेण अङ्गनासमुचित्तं वाद्यमित्याशयेन व्यक्तिर्व्यञ्जनधातुना दशविधेनेत्यत्र लब्धाऽमुनेत्युक्तम् ।

A. Bh., (MS.)Ch. XXIX., V. 101.

3. "रसभावदृष्टिहस्तशिरश्चाद्य (आद्यं ?) यद्यङ्गं पूर्णं वापूर्णं वा कृत (कुत ?) एव नाट्यनृत्तयोर्भेदस्तुल्यानुकारत्वे" इति हर्षवार्तिकम् ।

A. Bh., Vol. I, 207.

4. वार्तिककृताप्युक्तम्—

"वाच्यानुगतेऽभिनये प्रतिपाद्येऽर्थे च गात्रविक्षेपैः ।
उभयोरपि हि समाने को भेदो नृत्तनाट्यगतः ॥"

A. Bh., Vol. I, 172.

... ...

नास्त्यसौ भिन्नस्वभाव इति यावत् । यद्वार्तिकम्—
'एवमवान्तरवाक्यैरुपदेशो रागदर्शनीयेषु ।
सिंहादिवर्णकैर्वा क्वचिदप्यर्थान्तरन्यासात् ॥'
तस्मात्स्वभावस्य प्रयोजनस्य चाभेदान्नृत्तं नाट्यादभिन्नमिति ।

A. Bh., Vol. I, 174.

Page 194.

1. तेन पूर्वो रङ्गे इति पूर्वरङ्गः सुप्सुपेति समासः, राजदन्तादित्वाद्वा परनिपातः । श्रीहर्षस्तु रङ्गशब्देन तौर्यत्रिकं ब्रुवन् नाट्याङ्गप्रयोगस्य तस्यैव पूर्वरङ्गतां मन्यमानः पूर्वश्चासौ रङ्ग इति समासममंस्त । यदाह—
'दृष्टा येऽवस्थार्थे (वस्त्वर्थे ?) नाट्ये रङ्गाय पादभागाः स्युः ।
पूर्वं त एव यस्मिन् शुद्धाः स्युः पूर्वरङ्गोऽसौ ॥'

A. Bh., Vol. I, 211.

2. अनेन गवाक्षकरणं सूच्यत इत्येके । आदित्ये मित्रशब्दः पुल्लिङ्ग इति तेन यद्वार्तिककारो तदुपलक्षितो नर्तकी (हि) लज्जापरिहारहेतोः, नपुंसको नेपथ्यगृह इति तदपरामृष्टाभिधानम् । मित्र इति तेजस्विता आहार्योपयोगी (गि ?) रत्नादेरुक्ता ।

A. Bh., Vol. I, 31.

Page 197.

1. अत एवैतदनुसारेण भट्टलोल्लट-गोपालादिभिर्भङ्गोपभङ्गविभङ्गविषये तालदीपिकादौ चिरन्तनसंमतो ध्रुवातालानां नियोगः प्रपञ्चतो दूषितः ।

A. Bh., Vol. II, 134.

Page 198.

1. अन्ये तु यथोचितो मार्गो यथामार्ग इति विग्रहेण सुकुमारत्वाद् ध्रुवक एवात्रोह-इत्याहुः । यथाह भट्टगोपालः ।

A. Bh., (MS.) Ch. XXXI, V. 510.

Page 199.

1. षट्पदेयं नाटिकेति सङ्ग्रहानुसारिणो भट्टलोल्लटाद्याः । श्रीशङ्कुकस्त्वयुक्तमेतदित्यभिधायाष्टधेति व्याचष्टे। तथा हि देवी कन्या च ख्याताऽख्याताभेदेन चतुर्धा, कन्या त्वन्तःपुरसङ्गीतकभेदेन द्विधेति । घण्टकादयस्त्वाहुः नायको नृपतिरित्येतावन्मात्रं नाटकादावुपजीवितः न तु प्रख्यातत्वमपि तद्भेदद्वयादन्येऽष्टाविति षोडशभेदा इति ।

A. Bh., Vol. II, 436.

Page 201.

1. काव्यस्यात्मा ध्वनिरिति बुधैर्यः समाम्नातपूर्व-
स्तस्याभावं जगदुरपरे भाक्तमाहुस्तमन्ये ।
केचिद्वाचां स्थितमविषये तत्त्वमूचुस्तदीयम्

Dh. L., 3.

2. विनापि विशिष्टपुस्तकेषु विवेचनात् ।

Dh. L., 3,

न चास्माभिरभाववादिनां विकल्पाः श्रुताः ।

Dh. L., 3.

3. पूर्वग्रहणेनेदंप्रथमता नात्र संभाव्यते इत्याह ।

Dh. L., 3

4. दर्शयता इति भट्टोद्भटवामनादिना ।

Dh. L., 10.

Page 202.

1. ग्रन्थकृत्समानकालभाविना मनोरथनाम्ना कविना ।

Dh. L., 8.

Page 205.

1. वृत्त्या तात्पर्यं टीकया तद्विचारः सूत्रेष्वेतेषु ग्रन्थकारेण दृब्धम् ।

I. P. V., I., 3.

Page 211.

1. वल्लभदेवायनितश्चन्द्रादित्यादवाप्य जन्मेमाम् ।
कय्यटनामाऽरचयद्विवृत्तिं देवीशतस्तोत्रे ॥

वसुमुनिगगनोदधिसमकाले याते कलेस्तथा लोके ।
द्वापंचाशे वर्षे रचितेयं भीमगुप्तनृपे ॥

D. Ś., Comm.

Page 212.

1. इत्यलं पूर्ववंश्यैः सह विवादेन बहुना ।

Dh. L., 185.

2. किं लोचनं विना लोको भाति चन्द्रिकयापि हि ।
तेनाभिनवगुप्तोत्र लोचनोन्मीलनं व्यधात् ॥

Dh. L., 233.

Page 214.

1. श्रीमान् कात्यायनोऽभूद् वररुचिसदृशः प्रस्फुरद्बोधतृप्त-
स्तद्वंशालंकृतो यः स्थिरमतिरभवत् सौशुकाख्योतिविद्वान् ।
विप्रः श्रीभूतिराजस्तदनुसमभवत्तस्य सूनुर्महात्मा
येनामी सर्वलोकास्तमसि निपतिताः प्रोद्धृता भानुनेव ॥

Bh. G. S., 186.

Page 218.

1. निदर्शनं—यथा उभयाभिसारिकायाम् ।

A. Bh., Vol. II, 354.

Page 220.

1. महाकविना भासेनापि स्व प्रबन्ध उक्तः (स्व प्रबन्धे उक्तम् ?)—
'त्रेतायुगं तद्धि न मैथिली सा
रामस्य रागपदवी मृदु चास्य चेतः ।
लब्ध्वा जनस्य यदि रावणमस्य कायं
प्रोत्कृत्य तन्न तिलशो न वितृप्तिगामी ॥' इति ।

A. Bh., Vol. I, 320.

2. अमृतमथ(न्थ ?)नं समवकार इति भिन्नलिङ्गसामानाधिकरण्यसूचनद्वारेण तदेव तदिति साक्षात्कारकल्पनाद् व्यवधानविषयत्वाभावमस्याह, तत एव विक्रमोर्वशीय (विक्रमोर्वशी ?) स्वप्नवासवदत्ता (त्ते) नाटकमिति व्यवहरन्ति ।

A. Bh., Vol. I, 87.

It appears that the title of the drama, commonly known as "Vikramorvaśīyam", was "Vikramorvaśī". For, in that case alone भिन्नलिङ्गसामानाधिकरण्य is possible between Vikramorvarśī and Nāṭakam.

3. यथा स्वप्नवासवदत्ताख्ये नाटके—
'संजितपक्ष्मकपाटं नयनद्वारं स्वरूपतडनेन ।
उद्घाट्य सा प्रविष्टा हृदयगृहं मे नृपतनूजा ॥' इति ।

Dh. L., 152.

Page 221.

1. लेशो यथाविमारके द्वितीयेऽङ्के धात्री नायकमाह—अय्य किं चिंतीअदि । अविमारकः—भवति शास्त्रं चिन्त्यते ।

A. Bh., Vol. II, 362.

Page 222.

1. एतदुपजीवनेनैव चिरन्तनाः कवयो—'नाद्यन्ते सूत्रधारः' इति पुस्तके लिखन्ति स्म ।

A. Bh., Vol. I, 26.

Page 223.

1. अनर्थकं वचो यत्तु स प्रलाप इति परस्परमसम्बद्धं मौर्ख्यादिवशादित्यर्थः । यथा दरिद्रचारुदत्ते शकारः 'शुणामि मल्लगन्धं, अन्धआळशचिदादो उण णासिआदो हिदुत्तं एळामि ।

A. Bh., Vol. III, 175.

Page 224.

1. प्रथितयशसां धावकसौमिल्लकादि-कविरत्नानां प्रबन्धानतिक्रम्य वर्तमानकवेः कालिदासस्य क्रियायां कथं बहुमानः ।

M. A., 5.

Page 226.

1. मारकण्डेय उवाच ।
इति भृङ्गिवचः श्रुत्वा महादेवः कृपानिधिः ॥
उवाच भृङ्गिन् मे वाक्यं न कदापि मृषा भवेत् ।
पृथिव्यां ब्राह्मणो भूत्वा विद्यावान् धार्मिकः कृती ॥
नवलक्षमिता गाथाः कृत्वा रससमन्विताः ।
शिवलिङ्गं हि संस्थाप्य क्षेत्रे परमदुर्लभे ॥
मानुष्यं हि परित्यज्य कैलासं पुनरेष्यसि ।
इति शङ्करवाक्यान्ते भृङ्गी परमदुःखितः ॥
पतितः पृथिवीमध्ये स्वापराधेन जैमिने ।
पुत्रोऽभूद्विष्णुदत्तस्य मथुरायां सुतेजसः ॥

जातकर्मादिकं चास्य पिता चक्रे समाहितः ।
गुणाढ्य इति तन्नाम पृथिव्यां प्रथितं तदा ॥
पपाठ सकला विद्या मुने व्याकरणादिकाः ।
स सर्वशास्त्रवेत्ताऽभूद् गुणाढ्यो द्विजसत्तम ॥

N. M., Ch. XXVII.

... ...

जानामि सर्वं नृपते तवास्मीति निगद्यते ॥
पिशाचभाषया राजन् कृता गाथा मनोहराः ।
नवलक्षमितास्तास्त्वं संस्कृतेन लिखापय ॥
अहं यास्यामि नेपालं क्षेत्राणां क्षेत्रमुत्तमम् ।
इत्युक्त्वा प्रददौ तानि शाखिपत्राणि जैमिने ॥
आदाय तानि नृपतिः स्वकीयां नगरीं ययौ ।
तदा ययौ गुणाढ्योऽपि श्लेष्मान्तकवनं मुने ॥

N. M., Ch. XXVIII.

... ...

नेपालक्षेत्रमासाद्य गुणाढ्यो द्विजसत्तमः ।
वाग्मत्याः सलिले स्नात्वा दृष्ट्वा पशुपतीश्वरम् ॥
क्षेत्रप्रदक्षिणं कृत्वा लिङ्गं संस्थाप्य यत्नतः ।
आरुरोह ततो भृङ्गी कैलासं पर्वतोत्तमम् ॥

N. M., Ch. XXIX.

Page 227.

1. पणमह पणयप्पकुविअगोरीचलणग्गलग्गपडिबिंबं ।
तंसु णहदप्पणेसु अ एआअअ तनुअरं रुद्दं ॥
पणमत पणअप्पकुपिअकोरीचलणक्कलक्कपटिपिंपम् ।
तंसु नखतप्पनेसुं एकातस तनुतरं रुत्तम् ॥

A. Bh., Vol. III, 70.

Page 228.

1. चन्द्रकेन स्वानि रूपकाणि वीररौद्राधिकोपयोगीनि संस्कृतभाषयैव ।

A. Bh., Vol. III, 72.

Page 229.

1. अलङ्कारान्तराणि हि निरूप्यमाणदुर्घटनान्यपि रससमाहितचेतसः प्रतिभानवतः कवेरहंपूर्विकया परापतन्ति । यथा कादम्बर्यां कादम्बरीदर्शनावसरे । यथा च मायारामादिशिरो (रामशिरो ?) दर्शनविह्वलायां सीतादेव्यां सेतौ । Dh. L., 87.

2. यथा ह्यमरुकस्य कवेर्मुक्तकाः शृङ्गाररसस्यन्दिनः प्रबन्धायमानाः प्रसिद्धा एव ।

Dh. L., 142.

Page 230.

1. इत्यत्रेर्ष्यारोषात्मनो मानस्य प्रशमः ।

Dh. L., 24.

2. सूत्रे संक्षिप्य यद्विभावादि निरूपितं तद्विभागेन व्याख्येयमित्याशयेन शृङ्गारस्यावस्थाभेदमाह तस्य द्वे इत्यादिना । अधिष्ठाने अवस्थे इत्यर्थः । अधिष्ठीयतेऽवस्थात्र शृङ्गाररूपेण तेन न शृङ्गारस्येमौ भेदौ गोत्वस्येव शाबलेयत्वबाहुलेयत्वे । अपि तु तद्द्वयेऽप्यनुयायिनी या रतिरास्थाबन्धात्मिका तस्याश्चास्वाद्यमानं रूपं शृङ्गारः । यदाहुः—

एतस्मान्मां कुशलिनमभिज्ञानदानाद्विदित्वा
मा कौलीनादसितनयने मय्यविश्वासिनी भूः ।
स्नेहानाहुः किमपि विरहह्रासिनस्तेऽप्यभोगा-
दिष्टे वस्तुन्युपचितरसाः प्रेमराशीभवन्ति ॥ इति ।

अत एव सम्भोगे विप्रलम्भसम्भावनाभीरुत्वं विप्रलम्भेऽपि सम्भोगमनोराज्यानुवेध इति इयच्छृङ्गारस्य वपुः, अभिलाषेर्ष्याप्रवासादिदशास्वत्रैवान्तर्भूताः । सत्यामास्थाबन्धात्मिकायां रतौ, तेन सम्भोगशृङ्गार इत्यादि व्यपदेशो भोगेऽप्युपचारात्, अत एव सत्यतः सातिशयचमत्कारः ।

A. Bh., Vol. I, 304.

Page 231.

1. यान्त्या तया वलितकन्धरमाननं (नं ?) तदावृत्तवृन्तशतपत्रनिभं वहन्त्या ।
दिग्धोऽमृतेन च विषेण च पक्ष्मलाक्ष्या गाढं निखात इव मे हृदये कटाक्षः ॥
इत्यादावनुभावप्रत्ययोऽपि दुर्लभीभवेत्, का कथा रसस्य ।............
.........'निद्रानिमीलितदृशो मदमन्थरायाः', 'विवृण्वन्ती शैलसुतापि भावमङ्गैः' इत्यादिकाव्येषु सहृदयहृदयसागरसमुच्चलद्राकामृगाङ्कप्रतिबिम्बेषु जीवितभूतानां ह्रासालस्यौत्सुक्यनिद्रामदागमाभिलाषागमादीनां शब्दास्पृष्टत्वेन (शब्दस्पृष्टत्वेन ?) विभावानुत्साध्य (द्य ?) स्वभावे वीतरागतेव वककाकक्रीडाकल्पनैव स्यात् ।

A. Bh., Vol. II, 222–3.

2. यथा अमरुकस्य—
लग्ना नांशुकपल्लवे भुजलता न द्वारदेशेऽर्पिता
नो वा पादयुगे तया निपतितं तिष्ठेति नोक्तं वचः ।

काले केवलमम्बुदालिमलिने गन्तुं प्रवृत्तः शठः
तन्व्या वाष्पजलोपकल्पितनदीपूरेण रुद्धः प्रियः ॥
अत्र तृतीयपादेन विपरीतकार्यप्रवृत्तिरुक्ता। आद्यार्धेन कार्यज्ञत्वं नायिकायाः, तथापि निवारणं तुर्यपादेनोक्तम्।

A. Bh., Vol. II, 311–2.

Page 232.

1. तत्रास्य बहुतरव्यापिनो बहुगर्भस्वप्नायिततुल्यस्य नाट्यायितस्योदाहरणं महाकविसुबन्धुनिबद्धो—वासवदत्तानाट्यधाराख्यः समस्त एव प्रयोगः।

A. Bh., Vol. III, 172.

Page 233.

1. यत्तूदाहृतं केनचित्—
आसीन्नाथ पितामही तव मही जाता ततोऽनन्तरं
माता संप्रति साम्बुराशिरशना जाया कुलोद्भूतये।
पूर्णे वर्षशते भविष्यति पुनः सैवानवद्या स्नुषा
युक्तं नाम समग्रनीतिविदुषां किं भूपतीनां कुले॥
इति तदस्माकं ग्राम्यं प्रतिभाति। अत्यन्तासभ्यस्मृतिहेतुत्वात्। का वानेन स्तुतिः कृता। त्वं वंशक्रमेण राजेति हि कियदिदम्। इत्येवंप्राया व्याजस्तुतिः सहृदयगोष्ठीनिन्दितेत्युपेक्षयैव।

Dh. L., 44–5.

Page 235.

1. विचारस्यान्यथाभावस्तथा दृष्टोपदिष्टयोः।
सन्देहाज्जायते यत्र स विज्ञेयो विपर्ययः॥
यथा वा मत्तविलासे शाक्यभिक्षुः—परमकारुणिएण भअवदा तहागएण पासादेसु वासो पज्जंकेसु सअणं पुव्वण्हे भोअणं···एदेहिं उवदेसेहिं भिक्खुसंघस्स अणुग्गहं करन्तेण किं णु हु इत्थिआपरिग्गहो सुरापाणविहाणं अणादिट्ठं।

A. Bh., Vol. II, 357–8.

Paga 236.

1. तेषु कथाश्रयेषु तावत्स्वेच्छैव न योज्या। यदुक्तम्—'कथामार्गे न चातिक्रमः'। स्वेच्छापि यदि योज्या तद्रसविरोधिनी न योज्या।·········
······रामाभ्युदये यशोवर्मणा।

Dh. L., 148.

2. तत्र शुद्धस्योदाहरणं यथा रामाभ्युदये—'कृतककुपितैः' इत्यादिश्लोकः।

Dh. L., 133.

3. कम्पत इति कपोतो भीरुः पक्षी तत्प्रकृतिरन्योऽपि कपोतस्तस्य । तथा हि—रामाभ्युदये प्रथमेऽङ्के वटोः ।

A. Bh., Vol. II, 56.

4. एवमधिकाधिकं हृदयविपरिवर्तमानं समुचितं च नायकस्य फलं यद्यदा कविप्रयत्नेन विवक्ष्यते सम्पाद्यतया तदा तस्य प्रधानफलत्वम्, रामाभ्युदयादौ सीताप्रत्यानयनादेरिव ।

A. Bh., Vol. III, 5.

5. वचः सातिशयं श्लिष्टं काव्यबन्धसमाश्रयम् ।
पताकास्थानकमिदं द्वितीयं परिकीर्तितम् ॥
... ...

यथा रामाभ्युदये तृतीयेऽङ्के सीतां प्रति सुग्रीवस्य सन्देशोक्तिः ।

A. Bh., Vol. III, 20.

6. कविर्वाक्पतिराजश्रीभवभूत्यादिसेवितः ।
जितो ययौ यशोवर्मा तद्गुणस्तुतिवन्दिताम् ॥

R. T., IV., 144.

Page 237.

1. असदेतदितिप्राहुर्गुरवस्तत्त्वदर्शिनः ।
श्रीसोमानन्द-कल्याण-भवभूतिपुरोगमाः ॥
तथाहि त्रीशिकाशास्त्रविवृतौ तेऽभ्यधुर्बुधाः ।
... ... ॥

T. A., Ah. XIII, 96-7.

Page 238.

1. केचिदाहुः—अन्तरं छिद्रं सन्धिरिति । तदङ्गमात्रं—तात्स्थ्याच्च तत्स्थान्यं तेन सन्ध्यङ्गच्छिद्रवर्तित्वात् सन्ध्यन्तराणि, अत एव चाङ्गानां सम्बद्धानि ।
... ...

अन्ये मन्यन्ते—य एवोपक्षेपाद्याः सामान्या उक्ताः तेषामेवैतद्विशेषा अवान्तरभेदाः ।

A. Bh., Vol. III, 63.

2. रामाभ्युदये भयात्मोपक्षेपः, प्रतिमानिरुद्धे स्वप्नरूपः, उदात्तराघवे हेत्ववधारणात्मा ।

A. Bh., Vol. III, 64.

Page 239.

1. शृङ्गारानन्तरं नियमेन करुणं (णो) व्याप्रियते त्वसौ तज्जन्मनि, यथा तापसवत्सराजे वासवदत्तादाहाद्वत्सराजस्य ।

A. Bh., Vol. I,297.

2. ननु तत्रारतेरविच्छेदाद्बन्धुताकृतः शोकः नैतत्।.........न च बन्धुमात्रं हेतुः एवं हि सति ।
उत्कम्पिनी भयपरिस्खलितांशुकान्ता
ते लोचने प्रतिदिशं विधुरे क्षिपन्ती ।
क्रूरेण दारुणतया सहसैव दग्धा
धूमान्वितेन दहनेन न वीक्षितासि ॥ (तापसवत्सराजे २–१६)
इत्यादौ ते इति प्राणभूतं (पदं) निरुपयोगतां गमितं स्यात् ।

A. Bh., Vol. I, 298.

3. कालोत्थानगतिरसौ व्याख्यासंरम्भकार्यविषयाणाम् ।
अर्थाभिधानयुक्तः प्रवेशकः स्यादनेकार्थः ॥
... ...

व्याख्यायत इति व्याख्या । तथाहि—केनचित्प्रवेशकेन गूढो व्याख्यायत इत्यर्थः । यथा तापसवत्सराजे अमात्यप्रणिधिः ।

A. Bh., Vol. II, 424–5.

4. गर्भनिर्भिन्नबीजार्थो विलोभनकृतोऽथवा ।
क्रोधव्यसनजो वापि स विमर्श इति स्मृतः ॥
... ...

लोभस्तु निमित्तं, यथा तापसवत्सराजे—'वत्संप्राप्तिविलोभितेन सचिवैः प्राणा मया धारिताः' (६–३) इति । A. Bh., Vol. III, 26–7.

5. गुरुव्यतिक्रमो यस्तु स द्रवः परिकीर्तितः ।
विरोधिप्रशमो यश्च सा शक्तिः परिकीर्तिता ॥
... ...

यथा वा—तापसवत्सराजे षष्ठेऽङ्के वासवदत्ताया यौगन्धरायणवचनातिक्रमेण मरणाध्यवसायः । A. Bh., Vol. III, 53.

6. यथा तावसवत्सराजे वत्सराजस्य राज्यप्रत्यापत्तिः ।

A. Bh., Vol. III, 4.

7. तापसवत्सराजे वासवदत्ताप्रेमानुसन्धानं राजमुखेन प्रत्यङ्कं दर्शितम् ।

A. Bh., Vol. III, 14.

8. यथा वासवदत्तालाभे (तापसवत्सराजे) विन्दुः प्रधानं, कौशाम्बीराज्यलाभे तु प्रकरी पताका च प्रधाना ।

A. Bh., Vol. III, 17

Page 240.

1. यथा तापसवत्सराजचरिते पद्मावतीं प्रति कामोत्पत्तिर्वत्सेश्वरस्य निमित्तमत्यन्तानुवृत्तिर्नाम ।

A. Bh., Vol. III, 197.

2. राज्ञामन्तःपुरजने दिवा सम्भोग इष्यते ।

... ...

सम्भोगः परस्परावलोकन-प्रणयकलह-सङ्गीतकादि । यथोक्तम् 'तद्वक्त्रेन्दुविलोकनेन दिवसो नीतः' इति । (तापस—१-१६)

A. Bh., Vol. III, 206.

3. उक्तव्याख्याने तु कोहलादिलक्षिततोटकसट्टकरासकादिसङ्ग्रहः फलम् ।

A. Bh., Vol. II, 407.

4. भेज्जलेन राधाविप्रलम्भाख्यो रासकाङ्कः सैन्धवभाषाबाहुल्येन, चन्द्रकेन(ण ?)स्वानि रूपकाणि वीररौद्राधिकोपयोगीनि संस्कृतभाषयैव ।

A. Bh., Vol. III, 72.

5. एवं त्रियोगः, यथा भेज्जलविरचिते राधाविप्रलम्भे रासकाङ्के उपक्षेपेणैव हि 'लिअलीस्सा' इत्यादि—परिकरपरिन्यासकार्यगुरुभूते पालिते ।

A. Bh., Vol. III, 63.

6. एवं तावदन्तर्यवनिकाङ्गानां दृष्टार्थ एव प्रयोगः—तान्यन्तरेण प्रयोगस्यैवासम्पत्तेः । तथा च भेज्जलनाम्ना कविना निजरूपक उक्तम्—

A. Bh., Vol. I, 216.

Page 241.

1. प्रतिज्ञाचाणक्ये तन्महाकविना भीमेन राजापि विन्ध्यकेतुः शकार इति भूयसा व्यवहृतः ।

A. Bh., Vol. II, 161.

2. द्वियोगो यथा प्रतिमानिरुद्धे भीमसूनोर्वसुनागस्य कृते—उपक्षेपानन्तरमेवं न परिकरः, आद्येनैव कृते (कृतं ?)परिन्यासदर्शनम् ।

A. Bh., Vol. III, 63.

Page 242.

1. सूत्रधारेण सहिताः संलापं यत्तु कुर्वते ।
चित्रैर्वाक्यैः स्वकार्योत्थैर्वीथ्यङ्गैरन्यथापि वा ॥

... ...

यथा 'पीताम्बरगुरुशक्त्या हरत्युषां प्रसभमनिरुद्धः' । (प्रतिमानिरुद्धे)

A. Bh., Vol. III. 92.

2. सूत्रधारस्य वाक्यं वा यत्र वाक्यार्थमेव वा ।
गृहीत्वा प्रविशेत्पात्रं कथोद्धातः स कीर्तितः ॥

... ...

वाक्यार्थं यथा प्रतिमानिरुद्धे—पीताम्बरगुरुशक्त्या हरत्युषाम् इति ।

A. Bh., Vol. III, 94.

3. तस्मात् स्ववर्गापेक्षयेदमुत्तमत्वमद्यतने राजोचितानामुत्तमप्रकृतीनां वणिङ्मात्रे समारोप्य तद्दूषणं यत्कृतं न तेन ब्रह्मयशःस्वामियशः खण्डितम् अपि तु स्वयश एव।

A. Bh., Vol. II, 432

Page 243.

1. कवीनाम् उ(श)क्तिरेव बलीयसी सैव लोकोत्तरा व्युत्पत्तिरित्यभिधीयते नत्वन्या कविशक्तेः व्युत्पत्तिर्नाम काचित्। Gh. V., 21.

2. 'तावुभावपि शक्तिमुद्भासयतः। सा केवलं काव्ये हेतुः' इति यायावरीयः। विप्रसृतिश्च सा प्रतिभाव्युत्पत्तिभ्याम्। K. M., 11.

3. इतिहासादिवाक्यमतिक्रम्य सा उचितरञ्जकेतिवृत्तकल्पनात्मिका क्रिया। राजशेखरेण रामनिर्वासना दशरथवेषराक्षसविरचितत्वकल्पना।

A. Bh., Vol. II, 215.

page 244.

1. तथाहि श्रृङ्गाररसे सातिशयोपयोगिनी प्राकृतभाषेति सट्टकः कर्पूरमञ्जर्याख्यो राजशेखरेण तन्मय एव निबद्धः।

A. Bh., Vol. III, 72.

2. शत्रुहृदयम्लाननि(नि?)मित्तभूतप्रसिद्धिविशेषात्मनि तथा प्रकृष्टे चोद्धतादपि तथोपहरणाय 'हस्तच्छत्रनिरुद्धचन्द्रमहस' (विद्धसा-) इत्यादौ।

A. Bh., Vol. II, 29

3. सद्भिप्रतोतवदनोदितनाव्यवेद-
तत्त्वार्थमर्थिजनवाञ्छितसिद्धिहेतोः।
माहेश्वराभिनवगुप्तपदप्रतिष्ठः
संक्षिप्तवृत्तिविधिना विशदीकरोति॥

A. Bh., Vol. I, 1

4. यदुक्तमस्मदुपाध्याय-भट्टतौतेन—'नायकस्य कवेः श्रोतुः समानोऽनुभवस्ततः' इति। Dh. L., 29.

5. मोक्षफलत्वेन चायं परमपुरुषार्थनिष्ठितत्वात्सर्वरसेभ्यः प्रधानतमः। स चायमस्मदुपाध्यायभट्टतौतेन काव्यकौतुके, अस्माभिश्च तद्विवरणे बहुतरकृतनिर्णयः पूर्वपक्षसिद्धान्त इत्यलं बहुना।

Dh. L., 178.

Page 245.

1. करणाङ्गहारान्प्रयुञ्जीतेति भाण्डवाद्यस्यानुप्रयोज्यता प्राधान्येनोक्ता। यथोक्तं भवति भट्टतोतेन 'पर्यायशस्त्र्यश्रस्य प्रयोग' इति।

A. Bh., Vol. I, 187.

2. न नाट्य एव च रसाः, काव्येऽपि, नाट्यायमान एव रसः, काव्यार्थविषये हि प्रत्यक्षकल्पसंवेदनोदये रसोदय इत्युपाध्यायाः। यदाहुः काव्य-कौतुके..............ये त्वतथाभूतास्तेषां प्रत्यक्षोचिततथाविधचर्वणा-लाभाय नटादिप्रक्रिया, स्वगतक्रोधशोकादिसङ्कटहृदयग्रन्थिभञ्जनाय गीतादिप्रक्रिया च मुनिना विरचिता, सर्वानुग्राहकं हि शास्त्रमिति न्यायात्तेन नाट्य एव रसा न लोक इत्यर्थः।

A. Bh., Vol. I. 291–2.

Page 246.

1. तदुक्तमस्मदुपाध्यायभट्टतोतेन—'स्वातन्त्र्येण प्रवृत्तौ तु सर्वप्राणिषु सम्भवः' इति।

A. Bh., Vol. I, 310.

2. अन्ये तु चित्रपदं भाविकं चेत्यङ्गद्वयमाहुः पठन्ति च.........तच्चेदमसत्, 'लास्ये दशविधं' (१९–१२०) इत्यत्रत्येन ग्रन्थेन, 'दशाङ्गं लास्य' मिति च तालाध्याये (३१) पठिष्यमाणेन विरोधात्'।

A. Bh., Vol. III, 77.

3. अस्मान्नाटकादनुकाराभिनेयलक्षणात् विनिस्सृतानि बहिर्भूतानि, एक-पात्रहार्याणि। A. Bh., Vol. III, 66.

Page 247.

1. इह चित्तवृत्तिरेव संवेदनभूमौ संक्रान्ता देहमपि व्याप्नोति। सैव च सत्त्वमित्युच्यते। तत्र चाव्यक्तं संवित्प्राणभूमिद्वयानिपतितं यत्सत्त्वं तद्भावाध्यायसंश्रयत्वेनैव विज्ञेयम्।

A. Bh., Vol. III, 152.

2. शरीरस्वभावं तावत्सत्त्वं सम्भाव्यते उत्तमशरीरतां प्राप्तमित्यर्थः।

A. Bh., Vol. III, 155.

3. तत्र देहविकाराः केचन क्रियात्मका अपि ते च प्राग्जन्माभ्यन्तरिता भावसंस्कारमात्रेण सत्त्वोद्बुद्धेन देहमात्रे सति भवन्ति, त एवाङ्गजा उच्यन्ते। A. Bh., Vol. III, 154.

Page 248.

1. भ्रूतारकचिबुकग्रीवादेः सातिशयो विकाररूपो धर्मः,अत एव श्रृङ्गारोचित-माकारं सहृदयासहृदयसर्वजनहृदयं सूचयतीति हावः।

A. Bh., Vol. III, 156.

2. हावावस्थायां यत्स्वयं रतेः प्रबोधनं न मन्यते केवलं तत्संस्कारबलात्तथा-विकारान् करोति। यैर्दृष्टा तथा कल्पयति। यदा तु रतिवासनाप्रबोधात्तां

प्रबुद्धां रतिमभिमन्यते केवलं समुचितविभावोपग्रहविरहान्निर्विषयतया स्फुटीभावं न प्रतिपद्यते तदा तज्जनितो देहविकारविशेषो हेला।

A. Bh., Vol. III, 157.

3. चाण्डालीनामपि रूपलावण्यसंपदो दृश्यन्ते ननु, चेष्टालङ्कारास्तासामपि- भवन्त उत्तमतामेव सूचयन्ति स्ववर्गापेक्षया।

A. Bh., Vol. III, 153.

4. यदा तु काम उदितस्तदादेः प्राप्तसम्भोगता कामावस्थानामुदय एव तथा च प्राप्तसम्भोगतायामपि विप्रलम्भे कुसमसदृत्तादिमहिमानं प्राप्ते कामिजन- सम्भोगे भवन्त्येवैता अवस्थाः। तथा च भट्टतोतेनोक्तम्—

कामावस्था न शृङ्गारः क्वचिदासां तदङ्गता। इति।

A. Bh., Vol. III, 199.

5. सद्वृत्तभाषागुणः स्फुटतमां स्वार्थप्रतीतिं यदा विधत्ते तत एव रसभावा- नुभावकं तदा तदेव वाक्याभिनय इति तु काव्यकौतुकग्रन्थः। अत्र तु पाठ्यरूपः सामान्याभिनयः कथमिति चिन्त्यम्।

A. Bh., Vol. III, 168.

Page 249.

1. मनोरथो यथा विकटनितम्बाप्रहसने विकटनितम्बाह—

अन्यासु तावदुपमर्दसहासु भृङ्ग
लोलं विनोदय मनः सुमनोलतासु।
मुग्धाननामरजसां कलिकामकाले
वालं कदर्थयसि किं नवमालिकायाः॥
अत्रात्मानमेव सुमनोलतात्वेनापदिशति॥

A. Bh., Vol. II, 362.

Page 250.

1. यथा च सर्वसेनविरचिते हरिविजये।

... ...

हरिविजये कान्तानुनयनाङ्गत्वेन पारिजातहरणादि निरूपितमितिहासेषु (ष्व ?) दृष्टमपि। Dh. L., 148.

Page 251.

1. मूलभूतस्य च पाठ्यस्य सम्भावनानुषक्तमाकाशभाषितमपि स्यात् पाद- ताडितकादिभासा (ण ?) रूपक इव।

A. Bh., Vol. I, 178.

Page 252.

1. परोक्षं यथा पादताडितके मदनसेनाया वर्णनम्—
उत्क्षिप्तालकमीक्षणान्तगलितं कोपाञ्चितान्तभ्रुवा
दष्टाधरोष्ठमधीरदन्तकिरणं प्रोत्कम्पयन्त्या मुखम् ।
शिञ्जन्नूपुरया विकृष्य विगलद्रक्तांशुकं पाणिना
मूर्धन्यस्य सनूपुरः समदया पादोऽर्पितः कान्तया ॥ इति

A. Bh., Vol. II, 356.

Page 254.

1. अन्ये पितृव्यतनयाः शिवशक्तिशुभ्राः क्षेमोत्पलाभिनवचक्रकपद्मगुप्ताः ।

T. A., XII. 417.

2. यथास्मत्पितृव्यस्य वामनगुप्तस्य ।

A. Bh., Vol. I, 297.

Page 255.

1. अनन्तापरटीकाकृन्मध्ये स्थितिममृष्यता ।
विवृतं स्पन्दशास्त्रं नो गुरुणा नो मयास्य तु ॥

S. N., 77.

2. स्पन्दामृते चर्वितेऽपि स्पन्दसन्दोहतो मनाक् ।
पूर्णस्तच्चर्वणाभोगोद्योग एष मयाश्रितः ॥

S. N., 1.

3. मयैव स्पन्दसन्दोहे वितत्य निर्णीतस्य ।

S. N., 7.

Page 258.

1. विस्तीर्णसद्गुरुपदस्मरणप्लवेन निस्तीर्णभीमतरभैरवधीप्रवाहः ।
अद्याष्टसप्ततितमे वयसीह वर्ते वाचा सुधारसमुचा सह माधुरोऽहम् ॥

S. Pa., 6.

2. नवनवगद्यपद्यमयसूक्तिसहस्रसुधा–
रसघनसारसौरभवशीकृतविश्वधियः ।
अविरतमुन्मिषन्तु हृदये हृदये विदुषां
शिवपदकिङ्करस्य मधुराजकवेः कृतयः ॥

S. Pa., 14.

3. स्वच्छस्वसंविद्घनसारनिर्यत्सरस्वतीसौरभवासिताशः ।
प्रच्छन्नवेषोऽपि महाप्रकाशः स्वच्छन्दवृत्तिर्मधुराजयोगी ॥

S. Pa., 9.

4. त्र्यम्बककृपाप्रपाकणकणान्नचूर्णाशनैः
स्वकर्मवशसम्भवत्सकलदुःखनिर्णाशनैः ।
सरःसुरसरित्क्रमप्रचुरसारसारस्वतो
वितृष्ण इव भूतले चरति भट्टकृष्णः कृती ॥
S. Pa.. 13.

Page 260.

1. मधुमालवपङ्क (वङ्ग ?) लाटगौडानपरानप्यखिलानपूर्वदेशान् ।
अटतः पठतः शिवस्तवान्मे हठतः क्वापि न केनचिद्विरोधः ॥
छत्रोपानद्दण्डकुण्डी कपाली कन्थाशाठी-पुस्तिका-योगपट्टैः ।
(कन्थाशाटीं पुस्तिकां योगपट्टम् ?)
भस्मासारं देवशिक्यं च बिभ्रत् कश्चिद्भिक्षुर्याति देशान् दिदृक्षुः ॥
हृदि स्फुरति देशिकः शिव शिवेति वागानने
करे कमठपीठिका कर-भेक्षिकच्छत्रिका (कृतत्रिकच्छत्रिका ?) ।
विलासिनि पुरे पुरे विहरतां सतां स्वैरिणां
कलासु निपुणात्मनां नहि परैरपेक्षास्ति नः ॥
तृणभक्षश्चणभक्षः कणभक्षश्च क्वचित् क्वचिद्विहरन् ।
दुर्जनगर्जनभीत्या निर्जनदेशे समासीय ॥
S. Pa., (MS.) 24–7.

2. द्वैते लक्षद्वयाध्यायी योऽद्वैते लक्षपाठकः ।
सोऽद्यापि विद्याभ्यासाय जागर्त्येव जरन्नपि ॥
लक्षाध्यायी लक्षवेधी तथापि स्वाधीनोऽपि श्रीपराधीनवृत्तिः ।
विप्राकारोऽप्यात्मशक्त्याऽस्मि गुप्तः पूर्णाहन्तानिर्भरो निर्ममोऽपि ॥
यजुषि सलक्षणसूत्रे पञ्चमुखे मन्त्रतन्त्रविज्ञाने ।
परमाद्वैतपथेऽपि च पाण्डित्यं नः परम्परायातम् ॥
S. Pa., (MS.) 31–33.

3. अखण्डसंवित्साम्राज्ययौवराज्याधिकारिणाम् ।
मधुराजकुमाराणामचिन्त्यो हि पराक्रमः ॥
S. Pa., (MS.) 23.

4. न यामि कस्यापि गृहं प्रतीच्छन् नयामि सौख्येन तथापि कालम् ।
पुरीह पाण्ड्येश्वरपालितायां निरीहचूडामणिरस्मि तस्मात् ॥
कस्याञ्चिदाढ्यवहिरं कण(बहिरङ्गण?)वेदिकायामावद्धवासरुचिरागतमात्रतुष्टः
आचार्यवागमृतचर्वणमेव कुर्वन्नन्ते परं पदमनुत्तरमाविशामि ॥
S. Pa., (MS.) 41–2.

Page 261.

1. श्रीमतः क्षेमराजस्य सद्गुर्वाम्नायशालिनः ।
साक्षात्कृतमहेशस्य तस्यान्तेवासिना मया ॥
श्रीवितस्तापुरीधाम्ना विरक्तेन तपस्विना ।
विवृतिर्योगनाम्न्येयं पूर्णाद्वयमयी कृता ॥

P. S., Comm., 199.

2. व्यधुस्तन्त्रालोके किल सुभटपादा विवरणम् ।

T. A., Comm., XII, 433.

3. श्रीविश्वदत्तपौत्रस् त्रिभुवनदत्तात्मजः कुलक्रमतः ।
श्रीसुभटदत्त आसीत् अस्य गुरुर्यो ममाप्यकृत दीक्षाम् ॥

T. A., Comm., XII, 433.

4. इह केषांचिदपि व्याख्यान्तराणामसामञ्जस्यमतीव संभवदपि न प्रकाशितम्.........इह चास्माभिस्तद्व्याख्यासारोच्चयस्यैव प्रतिज्ञातत्वात् ।

T. A., Comm., Ah. I, 15-6.

Page 262.

1. इह मम गतस्तन्त्रालोके विवेचयतो यतो ।
निरवधिमभिप्रेतोत्साहः स एव निमित्तताम् ॥
2. श्रीसुभटदत्त आसीदस्य गुरुर्यो ममाप्यकृत दीक्षाम् ।
3. शिवाद्वैतज्ञप्तिप्रकटितमहानन्दविदितम् ।
गुरुं श्रीकल्याणाभिधममुमवाप्यास्तरजसम् ॥
4. तस्माच्छ्रीशंखधरादवाप्तविद्यः कृती जयरथाख्यः ।
5. जयरथजयरद्रथाख्यौ सकलजनानन्दकौ समगुणर्द्धी ।
अमृतशशिनाविवाब्धेरस्मात्कमलाश्रयादुदितौ ॥
ज्येष्ठोनयोरकार्षीत्तन्त्रालोके विवेकमिमम् ।
6. तया स श्रृङ्गाररथाभिधानो बालो विवृद्धिं गमितो जनन्या ।
सत्त्वाख्यया ख्यातगुणः क्रमेण श्रीराजराजः सचिवं व्यधात्तम् ॥

T. A. ,Comm., XII, 428-34.

7. श्रीमान् यशस्करनृपः सचिवं समस्त-
धर्म्यस्थितिष्वकृत पूर्णमनोरथाख्यम् ।
8. तस्यानन्तक्षितीन्दोर्बलबहलदरद्राजविद्रावणस्य
प्रापत् साचिव्यमाप्योत्पलरथ उचितां पद्धतिं मुक्तिमार्गे ।

T. A., Comm., XII, 430.

Page 263.

1. स्तवपञ्चिकाकारस्तु 'वसुरसपौषे' वसु धनं त्रिविधं भवति अतएव तृतीयसंख्या लिख्यते। रसशब्देन जलानि लक्ष्यन्ते तानि पञ्च। अतएव

पञ्चेति संख्या लिख्यते । ततस्त्रिपञ्चाशत्तमः संवत्सरो ज्ञायते । 'अकृष्णदशभ्याम्' इति·········शिवराभ्याम् ।

Bh. S., Comm., (MS.)

Page 264.

1. यः कण्ठधौम्यायनताप्रसिद्धविशुद्धराजानकवंशजातः ।
स भास्कराख्यो द्विज एष टीकां करोति शास्त्रेऽभिनवोदितेस्मिन् ॥

Bh., Vol. 1, 2.

2. श्रीमद्राजानकवैडूर्यकण्ठात्मजश्रीमदवतारकण्ठपुत्रो
भास्करकण्ठोहं······कौलनरोत्तमेभ्यश्च विद्योपदेशमासाद्य·········

Bh., Vol. 1,3.

Page 267.

1. एकाधिकेऽब्दे विहितचत्वारिंशे स कार्तिके
राज्ये कलशभूभर्तुः काश्मीरेष्वच्युतस्तवः ।

D. C., (Concl.)

Page 272.

1, चोलास्ते सततोत्सवा जनपदाः श्लाघ्यो गुणैर्माधवो
रेतोधाः························

M. M., 202.

2. नमो निखिलमालिन्यविलापनपटीयसे ।
महाप्रकाशपादाब्जपरागपरमाणवे ॥

M. M., 1.

3. सत्संवित्समयमहाब्धिकल्पवृक्षान् आचार्यानभिनवगुप्तपादनाथान् ।
आमूलादमलमतीनुपाश्रयन्त्या वाग्वल्याः प्रचुरफलो ननु प्ररोहः ॥

M. M., 202.

4. साहित्याब्धौ कर्णधारोहमासं काव्यालोकं लोचनं चानुशील्य ।
तद्वत्स्वच्छं लब्धवानस्मि बोधम् पान्थो भूत्वा प्रत्यभिज्ञापदव्याम् ॥

M. M., 202.

Page 273.

1. तद्भावापत्तिश्च तस्य देशिककटाक्षपातशक्तिपातसौभाग्यस्य समयानुप्रवेशमङ्गलमहाभिषेकसम्पत्संस्कारोपारोहप्रक्षालितमलोपलेपत्वाद्, औत्तराम्नायाद्यशेषशास्त्रार्थावबोधशिक्षाशालित्वात् ।

M. M., 6.

2. अवगतशिवदृष्टिप्रत्यभिज्ञार्थतत्त्व-
क्रमसरणिरहस्योल्लाससर्वस्ववेदी ।
गुरुचरणसपर्याचातुरीचिह्नोऽहं
गहनमपि हृदन्तर्व्योम तद् व्याकरोमि ॥

M. M., 2.

3. स्वस्य च परमेश्वरैश्वर्योत्कर्षविमर्शानुस्यूत्युपत्तीणान्तःकरणत्वाच्चेत्य-
वगन्तव्यम् । M. M., 6

Page 274.

1. स्वक्रियाया अपि व्याख्यां स्वयमेव प्रयुञ्जमहे ।
उपर्यप्यात्मसंरम्भसम्भोगाम्रेडनोत्सुकः ॥

M. M., 2.

2. गोरक्षो लोकधिया देशिकदृष्ट्या महेश्वरानन्दः ।
उन्मीलयामि परिमलमन्तर्ग्राह्यं महार्थमञ्जर्याम् ॥

M. M., 1.

3. श्रीआदिनाथ–मत्स्येन्द्र–शावरानन्दभैरवाः ।
चौरङ्गी–मीन–गोरक्ष–विरूपाक्ष–विलेशयाः ॥
... ...

इत्यादयो महासिद्धा हठयोगप्रभावतः ।
खण्डयित्वा कालदण्डं ब्रह्माण्डे विचरन्ति ते ॥

H. Y. P., 8–10.

4. स्वात्मारामः स्वात्मारामनामा । अथवाशब्दःसमुच्चये । योगी योगवान्
तत्प्रसादतः गोरक्षप्रसादाज्जानीत इत्यन्वयः ।

H. Y. P., 7.

5. तथाहि गोरक्षवचनम् :—
वर्जयेद् दुर्जनप्रान्तं वह्निस्त्रीपथिसेवनम् ।
प्रातःस्नानोपवासादि कायक्लेशविधिं तथा ॥

H. Y. P., 41.

6. इति श्रीगोरक्षनाथविरचितं परमरहस्योपदेशमहाज्ञानममरौघशासनं
सम्पूर्णम् । A. S., 13.

Page 275.

1. 'सम्प्रदायस्य काश्मीरोद्भूतत्वात्, प्राकृतभाषाविशेषत्वाच्च यथा–
सम्प्रदायं व्यवहार इत्युपदेशः ।'

M. M., 193

2. तर्पयित्वा परां देवीं गन्धपुष्पाक्षतासवैः ।
आस्वाद्यानन्दपात्राणि त्रीणि तीव्राणि तन्मनाः ॥

M. M., 197.

Page 276.

1. स एव च वक्ष्यमाणस्य प्रत्यभिज्ञापरपर्यायस्य विमर्शस्योपायतया तन्त्रप्रतिपाद्योऽर्थः। M. M., 7.

2. एवं च ग्राह्यग्रहणवेलायामिन्द्रियादिप्रणालिकया विश्वप्रतिष्ठाभूमिरकृत्रिमः प्रमाता कश्चिदन्तर्विमष्टव्य इति पारम्पर्यादापतितम् ॥
M. M., 13.

3. यदनेन दर्शनान्तरप्रणेतृमनीषया संसारनिबन्धनत्वेनोपकल्पितः शब्दस्पर्शादिविषयविक्षोभो जीवन्मुक्तिलक्षणाह्लादस्वभावं स्वात्मनो विमर्शं प्रत्युपायतयोपदिश्यते। M. M., 14.

Page 277.

1. हृदयङ्गमीभावे च कश्चिदुपायो वक्तव्य इत्याकांक्षां शिथिलयितुम्।
M. M., 83,

2. यत् पुनः शाम्भवेऽप्युपायसामान्यानुप्रवेशात् सूक्ष्मेक्षिकया किञ्चिद्विकल्पशङ्कायां अवर्जनीयत्वम्, तदपि निरुपायपर्वसन्निकर्षादत्यन्तशुद्धसंविन्मयं सत् पर्यन्ततो विकल्पवार्तानभिज्ञतायां पर्यवस्यति।
M. M., 168.

Page 278.

1. अनेन च विश्वस्य भोग्यतयावस्थापनाद् वक्ष्यमाणस्य विमर्शोपायस्यौचित्यमुन्मील्यते। यतो निर्भयभोगमित्येतत्तन्त्रमाम्नायते।
M. M., 7.

2. अण्डमये निजपिण्डे पीठे स्फुरन्ति करणदेव्यः।
प्रस्फुरति च परमशिवो ज्ञाननिधिस्तासां मध्ये ॥
... ...
स तत्रार्चनीयो विमर्शपुष्पाधिवाससुरभिभिः।
चित्तचषकार्पितैर्वेद्यसुधावीरपाणवस्तुभिः ॥
M. M., 83.

3. भावा वृत्तिषु ताश्चिते चित्तं संविदि सा परे।
व्योम्न्यस्तंगमितो यत्र क्रम उल्लङ्घनात्मकः ॥
M. M., 85.

4. वाह्यस्तु प्रसूनाक्षतासवधूपदीपघण्टादिस्वभावः प्रपञ्चोऽस्माभिः अधिकं नैव दुष्यतीति न्यायादाद्रियत इति। एतदुपर्यप्यालोचयिष्यते।
M. M., 86.

5. अयं च संकोचविकासयोगादेकारमारभ्याऽसङ्ख्यारपर्यन्तमागमेष्वर्चनीयतया आम्नायते। M. M., 85.

6. अत्र च गणपतिवटुकादिदेवतानां नामोपादानं तेषां च तत्तदर्थानुगुण्येन निर्वचनं च क्रियमाणं ग्रन्थगौरवमत्यन्तरहस्योन्मीलनदोषमप्युन्मेषयिष्यतीति संक्षिप्तेनैव पथा प्रस्थीयते ।

M. M., 88.

Page 279.

1. ते च वाहाः व्योमवामेश्वरी खेचरी दिक्चरी गोचरी भूचरीति च भवन्ति।

M. M., 89.

2. वामेश्वरीतिशब्देन प्रोक्ता श्रीनिशिसञ्चरे ।

T. A., Ah. IV., 206.

3. सा च मातरि विज्ञाने माने करणगोचरे ।
मेये चतुर्विधं भाति रूपमाश्रित्य सर्वदा ॥

T. A., Ah. IV., 127.

4. संवित्क्रमे स्वात्मस्फुरत्तासारा वामेश्वरीखेचर्य्याद्याः ।

M. M., 25.

5. प्रमातृप्रमाणोपगृहीतव्योमादिपञ्चकस्वभावत्वात् पञ्चवाहचक्रतादात्म्यं न किञ्चिदप्यतिक्रम्यते ।

M. M., 88.

Page 280.

1. प्रकृतमहानयशिष्याः प्रथितास्त्रयः सवंशास्तु ॥

T. A., III, 195.

2. अनेन श्रीमहार्थत्रिकदर्शनयोरन्योन्यं नात्यन्तं भेदप्रथेति व्याख्यातम् ।

M. M., 96.

3. अन्तर्लक्षे पदे तिष्ठन् बभाषे तत्त्वमौत्तरम् ।

M. M., 196.

4. औत्तराम्नायाद्यशेषशास्त्रार्थावबोधशिक्षाशालित्वात् ।

M, M., 6

Page 281.

1. एवं पीठपरामर्शस्य प्राधान्यं प्रतिपादयितुं ह्यादौ दूतीयजनमारम्भणीयतयोद्भाव्यते । M. M., 87.

2. महिलामद्यमांसादीन्येव द्रव्याण्यस्मदुपास्यानां देवतानां सपर्यासु परिवर्हतयाभ्यर्हितानीति । M. M., 182.

3. Refer to F. N. 1. Page No. 275.

4. अथ सा कालयोगेन शिवानन्दस्य धीमतः ।
शिष्यस्योपादिशद् देवी चिदद्वैतस्य निश्चयम् ॥ M. M., 197.

Page 282.

1. एतद् वितत्य विख्यातैः क्रमकेलौ कुलागमे ।
M. M., 190.

2. नित्योदितोद्योगस्वभावं शिवशक्तिमेलापरूपं रुद्रयामलमित्याख्यायते। तदुक्तं श्रीत्रीशिकाशास्त्रे—'इत्येतद् रुद्रयामलम्' इति ।
M. M., 170-1

3. अमृतस्वभावचिदाह्लादद्वितयसामरस्याकारसारस्य रूपतया (स्वरूपतया ?) जीवन्मुक्त्यात्मा महोपभोगो भवति । M. M., 173.

4. तत्र च..............................
इति श्रीप्रबोधपञ्चदशिकाप्रक्रियया । M. M., 134.

Page. 283.

1. अन्यसमयाचारादनुत्तराचारं प्रति तदास्वादनस्य स्फुरत्तापरपर्यायशक्तिस्वभावतयानुभूयमानत्वाच्च शाक्त इत्युक्तः। पर्यन्तदृष्ट्या पुनरुपपादितद्रव्यस्वीकारसाध्यस्याह्लादोत्कर्षानुभूतिचमत्कारस्य स्वस्वभावात्मकतयानुभूयमानत्वाच्छाम्भव एवेत्यवगन्तव्यम् ।
M. M., 152.

2. योऽयमुपायभूमिलक्षणोऽर्थः सः खल्वाणवादिक्रमोल्लङ्घनेन प्रतिष्ठितः शाम्भवतात्मना पार्यन्तिक इत्याख्यायते ।
M. M., 168.

3. अत्र श्रीविज्ञानभट्टारकांशे एषा शाम्भवी भूतिरिति-श्रीमत्क्षेमराजेन व्याख्यातम् । M. M., 152.

Page 284.

1. तत्र कन्था नाम भेदप्रभेदवैचित्र्यवत्तायामपि पर्यन्तत एकानुसन्धानसाध्यो विश्वव्यवहारः । शूलं पुनः—
"इत्थमिच्छाक्रियाज्ञानशक्तिशूलाम्बुजाश्रयः" इति न्यायादिच्छाज्ञानक्रियात्मकं शक्तित्रयम् । कपालं च शरीराहन्ताधिवासितात्मा परिमितः प्रमाता । M. M., 192.

Page 285.

1. मधुराजकुमाराणां महाहन्ताधिरोहिणाम् ।
पश्चिमेन तदालोकध्वस्तपश्चिमजन्मना ॥
S. S. V., 45.

... ...

2. महामाहेश्वरश्रीमत्क्षेमराजमुखोद्गताम् ।
अनुसृत्यैव सद्वृत्तिमञ्जसा क्रियते मया ।

वार्तिकं शिवसूत्राणां वाक्यैरेव तदीरितैः ॥

Ś. S. V., 1–2

प्रागुक्तवार्तिकांशेन सहितं वार्तिकान्तरम् ।

S. S. V., 45.

Page 291.

1. तदर्थग्रहणदार्ढ्यायानुमानमपि वेदान्तवाक्याविरोधि प्रमाणं भवन्न निवार्यते । श्रुत्यैव सहायत्वेन तर्कस्याभ्युपेतत्वात् ।

Ś. Bh., 8.

2. इति प्रकटितो मया सुघट एष मार्गो नवो ।
गुरुभिरुच्यते स्म शिवदृष्टिशास्त्रे यथा ॥

I. P. V., II, 271.

3. वृत्त्या तात्पर्यं टीकया तद्विचारः सूत्रेष्वेतेषु ग्रन्थकारेण दृब्धम् ।
तस्मात्सूत्रार्थान्मन्दबुद्धीन् प्रतीत्थं सम्यग् व्याख्यास्ये········· ॥

I. P. V., I, 3.

4. श्रीशाम्भवाद्वयपदे जनतां नियोक्तुमभ्युद्यतः सकलसंपदुदारवृत्तौ ।
टीकाविमर्शमकरोत्त्वधुना नयेन स्पष्टेन चाभिनवगुप्तपदप्रतिष्ठः ॥

I. P. V. V., Vol. III, 406.

5. न तदस्तीह यन्न श्रीमालिनीविजयोत्तरे ।
देवदेवेन निर्दिष्टं स्वशब्देनाथ लिङ्गतः ॥

T. A., I, 35.

Page 292.

1. इति यज्ज्ञेयसतत्त्वं दर्श्यते तच्छिवाज्ञया ।
मया स्वसंवित्सत्तर्कपतिशास्त्रत्रिकक्रमात् ॥

T. A., I, 149.

Page 293.

1. आत्मात एव चैतन्यं चित्क्रियाचितिकर्तृता ।
तात्पर्येणोदितस्तेन जडात्स हि विलक्षणः ॥ I. P. V., I, 200.

2. सा स्फुरत्ता महासत्ता देशकालाविशेषिणी । स्फुरणं स्पन्दनम् ।

I. P. V., I, 208–9.

Page 294.

1. अतोत्रान्तर्गतं सर्वं सम्प्रदायोज्झितैर्बुधैः ।
अदृष्टं प्रकटीकुर्मो गुरुनाथाज्ञया वयम् ॥

T. A., I, 50.

Page 295.

1. दशाष्टादशवस्वष्टभिन्नं यच्छासनं विभोः ।
तत्सारं त्रिकशास्त्रं हि तत्सारं मालिनीमतम् ॥

T. A., I. 35,

तच्च (त्रिकशास्त्रम्) सिद्धानामकमालिन्याख्यखण्डत्रयात्मकत्वात्त्रिविधम् ।

T. A., I, 49.

Page 296.

1. शिवशक्तिसंघट्टात्मकं परत्रिकशब्दवाच्यम् ।

T. A., I, 7–21.

इदानीमपरमपि त्रिकं परामृष्टुमाह
स्वातंत्र्यशक्तिः क्रमसंसिसृक्षा, क्रमात्मिका चेति विभोर्विभूतिः ।
तदेव देवीत्रयम्······ ॥

T. A., I, 20.

तदेवं परं त्रिकं परामृश्य परापरमपि परामृष्टुमाह ।

T. A., I, 20.

2. वक्ष्यमाणषडर्धशास्त्रार्थगर्भीकारेण ।

T. A., I, 3.

3. तयोर्यद्यामलं रूपं स संघट्ट इति स्मृतः ।
आनन्दशक्तिः सैवोक्ता········ ॥
सैव प्रक्षुब्धरूपत्वादीशित्री संप्रजायते········
ज्ञेयांशः प्रोन्मिषन् क्षोभं यदैति वलवत्त्वतः ।
ऊनताभासनम्···········

T. A., II, 81—6.

4. भोग्यं भोक्तरि लीनं चेद् भोक्ता तद्वस्तुतः स्फुटः ।
अतः षण्णां त्रिकं सारं चिदिष्युन्मेषणात्मकम् ॥

T. A., II, 186.

5. अनुत्तरा परेच्छा च परापरतया स्थिता ।
उन्मेषशक्तिर्ज्ञानाख्या त्वपरेति निगद्यते ॥ T. A., II, 233.

Page 297.

1. यस्य कस्यचिज्जन्तोरिति नात्र जात्याद्यपेक्षा काचित्

I. P. V. II. 276.

Page 298.

1. किन्तु मोहवशादस्मिन्दृष्टेप्यनुपलक्षिते ।
शक्त्याविष्करणेनेयं प्रत्यभिज्ञोपदर्श्यते ॥ I. P. V., I, 35.

Page 302.

1. स्वात्मप्रकाशो हि न अननुभूतपूर्वोऽविच्छिन्नप्रकाशत्वात् ।

I. P. V., I, 20.

2. इहापि प्रसिद्धपुराणसिद्धान्तानुमानागमादिविदितपूर्णशक्तिके ईश्वरे सति···

I. P. V., I, 21.

3. दीक्षापि बौद्धविज्ञानपूर्वा सत्यं विमोचिका ।
तेन तत्रापि बौद्धस्य ज्ञानस्यास्ति प्रधानता ॥

T. A., I, 83.

Page 303.

1. स्वातन्त्र्यहानिर्बोधस्य स्वातन्त्र्यस्याप्यबोधता ।
द्विधाणवं मलमिदं स्वस्वरूपापहानितः ॥

T. A., I, 55.

Page 304.

1. दीयते ज्ञानसद्भावः क्षीयते पशुबन्धना ।
दानक्षपणसंयुक्ता दीक्षा तेनेह कीर्तिता ॥

T. A., I, 80.

Page 305.

1. यदा तु दूतीवचनाद्वा तल्लक्षणाभिज्ञानाद्वोपायान्तराद्वा तानुत्कर्षान् हृदयङ्गमीकारेणामृशति ।

I. P. V., II, 275.

2. दीक्षया मुच्यते जन्तुः प्रातिभेन तथा प्रिये ॥
गुर्वायत्ता तु सा दीक्षा बध्यबन्धनमोक्षणे ।
प्रातिभोस्य स्वभावस्तु केवलीभावसिद्धिदः ॥

T. A., VIII, 107.

3. इत्थं श्रीशक्तिपातोयं निरपेक्ष इहोदितः ।

T. A., VIII, 173.

4. स्वातन्त्र्यमहिमैवायं देवस्य यदसौ पुनः ।
स्वं रूपं परिशुद्धं सत्स्पृशत्यप्यणुतामयः ॥

T. A., VIII, 163.

Page 306.

1. अज्ञानं किल बन्धहेतुरुदितः शास्त्रे मलं तत्स्मृतम् ।

T. S., 5.

2. अज्ञानमिति न ज्ञानाभावश्चातिप्रसङ्गतः ।
स हि लोष्टादिकेप्यस्ति न च तस्यास्ति संसृतिः ॥
T. A., I. 58.

3. विशेषणेन बुद्धिस्थे संसारोत्तरकालिके ।
संभावनां निरस्यैतदभावे मोक्षमब्रवीत् ॥
T. A., I, 56.

4. मलमज्ञानमिच्छन्ति संसाराङ्कुरकारणम् ।
T. A., I, 54,

5. परमावरणं मल इह सूक्ष्मं मायादिकञ्चुकं स्थूलम् ।
बाह्यं विग्रहरूपं कोशत्रयवेष्टितो ह्यात्मा ॥
P. S., 55,

तुषकम्बुककिंशारुकमुक्तं बीजं यथाङ्कुरं कुरुते ।
नैव तथाणवमायाकर्मवियुक्तो भवाङ्कुरं ह्यात्मा ॥
P. S., 54.

Page 307.

1. अस्य कार्ममलस्येयन्मायान्ताध्वविसारिणः ।
प्रधानं कारणं प्रोक्तमज्ञानात्माणवो मलः ॥
T. A., VI, 111.

2. या त्वस्य कर्मणश्चित्रफलदत्वेन कर्मता ।
प्रसिद्धा सा न संकोचं विनात्मनि मलश्च सः ॥
T. A., VI, 82-3.

3. यथैवाव्यतिरिक्तस्य धरादेर्भावितात्मता ।
तथैवास्येति शास्त्रेषु व्यतिरिक्तः स्थितो मलः ॥
T. A., VI, 61.

4. अथानादिर्मलः पुंसां पशुत्वं परिकीर्तितम् ।
T. A., VI, 60.

ईश्वरेच्छावशक्षुब्धभोगलोलिकचिद्गणान् ।
संविभक्तुमघोरेशः सृजतीह सितेतरम् ॥
T. A., VI, 55.

Page 308.

1. तदज्ञानं न बुद्‌ध्यंशोऽध्यवसायाद्यभावतः ।
T. A., VI, 76.

2. निरुद्धे चेतसि पुरा सविकल्पसमाधिना ।
निर्विकल्पसमाधिस्तु भवेदत्र त्रिभूमिकः ॥

व्युत्तिष्ठते स्वतस्त्वाद्ये द्वितीये परबोधितः ।
अन्ते व्युत्तिष्ठते नैव सदा भवति तन्मयः ॥
S. C., 455. (Bhūmikā).

Page 309.

1. योग्यतामात्रमेवैतत् भाव्यवच्छेदसङ्ग्रहे ।
मलस्तेनास्य न पृथक् तत्त्वभावोस्ति रागवत् ॥
... ...
निरवच्छेदकर्मांशमात्रावच्छेदतस्तु सा ।
रागः पुंसि धियो धर्मः कर्मभेदविचित्रता ॥
अपूर्णंमन्यता चेयं तथारूपावभासनम् ।
T. A., VI, 57-9.

2. शुद्धेऽध्वनि शिवः कर्ता प्रोक्तोऽनन्तोऽसिते प्रभुः ।
T. A., VI, 56.

Page 310.

1. निष्कर्मा हि स्थिते मूलमलेऽप्यज्ञाननामनि ।
वैचित्र्यकारणाभावान्नोर्ध्वं सरति नाप्यधः ॥
केवलं पारिमित्येन शिवाभेदमसंस्पृशन् ।
विज्ञानकेवली प्रोक्तः शुद्धचिन्मात्रसंस्थितः ॥ T. A., VI, 77.
नैवं स हि मलो ज्ञानाकले दिध्वंसिसुः कथम् ।
हेतुः स्यात् ...... T. A., VI, 81.

2. दिध्वंसिसुध्वंसमानध्वस्ताख्यासु तिसृष्वथ ।
दशास्वन्तःकृतावस्थान्तरासु स्वक्रमस्थितेः ॥
विज्ञानाकलमन्त्रेशतदीशादित्वकल्पना ।
T. A., VI, 80.

Page 311.

1. शरीरभुवनाकारो मायीयः परिकीर्तितः ।
T. A., I, 56.

2. यत्तु ज्ञेयसतत्त्वस्य ज्ञानं सर्वात्मनोज्झितम् ।
अवच्छेदैर्न तत्कुत्राप्यज्ञानं सत्यमुक्तिदम् ॥
T. A., I, 72.

3. क्षीणे तु पशुसंस्कारे पुंसः प्राप्तपरस्थितेः ।
विकस्वरं तद्विज्ञानं पौरुषं निर्विकल्पकम् ॥
T. A., I, 78,

विकस्वराविकल्पात्मविज्ञानौचित्येन यावसा। तद्बौद्धम्.........
औचित्येन इति तद्वत्पूर्णनात्मना इत्यर्थः।
अतश्च सर्वो ममायं विभव इत्येवंरूपत्वमस्याः।

T. A., I, 79.

4. तत्र दीक्षादिना पौंस्नमज्ञानं ध्वंसि यद्यपि।

T. A., I, 79.

5. बौद्धज्ञानेन तु यदा बौद्धमज्ञानजृंभितम्।

T. A., I, 81.

विलीयते तदा जीवन्मुक्तिः करतले स्थिता।
बौद्धज्ञानेन—इति, परमेश्वराद्वयशास्त्रश्रवणाद्युद्भूतेन।

T. A., I, 82.

6. दीक्षापि बौद्धविज्ञानपूर्वा सत्यं विमोचिका।
तेन तत्रापि बौद्धस्याज्ञानस्यास्ति प्रधानता॥ T. A., I, 83.

Page 312.

1. इति ज्ञानचतुष्कं यत् सिद्धिमुक्तिमहोदयम्।

T. A., I. 258.

2. एवं शक्तित्रयोपायं यज्ज्ञानं तत्र पश्चिमम्।
मूलं तदुत्तरं मध्यमुत्तरोत्तरमादिमम्॥
ततोऽपि परमं ज्ञानमुपायादिविवर्जितम्।
आनन्दशक्तिविश्रान्तमनुत्तरमिहोच्यते ॥

T. A., I, 255-6.

3. उपायोपेयादिना द्वारद्वारिभावेन शाम्भवोपाय एव प्राधान्येन विश्रान्तिः।

T. A., I, 203.

4. साक्षादुपायेन इति—शाम्भवेन। तदेव हि अव्यवहितं परज्ञानावाप्तौ निमित्तम्। स एव परां काष्ठां प्राप्तश्चानुपाय इत्युच्यते।

T. A., I, 182.

5. आवेशश्चास्वतन्त्रस्य स्वतद्रूपनिमज्जनात्।
परतद्रूपता शंभोराद्याच्छक्त्यविभागिनः॥

T. A., I, 205.

Page 313.

1. भूयो भूयो विकल्पांशनिश्चयक्रमचर्चनात्।
यत्परामर्शमभ्येति ज्ञानोपायं तु तद्विदुः॥
यत्तु तत्कल्पनाक्लृप्तबहिर्भूतार्थसाधनम्।
क्रियोपायं तदाम्नातं भेदो नात्रापवर्गगः॥

T. A., I, 186-7.

Page 314.

1. बहिर्भूतोऽवच्छिन्नो योऽसौ उच्चारादिः अर्थः तत्साधनम्, तु शब्दो व्यतिरेके।
शाक्ते हि विकल्प एवार्थः ।

T. A., Comm., I, 188.

2. सामानाधिकरण्यं हि सद्विद्याहमिदन्धियोः ।

I. P. V., II, 196.

यत्तु तत्कल्पनाक्लृप्तबहिर्भूतार्थसाधनम् ।
क्रियोपायं तदाम्नातं भेदोनात्रापवर्गगः ॥

T. A., I, 187.

3. एवं परेच्छाशक्त्यंशसदुपायमिमं विदुः ।
शाम्भवाख्यं समावेशं सुमत्यन्तेनिवासिनः ॥

T. A., I, 235.

Page 315.

1. यथा विस्फुरितदृशामनुसन्धिं विनाप्यलम् ।
भाति भावः स्फुटस्तद्वत् केषामपि शिवात्मता ॥

T, A., I, 186.

2. इदमुक्तं तथा श्रीमत्सोमानन्दादिदेशिकैः ।

T. A., Ah. II, 39.

सकृज्ज्ञाते सुवर्णे किं भावना करणं व्रजेत् ।
एकवारं प्रमाणेन शास्त्राद्वा गुरुवाक्यतः ॥
ज्ञाते शिवत्वे सर्वस्थे प्रतिपत्त्या दृढात्मना ।
करणेन नास्ति कृत्यं नापि भावनयापि वा ॥

T. A., Comm., Ah. II, 40

3. अनुपायमिदं रूपं कोर्थो देशनयात्र वै ।
सकृत्स्याद्देशना पश्चादनुपायत्वमुच्यते ॥ T. A., Ah. II, 3.

4. स्वतन्त्रात्मातिरिक्तस्तु तुच्छोऽतुच्छोपि कश्चन ।
न मोक्षो नाम तन्नास्य पृथङ् नामापि गृह्यते ॥ T. A., I, 62.

5. मोक्षो हि नाम नैवान्यः स्वरूपप्रथनं हि तत् ।
स्वरूपं चात्मनः संवित् नान्यत्……… ॥

T. A., I, 192.

Page 316.

1. रागादिकलुषं चित्तं संसारस्तद्विमुक्तता ।
संक्षेपात्कथितो मोक्षः प्रहीणावरणैर्जनैः ॥

T. A., I, 64.

Page 317.

1. चित्तमात्रमिदं विश्वमिति या देशना मुनेः ॥
तत्रासपरिहारार्थं बालानां सा न तत्त्वतः ।
सापि ध्वस्ता महाभागैश्चित्तमात्रव्यवस्थितिः ॥

T. A., I, 66.

Page 318.

1. बौद्धाः एकमेव संविद्रूपं हर्षविषादाद्यनेकाकारवितर्तं पश्याम इत्याद्युक्त्या बुद्धिवृत्त्यात्मकं ज्ञानमेव तत्त्वं प्रतिपन्नाः इति बुद्धितत्त्वावाप्तिरेवैषां मोक्षः............ ।
सांख्याश्च सुखदुःखाद्यात्मकप्रकृतिपृथग्भावेन पुंस एव स्वरूपेणावस्थानं तत्त्वं प्रतिपन्ना इति पुंस्तत्त्वप्राप्तिरेवैषां मोक्षः ।

T. A., I, 69.

2. सांख्यपातञ्जलयोः प्रकृतिपृथग्भावेन पुंज्ञानस्य साम्येऽपि सांख्येभ्यः पातञ्जलानामीश्वरप्रणिधानात् तद्विशिष्यते इति तेषां पुंस्तत्त्वोर्ध्ववर्ति-नियतितत्त्वप्राप्तिरुक्ता ।

T. A., I, 70.

Page 319.

1. इति यज्ज्ञेयसतत्त्वं दर्श्यते तच्छिवाज्ञया ।
मया स्वसंवित्सत्तर्कपतिशास्त्रत्रिकक्रमात् ॥

T. A., I, 149.

Page 320.

1. ईश्वरस्वभाव आत्मा प्रकाशते तावत् तत्र च अस्य स्वातन्त्र्यम् इति न केनचिद्वपुषा न प्रकाशते तत्र अप्रकाशात्मनापि प्रकाशते प्रकाशात्मनापि।

I. P. V., I, 35–6.

Page 321.

1. 'अनुत्तरम्' इति । न विद्यते उत्तरमधिकं यतः । यथा हि तत्त्वान्तराणि षट्त्रिंशत् अनाश्रितशिवपर्यन्तानि परभैरवबोधानुप्रवेशासादिततथाभाव-सिद्धीनि संविदमधिकयन्ति, नैवं परा परिपूर्णा संवित्, तस्याः सदा स्वयमनर्गलानपेक्षप्रथाचमत्कारसारत्वात् । P. T. V., 19.

2. उत्तरं च शब्दनं तत् सर्वथा 'ईदृशं तादृशम्' इति व्यवच्छेदं कुर्यात् । तद् यत्र न भवति अव्यवच्छिन्नमिदमनुत्तरम् ।

P. T. V., 21.

Page 323.

1. उक्तं च कामिके देवः सर्वाकृतिर्निराकृतिः ।

T. A., I, 104.

सर्वाकृतिः विश्वमयः निराकृतिः विश्वोत्तीर्णः ।

T. A., Comm., I, 105.

Page 326.

1. अतोऽसौ परमेशानः स्वात्मव्योमन्यनर्गलः ।
इयतः सृष्टिसंहाराडम्बरस्य प्रकाशकः ॥
निर्मले मुकुरे यद्वत् भान्ति भूमिजलादयः ।
अमिश्रास्तद्वदेकस्मिंश्चिन्नाथे विश्ववृत्तयः ॥

T. A., II, 3–4.

2. इह तावत् स्वप्नस्मरणमनोराज्यसंकल्पादिषु नीलाद्याभासवैचित्र्यं बाह्य-समर्पकहेतुव्यतिरेकेणैव निर्भासते·········यत्पुनरिदं योगिनाम् इच्छा-मात्रेण पुरसेनादिनिर्माणं दृष्टम् , तत्र उपादानं प्रसिद्धमृतकाष्ठशुक्रशोणि-तादिवैचित्र्यमयं न संभवत्येव·········
तत् अस्ति संभवः यत् संविदेव अभ्युपगतस्वातन्त्र्यलक्षणात् इच्छावि-शेषात् अन्तःस्थितमेव भावजातम् इदमित्येवं बाह्यत्वेन आभासयति ।

I. P. V., I, 182–5.

Page 328.

1. सर्वाः शक्तीः कर्तृत्वशक्तिः ऐश्वर्यात्मा समाक्षिपति सा च विमर्शरूपा इति युक्तम् अस्या एव प्राधान्यम् ।

I. P. V., I, 214.

Page 329.

1. आत्मात एव चैतन्यं चित्क्रियाचितिकर्तृता ।
तात्पर्येणोदितस्तेन जडात्स हि विलक्षणः ॥

I. P. V., I, 200.

2. स्पन्दनं च किंचिच्चलनम् एषैव किंचिद्रूपता यत् अचलमपि चलम् आभासते । प्रकाशरूपं हि मनागपि नातिरिच्यते । अतिरिच्यते इव इति अचलमेव आभासभेदयुक्तमेव च भाति ।

I. P. V., I, 208-9.

3. सत्ता च भवनकर्तृता सर्वक्रियासु स्वातन्त्र्यम्,
सा च खपुष्पादिकमपि व्याप्नोति इति महती ।

I. P. V., I, 209.

4. चितिः प्रत्यवमर्शात्मा परा वाक् स्वरसोदिता ।

I. P. V., I, 203.

Page 334.

1. तत्र च यद्यपि तत्त्वतः शिवपरमशिवयोरैक्यमेव तथापि स्वरूपनिर्देशाभिप्रायेण अनाश्रितशिवत्वेन कथनम्………… ।

Bh., Vol. II, 212.

Page 337.

1. ईश्वरस्य चिकीर्षावशात् परमाणुषु क्रिया जायते । ततः परमाणुद्वयसंयोगे सति द्व्यणुकमुत्पद्यते । त्रिभिर्द्व्यणुकैस्त्र्यणुकम् । एवं चतुरणुकादिक्रमेण महती पृथिवी…………उत्पद्यते ।

Ta. San., T. D., 9.

2. 'प्रकृतिश्च प्रतिज्ञादृष्टान्तानुपरोधात्' ब्रह्म च 'जन्माद्यस्य यतः' इति लक्षितम् । तच्च लक्षणं घटरुचकादीनां मृत्सुवर्णादिवत् प्रकृतित्वे कुलालसुवर्णकारादिवन्निमित्तत्वे च समानमित्यतो भवति विमर्शः ।

S. Bh., 337.

Page 338.

1. न चेदन्तःकृतानन्तविश्वरूपः । I. P. V., I, 106.
2. स्वरूपान्तर्त्रुटितमर्थराशिम् अपरमपि भिन्नाकारम् आत्मनि परिगृह्य कञ्चिदेव अर्थं स्वरूपादुन्मग्नमाभासयति ।

I. P. V., I, 108.

3. स एव हि स्वात्मा सन्वक्तव्यो यस्य अन्यानुपाहितं रूपं चकास्ति ।

I. P. V., I, 42-3.

Page 341.

1. माया पदं हि सर्वं भ्रान्तिः, तत्रापि तु स्वप्ने स्वप्न इव गण्डे स्फोट इव अपरेयं भ्रान्तिः ।

I. P. V., II, 114.

Page 342.

1. अनपेक्षस्य वशिनो देशकालाकृतिक्रमाः ।
नियता नेति स विभुर्नित्यो विश्वाकृतिः शिवः ॥
विभुत्वात्सर्वगो नित्यभावादाद्यन्तवर्जितः ।
विश्वाकृतित्वाच्चिदचित् तद्वैचित्र्यावभासकः ॥

T. A., I, 98-9.

2. तेन सर्वक्रियास्वतन्त्रे सर्वशक्तिके इति यावदुक्तं भवेत् तावदेव कर्तरि ज्ञातरि इति ।

I. P. V., I, 32.

3. तस्य देवातिदेवस्य परापेक्षा न विद्यते ।
परस्य तदपेक्षत्वात् स्वतन्त्रोयमतः स्थितः ॥

T. A., I, 98.

4. स्वम् आत्मीयम् उपकरणम् ईरयति स्वकर्तव्येषु अवश्यं तच्छीलः । स्वं च आत्मानमीरयति न पुनः स्वकर्तव्ये प्रेरकमपेक्षते इति 'स्वैरी' स्वतन्त्रः ।

I. P. V., I, 118.

5. न तत्र सूर्यो भाति न चन्द्रतारकं नेमा विद्युतो भान्ति कुतोयमग्निः ।
तमेवभान्तमनुभाति सर्वं तस्य भासा सर्वमिदं विभाति ॥

I. P. V., I, 277.

6. कर्तरि ज्ञातरि स्वात्मन्यादिसिद्धे महेश्वरे ।
अजडात्मा निषेधं वा सिद्धिं वा विदधीत कः ॥

I. P. V., I, 29.

Page 343.

1. सर्वापह्नवहेवाकधर्माप्येवं हि वर्तते ।
ज्ञानमात्मार्थमित्येतन्नेति मां प्रति भासते ॥

T. A., I, 95.

2. स एव हि तेन तेन वपुषा जानाति स्मरति विकल्पयति च । यथोक्त-माचार्येणैव :—
यद्यप्यर्थस्थितिः प्राणपुर्यष्टकनियन्त्रिते ।
जीवे निरुद्धा तत्रापि परमात्मनि सा स्थिता ॥

I. P. V., I, 111.

Page 344.

1. शक्तिश्च नाम भावस्य स्वं रूपं मातृकल्पितम् ।
तेनाद्वयः स एवापि शक्तिमत्परिकल्पने ॥

T. A., I, 109.

2. मातृक्लृप्ते हि देवस्य तत्र तत्र वपुष्यलम् ।
को भेदो वस्तुतो वह्नेर्दग्धृपक्तृत्वयोरिव ॥

T. A., I, 110.

Page 345.

1. स्वरूपान्तर्ब्रुडितम् अर्थराशिम् अपरमपि भिन्नाकारम् आत्मनि परिगृह्य कंचिदेव अर्थम् स्वरूपादुन्मग्नम् आभासयति इति आपतितम्। सैषा ज्ञानशक्तिः। उन्मग्नाभाससंभिन्नं च चित्स्वरूपं बहिर्मुखत्वात् तच्छाया-नुरागात् नवं नवं ज्ञानमुक्तम्।

I. P. V., I, 108-9.

2. न केवलं नीलादिरूपमेव ज्ञेयम् यावत् अत्यक्तकर्तृभावं स्वातन्त्र्येण अपरि-त्यक्तमेव सन्तम् आत्मानं निर्माय............

I. P. V., I, 215.

Page 347.

1. एवमपि नवनवाभासाः प्रतिक्षणमुदयव्ययभाजः इति सैव व्यवहारनिवह-हानिः। तेन क्वचित् अभासे गृहीतपूर्वे यत्संवेदनं बहिर्मुखमभूत् तस्य यत् अन्तर्मुखं चित्स्वरूपं तत्कालान्तरेऽपि अवस्थास्तु स्वात्मगतं तद्विषय-विशेषे बहिर्मुखत्वं परामृशति इति एषा स्मृतिशक्तिः।

I. P. V., I, 109.

2. मायाप्रमातरि तदेतत्स्मरणमुच्यते। तत्र यत्तथाविधं प्रमात्रादिनिर्माण-सामर्थ्यम् तद्भगवतः स्मृतिशक्तिरिति भावः।

I. P. V., I, 109. F. N.

Page 348.

1. यत्किल आभास्यते तत्संविदो न विच्छिद्यते संविच्च ततः संविच्च संविद-न्तरात् संवेद्यं च संवेद्यान्तरात्। न च विच्छेदनं वस्तुतः संभवतीति विच्छेदनस्यावभासमात्रम्............एष च परितश्छेदनात् परिच्छेद उच्यते। तदवभासनसामर्थ्यमपोहनशक्तिः।

I. P. V., I, 110–11.

2. तथा च यया भगवतः स्वातन्त्र्यशक्त्या मायीयप्रमातुर्विकल्परूपं विज्ञानं सा अपोहनशक्तिरिति फलितार्थः।

I. P. V., I, 110. F. N.

Page 349.

1. मूर्तिवैचित्र्यतो देशक्रममाभासयत्यसौ।
क्रियावैचित्र्यनिर्भासात्कालक्रममपीश्वरः॥

I. P. V., II, 13.

2, यदा तु गाढप्रत्यभिज्ञाप्रकाशबलात् तदेव इदं हस्तस्वरूपमिति प्रतिपत्तौ मूर्तेर्न भेदः अथ च अन्यान्यरूपत्वं भाति तदा एकस्मिन्स्वरूपे यदन्यत् अन्यत् रूपं तद्विरोधवशादसहभवत् क्रिया उच्यते।

I. P. V., II, 14.

Page 351.

1. एकात्मनो विभेदश्च क्रिया कालक्रमानुगा।............
तत्र प्रत्यभिज्ञाबलेन यदेकात्मकमनेकस्वभावं तस्य यो भेदोऽन्यान्यरूपता इयमेव सा क्रियोच्यते।

I. P. V., II, 174-5.

2. तौ च आभासानां भावाभावौ न बाह्यहेतुकृतौ इति विस्तार्य उपपादितम् इति य एव संवित्स्वभाव आत्मा स्वप्नसंकल्पादौ आभासवैचित्र्यनिर्माणे प्रभुः प्रभविष्णुः इति स्वसंविदितस्तत एव तौ भवतः।

I. P. V., II, 12.

3. तत्क्रमोपश्लिष्टा भाति दर्पणतलमिव विततप्रवहन्नदीप्रवाहसमाश्लिष्टम्। अत्र केवलं दर्पणस्य तथा इच्छा नास्ति इति उभयथा अस्य क्रियाशक्तिः। क्रमरूपक्रियानिर्माणसामर्थ्यम् क्रमरूपक्रियोपरागयोगश्च।

I. P. V., II, 23-4.

4. क्रियाशक्तेरेवायं सर्वो विस्फारः।

I. P. V., II, 42.

क्रियासम्बन्धसामान्यदेशदिक्कालबुद्धयः।

I. P. V., II, 28.

5. यो यावति ज्ञाता कर्ता च स तावति ईश्वरो राजेव। अनीश्वरस्य ज्ञातृत्व-कर्तृत्वे स्वभावविरुद्धे यतः। आत्मा च विश्वत्र ज्ञाता कर्ता च, इति सिद्धा प्रत्यभिज्ञा।

I. P. V., I, 44.

Page 352.

1. न हि प्रत्यक्षं मायाप्रमातुः सर्वत्र क्रमते अनुमानमप्येवम्। न हि यद्यदस्ति तत्र तत्र लिंगव्याप्त्यादिसंभवः। आगमस्तु अपरिच्छिन्न-प्रकाशात्मकमहेश्वरविमर्शपरमार्थः किं न पश्येत् इति तदनुसारेण पदार्थनिर्णयम्...... ।

I. P. V., II, 186.

Page 353.

1. शिवः स्वतन्त्रदृग्रूपः पंचशक्तिसुनिर्भरः।
स्वातन्त्र्याभासितभिदा पंचधा प्रविभज्यते॥

T. A., VI, 48.

तदेवं पंचकमिदं शुद्धोऽध्वा परिभाष्यते।
तत्र साक्षाच्छिवेच्छैव कर्त्र्याभासितभेदिका॥
ईश्वरेच्छावशक्षुब्धभोगलोलिकचिद्गणान् ।
संविभंक्तुमघोरेशः सृजतीह सितेतरम् ॥

T. A., VI, 55.

Page 355.

1. वैषम्यनैर्घृण्ये न सापेक्षत्वात्तथा हि दर्शयति, यदि हि निरपेक्षः केवल ईश्वरो विषमां सृष्टिं निर्मिमीते स्यातामेतौ दोषौ वैषम्यं नैर्घृण्यञ्च न तु निरपेक्षस्य निर्मातृत्वमस्ति सापेक्षो हीश्वरो विषमां सृष्टिं निर्मिमीते, किमपेक्षत इति चेत् धर्माधर्मावपेक्षत इति वदामः।

V. S. S. Bh., 407.

Page 357.

1. तत्स्वातन्त्र्यरसात्पुनः शिवपदाद् भेदे विभाते परम्।
यद्रूपं बहुधानुगामि तदिदं तत्त्वं विभोः शासने॥

T. A., VI, 3.

Page 358.

1. शाम्भवाः शक्तिजाः मंत्रमहेशाः मंत्रनायकाः।
मंत्रा इति विशुद्धाः स्युरमी पंचगणाः क्रमात्॥

T. A., VI, 52.

2. एकैकत्रापि तत्त्वेऽस्मिन्सर्वशक्तिसुनिर्भरे।
तत्तत्प्राधान्ययोगेन स स भेदो निरूप्यते॥

T. A., VI, 49.

Page 360.

1. शिवः स्वतन्त्रदृग्रूपः पंचशक्तिसुनिर्भरः।

T. A., VI, 48.

Page 362.

1. निराशंसात्पूर्णादहमिति पुरा भासयति यत्।

I. P. V., I, 1.

Page 363.

1. एवंविधात्स्वरूपात् स्वस्मादन्याननुयायिनः,
अन्यत्रासंबन्धिन इति यावत्, रूपात् उपादानभूतात्।
"तत्कुलं विद्धि सर्वज्ञ शिवशक्तिविवर्जितम्"
इति नीत्या अनुत्तरकुलरूपाद्वपुषः।

Bh., Vol. I, 5.

Page 365.

1. तस्य प्रथमसृष्टावस्माकमन्तःकरणैकवेद्यमिव ध्यामलप्रायमुन्मीलितचित्रमात्रकल्पं यद् भावचक्रं तस्य चैतन्यवर्गस्य तादृशि भावराशौ तथा प्रथनं नाम यच्चिद्विशेषत्वं तत्सदाशिवतत्त्वम्।

I. P. V., II, 192–3.

Page 366.

1. बहिर्भावपरत्वे तु परतः पारमेश्वरम् ।

I. P. V., II, 191.

2. सामानाधिकरण्यं हि सद्विद्याहमिदन्धियोः ।

I. P. V., II, 196.

Page 369.

1. ये एते अहम् इति इदम् इति धियौ तयोर्मायाप्रमातरि प्रथगधिकरणत्वम् अहम् इति ग्राहके इदम् इति च ग्राह्ये, तन्निरसनेन एकस्मिन्नेवाधिकरणे यत्संगमनं सम्बन्धरूपतया प्रथनं तत् सती शुद्धा विद्या अतोऽशुद्धविद्यातो मायाप्रमातृगताया अन्यैव ।

I. P. V., II, 196-7

2. स पुनः शाम्भवेच्छातः शिवाभेदं परामृशन् ।
क्रमान्मंत्रेशतन्नेतृरूपो याति शिवात्मताम् ॥

T. A., VI, 78.

3. दिध्वंसिषुध्वंसमानध्वस्ताख्यासु तिसृष्वथ ।
दशास्वन्तःकृतावस्थान्तरासु स्वक्रमस्थितेः ॥
विज्ञानाकलमंत्रेशतदीशत्वादिकल्पना ।

T. A., VI, 80.

अवस्थान्तराणि किंचिद्ध्वंसमानकिंचिद्ध्वस्तत्वादिरूपाणि

T. A., (Comm.) VI, 81.

Page 370.

1. चिदानन्देषणाज्ञानक्रियाणां सुस्फुटत्वतः ।
शिवशक्तिसदेशानविद्याख्यं तत्त्वपञ्चकम् ॥

T. A., VI, 49.

2. चिदानन्देषणाज्ञानक्रियापञ्चमहातनुः ।
विवर्त्तते महेशानस्तत्त्ववर्गेषु पञ्चधा ॥
शिवशक्तिसदाशिवतामीश्वरविद्यामयीं च तत्त्वदशाम् ।
शक्तीनां पञ्चानां विभक्तभावेन भासयति ॥

T. A., (Comm.) VI, 49.

Page 371.

1. माया च नाम देवस्य शक्तिरव्यतिरेकिणी ।
भेदावभासस्वातन्त्र्यं तथा हि स तया कृतः ॥

T. A., VI, 116.

2. मोहयति अनेन शक्तिविशेषेण इति वा मोहो मायाशक्तिः ।

I. P. V., 1, 35.

3. आद्यो भेदावभासो यो विभागमनुपेयिवान् ।
गर्भीकृतानन्तभाविविभासा सा परा निशा ॥

T. A., VI, 116.

4. सा जडा भेदरूपत्वात् कार्यं चास्या जडं यतः ।
व्यापिनी विश्वहेतुत्वात् सूक्ष्मा कार्यैककल्पनात् ॥
शिवशक्त्यविनाभावात् नित्यैका मूलकारणम् ।

T. A., VI, 117.

Page 372.

1. सा माया क्षोभमापन्ना विश्वं सूते समन्ततः ।
दण्डाहतेवामलकी फलानि किल यद्यपि ॥

T. A., VI, 128.

2. सा यद्यप्यन्यशास्त्रेषु बहुधा दृश्यते स्फुटम् ।
तथापि मालिनीशास्त्रदृशा तां संप्रचक्ष्महे ॥

T. A., VI, 129.

Page 373.

1. कला हि किञ्चित्कर्तृत्वं सूते स्वालिंगनादणोः ।
तस्याश्चाप्यणुनान्योन्यं ह्यञ्जनं सा प्रसूयते ॥

T. A., VI, 136.

2. सेयं कला न करणं मुख्यं विद्यादिकं यथा ।
पुंसि कर्तरि सा कर्त्री प्रयोजकतया यतः ॥

T. A., VI, 142.

3. पुंस्कलयोः प्रयोज्यप्रयोजकतया..............
एककर्तृकारकीभूतत्वेन लक्ष्यान्तरत्वेऽपि भगवदनुग्रहात् कस्यचिद्यदानयोर्विवेकज्ञानं जायते तदासौ मायापुंविवेकः सर्वकर्मक्षयात् विज्ञानाकलता च भवेद् येनायं पुमान् मायाधो न संसरेत् ।

T. A., Comm., VI, 143.

4. धीपुंविवेके विज्ञाते प्रधानपुरुषान्तरे ।
अपि न क्षीणकर्मा स्यात् कलायां तद्धि संभवेत् ॥
अतः सांख्यदृशा सिद्धः प्रधानाधो न संसरेत् ।

T. A., VI, 144–5.

Page 374.

1. बुद्धिस्तु गुणसंकीर्णा विवेकेन कथं सुखम् ।
दुःखं मोहात्मकं वापि विषयं दर्शयेदपि ॥

T. A., VI, 151–2.

2. किञ्चित्तु कुरुते तस्मान्नूनमस्त्यपरं तु तत् ।
रागतत्त्वमिति प्रोक्तं यत्तत्रैवोपरञ्जकम् ॥

T. A., VI, 157.

Page 375.

1. नियतिर्नियोजनां धत्ते विशिष्टे कार्यमण्डले ।

T. A., VI, 160.

2. विद्या रागोऽथ नियतिः कालश्चैतच्चतुष्टयम् । कलाकार्यम्..............

T. A., VI, 161.

Page 376.

1. देहपुर्यष्टकाद्येषु वेद्येषु किल वेदनम् ।
एतत्षट्कससंकोचं यद्वेद्यमसावणुः ॥

T. A., VI, 164–5.

2. अत एवेयं प्ररोहासहिष्णुं यत इदन्तां भासयति ततः शुद्धा, भासनाच्च विद्या । अत एवाप्ररूढमायाकल्पत्वात् महामायेयम् ।

I. P. V., II, 200.

Page 377.

1. वेद्यमात्रं स्फुटं भिन्नं प्रधानं सूयते कला ।

T. A., VI, 171.

Page 378.

1. ईश्वरेच्छावशक्षुब्धलोलिकं पुरुषं प्रति ।
भोक्तृत्वाय स्वतन्त्रेशः प्रकृतिं क्षोभयेद् भृशम् ॥

T. A., VI, 180.

Page 379.

1, न च बुद्धिरसंवेद्या करणत्वान्मनो यथा ।
प्रधानवदसंवेद्यबुद्धिवादस्तदुज्झितः ॥

T. A., VI, 192.

2. तया पंचविधश्चैष वायुः संरंभरूपया ।
प्रेरितो जीवनाय स्यादन्यथा मरणं भवेत् ॥

T, A., VI, 185.

3. अस्या अहंकृतेः शुद्धस्वातन्त्र्यमयात् स्वात्ममात्रविश्रान्तिसतत्त्वात् स्वरसोदितादहंभावादियान् विशेषो यदियं जडायामनात्मरूपायां बुद्धावभिनिविष्टा ।

T. A., Comm., VI, 185.

Page 381.

1. तेनाशुद्धैव विद्यास्य सामान्यं करणं विदुः ।
ज्ञप्तौ कृतौ तु सामान्यं कला करणमुच्यते ॥

T. A., VI, 199.

Page 382.

1. नैयायिकक्रमस्यैव मायापदे पारमार्थिकत्वम् ।

I. P. V., I, 25.

page 387.

1. तेन शून्यधीप्राणदेहाद्युपाध्याश्रयसंकुचितात् मायाप्रमातुः अनन्तकालान्तर्मुखसंवेदनरूपात् स प्रमाणाभिमत आभासो यावत् प्रमेयोन्मुखतास्वभावः तावत् प्रमेयस्य देशकालाकाराभाससंभेदवत्त्वात् सोपि तथैव क्षणे क्षणे अन्यान्यरूपः स्रष्टव्यः ।

I. P. V., II, 66.

2. विमर्शबलेन च यतः प्रमाणम्, विमर्शश्च शब्दजीवितः शब्दश्च आभासान्तरैः देशकालादिरूपैरनामृष्टे एकत्रैव आभासमात्रे प्रवर्तते घट इति लोहित इति । ततो देशकालाभासयोः स्वलक्षणत्वार्पणप्रवणयोरनामिश्रणात् सामान्यायमाने आभासे प्रमाणं प्रवर्तते ।

I. P. V., II, 69-71.

Page 388.

1. यथारुचि यथार्थित्वं यथाव्युत्पत्ति भिद्यते ।
आभासोप्यर्थ एकस्मिन्ननुसंधानसाधिते ॥

I. P. V., II, 85-6.

Page 390.

1. यत्किल प्रभुः परस्परं व्यवहारकाले क्रेयविक्रेयप्रेक्षाव्याख्यानादौ चैत्रमैत्रादिसम्बन्धिनो देहप्राणादीन् एकतया तावति आभासे आविशन् अन्तर्भान्तमेव अनुज्झितान्तःप्रकाशमेव सन्तं बहिः एकाभासतया भासयति ।

I. P. V., I, 261.

2. तात्कालिकाक्षसामग्र्यसापेक्षाः केवलं क्वचित् ।
आभासा अन्यथान्यत्र त्वन्धान्धतमसादिषु ॥
विशेषोऽर्थावभासस्य सत्तायां न पुनः क्वचित् ।
विकल्पेषु भवेद्भाविभवद्भूतार्थगामिषु ॥

I. P. V., I, 320.

3. एतदुक्तं भवति नीलमिदं पश्यामि, संकल्पयामि, उत्प्रेक्षे, स्मरामि, करोमि, वेद्मि इत्यादौ नीलाभासोऽसौ स्वरूपतोऽन्यूनाधिकः एवं पश्यामीत्येवं यः पीतादिषु, ते पुनराभासाः स्वातन्त्र्येण यदा भगवता संयोज्यन्ते वियोज्यन्ते च तदा अयं स्फुटत्वाऽस्फुटत्वादिव्यवहारः । नीलमित्याभासस्य उत्प्रेक्षे इत्याभासान्तरव्यवच्छेदेन पश्यामीत्याभासमिश्रणायां स्फुटताव्यवहारः एवं त्रैकालिकव्यवहारवैचित्र्योत्पत्तिः ।

I. P.V., I, 322.

4. सा हि अर्थक्रिया आभासभेदनियता, तथा च कान्ताभासस्य बाह्यत्वेऽपि सति आभासान्तरस्य आलिङ्गनलक्षणस्य व्यपगमे दूरीभवति, इयम् इति च आभासान्तरस्य उपगमे अन्यैव प्राक्तनाह्लादविपरीता दृश्यते अर्थक्रिया अतः आभासभेदाभावः ।

I. P. V., I, 329-30

Paga 391.

1. अर्थक्रियाभासोपि आभासान्तरमेव इति अर्थक्रियाकारित्वमपि न भावानां सत्त्वम् ।

I. P. V., I, 330.

Page 392.

1. पृथग् दीपप्रकाशानां स्रोतसां सागरे यथा ।
अविरुद्धावभासानामेककार्या तथैक्यधीः ॥

I. P. V., II, 96.

Page 393.

1. अथार्थस्य यथा रूपं धत्ते बुद्धिस्तथात्मनश्चैतन्यम् ।

I. P. V., I, 71.

Page 395.

1. अजडा सैवं जाड्ये नार्थप्रकाशता ।

I. P. V., I, 77.

Page 397.

1, तस्मात् स स विचित्रनीलपीतादिरूप आकस्मिकोऽज्ञातप्रसिद्धहेतुकः सन्

बाह्यविज्ञानगतप्रतिबिंबात्मकस्वस्वभावसंपादकम् औचित्यवशात् निजरूपसदृशं क्रमोपनिपतद्रूपबहुतरभेदात्मकं ज्ञानात्सर्वथा पृथग्भूतमनुमापयति ।

I, P. V., I, 166.

Page 398.

1. तत्रापि विकल्पेन यथा सोर्थः स्पृश्यते तथानुमेय इति स्थितिः । विकल्पश्च न इन्द्रियादिकमर्थं केनचित्सन्निवेशविशेषात्मना स्पृशति अपि तु किञ्चिदुपलब्धेः कारणमित्यमुना स्वभावेन, स च स्वभावः कारणतालक्षणः प्रत्यक्षगृहीत एव ।

I. P. V., I, 188.

2. आभासाद् बाह्यः पुनरनाभासरूपः स च आभासत इति विप्रतिषिद्धम् ।

I. P. V., I, 190.

3. अस्तु वा नीलाद्याभाससंपादनसामर्थ्यरूपा ज्ञानस्य योग्यतात्मिका शक्तिः वासना । तस्याश्च स्वकार्यसंपादनौन्मुख्यं प्रबोधः, ततो बोधेषु आभासवैचित्र्यम् ।

I. P. V., I, 167.

Page 399.

1. यद्यपि आभासानां ज्ञानान्तर्वर्तिनाम् अपारमार्थिकम् संवृतिसत्त्वमुच्येतापि तथापि यत् एषां कारणम् तद्वस्तुसदेव अङ्गीकार्यम्, अवस्तुनः सर्वसामर्थ्यविरहितालक्षणस्य कार्यसम्पादनप्राणितसामर्थ्यात्मकस्वभावानुपपत्तेः, एवं स्थिते या एता वासना आभासकारणत्वेन इष्यन्ते तासां बोधाद् यदि भिन्नं रूपं तच्च परमार्थसत् तदयं शब्दान्तरप्रच्छन्नो बाह्यार्थवादप्रकार एव ।

I. P. V., I, 167-8.

2. अथ येन रूपेण आसां पारमार्थिकता तेन कारणता तर्हि ज्ञानमात्रम्, तच्च अभिन्नम् इति नीलाद्याभासस्य कार्यरूपस्य असिद्धिः । एवं वासनानामविचित्रत्वे तत्प्रबोधो विचित्र इति का प्रत्याशा ।

I. P. V., I, 168.

3. यदि प्रमात्रन्तराणि भिन्नानि तदा तन्निष्ठानामाभासानां भेद एव, ज्ञानादव्यतिरिक्तं चेति न्यायात् । ततश्च एकाभासनिष्ठत्वाभावात् एकाभासविश्रान्तः प्रमातॄणां सम्भूय व्यवहारो न स्यात् ।

I. P. V., I, 174.

Page 401.

1. अयं पुमान् इन्द्रियप्रणालिकया बुद्धौ प्रतिसंक्रान्तं सुखदुःखाद्यात्मकं विषयं विद्यया परस्परवैविक्त्येन जानाति ।

T. A., VI, 156.

Page 402.

1, "चितिरेव चेतनपदादवरूढा चेत्यसंकोचिनी चित्तम्"·········चितिरेव संकुचितग्राहकरूपा, चेतनपदादवरूढा—अर्थग्रहणोन्मुखी सती, चेत्येन–नीलसुखादिना, संकोचिनी–उभयसंकोचसंकुचितैव, चित्तम् ।

P. H., 11-2.

Page 403.

1. मायाप्रमातुः अनन्तकालान्तर्सुखसंवेदनरूपात् स प्रमाणाभिमत आभासो यावत् प्रमेयोन्मुखतास्वभावः तावत्प्रमेयस्य देशकालाकारसंभेदवत्वात् सोपि तथैव क्षणे क्षणे अन्यान्याभासरूपः सृष्टव्यः ।

I. P. V., II, 66.

2. अन्तराभासमानस्य तथारूपापरित्यागेनैव बहिराभासनं निर्माणम् ।

I. P. V., II, 144.

Page 404.

1. स्वलक्षणाभासं ज्ञानमेकम् परं पुनः साभिलापं विकल्पाख्यं बहुधा······। स्वम्—अन्याननुयायि, स्वरूपसंकोचभागि, लक्षणम्—देशकालाकाररूपं यस्य तस्य आभासः—प्रकाशनम् अन्तर्मुखं यस्मिन् बहिर्मुखीनस्वरूपधारिणि ज्ञाने तत् अविकल्पकम्, विषयभेदेऽपि एकजातीयं स्वरूपे, तद्वैचित्र्ये कारणाभावात्, विकल्पे हि वैचित्र्यकारणम् अभिलापः स च अत्र नास्ति ।

I. P. V., I, 53-4.

2. ················प्रतिबिम्बनमर्हति ।
शब्दो नभसि सानन्दे स्पर्शधामनि सुन्दरः ॥
स्पर्शोऽन्योपि दृढाघातशूलकुन्तादिकोद्भवः ।
परस्थः प्रतिबिम्बत्वात् स्वदेहोद्धूलनाकरः ॥
··

एवं घ्राणान्तरे गन्धो रसो दन्तोदके स्फुटः ।

T. A., II, 45-7,

3. अतोऽन्तिकस्थस्वकताद्दगिन्द्रियप्रयोजनान्तःकरणैर्यदा कृता ।
तदा तदात्तं प्रतिबिम्बमिन्द्रिये स्वकां क्रियां सूयत एव तादृशीम् ॥

T, A., II, 50.

Page 405.

1. यथा च रूपं प्रतिबिम्बितं दृशोर्न चक्षुषान्येन विना हि लक्ष्यते ।
तथा रसस्पर्शनसौरभादिकं न लक्ष्यतेऽक्षेण विना स्थितं त्वपि ॥
इह अवभासनमात्रसारमेव प्रतिबिंबसतत्त्वमित्युक्तं बहुशः, अवभासनञ्च तत्तद्विषयग्राहकेन्द्रियानुग्राहकान्तःकरणायत्तम् .... ततश्च दृशोः-दृगिन्द्रियाधिष्ठेययोर्गोलकयोः, प्रतिसंक्रान्तं रूपम् , अन्येन—अन्यसंबन्धिना चक्षुरिन्द्रियेण विना नाभिलक्ष्यते, चक्षुरिन्द्रियान्तरव्यापारमन्तरेण न निर्भासत इत्यर्थः ।

T. A., II, 47-8.

2. "तथा हि बाह्यवृत्तीनामक्षाणां वृत्तिभासने आलोचने शक्तिः । अन्तर्योजने मनसः पुनः, बाह्यानां चक्षुरादीनां ....

....

एषां चाविकल्पनिजवृत्तिभासनात्मन्यालोचनमात्र एव सामर्थ्यमित्युक्तम् "वृत्तिभासने आलोचने शक्तिः" ।

T. A., VI, 223.

3. कार्यांशस्पर्शोद्रेकादीषत्परिस्फुरणं नाम कर्मेन्द्रियाणां मुख्या वृत्तिः ।

T. A., VI, 224.

Page 408.

1. अथ ब्रूयात् परो यत् इन्द्रियज्ञाने प्रकाशनीयं स्वलक्षणं तद्विकल्पः कथं स्पृशेदिति । भवेदेवं यदि विकल्पो नाम स्वतन्त्रो भवेत् , यावता प्रमातुरसौ व्यापारः प्रमाता च पूर्वानुभवान्तःस्वसंवेदनरूपः । तदस्य च अयमेव पूर्वानुभवसंस्कारो यद्विकल्पनव्यापारकालेऽपि पूर्वानुभवात्मत्वमनुज्झन्नेवास्ते । ततः पूर्वानुभवो यावत् स्वलक्षणात्मा तावत् पूर्वानुभवतादात्म्यापन्नप्रमातृतत्त्वव्यापारोपि विकल्पस्तद्विषय एव, ... तस्मात् प्रमातुर्यो व्यापारः एकानेकत्वयोजनात्मा स एव प्रकृतो यत्र तादृशीः क्रियादिकल्पना एकानेकवस्तुविषया ....
मन एव करोति ।

I. P. V., II, 40-1.

2. विकल्पे हि वैचित्र्यकारणम् अभिलापः स च अत्र नास्ति न हि अभिलापो नीलस्य धर्मः न च चक्षुर्ग्राह्यः ततोसौ प्राच्यः स्मर्तव्यः, अप्रबुद्धे च संस्कारे न स्मृतिः तत्प्रबोधश्च वस्तुदर्शनोत्थितः इति ।

I. P. V., I, 54-5.

Page 409.

1. विविधा कल्पना, विविधत्वेन च शंकितस्य कल्पः अन्यव्यवच्छेदनं विकल्पः ।

I. P. V., I, 240.

2. तेषामपि आभासानां यथोचितं यत् अन्योन्यनान्तरीयकत्वं तदेकेन संवेदनरूपेण तदनेकप्रमिताभासविषयपूर्वप्रवृत्तसंवेदनकलापानुप्राणकान्तर्मुखरूपेण निश्चीयते, तच्च ऐक्याभासमात्रे अनुसंधानरूपं प्रमाणम्, अनुसंधीयमानेषु तु आभासेषु गृहीतग्राहित्वादप्रमाणम्।

I. P. V., II, 103.

3. दृष्टमपि निर्विकल्पेन यावन्न परामृष्टं विमर्शविशेषविश्रान्त्या तावन्न स्मर्यते मार्गदृष्टमिव तृणपर्णादिविशेषरूपेण।

I. P. V., I, 141–2.

Page 418.

1. स्मृतौ अर्थस्य न प्रकाशः न अध्यवसायः.........
सर्वत्र "अयम्" इति प्रत्ययप्रसंगात्, किन्तु अनुभवप्रकाश एव स्मृतौ प्रधानम्। अनुभवस्य तु अर्थप्रकाशात्मकत्वात् अनुभवप्रकाशनान्तरीयकोऽर्थावभासः।

I. P. V., I, 60–1

2. अनुभूतेषु वस्तुषु या स्मृतिः तस्याम् अनुभवो दृगात्मा द्वारम् अर्थांशस्पर्शे स च सत्यपि आत्मनि नष्टोऽनुभवः, तस्य हि अनाशे "इदम्" इत्येष एवात्रुटितः प्रकाश इति का स्मृतिः, तदनुभविता च स्मृतेः किं कुर्यात्।

I. P. V., I, 63.

Page 419.

1. अनुभवेन हि संस्कारो जन्यते स्वोचितः; संस्कारश्च प्राक्तनरूपां स्थितिं स्थापयति आकृष्टशाखादेश्चिरसंवर्तितस्य विवर्त्यमानस्य भूर्जादेः।

I. P. V., I, 64.

Page 425,

1. प्रकाशनं च न तदानीन्तनकालत्यागेन नापि इदानीन्तनकालस्य स्वीकारेण "इदम्" इत्येवावभासनप्रसंगात्। तस्मात् अतीतानुभवकालः पूर्वानुभूतभावस्वालक्षण्याक्षेपकत्वेनापेक्षणीयो वेद्यभागे, प्रकाशात्मकावभासाभिनिवेशितया, स्मर्तृदेहप्राणाद्यवभासश्च आलम्बनीयो वेदकभागे, विमर्शांशाभिनिवेशित्वेन.........तदेव आभासान्तरव्यामिश्रणया दीपसहस्रसंमूर्च्छनवत् स्फुटीभवति।

I. P. V., I, 124.

Page 426.

1. एवञ्च स एव परमेश्वरः स्मरति। एतदेव हि तस्य स्मरणम् यत् एवंप्रकारपरामर्शोचितकालकलादिस्पर्शसहिष्णुमायाप्रमातृभावपरिग्रहः।

I. P. V.. I, 119–20.

2. अस्मद्दर्शने तु भिन्नकाला अपि संविदः तत्कालात्यागेन एकताभासनेन स्वतन्त्रः प्रमाता यावदन्तर्मुखतया तावत्यंशे विमृशति तावत् प्रकाशस्य तात्कालिकबहिर्भावावभासो विमर्शस्य च इदानीन्तनान्तर्मुखा स्थितिरेव। एतदेव वेदनाधिकं वेदितृत्वम् वेदनेषु संयोजनवियोजनयोः यथारुचि करणं स्वातन्त्र्यम्।

I. P. V., I, 129.

Page 428.

1. क्रियाशक्तिस्फारप्रायसम्बन्धाभिधानप्रसङ्गात् ज्ञाप्यज्ञापकभावस्य तत्त्वं प्रसाध्य कार्यकारणभावस्य तत्त्वं प्रसाधयितुम्।

I. P. V., II, 134-5.

Page 434.

1. योगिनामपि मृद्बीजे विनैवेच्छावशेन यत्।
घटादि जायते तत्तत् स्थिरस्वार्थक्रियाकरम्॥

I. P. V., II, 150-1.

2. यथा हि घटसाहित्यं पटस्याप्यवभासते।
तथा घटानन्तरता किन्तु सा नियमोज्झिता॥
अतो यन्नियमेनैव यस्मादाभात्यनन्तरम्।
तत्तस्य कारणं ब्रूमः सति रूपान्वयेऽधिके॥

T. A., VI, 30.

3. तस्मात् चिद्रूप एव परमेश्वरः स्वेच्छावशात् इयद्विश्वम् अवभासयति। किन्तु नियतिदशायाम् प्रथान्तरव्यवधानेन येन 'बीजादङ्कुरो मृदो घटः' इत्याद्यात्मिका लोकस्य प्रतीतिः।

T. A., Comm., VI, 10.

Page 436.

1. बीजमंकुर इत्यस्मिन् सतत्त्वे हेतुतद्वतोः।
घटः पटश्चेति भवेत् कार्यकारणता न किम्॥

T. A., VI, 23.

2. असत्स्वभाववपुषो स स्वभावो न युज्यते।

T. A., VI, 25.

3. यदसत्तदसत् युक्ता नासतः सत्स्वरूपता। सतोऽपि न पुनः सत्तालाभेनार्थः। ....अभिव्यक्तिविषयत्वादयोऽपि सदसद्रूपतया चिन्त्याः।

I. P. V., II, 139.

4. अस्मिन् सतीदमस्तीति कार्यकारणतापि या ।
साप्यपेक्षाविहीनानां जडानां नोपपद्यते ॥

I. P. V., II, 168.

Page 437.

1. न च बहुशोऽपि दैवयोगाद् पुरुषेण घटानन्तरं पटो दृष्ट इति तयोः परस्परनिरपेक्षयोरपि तावता किञ्चित् नियामकं ज्ञातेयमुदियात् येनावश्यं पौर्वापर्यं स्यात् । एवं च कृत्तिकारोहिण्युदययोरपि कार्यकारणभावो भवेत् यदुदितासु कृत्तिकासु नियमेन रोहिण्युदय इति ।

T. A., (Comm.,) VI, 17.

Page 438.

1. परस्परस्वभावत्वे कार्यकारणयोरपि ।
एकत्वमेव भेदे हि नैवान्योन्यस्वरूपता ॥

I. P. V., II, 173.

2. एकात्मनो विभेदश्च क्रिया कालक्रमानुगा ।
तथा स्यात्कर्तृतैवैवं तथापरिणमत्तया ॥

I. P. V., II, 174.

Page 439.

1. नन्वेतावता विज्ञानमेव ब्रह्मरूपमिमां विश्वरूपतावैचित्रीं परिगृह्णातु किमीश्वरतापरिकल्पनया इत्याशंक्याह :—
वास्तवेपि चिदेकत्वे न स्यादाभासभिन्नयोः ।
चिकीर्षालक्षणैकत्वपरामर्शं विना क्रिया ॥

I. P. V., II, 178-9.

2. यत्तु प्रमेयदशापतितं न भवति किन्तु चिद्रूपतया प्रकाशपरमार्थरूपं चिदेकस्वभावं स्वच्छं तत्र भेदाभेदरूपता उपलभ्यते, अनुभवादेव हि स्वच्छस्यादर्शादेः अखण्डितस्वस्वभावस्यैव पर्वतमतङ्गजादिरूपसहस्र-संभिन्नं वपुरुपपद्यते ।

I. P. V., II, 177.

3. अतो निमित्तं देवस्य शक्तयः सन्तु तादृशे ।

T. A., II, 72.

4. ततश्चेश्वर एव बीजभूमिजलाद्याभाससाहित्येन अंकुरात्मना भासते ।

I. P. V., II, 146.

Page 440.

1. श्रीशंभुवदनोद्गीर्णां वच्म्यागममहौषधिम् ।

T. A., VIII, 69.

2. आहास्मत्परमेष्ठी च शिवदृष्टौ गुरूत्तमः ।

T. A., VIII, 72.

Page 441.

1. स्वातन्त्र्यहानिर्बोधस्य स्वातन्त्र्यस्याप्यबोधता ।
द्विधाणवं मलमिदं स्वस्वरूपापहानितः ॥

I. P. V., II, 220.

Page 442.

1. ईश्वरस्य च या स्वात्मतिरोधित्सा निमित्तताम् ।
साभ्येति कर्ममलयोरतोनादिव्यवस्थितिः ॥

T. A., VIII, 74.

2. स्वयं बध्नाति देवेशः स्वयञ्चैव विमुञ्चति ।

T. A., VIII, 82.

3. न वाच्यं तु कथं नाम कस्मिंश्चित्पुंस्यसौ तथा ।
न हि नाम पुमान् कश्चिद्यस्मिन्पर्यनुयुज्यते ॥

T. A., VIII, 71.

4. देव एव तथासौ चेत् स्वरूपं चास्य तादृशम् ।
तादृक्प्रथास्वभावस्य स्वभावे कानुयोज्यता ॥

T. A., VIII, 72.

Page 443.

1. देवादीनां च सर्वेषां भविनां त्रिविधं मलम् ।
तथापि कार्ममेवैकं मुख्यं संसारकारणम् ॥

T. A., VI, 56.

Page 446.

1. स स्वयं कल्पिताकारविकल्पात्मककर्मभिः ।
बध्नात्यात्मानमेवेह स्वातन्त्र्यादिति वर्णितम् ॥

T. A., VIII, 70.

2. समस्तेतरनिर्माणमध्ये इदमपि परमेश्वरेण निर्मितम् यदविचलस्तस्य कुम्भकारपशोर्मिथ्याभिमानः ।

I. P. V., II, 149.

Page 447.

1. फलिष्यतीदं कर्मेति या दृढा वृत्तिरात्मनि ।
स संस्कारः फलायेह न तु स्मरणकारणम् ॥

T. A., VI, 85.

Page 448.

1. लक्ष्यते सुखदुःखाद्यैः समाने दृष्टकारणे ।
चित्रैर्हेत्वन्तरं किञ्चित् तच्च कर्मेह दर्शनात् ॥

T. A., VI, 98.

2. नाहं कर्तेति मन्वानः कर्मसंस्कारमुज्झति ।

T. A., VI, 85.

3. अप्रध्वस्तेऽपि संकोचे नाहं कर्तेति भावनात् ।
न फलं क्लीबमूढादेः प्रायश्चित्तेऽथवा कृते ॥

T. A., VI, 86.

4. यन्मयाद्य तपस्तप्तं तदस्मै स्यादिति स्फुटम् ।
अभिसन्धिमतः कर्म न फलेदभिसन्धितः ॥

T. A., VI, 87.

Page 449.

1. आरब्धकार्यं देहेऽस्मिन् यत्पुनः कर्म तत्कथम् ।
उच्छिद्यतामन्त्यदशं निरोद्धुं न हि शक्यते ॥

T. A., VI, 103.

Page 450.

1. अत एव कृतं कर्म कर्मणा तपसापि वा ।
ज्ञानेन वा निरुध्येत फलपाकेष्वनुन्मुखम् ॥

T. A., VI, 102.

2. निष्कर्मा हि स्थिते मूलमलेऽप्यज्ञाननामनि ।
वैचित्र्यकारणाभावान्नोर्ध्वं सरति नाप्यधः ॥
केवलं पारिमित्येन शिवाभेदमसंस्पृशन् ।
विज्ञानकेवली प्रोक्तः शुद्धचिन्मात्रसंस्थितः ॥

T. A., VI, 77.

Page 451.

1. ननु कारणमेतस्य कर्मणश्चेन्मलः कथम् ।
स विज्ञानाकलस्यापि न सूते कर्मसन्ततिम् ॥
मैवं स हि मलो ज्ञानाकले दिध्वंसिषुः कथम् ।
हेतुः स्याद् ध्वंसमानत्वं स्वातन्त्र्यादेव चोद्भवेत् ॥

T. A., VI, 79–80.

2. अतो मोहपराधीनो यद्यप्यकृत किंचन ।
तथापि ज्ञानकाले तत्सर्वमेव प्रदह्यते ॥

T. A., VI, 106-7.

3. देहस्थमिति देहेन सह तादात्म्यमाश्रिता ।
स्वाच्छन्द्यात्संविदेवोक्ता तत्रस्थं कर्म दह्यते ॥
देहैक्यवासनात्यागात् स च विश्वात्मतास्थितेः ।

T. A., VI, 108.

Page 452.

1. न हि कर्मास्ति तादृक्तं येन ज्ञानं प्रवर्तते ।
कर्मजत्वे च तज्ज्ञानं फलराशौ पतेद् ध्रुवम् ॥
अन्यकर्मफलं प्राच्यं कर्मराशिं न किं दहेत् ।

T. A., VIII, 9.

Page 453.

1. अथ प्रलयकालेऽपि चित्स्वभावत्वयोगतः ।
अणूनां संभवत्येव ज्ञानं मिथ्येति तत्कुतः ॥
स्वभावादिति चेन्मुक्ते शिवे वा किं तथा न हि ।

T. A., VIII, 20.

Page 455.

1. यच्चादर्शनमाख्यातं निमित्तं परिणामिनि ।
प्रधाने तद्धि संकीर्णवैविक्त्योभययोगतः ॥
दर्शनाय पुमर्थैकयोग्यतासचिवं धियः ।
आरभ्य सूते धरणीपर्यन्तन्तत्र यच्चितः ॥
बुद्धिवृत्त्यविशिष्टत्वं पुंस्प्रकाशप्रसादतः ।
प्रकाशनाद्धियोर्थेन सह भोगः स भण्यते ॥

T. A., VIII, 21-2.

Page 456.

1. "परिभाष्यते" इति श्रीमत्खेटपालाचार्यप्रभृतिभिः स्वसमयेन अवस्थाप्यते इत्यर्थः ।

T. A., Comm., VIII, 36.

2. आवारणात्मना सिद्धं तत्स्वरूपादभेदवत् ।
भेदे प्रमाणाभावाच्च तदेकं निखिलात्मसु ॥

T. A., VIII, 30.

Page 459.

1. रोधे तयोश्च जात्यायुरपि न स्यादतः पतेत् ।
देहो भोगात्तयोरेव निरोध इति चेन्ननु ॥
जात्यायुष्प्रदकर्मांशसन्निधौ यदि शंकरः ।
मलं रुन्द्धे भोगदातुः कर्मणः किं बिभेति सः ॥

T. A., VIII ,49.

Page 460.

1. ननु भेदवादिवन्मलादीनामीश्वरस्य च
"यथानादिप्रवृत्तोयं घोरः संसारसागरः।
शिवोपि हि तथानादिः संसारान्मोचकः स्मृतः ॥"
इत्यादि नीत्या तुल्यकक्ष्यतयैवानादित्वमुच्यतां किमेवं प्रक्रियागौरवकारिणा हेतुहेतुमद्भावपरिकल्पनेनेत्याशंक्याह।

T. A., Comm., VIII, 75.

Page 462.

1. अतिमार्गक्रमकुलत्रिकस्रोतोन्तरादिषु।

M. V. V., 20.

2. ननु क्रमदर्शने सर्वत्रैव श्रीसृष्ट्यादिदेवीनां मध्ये श्रीसुकाल्या भगवत्या अभिधानम्।
... ...
तदत्र क्रमनयसमानकक्ष्यत्वविवक्षायामपि कथमेतद्विरुद्धमभिहितं 'द्वादशैव देव्यः'।

T. A., (Comm.), III, 189, 190.

Page 463.

1. चतुर्ष्वेव विकल्पेषु यः संस्कारः क्रमादसौ।
अस्फुटः स्फुटताभावी प्रस्फुटन्स्फुटितात्मकः ॥
... ...
ततः स्फुटतरो यावदन्ते स्फुटतमो भवेत्।

T. A., III, 4–5.

2. श्रीभूतिराजनामाप्याचार्यश्चक्रभानुशिष्योऽन्यः।
अभिनवगुप्तस्य गुरोर्यस्य हि कालीनये गुरुता ॥

T. A., III, 193

3. श्रीवीरनाथपादैः पञ्च च देवीनये कृताः शिष्याः।

T. A., III, 196.

4. Refer to foot Note 1 on page 280.

5. श्रीकेयूरवतीतः प्रभृति श्रीचक्रभानुशिष्यान्तम्।
सन्ततयोऽतिनयस्य प्रथिता इह षोडशैवेत्थम् ॥

T. A., III, 195.

6. आयातिरथ तन्त्रस्य कथ्यते कौलिकोदिता।
यामाकर्ण्य पुमानत्र विमर्शौचित्यमश्नुते ॥
पुरा कदाचिद् भगवान् भैरवो विश्वभावनः।
... ...

इच्छाशक्तिरभूदेका प्रबुद्धा परमेष्ठिनः ।
... ...

प्रणिपत्य च सा भूयः कल्पिताञ्जलिकुड्मला ।
शुचिस्मिता स्मरारातिं बभाषे शशिभूषणम् ॥
देव ! त्वद्वदनादेव गोपितान्यन्यदर्शने ।
प्राक्प्रत्ययगुत्तरावाञ्छि स्रोतांसि श्रुतवत्यहम् ॥
किन्तु प्रष्टव्यमेतन्मे कारुण्यं यदि ते हृदि ।
किंतत्त्वमत्र सर्वत्र यज्ज्ञानात् पूर्णता भवेत् ॥
... ...

अन्तर्लक्षे पदे तिष्ठन् बभाषे तत्त्वमौत्तरम् ।
... ...

अर्थतत्त्वमुपादिक्षदौत्तराम्नायसंविदाम् ॥

M. M., 195-6.

Page 464.

1. सिद्धान्तानां यथान्येषां सारं स्यादौत्तरः क्रमः ॥

M. M., 196-201.

2. अत एव हि नैकट्याद्वामदक्षिणशास्त्रयोः ।
धाराग्रान्तधराप्रान्ते कौलिकी प्रविजृम्भते ॥

M. V. V., 38

Page 465.

1. Refer to F. N. 1. Page 280.
2. 'श्रीमानेरकस्तु' सिद्ध्यै प्रायतत, यावत्सिद्धः सन् एवं मनसा समर्थयते स्म किं भोगैः ।

... ...

'तदिदानीमपि निजभावगतरहस्योपदेशं स्तोत्रमुखेनापि तावत्प्रसारयंल्लोकाननुगृह्णीयाम् इति'

T. A., (Comm.) III, 192-3.

Page 466.

1. किं च श्रीमदवतारकनाथेन श्रीककारदेवीवत् श्रीमदनिकाश्रीकल्याणिके चानुगृहीते ।

T. A., (Comm.) III, 195.

Page 468.

1. यथा श्रीक्रमसद्भावेऽपि—
गोपनीयानि नामानि चोरेभ्यो द्रविणं यथा ।
गोपनात् पालयन्त्येव मूर्तयस्तु महार्थतः ॥

M. M., 88.

2. श्रीपीठपञ्चवाहनेत्रत्रयवृन्दचक्राणि स्मरत ।
स्मरत च गुरूणां पङ्क्तिं पञ्च च शक्तीः सृष्टिप्रमुखाः ॥
... ...
पीठे कला नव पञ्चैव पञ्चवाहपदद्व्याम् ।
सप्तदश फालनेत्रे द्वादश षोडश चान्यनेत्रयोः ॥

M. M., 86–92.

3. धाममुद्रावर्णकला संविद्भावस्वभावतः ।
पातोऽनिकेतदृष्ट्या च वृन्दचक्रं प्रकाशितम् ॥

M. M., 92-6.

4. यथा श्रीक्रमसद्भावे—
ज्ञानं सृष्टिं विजानीयात् स्थितिर्मन्त्रः प्रकीर्तितः ।
संहारं तु महाकालमेलापं परमं विदुः ॥
अनाख्यं शक्तिरूपं तु भासाख्यं शम्भुरूपकम् ।
पञ्चप्रकारमेतद्धि विज्ञेयं तत्त्वदर्शिभिः ॥

M. M., 97.

5. यथोक्तं श्रीक्रमसद्भावे—
तया व्याप्तमिदं विश्वं त्रैलोक्यं सचराचरम् ।

M. M., 101.

Page 469.

1. तत्रोद्दिष्टभङ्ग्या सृष्ट्यादिभासान्तं चक्रं श्रीदेवपाणिसम्प्रदायानुप्रविष्टै-
रस्माभिरनुसन्धीयते न पुनरेतद् विपर्ययेण। यथा श्रीक्रमसद्भावे ।
'तेषां मध्यात् क्रमेणैव आदौ पूज्यस्तु कः क्रमः ।
तन्मे कथय सुश्रोणि ! विस्तरेण यथाविधि ॥'

M. M., 108.

2. यतः श्रीक्रमसद्भावभट्टारके अनाख्यचक्रे सप्तदशदेव्यः पूज्यत्वेनोक्ताः
यदुक्तं तत्र ।
कालोत्थिता महादेव सानन्दा नन्दिनी शिवा ।
चिद्घना युग्मसध्यस्था अक्षराक्षरगोचरा ॥
अकुला कलयेन्नित्या कालकाली निराकुला ।
सकला लीयते यस्यां सृष्टिकाली तु सा स्मृता ॥

T. A., III, 190.

3. श्रीसर्वाचार वीराली निशाचर क्रमादिषु ।
शास्त्रेसु विततं चैतत्तत्र तन्त्रोच्यते यतः ॥

क्रमः क्रमदर्शनम् ।

...   .

श्रीक्रमसद्भावेऽपि—

'..................शङ्काशून्यो भवेत्सदा ।'

T. A., Ah. XII, 105–7.

4. इयं परासंविदुक्तेन प्रकारेण रूपं कलयन्ती—
श्रीक्रमसद्भावभट्टारके 'रुद्रकालीति' व्यपदिष्टेत्यर्थः ।
........................श्रीपञ्चशतिकादौ पुनरियं
'भद्रकाली' इत्युक्ता ।

T. A., III, 172.

Page 470.

1. ते च वाहाः व्योमवामेश्वरी खेचरी दिक्चरी गोचरी भूचरीति च भवन्ति । अन्ये पुनरासां क्रमं गोदिग्भूरूपं भूदिग्गोरूपं चाचक्षते । तत्र तत्सम्प्रदायानुगुण्यात् तन्निरुक्तिरुह्या । अस्मत्क्रमस्तु निर्दिष्टक्रम एव । यथा श्रीक्रमसिद्धौ ।

M. M., 89.

2. यथोक्तं श्रीक्रमसिद्धौ—
संवित्क्रममिमं देव ! शृणु वक्ष्यामि सुन्दर ।
सृष्टिं स्थितिं च संहारानाख्याभासास्वरूपकम् ॥
ज्ञानमात्रं च मेलापं शाक्तं शाम्भवसंयुतम् ।
यथा श्रीक्रमसद्भावे—
ज्ञानं सृष्टिं विजानीयात् स्थितिर्मन्त्रः प्रकीर्तितः ।
संहारं तु महाकालमेलापं परमं विदुः ॥
अनाख्यं शक्तिरूपं तु भासाख्यं शम्भुरूपकम् ।
पञ्चप्रकारमेतद्धि विज्ञेयं तत्त्वदर्शिभिः ॥

M. M., 97.

3. यथा श्रीक्रमसिद्धौ—
दोहे व्याप्तं गवि क्षीरं स्तनाभ्यां प्रसृतं यथा ।
सर्वगा व्यापिनी सूक्ष्मा एकस्मिन् प्रसृता शिवा ॥

M. M., 101.

4. इत्थमेतत्क्रमपरामर्श एव स्वात्मविमर्शरूपो जीवन्मोक्षः ।
.... स च गुरुकटाक्षसम्पर्कादृते न
सम्पद्यते । यथा श्रीक्रमसिद्धौ ।

M. M., 109.

Page 471.

1. श्रीक्रमस्तोत्रेऽपि—
'महाविनोदार्पितमातृचक्रवीरेन्द्रकासृग्रसपानसक्ताम्।
रक्तीकृतां च प्रलयात्यये तां नमामि विश्वाकृतिरक्तकालीम् ॥'
T. A., (Comm.) III, 160–1.

2. तत्रैव—श्रीब्रह्मयामले············
दीक्षयेज्जपयोगेन रक्तादेवी क्रमाद्यतः।
गुरोरलाभे प्रोक्तस्य विधिमेतं समाचरेत् ॥
T. A., III, 70–1.

3. तदुक्तं श्रीपञ्चशतिके············
श्रीतन्त्रराजभट्टारकेऽपि।
T. A., III, 189.

4. श्रीमदवतारकनाथस्यापि अत्र त्रयोदशैव विवक्षिताः यः श्रीगोविन्दराजादीनामपि परमगुरुत्वेन स्थितः।
T. A., III, 197.

5. अयं च प्रथममेताभिरेव कामरूपे चरुकप्रधा(दा ?)नेनानुगृहीतः इति गुरवः।
T. A., III, 201.

Page 472.

1. कालस्य कालि देहं विभज्य मुनिपञ्चसंख्यया भिन्नम्।
स्वस्मिन्विराजमानं तद्रूपं कुर्वती जयसि ॥
T. A., III, 198.

2. एकं स्वरूपरूपं प्रसरस्थितिविलयभेदतस्त्रिविधम्।
प्रत्येकमुदयसंस्थितिलयविश्रमतश्चतुर्विधं तदपि ॥
इति वसुपञ्चकसंख्यं विधाय सहजस्वरूपमात्मीयम्।
T. A., III, 197.

3. 'श्रीमानेरकस्तु'·························
तदिदानीमपि निजभावगतरहस्योपदेशं स्तोत्रमुखेनापि तावत्प्रसारयं ल्लोकाननुगृह्णीयाम् इति।
T. A., III, 193.

4. तदुक्तं स्वपारम्पर्यं व्याचक्षाणेन श्रीसोमराजेन,
श्रीमद्वामनभानुः क्रमकमलविकासने चतुरः।
जयति षडध्वप्रोज्झितपरनभसि निवद्धसन्तानः ॥
येन ध्वस्तः समस्तो गहनतरमहामोहघोरान्धकारो

दत्तः सम्यक् प्रकाशः क्रमकमलवनोल्लासविश्रान्तिरूपः ।
प्राप्ता येनैव संविज्जिरुपमसरसास्वादसंयोगभोगा
वन्दे श्रीभोजराजं गुरुवरमहितं पूज्यमैहद्भिरन्तः ॥

T. A., III, 196-7,

Page 473.

1. Refer to F. N. 4. Page 472.

Page 474.

1. यदुक्तं श्रीक्रमसूत्रेषु—बाह्यादन्तः प्रवेश अभ्यन्तराद्वा बाह्यस्वरूपानुप्रवेशः इति । यथा च व्याख्यातं श्रीमत्क्षेमराजेन—'तत्र च बाह्याद् गृह्यमाणाद्············' ।

M. M., 166.

2. तदुक्तं श्रीक्रमोदये—
रागो माया कला विद्या नियतिः काल एव च ।
पञ्चवृत्याश्रयाः सर्वे पाशाश्चेति प्रकीर्तिताः ॥

M. M., 50.

3. एवं पीठपरामर्शस्य प्राधान्यं प्रतिपादयितुं ह्यादौ दूतीयजनमारम्भणीयतयोद्भाव्यते यथा श्रीक्रमोदये··········· ।

M. M., 87.

4. अतएव श्रीमहाभैरवचण्डोग्रघोरकालीभट्टारिकायाश्च त्रयोदशत्वम् ।
तदुक्तं श्रीपञ्चशतिके—
डकला भीषणा रौद्रा कुलकालिनिराकुला ।
अलक्ष्या लक्ष्यनिर्लक्ष्या सुकाली नाम सिद्धिदा ॥

T. A., III, 189.

Page 475.

1. श्रीदेवीपञ्चशतिकेऽपि अस्य श्रीसोमानन्दभट्टपादेभ्यः प्रभृति त्रिकदर्शनवदेवगुरवः, इति—न तत्राप्यस्य श्रीभूतिराजो गुरुत्वेन स्थितः ।

T. A., III, 194.

2. ननु श्रीदेवीपञ्चशतिकादौ—
निष्क्रियानन्दनाथश्च ज्ञानदीप्त्या सहैकतः ।
विद्यानन्दश्च रक्ता च द्वितीयं कथितं तव ॥
शक्त्यानन्दो महानन्दा तृतीयं सिद्धपूजितम् ।
शिवानन्दस्तथा ज्ञेया समया तच्चतुर्थकम् ॥

T. A., (Comm.) Ah. XXIX., 31.

3. अतश्चास्य गुरुक्रममजानानैरद्यतनैः ।
श्रीभूतिराजनामाप्याचार्यश्चक्रभानुशिष्योऽन्यः ॥
अभिनवगुप्तस्य गुरोर्यस्य हि कालीनये गुरुता ।
इत्यादि यदुक्तं तत्स्वोत्प्रेक्षितमेवेत्युपेक्ष्यम् ॥

T. A., (Comm.) III, 193.

Page 476.

1. Refer to foot note I, page 475.
2. यदुक्तं श्रीसार्धशतिके…………
सृष्टिः स्थितिश्च संहारो रक्तकाली तथैव च ।
स्वकाली यमकाली च मृत्युकाली तथैव च ॥
… … … … … …त्रयोदश उदाहृताः ॥

T. A., III, 161.

3. यतः श्रीक्रमसद्भावभट्टारके अनाख्यचक्रे सप्तदशदेव्यः
पूज्यत्वेनोक्ताः, यदुक्तं तत्र…………
'सप्तादशी तु सा काली विद्धि सर्वार्थकारिणी ।'
इति, अत एव च 'एतदाशयेन श्रीस्तोत्रकारस्य पूजाक्रमः, इति न ग्राह्यम्'

T. A., III, 190-1.

4. श्रीह्रस्वनाथेनापि स्वलिपिविवरणेऽस्य श्लोकस्य दृष्टत्वात्, सर्वेषामेव च विवरणकृतामत्र प्रतिपदं पाठानां श्लोकानां व्यत्यासो दृश्यते, इत्यस्मद्दृष्ट एव पाठे क इवायं प्रद्वेषः ।

T. A., III, 202.

Page 477.

1. तदुक्तं श्रीमहानयप्रकाशे—
"शिवशक्त्युभयोन्मेषसामरस्योद्भवं महत् ।
वीर्यं तस्माद् देह एव महापीठः समुद्गतः ॥"

M. M., 87.

2. यथा श्रीमहानयप्रकाशे—
" … … … …
आसां मेलापसिद्धानां देवीनां मुद्रिता सदा ।
मु (द्र) णेयं द्विधा भासमुद्रेयं भैरवात्मिका ॥"

M. M., 94.

3. यदुक्तं श्रीमहानयप्रकाशे—
"प्रायो हि मैथुने मद्ये मांसे च परिदृश्यते।
आसक्तिः सर्वजन्तूनां विशेषात् कस्यचित् क्वचित् ॥"

M. M., 120.

4. यदुक्तं श्रीमहानयप्रकाशे—
एवंविधं यदधिगन्तुमिहात्मतत्त्वं
मिथ्याविकल्पविभवोद्दलनं च सम्यक्।
युक्तिं महानयमयीं न विहाय शक्यं
सर्वोत्तमोत्तमतमो हि ततो महार्थः ॥"

M. M., 179.

Page 481.

1. तथा च श्रीमहानयपद्धतौ—
"परमनिरावरणात्मनि रूपे यो दृढतरः परामर्शः।
पूजनमेतदितीत्थं प्रभुणा निरणायि यद्यपि प्रकृतम् ॥"

M. M., 112.

Page 482.

1. अथैवमुपपादितस्य स्वात्मरूपपरमशिवभट्टारकाविभिन्नस्य श्रीदेशिकनाथस्य स्वातन्त्र्यसंविच्छक्तिविजृम्भणस्वभावमसाधारणं कृत्यपञ्चकं प्रकटयितुं सर्वोत्तीर्णां भासां पृथग्वक्तव्यतयावस्थाप्य प्रथमं सृष्ट्यादिचतुष्टयं स्पष्टयति।

M. M., 100.

2. भासा नाम सृष्ट्यादिकृत्याक्रान्तविश्ववैचित्र्यव्यवहारगर्भिणी सर्वोत्तीर्णा सर्वानुग्राहिणी च पारमेश्वरी चिच्छक्तिः, या तदीयं स्वातन्त्र्यं स एवेत्यध्यवसीयते।

M. M., 105.

3. तत्र च ताः शक्तयस्त्रयोदश। ता इति। या स्रष्ट्र्यः स्थापयित्र्यः संहर्त्र्यश्च तास्तादात्विकावस्थायां संहर्तृमात्रपारिशेष्येऽपि उद्भविष्यद्भूद्यवैचित्र्यात् किञ्चिदन्तःकन्दवदवतिष्ठमाना द्वादशेन्द्रियतत्समष्ट्यात्मना त्रयोदश संभवन्ति।

M. M.. 104.

Page 483.

1. ताश्च 'इहैकैकत्र सृष्ट्यादौ चक्ररूपता विद्यते' इति श्रीक्रमकेलिक्लृप्त्या सृष्टिसृष्टिः सृष्टिस्थितिः······।

M. M., 104.

2. यदुक्तं श्रीक्रमकेलौ—"अत एव ये निर्विमर्शं तुर्यातीतमिच्छन्ति, ते निरुपदेशा एव" इति ।

M. M., 106.

3. यानुभूतिः स्वहृदयैकसंवेद्या विमर्शशक्तिः सैव मन्त्र इत्यस्य शब्दस्याभिधेयतयानुभूयत इति·····························श्रीक्रमकेलौ च—
"सेयमेवंविधा भगवती संविद्देव्येव मन्त्रः" इति ।

M. M., 127

Page 484.

1. अतश्च वैचित्र्येणोक्तप्रकारप्रतिबिम्बनस्वभावेन वर्तनं विश्वस्य विवर्त इति व्याख्यायां न किञ्चिदनौचित्यम् । यथा श्रीक्रमकेलौ—
"तद्विवर्तः स्मृतो रश्मिपुञ्जश्चक्रेशिपूर्वकः"
इत्यत्र व्याख्यातं—विवर्तो विचित्रेण रूपेण वर्तनं न त्वविद्यावशात्, अपि तु स्वातन्त्र्यत इति ।

M. M., 156.

2. यच्चोक्तं श्रीक्रमकेलौ—वामदक्षिणतन्त्रादिष्वप्येतन्मयमेव सर्वं निर्वहतीति मन्तव्यम् इति ।

M. M., 178.

3. यश्चायमेवंविधार्थमथनप्रगल्भो भगवान्, अत एव सर्वपर्यन्तप्रतिष्ठास्थानरूपो यः कुलेश्वरः, स एव यतः स्वशक्तिं निर्मथ्य सृष्ट्यादिकारी, अत एवंविधं श्रीमन्थानं भैरवं नमामीति सम्बन्धः इति श्रीक्रमकेली कृपया ।
M. M., 179.

4. आशङ्कोत्तरचर्चाभिरन्यैश्च गमकैः क्रमैः ।
प्रकाशयद्भिर्विश्वस्य प्रतिष्ठामौत्तरं क्रमम् ॥
स्पष्टैरव्याकुलैर्वाक्यैरन्योन्यान्वयबन्धुरैः ।
बहुधा पुण्डरीकाक्षः पाण्डवं प्रत्यबोधयत् ॥
... ...
एतत् वितत्य विख्यातैः क्रमकेलौ कुलागमे ॥

M. M., 190.

5. तदुक्तं श्रीक्रमकेलौ—'वन्दनं हि तदनुप्रवेश' इति ।

M. M., 192.

Page 485.

1. स्वशरीरस्यैव पीठतयोपासनं प्राक् कर्तव्यम् । तदनु वक्ष्यमाणानामुपचारः कर्तव्य इत्युक्तं भवति । अत्र च गणपतिवटुकादिदेवतानां नामोपादानं तेषां च तत्तदर्थानुगुण्येन निवर्चनम् ।

M. M., 88.

Page 486.

1. तत्र च बाह्याद् गृह्यमाणाद् विषयग्रामादन्तः परस्यां चितिभूमौ ग्रसनक्रमेणैव प्रवेशः समावेशो भवति।

M. M., 166.

2. एताश्च श्रीक्षेमराजादिभिः पुस्तकेषु लिखितपठिता इत्यस्माभिरपि नामोपादनपूर्वकं चाकित्येन व्याख्याता इति।

M. M., 90.

3. शोषो नाम.........................पवित्रीकरणम्।
तदुक्तमस्मद्गुरुभिः क्रमवासनायाम्।

M. M., 115.

4. यत्करचरणाद्युपलक्षितस्य विकल्पक्षोभप्रपञ्चस्य पूर्णाहम्भावभावनास्वभावया कयाचिदविकल्पतया विमर्शनमिति।

M. M., 117.

5. अत्र ऋजुविमर्शिन्यां महामायातन्त्रं शबरतन्त्रं चेति तन्त्रद्वयपरं व्याख्यातम्।

N. S. A., 22.

Page 487.

1. 'इह हि विद्यायां त्रिष्वपि बीजेष्वन्तस्था(स्थ ?)तृतीयमस्ति सम्प्रदायस्य काश्मीरोद्भूतत्वात्, प्राकृतभाषाविशेषत्वाच्च यथासम्प्रदायं व्यवहार इत्युपदेशः'।

M. M., 193.

2. 'पूजा नाम न पुष्पाद्यैर्या मतिः क्रियते दृढा।
निर्विकल्पे महाव्योम्नि सा पूजा ह्यादराल्लयः'॥

M. M., 112.

3. 'स्वात्मैव देवता प्रोक्ता ललिता विश्वविग्रहा'।
इति एतच्चास्मत्परमगुरुकर्तृके श्रीमदृजुविमर्शिन्यादौ विमर्शनीयम्।

M. M., 123.

4. यदुक्तमस्मत्परमगुरुभिः श्रीमदृजुविमर्शिन्याम्—
'मातृकां परवागात्मनानाहतभट्टारकपरमशिवस्वरूपां षट्त्रिंशत्तत्त्वप्रसरणहेतुभूतां संविदमित्यर्थः' इति।

M. M., 129.

Page 488.

1. यदधिकारेण श्रीगोविन्दराजादीनामुपदेशः प्रवृत्तो योऽस्मत्पर्यन्तमपि प्राप्तः।

T. A., III, 198.

2. स्वयूथ्यानद्वयवादिनः प्रतीदानीमारम्भः ।

S. Dr., 94.

3. यतस्तैरेव ततः परावस्थातोऽनन्तरं शक्तिदशा किञ्चिदुच्छूनतेत्यादिनोक्ता ततो यैः शक्तः परत्वं गीयते तैस्तया धर्मभूतया धर्मी स्वाश्रयः स्वतन्त्रो वास्तवाभेदयुक्त्या देवः शिवः प्रकाशितः ।

S. Dr. 95.

4. तदुक्तं श्रीसोमानन्दपादैः—
'पञ्चविधकृत्यतत्परभगवद्भैरवभट्टारकस्य प्रथमशाक्तस्पन्दसमनन्तरम्'।
इत्यादि निजविवृतौ ।

P. T. V., 16,

Page 489.

1. वाहाः परमेश्वरस्य स्फुरणधाराः । ताश्च पञ्च ।

M. M., 89.

Page 490.

1. शक्तिरिति पराधीनत्वादस्याः स्त्रीलिङ्गस्य पुल्लिङ्गविशेषरूपत्वाच्च सिद्ध एव तस्यास्तदधीनत्वे यत्परत्वाभिधानं सा केवलं तत्तत्त्वोत्कर्षप्रख्यापिका भक्तिरेव ।

Ś. Dr., (F. N.) 94.

Page 491.

1. यच्च सप्तोचितां संख्यां कुर्वाणा करकुड्मले ।
... ...

तत् त्वयात्र विधातव्या स्फीतसारस्वतश्रिया ।
सूत्राणां सप्ततिस्तन्त्रे महार्थे मन्त्रगर्भिणी ॥

M. M., 198.

2. तादृशीमेनां श्रीकालसङ्कर्षणीरूपां योगिनीं बन्द इत्यक्षरार्थः ।

M, M., 192.

3. रहस्याम्नायन्यायादन्यशास्त्रविगर्हितानि मदिरामद्यमांसादीन्येव द्रव्याण्यस्मदुपास्यानां देवतानां सपर्यासु परिबर्हतयाभ्यर्हितानीति ।

M. M., 182.

Page 492.

1. सौत्रामण्यां सुरा होतुः शुद्धान्यस्य विपर्ययः ।

T. A., III, 272.

2. एवं यथा—'ब्राह्मणो न हन्तव्यः।' इति सामान्येन ब्रह्महत्यानिषेधो विहितः।
'ब्राह्मणो ब्राह्मणमालभेत।' इति विशेषश्रुत्या बाधितः।

T. A., III, 274.

3. 'ऋषिभिर्भक्षितं पूर्वं गोमांसं च नरोद्भवम्।'

T. A., III, 268.

4. एवं येनैव प्रमात्रा यच्छुद्धतया गृहीतं तस्यैव तच्छुद्धं नापरस्य।

T. A., III, 272.

Page 493.

1. अत एव च यत्किञ्चित् संविदैक्यमापन्नं तत् सर्वं शुद्धमिति; तेन संविदैकात्म्यानैकात्म्याभ्यां सर्वत्र शुद्ध्यशुद्धिविभागः।

T. A., (Comm.) III, 266.

2. अत एव तत्र चित्तप्रत्यवेक्षामात्रमेव प्रयोजनं—किं संविदेकाग्रीभूतं चित्तं न वा।

T. A., III, 269.

3. Refer to F. N. 1. Page 492.
4. Refer to F. N. 2. Page 492.
5. लोकसंरक्षणार्थं तु तत्तत्त्वं तैः प्रगोपितम्।
एवमुपदिष्टे हि अलब्धसंविदैकात्म्योऽपि लोको लोभलौल्याभ्यां यत्तत् कुर्वाणो लोकयात्रामुच्छिन्द्यात्—इति, तत् तत्त्वं संविदद्वैतात्म पारमार्थिकं रूपं तैः प्रकर्षेण तत्तद्द्रव्यदूषणादिद्वारेण गोपितं न प्रकाशितमित्यर्थः।

T. A., III, 269–70.

Page 494.

1. Refer to F. N. 2. Page 486.
2. Refer to F. N. 2. Page 468.
3. नवात्मकत्वेऽप्यस्य प्रमातृप्रमाणोपगृहीतव्योमादिपञ्चकस्वभावत्वात् पञ्चवाहचक्रतादात्म्यं न किञ्चिदप्यतिक्रम्यते।

M. M., 88,

Page 495.

1. तत्र दक्षिणं नेत्रं प्रकाशचक्रम्। प्रकाश्यतेऽनेन प्रमेयजातमिति व्युत्पत्त्या प्रकाशः प्रमाणमित्यर्थो भवति। तत्र च शक्तयो द्वादश··············· ताश्च तत्त्वदृष्ट्या यथाक्रमं बुद्धिप्रधानानि—वाक्पाणिपादपायूपस्थरूपाणि कर्मेन्द्रियाणि, मनःश्रेष्ठानि श्रोत्रत्वक्चक्षूरसनाघ्राणात्मकानि

ज्ञानेन्द्रियाणि च भवन्ति। अहङ्कारस्य सर्वत्रानुस्यूतत्वान्न पृथग् गणनम्।

M. M., 91–2.

Page 496.

1. संवित्क्रमे स्वात्मस्फुरत्तासारा वामेश्वरीखेचर्याद्याः।
... ...

तासां ह्यहन्तेदन्ताद्वितयावगाहनसामर्थ्यादात्मस्वरूपोन्मीलनवत् तदाच्छादनेऽप्यौचित्यमस्ति।

M. M., 25.

2. एता एव चिदानन्देच्छाज्ञानक्रियाख्याः शक्तयः परा सूक्ष्मा पश्यन्ती मध्यमा वैखरीति वाग्रूपाश्चानुभूयन्ते। यतश्चिच्छक्तिस्तावत्परमेश्वरस्य चैतन्यलक्षणा सर्वनिर्वाहकत्वपर्यायपरमस्वातन्त्र्यमयी—व्योमवामेश्वरी। आनन्दश्चा(न ?)वच्छिन्नप्रमातृस्वात्मविश्रान्तिस्वभावत्वात् खेचरी। इच्छा चाभ्युपगमरूपत्वादन्तःकरणप्रसाध्येति दिक्चरी। ज्ञानं च बहिर्मुखं चक्षुरादिभिर्बाह्यन्द्रियैरुद्दीप्यत इति गोचरी। क्रियापि पारमेश्वरीषु शक्तिष्वत्यन्तस्थौल्याद् वहिर्वेद्यवर्गवैचित्र्य एवोपलभ्यत इति भूचरी।

M. M., 89–90.

Page 497.

1. शब्दतत्त्वमघोषा वाग्ब्रह्म कुण्डलिनी ध्रुवम्।
विद्याशक्तिः परा नादो महामायेति देशिकैः॥
विन्दुरेवं समाख्यातो व्योमानाहतमित्यपि।
चतस्रो वृत्तयस्तस्य याभिर्व्याप्तास्त्रिधाणवः॥
वैखरी मध्यमाभिख्या पश्यन्ती सूक्ष्मसंज्ञिता।

R. Tr., 30.

Page 498.

1. तत्र सा वैखरी श्रोत्रग्राह्या याऽर्थस्य वाचिका।
स्थानेषु विधृते वायौ कृतवर्णपरिग्रहा॥
प्रयोक्तॄणामियं प्रायः प्राणवृत्तिनिबन्धना।
केवलं बुद्ध्युपादाना क्रमाद्वर्गानुपातिनी॥
अन्तःसंजल्परूपा तु न श्रोत्रमुपसर्पति।
प्राणवृत्तिमतिक्रम्य वर्तते मध्यमाह्वया॥

अविभागेन वर्णानां सर्वतः संहतिक्रमात् ।
स्वयंप्रकाशा पश्यन्ती मायूराण्डरसोपमा ॥
स्वरूपज्योतिरेवान्तः सूक्ष्मा वागनपायिनी ।
यस्यां दृष्टस्वरूपायामधिकारो निवर्तते ॥

R. Tr., 30–32.

Page 505.

1. क्षेपो ज्ञानं च संख्यानं गतिर्नाद इति क्रमात् ।
स्वात्मनो भेदनं क्षेपो भेदितस्याविकल्पनम् ॥
ज्ञानं विकल्पः संख्यानमन्यतो व्यतिभेदनात् ।
गतिः स्वरूपारोहित्वं प्रतिबिम्बवदेव यत् ॥
नादः स्वात्मपरामर्शशेषता तद्विलोपनात् ।
इति पञ्चविधामेनां कलनां कुर्वती परा ॥
देवी काली तथा कालकर्षिणी चेति कथ्यते ।
... ...

'कल किल विल क्षेपे' 'कल गतौ' 'कल संख्याने' 'कल शब्दे' इति धातुचतुष्टयस्य पञ्चधायमर्थो—यद्गतिर्ज्ञाने प्राप्तौ च वर्तते इति ।

T. A., III, 204–5.

Page 506.

1. द्वादशदेवीपर्यन्तं यथायथमुद्रेकमासादयन्त्यां संवित्तौ, सकलादिषु प्रमातृषु प्रमितिक्रियाकर्तृत्वलक्षणं प्रमातृत्वं स्फुटीभवेत्—स्वतन्त्रस्वप्रकाशपरसंविदेकरूपता स्यात्

T. A., III, 206.

2. तत्र व्योम्नामोमात्मकप्रणवरूपताविमर्शवैशिष्ट्यानुप्राणनानां वक्ष्यमाणसर्वपञ्चकात्मनां वामं वमनं प्रतीश्वरी सामर्थ्यशालिनीति व्योमवामेश्वरी ।

M. M., 89.,

3. यतश्चिच्छक्तिस्तावत् परमेश्वरस्य चैतन्यलक्षणा सर्वनिर्वाहकत्वपर्यायपरमस्वातन्त्र्यमयी व्योमवामेश्वरी ।

M. M., 90.

4. सर्वोर्ध्ववर्तिनीं सर्वाविभागस्वभावत्वात् सर्वसाधारण्येन स्फुरन्तीं व्योमवामेश्वरीम् ।

M. M. 91.

5. एषा तु कौलिकी विद्या सर्वसिद्धिप्रदायिका ।
सकाशाद्देवदेवस्य निर्याता शक्तिवर्त्मनि ॥
वामेश्वर्यवतारं तु प्रकाशत्वमुपागता ।

T. A., III, 207.

6. एवं ज्ञानशक्तिताभिप्रायेणापि पश्यन्त्या (भत्रलक्षणां प्रक्रियां प्रति) ? सूक्ष्मतरान्यापि पररूपा स्थितिरस्ति ।

S. Dr., 92.

Page 507.

1. चितिः प्रत्यवमर्शात्मा परावाक्स्वरसोदिता ।
स्वातन्त्र्यमेतन्मुख्यं तदैश्वर्यं परमात्मनः ॥

Bh., Vol. I. 250.

2. अकुलस्यास्य देवस्य कुलप्रथनशालिनी ।
कौलिकी सा परा शक्तिरवियुक्तो यया प्रभुः ॥

T. A., II, 74–5.

3. इयतीं रूपवैचित्रीमाश्रयन्त्याः स्वसंविदः ।
स्वाच्छन्द्यमनपेक्षं यत्सा परा परमेश्वरी ॥
... ...

'महाभैरवचण्डोग्रघोरकाली' या अस्मद्दर्शने पूर्णतया परा इति ।

T. A., III, 186–7.

4. ताश्च वाग्भूमौ परापश्यन्त्यादिमय्यो वाचि ब्राह्मीमाहेश्वर्यादयः । संवित्क्रमे स्वात्मस्फुरत्तासारा वामेश्वरीखेचर्याद्याः ।

M. M., 25

5. व्योमवामेश्वरी । सा च परमेश्वरस्याविकल्पभूम्यनुप्रविष्टा चिच्छक्तिः ।

M. M., 89

Page 508.

1. अन्यच्च सृष्टिस्थितिप्रभृतिपञ्चकीभूतमखिलमत्रैवान्तर्भवति ।

M. M., 89–90

2. एतानि च मूर्तिप्रकाशानन्दचक्राणि वामेश्वर्यादिशक्तिपञ्चकात्मकान्येव । तत्र प्रमातृवह्निरूपमूर्तिचक्रं सर्वोर्ध्ववर्तिनीं सर्वाविभागस्वभावत्वात् सर्वसाधारण्येन स्फुरन्तीं व्योमवामेश्वरीं प्राधान्यतो निमित्तीकृत्य खेचरीशक्त्या प्रवर्तते । खेचरी च प्रमातृस्फुरणतन्मयीति प्रागप्युक्तम् । प्रमाणार्करूपं तु प्रकाशचक्रं दिक्चरीगोचर्युभयमेलनारब्धं, तयोर्द्वयोरप्यन्तर्बहिरिन्द्रियोल्लासरूपत्वात् । प्रमेयसोममयमानन्दचक्रं तु भूचर्यनुप्राणनमिति विवेकः ।

M. M., 91–2.

3. Refer to F. N. 2. Page 506.
4. Refer to F. N. 3. Page 506.
5. Refer to F. N. 4. Page 506.

Page 509.

1. पातक्रमेण व्योमेश्वर्यादिपञ्चकस्वीकारस्यापरिहार्यत्वम् । तद्वत् सर्वानुस्यूतिसाम्राज्यशालिन्याः श्रीरुद्ररौद्रेश्वर्याः सर्वथावश्यम्भावः ।

M. M., 194.

2. भासा च नाम प्रतिभा महती सर्वगर्भिणी ।
स्वस्वभावशिवैकात्मदेशिकात्मकचिन्मयी ॥
यस्यां हि भित्तिभूतायां मातृमेयात्मकं जगत् ।
प्रतिविम्बतया भाति नगरादीव दर्पणे ॥
स्वातन्त्र्यरूपा सा काचिच्चिच्छक्तिः परमेष्ठिनः ।
तन्मयो भगवान् देवो गुरुर्गुरुमयी च सा ॥

M. M., 105.

Page 510.

1. भासायां न विकल्पः स्फुरति स्फुरदेकनिष्कलश्रियाम् ।
यदि प्रतिविम्बगत्या स्फुरति परं षोडशाधिका देवी ॥
... ...

षोडशाधिकेति, सप्तदशी कला ।

M. M., 105-6.

Page 511.

1. षोडशाधिकाविलासलक्षणमकालकलितं, श्रीकालसङ्कर्षणीभावमनुभवन् ।

M. M., 184-5.

2. Refer to F. N. 1. Page 509.
3. एतच्चक्रानुप्रविष्टा चेयं षोडशाधिका, षोडशविकारप्रतिबिम्बतत्समष्टिरूपत्वात् प्रथमं सप्तदशस्फुरणप्रकारा भवन्ती पश्चात् प्रकाशविमर्शद्वयभेदोपश्लेषवशाद् भैरव-भैरवीविभागयुक्त्या चतुस्त्रिंशदंशतयानुभूयते ।

M. M., 106.

4. सैव काली महादेवी गीयते लोकवेदयोः ।
इतिहासेषु तन्त्रेषु सिद्धान्तेषु कुलेषु च ॥

M. M., 107.

Page 512.

1. एतत् त्रितयं यया (या ?) आत्मनि क्रोडीकारेण अनुसन्धानात्मना ग्रसते सापि परैव कालकर्षिणी शब्दान्तरनिर्दिष्टा इति ।

P. T. V., (F. N.) 24.

2. न व्याख्यातं तु निर्भज्य यतोऽतिसरहस्यकम् ।

T. A., III, 155.

3. किं तु आगमे संवित्क्रमगोपनार्थम् आलूनविशीर्णतयैवमभिधानम् ।

T. A., III, 161.

Page 514.

1. 'मानं हि नाम मेयोपरञ्जितमेव भवेत्' इत्यविवादः, मानात्मना च बहिर्मुखेन रूपेण मातैव स्फुरेदिति, तस्यापि तद्द्वारेणैव मेयोपरञ्जनं, न पुनः—साक्षादिति भावः ।

T. A., III, 160.

2. सैव परा संविद्देवी, तां—प्रमाणरूपां रक्त्यपरपर्यायां स्थितिम्, अन्तः प्रमात्रेकात्मतायामौन्मुख्ये 'ज्ञातो मयार्थ' इति स्वात्मविश्रान्तिचमत्कारात्मनो रसात्, संहर्तुमिच्छुः—आत्मसाच्चिकीर्षुः, अत एव 'स्थितेर्नाशं कलयन्ती निरुच्यते' श्रीक्रमभट्टारकादौ स्थितिनाशकालीशब्दव्यपदेश्येत्यर्थः ।

T. A., III, 162–3.

3. तथाहि संविदेवेयमन्तर्बाह्योभयात्मना ।
स्वातन्त्र्याद्वर्तमानैव परामर्शस्वरूपिणी ॥

T. A., III, 124.

Page 515.

1. इदानीं तु प्रमाणांशभक्षणप्रवणं संहारादिदेवीचतुष्कं निरूपयति ।

T. A., III, 165.

Page 516.

1. स्वयमेव हि नाम भावानां संविद्विलीनतोत्पादनात्मा संहारो—यद्बहीरूपताविलापनेन प्रमाणदशामधिशयानायां संवित्तावभेदेन परामर्शनं, यत एवेयं संवित् 'मयैतदर्थजातमात्मनि अभेदेनावभासितम्' इत्येवं स्फुरत्तारूपा भवेत् ।

T. A., III, 167.

2. एतस्याः—प्रमाणमय्या निखिलार्थसंहर्तृत्वात् मृत्युरूपायाः संविदः ।

T. A., III, 168.

3. प्रमेयमिव प्रमाणे(प्रमाणं ?)निरुपाधिनि—तत्तदर्थानारूषिते, अत एव संशुद्धे—प्रमात्रात्मनि, संविद्रूपे 'अस्तमीयते'—तत्रैव रक्तिरूपां विश्रान्तिं गच्छेत् येनास्याः संहर्तृत्वमेव व्यवतिष्ठते, इत्येवं मृत्युरूपाया अपि संविदः कलनात् 'मृत्युकालीति' सर्वत्रेयमुद्घोष्यते ।

T. A., III, 168–9.

Page 517.

1. यद्वशादेव विचित्राचारप्रदर्शकेष्वनन्तेषु शास्त्रेषु कार्याकार्यविभाग-निश्चयमलभमानस्य प्रमातुः 'अधर्मं धर्ममिति या बुध्यते तमसावृता ।' इत्यादिदृशा यदेव यथा हृदये प्ररोहति तदेव तस्य तथा फलेत् ।

T. A., III, 170.

2. कार्याकार्यलक्षणप्रतिनियतभावाहितः संस्कारः प्रबुद्धः सन् शुभाशुभ-रूपां फलसंपदं जनयिष्यते, येनायं लोकः स्वर्निरयादिपात्रतया सुख-दुःखादिभोक्तृतामियात् ॥

T. A., III, 171.

Page 519.

1. कर्ता च द्विविधः प्रोक्तः कल्पिताकल्पितात्मकः ।

T. A., III, 179.

Page 520.

1. तच्च स्वच्छस्वतन्त्रात्मरत्ननिर्भासिनि स्फुटम् ।
भावौघे भेदसंधातृ स्वात्मनो नैशमुच्यते ॥
तदेव तु समस्तार्थनिर्भरात्मैकगोचरम् ।
शुद्धविद्यात्मकं सर्वमेवेदमहमित्यलम् ॥

T. A., III, 115-6.

2. इदं विकल्पनं शुद्धविद्यारूपं स्फुटात्मकम् ।
प्रतिहन्तीह मायीयं विकल्पं भेदभावकम् ॥

T. A., III, 117.

3. ननु स्नानादेरपि भेदसन्धायकत्वान्मायीयामर्शरूपत्वमेव युक्तं, तत् कथमस्य शुद्धविद्यापरामर्शकत्वमुक्तम् ? इत्याशङ्क्याह—
उल्लासिबोधहुतभुग्दग्धविश्वेन्धनोदिते ।
सितभस्मनि देहस्य मज्जनं स्नानमुच्यते ॥

T. A., III, 119.

Page 521.

1. ननु क्रमदर्शने सर्वत्रैव श्रीसृष्ट्यादिदेवीनां मध्ये श्रीसुकाल्या भगवत्या अभिधानम् , येनानाख्यचक्रे त्रयोदशदेव्यः, अत एव श्रीमहाभैरवचण्डो-ग्रघोरकालीभट्टारिकायाश्च त्रयोदशत्वम् ।
....
तदत्र क्रमनयसमानकक्ष्यत्वविवक्षायामपि कथमेतद्विरुद्धमभिहितं 'द्वाद-शैव देव्यः' ।

T. A., III, 189-90.

Page 522.

1. इह तु पूजाक्रमगोपनाय स्वशय्ययैव स्थापनम्, यदधिकृत्य संवित्क्रमः परिनिष्ठितिमियात्।

T. A., (Comm.) III, 162.

2. इह खलु परैव संवित् स्वस्वातन्त्र्यात् यथोक्तयुक्त्या द्वादशधा प्रस्फुरिता इति तावदविवादः, तत्र यद्यसौ परैव संवित् तेभ्यो द्वादशभ्यो रूपेभ्यः पृथगवभासेत तदस्या भवेत्त्रयोदशत्वम्।

T. A., (Comm.) III, 129.

Page 525.

1. प्रक्रियान्तरेण अस्य द्वादशधोदय उक्तः, इति सर्वं निरवद्यम्।

T. A., (Comm.) III, 134.

2. विकासात्तृप्तितः पाशोत्कर्तनात्कृतिशक्तितः।
चक्रं कसेश्चकेः कृत्या(कृत्याः ?)करोतेश्च किलोदितम्॥
कसी विकासे, चक तृप्तौ, कृतीच्छेदने, डुकृञ् करणे–इति धातु चतुष्टयार्थान्वयादत्र चक्रशब्दः। तेन विकसति, चकति, कृन्तति, करोतीति चक्रम्।

T. A., Ah. XXIX, 76.

3. तेन स्थितेर्मूलकन्दः सृष्टिः सृष्टेः पल्लवः स्थितिरित्यादिक्रमोऽपि स्वयमूहनीयः।

M. M., 109.

Page 526.

1. पञ्चापि कृत्यानि प्रत्येकं पञ्चकात्मकतां नातिक्रामन्ति। तेषु च पूर्वपूर्वपञ्चकस्य पञ्चमीकलामवलम्ब्योत्तरोत्तरस्य पञ्चकस्य प्राथमिकी परिस्फुरति। एवमुत्तरोत्तरपञ्चकप्रथमस्फुरत्तानामधोधः पञ्चकपर्यन्तशक्तिषु विश्रान्त्यनुभवः।

M. M., 109,

2. सृष्ट्यादिषु चतुर्षु कृत्येषु सृष्टिसृष्टिः सृष्टिस्थितिरित्यादि क्रमेण प्रत्येकं चातुर्विध्यं, पर्यन्ततो भासापर्यवसायित्वं च।

M. M., 109.

3. मातृमण्डलसम्बोधात्संस्कारात्तपसः प्रिये॥
ध्यानाद्योगाज्जपाज्ज्ञानान्मन्त्राराधनतो व्रतात्।
संप्राप्यं कुलसामान्यं ज्ञानं कौलिकसिद्धिदम्॥
... ...

स्वात्ममात्ररूपतया प्रस्फुरत्परप्रमात्रात्मज्ञानमवश्यं प्राप्यते इत्यर्थः।

T. A., III, 64–5.

Page 527.

1. ततोऽपि संक्षेपे सर्वस्यापि प्रपञ्चस्य पञ्चवाहपारिशेष्यात् पञ्चपिण्डत्वेन ।
M. M., 106.

Page 529.

1. तासां ह्यहन्तेदन्ताद्वितयावगाहनसामर्थ्यादात्मस्वरूपोन्मीलनवत् तदाच्छादनेऽप्यौचित्यमस्ति ।
M.M., 25.

2. ततश्च ज्ञानसिद्धाः प्रमेयांशतया पर्यालोचनीयाः । मन्त्रसिद्धाः प्रमाणमयत्वेन मेलापसिद्धाः प्रमात्रात्मकतया । शाक्तसिद्धास्तदवच्छेदव्यपोहेन शुद्धप्रमातृतया । शाम्भवसिद्धाश्च पूर्णसंवित्स्वातन्त्र्यमयपरमशिवभट्टारकस्वरूपतयेति । अथ शाम्भव्यादीनां वामेश्यादितादात्म्यद्योतकः शाम्भवसिद्धासु वामेश्याः पात इत्यादि क्रमेण पञ्चवाहवृन्दचक्रयोरैकात्म्यानुसन्धानं पात इति पातप्रकारः ।
M. M., 97.

Page 530.

1. इत्येनां गुरुमुखसम्प्रदायलब्धां वाचालः शुक इव वृन्दचक्रचर्याम् ।
पञ्चार्थक्रमपदवीरहस्यसंवित्सर्वस्वव्यतिकरगर्भिणीमवोचम् ॥
M. M., 98.

2. तद्वत् सर्वानुस्यूतिसाम्राज्यशालिन्याः श्रीरुद्ररौद्रेश्वर्याः सर्वथावश्यम्भाव इति सप्ततिः सम्पद्यत इत्यत्र न विप्रतिपत्तिः
M. M., 194.

Page 532.

1. Refer to F. N. 2. Page 509.
2. परमेश्वरो ह्यलातचक्रच्छायया सृष्ट्यादीनि पञ्चकृत्यान्यविच्छिन्नमुद्भावयन् सृष्टृत्वस्थापयितृत्वाद्यशेषानुवृत्तमात्मनः कर्तृत्वोत्कर्षमनुभवन्नास्ते ।
M. M., 108.

Page 533.

1. ये चक्षुर्मण्डले श्वेते प्रत्यक्षे परमेश्वरि ।
षोडशारं द्वादशारं तन्त्रस्थं चक्रमुत्तमम् ॥
प्रतिवारणवद्रक्ते तद्बहिर्ये तदुच्यते ।
द्वितीयं मध्यगे ये ते कृष्णश्वेते च मण्डले ॥
तदन्तर्ये स्थिते शुद्धे भिन्नाञ्जनसमप्रभे ।
चतुर्दले तु ते ज्ञेये अग्नीषोमात्मके प्रिये ॥
मिथुनत्वे स्थिते ये च चक्रे द्वे परमेश्वरि ।

T. A., III, 136–7.

2. द्वितीयं—श्रीसृष्टिकाल्यादिरूपं द्वादशारं चक्रमुच्यते,—अनाख्यत्वेऽपि अत्र स्थित्यात्मनः प्रमाणस्य प्राधान्याद्रक्तत्वं, तद्धि प्रमेयोपरञ्जितमेव भवेत् अतश्च प्रमेयस्य तदभेदेनैवावस्थानात् तद्गतस्य रूपचतुष्कस्य पृथगभावात् द्वादशारत्वम् ।

T. A., (Comm.) III, 138.

3. एवं श्रोत्रेपि विज्ञेयं यावत्पादान्तगोचरम् ।

T. A., III, 153.

Page 534.

1. स्थानादिव्यपदेशाच्च ॥

... ...

'तेषु हि चक्षुरपि निर्दिष्टम्—यश्चक्षुषि तिष्ठन्' इति ।

B. Su., I, 2, 4, 14.

2. अनन्तराह्निकोक्तेऽस्मिन्स्वभावे पारमेश्वरे ।
प्रविविक्षुर्विकल्पस्य कुर्यात्संकारमञ्जसा ॥

T. A., III, 2.

3. विकल्पः संस्कृतः सूते विकल्पं स्वात्मसंस्कृतम् ।
स्वतुल्यं सोऽपि सोऽप्यन्यं सोऽप्यन्यं सदृशात्मकम् ॥

T. A., III, 3.

4. ततः स्फुटतमोदारताद्रूप्यपरिबृंहिता ।
संविदभ्येति विमलामविकल्पस्वरूपताम् ॥

T. A., III, 6,

Page 535.

1. दुर्भेदपादपस्यास्य मूलं कृन्तन्ति कोविदाः ।
धारारूढेन सत्तर्ककुठारेणेति निश्चयः ॥

T. A., III, 12.

2. यमनियमासनप्राणायामप्रत्याहारधारणाध्यानसमाधयोऽष्टावङ्गानि ॥

Y. S., Ch. II, 29.

3. प्राणायामस्तथा ध्यानं प्रत्याहारोऽथ धारणा ।
तर्कश्चैव समाधिश्च षडङ्गो योग उच्यते ॥

T. A., III, 15.

4. श्रीपूर्वशास्त्रे तत्प्रोक्तं तर्को योगाङ्गमुत्तमम् ।
हेयाद्यालोचनात्तस्मात्तत्र यत्नः प्रशस्यते ॥

T. A., III, 14.

5. सोऽपि सत्तर्कयोगेन नीयते सद्गुरुं प्रति ।
सत्तर्कः शुद्धविद्यैव सा चेच्छा परमेशितुः ॥

T. A., III, 39.

6. ....स यियासुः शिवेच्छया ।
भुक्तिमुक्तिप्रसिद्ध्यर्थं नीयते सद्गुरुं प्रति ॥

T. A., III, 39-40.

Page 536.

1. यस्तु तद्रूपभागात्मभावनातः परं विना ।
शास्त्रवित्स गुरुः शास्त्रे प्रोक्तोऽकल्पितकल्पकः ॥

T. A., III, 59.

2. अहिंसासत्यमस्तेयब्रह्मचर्यापरिग्रहाः ।
इति पञ्च यमाः साक्षात्संवित्तौ नोपयोगिनः ॥
तपःप्रभृतयो ये च नियमा यत्तथासनम् ।
प्राणायामाश्च ये सर्वमेतद्बाह्यविजृम्भितम् ॥

T. A., III, 94-5.

3. हेतुद्वयं तु चित्तस्य वासना च समीरणः ।
तयोर्विनष्ट एकस्मिंस्तौ द्वावपि विनश्यतः ॥
मनो यत्र विलीयेत पवनस्तत्र लीयते ।
पवनो लीयते यत्र मनस्तत्र विलीयते ॥

H. Y. P., 179-80.

4. चित्तस्य चेत्यग्रासीकरणक्रमेण चेतयितरि यः प्रलयो विश्रान्तिः, स एव अनन्यगमनात्मा बन्धः, तेन शशिसहिते भास्करे—प्राणापानप्रवाहे प्रलीने, मध्यधामलयादुच्छिन्नस्ववाहे, अत एव जीवः—उदान एव आदित्यः तत्तत्प्रमेयादिदाह्यवस्तूपादानात् अग्निः तस्मिन् मध्योर्ध्वदाह-क्रमेण द्वादशान्तं प्राप्ते सति—प्रमाणप्रमेयव्यवहारोच्छेदेन प्रमातर्येव परां काष्ठामधिरूढे, निःश्रेयसात्मपरश्रेयोरूपे स्वबोधके स्वप्रकाशे बोध-मात्रे अर्थादुदिते, यः कश्चिदनुभवविशेषः स एव मोक्षः कथितः ।

T. A., III, 96.

5. Refer. to F. N. 2, above.

Page 537.

1. स्वविषयासम्प्रयोगे चित्तस्य स्वरूपानुकार इवेन्द्रियाणां प्रत्याहारः ॥
Y. S., (Comm.), Ch, II, (Sū) 54.

2. नाभिचक्रे, हृदयपुण्डरीके, मूर्ध्नि, ज्योतिषि, नासिकाग्रे, जिह्वाऽग्र इत्येव-मादिषु देशेषु, बाह्ये वा विषये, चित्तस्य वृत्तिमात्रेण बन्ध इति धारणा ॥
तत्र प्रत्ययैकतानता ध्यानम् ॥

तस्मिन् देशे ध्येयालम्बनस्य प्रत्ययस्यैकतानता
सदृशः प्रवाहः प्रत्ययान्तरेणापरामृष्टो ध्यानम् ॥

Y. S., (Comm.) Ch. III, (Sū) 1–2.

3. तदेषा धारणा-ध्यानसमाधित्रितयी पराम् ।
संविदं प्रति नो कंचिदुपयोगं समश्नुते ॥

T. A., III, 101.

Page 538.

1. योगाङ्गता यमादेस्तु समाध्यन्तस्य वर्ण्यते ।
स्वपूर्वपूर्वोपायत्वादन्त्यतर्कोपयोगतः ॥

T. A., III, 102.

2. एवमाद्यैरनेकैश्च प्रकारैः परमेश्वरः ।
संसारिणोऽनुगृह्णाति विश्वस्य जगतः पतिः ॥

T. A., III, 62.

Page 539.

1. प्रमातापि प्रमेयौन्मुख्येन 'ज्ञातोऽयं मयार्थ' इति सन्तोषोत्पादान्निराकाङ्क्षः सन् स्वात्मनि विश्रान्तिमासादयेत्—इति प्रमातृप्रमेयसंघट्टादपि पूर्णायाः परस्याः संविदः समुल्लासः स्यात् ॥

T. A., III, 140.

2. तच्चक्रपीडनाद्रात्रौ ज्योतिर्भात्यर्कसोमगम् ।
तां दृष्ट्वा परमां ज्योत्स्नां कालज्ञानं प्रवर्तते ॥

T. A., III, 142.

Page 540.

1. Refer to F. N. 3. Page 520.
निजबलनिभालनमेव वरिवस्या सा च दुर्लभा लोके ।
सुलभानि विश्वपतेरासवताम्बूलगन्धपुष्पाणि ॥

M. M., 110 ff.

Page 541.

1. एतद्रूपपरामर्शमकृत्रिममनाविलम् ।
अहमित्याहुरेषैव प्रकाशस्य प्रकाशता ॥
एतद्वीर्यं हि सर्वेषां मन्त्राणां हृदयात्मकम् ॥
विनानेन जडास्ते स्युर्जीवा इव विना हृदा ॥

T. A., III, 224.

2. तदस्याः संविदो देव्या यत्र क्वापि प्रवर्तनम् ।
तत्र तादात्म्ययोगेन पूजा पूर्णैव वर्तते ॥

T. A., III, 210.

Page 542.

1. यत्रोदितमिदं चित्रं विश्वं यत्रास्तमेति च ।
तत्कुलं विद्धि सर्वज्ञ शिवशक्तिविवर्जितम् ॥

T. A. (Comm.) II, 75.

2. इह खलु पूर्णः शिवशक्त्यादिप्रतिनियतव्यपदेशासहिष्णुः अनाख्यः परपरामर्शात्मा अनुत्तरः प्रकाश एव परं तत्त्वम्, स एव च स्वातन्त्र्याद्विश्वमवबिभासयिषुः प्रथमं शिवशक्तिरूपतां स्वात्मन्यवभासयति ।

T, A. (Comm.) II, 75.

3. वेदादिभ्यः परं शैवं शैवाद्वामं च दक्षिणम् ।
दक्षिणाच्च परं कौलं कौलात्परतरं नहि ॥

T. A., (Comm.) I, 48.

Page 543.

1. वेदाच्छैवं ततो वामं ततो दक्षं ततः कुलम् ।
ततो मतं ततश्चापि त्रिकं सर्वोत्तमं परम् ॥

T. A., (Comm.) I, 49.

2. इदानीमनुपायानन्तर्येण क्रमप्राप्तं शाम्भवोपायं द्वितीयार्धेन प्रणिगदितुं प्रतिजानीते ।

T. A. II, (Comm.) 1,

Page 544.

1. Refer to F. N. 2. Page 468.

Page 545.

1. षण्णां वै राजपुत्राणां घरपल्लिक्रमं शृणु ।
अमरस्य तु पट्टिल्लः दक्षिणावर्तपल्लिका ॥
वरदेवे करविल्लं पल्ली कुम्भारिका भवेत् ।
अम्बिल्लं चैव चित्रस्य विल्लं पल्ली सुमध्यमे ॥
अलिनाथे पुलिन्देति अडवी पल्लिरुच्यते ।
शरविल्लं विन्ध्यनाथे पल्ली चाक्षरसंज्ञिता ॥
गुडिकानाथपादानामडविल्लं घरं प्रिये ।
डोम्बी पल्ली च निर्दिष्टा''''''॥

T. A., Ah. XXIX, 29.

Page 546.

1. भट्टेन्द्रवल्कलाहीन्द्रगजेन्द्राः समहीधराः ।
ऊर्ध्वरेतस एते षडधिकारपदोज्झिताः ॥

T. A., Ah. XXIX, 30.

2. अन्याश्च गुरुतल्पत्न्यः श्रीमत्कालीकुलोदिताः ।
अनात्तदेहाः क्रीडन्ति तैस्तैर्देहैरशङ्किताः ॥
T. A., Ah. XXIX, 31.

page 547.

1. देव्या यामल उक्तं तद्द्वापञ्चाशाह्न आह्निके ।
तदेव अर्थद्वारेण आह–
देव एव गुरुत्वेन तिष्ठासुर्दशधा भवेत् ॥
दशधात्वमेव दर्शयति–
उच्छुष्मशवरचण्डगुमतङ्गघोरान्तकोग्रहलहलकाः ।
क्रोधी हुलहुलुरेते दश गुरवः शिवमयाः पूर्वे ॥
... ...
T. A., XXVIII, 166–7.

2. इत्याद्युक्त्या अन्येऽपि सपत्नीका गुरव उक्तास्तद्वदिहापि कथं नोच्यन्त इत्याशङ्क्य आह ।
T. A., Ah. XXIX, 31.

Page 550.

1. विद्यापीठप्रधानं च सिद्धयोगीश्वरीमतम् ।
T. A., Ah. XXXVII, 400.

2. तत्रैषां दर्श्यते दृष्टः सिद्धयोगीश्वरीमते ।
कार्यकारणभावो यः शिवेच्छापरिकल्पितः ॥
सिद्धयोगीश्वरीतन्त्रं शतकोटिप्रविस्तरम् ।
T. A., Ah. IX, 7.

Page 551.

1. प्रत्यक्षमपि नेत्रात्मदीपार्थादिविशेषजम् ।
अपेक्षते तत्र मूले प्रसिद्धिं तां तथात्मिकाम् ॥
T. A., Ah. XXXV, 355–7.

2. पुष्पे गन्धस्तिले तैलं देहे जीवो जलेऽमृतम् ।
यथा तथैव शास्त्राणां कुलमन्तः प्रतिष्ठितम् ॥
T. A., Ah. XXXV, 373–4.

Paga 552.

1. विद्यापीठप्रधानं च सिद्धयोगीश्वरीमतम् ।
तस्यापि परमं सारं मालिनीविजयोत्तरम् ॥
T. A., Ah. XXXVII, 400.

Page 553.

1. करशुद्ध्यादि विधानामेकैकं परमेश्वरि ।
रुद्रयामलतन्त्रे तु कर्म प्रोक्तं मया पुरा ॥

V. T., 121.

2. वेदशास्त्रपुराणेषु यामलेष्वपि सुव्रते ।
गुप्ता श्रीषोडशार्णेयं निधानमिव संस्मरेत् ॥

J.A.,119.

3. श्रीचक्रस्वरूपमवान्तरनवचक्रात्मकमुक्तं यामले ।

N. S. A., 27.

4. प्रत्युत तन्त्रराजस्याप्येतत्सापेक्षतैव दृश्यते ।
यदुक्तं तत्रैव—नित्याहृदयसंप्रोक्तस्फुटोपायेन भावयेत् ।

N. S. A., 6.

5. श्रीब्रह्मयामलेऽप्युक्तं सुरा शिवरसो बहिः ।

T. A., Ah. XXIX, 8.

Page 554.

1. श्रीयामलं महातन्त्रं स्वतन्त्रं विष्णुयामलम् ॥
शक्तियामलमाख्यातं ब्रह्मणः स्तुतिहेतुना ।
ब्रह्मयामलवेदाङ्गं सर्वज्ञ कथितं प्रिये ! ॥
इदानीमुत्तराकाण्डं वद श्रीरुद्रयामलम् ।

R. Y., 1.

Page 555.

1. प्रथमं दिव्यभावन्तु कौलिके शृणु यत्नतः ।

R. Y., 71.

2. पञ्चतत्त्वं कुलद्रव्यं निजकल्याणवर्द्धनम् ॥

R. Y., 80.

3. स भवेद्धि कथं योगी कौलमार्गपरायणः ॥

R. Y., 133.

4. तथा योगं विना नाथ ! अष्टाङ्गाभ्यसनं विना ॥
कुलमार्गो महातत्त्वो न सिध्यति कदाचन ।
कुलमार्गं विना मोक्षं कः प्राप्नोति महीतले ? ॥

R. Y., 141.

5. वशिष्ठ ! शृणु वक्ष्यामि कुलमार्गमनुत्तमम् ।
येन विज्ञान (विज्ञात ?)मात्रेण रुद्ररूपी भवेत् क्षणात् ॥

R. Y., 153.

6. ततो मुनिवरः श्रुत्वा महाविद्यासरस्वतीम् ।
जगाम चीनभूमौ च यत्र बुद्धः प्रतिष्ठति ॥

R. Y., 152.

7. मदिरासाधनं कर्तुं जगाम कुलमण्डले ।
मद्यं मांसं तथा मत्स्यं मुद्रा मैथुनमेव च ॥
पुनः पुनः साधयित्वा पूर्णयोगी बभूव सः ।

R. Y., 155.

Page 556.

1. चतुःषष्ट्यासनानीह वदामि वायुसाधनात् ।

R. Y., 192.

2. कृष्णभक्तो सदा कृष्णं ध्यात्वा ध्यात्वा यतिर्भवेत् ।
श्रीकृष्णचरणाम्भोजे तस्य भक्तिर्न संशयः ॥

R. Y., 303.

3. श्रीकृष्णस्तोत्रम्— ॥

R. Y., 309–15.

4. मत्कुलागमयोगेन कुर्य्याद्वायुनिषेवणम् ॥

R. Y., 192.

5. सर्वाणि तन्त्राणि कृतानि नाथ ! सूक्ष्माणि नालं वशहेतुना मया ॥

R. Y., 212.

6. वेदनिन्दापराः सर्वे बौद्धाः शून्याभिवादिनः ।
मम ज्ञानाश्रिताः कान्ताश्चीनभूमिनिवासिनः ॥

R. Y., 239.

7. सूक्ष्मतन्त्रानुसारेण कथितं पूर्वसूचितम् ॥

R. Y., 246.

8. चतुःषष्टितन्त्रार्णवाह्लादकत्वात् ।

R. Y., 359,

9. नकुलीशः शिवेशश्च सम्वर्त्तकेश एव च ॥

R. Y. 369.

Page 557.

1. मथित्वा ज्ञानमन्थेन वेदागममहार्णवम् ।
सर्वज्ञेन मया देवि ! कुलधर्मः समुद्धृतः ॥

K. Ar., Ch. II, 10.

2. सर्वेभ्यश्चोत्तमा वेदा वेदेभ्यो वैष्णवं परम् ।
वैष्णवादुत्तमं शैवं शैवाद्दक्षिणमुत्तमम् ॥
दक्षिणादुत्तमं वामं वामात् सिद्धान्तमुत्तमम् ।
सिद्धान्तादुत्तमं कौलं कौलात् परतरं न हि ॥

K. Ar,, Ch. II, 7–8.

3. ऊर्द्ध्वत्वात् सर्वधर्माणामूर्द्ध्वाम्नायः प्रशस्यते ।
ऊर्द्ध्वं नयत्यधःस्थञ्चेदूर्द्ध्वा(त्यधःस्थं य ऊर्ध्वा MS.)म्नाय इति स्मृतः ॥
K. Ar., Ch. III, 18.

Page 558.

1. गृहारण्यसमा लोके गतव्रीडा दिगम्बराः ।
चरन्ति गर्दभाद्याश्च विरक्तास्ते भवन्ति किम् ॥
आजन्ममरणान्तञ्च गङ्गादितटिनीस्थिताः ।
मातङ्ग(मण्डूक MS.)मत्स्यप्रमुखा व्रतिनस्ते भवन्ति किम् ॥
वदन्ति हृदयानन्दं पठन्ति शुकसारिकाः ।
तत्रैव (जनानां MS.) पुरतो देवि ! विबुधाः किं भवन्ति हि ॥
तृणपर्णोदकाहाराः सततं वनवासिनः ।
हरिणादिमृगा देवि ! तापसास्ते भवन्ति किम् ॥
पारावताः शिलाहाराः परमेश्वरि ! चातकाः ।
न पिबन्ति महीतोयं योगिनस्ते भवन्ति किम् ॥
शीतवातातपसहा जम्बालाश्मशयाः (भक्ष्याभक्ष्यसमाः MS.) प्रिये ।
तिष्ठन्ति शूकराद्याश्च योगिनस्ते भवन्ति किम् ॥
तस्मादित्यादिकं कर्म लोकरञ्जनकारणम् (कारकम् MS.) ।
मोक्षस्य कारणं साक्षात्तत्त्वज्ञानं कुलेश्वरि ! ॥
K. Ar., Ch. I, 82-8.

2. संसारमात्रनाशाय शाब्दबोधो नहि क्षमः ।
न निवर्तेत तिमिरं कदाचिद्दीपशिखया (वार्तया MS.) ॥
K. Ar., Ch. I, 99.

3. यावन्न मनसः स्थैर्यं तावत्तत्त्वकथा कुतः ।
यावद्देहाभिमानश्च ममता यावदस्ति हि ॥
यावन्न गुरुकारुण्यं तावत्तत्त्वकथा कुतः ।
K. Ar., Ch. II, 17-8.

4. आराध्य समयाचारं कुलज्ञानं वदेद् यदि ।
स गुरुश्चापि शिष्यश्च योगिनीनां भवेत् प्रभुः ॥
K. Ar., Ch. II. 38.

Page 559.

1. सर्वधर्मविहीनोऽपि वर्णाश्रमविवर्जितः ।
कुलनिष्ठः कुलेशानि ! भुक्तिमुक्त्योः स भाजनम् ॥
K. Ar., Ch. II, 50.

2. बहवः कौलिकं धर्मं मिथ्याज्ञानविडम्बकाः ।
स्वबुद्ध्या कल्पयन्तीत्थं पारम्पर्य्यविमोहिताः ॥
मद्यपानेन मनुजो यदि सिद्धिं लभेत वै ।
मद्यपानरताः सर्वे सिद्धिं गच्छन्तु पामराः ॥
मांसभक्षणमात्रेण यदि पुण्या गतिर्भवेत् ।
लोके मांसाशिनः सर्वे पुण्यभाजो भवन्ति हि(पुण्यवन्तो भवन्ति किम् MS.)॥
स्त्रीसम्भोगेन देवेशि ! यदि मोक्षो भवेत वै (मोक्षं व्रजन्ति चेत् MS.) ।
सर्वेऽपि जन्तवो लोके मुक्ताः स्युः स्त्रीनिषेवणात् ॥
कुलमार्गो महादेवि ! न मया निन्दितः क्वचित् ।
आचाररहिता येऽत्र निन्दितास्ते न चेतरे ॥
K. Ar., Ch. II, 117-21.

3. कृपाणधारागमनाद्व्याघ्रकर्णावलम्बनात् ।
भुजङ्गधारणान्नूनमशक्यं कुलसेवनम् ॥
K. Ar., Ch. II, 123.

Page 560.

1. सुरादर्शनमात्रेण कुर्य्यात् सूर्य्यावलोकनम् ।
तत्समाघ्राणमात्रेण प्राणायामत्रयं चरेत् ॥
K. Ar., Ch. II, 128.

2. अनुमन्ता विशसिता निहन्ता क्रयविक्रयी ।
संस्कर्ता चोपहर्ता च खादिताष्टौ च घातकाः ॥
K. Ar., Ch. II, 133.

Page 561.

1. यथा क्रतुषु विप्राणां सोमपानं विधीयते (न दूषितम् M S.) ।
मद्यपानं तथा कार्य्यं समग्रभोगमोक्षदम् ॥
(अलिपानं तथा कार्यं समये भोगमोक्षदम् MS.)
K. Ar., Ch. V, 89.

2. पितृदैवतयज्ञेषु देवि ! (वेदे MS.) हिंसा विभाविता (विधीयते MS.) ।
आत्मार्थं प्राणिनां हिंसा कदाचिन्नोदिता प्रिये ॥
K. Ar., Ch. V, 40.

3. सेवते मधुमांसानि तृष्णया चेत् स पातकी ।
मन्त्रार्थस्मरणञ्चैव मनसः स्थिरहेतवे ॥
(मन्त्रार्थस्फुरणार्थंच मनःस्थैर्याय हेतवे । MS.)
भवपाशनिवृत्त्यर्थं मद्य (ज्ञान ?) पानं समाचरेत् ॥
K. Ar., Ch. V, 82-3.

Page 562.

1. आनन्दं ब्रह्मणो रूपं तच्च देहे व्यवस्थितम् ।
तस्याभिव्यञ्जकं मद्यं योगिभिस्तेन पीयते ॥
K. Ar., Ch. V, 76.

2. तन्मैरेयं शिवं पीत्वा यो वा विकुरुते (न विक्रियते M.S.) नरः।
मद्ध्यानैकपरो भूत्वा स मुक्तः स च कौलिकः ॥

K. Ar., Ch. V. 74.

3. सेविते च कुलद्रव्ये कुलतत्त्वार्थदर्शिनः (वेदिनः MS.)।
जायते भैरवावेशः सर्वत्र समदर्शनः ॥

K. Ar., Ch. V. 70.

Page 563.

1. दिव्यं देव्यग्रतः पानं वीरं मुद्रासने हृतम् (कृतम् MS.)।
स्वेच्छया पशुवत्पानं पशुपानमितीरितम् ॥

K. Ar., Ch. VII, 103-4.

2. यावन्नेन्द्रियवैकल्यं यावन्नो मुखविक्रिया।
तावत् यो पिबते मद्यं स मुक्तो नात्र संशयः ॥

K. Ar., Ch. VII, 106.

3. पीत्वा पीत्वा पुनः पीत्वा यावत्पतति भूतले।
उत्थाय च पुनः पीत्वा पुनर्जन्म न विद्यते ॥
आनन्दात्तृप्यते देवी मूर्च्छनाद्भैरवः स्वयम्।
वमनात् सर्वदेवाश्च तस्मात् त्रिविधमाचरेत् ॥

K. Ar., Ch. VII. 109-10.

Page 564.

1. निष्पन्दकरणग्रामः स्वात्मनात्मा च निश्चलः (स्वात्मलीनमनोनिलः MS.)।
य आस्ते मृतवत् साक्षाज्जीवन्मुक्तः स उच्यते ॥
न शृणोति न वा पश्येन्न (चाघ्राति न MS.) तिष्ठति न गच्छति।
न जानाति सुखं दुःखं न च संलिप्यते मनः ॥
न चापि किञ्चिज्जानाति न च बुध्यति काष्ठवत्।
एवं शिवे विलीनात्मा समाधिस्थ इहोच्यते ॥
यथा जले जलं क्षिप्तं क्षीरे क्षीरं घृते घृतम्।
अविशेषो भवेत्तद्वज्जीवात्मपरमात्मनोः ॥

K. Ar.. Ch. IX, 8-15.

2. सर्वकर्माणि सन्त्यक्तुं न शक्यं देहधारिणा।
त्यजेत् कर्मफलं यो वा स त्यागीत्यभिधीयते ॥
स्वकार्य्येषु प्रवर्तन्ते करणानीति चिन्तयेत्।
अहम्भावमपास्यैव यः कुर्य्यात् स न लिप्यते ॥
क्रियमाणानि कर्माणि ज्ञानप्राप्तेरनन्तरम्।
न च स्पृशन्ति तत्त्वज्ञं जलं पद्मदलं यथा।
तत्त्वनिष्ठस्य कर्माणि पुण्यापुण्यानि सङ्क्षयम् ॥
प्रयान्ति नैव लिप्यन्ते क्रियमाणानि चाधुना।

K. Ar., Ch. IX. 124-9.

Page 565.

1. मन्त्रयोगेन देवेशि ! कुर्य्याच्छ्रीचक्रपूजनम् ।
तदहं तु त्वया सार्द्धं गृह्णामि स्वयमादरात् ॥
K. Ar., Ch. VI, 9.

2. खेचरी भूचरी व्योमचरी प्रीतास्तु मे सदा ।
तारत्रयं वदेत् सर्वभूतेभ्यः सर्व एव हि ॥
K. Ar., Ch. VII, 14.

3. प्रकृत्याद्यैः पृथिव्यन्तैश्चतुर्विंशतिभिः शिवैः(शिवे MS.) ।
स्वरैर्विशुद्धितत्त्वैश्च वाग्भवैर्नकुलेश्वरि ॥
संयुक्तेनाथ(नात्म MS.) तत्त्वेन स्थूलदेहं विशोधयेत् ।
मायादिपुरुषान्तैश्च शुद्धाशुद्धैश्च सप्तभिः ॥
तत्त्वैः स्पर्शाह्वयैर्वर्णैः कामराजेन मन्त्रवित् ।
युक्तेन विद्यातत्त्वेन सूक्ष्मदेहं विशोधयेत् ॥
शिवादिशुद्धविद्यान्तैः पञ्चतत्त्वैश्च व्यापकम् ।
परया शिवतत्त्वेन परं देहं विशोधयेत् ॥
षट्त्रिंशत्तत्त्वसहितं मालिन्याऽबलया प्रिये ! ।
तत्त्वत्रयाश्रितं बीजं सर्वतत्त्वं विशोधयेत् ॥
K. Ar., Ch. VII, 78–82.

4. परान्तं शिवतत्त्वं स्यादिति तत्त्वत्रयं जगत् ॥
एवं तत्त्वत्रयज्ञानं गुरोर्ज्ञात्वा य आचरेत् ।
स जीवन्नेव मुक्तः स्यादिति शङ्करभाषितम् ॥
K. Ar., Ch. VII, 87.

5. आचार्य्येणाथवान्येन कारयेच्चक्रपूजनम् ।
स्वयं वा पूजयेद्देवि ! बिन्दुपूजापुरःसरम् ॥
सत्यलोकमवाप्नोति पुनरावृत्तिवर्जितः ।
न कृत्वा कौलिको मोहाद्देवताशापमाप्नुयात् ॥
K. Ar., Ch. X, 12–3.

6. वेद्यञ्च षड्विधं देवि ! स हि वेत्ति परो गुरुः ।
पदमन्त्रकलायन्त्रसतत्त्वतद्गुणा(भुवना MS.)ह्वयम् ॥
शोधयेद्यः षडध्वानं स गुरुः कथितः प्रिये ।
K. Ar., Ch. XIII, 76–7.

7. यो वा परां च पश्यन्तीं मध्यमां वैखरीमपि ।
चतुष्टयं विजानाति स गुरुः कथितः प्रिये ॥
K. Ar., Ch. XIII, 81.

8. आनव्यं(आणवं MS.) कार्मणञ्चैव मायिकञ्च मलत्रयम् ।
यो विशोधयितुं शक्तः स गुरुः परमो मतः ॥
K. Ar., Ch. XIII, 86.

9. शिवादिक्षितिपर्य्यन्तं षट्त्रिंशत्तत्त्वनिर्णयम् ।
यो विजानाति तत्त्वेन स गुरुः परमो मतः ॥
K. Ar., Ch. XIII, 90.

10. रसेन्द्रेण यथा सिद्धमयः सौवर्णतां व्रजेत् ।
दीक्षान्वितस्तथा ह्यात्मा शिवत्वं लभते प्रिये ! ॥
K. Ar., Ch. XIV, 92.

Page 566.

1. कुलागमक्रमेणैव ध्यात्वा ब्रह्मविकाशिनीम् ।
मूलादिब्रह्मरन्ध्रान्तं विसतन्तुतनीयसीम् ॥
J. A., 10.

2. रक्तपद्मैर्महेशानि पूजयेच्चक्रमुत्तमम् ।
समस्तरश्मिसहितं नित्याम्नायपुरस्कृतम् ॥
कुलाचारक्रमाद् देवि कर्पूरक्षोदमण्डितम् ।
J. A., 84.

3. मादकं धर्मसंछेदाद्वर्ज्यमासीत्सुलोचने ।
ज्ञानेन संस्कृतं तत्तु महापातकनाशनम् ॥
J. A., 107.

4. न ब्राह्मणो ब्राह्मणस्तु क्षत्रियः क्षत्रियस्तथा ।
वैश्यो न वैश्यः शूद्रो न शूद्रस्तु परमेश्वरि ॥
चाण्डालो नैव चाण्डालः पौल्कसो न च पौल्कसः ॥
सर्वं समं विजानीयात्परमात्मविनिश्चयात् ।
J. A., 113–4.

5. वेदशास्त्रपुराणेषु यामलेष्वपि सुव्रते ।
गुप्ता श्रीषोडशार्णेयं निधानमिव संस्मरेत् ॥
J. A., 119.

6. एतत् त्रयं महेशानि स्थितिचक्रं सुखप्रदम् ॥
... ...
विन्दुचक्रं वरारोहे सर्वानन्दमयं परम् ।
सदाशिवमयं चक्रनायकं परमेश्वरि ॥
J. A., 37.

7. नन्दिकेश्वरविद्यां च षट्कूटा वैष्णवी भवेत् ।
दुर्वाससा पुरा देवी निष्करा (निष्कूटा) पूजिता परा ॥
कामराजाख्यविद्यायास्त्रिकूटेषु वरानने ।

J. A., 41.

8. शैवं तु दर्शनं देवि वैन्दवे पूजयेत्प्रिये ॥
परितो दर्शनं शाक्तं चक्रस्य परमेश्वरि ।
ब्राह्मं तु दर्शनं पूज्यं भूबिम्बे प्रथमे प्रिये ॥
शिवस्य वामतो देवि वैष्णवं दर्शनं भजेत् ।
सृष्टिचक्रे भवेत्सूर्यदर्शनं कमलेक्षणे ॥
स्थितिचक्रे तु सम्पूज्यं बौद्धदर्शनमुत्तमम् ।
एवं सम्पूज्य सकलं श्रीविद्यां परितोषयेत् ॥

J. A., 70.

Page 567.

1. कुलं शक्तिः समाख्याता सा च नित्या प्रकीर्तिता ॥

T. A., (Comm.) Ah. XXVIII, 51.

2. नित्यातन्त्रविदः कृष्णं कार्तिकाच्चरमं दिनम् ।
कुलस्य नित्याचक्रस्य पूर्णत्वं यत्र तन्मतम् ॥

T. A., Ah. XXVIII, 51.

Page 568.

1. महामाया शम्बरं च योगिनी जालशम्बरम् ।
तत्त्वशम्बरकं चैव भैरवाष्टकमेव च ॥
बहुरूपाष्टकं चैव यामलाष्टकमेव च ।
चन्द्रज्ञानं वासुकिं च महासम्मोहनं तथा ॥
महोच्छुष्मं महादेव वातुलं वातुलोत्तरम् ।
हृद्भेदं तन्त्रभेदं च गुह्यतन्त्रं च कामिकम् ॥
कलावादं कलासारं तथाऽन्यत्कुब्जिकामतम् ।
तन्त्रोत्तरं च वीणाख्यं त्रोतलं त्रोतलोत्तरम् ॥
पञ्चामृतं रूपभेदं भूतोड्डामरमेव च ।
कुलसारं कुलोड्डीशं कुलचूडामणिं तथा ॥
सर्वज्ञानोत्तरं देव महाकालीमतं तथा ।
महालक्ष्मीमतं चैव सिद्धयोगीश्वरीमतम् ॥
कुरूपिकामतं देव रूपिकामतमेव च ।
सर्ववीरमतं चैव विमलामतमुत्तमम् ॥
पूर्वपश्चिमदक्षं च उत्तरं च निरुत्तरम् ।
तन्त्रं वैशेषिकं ज्ञानं वीरावलि तथा परम् ॥
अरुणेशं मोहिनीशं विशुद्धेश्वरमेव च ।

N.S. A., 22–3.

2. अन्यान्यपि कुलार्णवदक्षिणामूर्तिसंहिता-सनत्कुमारसंहिता-परमानन्द-तन्त्रादीनि ॥

N. S. A., 25.

3. वामकेश्वरतन्त्रस्थे नित्याषोडशिकार्णवे ।
पूर्वोत्तरचतुःशत्यौ व्याचष्टे भास्करः सुधीः ॥

N. S. A,, 1.

Page 569.

1. एवं सार्धत्रिंशदधिकचतुःशतैः श्लोकैर्बाह्यमेव यागं प्रपञ्च्यान्तर्यागं प्रपञ्चेनोपदेष्टुकामः परिशिवस्तद्विषयकं देवीप्रश्नमवतारयति ।

N. S. A., 177.

2. नित्याहृदयमित्येतत्तन्त्रोत्तरार्धस्य योगिनीहृदयस्य संज्ञा ।

N. S. A., 6.

3. उभे च चतुःशत्यौ यद्यपि प्राचीनैर्बहुभिर्व्याख्याते एव परं तु ताष्टीका अस्थाने विस्तृताः ।

N. S. A., 7.

4. ज्ञानार्णवपरं स्वतन्त्रपदमिति तु गौरीकान्तः ।

N. S. A., 5.

5. नित्याः षोडश देवेश सूचिता न प्रकाशिताः ।
इदानीं श्रोतुमिच्छामि तासां नामानि शङ्कर ॥

N. S. A., 25.

6. कुलविद्या महेशानि सर्वकार्यार्थसाधिनी ।
अनया विद्यया गौरि रक्षामात्मनि कारयेत् ॥

N. S. A., 58.

Page 570.

1. अत्र ऋजुविमर्शिन्यां महामायातन्त्रं शम्बरतन्त्रं चेति तन्त्रद्वयपरं व्याख्यातम् । लक्ष्मणेन तु महामायाशम्बराख्यमेकं तन्त्रमित्युक्तम् । अर्थरत्नावल्यां तु द्वयमपि नोक्तम् ।

N. S. A., 22–3.

2. मनोरमायां त्वेतत्स्तोत्रव्याख्यारम्भे नित्याषोडशिकार्णवे महात्मभिः काश्मीरादिभिर्व्याख्यातत्वात्सैव व्याख्या स्वेन लिख्यत इति वदता सुभगानन्दनाथेन पाठभेदो नास्तीति ध्वनितम् ।

N. S. A., 16–17.

3. Refer to F. N. 1, above.

4. द्वयमपि भिन्नमेवेति गौरीकान्तः ।

N. S. A., 23.

5. तत्र शिवानन्दनाथादयस्तावदाहुः।..............
विद्यानन्दनाथादयस्तु—उत्तरवाक्ये विस्तार्येत्यस्य।

N. S. A., 32.

6. अन्यथा विशेषार्घ्यद्रव्येणैवाऽऽत्मपूजने प्रधानदेव्यै निवेदनात्पूर्वमुच्छिष्ट-करणदोषापत्तेरित्याहुः शङ्करानन्दनाथादयः।

N. S. A., 73.

7. ये तु मन्त्रदोषनिरासे कथितं योनिमुद्राबन्धनमपि प्रोक्तसंक्षोभिण्यादि-दशकान्तर्गतमेवेति मन्यन्ते ते त्वसाम्प्रदायिका इत्युक्तं श्रीहर्षदीक्षितैः।

... N. S. A., 111.

8. तस्यार्थो मनोरमायामुक्तः।

N. S. A., 74.

Page 571.

1. Refer to F. N. 2. Page 570.
2. ....शैवाद्वामं तु दक्षिणम्।
दक्षिणात्परतः कौलं कौलात्परतरं नहि॥

S. T., VI, 54–55

3. एवं वै मन्त्रराजस्य कौलिकश्चोदितो विधिः।
पुनरन्यत्प्रवक्ष्यामि विधानं यत्फलप्रदम्॥

N. T., I, 260.

4. भैरवागमेषु दक्षिणस्रोतःसमुत्थेषु स्वच्छन्दचण्डत्रिशिरोभैरवादिषु भेदितं भेदसंहारित्वेन दीप्तविशिष्टरूपतया प्रतिपादितं भगवतो मृत्युजितः स्वरूपं वक्ष्यामि।

N. T., I, 225.

5. शतकोटिप्रविस्तीर्णं भेदानन्त्यविसर्पितम्।
चतुष्पीठं महातन्त्रं चतुष्टयफलोदयम्॥

S. T., I, 9,

6. गुरुपारम्परायातः सम्प्रदायः प्रकाशितः।
परम्परैव पारम्परं, गुरूणां शक्तिसदाशिवश्रीकण्ठादीनां पारम्परेणायातः।

S. T., III, 69,

Page 572.

1. दक्षिणस्रोतःसमुद्भूतभैरवतन्त्रजातमध्ये प्रधानभूतं दिव्यं सर्वभोगाप-वर्गप्रदं तन्त्रम्।

S. T., IV, 26,

2. मौसुले कारुके चैव मायातत्त्वं प्रकीर्तितम्॥
श्रीलकुलेशशिष्येण मुसलेन्द्रेण कारोहणस्थानावतीर्णेन।

S. T., VI, 52–3

3. सर्वाभरणसंयुक्तैः कामशास्त्रसुपेशलैः ।

S. T., V, 51.

4. रचितैश्चित्रशास्त्रज्ञै रत्नचूर्णसमुज्ज्वलैः ।

S. T., V, 241.

5. या वाल्मीकौ स्थिता देवी व्यासे चैव निरन्तरम् ।
ऋषीणां चैव सर्वेषां मेधाबुद्धिविवर्धनी ॥

S. T., V, 350.

6. तथा तत्त्वविभागेन पुनश्च शृणु सुव्रते ।
... ...
गुणेभ्यो धिषणा जाता भावभेदैः समन्विता ।
ब्रह्मा तत्राधिपत्येन बुद्धितत्त्वे व्यवस्थितः ॥
सर्वज्ञं च तमेवाहुर्बौद्धानां परमं पदम् ।
गुणेष्वारहतानां च प्रधानं वेदवादिनाम् ॥
पौरुषं चैव सांख्यानां सुखदुःखादिवर्जितम् ।
षड्विंशकं च देवेशि योगशास्त्रे परम्पदम् ।
व्रते पाशुपते प्रोक्तमैश्वरं परमं पदम् ॥

S. T., VI, 34–52.

Page 573.

1. कीदृशं वै गुरुं विद्यात्साधकं च महेश्वर ।
भयाभयप्रदातारं शिष्यं भूमिं च कीदृशीम् ॥
मन्त्रांश्चैव समासेन कालं चैव समासतः ।
यजनं हवनं चैव अधिवासं रजांसि च ॥
पञ्चगव्यं चरुं चैव दन्तकाष्ठं च मण्डलम् ।
दीक्षा चाध्वाभिषेकौ च समयान्साधनानि च ॥
कलिमासाद्य सिद्ध्यन्ति तथा ब्रूहि महेश्वर ।

S. T., I, 11–3.

2. कालो द्विधाऽत्र विज्ञेयः सौरश्चाध्यात्मिकः प्रिये ।
कलयति जन्मस्थित्यादिविकारषट्केन परिच्छिनत्ति जगद्यः पारमेश-क्रियाशक्तिस्पन्दात्मा 'कालो द्विधा' इत्येकरूपोऽपि बाह्याभ्यन्तरतया संस्थितः, ।

S. T., III, 168.

3. शुभान् स्वप्नान्प्रवक्ष्यामि अशुभांश्च वरानने ।
स्वप्नेषु मदिरापानमाममांसस्य भक्षणम् ॥
क्रिमिविष्ठानुलेपं च रुधिरेणाभिषेचनम् ।
भक्षणं दधिभक्तस्य श्वेतवस्त्रानुलेपनम् ॥

श्वेतातपत्रं मूर्धस्थं श्वेतस्रग्दामभूषणम् ।
सिंहासनं रथं यानं ध्वजं राज्याभिषेचनम् ॥
रत्नाङ्गाभरणादीनि ताम्बूलं फलमेव च ।
दर्शनं श्रीसरस्वत्योः शुभनार्यवगूहनम् ॥
क्रिमिर्लाक्षा, एतत्सर्वं श्रेष्ठम्‌‥‥‥‥‥‥।

S. T., II, 2–11.

4. ब्राह्मणाः क्षत्रिया वैश्याः शूद्राश्चान्येऽथवा प्रिये ।
सर्वे ते समधर्माणः शिवधर्मे नियोजिताः ॥
सर्वे जटाधराः प्रोक्ता भस्मोद्धूलितविग्रहाः ।

S. T., II, 329.

5. Refer to F. N. 4. Page 571.

6. सर्वतन्त्रेषु सामान्यो मृत्युजित्प्रकटीकृतः ॥
सर्वेषां हृदयं गुह्यमप्रकाश्यं महाद्भुतम् ।

N. T., II, 158.

7. विस्तरोऽन्यत्र वर्णितः ।
अन्यत्र श्रीतोतुलक्रियाकालगुणोत्तरादौ ॥

N. T., II, 199.

8. यत्तदापोमयं देव चक्षुः सर्वत्र दृश्यते ।
तस्मादग्निः कथं रौद्र उत्पन्नः कालदाहकः ॥
येन वै दृष्टमात्रस्तु मित्रजो भस्मसात्कृतः ।
किं तद्रौद्रं कृतं देव वह्निकालदिधक्षया ॥
प्रज्वालितं जगत्सर्वं ब्रह्मादिस्थावरान्तकम् ।

N. T., I, 12.

9. मृत्योरुत्तारयेद्यस्मान्मृत्युजित्तेन चोच्यते ॥

N. T., II, 297.

Page 574.

1, ऊर्ध्वदक्षिणवामस्रोतोरूपतामुन्मील्य, तदविभेदसारकुलाम्नायमयतामपि मृत्युजिन्नाथस्य दर्शयितुं श्रीभगवानुवाच ।

N. T., I, 252.

2. भगवन् ! सर्वतन्त्राणि भवतोक्तानि मे पुरा ।
नित्यानां षोडशानां च नवतन्त्राणि कृत्स्नशः ॥
तत्र सर्वतन्त्राणि नित्याशोडशिकार्णवोक्तरुद्रयामलादिचतुःषष्टि मुख्यानि तन्त्राणि । नवतन्त्राणि—सुन्दरीहृदयनित्याषोडशकार्णवचन्द्रज्ञान-मातृकातन्त्रसंमोहनतन्त्रवामकेश्वरबहुरूपाष्टकप्रस्तारचिन्तामणिमेरु (२) प्रस्ताराख्यानि ।

T. R., 2.

3. मनोरमायां तु—नित्यानां षोडशानां च नव तन्त्राणि कृत्स्नशः। इतिश्लोकव्याख्यावसरे नित्याषोडशिकार्णवसुन्दरीहृदयवामकेश्वरतन्त्राणि पृथग्गणितानि। परं तु तद्योगिनीहृदय एव वामकेश्वरतन्त्रेऽस्मिन्नज्ञातार्थास्त्वनेकश इति निर्देशस्वरसविरुद्धम्।

N. S. A., 7.

Page 575.

1. Refer to F. N. 4. Page 569.

Page 576.

1. अत्र हि केषाञ्चन गुरूणां श्रीदेव्यायामलश्रीमाधवकुलार्थसम्मेलनया सम्प्रदायः समस्तीति।

T. A., Ah. XXIX, 40.

2. अतः परं देवीस्तोत्रश्लोकद्वादशकस्य पूर्वमेव नित्याषोडशिकार्णवे (षोडशकार्णवे ?) महात्मभिः काश्मीरिभिर्व्याख्यातत्वात्तेषां द्वादशानां श्लोकानामत्र व्याख्या सव लिख्यते।

T. R., 36.

3. इह खलु स्वत एव सत्तर्कोदयात् खिलीकृतनिखिलबन्धनस्य भैरवीभावपूर्णस्य सांसिद्धिकस्य गुरोः स्वात्मनि कृतकृत्यत्वात् शेषवृत्तौ परानुग्रह एव परं प्रयोजनम्।

T. A., III, 53.

4. इत्यसौ निरनुसन्धानदर्शनमात्रेणैव स्वसंवित्संक्रान्तेः स्वसाम्यापादनेनताननुगृह्णाति।

T. A., III, 54.

5. वटुकं त्रीन् गुरून्सिद्धान्योगिनीः पीठमर्चयेत्।

T. A., Ah. XXIX, 23.

6. Refer to F. N. 2. Page 551.

Page 577.

1. कुलपर्वेति तद् ब्रूमो यथोक्तं भैरवे कुले।
हैडरे त्रिकसद्भावे त्रिककालीकुलादिके॥

T. A., Ah. XXVIII, 7.

2. श्रीमत्कालीकुले चोक्तं पञ्चस्रोतोविवर्जितम्।
दशाष्टादशभेदस्य सारमेतत्प्रकीर्तितम्॥

T. A., Ah. XXXV, 373-4.

3. पीठमिति जालन्धरं यतस्तत्सिद्धयोगिनीक्रमेण अस्य दर्शनस्य अवतारः।

T. A., Ah. XXIX, 23.

Page 578.

1. पुनर्विद्याद्यमस्योर्ध्वमन्तरन्तं शिवान्वितम् ।
त्रैलोक्यमोहनीयं सा विद्या चक्रासनस्थिता ॥
पुनः करशुद्धिकर्या आद्याया एव विद्याया यदाद्यं बीजं वाग्भवमन्तरन्तरालवर्ति कामराजं अन्तमन्त्यं शक्तिबीजं च अस्य त्रयस्य अपि ऊर्ध्वं शिवेन हकारेण अन्वितं कुर्यादिति श्रीमदीश्वरशिवाचार्यः । एवं हैंहक्लीं-ह्सौः । तदुक्तं—
'गृहीत्वा वर्णमेकैकमाद्यमाद्यतृतीययोः ।
तदन्तमूर्ध्वे बाधेन विद्या चक्रासनस्थिता ॥' इति ।

V. M., (Comm.) 47.

Page 580.

1. यत् रसमहोदधिः
'वाचामगोचरं देव्याः सर्वानन्दमयं पुनः ।'
....

श्रीरसमहोदधावपि
.........प्रान्तक्रमसमन्वितामू ।'
इति उक्तम्......................
श्रीरसमहोदधौ पुनः
'उभौ तु सन्निरुद्धौ तु प्राणापानौ व्यवस्थितौ ।
तत्र मध्ये परं तत्त्वं भावाभावपदोद्भवम् ॥
तत्र मध्ये चितं कुर्यान्मुद्रैषा खेचरी परा ।
अन्यास्तु करबन्धेन सर्वशास्त्रेषु संस्थिताः ॥'

V. M., 62, 71, 97.

2. कर्णिकापद्मद्वयार्थं भ्रमत्रयविधानं, तदनु चतुरस्रविधिः, परतः कर्णिकायां सूत्रैस्त्रिचत्वारिंशत्त्रिकोणविरचनमित्यादि व्याख्यानं रेखाकर्मानभिज्ञत्वप्रतिपादनफलमतीव हास्यावहतां गुरुपुङ्गवस्य प्रकाशयतीत्यलं चर्यानन्दनाथोपदेशविषदप्रतिभाविभवैः सह संभाषितेन ।

V. M., 34.

Page 581.

1. प्रत्युत श्रीमदीश्वरशिवाचार्यमतस्य बलवत्त्वं लक्ष्यते यतः स एव श्रीरसमहोदधिश्लोकानां साक्षात्प्रवर्तयितेति सर्वत्र अविगीता प्रसिद्धिः ।

V. M., 48.

2. वस्तुतो हि अस्य दर्शनस्य एतदेव आचार्यद्वयं काश्मीरेषु अवतारकम् । ततश्च श्रीविश्वावर्तमुखेनैव लक्ष्यते यत्, तदेव इदमस्मत्पर्यन्तं शिष्यप्रशिष्यक्रमेण सर्वेषामपि प्राप्तम् ।

V. M., 48

3. यतोऽद्य यतः कुतश्चन स्थानादनयेन अन्ततश्चौर्यादिना अपि आसादितखण्डितपत्रिकामात्राः सर्व(सर्वम् ?) एव यथास्थितं गुर्वादि परिवर्त्य, तत्र आज्ञामपि स्वपित्रादि च गुरुतया परिकल्प्य शास्त्रानुष्ठानपराङ्मुखा मन्त्रविक्रयमात्रतात्पर्या धनसंग्रहणपरायणाः सकलं लोकं विप्लावयन्तो दृश्यन्ते ।

V. M., 55.

4. आश्रीदीपकनाथतो ह्यगणितैरद्यापि वृत्तिः कृता ।
यस्यान्यैश्च करिष्यते गुरुवरैः स्वस्वाशयौचित्यतः ॥

V. M., 115.

5. जयन्ति परमाद्वैतविज्ञानामृतनिर्भराः ।
पूर्वे श्रीदीपिकाचार्यप्रमुखा गुरवो मम ॥

V. M., 1.

Page 582.

1. श्रीकल्याणवर्मणा कोणषट्कमध्ये ब्लूंकारं, तद्बहिः क्रौंकाराष्टकं दिगष्टके न्यसेद्वेति व्याख्यातम् । तदेवं वृद्धप्रपितामहसंभृतं तत्र तत्र तत्तदर्थावबोधनक्षमम् ।

V. M., 118.

2. एवं हि श्रीमदीश्वरशिवमतेन यथा इह चक्रासनोद्धारस्तथैव राजानककल्याणवर्ममतेन न पर्यवसित इति यादृक् तादृग्न्यायोपासकेन तावदाशयेन कृतम् ।

V. M., 48.

3. यत्तु श्रीमदल्लटेन अपि अङ्गन्यासविद्यायां·········इत्यादि च उक्तम्, तत् सर्वमेवमुपेक्ष्यमुक्तनीत्या सर्वप्रकारं सामञ्जस्याभावात् ।

V. M., 54–5.

4. यच्च अत्र अन्यैः
कालहल्लोलसूत्रेण रवितार्च्यादिसूत्रतः ।
एकाक्षरा त्र्यक्षरा च द्वे विद्ये सूचिते मया ॥
इत्यादि जिष्णू कुर्वत् विश्वामित्रन्यायेन नवामेव
वाच्यवाचकमयीं सृष्टिं विधाय रव्यादिशब्दैः
... ...

यद्वा किमस्मुष्मै तपस्विने रुष्यते यत्—
वार्तिककारेण अपि एवमेव प्रतिपदं मन्त्रोद्धारः कृतः इति अलमनालोच्यालोचनेन ।

V. M., 9

5. स्वशरीराधिकसद्भावभावितामिति ततः प्राह।
श्रीमत्कश्चिटनाथः प्रोक्तसमस्तार्थलब्धये वाक्यम् ॥

T. A., Ah. XXIX, 88.

Page 583.

1. आतपनान्मोटकान्तं यस्य मेऽस्ति गुरुक्रमः।
तस्य मे सर्वशिष्यस्य नोपदेशदरिद्रता ॥
श्रीमता कल्लटेनेत्थं गुरुणा तु न्यरूप्यत।

T. A., Ah. XIII, 206.

2. श्रीत्र्यम्बकसन्तानविततताम्बरभास्करः ॥
दिनरात्रिक्रमं मे श्रीशम्भुरित्थमपप्रथत्।

T. A., Ah. VI, 77–8.

3. श्रीमत्सुमतिसंशुद्धसद्भक्तजनदक्षिणः।
शम्भुनाथः प्रसन्नो मे भूयाद्वाक्पुष्पतोषितः ॥

M. V. V., 1.

4. तुलामेलकयोगः श्रीतन्त्रसद्भावशासने।
य उक्तः शम्भुनाथेन स मया दर्शितः क्रमात् ॥

T. A., Ah. XXX, 214.

Page 584.

1. श्रीगम्भीरविपश्चितः पितुरभूद्यः कोनमाम्बोदरे
विद्याष्टादशकस्य मर्मभि(वि)दभूद्यः श्रीनृसिंहाद् गुरोः।
यश्च श्रीशिवदत्तशुक्लचरणैः पूर्णाभिषिक्तोऽभवत्
स त्रेता त्रिपुरा त्रयीति मनुते तामेव नाथत्रयीम् ॥

N. S. A., 1.

2. ज्येष्ठा स(त्स)तीर्थ्यात्सरहस्यमेतत्
ससम्प्रदायं समधीत्य तन्त्रम्।
तन्त्राणि चान्यानि विचार्य टीका-
मेकामकार्षीद्भुवि भास्करार्यः ॥

N. S. A., 350.

Page 585.

1. गम्भीररायैः स्वकृतस्य श्लोकात्मकविष्णुसहस्रनामपद्यप्रसूनाञ्जलिनिबन्ध-
स्योपोद्घाते स्ववंशक्रमश्चेत्थं प्रदर्शितः—
"मन्मातुः प्रपितामहो हि भिषजांवर्यो बुधो मुद्गलः
श्रीवत्सान्वयसम्भवो गुणनिधिर्नारायणस्तत्सुतः।

तस्याण्णाजिबुधः सुतः किल पुनर्नारायणस्तत्सुत-
स्तं वन्दे गुरुमागमांश्च सकलान् योऽध्यापयन्मातुलः ॥
विश्वामित्र इति प्रसिद्धमहिमा मूर्द्धा तपोऽग्निं त्यजं-
स्त्रैलोक्यं सचराचरं स सहसा सन्तापयंस्तापसः ।
यो ब्रह्मेन्द्रमहेशमुख्यविबुधैः सम्प्रार्थितः पूजितो
ब्रह्मर्षित्वमवाप कोऽपि मुनिराट् पायात्पुनः सृष्टिकृत् ॥
तद्गोत्रोद्भव एकनाथ इति च श्रीमानुदारः शुचि-
स्तत्पुत्रस्तुकदेवपण्डित इति प्रौढः प्रतापोच्छ्रितः ।
तत्सूनुश्च यमाजिपण्डित इति ख्यातः सतां सम्मतो
जाया तस्य सती सतीजननुता स्या(सी ?)चन्द्रमा नामतः ॥
दमवांश्चन्द्रमाख्यायां यमाजिर्यमजीजनत् ।
स सूरिशिक्षादीक्षावान् कविर्गम्भीरभारती ॥"।

Sau. Bh., (Intro.) 8.

2. छन्दः कौस्तुभे भास्कररायैः—
"प्रख्यातो विजयापुरीनरपतेर्यः सेवया फारसी-
भाषाष्टादशपर्वभारतकृतिं सर्वां विपर्यासयत् ।
आचान्ताखिलशास्त्रवारिधिमिमं दृष्ट्वैव वाचंयमाः
पराशर्यकणादजैमिनिमुखा अद्यापि चान्तर्हिताः ॥
यः शास्त्राम्बुनिधीन् प्रमथ्य कृतवान् ग्रन्थाननन्योपमा-
नग्निष्टोममुखैर्मखैः सुरपतिं तुष्टं गृहेऽवासयत् ।
यः काश्यां चरमायुरौज्झदमलः साम्बादभेदेन तं
तातं भारतिदीक्षितोत्तरपदं गम्भीरराजं नुमः ॥

Ch. K., Verses. 1-2.

Page 587.

1. प्रादुर्भूतः सैष भागानगर्यां पुर्यां काश्यां तातपादोपनीतः ।
अन्तेवासी सन्नृसिंहाध्वरीन्दोरस्माद्विद्याः प्रापदष्टादशापि ॥

Bh. V., (V.) 7.

2. सप्तवर्षोऽपि युक्त्या यः सभेश्वरपतेर्मनः ।
समेशभक्तो भूपालसभे कस्मिन् जयी न सः ॥

Bh. V., (V.)9.

3. आनन्दी परिणिन्येऽसावानन्दीनामिकां प्रियाम् ।
सानन्दयन्मनो भर्तुर्मानं दत्त्वा तु पृष्ठतः ॥

Bh. V., (V.) 23.

4. पाण्डुरङ्गमभजत्सुतमाशाः पाण्डुरं गमयति स्म यशो यः ॥

Bh. V., (V.) 25.

5. काश्यां जज्ञे सोमपीथी यथावत्कालं कंचित्तत्र कृत्वा विहारम् ।
शिष्यस्यासौ चन्द्रसेनस्य राज्ञः सेवातुष्टयोवास कृष्णोपकण्ठम् ॥
Bh. V., (V.) 33.

6. यादववंशैकमणिर्यो भोसलभूभृतश्चमूनाथः ।
श्रीगुरुचरणोपास्तौ स्वयमेव प्रापदुपमितिं स्वस्य ॥
Bh. V., (V.) 34.

Page 588.

1. संनतिमान्नाथपदोः(दः ?) संनतिनाम्नीह विश्रुते क्षेत्रे ।
चक्रे स मन्दिरं श्रीचक्राकारेण चन्द्रलाम्बायाः ॥
Bh. V., (V.) 37.

2. गुर्जरदेशे विदधे जर्जरधैर्यं स वल्लभाचार्यम् ॥
वादे मस्करिणं माध्वं विधूयामुष्य बन्धुजाम् ।
पार्वतीं व्यवहत् कीर्त्या समं सत्यप्रतिश्रवाः ॥
Bh. V., (V.) 30–1.

3. क्षेत्रे श्रीसप्तकोटीश्वरपुरि शिवरात्रौ शके शर्म चापे ।
नित्याषोडश्युदन्वत्परतटगतये सेतुमेवं न्यबध्नात्
N. S. A., 350.

4. आदित्यपुराणप्रसिद्धपश्चिमोदधितीरस्थसप्तकोटीश्वरनामनिर्वचनश्लोकेऽपि।
Sau. Bh., 24.

5. वयसि चरमे लब्ध्वा सह्याद्रिजातटगेहितां
विदितनिखिलत्रय्यन्तार्थं(र्थः ?) चिदैक्यविभावनात् ।
महिममहति क्षेत्रे मध्यार्जुने शिवतां गतो-
ऽप्यमलवपुषा कीर्त्या जागर्ति शाश्वतिकेन सः ॥
Bh. V., (V.) 110.

Page 590.

1. ब्रह्मयामलमित्युक्तं विष्णुयामलकं तथा ॥
स्वच्छन्दश्च रुरुश्चैव षष्ठं चाथर्वणं स्मृतम् ।
सप्तमं रुद्रमित्युक्तं वेतालं चाष्टमं स्मृतम् ॥
T. A., (Comm.) Ah. I, 42.

Page 591.

1. Refer to F. N. 3. Page 91.
2. यदि तु योगप्राधान्यं तदा श्रीपूर्वादिशास्त्रनिरूपितं पूर्वमेव व्रतादि कृत्वा 'अस्योच्चारे कृते' इत्यादि स्पष्टमेव व्याख्येयम् ।
P. T. V., 250.

3. 'देवीसुत' इत्युभयोरपि कुलशास्त्रोचितोऽयं व्यपदेशः।
....

अतश्च वक्ष्यमाणशास्त्रस्य कुलतन्त्रप्रक्रियात्मकत्वेन द्वैविध्येऽपि।

T. A., I, 23-4.

Page 593.

1. 'अनुत्तरं कथम्' इत्यादि सार्द्धश्लोकयुगलनिगमितेन प्रश्नेन 'शृणु देवि' इत्यादिना सार्धश्लोकनिर्णीतेन चोत्तरेण, अनुत्तरपदप्राप्तिवशाविष्टजीवन्मुक्तभावानां कृतकृत्यता, अतस्तावन्मात्र एव दृढप्रतिपत्तिपवित्रीकृतैर्विश्रमणीयम्—इत्युद्भुजाः फूत्कुर्मः।

P. T. V., 96-7.

2. अथ सर्वाप्युपास्येयं कुलप्रक्रिययोच्यते॥

T. A., Ah. XXIX, 1.

Page 594,

1. कुलं स्थूलसूक्ष्मपरप्राणेन्द्रियभूतादि—समूहात्मतया, कार्यकारणभावात् च। यथोक्तम् "संहत्यकारित्वात्" इति। तथा कुलं बोधस्यैव आश्यानरूपतया यथावस्थानात् बोधस्वातन्त्र्यादेव च अस्य बन्धाभिमानात्। उक्तं हि 'कुल संस्त्याने बन्धुषु च' (धा० भ्वा० प०) इति।

P. T. V., 32-3.

2. यतो यावदिदं परमेश्वरस्य भैरवभानोः रश्मिचक्रात्मकं निजभासास्फारमयं कुलमुक्तम्, तत् च एतत् अन्तर्मुखपरभैरवसंवित्तादात्म्यलक्षणं निरोधमेति, तदा तदेव परमानन्दामृतास्वादमयमदेशकालकलितम् अनुत्तरं ध्रुवं विसर्गरूपं सततोदितम्।

P. T. V., 35.

Page 595.

1. ततश्च
यत्रोदितमिदं चित्रं विश्वं यत्रास्तमेति च।
तत्कुलं विद्धि सर्वज्ञ शिवशक्तिविवर्जितम्॥
इत्यादि लक्षितात्पूर्णपरसंवित्तत्त्वलक्षणात् कुलात् यदन्यदवभासितं शिवलक्षणमकुलं तस्य प्रकाशैकरूपत्वेन द्योतमानस्य सा परा विश्वापूरणस्वभावा।

T. A., Ah. III, 74-6.

2. अनुत्तरं परं धाम तदेवाकुलमुच्यते।
विसर्गस्तस्य नाथस्य कौलिकी शक्तिरुच्यते॥

T. A., Ah. III, 145.

3. एवम्—'अकुलस्यास्य देवस्य.........'।
इत्याद्युपक्रान्तमेव इह निर्वाहितं, न तु अपूर्वं किंचिदुक्तम्, इति भावः॥
T. A., Ah. III, 146.

4. कुलस्य शाक्तप्रसरात्मनो जगतो यत्प्रथनं तेन शालते तच्छीला।
T. A., Ah. III, 76.

Page 596.

1. कुलं च परमेशस्य शक्तिः सामर्थ्यमूर्ध्वता।
स्वातन्त्र्यमोजो वीर्यं च पिण्डः संविच्छरीरकम्॥
T. A., Ah. XXIX, 3-4.

2. Refer to F. N. 2. Page 594.

3. तथा कुलात् प्राणदेहादेः आगता सिद्धिः।.........
तथा कुले शिवशक्त्यात्मनि।
P. T. V., 36.

4. तस्यैवं कुलस्यान्तः पृथिव्यादीनि च यावत्ब्रह्मपञ्चकम्।
P. T. V., 208.

5. कुलशक्तेरत्रैव निवेशात्, कलनात्मिका हि विमर्शशक्तिः तामन्तरेण-
कुलमपि तुर्यातीतं नाम न किंचित्।
P. T. V., 164-5

6. अविद्यमानं मृतं यत्र तत् 'कुलं' शरीरं यस्य तत्।
T. A., I, 5.

7. कुलं पद्मनाख्यम्.........'।
T. A., I, 9.

8. 'कुलम्' आकारो यस्य तत्।
T. A., I, 12.

9. Refer to F. N. 1, page 567.

Page 597.

1. Refer to F. N. 1, page 596.

2. एकवीरो यामलोऽथ त्रिशक्तिश्चतुरात्मकः।
....
एवं यावत्सहस्रारे निःसंख्यारेऽपि वा प्रभुः।
विश्वचक्रे महेशानो विश्वशक्तिर्विजृम्भते॥
T. A., I, 152-4.

3. कुलप्रक्रियायां तिस्रः शक्तयः पराद्याः।
T. A., I, 153.

Page 598.

1. अकुलस्यास्य देवस्य कुलप्रथनशालिनी ।
कौलिकी सा परा शक्तिरवियुक्तो यया प्रभुः ॥

T. A., II, 74-5.

2. परैव सूक्ष्मा कुण्डलिनी शक्तिः ।

T. A., II, 77.

3. कौलिकीति, परेति चोक्ता अन्तः प्रमात्रैकात्म्येन वर्तमाना विमर्शात्मा यासौ विसिसृक्षा ।

T. A., (Comm.) II, 139.

4. अनुत्तरा परेच्छा च परापरतया स्थिता ।
उन्मेषशक्तिर्ज्ञानाख्या स्वपरेति निगद्यते ॥

T. A., II, 233.

5. अहंपरामर्शस्य विभजने सति 'तदेव त्रितयं प्राहुर्भैरवस्य परं महः ।' इत्याद्युक्तनयेन अनुत्तरेच्छोन्मेषाख्यं त्रिकमेव वस्तुतोऽस्ति ।

T. A., Ah. XXXIII, 347.

6. यदुक्तं चक्रभेदेन सार्धं पूज्यमिति त्रिकम् ।
तत्रैष चक्रभेदानामेकीकारो दिशानया ॥

T. A., Ah. XXXIII, 336-7.

7. इह परमेश्वरं प्रति या इयं कायवाङ्मनसां तदेकविषयतानियोजनालक्षणा प्रह्वता सा नमस्कारस्य अर्थः ।

Bh., Vol. I, 18.

8. तस्य यत्तत् परं प्राप्यं धाम तत् त्रिकशब्दितम् ।

T. A., Ah. XXXV, 373.

Page 599.

1. सर्वाविभेदानुच्छेदात् तदेव कुलमुच्यते ।

T. A., Ah. XXXV, 373.

Page 601.

1. अदृष्टमण्डलोऽप्येवं यः कश्चिद्वेत्ति तत्त्वतः ।
स सिद्धिभाग्भवेन्नित्यं स योगी स च दीक्षितः ॥

P. T. V., 251-2.

Page 602.

1. वाय्वादिशब्दवाच्या यादयो वकारान्ता रागविद्याकलामायाख्यानि तत्त्वानि ।

P. T. V., 113.

2. यथा वा इहैव श्रीत्रिकागमेषु 'नियतिकालौ न पृथक् निरूपितौ ।

P. T. V., 119

3. गुरूपदेशात्संशयविपर्यासादिरहितत्वेनाधिगतमनुत्तरत्रिकार्थप्रक्रिया-लक्षणम् ।

T. A., I, 33-4.

Page 603.

1. एकात्मकत्वे हि अप्रतियोगित्वात् शिवता, प्रतियोगिसम्भवे शाक्तत्वम्, अनेकतायां भेद एव नरात्मभावः ।

P. T. V., 79.

2. 'दक्षे मते कुले कौले षडर्धे हृदये ततः ।
........................' ॥
......षडर्धे हृदये इति सामानाधिकरण्येन योज्यम् ।

T. A., Ah. XIII, 181.

3. 'कुलादौ' अद्वयदर्शने पुनरसौ लिङ्ग-पूजा 'निषिद्धा' यतो देह एव सर्वाध्वमयः,—इति तत्रैव तत्साक्षात्कारः सुलभः,—इति किमनुपपत्तिना बाह्येन लिङ्गादिना फलम् ।.........इह पुनः परमाद्वयरूपे त्रिकदर्शने तद्विधिना तन्निषेधेन वा न किञ्चित्प्रयोजनम् ।

T. A., III, 286.

4. 'कौले' कुलदर्शने पुनः 'अस्य' जटाभस्मादेः 'त्यागो' निषेधो विहितः ।
.........इह पुनः सार्वात्म्यात् तद्विधिप्रतिषेधने न भवतः ।

T. A., III, 288-9.

Page 604.

1. परतत्त्वप्रवेशे तु यमेव निकटं यदा ।
उपायं वेत्ति स ग्राह्यस्तदा त्याज्योऽथ वा क्वचित् ॥
न यन्त्रणात्र कार्येति प्रोक्तं श्रीत्रिकशासने ।

T. A., III, 302.

2. अतश्च वक्ष्यमाणशास्त्रस्य कुलतन्त्रप्रक्रियात्मकत्वेन द्वैविध्येऽपि ।

T. A., I, 24.

3. वक्ष्यमाणतन्त्रप्रक्रियायाः त्र्यम्बकमठिकाश्रयणेन आयातिक्रमोऽस्ति ।

T. A., I, 27.

4. एवं च तन्त्रप्रक्रियोपासन्नगुर्वभिमुखीकरणानन्तरं विश्रान्तिस्थानतया कुलप्रक्रियागुरुमपि उत्कर्षयति ।

T. A., I, 31.

5. उत्तरमिति कौलिकं दीक्षादिकर्म । अधस्तनमिति तन्त्रोक्तम् ।
T. A., Ah., XXI, 238.

Page 605.

1. संविदात्मनि विश्वोऽयं भाववर्गः प्रपञ्चवान् ।
प्रतिबिम्बतया भाति यस्य विश्वेश्वरो हि सः ॥
T. A., II, 246.

2. धरामेवाविकल्पेन स्वात्मनि प्रतिबिम्बिताम् ।
पश्यन्भैरवतां याति जलादिष्वप्ययं विधिः ॥
यावदन्ते परं तत्त्वं समस्तावरणोर्ध्वगम् ।
व्यापि स्वतन्त्रं सर्वज्ञं यच्छिवं परिकल्पितम् ॥
T. A., II, 249–50.

3. तदप्यकल्पितोदारसंविद्दर्पणबिम्बितम् ।
पश्यन्विकल्पविकलो भैरवीभवति स्वयम् ॥
T. A., II, 251.

4. अथासौ तादृशो न स्याद्भवभक्त्या च भावितः ।
तं चाराधयते भाविताद्दृशानुग्रहेरितः ॥
T. A., II, 261.

Page 606.

1. स्नानमण्डलकुण्डादि षोढान्यासादि यच्च तत् ।
किञ्चिदत्रोपयुज्येत कृतं वा खण्डनाय नो ॥
T. A., Ah. XXIX, 6.

2. साक्षादुपायेन इति शाम्भवेन । तदेव हि अव्यवहितं परज्ञानावाप्तौ निमित्तं, स एव परां काष्ठां प्राप्तश्चानुपाय इत्युच्यते ।
T. A., I, 182.

3. स्नानं व्रतं देहशुद्धिर्धारणा मन्त्रयोजना ।
अध्वक्लृप्तिर्यागविधिर्होमजप्यसमाधयः ॥
इत्यादिकल्पना कापि नात्र भेदेन युज्यते ।
T. A., II, 230.

Page 607.

1. धाराधिरूढेष्विति अनेन परकाष्ठाप्राप्तनिर्विकल्पकदशाधिशायितया रूढप्रायतामभिदधता अधिकारिभेदोऽपि उपक्षिप्तः ।
T. A., Ah. XXIX, 2.

2. Refer to F. N. 1. Page 606.

3. अथासौ तादृशो न स्याद्भवभक्त्या च भावितः ॥
तं चाराधयते भाविताद्दशानुग्रहेरितः ।
तदा विचित्रं दीक्षादिविधिं शिक्षेत कोविदः ॥

T. A., II, 261.

4. अथ सर्वाप्युपासेयं कुलप्रक्रिययोच्यते ॥

T. A., Ah. XXIX, I.

5. अत्र निर्विकल्पवृत्तीनां महात्मनां ज्ञानिनामेव अधिकारो येषां स्ववृत्तिप्रतिक्षेपेण संविदद्वैते एव किमेकाग्रीभूतं चेतो न वेति प्रत्यवेक्षामात्रे एव अनुसन्धानम् ।

T. A., Ah. XXIX, (Comm.) 73-4.

6. येऽप्यप्राप्तविबोधास्तेऽभ्युदितोत्फुल्लयागसंरूढाः ।
तत्परिकल्पितचक्रस्थदेवताः प्राप्नुवन्ति विज्ञानम् ॥

T. A., Ah. XXIX, 93.

7. स्रोतोद्वयस्य निष्ठान्तमूर्ध्वाधश्चक्रबोधनम् ।
विश्रामं च समावेशं सुषीणां मरुतां तथा ॥
गतभेदं च यन्त्राणां सन्धीनां मर्मणामपि ।
द्वासप्ततिपदे देहे सहस्रारे च नित्यशः ॥
गत्यागत्यन्तरा वित्ती सङ्घट्टयति यच्छिवः ।
तत्प्रयत्नात्सदा तिष्ठेत्सङ्घट्टे भैरवे पदे ॥
उभयोस्तन्निराकारभावसंप्राप्तिलक्षणम् ।
मात्राविभागरहितं सुस्फुटार्थप्रकाशकम् ॥
अभ्यस्येद्भावसंवित्तिं सर्वभावनिवर्तनात् ।
सूर्यसोमौ तु संरुध्य लयविक्षेपमार्गतः ॥

T. A., Ah. XXIX, 100–2.

8. तादृङ्मेलककलिकाकलिततनुः कोऽपि यो भवेद्गर्भे ।
उक्तः स योगिनीभूः स्वयमेव ज्ञानभाजनं रुद्रः ॥

T. A., Ah. XXIX, 111–2.

Page 608.

1. अत्र यागे च यद्द्रव्यं निषिद्धं शास्त्रसन्ततौ ।
तदेव योजयेद्धीमान्वामामृतपरिप्लुतम् ॥

T. A., Ah. XXIX, 7.

2. अदिव्यवपुषा क्रियमाणं यागादि फलदायि न स्यादित्यत्र साधकेन स्वात्मनि भैरवीभावो भावयितव्य इत्याह—
तन्त्रोक्तमन्त्रतादात्म्याद्भैरवात्मत्वमानयेत् ॥

T. A., Ah. XXIX, 19.

3. क्रमात्स्फुटत्वकरणं भावनं परिकीर्त्यते ॥

T. A., Ah. XXVIII, 143.

4. तन्त्रोक्तमन्त्रतादात्म्याद्भैरवात्मत्वमानयेत् ।

T. A. Ah. XXIX, 19.

Page 609.

1. ज्ञाते शिवत्वे सर्वस्थे प्रतिपत्त्या दृढात्मना ।
करणेन नास्ति कृत्यं क्वापि भावनयापि वा ॥

Bh., Vol. II, 311.

Page 610.

1. अशेषतन्त्रसारं तु वामदक्षिणमाश्रितम् ।
एकत्र मिलितं कौलं श्रीषडर्धकशासने ॥

T. A., XII, 400.

2. यदार्षे पातहेतूक्तं तदस्मिन् वामशासने ।
आशुसिद्ध्यै यतः सर्वमार्षं मायोदरस्थितम् ॥

T. A., XII, 395.

3. श्रीमदानन्दशास्त्रादौ प्रोक्तं भगवता किल ।
समूहः पीठमेतच्च द्विधा दक्षिणवामतः ॥
मन्त्रो विद्येति तस्माच्च मुद्रामण्डलगं द्वयम् ।

T. A., Ah. XXXVII, 397–8,

Page 611.

1. यदा त्रयाणां वक्त्राणां वामदक्षिणसङ्गतिः ।

T. A., I, 39.

Page 612.

1. दक्षिणं रौद्रकर्माढ्यं वामं सिद्धिसमाकुलम् ।

T. A., Ah. XXXVII, 400.

2. अतएव हि नैकट्याद्वामदक्षिणशास्त्रयोः ।
धारा प्रान्तधराप्रान्ते कौलिकी प्रविजम्भते ॥

M. V. V., 38.

3. Refer to F. N. 5, page 607.

4. इह अनुचक्रात्मनां निखिलानां चक्राणां मध्ये तत्संक्षोभे यथोचित-मर्थजातमाहरन्नपि विमलं तदासङ्गाभावात् वैवश्यकलङ्कोन्मुक्तं यदासन-मवस्थानं तन्निष्ठः सन् स्वस्वरूपविश्रान्त्या तत्क्षोभोपसंहारात् रुद्रस्थानं समाविशेत् मुख्यचक्रात्मकपरप्रमातृदशावेशभाग्भवेदित्यर्थः ।

T. A., Ah. XXIX, (Comm.) 79-80

Page 613.

1. धाराधिरूढेष्विति अनेन परकाष्ठाप्राप्तनिर्विकल्पकदशाधिशायितया रूढप्रायतामभिदधता अधिकारिभेदोऽपि उपक्षिप्तः ।

T. A., Ah. XXIX, (Comm.) 2.

2. न चर्या भोगतः प्रोक्ता ख्याता कामसुरूपिणी ।
स्वचित्तप्रत्यवेक्षातः स्थिरं किं वा चलं मनः ॥

T. A., Ah. XXIX, (Comm.) 74.

3. कुलमार्गानुप्रविष्टेन सर्वथा स्वात्मानन्दव्यञ्जकतामात्रपरतया सेव्यं न तु तद्गर्धेन ।

T. A., Ah. XXIX, (Comm.) 67.

Page 614.

1. ओष्ठ्यान्त्यत्रितयासेवी ब्रह्मचारी स उच्यते ।

T. A., Ah. XXIX, 65.

2. संघट्टवेलायां हि ऊर्ध्वधामनि परानन्दमये योगिनीवक्त्रात्मनि मुख्यचक्रे।

T. A., Ah. XXIX, (Comm.) 82.

3. शिवशक्तिसामरस्यमयजगदानन्दरूपमित्यर्थः ।

T. A., Ah. XXIX, (Comm.) 84.

4. ओष्ठ्यः पवर्गः, तस्य अन्त्यो मकारस्तत्त्रितयं मद्यमांसमैथुनलक्षणम् ।

T. A., Ah. XXIX, (Comm.) 65.

Page 615.

1. यदपक्वौषधाम्बुभ्यां सिद्धं मद्यं स आसवः ।
अरिष्टः क्वाथसिद्धः स्यात्तयोर्मानं जलोन्मितम् ॥

Sa. Sam. 233.

2. अम्भसां द्वादशप्रस्थं प्रस्थार्धं तक्रमेव च ।
तण्डुलानां चतुःप्रस्थं द्विप्रस्थं च तथान्धसाम् ॥
मुष्टिमात्राङ्कुरं देवि एकस्मिन्योजयेद् घटे ।

शीतादिरहितस्थाने दिवसद्वय यास्मृताम् (मास्यताम् ?)
पश्चादग्नौ समारोप्य जंबालसदृशं पचेत् ।
अवरोप्य पुनः शित्यमवद्यां ताङ्कुरैः सह ॥
पादोनप्रस्थकैः पिष्ट्वा हस्ताभ्यां मेलयेत्सुधीः ।
प्रस्थार्धतण्डुलं पक्त्वा परेद्युस्तत्समाङ्कुरैः ॥
सम्यक् संमर्द्य तत्तेन मेलयित्वा विचक्षणः ।
अनार्द्रभूतले देवि रहःस्थाने विनिक्षिपेत् ॥
एकाहं वा पुनर्नीत्वां परेद्युस्तत्समाङ्कुरैः ।
मत्स्यकूर्मं समर्धते (?) पाकमालोक्य मेलयेत् ॥
एषा पैष्टीति विख्याता पूजिता देवदानवैः ॥

K. Ar., 44–5.

Page 616.

1. सुरादर्शनमात्रेण सर्वपापैः प्रमुच्यते ।
तद्गन्धाघ्राणमात्रेण शतक्रतुफलं लभेत् ॥
तत्संस्पर्शनमात्रेण तीर्थकोटिफलं लभेत् ।
देवि तत्पानतः साक्षाल्लभेन्मुक्तिं चतुर्विधाम् ॥

K. Ar., 46.

2. श्रीब्रह्मयामलेऽप्युक्तं सुरा शिवरसो बहिः ।
तां विना भुक्तिमुक्ती नो पिष्टक्षौद्रगुडैस्तु सा ॥
स्त्रीनपुंसकपुंरूपा तु पूर्वापरभोगदा ।
द्राक्षोत्थं तु परं तेजो भैरवं कल्पनोज्झितम् ॥
× × × ×
सा च द्विधा कृत्रिमा सहजा च । तत्र कृत्रिमा त्रिविधा पैष्टी क्षौद्री गौडी चेति, सहजस्तु एक एव द्राक्षोत्थो भैरवादिशब्दव्यपदेश्यः ।

T. A., Ah. XXIX, 8–9.

3. अयष्ट्वा भैरवं देवमकृत्वा मन्त्रतर्पणम् ।
पशुपानविधौ पीत्वा वीरोऽपि नरकं व्रजेत् ॥

T. A., Ah. XXIX, (Comm.) 11.

4. मांसं तु त्रिविधं प्रोक्तं खभूजलचरं प्रिये ।
यथासम्भवमेष्वेकं तर्पणार्थं प्रकल्पयेत् ॥

K. Ar. 47.

5. मत्स्यमांसविहीनेन मद्येनापि च तर्पयेत् ।
न कुर्यान्मांसमद्याभ्यां विना द्रव्येण पूजनम् ॥

K. Ar. 47.

6. ततस्तत्रानयेद् दूतीं मदघूर्णितलोचनाम् ।
बिम्बोष्ठीं चारुदशनां सभ्रूभङ्गाननां शुभाम् ॥
त्रस्तबालमृगाभासनयनां चारुहासिनीम् ।
स्फुरद्भ्रमरसङ्घातनिभसत्केशपाशिकाम् ॥
कामकार्मुकसङ्काशभ्रूभङ्गतरलेक्षणाम् ।
द्रवच्चामीकराकारसवर्णां निस्तरङ्गिणीम् ॥
कर्णाभरणसच्चित्रशोभाशतसुशोभनाम् ।
सत्कम्बुनिभसत्कण्ठवरभूषणभूषिताम् ॥
गजकुम्भनिभोद्दामस्तनभारावनामिताम् ।
सुवृत्तोपचिताकारबाहुकन्दलिमण्डिताम् ॥
सत्पञ्चफणसङ्काशकरशाखाविराजिताम् ।
स्फुरद्रत्नशिखाचित्रकोर्मिकाङ्गुलिशोभिताम् ॥
पूर्णेन्दुवरलावण्यवदनां चित्तहारिणीम् ।
हरिहेतिमहासिंहपिपीलवरमध्यगा(मा ?)म् ॥
त्रिवलिश्रेणिसद्बिम्बजघनालसगामिनीम् ।
रम्भाकरिकराकारवरोरुवरजङ्घिकाम् ।
सत्कामरथचक्राभगुल्फपादसुशोभनाम् ॥
प्रलम्बहेमाभरणहारावलिविराजिताम् ।
स्फुरन्मञ्जीरझङ्काररशनामुखरस्वनाम् ॥
पारिहार्यझणत्कारवलयध्वानमन्थराम् ।
मत्तनागेन्द्रसङ्काशगतिं गम्भीरनाभिकाम् ॥
हंसगद्गदवाग्वंशसदृशां शुभभाषिणीम् ।
केयूरसूत्रिकामोदिपुष्पस्रग्दामभूषिताम् ॥
महापञ्चफणापीडताम्बूलवरलालसाम ।
नृत्तगीतससीत्कारलीलाकुट्टमितावृताम् ॥
निस्तरङ्गां सवर्णां च देव्येकार्पितमानसाम् ।
लोभमोहपरिक्षीणचेतसं चित्स्वभाविकाम् ॥
भैरवैकचमत्कारचर्वणैकस्वरूपिणीम् ।

T. A., Ah. XXIX, (Comm.) 68–9.

Page 617.

1. शक्तेर्लक्षणमेतावत्तद्वतो ह्यविभेदिता ।
तादृशीं तेन तां कुर्यान्नतु वर्णाद्यपेक्षणम् ॥

T. A., Ah. XXIX, 70–1

Page 618.

1. इह खलु गुरोः शासने अस्मद्दर्शने सा एवंविधा शक्तिर्जन्या जनिका सहजा चेति मुख्यया वृत्त्या त्रिविधा उक्ता यतोऽत्र अस्या लौकिकात् यौनादलौकिकात् ज्ञानीयाच्च सम्बन्धादधिकं तादात्म्यम् ।
T. A., Ah. XXIX, (Comm.) 72.

2. स्वपत्न्यपि अत्र कस्मात् न परिगणिता यत् तत्रापि अस्ति लौकिकालौकिकतयाद्वयात्मप्रसङ्गः । तत् कथमिह अस्याः षड्विधत्वमेव उक्तम् । सत्यं, किन्तु अत्र लौकिकवत् रिरंसया न प्रवृत्तिः, अपितु वक्ष्यमाणदृशा अनवच्छिन्नपरसंवित्स्वरूपावेशसमुत्कतयेत्येवंपरमेतदुक्तम् । स्वपत्न्यां हि रिरंसासम्भावनाया अपि अवकाशः स्यात् ।
T. A.. Ah. XXIX, (Comm.) 72–3.

3. श्रीसर्वाचारहृदये तदेतदुपसंहृतम् ।
षडेताः शक्तयः प्रोक्ता भुक्तिमुक्तिफलप्रदाः ॥
T. A., Ah. XXIX, 74.

4. यागौको गन्धधूपाढ्यं प्रविश्य प्रागुदङ्मुखः ।
परया वाऽथ मालिन्या विलोमाच्चानुलोमतः ॥
दाहाप्यायमयीं शुद्धिं दीप्तसौम्यविभेदतः ।
क्रमेण कुर्यादथवा मातृसद्भावमन्त्रतः ॥
T. A., Ah. XXIX, 16.

5. ततः संशोध्य वस्तूनि शक्त्यैवामृततां नयेत् ।
T. A., Ah. XXIX, 17.

6. Refer to F. N. 4. Page 608.

7. तेन निर्भरमात्मानं बहिश्चक्रानुचक्रगम् ।
विप्रुड्भिरूर्ध्वाधरयोरन्तः पीत्या च तर्पयेत् ॥
T. A., Ah. XXIX, 20.

8. विकसितेन्द्रियवृत्तिर्बहिरपि पूर्णमेव आत्मानं दिदृक्षुर्बहीरूपतयाऽपि बिम्बप्रतिबिम्बन्यायेन परंव संविदवभासत इत्यनुसन्धत्ते, तदा बहिरर्चयेत् ।

... ...

अर्काङ्गुलेऽथ तद्द्वित्रिगुणे रक्तपटे शुभे ।
व्योम्नि सिन्दूरसुभगे राजवर्त्तभृतेऽथवा ॥
नारिकेलात्मके काद्ये मद्यपूर्णेऽथ भाजने ।
T. A., Ah. XXIX, 21.

Page 619.

1. तेन भूपृष्ठे रक्तवस्त्रं, तदुपरि च कायपीठशब्दाभिधेयं काद्यं तदनुकल्पात्मकं विश्वामित्रकपालं वेति ।

T. A., Ah. XXIX, (Comm.) 22.

2. पीठमिति जालन्धरं यतस्तत्सिद्धयोगिनीक्रमेण अस्य दर्शनस्य अवतारः ।

T. A., Ah. XXIX, (Comm.) 23.

3. अट्टहासं शिखास्थाने चरित्रं च करन्ध्रके ।
श्रुत्योः कौलगिरिं नासारन्ध्रयोश्च जयन्तिकाम् ॥
भ्रुवोरुज्जयिनीं वक्त्रे प्रयागं हृदये पुनः ।
वाराणसीं स्कन्धयुगे श्रीपीठं विरजं गले ॥
एडाभीमुदरे हालां नाभौ कन्धे तु गोश्रुतिम् ।
उपस्थे मरुकोशं च नगरं पौण्ड्रवर्धनम् ॥
एलापुरं पुरस्तीरं सक्थ्यूर्वोर्दक्षिणादितः ।
कुड्याकेशीं च सोपानं मायापुक्षीरके तथा ॥
जानुजङ्घे गुल्फयुग्मे त्वाम्रातनृपसद्मनी ।
पादाधारे तु वैरिञ्चीं कालाग्न्यवधिधारिकाम् ॥

T. A., Ah. XXIX, 42–3.

4. न अत्र ताटस्थ्येन अवस्थातव्यं, किन्तु अहमेव पीठस्तदधिष्ठात्र्यः शक्तयश्चेति अनुसन्धातव्यं येन सिद्धिः स्यादित्याह—
नाहमस्मि न चान्योऽस्ति केवलाः शक्तयस्त्वहम् ।
इत्येवंवासनां कुर्यात्सर्वदा स्मृतिमात्रतः ॥

T. A., Ah. XXIX, 44.

5. ततो जपः प्रकर्तव्यस्त्रिलक्षादिविभेदतः ।
उक्तं श्रीयोगसञ्चारे स च चित्रस्वरूपकः ॥

T. A., Ah. XXIX, 56–7.

6. तेन अस्य एवमुक्तानामास्यादीनामपमार्गाणां निरोधे अनुसन्धातव्यं येन सर्वतो रुद्धः सन् गत्यन्तराभावान्मध्यधामैव असावनुप्रविशतीति ।

T. A., Ah. XXIX, (Comm.) 60.

7. होमोऽप्यत्र दशांशतः ।

T. A., Ah. XXIX, 58.

8. साकं बाह्यस्थया शक्त्या यदा त्वेष समर्चयेत् ।
तदायं परमेशोक्तो रहस्यो भण्यते विधिः ॥

T. A., Ah. XXIX, 63.

9. आदीयते यतः सारं तस्य मुख्यस्य चैव यत् ।
मुख्यश्च यागस्तेनायमादियाग इति स्मृतः ॥
T. A., Ah. XXIX, 112.

10. आदेर्मुख्यचक्रस्य याग इति च ।
T. A., Ah. XXIX, (Comm.) 113.

Page 620.

1. 'आनन्दो ब्रह्मणो रूपम्.........।'
इति परमित्यनेन अस्य अवश्यसेव्यत्वमुक्तम् । तच्च न केवलं परब्रह्मादिविभेदमात्मनि एव स्थितं, यावदनात्मरूपे बाह्यशरीरादावपीत्याह देहे इति । तत्रेति त्रयाणां मध्यात् । द्वयमिति मद्यमांसलक्षणम् । अन्यदिति मैथुनम् । मद्यमांसपानाशनप्रवर्धितधातुर्हि रममाण आनन्दमियादित्युक्तमुपकारीति......।
T. A., Ah. XXIX, (Comm.) 64–5.

2. Refer to F. N. 1. Page 614.
3. तद्वर्जिता ये पशव आनन्दपरिवर्जिताः ।
आनन्दकृत्रिमाहारास्तद्वर्जं चक्रयाजकाः ॥
द्वयेऽपि निरये यान्ति रौरवे भीषणे त्विति ।
T. A., Ah. XXIX, 66.

4. Refer to F. N. 3. Page 613.
5. अवान्तरभेदप्रायं प्रत्येकं सम्भवदपि आनन्त्यादिह न परिगणितम् ।
T. A., Ah. XXIX, (Comm.) 74.

Page 621.

1. चितो नैराकाङ्क्ष्योत्पादात् विकासः समुच्छलद्रूपत्वमित्यर्थः ।
T. A., Ah. XXIX, (Comm.) 77.

2. स्वादः काव्यार्थसंभेदादात्मानन्दसमुद्भवः ।
विकासविस्तरक्षोभविक्षेपैः स चतुर्विधः ॥
श्रृङ्गारवीरबीभत्सरौद्रेषु मनसः क्रमात् ।
D. R., (G) 162.

3. तथा च मधुरादौ रसे औदरिकाभ्यवहारवैलक्षण्येन प्रवृत्त इदमित्थमिति प्रमातरि विश्रमयन् प्रमातृभागमेव प्रधानतया विमृशन् भुञ्जान इति उच्यते । यत्रापि अत्यन्तमन्यथाभावमतिक्रम्य सुखमास्वाद्यते अर्जनादिसम्भाव्यमानविघ्नान्तरनिरासात् वैषयिकानन्दविलक्षणश्रृङ्गारादौ नाट्य-

काव्यादिविषये, तत्र वीतविघ्नस्वादेव असौ रसना चर्वणा निर्वृत्तिः प्रतीतिः प्रमातृताविश्रान्तिरेव, तत एव हृदयेन परामर्शलक्षणेन प्राधान्यात् व्यपदेश्या व्यवस्थितस्य अपि प्रकाशभागस्य वेद्यविश्रान्तस्य अनादरणात् सहृदयता उच्यते इति निर्विघ्नास्वादरूपा च रसना तद्गोचरीकार्याश्रित्तवृत्तयो रसा न वा इत्ययमर्थोऽभिनवभारत्यां नाट्यवेदविवृतौ वितत्य व्युत्पादितोऽस्माभिरिति। तत्कुतूहली तामेव अवलोकयेत्। इह तु प्रकृतविघ्नकारित्वात् न विततः। तस्मादनुपचरितस्य संवेदनरूपतानान्तरीयत्वेन अवस्थितस्य स्वतन्त्रस्यैव रसनैकघनतया परामर्शः परमानन्दो निर्वृत्तिश्चमत्कार उच्यते।

I. P. V. V., Vol. II, 178–9.

4. यथा प्रेक्षणके तत्तद्द्रष्टृसंविदभेदिताम्।
क्रमोदितां सद्य एव लभते तत्प्रवेशनात्॥

T. A., Ah. XXVIII, 10.

Page 622.

1. सर्वत्र तावदुपायमार्गे समस्तेतरवृत्तिप्रशमपूर्वमेकाग्रीभवन्ति योगिनः, एतास्वतिक्रोधाद्यवस्थासु स्वरसत एव समस्तापरवृत्तिक्षयमयीषु यदि स्पन्दतत्त्वविविक्तये सततमुद्युक्ता झटित्यन्तर्मुखीभवन्ति योगिनस्तत्समीहितमचिरेणैव लभन्ते।

S. N., 39–40

2. यथोक्तं श्रीविज्ञानभैरवे
'कामक्रोधलोभमोहमदमात्सर्यगोचरे।
बुद्धिं निस्तिमितां कृत्वा तत्तत्त्वमवशिष्यते॥'

S. N., 40.

3. क्षोभाद्यन्तर्विरामेषु तदेव च परामृतम्।
सीत्कारसुखसद्भावसमावेशसमाधिषु ॥
क्षोभस्य—आदियागरूपस्य ये आद्यन्तर्विरामाः तेषु ये सीत्कारादयः, तेषु तदेवामृतं परं धाम अर्थादभिव्यज्यत इति सम्बन्धः,............ ।

T. A., II, 164–5.

4. यथा खगेश्वरीभावनिःशङ्कत्वाद्विषं व्रजेत्।
क्षयं कर्मस्थितिस्तद्वदशङ्काद् भैरवत्वतः॥

T. A., Ah. XXXVII, 3?6.

Page 623.

1. इत्थं स्वोचितवस्त्वंशैरनुचक्रेषु तर्पणम्।
कुर्वीयातामिहान्योन्यं मुख्यचक्रैकताकृते॥

T. A., Ah. XXIX, 78.

2. इह अनुचक्रात्मनां निखिलानां चक्राणां मध्ये तत्संक्षोभे यथोचितमर्थ-जातमाहरन्नपि विमलं तदासङ्गाभावात् वैवश्यकलंकोन्मुक्तं यदासनमवस्थानं तन्निष्ठः सन् स्वस्वरूपविश्रान्त्या तत्क्षोभोपसंहारात् रुद्रस्थानं समाविशेत् मुख्यचक्रात्मकपरप्रमातृदशावेशभाग्भवेदित्यर्थः ।

T. A., Ah. XXIX, (Comm.) 79–80.

3. इत्थं यामलमेतद्गलितभिदासंकथं यदेव स्यात् ।
क्रमतारतम्ययोगात्सैव हि संविद्विसर्गसङ्घट्टः ॥
तद्ध्रुवधामानुत्तरमुभयात्मकजगदुदारसानन्दम् ।
नो शान्तं नाप्युदितं शान्तोदितसूतिकारणं परं कौलम् ॥

T. A., Ah. XXIX. 83.

4. दक्षवामवाहात्मनः स्रोतोद्वयस्य निष्ठान्तं मध्यधामविश्रान्तिपर्यन्तं बोधनं विश्रामं समावेशं च………… ।

T. A., Ah. XXIX, (Comm.) 101.

Page 626.

1. इह पुरा पाणिनीयेऽस्मिन् व्याकरणे व्याड्युपरचितं ग्रन्थलक्षपरिमाणं संग्रहाभिधानं निबन्धनमासीत् ।

V. P., Ch. II, (Comm.) 283.

2. तत्र ह्युपलतले रावणविरचितो मूलभूतव्याकरणागमस्तिष्ठति केनचिच्च ब्रह्मरक्षसानीय चन्द्राचार्यवसुरातगुरुप्रभृतीनां दत्त इति ।
न्यायप्रस्थानमार्गांस्तानभ्यस्य स्वं च दर्शनम् ।
प्रणीतो गुरुणाऽस्माकमयमागमसंग्रहः ॥

V. P., Ch. II, 285–6.

3. कुणिना प्राग्ग्रहणमाचार्यनिर्देशार्थं व्यवस्थितविभाषार्थं चेति व्याख्यातम् ।

M. Bh., (Pra.) 538.

4. भाष्याब्धिः क्वातिगम्भीरः क्वाहं मन्दमतिस्ततः ।
छात्राणामुपहास्यत्वं यास्यामि पिशुनात्मनाम् ॥
तथापि हरिबद्धेन सारेण ग्रन्थसेतुना ।
क्रममाणः शनैः पारं तस्य प्राप्तास्मि पङ्गुवत् ॥

M. Bh., (Pra.) 5.

Page 628.

1. यथा धीवराः पचयन्तराणां ग्रहणाय सूत्रप्रतिबद्धान् पक्षिणश्चेष्टयन्ते तथा च ते सूत्रप्रतिबन्धादस्वतन्त्रा इव भवन्ति तथेच्छायां तन्तुनाऽऽकर्षणात् एवं कालसूत्रप्रतिबन्धात् पदार्थाः संकोचविकासलक्षणावुत्पत्तिध्वंसावनवरतमनुभवन्ति ।

V. P., (Comm., Ban.) 5-6

2. कालाख्येन स्वातन्त्र्येण सर्वाः परतन्त्रा जन्मादिमय्यः शक्तयः ।

V. P., (Comm.) Ch. I. P. 2.

अत एव स्वातन्त्र्यशक्तिः काल इति वाक्यपदीये सिद्धान्तितम् ।

V. P., Ch. III, (Comm.) P. 346.

Page 629.

1. तच्च पश्यन्तीरूपं ग्राह्यग्राहकविभागक्रमरहितम्, अविभागा तु पश्यन्ती देशकालक्रमसंहारवती चेति—

S. Dr., 45.

Page 632.

1. प्रागिवार्थोऽप्रकाशः स्यात्प्रकाशात्मतया विना ।
न च प्रकाशो भिन्नः स्यादात्मार्थस्य प्रकाशता ॥

Bh., Vol. I, 198.

Page 634.

1. परापरं तु इदंभावरूपस्य प्रत्यवमर्शस्य अख्यातिप्राणस्य उद्बोधमात्रेऽपि अहम्भाव एव विश्रान्तेः श्रीसदाशिवादिभूमौ पश्यन्तीदशायाम् ।

Bh., Vol. I, 254.

Page 635.

1. अनन्यापेक्षिता यास्य विश्वात्मत्वं प्रति प्रभोः ।
तां परां प्रतिभां देवीं संगिरन्ते ह्यनुत्तराम् ॥
अकुलस्यास्य देवस्य कुलप्रथनशालिनी ।
कौलिकी सा परा शक्तिरवियुक्तो यया प्रभुः ॥

T. A., II, 74-5.

2. 'अनुत्तरं कथम्' इत्यादिसार्धश्लोकयुगलनिगमितेन प्रश्नेन 'शृणु देवि' इत्यादिना सार्धश्लोकनिर्णीतेन चोत्तरेण, अनुत्तरपदप्राप्तिवशाविष्टजीवन्मुक्तभावानां कृतकृत्यता, अतस्तावन्मात्र एव दृढप्रतिपत्तिपवित्रीकृतैर्विश्रमणीयम्—इत्युक्तुजाः फूत्कुर्मः ।

P. T. V., 96-7.

3. कस्मिंश्च प्रकारे मोक्षे एव किं वा बन्धाभिमतेऽपि ।

P. T. V., 32.

Page 636.

1. 'यत्र स्थितमिदं सर्वं कार्यं यस्माच्च निर्गतम् ।
तस्यानावृतरूपत्वान्न निरोधोऽस्ति कुत्रचित् ॥
इति । आवरकत्वेन निरोधकाभिमतोऽपि हि तदावरणादिस्वातन्त्र्येण प्रकाशमानो दृक्क्रियात्मक एव परमेश्वरः,...... ।

P. T. V. 88.

2. व्याख्यातमिदमनुत्तरं षोडशधा । यदुक्तं सारशास्त्रे—
'अनुत्तरं तद्धृदयं हृदये ग्रन्थिरूपता ।
ग्रन्थिं षोडशधा ज्ञात्वा कुर्यात्कर्म यथा सुखम् ॥'

P. T. V., 31.

Page 637.

1. 'अनुत्तरम्' इति, न विद्यते उत्तरमधिकं यतः, यथा हि तत्त्वान्तराणि षट्त्रिंशत् अनाश्रितशिवपर्यन्तानि परभैरवबोधानुप्रवेशासादिततथाभावसिद्धीनि संविदमधिकयन्ति, नैवं परा परिपूर्णा परभैरवसंवित् तस्याः सदा स्वयमनर्गलानपेक्षप्रथाचमत्कारसारत्वात् । तथा न विद्यते उत्तरं प्रश्नप्रतिवचोरूपं यत्र,............ ।

P. T. V., 19.

2. उत्तरं च शब्दनं तत् सर्वथा 'ईदृशं तादृशम्' इति व्यवच्छेदं कुर्यात्, तत् यत्र न भवति अव्यवच्छिन्नम् 'इदम्' अनुत्तरम् ।

P. T. V., 21.

3. यावदनुत्तरे रूपे प्रविविक्षुः मायीयः प्रमाता तावत् कल्पित एव विशेषात्मनि, तत्र तु अविकल्पितं यत् अविनाभावि तद्विना कल्पितरूपास्फुरणात्, तदेव वस्तुतोऽनुत्तरम् ।

P. T. V., 22.

4. तत् ईदृशमौत्तराधर्यद्वैतसंमोहाधायि उत्तरत्वम्,......ऊनाधिकत्वं यत्र न स्यात्, भावप्राधान्यमुत्तरशब्दस्य । उत्तराः पश्यन्त्याद्याः शक्तयः, अघोराद्याः ता यत्र न स्युः,............ ।

P. T. V., 24.

Page 638.

1. अनिति श्वसिति इति क्विपि अन्–अणुः आत्मा देहपुर्यष्टकादिः, तथा अननं जीवनम् अन्–देहाद्यन्तर्गतैव भिन्नभिन्नशक्त्याद्यहन्ताशून्यप्राया जीवनाख्या वृत्तिः, यः शून्यप्रमाता इति अभिहितः, तस्यैव उत्तरत्वं सर्वतः परमार्थतया आधिक्यं यत्र–भैरवैकमयत्वात्;...... ।

P. T. V., 25–6.

2. शून्ये प्रमातरि समवेता प्राणापानसमानोदानव्यानात्मके वायुचक्रे प्रेरणात्मिका शक्तिः, सा च विद्याकलयोः प्रपञ्चभूतौ यौ क्रमेण बुद्धीन्द्रियकर्मेन्द्रियवर्गौ तयोरान्तरी वृत्तिः ।

Bh., Vol. II, 263.

Page 639.

1. यन्नाम हि इदं मातृमानमेयत्रयात्मविश्वाभेदेन अवभासमानं प्रकाशतत्त्वम् इच्छादिशक्त्यविशेषितं तदेव स्वातन्त्र्यात् स्वात्मनि स्वाविभागेनावस्थितं विश्वात्ममेयमवविभासयिषया आत्मनः पृथक्कृत्य सर्वस्मात् उत्तीर्णोऽहम् इत्यामर्शनेन सकलभावशून्यत्वात् निरावरणरूपतया शून्यप्रमाता इत्यागमेषु आम्नातः । शून्यत्वं चात्र सकलभावक्षयात् न तु संविदोऽपि, तथात्वे च सर्वमनेडमूकं स्यात् । उक्तं च अन्यत्र—
'सर्वालम्बनधर्मैश्च सर्वतत्त्वैरशेषतः ।
सर्वक्लेशाशयैः शून्यं न शून्यं परमार्थतः ॥'

P. T. V., (F. N.) 26.

Page 640.

1. 'अ' इति च या इयम् अमायीयाश्रौतनैसर्गिकमहाप्रकाशविश्रान्तनिस्तरङ्गचिदुदधिस्वात्मचमत्काररूपा शाक्तोल्लासमयविश्वामर्शनरूपपरिपूर्णाहम्भावप्रथमपर्यवसानोभयभूमिगा कला तस्या एव वक्ष्यमाणनयेन या इयं 'नुत्' विसर्गान्तता तस्या एव 'तरः' प्लवनं—सर्वोपरिवृत्तित्वं यत्र ।

P. T. V., 27–8.

Page 641.

1. लौकिक्याः क्रियायाः सक्रमत्वं कालशक्तेः आभासविच्छेदनप्रदर्शनसामर्थ्यरूपात् पारमेश्वरात् शक्तिविशेषात् घटते उपपद्यते, या तु प्रभोः सम्बन्धिनी तद्व्यतिरिक्ता क्रियाशक्तिः शाश्वती कालेन अस्पृष्टा तस्याः सक्रमत्वम् अस्ति इति संभावनाऽपि नास्ति, यथा प्रभोः सक्रमत्वमसंभाव्यं तथा अस्या अपि ।

Bh., Vol. II, 10–11

2. उत्तरस्यापि संनिहितस्य यत् अनुत्तरं, प्रागुक्तक्रमेण हि उत्तरमपि अनुत्तरतादात्म्येनैव भवेत् नान्यथा,...... ।

P. T. V., 81.

Page 642.

1. तथा उत्तरस्यापि ग्रन्थभागस्य अनुत्तरं तेनापि उत्तरीतुं न शक्यते ।

P. T. V., 82.

2. उत्तरस्य त्रिशूलप्रेरणामयस्य यत् अनुत्तरं विश्रान्तिस्थानं, किं तत्? इत्याह—यतः स्यात् अयं कौलिको विधिः—कौलिकः कुलाकुलात्मा प्राक् व्याख्यातो विधीयमानत्वात् विधिः महासृष्टिरूपो—गर्भीकृतानन्तसृष्ट्यादिकोटिशतो यस्मात्प्रसृत एतदेव तदनुत्तरम्,...... ।

P. T. V., 83.

3. इदं विश्वं चिच्चित्तप्राणदेहसुखदुःखेन्द्रियभूतघटादिमयमेकस्यां वा परस्यां परमेश्वर्यां भैरवसंविदि अविभागेनैव बोधात्मकेन रूपेण आस्ते, यद्यपि बोधात्मकं रूपं नास्तमेति जातुचिदपि तदस्तमये अप्रकाशमानतापत्तेः, तथापि परस्पराभावात्मकोऽवच्छेदः तत्र नास्ति, विश्वात्मान एव भावाः, तत्र च यदि एषामवस्थितिः न स्यात् तत् प्रथमानुसंधानादिकमेव अक्षप्रेरणोपयोग्यपि न भवेत् इति समुचितानुदितेदन्ताकमहंपरामर्शमात्राभिन्नमेव भावजातं विगतभेदकलनं तिष्ठति न तत्र कश्चित् अवच्छेदः,... ।

P. T. V., 84-5.

4. सर्वमिदं हि षट्त्रिंशदात्म, ततः सामान्यस्पन्दसंविदात्मनः शक्तिमतः परशक्तिप्रधानात् शिवात् स्वशक्त्या सृष्टमपि सत् तत्रैव भैरवविशेषस्पन्दात्मनि शक्तिप्रधाने स्वस्वरूपे विश्राम्येत्,...... ।

P. T. V., 86.

Page 643.

1. ममेति यत् एतत् हृदयं सर्वभावानां स्थानं प्रतिष्ठाधाम, नीलादीनां हि अन्ततः क्रिमिपर्यन्तं चिदंशानिविष्टानां न किंचित् नीलादि रूपमिति प्रमातुरेव यत् 'ममेति' अविच्छिन्नचमत्कारांशोपारोहित्वं 'मम नीलं भातम्' इति तदेव नीलादिरूपत्वमिति, तस्य ममेत्यस्य नीलाद्यनन्तसर्वभावहृदयस्य यत् व्योम, यत्र तत् ममकारात्मकं विश्वं वीतं सम्यक् धृतम्, अत एव त्यक्तभिन्ननिजरूपतया शून्यरूपं व्योम यत्र, तथा ममेत्यस्य भिन्नाभिन्नरूपपरापरसंविदात्मनो यत् हृदयं पर्यन्तप्रतिष्ठाधाम 'अहमिति' तस्यापि व्योम संहाररूपकलनेन 'महअ' इति, नरात्मकं लीनं बिन्द्वात्मशक्तौ, म–इति कुण्डलिनी–ह–कलारूपायां प्रविश्य,

परिपूर्णनिरर्गलचमत्कारे सर्वाविच्छिन्ने अ-इत्यनुप्रविष्टं तथा भवति,········।

P. T. V., 86–7.

2. एवं यत इदं प्रसृतं यत्र च विश्रान्तं तदेव नित्यमनावृतस्वभावं स्वयं प्रथमानम् अनपह्नवनीयमनुत्तरम् ।

P. T. V., 87–8.

3. इत्थं यामलमेतद्गलितभिदासंकथं यदेव स्यात् ।
क्रमतारतम्ययोगात्सैव हि संविद्विसर्गसंघट्टः ॥
तद्ध्रुवधामानुत्तरमुभयात्मकजगदुदारसानन्दम् ।
नो शान्तं नाप्युदितं शान्तोदितसूतिकारणं परं कौलम् ॥

T. A., Ah. XXIX, 83.

4. एतच्च आदरातिशयमवद्योतयितुं प्राक्संवादितेनापि निजस्तोत्रैकदेशेन संवादयति—
कृत्वाधारधरां चमत्कृतिरसप्रोक्षाक्षणक्षालिताम्,
आत्तैर्मानसतः स्वभावकुसुमैः स्वामोदसन्दोहिभिः ।
आनन्दामृतनिर्भरस्वहृदयानर्घार्घपात्रक्रमात्,
त्वां देव्या सह देहदेवसदने देवार्चयेऽहर्निशम् ॥

T. A., Ah. XXIX, 118.

Page 645.

1. भवति च इदमस्तमितोदेष्यदुभयविकल्पज्ञानान्तरालवर्ति उन्मेषप्रतिभादि, शब्दागमगीतं निर्विकल्पकं, ससंवादविरुद्धाभिमतनीलादिविकल्पपूर्वभावि तस्मात्तदनन्तावभासाविभागमयमेवेति, उभयोश्च ज्ञानयोरन्तरालमनपह्नवनीयं-ज्ञानयोर्भेदादेव, तच्च संविदात्मकमेव अन्यथा तेनैव संवित्संस्कारोच्छेदे स्मरणाद्यनुसंधानाद्ययोग इति, प्रतिभाख्यस्य धर्मिणः सर्ववादिनः प्रति अविवाद एव इति न असिद्धिः ।

P. T. V., 106–7

2. इत्येतद्धृदयाद्येकस्वभावेऽपि स्वधामनि ।
षट्प्राणोच्चारजं रूपमथ व्याप्त्या तदुच्यते ॥

T. A., Ah. V, 357.

Page 646.

1. या तत्र सम्यग्विश्रान्तिः सानुत्तरमयी स्थितिः ।

T. A., Ah. V, 356.

2. 'शून्यतामात्रे' विश्रान्तिमाश्रित्य प्राणाद्युदयविश्रान्तिधामनि 'हृदि' विषये 'निजो' निरुपाधिकत्वात्स्वभावभूत 'आनन्दो' यस्यैवंविधे प्रमेयाद्यंशान्तरापेक्षया 'प्रमात्रंशमात्रे स्थितः' स्वात्मानमेव केवलतया साक्षात्कुर्वन्नवस्थितः सन्·········।

T. A., Ah. V, 350.

3. 'साक्षं सर्वमिदं देहं यद्यपि व्याप्य संस्थितः।
तथाप्यस्य परं स्थानं हृत्पङ्कजसमुद्गकम् ॥'

T. A., Ah. V, 330.

4. 'प्राक्संवित् प्राणे परिणता।'
इति नीत्या प्रमाणात्मनः 'प्राणस्य'·········।

T. A., Ah. V, 350.

Page 647.

1. अपानात्मनि 'प्रमेये' पुनरुदयति 'परेण' प्रमेयेण कृतम् 'आनन्दं विभावयेत'; यतः 'तत्र' तस्यां प्रमेयोदयदशायाम् असौ परानन्दनिष्ठस्तिष्ठेत्।

T. A., Ah. V, 350–1.

2. योगी मध्यमार्गेणोर्ध्वगामिनि 'उदानवह्नौ' उत्कर्षक्रमेण परिहृतप्राणाद्यवान्तरक्षोभतया 'विश्रान्तो महान्तं' प्रमाणादिदशाधिशायि निरानन्दादिवैलक्षण्यादुत्कृष्टं प्रमातृसंमतम् 'आनन्दं विभावयेत्' स्वात्ममात्रविश्रान्तिरूपतया विमृशेदित्यर्थः ॥

T. A., Ah. V, 352.

3. निरुपाधिर्महाव्याप्तिर्व्यानाख्योपाधिवर्जिता।
तदा खलु चिदानन्दो यो जडानुपबृंहितः ॥

T. A., Ah. V, 353.

Page 648.

1. Refer to F. N. 1. Page 646.
2. स्वस्थतनोरपरस्य तु ता देहाधिष्ठितं विहाय यतः।
आसत इति तदहंयुर्नो पूर्णो नापि चोच्छलति ॥

T. A., Ah. XXIX, 81.

Page 649.

1. शिवशक्तिसामरस्यमयजगदानन्दरूपमित्यर्थः। शान्तमिति विश्वोत्तीर्णम्। उदितमिति विश्वमयम्। परं कौलमिति शान्तोदितादिशब्दव्यपदेश्यत्वायोगादतीव रहस्यरूपमित्यर्थः। अथ च क्षेपस्य असम्पत्तेर्न शान्तं स्वरूपविश्रान्त्या च न उदितं, किन्तु एतदवस्थाद्वयहेतुभूतमनवच्छिन्नसंविन्मात्रसतत्त्वमित्यर्थः।

T. A., Ah. XXIX, 84.

Page 650.

1. पूर्णतामयम् अन्तर्गतविश्ववीर्यसमुच्छलत्तात्मकविसर्गविश्लेषानन्दशक्त्यैकघनं ब्रह्म बृहद् व्यापकं बृंहितं च, न तु वेदान्तपाठकाङ्गीकृतकेवलशून्यवादाविदूरवर्तिब्रह्मदर्शने इव, एतच्च तृतीयं नराद्यपेक्षया शिवपरैकरूपम्……… ।

P. T. V., 221.

2. भैरवरूपस्य विश्वस्य प्रदर्शितयुक्त्यागमनिरूपितनररूपापराभट्टारिकास्वभावः शाक्तः, तस्य हृदयं सारं शिवरूपम्……… ।

P, T. V., 220.

3. एवमेतत् चतुर्दशसु युतं संश्लिष्टं पञ्चदशात्मकं तिथीशान्तेन विसर्गेण षोडशेनान्वितम्, यद्वा चतुर्दशसहितं युतं युग्मं षोडश, तिथीनां पञ्चदशानामीशो विसर्गः तस्यान्तः सप्तदश्यनुत्तरकला तदन्वितं हृदयम्……… ।

P. T. V., 223–4.

4. आदौ हि निस्तरङ्गजलधिप्रख्येऽनुत्तरात्मनि परस्मिन् विसर्गे प्रकाशैकघने प्रथमसमुल्लसनशीलो व्यतिरिक्तविमृश्याभावात् चिद्विमर्शपरः स्वात्ममात्रपरामर्शनतत्पराहंपरामर्शः स्फुरति स एव प्रोल्लाससमय इत्युच्यते येनास्य सर्वत्रैव स्वातन्त्र्यमुदियात् ।

P. T. V., 205. (F. N.)

5. तत्रानुत्तरानुसारेण यदेतत् ब्रह्म सामरस्यं वेद्यवेदकयोश्चतसृणां दशानामुद्योगादीनां समाहारोऽविभागभूः प्राथमिकी, तया युतमविभागि,… ।

P. T. V., 224.

Page 651.

1. इच्छाभिप्रायेण तृतीयमिच्छा, तच्च बृंहितमिष्यमाणेनाभिन्नेन पूर्णं ब्रह्म……… ।

P. T. V., 226.

Page 652.

1. ज्ञातमात्रं, ज्ञातमेव, ज्ञेयैकरूपत्वात्, न तु कदाचित् ज्ञातृरूपं घटादि, तथा ज्ञाता ज्ञेयरूपा भेदमयी इयं माया, तदुभयं विगतं यत्र तत् विज्ञातमात्रम्,……… ।

P. T. V., 39.

2. परैव सूक्ष्मा कुण्डलिनी शक्तिः शिवेन सह परस्परसामरस्यरूपमथ्यमन्थकभावात्मकं संघट्टमासाद्य उत्थिता सती इच्छाज्ञानक्रियारूपतामाश्रित्य रौद्रीत्वमुन्मुद्रयन्ती शृङ्गाटकाकारतामम्बिकात्वमवलम्बमाना उकारात्मकशशाङ्कशकलाकारतां ज्येष्ठात्वमधितिष्ठन्ती च शशिबिन्दूदितकालाग्निरूपरेफात्मकबिन्दुविश्रान्तस्पष्टरेखाकारतामाभासयति...... ।

T. A., II, (Comm.) 77.

Page 654.

1. अनन्यापेक्षिता याऽस्य विश्वात्मत्वं प्रति प्रभोः ।
तां परां प्रतिभां देवीं संविदन्ते ह्यनुत्तराम् ॥

T. A., II, 74.

2. तयोर्यद्यामलं रूपं स संघट्ट इति स्मृतः ।
आनन्दशक्तिः सैवोक्ता यतो विश्वं विसृज्यते ॥

T. A., II, 81.

अतश्च प्रकाशविमर्शात्मनोरनुत्तरयोरेव संघट्टादानन्दशक्त्यात्मनो द्वितीयवर्णस्य उदयो, यतः...... ।

T. A., II, (Comm.) 81.

3. परापरात्परं तत्त्वं सैषा देवी निगद्यते ।
तत्सारं तच्च हृदयं स विसर्गः परः प्रभुः ॥
परात्–विश्वोत्तीर्णात् शैवात् रूपात् , अपरात् विश्वमयात् शाक्ताद्रूपात्, परं पूर्णम्,......... ।

T. A., II, 81–2.

Page 655.

1. संघट्टेऽस्मिंश्चिदात्मत्वाद्यत्तत्प्रत्यवमर्शनम् ।
इच्छाशक्तिरघोराणां शक्तीनां सा परा प्रभुः ॥

T. A., II, 83.

2. सैव प्रक्षुब्धरूपा चेदीशित्री संप्रजायते ।
तदा घोराः परादेव्यो जाताः शैवाध्वदैशिकाः ॥

T. A., II, 84.

3. स्वात्मप्रत्यवमर्शो यः प्रागभूदेकवीरकः ।
ज्ञातव्यविश्वोन्मेषात्मा ज्ञानशक्तितया स्थितः ॥

T. A., II, 85.

Page 656.

1. तेन अक्षुब्धा ज्वलनशक्त्याच्छुरिता इच्छा 'ऋ' क्षुब्धा तु 'ॠ' एवं धराशक्त्याच्छुरिता 'ऌॡ' इति,...... ।

T. A., II, (Comm.) 90.

2. स्वात्मसंघट्टवैचित्र्यं शक्तीनां यत्परस्परम् ।
एतदेव परं प्राहुः क्रियाशक्तेः स्फुटं वपुः ॥

T. A., II, 111.

3. एतत्त्रितयसंक्येन यदा तु प्रस्फुरेत्तदा ।
न केनचिदुपाधेयं स्वस्वविप्रतिषेधतः ॥
लोलीभूतमतः शक्तित्रितयं तत्त्रिशूलकम् ।
यस्मिन्नाशु समावेशाद्भवेद्योगी निरञ्जनः ॥

T. A., II, 114-5.

Page 657.

1. परस्य आनन्दात्मनो विसर्गस्य उक्तत्वात् अपरस्य च हकारात्मनो वक्ष्यमाणत्वात् परापरो योऽसौ विसर्गः तस्य स्वरूपस्थौ यावात्मभूतौ विसर्जनीयशब्दवाच्यौ बिन्दू, तयोर्गतिः—तद्रूपावभासनेन प्रसरणं तया विसर्पिता—तत्तद्रूपावविभासयिषया प्रोच्छलन्तीत्यर्थः,...... ।

T. A., II, (Comm.) 141-2.

Page 658.

1. सैव पुनर्विसर्गेण—बहिर्भावौन्मुख्येन विरहिता सती, प्रसुप्तभुजगाकारत्वात् स्वात्ममात्रविश्रान्ता शक्तिकुण्डलिनी—परा संविन्मात्ररूपेति यावत्, अत एव विसर्गस्य बहिर्भावौन्मुख्यात्मकादिकोटिरूपे प्रान्तदेशे प्राणकुण्डलिका—

'प्राक् संवित्प्राणे परिणता ।'

इति नीत्या प्रथममेव प्राणरूपतामवभासयन्तीत्यर्थः, तथा प्रत्यावृत्तिक्रमेण अन्तर्भावौन्मुख्यरूपान्तकोट्यात्मनि प्रान्ते स्वरूपे 'परा कुण्डलिनी' स्वात्मविश्रान्तपरसंविन्मात्ररूपेत्यर्थः,...... ।

T. A., II, (Comm.) 142.

2. विसर्ग एव तावान्यदाक्षिप्तैतावदात्मकः ।
इयद्रूपं सागरस्य यदनन्तोर्मिसंततिः ॥
अत एव विसर्गोऽयमव्यक्तहकलात्मकः ।
कामतत्त्वमिति श्रीमत्कुलगुह्वर उच्यते ॥

T. A., II, 147.

Page 659.

1. विसर्ग एवमुत्सृष्ट आश्यानत्वमुपागतः ।
हंसः प्राणो व्यञ्जनं च स्पर्शश्च परिभाष्यते ॥

T. A., II, 144.

2. Refer to F. N. 2. Page 658.

3. 'नास्योच्चारयिता कश्चित्प्रतिहन्ता न विद्यते ।
स्वयमुच्चरते देवः प्राणिनामुरसि स्थितः ॥'

T. A., II, (Comm.) 149.

4. यत्तदक्षरमव्यक्तं कान्ताकण्ठे व्यवस्थितम् ।
ध्वनिरूपमनिच्छं तु ध्यानधारणवर्जितम् ॥
तत्र चित्तं समाधाय वशयेद्युगपज्जगत् ।

· T. A., II, 148.

Page 661.

1. क्षुभिताक्षुभितरूपत्वेन द्विविधा येयमिच्छाशक्तिः सा, विजातीयश्चिद्रूपो योऽयं शक्त्यंशोऽनुत्तरस्तत्र प्रोन्मुखी तेन समम् 'इको यणचि' इति प्राप्तसंधिः सती यात्मतां याति—यकारात्मना प्रस्फुरतीत्यर्थः, सैव द्विरूपापीच्छाशक्तिः 'अचिरद्युतिभासिन्या' इत्याद्युक्तगत्या शीघ्रं स्थिरं च कृत्वा, उपात्तं यत् ज्ञेयम्—अर्थादिष्यमाणं तत्कालुष्येणारूषिता सती अनुत्तरात्मनि विजातीये यदुन्मुखत्वं—तेन समम् 'इको यणचि' इति संधिः, तेन रत्वं लत्वं च गच्छति—तदात्मना भासत इत्यर्थः, एवमुन्मेषशक्तिरपि द्विप्रकारा 'वैजात्यशक्तिगा'—अनुत्तरेण सह प्राग्वदेव कृतसन्धिर्वकारत्वमवभासयेत्,...... ।

T. A., II, 157.

2. 'सृष्टिसारप्रवर्षकम्' इत्यनेन अस्य वरुणबीजत्वादाप्यायकारित्वं दर्शितम्, एवं य-र-लानामपि शोषकारित्वं दाहकत्वं स्तम्भकत्वं च क्रमेणावमन्तव्यम् ।

T. A., II, 157.

3. इदं चतुष्कमन्तःस्थमत एव निगद्यते ।
इच्छाद्यन्तर्गतत्वेन स्वसमाप्तौ च संस्थितेः ॥
अत एव—प्रागुक्ताद्धेतोः, 'इच्छादि' इति आदिशब्देन उन्मेषस्य ग्रहणादिच्छोन्मेषयोरन्तर्—अभेदेनावस्थानात्, तथा स्वस्य—प्रमात्रेकरूपस्य आत्मनः, सम्यगाप्तिः—ऐकात्म्येनावभासः, तत्र संस्थितेः—प्रमात्रैकात्म्येन वर्तमानत्वादिदं यादि—वान्तं चतुष्कमन्तःस्थं निगद्यते......... ।

T. A., II, 159.

4. वाय्वादिशब्दवाच्या यादयो वकारान्ता राग-विद्या–कलामायाख्यानि तत्त्वानि,...... ।

P. T. V., 113.

Page 663.

1. इच्छा या कर्मणा हीना या चैष्ट्येन रूषिता।
शीघ्रस्थैर्यप्रभिन्नेन त्रिधा भावमुपागता॥
अनुन्मिषितमुन्मीलत्प्रोन्मीलितमिति स्थितम्।
इष्यमाणं त्रिधैतस्यां ताद्रूप्यस्यापरिच्युतेः॥
तदेव स्वोष्मणा स्वात्मस्वातन्त्र्यप्रेरणात्मना।
वहिर्भाव्यस्फुटं क्षिप्तं श-ष-सत्रितयं स्थितम्॥

T. A., II, 162.

2. सकारात्म चान्द्रं तेजः, तन्निरञ्जनम्,.........
'शक्तिमानुच्यते यस्मान्न शक्तिर्जातु केन चित्'.........
न केनचिदुपाधेयमित्यर्थः, तस्य पुनः क्रियाशक्त्यात्मनः चान्द्रस्य धाम्नो यत्तत्त्वं—परमप्रकाशात्मशक्तिमल्लक्षणं विश्रान्तिस्थानम्—तत्साञ्जनम्,.... शक्तिकर्तृकेन व्यक्तीकरणेन युक्तमित्यर्थः।

T. A. II, (Comm.) 171.

3. एतद्वर्णचतुष्कस्य स्वोष्मणाभासनावशात्।
ऊष्मेति कथितं नाम भैरवेणामलात्मना॥

T. A., II, 176.

Page 664.

1. अनुत्तरानन्दभुवामिच्छाद्ये भोग्यतां गते।
संध्यक्षराणामुदयो भोक्तृरूपं च कथ्यते॥

T. A., II, 184.

Page 665.

1. अनुत्तरम्—आदिवर्णलक्षणं परं रूपं स्वात्मनि भोक्तृभोग्यभावमाभास्य परस्परौन्मुख्येन संघट्टरूपतां प्राप्तं सत्, 'भोग्यम्' इत्युच्यते, अन्यथा न भोक्तृत्वं भोग्यत्वं च भवेत् - अन्योन्यापेक्षत्वात्तयोः, तेनाकारद्वयस्य संघट्टादाकारलक्षणं भोग्यं जातमिति तात्पर्यम्, भोग्यं चात्र वक्तुमुपक्रान्तमिति प्राधान्येन तदेवोपात्तम्, एवमिच्छोन्मेषावपि स्वात्मनि भोक्तृभोग्यभावेन संघट्टमासाद्यैषणोनतात्मभोग्यरूपतामापाविति...... ।

T. A., II, 183–4.

2. भोग्यं भोक्तरि लीनं चेद् भोक्ता तद्वस्तुतः स्फुटः।
अतः षण्णां त्रिकं सारं चिदिष्युन्मेषणात्मकम्॥

तदेव त्रितयं प्राहुर्भैरवस्य परं महः।
तच्चिकं परमेशस्य पूर्णा शक्तिः प्रगीयते ॥

T. A., II, 186-7.

3. यतस्तेन त्रिकेण सर्वमिदमाक्षिप्तम् अतोऽस्मिन्नेव स्वातन्त्र्यशक्तिमात्रपरमार्थे त्रिके समावेशशालिनः—

'............शैवी मुखमिहोच्यते।'

इत्याद्युक्त्या तद्द्वारेणैव अनवच्छिन्नस्वभावत्वात्पूर्णे शक्तिमद्रूपेऽपि अयत्नेनैव समावेशो जायते इति वाक्यार्थः॥

T. A., II, 188.

Page 666.

1. शक्तिमदैक्यात्म्यलक्षणात् लवणारनालवत्परस्परमेलनात्,...।

T. A., II, 192.

2. अथापि—'अर्थादेकस्यानुत्तरस्य' द्वितीयमप्यनुत्तरं संघट्टमानम् आनन्दजन्मने न पर्याप्तं स्यात्, तदा क्षोभात्मकानन्दप्रादुर्भावमन्तरेण 'अतो-गुणे' इति पररूपे कृते सति, अनुत्तरात्मतैव भवेत्, यथा 'सीमन्तम्' इत्यादाविति...।

T. A., II, 161.

Page 667.

1. इह खलु अनुत्तरस्य परमेश्वरस्य शाक्त एवायं विसर्गो—हकारपर्यन्तेन स्थूलेन रूपेण परिस्फुरन्(णं ?) पुनः प्रत्यावृत्य शिवबिन्दुतया निर्विभागात्मपरप्रकाशात्मप्रमात्रैकरूपतया क्रोडीकृतनिखिलवाच्यवाचककलापः सन् अनुत्तरात्मतां श्रयते निर्विभागपरप्रकाशस्वभावबिन्दुरूपतामाश्रयते, येन 'अहम्' इति परामर्शो भवेत्–यदनुत्तर एव हकारात्मशक्तिरूपतामाभास्य स्वात्मन्येव अविभागप्रकाशरूपे विश्राम्यतीति भावः।

T. A., II, 193-4.

Page 668.

1. अनुत्तरविसर्गात्मिके ये शिवशक्ती, तयोरद्वयं सामरस्यं, यत्र 'शिव इति; शक्तिरित्यपि' पृथक् परामर्शो नास्ति, तथात्वे हि प्रतियोगिनः संभावनामात्रमपि भवेदिति भावः। एवं विधे परप्रकाशस्वभावे विभोः अनुत्तरस्यात्मनि निर्भरत्वात्परस्य कस्यचिदपेक्षणीयस्याविद्यमानत्वेन पूर्णत्वात्—

'प्रकाशस्यात्मविश्रान्तिरहं भावो हि कीर्तितः।'

(अ. प्र. २२ श्लो.)

इत्यादिदृशा अहमिति स्वात्ममात्रस्फुरत्तारूपः परामर्श उच्यते··· ।

T. A., II, 195.

2. अनुत्तराद्या प्रसृतिर्हान्ता शक्तिस्वरूपिणी ।
प्रत्याहृताशेषविश्वानुत्तरे सा निलीयते ॥

T. A., II, 196.

3. संवित्तौ भाति यद्विश्वं तत्रापि खलु संविदा ।
तदेतत्त्रितय द्वन्द्वयोगात्संघाततां गतम् ॥
एकमेव परं रूपं भैरवस्याहमात्मकम् ।

T. A., II, 198.

4. आदिमान्त्यविहीनास्तु मन्त्राः स्युः शरदभ्रवत् ।
गुरोर्लक्षणमेतावदादिमान्त्यं च वेदयेत् ॥

T. A., II, 212

5. विसर्गशक्तिर्विश्वस्य कारणं च निरूपिता ।
ऐतरेयाख्यवेदान्ते परमेशेन विस्तरात् ॥
यल्लोहितं तदग्निर्यद्वीर्यं सूर्येन्दुविग्रहम् ।
अ इति ब्रह्म परमं तत्संघट्टोदयात्मकम् ॥

T. A., II, 215.

Page 669.

1. हृदयस्था तु या शक्तिः कौलिकी कुलनायिका ।
तां मे कथय देवेश येन तृप्तिं लभाम्यहम् ॥

P. T. V., 61.

Page 670.

1. इयं स्फुरणमयी शक्तिः, कुलस्य नायिका शरीरप्राणसुखादेः स्फुरत्ता-दायिनी, ब्राह्म्यादिदेवताचक्रस्य वीर्यभूता, निखिलाक्षनाडीचक्रस्य मध्य-मध्यमरूपा जननस्थानकर्णिकालिङ्गात्मा अस्ति। तत्रैव च कुले भवा कुलरूपा कौलिकी, यद्वा कुले भवमकुलात्म कौलं तत् यस्यामन्तः तादात्म्येन अस्ति सा कौलिकी;······ ।

P. T. V., 61–2

2. भैरवो भरणात्मको महामन्त्ररवात्मकश्च, केवलमत्र शक्तिमत्प्राधान्यं संहाररूपेण महअइत्येवं रूपम्—

P. T. V., 63.

प्रसरे पश्यन्त्यादिरूपतया शक्तिप्राधान्यं, संहारे पुनः शक्तिसंकोचेन शक्तिमत्प्राधान्यं सुबोधमेवेति ।

P. T. V., (F. N.) 63.

3. महान् भागो यस्याः, या भज्यमाना उक्तवक्ष्यमाणोपदेशानुशीलनेन सेव्यमाना पारमेश्वर्याख्यमहाबलदा भवति इति। महत्–परममहद्रूपतया प्रसिद्धोऽनाश्रितशिवरूपः स यस्याः भागः अंशः, पारमेश्वरी हि शक्तिः अनन्तषट्त्रिंशदादितत्त्वगर्भिणी । महान्—बुद्ध्यादिः तत्त्वविशेषो भागो विभागकलापेक्षि रूपं यस्याः, पारमेश्वरी हि संविदेकघनशक्तिः स्वस्वातन्त्र्योपकल्पितभिन्नज्ञेयकार्यप्रतिष्ठापदत्वे बुद्धिरित्युच्यते ।

P. T. V., 6[illegible]–7.

Page 672.

1. स्वरूपाव्यतिरेकिणि विश्वत्र भगवतः प्रकाशविमर्शौ ज्ञानक्रियाशक्ती, क्रियाशक्तेरेव विजृम्भात्मिका सदाशिवेशपदे आच्छादनीयेदन्तोन्मेषदायिनी मायाशक्तिः ।

I. P. V. V., Vol. III, 361.

Page 673.

1. स्वाङ्गरूपेषु भावेषु पत्युर्ज्ञानं क्रिया च या ।
मायातृतीये ते एव पशोः सत्त्वं रजस्तमः ॥

Bh., Vol. II, 285.

Page 674.

1. अतो योऽयं 'द्व्यात्मा' मिश्रस्वभावः तद्रजोगुणः, अतएव प्रकाशाप्रकाशस्वरूपयोः सत्त्वतमसोरत्र श्लेषेणावस्थानम् इति दुःखत्वम्, प्रियपुत्रादेरेकघन एव हि प्रकाशः सुखम्; एकघन एवाप्रकाशो मोहः ; यस्तु कथञ्चित्प्रकाशो यथा सव्याधिकदेहरूपतयानभिमतया, कथञ्चिच्चाप्रकाशो यथा गतगदकल्याणधर्मयोगितयाभिमतया तदेव दुःखत्वम्; अयमेव च पूर्वापरीभावसारः क्रियापरमार्थः ।

Bh., Vol. II, 290-1.

2. भागो भेदः स यत्र अस्ति रूपे इति मत्वर्थीयाकारप्रत्ययान्तेन भागशब्देन विभक्तं रूपमुच्यते । विभक्ते च वपुषि परिच्छेदोऽन्योन्यव्यवच्छेदेनैव भवति इति प्रसादात्मकविषयनिश्चयो बुद्धावुपजायमानोऽपररम्यारम्यादिविश्ववर्तिनो भावान् अस्पृशन्नेव, प्रत्युत तान् व्यवच्छिन्दन् उपजायते इति ।

P. T. V., 67-8.

Page 675.

1. अत एव 'महस्य' सर्वतोऽखण्डितपरिपूर्णनिरर्गलनिरपेक्षस्वातन्त्र्यजगदानन्दमयस्य आ—ईषत् भागाः सुखलक्षणा अंशा यतः······ ।

P. T. V., 68-9.

2. यत् यत् किल सुखं तत् महानन्दनिर्वृतिपरधाम्नि विसर्गशक्तौ अनुप्रवेशात् तथाऽचेत्यमानतया कियद्रूपतां प्राप्तम् ।

P. T. V., 69.

Page 676.

1. प्राङ्नयेन यदुक्तं 'महअ' इति रूपं तदेव भजनीयं यस्याः ।

P. T. V., 69.

2. संकलनं च भगवती सैव परा परमेश्वरी करोति ।

P. T. V., 71.

Page 679.

1. अमीषां वर्णानां परा वाग्भूमिरियमिह निर्णीयते, यत्रैव एषामसामयिकं नित्यमकृत्रिमं संविन्मयमेव रूपं, संविन्मये च वपुषि सर्वसर्वात्मकता सततोदितैव, सा च परमेश्वरी पराभट्टारिका तथाविधनिरतिशयाभेदभागिन्यपि पश्यन्त्यादिकाः परापराभट्टारिकादिस्फाररूपा अन्तःकृत्य तत्तदनन्तवैचित्र्यगर्भमयी, नहि "तत्र यन्नास्ति तत् क्वाप्यस्ति" इति न्याय्यम्, परामृशत च प्रथमां प्रतिभाभिधानां संकोचकलङ्ककालुष्यलेशशून्यां भगवतीं संविदम् ।

P. T. V., 102.

2. अनन्यापेक्षिता यास्य विश्वात्मत्वं प्रति प्रभोः ।
तां परां प्रतिभां देवीं संगिरन्ते ह्यनुत्तराम् ॥

T. A., II, 74.

3. प्रतिभातेति, अयमत्र भावः—इह नीलं गृह्णतः प्राणस्त्रुटिषोडशकात्मा वेद्यावेशपर्यन्तमुदेति, तत्र आद्या त्रुटिरविभागैकरूपा, द्वितीया ग्राहकोल्लासरूपा, अन्त्या तु ग्राह्याभिन्ना तन्मयी, उपान्त्या तु स्फुटीभूतग्राहकरूपा, मध्यं यद्द्वादशकं तस्यार्धं निर्विकल्पस्वभावं विकल्पाच्छादकं, तत्र स्वरूपेणैका आच्छादनीये विकल्पे पञ्चकत्वमुन्मिमिषिषा उन्मिषत्ता, सा चेयं स्फुटक्रियारूपत्वात्त्रुटिद्वयात्मिका स्पन्दनस्यैकक्षणरूपत्वाभावात् उन्मिषितता स्वकार्यकर्तृत्वं च इत्येवमाच्छादनीयविषयपाञ्चविध्यात्स्वस्वरूपाच्च षट्क्षणा निर्विकल्पकाः, ततोऽपि निर्विकल्पस्य ध्वंसमानता, ध्वंसः विकल्पस्य उन्मिमिषिषा, उन्मिषत्ता त्रुटिद्वयात्मिका उन्मि-

पितता च इति षट्तुटयः, स्वकार्यकर्तृता तु ग्राहकरूपता इत्युक्तं 'न सा भूयो गण्यते' इति, तत्र विकल्पन्यूनत्वे तुटिन्यूनता, एवं स्थिते यावत् स्फुटेदन्तात्मनो भेदस्य न्यूनता तावद्द्वयं द्वयं ह्रसति यावत द्वितुटिकः शिवावेशः, तत्र आद्या तुटिः सर्वतः पूर्णा, द्वितीया सर्वज्ञानकरणाविष्टा अभ्यस्यमाना सर्वज्ञत्वसर्वकर्तृत्वाय कल्पते—न त्वाद्या, तदेतद्भट्टकल्लटेन 'तुटिपात' इति आम्नातम्—तुटेराद्यायाः पातोऽपचयोऽपरा तुटिर्द्वितीयेत्यर्थः।

P. T. V. (F. N,) 104.

Page 681.

1. उभयोश्च ज्ञानयोरन्तरालमनपह्नवनीयं—ज्ञानयोर्भेदादेव, तच्च संविदात्मकमेव, अन्यथा तेनैव संवित्संस्कारोच्छेदे स्मरणाद्यनुसंधानाद्ययोग इति।

P. T. V., 106

2. एकैव सा पारमेश्वरी प्रतिभा अस्मदुक्तिमाहात्म्यकल्पिता एवंविधा अपरिच्छिन्नस्वभावापि सर्वात्मैव, मध्येऽपि वर्तमानभूतभविष्यद्रूपविकल्पान्तरप्रसवभूरेव, तथा च विवेककुशलैरालयविज्ञानमेवमेवोपगतम्।

P. T. V., 108–9

Page 683.

1. खे ब्रह्मणि अभेदरूपे स्थित्वा चरति-विषयमवगमयति, तथा हानादानादिचेष्टां विधत्ते स्वरूपे च आस्ते इति खेचरी, अन्तर्बहिष्करणतदर्थ सुखादिनीलादिरूपा—

P. T. V., 39.

2. नहि आत्मनो मनसः इन्द्रियाणां बाह्यानां च भेदविषयस्य व्यवस्थापनं व्यवस्था च युज्यते—अभिसंधानाद्ययोगात्, अप्रकाशत्वात् च। सैव खेचरी कामक्रोधादिरूपतया वैषम्येन लक्ष्यते।

P. T. V., 40.

3. स्वरूपापरिज्ञानमयतद्वैषम्यनिवृत्तौ मलाभावात्, क्रोधमोहादिवृत्तयो हि परिपूर्णभगवद्भैरवभट्टारकसंविदात्मिका एव।

P, T. V., 41.

4. अणुमात्रमपि अविकलानुत्तरस्वरूपापरिज्ञानमेव चित्तवृत्तीनां वैषम्यम्, स एव च संसारः।

P. T. V., 40.

Page 684.

1. तथाहि वेद्यवेदकभावानुल्लासिपदे शून्ये-संविन्मात्रदृगुल्लासे संवेद्यगतान्त-रैक्यरूपदिश्यमानभेदोल्लासे, स्फुटभेदोद्रेके च क्रमेण व्योमचरी-गोचरी-दिक्चरी-भूचरी-भूता याः शक्तयः।

P. T. V., 39.

Page 685.

1. तदेवं खेचरीसाम्यमेव मोक्षः, तत् च अनुत्तरस्वरूपपरिज्ञानमेव सततो-दितं परमेश्वर्याः शिवात्मनि संघट्टसमापत्त्या उभयविमर्शानन्दरूढि। शिवो हि परवाङ्मयमहामन्त्रवीर्यविसृष्टिमयः, परमेश्वरीविसृष्ट्या तद्वीर्य-घनतात्मकप्रसूननिर्भरया सृष्ट्या युज्यते।

P. T. V., 45.

2. तस्य अनुत्तररूपस्य प्रकाशस्य वीर्यं परिस्फुरणं बाह्यवीर्यं च, तेन घना-त्मकं तत्तादात्म्येन वर्त्तमानं च तत्प्रसूनं विश्वलक्षणमिदन्तास्फुरणं बाह्य-प्रसिद्धं च तेन निर्भरया संकुलया सृष्ट्या तादृक्क्रियारूपया।

P. T. V., 45 (F. N.)

Page 686.

1. इत्थं निजस्वरूपहृदयङ्गमीभावेन निजामोदभरक्रीडाभासितभेदस्य निखिलबन्धाभिमततत्त्वव्रातस्य स्वात्मचमत्कारपूर्णाहन्तातादात्म्यभैरव-स्वरूपाभेदसमावेशात्मिका जीवत एव मुक्तिः।

P. T. V., 18.

Page 687.

1. वस्तुतस्तु अकाराद्योगिन्याश्च विसर्गशक्तेः जातः प्रादुर्भूतप्रमातृभावो रुद्रो रोधको द्रावकश्च पाशानां, स एव ना पुरुषः, एतत् स्फुटं लभते, न तु अरुद्रो नापि अयोगिनीगर्भसम्भवः, 'सद्योयोगो' भैरवैकात्म्यं, स एव मोक्षो निर्णीतः।

P. T. V., 242–3.

Page 688.

1. संविदात्मनि विश्वोऽयं भाववर्गः प्रपञ्चवान्।
प्रतिबिम्बतया भाति यस्य विश्वेश्वरो हि सः॥

T. A., II, 246.

2. तथात्वदार्ढ्यं परिवृत्य आनन्दरूपं, हृदयस्वभावपरसंविदात्मकशिव-विमर्शतादात्म्यं, तां सिद्धिं ददाति, अनुत्तरस्वरूपतादात्म्ये हि कुलं तथा भवति।

P. T. V., 34.

Page 689.

1. तथा कुलात् प्राणदेहादेः आगता सिद्धिः ।

P. T. V., 36.

2. कुले जाता सिद्धिः शाक्त-हादिरूपप्रसरणात् आरभ्य बहिर्भावपटल-विकासपर्यन्तं भेदावभासना तां ददाति, तदेव हि अनुत्तरं महाप्रकाशात्म अन्तःकृतबोधमयविश्वभावप्रसरम् अनुत्तरत्वादेव निरतिशय-स्वातन्त्र्यैश्वर्यचमत्कारभरात् भेदं विकासयति ।

P. T. V., 38.

Page 690.

1. ननु यद्यप्येवं तथापि विकल्पस्य द्वयीगतिः, स हि कस्यचिदुपायान्तर-निरपेक्षतया स्वस्वातन्त्र्यादेव संस्कृतः स्यात्, कस्यचित्तु अन्यथा । तत्र पूर्वः प्रकारः शाक्तोपाये निरूपितः, इतरः पुनराणवोपाये निरूपयिष्यते;

T. A., III, 310–11.

2. तच्च साक्षादुपायेन, तदुपायादिनापि च ।
प्रथमानं विचित्राभिर्भङ्गीभिरिह भिद्यते ।
......साक्षादुपायेन इति शाम्भवेन । तदेव हि अव्यवहितं परज्ञाना-वाप्तौ निमित्तं, स एव परां काष्ठां प्राप्तश्चानुपाय इत्युच्यते ।

T. A., I, 181–2.

3. ततोपि परमं ज्ञानमुपायादिविवर्जितम् ।
आनन्दशक्तिविश्रान्तमनुत्तरमिहोच्यते ॥

T. A., I, 255–6.

4. विभुशक्त्यणुसम्बन्धात्समावेशस्त्रिधा मतः ।
इच्छा-ज्ञान-क्रियायोगादुत्तरोत्तरसंभृतः ॥

T. A., I, 255.

Page 691.

1. इच्छादीनां हि एषणीयादिविषयावच्छेदेन बाह्योन्मुखत्वात् भेदसम्भाव-नापि स्यात्, आनन्दशक्तिः पुनः—
आनन्दो ब्रह्मणो रूपम्...... ।
इत्याद्युक्त्या हि चितस्तत्स्वरूपमेव इति, नात्र उपायगन्धोऽस्ति इति तात्पर्यम् ।

T. A., I, 256.

2. श्रीमन्नन्दिशिखातन्त्रे वितत्यैतन्निरूपितम् ।
प्रश्नोत्तरमुखेनेति तदभग्नं निरूप्यते ।
अनिर्देश्यः शिवस्तत्र कोऽभ्युपायो निरूप्यताम् ।
इति प्रश्ने कृते देव्या श्रीमाञ्छम्भुर्न्यरूपयत् ।
उपायोऽत्र विवेकैकः स हि हेयं विहापयन् ।
ददात्यस्य च सुश्रोणि प्रातिभं ज्ञानमुत्तमम् ।

T. A., Ah. XIII, 104–5.

3. अभेदोपायमत्रोक्तं शाम्भवं शाक्तमुच्यते ।
भेदाभेदात्मकोपायं भेदोपायं तदाणवम् ॥

T. A., I, 248.

4. विश्वचित्प्रतिबिम्बत्वं परामर्शोदयक्रमः ।
मन्त्राद्यभिन्नरूपत्वं परोपाये विविच्यते ॥

T. A., I. 288.

5. अथ परोपयिकं प्रणिगद्यते ।
पदमनुत्तरमेव महेशितुः ।

T. A., II. 1.

Page 692.

1. साक्षादुपायेन इति शाम्भवेन। तदेव हि अव्यवहितं परज्ञानावाप्तौ निमित्तं, स एव परां काष्ठां प्राप्तश्चानुपाय इत्युच्यते।

T. A., (Comm.) 1, 182.

2. Refer to foot note 5. Page 691.

3. ननु यदि नाम परोपायस्यापि अनुत्तरमेव रूपं तत्पूर्वेणैव गतार्थत्वात् किमर्थमिदमाह्निकान्तरमारभ्यते ? इत्याह ।
प्रकाशमात्रं यत्प्रोक्तं भैरवीयं परं महः ।
तत्र स्वतन्त्रतामात्रमधिकं प्रविविच्यते ॥

T. A., (Comm.) II, I.

4. यन्मूलं शासनं तेन न रिक्तः कोऽपि जन्तुकः। व्युत्पत्तेर्हि प्रतिभात्मकमेव वस्तु मूलम्। न च तेन प्रतिभात्मना वस्तुना तिर्यक्प्रायोऽपि कश्चिज्जन्तुः स्वोचितव्यापारनैपुण्यान्यथानुपपत्त्या रिक्तः। अतएव 'व्यवहाराः प्रतायन्ते तिरश्चामपि यद्वशात्'। इत्युक्तम् ॥

T. A., Ah. XIII, 89.

Page 693.

1. इत्थं प्रातिभविज्ञानं किं किं कस्य न साधयेत् ।
यत्प्रातिभाद्वा सर्वं चेत्यूचे शेषमहामुनिः ॥

T. A., Ah. XIII, 95.

2. —गुरवस्तत्त्वदर्शिनः ।
श्रीसोमानन्दकल्याणभवभूतिपुरोगमाः ॥
तथा हि त्रीशिकाशास्त्रविवृत्तौ तेऽभ्यधुर्बुधाः ।
T. A., Ah. XIII, 96.

Page 694.

1. प्रातिभाद्वा सर्वम् ।
प्रातिभं नाम तारकं, तद्विवेकजस्य ज्ञानस्य पूर्वरूपं यथोदये प्रभा भास्करस्य तेन वा सर्वमेव जानाति योगी प्रातिभस्य ज्ञानस्योत्पत्ताविति ॥
Y. D., 348–9

Page 696.

1. तत्प्रातिभं महाज्ञानं शास्त्राचार्यानपेक्षि यत् ॥
T. A., Ah. XIII, 87.

2. यतोऽस्य स्वप्रतिभात एव एवं ज्ञानमुदियादत एव अस्य महत्त्वे शास्त्राचार्यानपेक्षित्वं हेतुः ॥
T. A., Ah. XIII, (Comm.) 87.

3. सांसिद्धिकं यद्विज्ञानं तच्चिन्तारत्नमुच्यते ।
तदभावे तदर्थं तदाहृतं ज्ञानमादृतम् ॥
T. A., Ah. XIII, 97

4. उपायो देवदेवेशि विवेकस्तत्र वै परः ।
हेयतां चैव संसारे ज्ञात्वा जन्तुर्विमोचयेत् ॥
अनित्येऽस्मिन्छिवो ह्येकः शिवः सर्वगतः प्रभुः ।
मायीयान्युज्झ्य भावानि यदा भावेन भावयेत् ॥
ददात्यस्य च सुश्रोणि प्रातिभं ज्ञानमुत्तमम् ।
T. A., (Comm.) Ah. XIII, 106.

Page 697.

1. यः (येन ?) पुनरतीन्द्रियः प्रमाणागोचर एव संविल्लक्षणोऽर्थो विचारपदवीमभ्युपेयात् स स्वपरामर्शात्मा विवेको नाम,...... ।
T. A., Ah. XIII, (Comm.) 112–3.

2. स्वयं बध्नाति देवेशः स्वयं चैव विमुञ्चति ।
स्वयं भोक्ता स्वयं ज्ञाता स्वयं चैवोपलक्षयेत् ॥
T. A., Ah. XIII, 82.

3. तारतम्यप्रकाशो यत्तीव्रमध्यममन्दताः ।
ता एव शक्तिपातस्य प्रत्येकं त्रैधमास्थिताः ॥

T. A., Ah. XIII, 86.

4. अनेन च अस्य तरतमभावेन त्रैविध्यसूचनादपि प्रत्येकं तथात्वे सप्तविंशतिर्भेदा भवन्ति इति ।

T. A., Ah. XIII, (Comm.) 87.

5. मध्यतीव्रात्पुनः सर्वमज्ञानं विनिवर्तते ।
स्वयमेव यतो वेत्ति बन्धमोक्षतयात्मताम् ॥

T. A., Ah. XIII, 86.

Also refer to foot note 1 above.

6. प्रतिभाचन्द्रिकाशान्तध्वान्तश्चाचार्यचन्द्रमाः ।
तमस्तापौ हन्ति दृशं विस्फार्यानन्दनिर्भराम् ॥

Ibid. 87.

7. तत्रापि तारतम्योत्थमानन्त्यं दाढर्यकम्प्रते ।

T. A., Ah. XIII, 89,

8. दृढताकम्प्रताभेदैः सोऽपि स्वयमथ व्रतात् ।
तपोजपादेर्गुरुतः स्वसंस्कारं प्रकल्पयेत् ॥

T. A., Ah. XIII, 93.

Page 698.

1. परोपजीविताबुद्ध्या सर्वं इत्थं न भासते ।
तदुक्त्या न विना वेत्ति शक्तिपातस्य मान्द्यतः ॥

T. A., Ah. XIII, 103.

2. उपायोऽत्र विवेकैकः स हि हेयं विहापयन् ।
ददात्यस्य च सुश्रोणि प्रातिभं ज्ञानमुत्तमम् ॥

T. A., Ah. XIII, 105.

Page 699.

1. इह मनोबुद्ध्योजडवैकलक्षणात्संस्काराद्ल्लसता परस्परस्य संकल्प्याद्ध्यवसेयाच्च विषयात्प्रकृष्टेन भेदेन, अक्षत्वमिन्द्रियत्वं यतोऽनयोर्बन्धकत्वम् । तस्य च जाड्यसंस्कारकारणस्य भेदस्याखृत्या यथोक्तस्वरूपतया प्रकृष्टेन विवेकेनच्छित्तौ निवृत्तौ शिव एव भासको निरिन्द्रिया संविदेव सर्वतः समुज्जृम्भत इति सिद्धं विवेकजस्य ज्ञानस्यातीन्द्रियत्वम् ॥

T. A., (Comm.) Ah. XIII, 120–1.

2. स एव भूतेन्द्रियादियुक्तो बद्धोऽणुः प्रतिभया युक्तः प्रादुर्भूतविवेकश्चेत् तच्छक्तिनरत्वं निगद्यते शुद्धविद्यादशाधिशायी भवेत् येन तदनुग्रह-निग्रहाद्यनेककार्यकरणप्रवणतामियात्। तत्रैव लब्धप्ररोहः पुनरसौ भवार्णवान्मुक्तः शिव एव·········।

T. A., (Comm.) Ah. XIII, 118.

Page 700.

1. पशुप्रमातृषु, ग्राहकग्राह्योभयविपर्याससंस्कारे तु अतिनिवृत्तेऽपि यदे-तत् वस्तुपरमार्थप्रथनं तत्र विद्याशक्तिव्यापारो योगिज्ञानिप्रभृतिष्व-पशुप्रमातृषु। तदेतद्दर्शयति।
तस्यैश्वर्यस्वभावस्य पशुभावे प्रकाशिका।
विद्याशक्तिः,·········

Bh., Vol. II, 230.

2. अतो भेदसमुल्लासकलां प्राथमिकीं बुधाः।
चिन्वन्ति प्रतिभां देवीं सर्वज्ञत्वादिसिद्धये॥

T. A , Ah. X, 143.

3. अत एव नवनवोल्लेखशालित्वात्प्रतिभामित्युक्तम्।

T. A., Ah. X, (Comm.) 144.

4. तथा चोक्तं कल्लटेन श्रीमता तुटिपातगः।
लाभः सर्वज्ञकर्तृत्वे तुटेः पातोऽपरा तुटिः॥

T. A., Ah. X, 142.

Page 701.

1. Refer to foot note 1. Page 697.
2. सर्वभावविवेकात्तु सर्वभावपराङ्मुखः।
क्रीडासु सुविरक्तात्मा शिवभावैकभावितः॥
माहात्म्यमेतत्सुश्रोणि प्रातिभस्य विधीयते।
स्वच्छायादर्शवत्पश्येद्बहिरन्तर्गतं शिवम्॥

T. A., Ah. XIII, 114–5.

3. भस्मच्छन्नाग्निवत्स्फौट्यं प्रातिभे गौरवागमात्।
बीजं कालोप्तसंसिक्तं यथा वर्धेत तत्तथा॥
योगयागजपैरुक्तैर्गुरुणा प्रातिभं स्फुटेत्।

T. A., Ah., XIII, 111.

4. Refer to foot note 3. Page 696.
5. यदा प्रतिभया युक्तस्तदा मुक्तश्च मोचयेत्।
परशक्तिनिपातेन ध्वस्तमायामलः पुमान्॥
T. A., Ah. XIII, 105.

Page 702.

1. युक्तिः शास्त्रं गुरोर्वादोऽभ्यास इत्याद्यपेक्षते।
कम्पमानं हि विज्ञानं स्वयमेव पुनर्व्रजेत्॥
कस्यापि दार्ढ्यमन्यस्य युक्त्याद्यैः केवलेतरैः।
T. A., Ah. XIII, 90.

2. Refer to foot note 5. Page 697.
3. स्वमुक्तिमात्रे कस्यापि यावद्विश्वविमोचने।
प्रतिभोदेति खद्योतरत्नतारेन्दुसूर्यवत्॥
T. A., Ah. XIII, 101.

Page 703.

1. एकस्य संविन्नाथस्य ह्यान्तरी प्रतिभा तनुः।
सौम्यं वान्यन्मितं संविदूर्मिचक्रमुपास्यते॥
T. A., Ah. I, 157–8

Page 707.

1. 'प्रतिभाति घटः' इति यद्यपि विषयोपश्लिष्टमेव प्रतिभानं भाति तथापि न तद्विषयस्य स्वकं वपुः, अपितु संवेदनमेव तत् तथा चकास्ति 'मां प्रतिभाति' इति प्रमातृलग्नत्वात्। तथा च वेदः—
Bh., Vol. I, 348.

Page 708.

1. केवलं विषयोल्लेखनबलात् बहिः क्रमावभासः समर्थितः, स स क्रमयौगपद्यादिविचित्ररूपो यः पदार्थानां वक्ष्यमाणेश्वरस्वातन्त्र्यरूपदेशकालशक्त्युपकल्पितः क्रमः देशकालपरिपाटी, तेन रूषिता प्रतिबिम्बकल्पतया उपरक्ता या प्रतिभा उक्ता—

'केवलं भिन्नसंवेद्य··············।'

इत्यादिना। एषा इति च सर्वस्य स्वप्रकाशरूपा, परमार्थतश्च अन्तर्मुखत्वेन प्रकाशमात्रपरमार्थतया भेदाभावात् अक्रमा,······।
Bh., Vol. I, 351–2.

Page 709.

1. 'या प्रतिभा' इति उपक्रमे सेति वक्तव्ये पुंनिर्देशस्य क आशय इति। 'बाह्याभास' इति चित्तत्त्वस्य या अन्तरक्रमाभासता, सा लोकस्य मायाशक्तिविमोहबलात् न सिद्धेति विधीयते सिद्धं क्रमिकं बाह्यावभास-

मनूद्य 'या' इत्यनेन । न च तावन्मात्रतैव विधीयते येन सेति भवेत्, किन्तु 'प्रमाता महेश्वरः सा प्रतिभा' इति प्रमातृत्वमाहेश्वर्याभ्यामुपचिता लब्धपरिपोषा, तत एव उपचयबलादेव उचितः पुंस्त्वनिर्देशः ।

I. P. V. V., Vol II, 340.

Page 710.

1. प्रकाशात्मा परमेश्वर एव यतो देहादिप्रमातृताभिमानदशायामपि वस्तुतः प्रमाता, 'एवम्' इति, अतो हेतोः इदं सिद्धं भवति—स्मरणे अपोहनजीविते च विकल्पे अनुभवज्ञाने च अन्तराभासः प्रकाशविश्रान्तः स्थित एव, नात्र संशयः कश्चित्, यदि हि देहादिरेव परमार्थप्रमाता स्यात् तत् शरीरस्य प्राणस्य धियः शून्यस्य वा अन्तर्घटादि इति न किंचित् एतत् घटादिपरिहारेण देहादेः स्थितत्वात् । परमार्थप्रकाशस्तु सर्वंसहः इति तत्रान्तर्विश्रमः, इति अनायाससिद्धमेतत् ॥

Bh., vol. I, 334.

2. Refer to foot note 1. Page 709.

Page 711.

1. यथैव मृद्धर्मसमन्वयान्मृद्विवर्तं घटं व्यवस्थापयन्ति तथैवाम्नाये सम्भृतभोग्यभोक्तृशक्तेर्वागात्मनो बहुधा कारणत्वमाम्नातं सर्वत्र शब्दमात्रासमन्वयात् ।

V. P. (Comm.) Ch. 1, V., 121.

Page 712.

1. इति कर्तव्यता लोके सर्वा शब्दव्यपाश्रया ।
यां पूर्वाहितसंस्कारो बालोपि प्रतिपद्यते ॥
बालानामपि स्वस्वजातिषु पूर्वपूर्वतनशब्दावेशभावनासंस्कारेण यातार्थक्रियायामनाख्येयशब्दनिबन्धना प्रवृत्तिरिति न दोषः ॥

V. P., (Comm.) Ch. I, V., 122.

Page 713.

1. विच्छेदग्रहणेऽर्थानां प्रतिभाऽन्यैव जायते ।
वाक्यार्थ इति तामाहुः पदार्थैरुपपादिताम् ॥

V. P, Ch. II, V., 145.

2. अविभक्तेऽपि वाक्यार्थे शक्तिभेदादपोद्धृते ।
वाक्यान्तरविभागेन यथोक्तं न विरुध्यते ॥
तथा चास्मत्पक्षे अविभक्ते निर्विभागे वाक्यार्थे एकस्मिन् पानकरसादिवत्समाश्रीयमाणे ॥

V. P., (Comm.) Ch. II, V., 90

3. इदं तदिति सान्येषामनाख्येया कथं च न।
प्रत्यात्मवृत्तिसिद्धा सा कर्त्रापि न निरूप्यते॥
V. P., Ch. II, V., 164.

4. उपश्लेषमिवार्थानां सा करोत्यविचारिता ।
सार्वरूप्यमिवापन्ना विषयत्वेन वर्त्तते ॥
V. P., Ch., II., V., 147

Page 714.

1. साक्षाच्छब्देन जनितां भावनानुगमेन वा ।
इति कर्त्तव्यतायां तां न कश्चिदतिवर्त्तते॥
जन्मान्तरभावनावशेन वा गजवाजिप्रभृतीनाम्।
V. P., Ch. II., V., 148.

2. प्रमाणत्वेन तां लोकः सर्वः समनुपश्यति।
समारम्भाः प्रतीयन्ते तिरश्चामपि तद्वशात्॥
V. P., Ch. II, V., 149.

Page 715.

1. यथा द्रव्यविशेषाणां परिपाकैरयत्नजाः ।
मन्दादिशक्तयो दृष्टाः प्रतिभास्तद्वतां तथा॥
स्वरवृत्तिं विकुरुते मधौ पुंस्कोकिलस्य कः।
जन्त्वादयः कुलायादिकरणे केन शिक्षिताः॥
आहारप्रीत्यभिद्वेषप्लवनादिक्रियासु कः ।
जात्यन्वयप्रसिद्धासु प्रयोक्ता मृगपक्षिणाम्॥
V. P., Ch. II, V., 150–2.

2. स्वभावचरणाभ्यासयोगादृष्टोपपादिता।
विशिष्टोपहिता चेति प्रतिभां षड्विधां विदुः॥
V. P., Ch. II, V., 154.

3. इदानीं शब्दस्यैव जगन्मूलत्वं प्रपञ्चयति।
शब्देष्वेवाश्रिता शक्तिर्विश्वस्यास्य निबन्धनी॥
यन्नेत्रः प्रतिभात्मायं भेदरूपः प्रतीयते ॥
V. P., Ch., I., 119.

Page 718.

1. ततोऽस्म्युक्तो भगवता योजयामृतमन्थनम्।
एतदुत्साहजननं सुरप्रीतिकरं तथा॥

योऽयं समवकारस्तु धर्मकामार्थसाधकः ।
मया प्रग्रथितो विद्वन्स प्रयोगः प्रयुज्यताम् ॥

A. Bh., Vol. I, 87.

Page 719.

1. यज्ञविन्नर्तकश्चैव छन्दोविच्छब्दवित्तथा ।
अस्त्रविच्चित्रकृद्वेश्या गान्धर्वो राजसेवकः ॥
यज्ञविद्यज्ञयोगे तु नर्तकोऽभिनये स्मृतः।
छन्दोविद्वृत्तबन्धेषु शब्दवित्पाठ्यविस्तरे ।
इस्वस्त्रवित्सौष्ठवे तु नेपथ्ये चैव चित्रकृत् ॥
कामोपचारे वेश्या च गान्धर्वः स्वरकर्मणि ।
सेवकस्तूपचारे स्यादेते वै प्राश्निकाः स्मृताः ॥

A. Bh., Vol. III, 313.

2. चारित्राभिजनोपेताः शान्तवृत्ताः कृतश्रमाः ।
यशोधर्मपराश्चैव मध्यस्था वयसान्विताः ॥
षडङ्गनाट्यकुशलाः प्रबुद्धाः शुचयः समाः ।
चतुरातोद्यकुशला वृत्तज्ञास्तत्त्वदर्शिनः ॥
देशभाषाविधानज्ञाः कलाशिल्पप्रयोजकाः ।
चतुराभिनयोपेता रसभावविकल्पकाः ॥
शब्दच्छन्दोविधानज्ञा नानाशास्त्रविचक्षणाः ।
एवं विधास्तु कर्तव्याः प्राश्निका दशरूपके ॥

A. Bh., Vol. III, 311–2.

3. व्यापारोऽपि च तद्विदां तु तदभ्यासपराणां च तथाभूतकाव्यात्मकविषयावलोकने झटित्येव प्रतिभाति । तदन्यत्रानुमानेन प्रतिभया……।

A. Bh., Vol. II, 298.

4. यस्यार्थस्य द्वितीयस्यार्थस्य अभियुक्तियुक्तैः प्रतिभातिशयवद्भिः विशेषोऽपूर्वः स्वोल्लिखित उपपद्यते स समाहितमनःसंपाद्यविशेषत्वादर्थो विशिष्टः समाधिः……।

A. Bh., Vol. II, 337.

Page 720.

1. नटस्य तु या सम्यक् प्रयोगनिष्पत्तिलक्षणा सिद्धिः सा प्रयोगसिद्धिरुपयोगिनी प्रयोगनिष्पत्त्या हि विना नाट्यतैव नेति कुतः सा भवेत्प्रयोगनिष्पत्तिश्च सामान्याभिनयस्यैव सम्यक्तापत्तिः । परमार्थतस्तु परकीयप्रोत्सहनतारतम्योदितप्रकृतिभानप्रत्ययबलेन वा स्वतः प्रतिभानमाहात्म्येन वा……।

A. Bh., Vol. III, 306.

2. काव्यं तु जायते जातु कस्यचित् प्रतिभावतः ।

K. A., I.

3. मुख्यस्तावदयं न्यायो यत् स्वशक्त्या प्रवर्तते ।

K. A., 41.

4. अथ प्रतिज्ञाहेत्वादिहीनं दुष्टं च वर्ण्यते ।
समासेन यथा न्यायं तन्मात्रार्थप्रतीतये ॥

K. A., 32.

5. Refer to F. N. 2, above.

Page 722.

1. लोको विद्या प्रकीर्णञ्च काव्याङ्गानि ।

K. Su., 25.

एवमन्यासामपि विद्यानां यथास्वमुपयोगो वर्णनीय इति ।
लक्ष्यज्ञत्वमभियोगो वृद्धसेवाऽवेक्षणं प्रतिभानमवधानञ्च प्रकीर्णम् ॥

K. Su., 29.

2. Refer to foot note 4. Page 720.

3. कवित्वबीजं प्रतिभानम् ।

K. Su., 30.

4. नैसर्गिकी च प्रतिभा श्रुतञ्च बहु निर्म्मलम् ।
अमन्दाश्चाभियोगोऽस्याः कारणं काव्यसम्पदः ॥

K. Ad., 95.

Page 723.

1. न विद्यते यद्यपि पूर्ववासना गुणानुबन्धि प्रतिभानमद्भुतम् ।
श्रुतेन यत्नेन च वागुपासिता ध्रुवं करोत्येव कमप्यनुग्रहम् ॥

K. Ad., 97.

2. सरस्वती स्वादु तदर्थवस्तु निःस्यन्दमाना महतां कवीनाम् ।
अलोकसामान्यमभिव्यनक्ति परिस्फुरन्तं प्रतिभाविशेषम् ॥

Dh. L., (B) 91.

3. तच्छक्तित्रयोपजनितार्थावगममूलजाततत्प्रतिभापवित्रितप्रतिपत्तृप्रतिभा-
सहायार्थद्योतनशक्तिर्ध्वननव्यापारः ।

Ibid., 62.

प्रतिपत्तृप्रतिभासहकारित्वं ह्यस्माभिर्द्योतनस्य प्राणत्वेनोक्तम् ।

Ibid., 68.

तर्हि वक्तृप्रतिपत्तृप्रतिभाप्राणितो ध्वननव्यापारः किं न सह्यते ।

Ibid., 69.

Page 724.

1. वाग्धेनुर्दुग्ध एतं हि रसं यद् बालतृष्णया ।
तेन नास्य समः स स्याद्दुह्यते योगिभिर्हि यः ॥
तदावेशेन विनाप्याक्रान्त्या हि यो योगिभिर्दुह्यते ।............'प्रतिभा' अपूर्ववस्तुनिर्माणक्षमा प्रज्ञा, तस्या 'विशेषो' रसावेशवैशद्यसौन्दर्यकाव्यनिर्माणक्षमत्वम् ।

Dh. L., (B), 91–2.

2. प्रतिपत्तॄन् प्रति सा प्रतिभा नानुमीयमाना, अपितु तदावेशेन भासमानेत्यर्थः ।

Dh. L., (B), 92.

3. शक्तिः प्रतिभानं वर्णनीयवस्तुविषयनूतनोल्लेखशालित्वम् ।

Dh. L., (B), 317.

4. क्षणे क्षणे नूतनैर्नूतनैर्वैचित्र्यैर्जगन्त्यासूत्रयन्ती । दृष्टिरिति । प्रतिभारूपा ।

Dh. L., (B), 508.

5. ध्वनेर्यः सगुणीभूतव्यङ्ग्यस्याध्वा प्रदर्शितः ।
अनेनानन्त्यमायाति कवीनां प्रतिभागुणः ॥
तेन वाणीनां काव्यवाक्यानां तावन्नवत्वमायाति । तच्च प्रतिभानन्त्ये सत्युपपद्यते, तच्चार्थानन्त्ये, तच्च ध्वनिप्रभेदादिति ।

Dh. L., (B), 522.

6. ध्वनेरित्थं गुणीभूतव्यङ्ग्यस्य च समाश्रयात् ।
न काव्यार्थविरामोऽस्ति यदि स्यात्प्रतिभागुणः ॥

Dh. L., (B), 537.

7. प्रतिभानां वाणीनाञ्चानन्त्यं ध्वनिकृतमिति यदलुप्तिमुक्तं, तदेव कारिकया भङ्ग्या निरूप्यते... ।
दृष्टपूर्वा अपि ह्यर्थाः काव्ये रसपरिग्रहात् ।
सर्वे नवा इवाभान्ति मधुमास इव द्रुमाः ॥

Dh. L., (B), 527–8.

Page 725.

1. परस्वादानेच्छाविरतमनसो वस्तु सुकवेः ।
सरस्वत्येवैषा घटयति यथेष्टं भगवती ॥

Dh. L., (B), 550.

2. येषां सुकवीनां प्राक्तनपुण्याभ्यासपरिपाकवशेन प्रवृत्तिस्तेषां परोपरचितार्थपरिग्रहनिःस्पृहाणां स्वव्यापारो न क्वचिदुपयुज्यते। सैव भगवती सरस्वती स्वयमभिमतमर्थमाविर्भावयति।

Dh. L., (B), 551.

3. तावुभावपि शक्तिमुद्भासयतः। सा केवलं काव्ये हेतुः इति यायावरीयः। विप्रसृतिश्च सा प्रतिभाव्युत्पत्तिभ्याम्। शक्तिकर्तृके हि प्रतिभाव्युत्पत्तिकर्मणी। शक्तस्य प्रतिभाति शक्तश्च व्युत्पद्यते। या शब्दग्राममर्थसार्थमलङ्कारतन्त्रयुक्तिमार्गमन्यदपि तथाविधमधिहृदयं प्रतिभासयति सा प्रतिभा। अप्रतिभस्य पदार्थसार्थः परोक्ष इव। प्रतिभावतः पुनरपश्यतोऽपि प्रत्यक्ष इव।

K. M., 11–2.

4. सा च द्विधा कारयित्री भावयित्री च। कवेरुपकुर्वाणा कारयित्री।

K. M., 12.

5. भावकस्योपकुर्वाणा भावयित्री। सा हि कवेः श्रममभिप्रायं च भावयति। तया खलु फलितः कवेर्व्यापारतरुः।

K. M., 13.

Page 726.

1. शक्तिर्निपुणता लोकशास्त्रकाव्याद्यवेक्षणात्।
काव्यज्ञशिक्षयाभ्यास इति हेतुस्तदुद्भवे॥

K. Pra., 2–3.

2. वक्तृबोद्धव्यकाकूनां, वाक्यवाच्यान्यसन्निधेः।
प्रस्तावदेशकालादेर्वैशिष्ट्यात् प्रतिभाजुषाम्॥
योऽर्थस्यान्यार्थधीहेतुर्व्यापारो व्यक्तिरेव सा।

K. Pra., 22.

3. तस्य च कारणं कविगता केवला प्रतिभा। सा च काव्यघटनानुकूलशब्दार्थोपस्थितिः······तस्याश्च हेतुः क्वचिद्देवतामहापुरुषप्रसादादिजन्यमदृष्टम्। क्वचिच्च विलक्षणव्युत्पत्तिकाव्यकरणाभ्यासौ। न तु त्रयमेव।

R. G., 8.

Page 727.

1. "उचितानुचितविवेको व्युत्पत्तिः" इति यायावरीयः।

K. M., 16.

2. इह हि वाङ्मयमुभयथा शास्त्रं काव्यं च। शास्त्रपूर्वकत्वात् काव्यानां पूर्वं शास्त्रेष्वभिनिविशेत। नह्यप्रवर्त्तितप्रदीपास्तमसि तत्त्वार्थसार्थमध्यक्षयन्ति।

K. M., 2.

3. न निसर्गकविः शास्त्रे न क्षुण्णः कवते च यः।
विडम्बययति सा(?)त्मानमाग्रहग्रहिलः किल॥

K. M., 15.

Page 728.

1. लक्षणालंकृतिगुणा दोषाः शब्दप्रवृत्तयः।
वृत्तिसन्ध्यङ्गसंरम्भः संभारो यः कवेः किल॥······
······प्रतिभायाः प्रगल्भायाः सर्वमोडुप एष सः॥

A. Bh., Vol. III. 78.

2. एकेषां तु दर्शनं-कवेर्यः प्रतिभात्मा प्रथमपरिस्पन्दः तद्व्यापारवलोपनता गुणाः प्रतिभावत एव हि रसाभिव्यञ्जनसामर्थ्यं माधुर्यादिरुपनिबन्धनसामर्थ्यं न सामान्यकवेः। अनेन शब्देनेदं वस्तु वर्णयामीत्येवंभूतवर्णनापरपर्यायद्वितीयव्यापारसंपाद्यास्त्वलङ्काराः। शब्दानमीभिः शब्दैरर्थानमीभिरर्थैः संघटयामीत्येवमात्मकस्तु यस्तृतीयः······क्रियारूपाणि लक्षणानीति।

A. Bh., Vol. II, 29[illegible].

Page 729.

1. शक्तिः प्रतिभानम्।

Dh. L., (B) 317.

2. अन्यथा प्रभुसंमितेभ्यो वेदादिभ्यो मित्रसंमितेभ्यश्चेतिहासादिभ्यो व्युत्पत्तिहेतुभ्यः······।

Dh. L., 40.

3. यन्मूलं शासनं तेन न निरुक्तः कोऽपि जन्तुकः। व्युत्पत्तेर्हि प्रतिभात्मकमेव वस्तु मूलम्। न च तेन प्रतिभात्मना वस्तुना तिर्यक्प्रायोऽपि कश्चिज्जन्तुः स्वोचितव्यापारनैपुण्यान्यथानुपपत्त्या रिक्तः अतएव 'व्यवहाराः प्रतायन्ते तिरश्चामपि यद्वशात्।' इत्युक्तम्॥

T. A., Ah., XIII, 89.

Page 730.

1. रसानुगुणशब्दार्थचिन्तास्तिमितचेतसः।
क्षणं स्वरूपस्पर्शोत्था प्रज्ञैव प्रतिभा कवेः॥

सा हि चक्षुर्भगवतस्तृतीयमिति गीयते ।
येन साक्षात्करोत्येष भावाँस्त्रैकाल्यवर्त्तिनः ॥
इत्यादि प्रतिभातत्त्वमस्माभिरुपपादितम् ।
शास्त्रे तत्त्वोक्तिकोशाख्य इति नेह प्रपञ्चितम् ॥

V. V., 390-1.

2. तदेवं व्यवहारेऽपि प्रभुर्देहादिमाविशन् ।
भान्तमेवान्तरर्थौघमिच्छया भासयेद् बहिः ॥
यत् पूर्वं दर्शितं देहे बुद्धौ इत्यादि तत् एवम् उपपद्यते, कथम् ? यदि व्यवहारे मायापदे देहप्राणादिमपि प्रभुरेव प्रकाशपरमार्थं इच्छया मायाशक्तिरूपया, आविशन् देहप्राणादिप्राधान्येन स्वरूपं प्रदर्शयन् अन्तः संविन्मात्रे, भान्तम् अहमित्येवं रूपम् अर्थौघम् इच्छयैव बहिः इदमिति भासयति तत एतदुपपद्यते ।

Bh., Vol. I, 329.

Page 731.

1. स नैसर्गिक एवास्ति विकल्पे स्वैरचारिणि ।
यथाभिमतसंस्थानाभासनाद् बुद्धिगोचरे ॥

Bh., Vol. I, 338.

2. अप्रतिभस्य पदार्थसार्थः परोक्ष इव । प्रतिभावतः पुनरपश्यतोऽपि प्रत्यक्ष इव । यतो मेधाविरुद्रकुमारदासादयो जात्यन्धाः कवयः श्रूयन्ते ।

K. M., 11-2.

Page 732.

1. स एव प्रतिभायुक्तः शक्तितत्त्वं निगद्यते ।
तत्पातावेशतो मुक्तः शिव एव भवार्णवात् ॥

T. A., Ah. XIII, 118.



APPENDIX B.

Authorities referred to in the available works of Abhinava.

(I)

Mālinī Vijaya Vārtika.

Name	Page
Abhinavagupta	1, 17, 33, 36, 44, 58, 87, 88, 108, 118, 135
Utpala	1, 25, 27, 66, 127
Karṇaśiṣya	2
Kālapāda	20
Kiraṇa Śāsana	129
Kula Mata	130
Cukhulaka	1
Jantu Cakra	34
Ḍāmara Tantra	16
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Nara Siṁha	71
Patañjali	19
Pati Śāsana	134
Parameśāna Śāstra	20
Pratyabhijñā	4
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Bharga Śikhā	17
Bhūtajāntanivāsī	75

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Bhairava Kula	130
Bhairava Tantra	38
Mandra Śiṣya	2
Mālinī	2
Rudra Tantra	38
Lakṣmaṇagupta	2
Lollaṭa	72
Vayyā	78
Vijñāna Śāstra	37
Śaṅkara Nandana	41
Śambhunātha	1
Sāra Śāstra	59
Śiva Tantra	38
Śiva Dṛṣṭi	3
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(II)

Parā Triṁśikā Vivaraṇa.

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(III)

Tantrāloka

58

(IV)

Tantra Sāra

(V)

Dhvanyāloka Locana.

(VI)

Abhinava Bhāratī.

(VII)

Bhagavadgītārtha Saṅgraha.

(VIII)

Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vivṛti Vimarśinī.

(IX)

Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī.

APPENDIX C.

Philosophical stotras of Abhinava.

अनुत्तराष्टिका ।

संक्रामोऽत्र[1] न भावना न च कथायुक्तिर्न चर्चा न च
ध्यानं वा न च धारणा न च जपाभ्यासप्रयासो[2] न च ।
तत्किं नाम सुनिश्चितं वद परं सत्यं च तच्छ्रूयतां
न त्यागी न परिग्रही भज सुखं सर्वं यथावस्थितः ॥ १ ॥
संसारोऽस्ति न तत्त्वतस्तनुभृतां बन्धस्य वार्तैव का
बन्धो यस्य न जातु तस्य वितथा मुक्तस्य मुक्तिक्रिया ।
मिथ्यामोहकृदेष रज्जुभुजगच्छायापिशाचभ्रमो
मा किंचित्त्यज मा गृहाण विलस[3] स्वस्थो यथावस्थितः ॥ २ ॥
पूजापूजकपूज्यभेदसरणिः केयं कथानुत्तरे
संक्रामः[4] किल कस्य केन विदधे को वा प्रवेशक्रमः ।
मायेयं न चिदद्वयात्परतया भिन्नाप्यहो वर्तते
सर्वं स्वानुभवस्वभावविमलं चिन्तां वृथा मा कृथाः ॥ ३ ॥
आनन्दोऽत्र न वित्तमद्यमदवन्नैवाङ्गनासङ्गवत्
दीपार्केन्दुकृतप्रभाप्रकरवन् नैव प्रकाशोदयः ।
हर्षः संभृतभेदमुक्तिसुखभूर्भारावतारोपमः
सर्वाद्वैतपदस्य विस्मृतनिधेः प्राप्तिः प्रकाशोदयः ॥ ४ ॥
रागद्वेषसुखासुखोदयलयाहङ्कारदैन्यादयो
ये भावाः प्रविभान्ति विश्ववपुषो भिन्नस्वभावा न ते ।
व्यक्तिं पश्यसि यस्य यस्य सहसा तत्तत्तदेकात्मता-
संविद्रूपमवेक्ष्य किं न रमसे तद्भावनानिर्भरः ॥ ५ ॥
पूर्वाभावभवक्रिया हि सहसा भावाः सदाऽस्मिन्भवे
मध्याकारविकारसङ्करवतां तेषां कुतः सत्यता ।
निःसत्ये चपले प्रपञ्चनिचये स्वप्नभ्रमे पेशले
शङ्कातङ्ककलङ्कयुक्तिकलनातीतः प्रबुद्धो भव ॥ ६ ॥

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१ संकासो न न MSS.

२ जपाभ्यासः प्रयासो MSS.

३ विहर MS., A.

४ संन्नासत्किल MS., B.

भवानां न समुद्भवोऽस्ति सहजस्त्वद्भाविता भान्त्यमी
निःसत्या अपि सत्यतामनुभवभ्रान्त्या भजन्ति क्षणम् ।
त्वत्सङ्कल्पज एष विश्वमहिमा नास्त्यस्य जन्मान्यतः
तस्मात्त्वं विभवेन भासि भुवनेष्वेकोप्यनेकात्मकः ॥ ७ ॥
यत्सत्यं यदसत्यमल्पबहुलं नित्यं न नित्यं च यत्
यन्मायामलिनं यदात्मविमलं चिद्दर्पणे[1] राजते ।
तत्सर्वं स्वविमर्शसंविदुदयाद् रूपप्रकाशात्मकं
ज्ञात्वा स्वानुभवाधिरूढमहिमा विश्वेश्वरस्त्वं भज ॥ ८ ॥
इति श्रीमदाचार्याभिनवगुप्तपादैर्विरचितानुत्तराष्टिका समाप्ता ।

परमार्थद्वादशिका ।

शान्तिं[2] संभज नित्यमल्पवचनैर्जल्पक्रमं संहर[3]
तत्संहारगमेन किं कथमिदं कोसीति मार्चीक्लृपः ।
भावाभावविभागभासनतया यद्भात्यभग्नक्रमम्
तच्छून्यं शिवधाम वस्तु परमं ब्रह्मात्र कोर्थग्रहः ॥ १ ॥
यद्यतत्त्वपरिहारपूर्वकं तत्त्वमेपि तदतत्त्वमेव हि ।
यद्यतत्त्वमथ तत्त्वमेव वा तत्त्वमेव ननु तत्त्वमीदृशम् ॥ २ ॥
यद्यद्भाति न भानतः पृथगिदं भेदोपि भर्ताति चेत्
भाने सोऽपि न भाति किं जहि ततस्त द्भंगिभंगग्रहम्[4] ।
स्वप्ने स्वप्नतया प्रथां गतवति क्रीडैव नो भीतिकृ-
च्छस्त्राघातजलावपातहुतभुङ्निर्घातबन्धादिकम् ॥ ३ ॥
ज्ञानक्रियाकलनपूर्वकमध्यवस्ये-
द्यद्भवान् कथय कोऽस्य जडाद्विशेषः ।
स्फूर्जञ्जडोऽपि न किमद्वयबोधधाम
निस्सीमनित्यनिरवग्रहसत्यरूपम् ॥ ४ ॥
भावानामवभासकोसि यदि तैर्मोहः किमातन्यते
किं ते तद्यदि भान्ति[5] हन्त भवतस्तत्राप्यखण्डं महः ।
नोचेन्नास्ति तदेवमप्युभयथा निर्व्याजनिर्यन्त्रणा-
त्रुट्यद्विभ्रमनित्यतृप्तमहिमा नित्यं प्रबुद्धोऽसि भोः ॥ ५ ॥

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१ चिद्धर्पणे राजसे MSS.
२ तथ्यातथ्यमकल्पमल्पशयनैः MS., B.
३ संहरंस्तत् MS., B.
४ ततस्त्वद्भंगि MSS.
५ भाति MSS.

दृष्टिं बहिः प्रहिणु लक्ष्यपथातिरिक्तम्
स्यादीश्वरानुकरणं बत वञ्चनेयम् ।
निर्द्वन्द्वबोधगगनस्य न बाह्यमस्ति
नाभ्यन्तरं निरवकाशविकासधाम्नः ॥ ६ ॥
वासनाप्रसरविभ्रमोदये यद्यदुल्लसति तत्तदीक्ष्यताम् ।
आदिमध्यनिधनेषु तत्र चेत् भासि भासि तव लीयते जगत् ॥ ७ ॥
मोहो दुःखवितर्कतर्कणघनो हेतुप्रथानन्तर-
प्रोद्यद्विभ्रमश्रृङ्खलातिबहुलो गन्धर्वपूःसन्निभः ।
द्वैताद्वैतविकल्पनाश्रयपदे चिद्व्योम्नि नाभाति चेत्
कुत्रान्यत्र चकास्तु कास्तु परमा निष्ठाप्यनेकात्मना ॥ ८ ॥
स्वप्ने तावदसत्यमेव सरणं[1] सौसुप्तधाम्नि प्रथा
नैवास्यास्ति तदुत्तरे निरुपधौ चिद्व्योम्नि कोऽस्य ग्रहः ।
जाग्रत्येव धरावदर्थनिचयः स्याच्चेत् क्षणे कुत्रचित्
ज्ञानेनाथ तदत्ययेऽपृथगिदं तत्रापि का खण्डना ॥ ९ ॥
ये ये केऽपि प्रकाशा मयि सति परमव्योम्नि लब्धावकाशाः
काशा[2] ह्येतेषु नित्ये महिमनि मयि ते निर्विभागं विभान्ति ।
सोऽहं निर्व्याजनित्यप्रतिहतकलनानन्तसत्यस्वतन्त्र-
ध्वस्तद्वैताऽद्वयारिद्वयमयतिमिरापारबोधप्रकाशः ॥ १० ॥
कालः संकलयन्कलाः कलयतु स्रष्टा सृजत्वादरा-
दाज्ञायाः परतन्त्रतामुपगतो मथ्नातु वा मन्मथः ।
[3]क्रीडाडम्बरमम्बराश्रयमिव स्वोल्लेखरेखाक्रमं
देहाद्याश्रयमस्तु वैकृतमहामोहे न पश्यामि किम् ॥ ११ ॥
कः कोऽत्र भोः कवलीकरोमि कः कोत्र भोः सहसा निहन्मि ।
कः कोऽत्र भोः परबोधधामसच्चर्वणोन्मत्ततनुः पिबामि ॥ १२ ॥
भवोत्थभयभङ्गदङ्गदश्रृगालविद्रावणम्
प्रबोधधुरिधीमतामपि सकृद्यदुद्दीपनम्[4] ।
सुधामगहनाटवीविहरणातितृप्तस्युद्गमाद्
अभेदकरिबृंहितं व्यधित रम्यदेवो हरिः ॥ १३ ॥

इत्याचार्याभिनवगुप्तकृता परमार्थद्वादशिका भव्यायास्तुतराम् ।


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१ मरणम् MSS.
२ काशामेतेषु MS., A. काशांह्येतेषु MS., B.
३ क्रीडाम्बर MSS.
४ उद्दीपयन् MSS.

परमार्थचर्चा ।

अर्केन्दुदीपाद्यवभासभिन्नं नाभात्यनिव्याप्ततया ततश्च ।
प्रकाशरूपं तदियत् प्रकाश्यप्रकाशताख्या व्यवहार एव ॥ १ ॥
ज्ञानाद्विभिन्नो न हि कश्चिदर्थस्तत्तत्कृतः संविदि नास्ति भेदः ।
स्वयंप्रकाशाच्छतमैकधाम्नि प्रातिस्विकी नापि विभेदिता स्यात् ॥ २ ॥
इत्थं[1] स्वसंविद्घन एक एव शिवः स विश्वस्य परः प्रकाशः ।
तत्रापि भात्येव विचित्रशक्तौ ग्राह्यगृहीतृप्रविभागभेदः ॥ ३ ॥
भेदः स चायं न ततो विभिन्नः स्वच्छन्दसुस्वच्छतमैकधाम्नः ।
प्रासादहस्त्यश्वपयोदसिन्धुगिर्यादि यद्वन्मणिदर्पणादेः ॥ ४ ॥
आदर्शकुक्षौ[2] प्रतिबिम्बकारि सबिम्बकं स्याद्यदि मानसिद्धम् ।
स्वच्छन्दसंविन्मुकुरान्तराले भावेषु हेत्वन्तरमस्ति नान्यत् ॥ ५ ॥
संविद्घनस्तेन परस्त्वमेव त्वय्येव विश्वानि चकासति द्राक् ।
स्फुरन्ति च त्वन्महसः प्रभावात् त्वमेव चैषां परमेश कर्ता ॥ ६ ॥
इत्थं स्वसंवेदनमादिसिद्धमसाध्यमात्मानमनीशमीशम् ।
स्वशक्तिसंपूर्णमदेशकालं नित्यं विभुं भैरवनाथमीडे ॥ ७ ॥
सद्वृत्तसप्तकमिदं गलितान्यचिन्ताः
सम्यक् स्मरन्ति हृदये परमार्थकामाः ।
ते भैरवीयपरधाम मुहुर्विशन्ति
जानन्ति च त्रिजगतीपरमार्थचर्चाम् ॥ ८ ॥

इति श्रीमदभिनवगुप्तविरचिता परमार्थचर्चा समाप्ता ।



महोपदेशविंशतिकम्

प्रपञ्चोत्तीर्णरूपाय नमस्ते विश्वमूर्तये ।
सदानन्दप्रकाशाय स्वात्मनेऽनन्तशक्तये ॥ १ ॥
त्वं त्वमेवाहमेवाहं त्वमेवासि न चास्म्यहम् ।
अहं त्वमित्युभौ न स्तो यत्र तस्मै नमो नमः ॥ २ ॥
अन्तर्देहे मया नित्यं त्वमात्मा च गवेषितः ।
न दृष्टस्त्वं नचैवात्मा यच्च दृष्टं त्वमेव तत् ॥ ३ ॥
भवद्भक्तस्य संजातभवद्रूपस्य मेऽधुना ।
त्वामात्मरूपं संप्रेक्ष्य तुभ्यं मह्यं नमो नमः ॥ ४ ॥

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१ एवं स्व MS., B
२ आदर्शमध्ये MS., B.

एतद्वचननैपुण्यं यत्कर्तव्येतिमूलया[1]।
भवन्मायात्मनस्तस्य केन कस्मिन् कुतो लयः ॥ ५ ॥
अहं त्वं त्वमहं चेति भिन्नता नावयोः क्वचित्।
समाधिग्रहणेच्छाया भेदस्यावस्थितिर्ह्यसौ ॥ ६ ॥
त्वमहं सोयमित्यादि नूनं तानि सदा त्वयि।
न लभन्ते चावकाशं वचनानि कुतो जगत् ॥ ७ ॥
अलं भेदानुकथया त्वद्भक्तिरसचर्वणात्।
सर्वमेकमिदं शान्तमिति वक्तुं च लज्जते ॥ ८ ॥
त्वत्स्वरूपे जृम्भमाणे त्वं चाहं चाखिलं जगत्।
जाते तस्य तिरोधाने न त्वं नाहं न वै जगत् ॥ ९ ॥
जाग्रत्स्वप्नसुषुप्त्याद्या धारयंश्च निजाः कलाः।
स्वेच्छया भासि नटवन्[2] निष्कलोऽसि च तत्त्वतः ॥ १० ॥
त्वत्प्रबोधात् प्रबोधोस्य त्वन्निद्रातो लयोस्य यत्।
अतस्त्वदात्मकं सर्वं विश्वं सदसदात्मकम् ॥ ११ ॥
जिह्वा श्रान्ता भवन्नाम्नि मनः श्रान्तं भवत्स्मृतौ।
अरूपस्य कुतो ध्यानं निर्गुणस्य च नाम किम् ॥ १२ ॥
पूर्णस्यावाहनं कुत्र सर्वाधारस्य चासनम्।
स्वच्छस्य पाद्यमर्घ्यञ्च शुद्धस्याचमनं कुतः ॥ १३ ॥
निर्मलस्य कुतः स्नानं वस्त्रं विश्वोदरस्य च।
निर्लेपस्य कुतो गन्धो रम्यस्याभरणं कुतः ॥ १४ ॥
निरालम्बस्योपवीतं पुष्पं निर्वासनस्य च।
अघ्राणस्य कुतो धूपश्चक्षुर्हीनस्य दीपकः ॥ १५ ॥
नित्यतृप्तस्य नैवेद्यं ताम्बूलं च कुतो विभोः।
प्रदक्षिणमनन्तस्याऽद्वितीयस्य कुतो नतिः ॥ १६ ॥
स्वयं प्रकाशमानस्य कुतो नीराजनं विभोः।
वेदवाचामवेद्यस्य कुतः स्तोत्रं विधीयते ॥ १७ ॥
अन्तर्बहिश्च पूर्णस्य कथमुद्वासनं भवेत्।
भेदहीनस्य विश्वत्र कथं च हवनं भवेत् ॥ १८ ॥
पूर्णस्य दक्षिणा कुत्र नित्यतृप्तस्य तर्पणम्।
विसर्जनं व्यापकस्याऽप्रत्यक्षस्य क्षमापणम् ॥ १९ ॥
एवमेव परा पूजा सर्वावस्थासु सर्वदा।
ऐक्यबुद्ध्या तु सर्वेशे मनो देवे नियोजयेत् ॥ २० ॥

इति महामाहेश्वराचार्याभिनवगुप्तकृतं महोपदेशविंशतिकम्।

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१ This verse is obscure. It is very difficult to connect "यत्कर्तव्येतिमूलया" with the rest of the verse.

२ नरवत् MS., B.

क्रमस्तोत्रम् ।

अयं दुःखव्रातव्रतपरिगमे पारणविधि-
    र्महासौख्यासारप्रसरणरसे दुर्दिनमिदम् ।
यदन्यन्यक्कृत्या विषमविशिखप्लोषणगुरो-
    र्विभोः स्तोत्रे शश्वत्प्रतिफलति चेतो गतभयम् ॥ १ ॥
विमृश्य स्वात्मानं विमृशति पुनः स्तुत्यचरितम्
    तथा स्तोता स्तोत्रे प्रकटयति भेदैकविषये ।
विमृष्टश्च स्वात्मा निखिलविषयज्ञानसमये
    तदित्थं त्वत्स्तोत्रेऽहमिह सततं यत्नरहितः ॥ २ ॥
अनामृष्टः स्वात्मा न हि भवति भावप्रमितिभाक्
    अनामृष्टः स्वात्मेत्यपि हि न विनाऽऽमर्शनविधेः ।
शिवश्चासौ स्वात्मा स्फुरदखिलभावैकसरस-
    स्ततोऽहं त्वत्स्तोत्रे प्रवणहृदयो नित्यसुखितः ॥ ३ ॥
विचित्रैर्जात्यादिभ्रमणपरिपाटीपरिकरै-
    रवाप्तं सार्वज्ञं हृदय यदयत्नेन भवता ।
तदन्तस्त्वद्बोधप्रसरसरणीभूतमहसि
    स्फुटं वाचि प्राप्य प्रकटय विभोः स्तोत्रमधुना ॥ ४ ॥
विधुन्वानो बन्धाभिमतभवमार्गस्थितिमिमां
    रसीकृत्यानन्तस्तुतिहुतवहप्लोषितभिदाम् ।
विचित्रस्वस्फारस्फुरितमहिमारम्भरभसात्
    पिबन् भावानेतान् वरद मदमत्तोस्मि सुखितः ॥ ५ ॥
भवप्राज्यैश्वर्यप्रथितबहुशक्तेर्भगवतो
    विचित्रं चारित्रं हृदयमधिशेते यदि ततः ।
कथं स्तोत्रं कुर्यादथ च कुरुते तेन सहसा
    शिवैकात्म्यप्राप्तौ शिवनतिरुपायः प्रथमकः ॥ ६ ॥
ज्वलद्रूपं भास्वत्पचनमथ दाहं प्रकटनम्
    विमुच्यान्यद्वह्नेः किमपि घटते नैव हि वपुः ।
स्तुवे संविद्रश्मीन् यदि निजनिजांस्तेन स नुतो
    भवेन्नान्यः कश्चिद् भवति परमेशस्य विभवः ॥ ७ ॥
विचित्रारम्भत्वे गलितनियमे यः किल रसः
    परिच्छेदाभावात् परमपरिपूर्णत्वमसमम् ।
स्वयं भासां योगः सकलभवभावैकमयता
    विरुद्धैर्धर्मौघैः परचितिरनर्घोचितगुणा ॥ ८ ॥
इतीदृक्षै रूपैर्वरद विविधं ते किल वपु-
    र्विभाति स्वांशेऽस्मिन् जगति गतभेदं भगवतः ।

तदेवैतत्स्तोतुं हृदयमथ गीर्बाह्यकरण-
प्रबन्धाश्च स्युर्मे सततमपरित्यक्तरभसः ॥ ९ ॥
[1]तवैवैकस्यान्तः स्फुरितमहसो बोधजलधे-
र्विचित्रोर्मिव्रातप्रसरणरसो यः स्वरसतः ।
त एवामी सृष्टिस्थितिलयमयस्फूर्जितरुचां
शशांकार्काग्नीनां युगपदुदयापायविभवाः ॥ १० ॥
अतश्चित्राचित्रक्रमतदितरादिस्थितिजुषो
विभोः शक्तिः शश्वद् व्रजति न विभेदं कथमपि ।
तदेतस्यां भूमावकुलमिति ते यत्किल पदम्
तदेकाग्रीभूयान्मम हृदयभूर्भैरव विभो ॥ ११ ॥
अमुष्मात् सम्पूर्णात् बत रसमहोल्लाससरसा-
न्निजां शक्तिं भेदं गमयसि निजेच्छाप्रसरतः ।
अनर्घं स्वातंत्र्यं तव तदिदमत्यद्भुतमयीम्
भवच्छक्तिं स्तुन्वन् विगलितभयोहं शिवमयः ॥ १२ ॥
इदन्तावद्रूपं तव भगवतः शक्तिसरसं
क्रमाभावादेव प्रसभविगलत्कालकलनम् ।
मनःशक्त्या वाचाप्यथ करणचक्रैर्बहिरथो
घटाद्यैस्तद्रूपं युगपदधितिष्ठेयमनिशम् ॥ १३ ॥
क्रमोल्लासं तस्यां भुवि विरचयन् भेदकलनाम्
स्वशक्तीनां देव[2] प्रथयसि सदा स्वात्मनि ततः ।
[3]क्रियाज्ञानेच्छाख्यां स्थितिलयमहासृष्टिविभवां
त्रिरूपां भूयासं समधिशयितुं व्यग्रहृदयः ॥ १४ ॥
परा सृष्टिर्लीना हुतवहमयी यात्र विलसत्[4]-
परोल्लासौन्मुख्यं व्रजति शशिसंस्पर्शसुभगा ।
हुताशेन्दुस्फारोभयविभवभाग् भैरवविभो
तवेयं सृष्ट्याख्या मम मनसि नित्यं विलसतात् ॥ १५ ॥
विसृष्टे भावांशे बहिरतिशयास्वादविरसे
यदा तत्रैव त्वं भजसि रभसाद् रक्तिमयताम् ।
तदा रक्ता देवी तव सकलभावेषु ननु माम्
क्रियाद्रक्तापानक्रमघटितगोष्ठीगतघृणम् ॥ १६ ॥
बहिर्वृत्तिं हातुं चितिभुवमुदारां निवसितुं
यदा भावाभेदं प्रथयसि विनष्टोर्मिचपलः ।

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१ तवैकैकस्य MSS.
२ देवः MSS.
३ क्रियाज्ञानेच्छाख्या स्थितिलयमहासृष्टिविभवा त्रिरूपा MSS,
४ विलसेत् MSS.

स्थितेर्नाशं देवी कलयति तदा सा तव विभो
स्थितेः सांसारिक्याः कलयतु विनाशं मम सदा ॥ १७ ॥
जगत्संहारेण प्रशमयितुकामः स्वरभसात्
स्वशंकातंकाख्यं विधिमथ निषेधं प्रथयसि ।
[1]इमं सृष्ट्वेत्थं त्वं पुनरपि च शङ्कां विदलयन्
महादेवी सेयं मम भवभयं संदलयताम् ॥ १८ ॥
विलीने शङ्कौघे सपदि परिपूर्णे च विभवे
गते लोकाचारे गलितविभवे शास्त्रनियमे ।
अनन्तं भोग्यौघं ग्रसितुमभितो लंपटरसा
विभो संसाराख्या मम हृदि भिदांशं प्रहरतु ॥ १९ ॥
तदित्थं देवीभिः सपदि दलिते भेदविभवे
विकल्पप्राणासौ प्रविलसति मातृस्थितिरलम् ।
अतः संसारांशं निजहृदि विसृश्य स्थितिमयी
प्रसन्ना स्यान्मृत्युप्रलयकरणी मे भगवती ॥ २० ॥
तदित्थं ते तिस्रो निजविभवविस्फारणवशा-
दवाप्ताः षट्चक्रं क्रमकृतपदं शक्तय इमाः ।
क्रमादुन्मेषेण प्रविदधति चित्रां भुवि दशा-
मिमाभ्यो देवीभ्यः प्रवणहृदयः स्यां गतभयः ॥ २१ ॥
इमां रुन्धे भूमिं भवभयभिदातंककरणीम्
इमां बोधैकान्तद्रुतिरसमयीं चापि विदधे ।
तदित्थं संबोधद्रुतिमथ विलुप्याशुभतती-
र्यथेष्टं चाचारं भजति लसतात् सा मम हृदि ॥ २२ ॥
क्रियाबुद्ध्यक्षादेः परिमितपदे मानपदवी-
मवाप्तस्य स्फारं निजनिजरुचा संहरति या ।
इयं मार्तण्डस्य स्थितिपदयुजः सारमखिलम्
हठादाकर्षन्ती क्षपतु मम भेदं भवभयात् ॥ २३ ॥
समग्रामक्षालीं क्रमविरहितामात्मनि मुहु-
र्निवेश्यानन्तान्तर्बहलितमहारश्मिनिवहा ।
परा दिव्यानन्दं कलयितुमुदारादरवती
प्रसन्ना मे भूयात् हृदयपदवीं भूषयतु च ॥ २४ ॥
प्रमाणे संलीने शिवपदलसद्वैभववशा-
च्छरीरं प्राणादिर्मितकृतकमातृस्थितिमयः ।
यदा कालोपाधिः प्रलयपदमासादयति ते
तदा देवी यासौ लसति मम सा स्तान्च्छिवमयी ॥ २५ ॥

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१ यमम् MSS.

प्रकाशाख्या संवित् क्रमविरहिता शून्यपदतो
बहिर्लीनात्यन्तं प्रसरति समाच्छादकतया ।
ततोऽप्यन्तःसारे गलितरभसादक्रमतया ।
महाकाली सेयं मम कलयतां कालमखिलम् ॥ २६ ॥
ततो देव्यां यस्यां परमपरिपूर्णस्थितिजुषि
क्रमं विच्छिद्याशु स्थितिमतिरसात्संविदधति[1] ।
प्रमाणं मातारं [2]मितिमथ समग्रं जगदिदम्
स्थितां क्रोडीकृत्य श्रयति मम चित्तं चितिमिमाम् ॥ २७ ॥
अनर्गलस्वात्ममये महेशे तिष्ठन्ति यस्मिन् विभुशक्तयस्ताः ।
तं शक्तिमन्तं प्रणमामि देवं मन्थानसंज्ञं जगदेकसारम् ॥ २८ ॥
इत्थं स्वशक्तिकिरणौघनुतिप्रबन्धान्[3]
आकर्ण्य देव यदि मे व्रजसि प्रसादम् ।
तेनाशु सर्वजनतां निजशासनांशु-
संशान्तिताखिलतमःपटलां विधेयाः ॥ २९ ॥
षट्षष्ठिनामके वर्षे नवम्यामसितेऽहनि ।
मयाऽभिनवगुप्तेन मार्गशीर्षे स्तुतः शिवः ॥ ३० ॥
इति श्री अभिनवगुप्तपादाचार्यकृतं क्रमस्तोत्रं सम्पूर्णम् ॥

भैरवस्तवः

व्याप्तचराचरभावविशेषं चिन्मयमेकमनन्तमनादिम् ।
भैरवनाथमनाथशरण्यं त्वन्मयचित्ततया हृदि वन्दे ॥ १ ॥
त्वन्मयमेतदशेषमिदानीं भाति मम त्वदनुग्रहशक्त्या ।
त्वं च महेश सदैव ममात्मा स्वात्ममयं मम तेन समस्तम् ॥ २ ॥
स्वात्मनि विश्वगते त्वयि नाथे तेन न संसृतिभीतिकथास्ति ।
सत्स्वपि दुर्धरदुःखविमोहत्रासविधायिषु कर्मगणेषु ॥ ३ ॥
अन्तक मां प्रति मा दृशमेनां क्रोधकरालतमां विनिधेहि ।
शङ्करसेवनचिन्तनधीरो भीषणभैरवशक्तिमयोस्मि ॥ ४ ॥
इत्थमुपोढभवन्मयसंविद्दीधितिदारितभूरितमिस्रः ।
मृत्युयमान्तककर्मपिशाचैर्नाथ नमोस्तु न जातु बिभेमि ॥ ५ ॥

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1. According to the post—Nāgeśa grammarians the root "Dadha" cannot be used in active voice. Abhinava, however, here seems to follow the practice of earlier grammarians who maintained "अनुदात्तेत्त्वलक्षणमात्मनेपदमनित्यम् " ।

२. मित MSS.

३. प्रबन्धात् MSS.

प्रोदितसत्यविबोधमरीचिप्रेक्षितविश्वपदार्थसतत्त्वः ।
भावपरामृतनिर्भरपूर्णे त्वय्यहमात्मनि निर्वृतिमेमि ॥ ६ ॥
मानसगोचरमेति यदैव क्लेशदशाऽतनुतापविधात्री[1] ।
नाथ तदैव मम त्वदभेदस्तोत्रपरामृतवृष्टिरुदेति ॥ ७ ॥
शङ्कर सत्यमिदं व्रतदानस्नानतपो भवतापविदारि ।
तावकशास्त्रपरामृतचिन्ता स्यन्दति चेतसि निर्वृतिधाराम् ॥ ८ ॥
नृत्यति गायति हृष्यति गाढं संविदियं मम भैरवनाथ ।
त्वां प्रियमाप्य सुदर्शनमेकं दुर्लभमन्यजनैः समयज्ञम् ॥ ९ ॥
वसुरसपौषे कृष्णदशम्यामभिनवगुप्तः स्तवमिममकरोत् ।
येन विभुर्भवमरुसन्तापं शमयति जनस्य झटिति[2] दयालुः ॥ १० ॥

समाप्तं स्तवमिदमभिनवाख्यं पद्यनवकम्[3] ।

देहस्थदेवताचक्रस्तोत्रम् ।

असुरसुरवृन्दवन्दितमभिमतवरवितरणे निरतम् ।
दर्शनशताग्र्यपूज्यं प्राणतनुं गणपतिं वन्दे ॥ १ ॥
वरवीरयोगिनीगणसिद्धावलिपूजितांघ्रियुगलम् ।
अपहृतविनयिजनार्तिं वटुकमपानाभिधं वन्दे ॥ २ ॥
आत्मीयविषयभोगैरिन्द्रियदेव्यः सदा हृदम्भोजे ।
अभिपूजयन्ति यं तं चिन्मयमानन्दभैरवं वन्दे ॥ ३ ॥
यद्धीबलेन विश्वं भक्तानां शिवपथं भाति ।
तमहमवधानरूपं सद्गुरुममलं सदा वन्दे ॥ ४ ॥
उदयावभासचर्वणलीलां विश्वस्य या करोत्यनिशम् ।
आनन्दभैरवीं तां विमर्शरूपामहं वन्दे ॥ ५ ॥
अर्चयति भैरवं या निश्चयकुसुमैः सुरेशपत्रस्था ।
प्रणमामि बुद्धिरूपां ब्रह्माणीं तामहं सततम् ॥ ६ ॥
कुरुते भैरवपूजामनलदलस्थाऽभिमानकुसुमैर्या ।
नित्यमहंकृतिरूपां वन्दे तां शाम्भवीमम्बाम् ॥ ७ ॥

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1. तनुतामविधाय MS., B.
2. The metre here is apparently defective. We have, however, not corrected it, because this reading is supported by all the MSS., to which we have had access, as well as by the current oral tradition.
3. This "Abhinavākhya padyanavaka" is popularly called "Bhairava Stava".

विदधाति भैरवार्चां दक्षिणदलगा विकल्पकुसुमैर्या ।
नित्यं मनःस्वरूपां कौमारीं तामहं वन्दे ॥ ८ ॥
नैर्ऋतदलगा भैरवमर्चयते शब्दकुसुमैर्या ।
प्रणमामि शब्दरूपां नित्यं तां वैष्णवीं शक्तिम् ॥ ९ ॥
पश्चिमदिग्दलसंस्था हृदयहरैः स्पर्शकुसुमैर्या ।
तोषयति भैरवं तां त्वग्रूपधरां नमामि वाराहीम् ॥ १० ॥
वरतररूपविशेषैर्मारुतदिग्दलनिषण्णदेहा या ।
पूजयति भैरवं तामिन्द्राणीं दृक्तनुं वन्दे ॥ ११ ॥
धनपतिकिसलयनिलया या नित्यं विविधषड्रसाहारैः ।
पूजयति भैरवं तां जिह्वाभिख्यां नमामि चामुण्डाम् ॥ १२ ॥
ईशदलस्था भैरवमर्चयते परिमलैर्विचित्रैर्या ।
प्रणमामि सर्वदा तां घ्राणाभिख्यां महालक्ष्मीम् ॥ १३ ॥
षड्दर्शनेषु पूज्यं षट्त्रिंशत्तत्त्वसंवलितम् ।
आत्माभिख्यं सततं क्षेत्रपतिं सिद्धिदं वन्दे ॥ १४ ॥
संस्फुरदनुभवसारं सर्वान्तः सततसन्निहितम् ।
नौमि सदोदितमित्थं निजदेहगदेवताचक्रम् ॥ १५ ॥

इति देहस्थदेवताचक्रस्तोत्रम् ।

अनुभवनिवेदनम् ।

अन्तर्लक्ष्यविलीनचित्तपवनो योगी यदा वर्तते
दृष्ट्या निश्चलतारया बहिरसौ पश्यन्नपश्यन्नपि ।
मुद्रेयं खलु शाम्भवी भवति सा युष्मत्प्रसादाद् गुरो
शून्याशून्यविवर्जितं भवति यत् तत्त्वं पदं शाम्भवम् ॥ १ ॥
अर्धोद्घाटितलोचनः स्थिरमना नासाग्रदत्तेक्षण-
श्चन्द्रार्कावपि लीनतामुपगतौ त्रिस्पन्दभावान्तरे ।
ज्योतीरूपमशेषबाह्यरहितं चैकं पुमांसं परम्
तत्त्वं तत्पदमेति वस्तु परमं वाच्यं किमत्राधिकम् ॥ २ ॥
शब्दः कश्चन यो मुखादुदयते मन्त्रः स लोकोत्तरः
संस्थानं सुखदुःखजन्मवपुषो यत्कापि मुद्रैव सा ।
प्राणस्य स्वरसेन यत्प्रवहणं योगः स एवाद्भुतः
शाक्तं धाम परं ममानुभवतः किन्नाम न भ्राजते ॥ ३ ॥
मन्त्रः स प्रतिभाति वर्णरचना यस्मिन्न संलक्ष्यते
मुद्रा सा समुदेति यत्र गलिता कृत्स्ना क्रिया कायिकी ।
योगः स प्रथते यतः प्रवहणं प्राणस्य संक्षीयते
त्वद्धामाधिगमोत्सवेषु सुधियां किं किं न नामाद्भुतम् ॥ ४ ॥

इति अनुभवनिवेदनस्तोत्रम् ।

रहस्यपञ्चदशिका ।

ब्राह्मे मुहूर्त्ते भगवत्प्रपत्तिस्ततः समाधिर्नियमोऽथ सान्ध्यः ।
यामौ जपार्चादि ततोऽन्यसत्रं शेपस्तुकालः शिवशेषवृतिः (वृत्ति) ? ॥१॥
आदिमुखा कादिकरा टादिपदा पादिपार्श्वयुङ्मध्या ।
यादिहृदया भगवती संविद्रूपा सरस्वती जयति ॥ २ ॥
फलन्ति चिन्तामणिकामधेनुकल्पद्रुमाः कांक्षितमेव पुंसाम् ।
अप्रार्थिता न प्रचितान्पुमर्थान् पुष्णातु मे मातुरुदारभावः ॥ ३ ॥
यया विना नैव करोति किञ्चिन्न वेत्ति नापीच्छति संविदेशः ।
तस्यै परस्यै जगतां जनन्यै नमः शिवायै शिववल्लभायै ॥ ४ ॥
सदोदिते भगवति सर्वमङ्गले शिवप्रदे शिवहृदयस्थिते शिवे ।
भजन्मनःकुमुदविकासचन्द्रिके द्विजन्मनः कुरु मम खे गतिं परे ॥ ५ ॥
प्रसीद सर्वमङ्गले शिवे शिवस्य वल्लभे ।
उमे रमे सरस्वति त्वमेव देवता परा ॥ ६ ॥
अमे अम्बिके अस्वरूपे अनाख्ये उमे रौद्रि वामे महालक्ष्मि माये ।
परे देवते पञ्चकृत्यैकलोले शिवे भैरवि श्रीमति त्वां प्रपद्ये ॥ ७ ॥
माये विद्ये मातृके मानिनि त्वं काये काये स्पन्दसे चित्कलात्मा ।
ध्यायेयं तां त्वां कथं स्वस्फुरत्तां ध्यायेयं त्वां वाचमन्तर्नदन्तीम् ॥ ८ ॥
त्वग्रुधिरमांसमेदोमज्जास्थिमये सदामये काये ।
माये मज्जयसि त्वं महात्म्यं ते जनानजानानान् ॥ ९ ॥
लोहालेख्यस्थापितान् वीक्ष्य देवान् हा हा हन्तेत्याहुरेकेऽकृतार्थाः ।
देहाहन्ताशालिनां देहभाजां मोहावेशं कं न माया प्रसूते ॥ १० ॥
मायाविलासोदितबुद्धिशून्यकायाद्यहन्ताजनितादशेषात् ।
आयासकादात्मविमर्शरूपात् पायादपायात् परदेवता माम् ॥ ११ ॥
घोरात्मिकां घोरतमामघोरां परापराख्यामपरां परां च ।
विचित्ररूपां शिवयोर्विभूतिं विलोकयन् विस्मयमान आस्ते ॥ १२ ॥
परापरापरापरामरीचिमध्यवर्तिनो ।
न मे ऽभिदाभिदाभिदाभिदासु कश्चिदाग्रहः ॥ १३ ॥
स्फुरति यत्तवरूपमनुत्तरं यदपरं च जगन्मयमम्बिके ।
उभयमेतदनुस्मरतां सतामभयदे ! वरदे ! परदेवते ! ॥ १४ ॥
परमेश्वरि पञ्चकृत्यलीले परसंविन्मयि पार्वति ! प्रसीद ।
पतितं पशुपाशमुद्धरेमं शिशुमाश्वासय शीतलैः कटाक्षैः ॥ १५ ॥
विवर्तते (प्रवर्तते) ? ऽनुवर्तते हि वर्तते च यत्र स-
न्नयं षडध्वडंबरः (सन्निदं षडध्वडंबरं) ? त्वमेव तच्चिदम्बरम् ॥१६॥
अज्ञानामसमर्थानामस्थानाभिनिवेशिनाम् ।
अम्ब त्वं बलमस्माकं शिशूनां शिववल्लभे ॥ १७ ॥

वेदप्रसिद्धाद्विविधप्रभावात् पादप्रभावात्परदेवतायाः ।
छेदप्रदा स्वात्ममहाविभूतेर्भेदप्रथा मे सकला निवृत्ता ॥ १८ ॥

वीरबाधकविपक्षभक्षिणी धीरसाधकसपक्षरक्षिणी ।
साक्षिणी मम सदाधितिष्ठतः साक्षिणी सकलसंविदां परा ॥ १९ ॥

सच्चिदम्ब सकलं त्वदात्मकं त्वत्त उद्भवति लीयते त्वयि ।
भामती भगवती स्वयेच्छया केन नैव वपुषा प्रकाशसे ॥ २० ॥

निर्द्वन्द्वचिद्घननिजात्मधृताध्वषट्के
दोर्द्वन्द्वसंकलितपुस्तकबोधमुद्रे ।
नेत्रैस्त्रिभिः शिखिरवीन्दुमयैर्दयार्द्रैः
मातः शिवं कुरु शिवे शरणागतं माम् ॥ २१ ॥

मुग्धा पुस्तकहस्ता मुग्धेन्दुकलाललाटनेत्रवती ।
शारदशशाङ्कधवला दयामयी कापि देवता जयति ॥ २२ ॥

सत्त्वभूतिनिजमूर्तिसम्भवत्तत्त्वभूतिपुरशालिपालिकाम् ।
हस्तयुग्मधृतपुस्ततूलिकां बालिकां परिचिनोमि तां पराम् ॥ २३ ॥

चन्द्रमुखि चन्द्रधारिणि चन्द्रनिभे चन्द्रमण्डलान्तःस्थे ।
चन्द्राभरणकुटुम्बिनि चन्द्रादित्याग्निलोचने रक्ष ॥ २४ ॥

महा (मही) ? मूलमायोर्ध्वशक्त्यण्डरत्नप्रभाकीर्ण-
सौवर्णपीठाधि (पीणधि) ? रूढा ।
सृजन्ती बहिर्विश्वमन्तश्च संवित् परा देवताहंपरामर्शरूपा ॥ २५ ॥

सौवर्णपीठमारूढां जाग्रतीमग्रपृष्ठयोः ।
चिच्चक्रवर्तिमहिषीं वन्दे तां देवतां पराम् ॥ २६ ॥

सौवर्णसम्पुटकमध्यभुवि प्रविष्टम्
ऊर्ध्वाधराननिपीतविसृष्टसृष्टि ।
सारस्वतं किमपि रत्नमयत्नसिद्धं
जागर्ति यस्य हृदये जगतां स ईष्टे ॥ २७ ॥

यत् सचराचरमिदं तदशेषमिच्छा-
ज्ञानक्रियाभिरनुविध्य यया विसृष्टम् ।
स्वस्मिन्ननुत्तरपदेन्तरहंतयास्ते
सासौ परा त्वमसि शक्तिरुमे शिवस्य ॥ २८ ॥

स्वस्मिन्ननुत्तरविसर्गमये सदन्तः
संविन्मये सकलमेव सदा शिवाद्यम् ।
इच्छादिशक्तिभिरिदं बहिरात्मनासौ
सा त्वं शिवस्य दयिते विसृजस्यजस्रजम् ॥ २९ ॥

या सौ स्फुरस्यखिलशक्त्यविभागमूर्तेः
स्वौजःकृता भगवतः प्रथमा विभक्तिः ।
सत्त्वादिहेतुमखिलस्य पदार्थराशे-
स्तां त्वां सदाम्ब विमृशन् विजयी भवेयम् ॥ ३० ॥

भुक्तिमुक्त्युभयप्राप्तिर्यदिच्छालब्धया यया ।
पुंसां पुण्यकृतां सासौ श्रीरन्तर्वसति स्थिरा ॥ ३१ ॥

मूलाधारमुखोदितोदिततडित्स्फारस्फुरत्तामयी
कालाग्न्यादिशिवान्तचित्ररचनावैचित्र्यलोला सदा ।
लीलापुस्तकलेखिनीधरकरा चिच्चन्द्रबिम्बास्थिता
बाला काचन देवता शिवकथालीलानुकूला परा ॥ ३२ ॥

संविन्मूलालवाला त्रिवलयकलिता बीजशक्त्यात्मगर्भा
या सा सौदामिनीव स्फुरति परशिवज्योतिरङ्कूररूपा ।
सैषा शाखोपशाखोदितकुसुमफलव्याप्तविश्वावकाशा
धीश्रीविश्रान्तभूमिः शरणमुपयतां कल्पनाकल्पवल्लीम् ॥ ३३ ॥

सदंशं चिदंशे चिदंशं मुदंशे मुदंशं निरंशे तुरीये विलाप्य ।
परं शम्भुमेवाविशेद (आविशन्न) ? प्रमेयं
प्रमेयप्रमाणप्रमातृप्रकाशम् ॥ ३४ ॥

दक्षिणं पश्चिमं पूर्वमुत्तरन्तु निरुत्तरम् ।
इदं परं पदं तस्मात् (दे:·········सभापारम्) ? ॥ ३५ ॥

······पालयेत् परमेश्वरीम् ।
अभेदेनाधिशय्यैनां (अतिशय्येन) ? जीवन्मुक्तो भवेज्जनः ॥ ३६ ॥

पूर्वसिद्धान् गुरून् देवान् देवीं नत्वाथ योगिनः ।
इमेऽभिनवगुप्तेन श्लोकाः पञ्चदशोदिताः ॥ ३७ ॥

इति रहस्यपञ्चदशिका

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